Podcast appearances and mentions of Brown V Davenport

In this case the AEDPA and Brect must BOTH be followed.Support the show

Brown v Davenport, (2022), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court. The case concerned whether habeas relief may be granted if the Brecht v Abrahamson test alone is satisfied, or if the application of Chapman v California by the state courts was unreasonable because of AEDPA. The court held that federal courts can not grant habeas relief when state courts have already ruled on a prisoner's claim, unless the situation satisfies the test laid out in Brecht v Abrahamson, and the test laid out in AEDPA. Background In 2008, Ervine Davenport was convicted of first-degree murder. His conviction was challenged because during his trial he had been placed in shackles. His wrists, waist, and ankles were all restrained, but there was a curtain to prevent the jury from seeing the shackles. The state said that although the shackles were unconstitutional, they did not affect the jury's verdict. Michigan's Court of Appeals agreed with the state. The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed, however, after several jurors testified that they had seen the shackles or heard comments about them, and then sent the case back to the lower courts. The lower court again determined that the shackles did not affect the verdict, and the appellate court agreed with the state once again, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied an appeal. Davenport then challenged his conviction in the federal courts. The district court refused to hear the case. He then petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which agreed to hear the case. This appeals court cited the Deck v Missouri decision, and quoted from Holbrook v Flynn: "shackling is inherently prejudicial". The court found that the state had not met the burden of proof necessary to show that the jury was not influenced by the shackling, and provided habeas relief. The state attempted to have the decision stayed, but the court declined. … United States v Vaello Madero, (2022), was a United States Supreme Court case related to the constitutionality of the exclusion of United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico from the Supplemental Security Income program. In an 8 to 1 decision, the Court ruled that as Congress had been granted broad oversight of United States territories by Article Four of the United States Constitution, the exclusion of the territories by Congress from programs like Supplemental Security Income did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Background. The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program is a benefit for older or impaired citizens that are unable to take care of themselves. As established by Congress, the benefits are available to all citizens of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands, but does not cover residents of the other United States territories, including Puerto Rico. Jose Luis Vaello Madero was a recipient of SSI benefits while living in New York, and then moved to Puetro Rico in 2013. He continued to receive SSI benefits, but eventually the government discovered his new residence, terminated the SSI benefits and sought to recover approximately $28,000 he had improperly received while in Puetro Rico. A federal district judge and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that this exclusion violated the equal protection principle of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution's due process clause, which was first established in Bolling v Sharpe.

Davenport, convicted of first-degree murder following a jury trial where he sat shackled at a table with a “privacy screen,” argued that his conviction should be set aside because the Due Process Clause generally forbids such shackling absent “a special need.” On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing; jurors testified that the shackles had not affected their verdict. The federal district court found habeas relief unwarranted under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Sixth Circuit reversed without analyzing the case under AEDPA. The Supreme Court reversed. When a state court has ruled on the merits of a prisoner's claim, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief without applying both the Supreme Court's "Brecht" test and AEDPA. Brecht held that the harmless-error rule for direct appeals was inappropriate for federal habeas review of final state-court judgments. A state prisoner must show that a state court's error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the trial's outcome, AEDPA instructs that if a state court has adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief “unless” the state court's decision was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” presented in the state-court proceeding. The Court rejected Davenport's argument that the AEDPA inquiry represents a logical subset of the Brecht test, so the Sixth Circuit necessarily found that he satisfied AEDPA. AEDPA asks whether every fair-minded jurist would agree that an error was prejudicial, Brecht asks only whether a federal habeas court itself harbors grave doubt about the verdict. The legal materials a court may consult when answering each test also differ. Even assuming that Davenport's claim can survive Brecht, he cannot satisfy AEDPA. Nothing in Supreme Court precedent is inconsistent with the Michigan Court of Appeals' reliance on post-trial testimony from actual jurors. * Credit: Justia US Supreme Court. Available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-826/ --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus-opinions/support

In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the test for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless on habeas review is whether the defendant suffered "actual prejudice." Congress later enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), which prohibits habeas relief on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, orinvolved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Although the Court has held that the Brecht test "subsumes" § 2254(d)(1)'s requirements, the Court declared in Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 267 (2015), that those requirements are still a "precondition" for relief and that a state-court harmlessness determination under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), still retains "significance" under the Brecht test. The question presented is:May a federal habeas court grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the. Brecht test is satisfied, as the Sixth Circuit held, or must the court also find that the state court's Chapman application was unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1), as the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held?★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

October 5, 2021 Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Brown v. Davenport | 10/05/21 | Docket #: 20-826

Brown v. Davenport

A case in which the Court will decide how the “harmless error” standard of review applies when a criminal defendant is seeking federal post-conviction relief.