Supreme Court Opinions

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Medicaid Act's “any qualified provider” provision unambiguously confer a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider?The case was decided on June 26, 2025.The Supreme Court held that Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) of the Medicaid Act does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under 42 U-S-C § 1983. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.Federal statutes create individual rights only in “atypical cases,” and 42 U-S-C § 1983 provides causes of action for deprivation of “rights,” not mere “benefits” or “interests.” To prove an enforceable right, plaintiffs must show the statute clearly and unambiguously uses “rights-creating terms” with “an unmistakable focus” on individuals. This is a “stringent” and “demanding” test that spending-power statutes are especially unlikely to satisfy because spending-power legislation is “much in the nature of a contract” requiring States' voluntary and knowing consent to private suits.Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) lacks the required clear rights-creating language. The provision states that Medicaid plans must “provide that…any individual eligible for medical assistance…may obtain such assistance from any…qualified” provider. This language addresses state duties and may benefit providers and patients, but lacks the clear “rights-creating language” found in the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act provisions upheld in Talevski. Congress knows how to create clear rights, as FNHRA shows by giving nursing-home residents “the right to choose a personal attending physician.” The any-qualified-provider provision contains no such language. The provision's exceptions confirm this reading—States may exclude providers “convicted of a felony” and “determine” which convictions qualify, which makes sense if the provision addresses state duties to the federal government but creates problems if it confers individual rights.Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion arguing that the Court should reexamine more broadly its § 1983 jurisprudence, which, he claimed, bears little resemblance to the statute as originally understood.Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, arguing that the any-qualified-provider provision readily creates an enforceable right under a faithful application of the Court's unambiguous-conferral test. She criticized the majority's requirement that Congress mirror the specific language of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act rather than apply the established test for whether a statute unambiguously confers rights, and she warned that the decision continues a pattern of weakening Reconstruction-era civil rights protections.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provision apply to a defendant whose original sentence was imposed before the Act's enactment, but was later vacated and resentenced after the Act took effect?The case was decided on June 26, 2025. The Supreme Court held that because a sentence “has...been imposed” for purposes of § 403(b) of the First Step Act only if the sentence is extant (i.e., has not been vacated), the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.When Congress employs the present-perfect tense (“has been imposed”), it addresses whether something has continuing relevance to the present, not merely whether it occurred as a historical fact. The present-perfect tense can refer to either “an act, state, or condition that is now completed” or “a past action that comes up to and touches the present,” but in both senses it conveys that the event in question continues to be true or valid. A sentence has been imposed for § 403(b) purposes only if it remains extant—that is, has not been vacated. This interpretation aligns with background legal principles that vacated court orders are void ab initio and lack prospective legal effect.Background principles confirm this interpretation. When interpreting statutes, courts recognize that Congress legislates against certain unexpressed presumptions, including that vacated court orders are treated as though they never occurred. Just as defendants with vacated prior felony convictions are not precluded from possessing weapons under the federal felon-in-possession ban, § 403(b) retroactivity does not exclude those whose prior sentences have been vacated. The statute's use of present-perfect rather than past-perfect tense, especially when adjacent provisions use simple past tense, reinforces that only past sentences with continued validity preclude application of the Act's new penalties.Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, arguing that the present-perfect tense in §403(b) refers to the historical fact of whether a sentence had been imposed as of the Act's enactment date, regardless of subsequent vacatur.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a Texas death-row inmate have standing to sue the state over its refusal to grant access to DNA testing under a law that allows such testing only when the person can demonstrate that exculpatory results would have prevented their conviction?The case was decided on June 26, 2025. The Supreme Court held that Petitioner Ruben Gutierrez has standing to bring his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.Prisoners convicted in state court have a liberty interest in demonstrating their innocence with new evidence under state law. When states create postconviction procedures, they can create rights to other procedures essential to realizing those rights. Under Skinner v Switzer, a prisoner may bring a § 1983 due process claim alleging that a state's DNA testing statute unconstitutionally prevents him from obtaining testing, even though he cannot directly challenge state court denials of his testing motions. To bring such a suit, the prisoner must demonstrate judicial standing to sue.The standing analysis follows Reed v Goertz, which requires three elements. First, Gutierrez adequately alleged an injury: the prosecutor's denial of access to DNA evidence. Second, prosecutor Saenz caused this injury by refusing to release evidence in his custody for testing. Third, if a federal court declares Texas's procedures unconstitutional, that judgment would eliminate Saenz's justification for denying testing, thereby removing the barrier between Gutierrez and the evidence. The declaratory judgment would change the parties' legal status and redress Gutierrez's injury by eliminating the allegedly unlawful basis for the denial.The Fifth Circuit erred in two fundamental ways. First, it improperly focused on the limited declaratory judgment the District Court ultimately issued rather than on Gutierrez's broader complaint. Gutierrez's complaint challenged not just Article 64's limitation to actual innocence claims, but multiple barriers the statute creates—including its virtually insurmountable standard for parties to crimes, its refusal to consider new evidence, and its prohibition on testing solely to challenge death eligibility. Standing depends on the allegations in the complaint, not on the particular relief a district court later grants.Second, the Fifth Circuit wrongly transformed the redressability inquiry into speculation about whether the prosecutor would ultimately provide the evidence. Under Reed, a declaratory judgment need only eliminate the prosecutor's reliance on the challenged provision as a justification for denying testing. The Court rejected the notion that redressability requires certainty about the ultimate outcome. That a prosecutor might find other reasons to deny testing—just as the prosecutor in Reed had multiple grounds for denial—does not defeat standing to challenge specific reasons as unconstitutional. Courts regularly allow plaintiffs to challenge improper legal grounds for discretionary decisions even when the decision-maker might reach the same result for different reasons.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee — who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed — lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?The case was decided on June 20, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not protect former employees who neither hold nor desire a job at the time of an employer's alleged act of discrimination. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.Title 1 of the A-D-A makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against a “qualified individual” based on disability regarding compensation and other employment matters. The statute defines a “qualified individual” as someone who "can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” The present-tense verbs—“holds,” “desires,” and “can perform”—signal that the law protects individuals able to perform a job they currently hold or seek when discrimination occurs, not retirees who neither hold nor desire employment. The statute's definition of “reasonable accommodation,” which includes job restructuring and modifying facilities for employees, reinforces this interpretation by referencing accommodations that make sense only for current employees or job applicants, not retirees.The A-D-A's structure further supports this reading through its examples of discrimination in Section 12112(b), such as “qualification standards” and “employment tests,” which clearly aim to protect job holders and seekers rather than retirees. Additionally, comparing Title 1 with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act reveals that while Title VII protects “employees” without temporal qualification, the A-D-A's use of “qualified individual” linked to present-tense verbs indicates protection for current job holders or seekers only. The Court's precedent in Cleveland v Policy Management Systems Corporation anticipated that someone may fall outside the A-D-A's protections if she can no longer perform the job.Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, expressing concern about litigants changing their arguments after the Court grants certiorari.Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that Title 1's prohibition on disability discrimination should not cease when an employee retires.Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor in parts, arguing that the majority misreads Title 1 by viewing it through “the distorted lens of pure textualism,” incorrectly using the qualified individual definition as a temporal limit it was never designed to be, and thereby rendering meaningless the A-D-A's protections for disabled workers' retirement benefits just when those protections matter most.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?The case was decided on June 20, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not impose the same jurisdictional limitations as the Fourteenth Amendment because the federal government occupies a sovereign sphere dramatically different from that of state governments. While the Fourteenth Amendment's jurisdictional limits protect interstate federalism by ensuring states do not exceed their territorial boundaries as coequal sovereigns, these federalism concerns are inapplicable to the federal government, which possesses both nationwide and extraterritorial authority. The Constitution authorizes the federal government alone to regulate foreign commerce, prosecute offenses against U.S. nationals abroad, and conduct foreign affairs. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment permits a more flexible jurisdictional inquiry commensurate with the federal government's broader sovereign authority than the “minimum contacts” standard required under the Fourteenth Amendment.The PSJVTA represents a permissible exercise of this authority because it narrowly targets only two specific foreign entities that have longstanding, complex relationships with the United States involving terrorism concerns. The statute's jurisdictional predicates—payments to imprisoned terrorists and their families, and activities conducted on U.S. soil—directly implicate important federal policies aimed at deterring terrorism and protecting American citizens. The political branches' coordinated judgment in enacting this legislation warrants judicial deference, particularly given the statute's limited scope applying only to ATA cases and its clear notice to the PLO and PA that specified conduct would subject them to U.S. jurisdiction. Even assuming a reasonableness inquiry applies under the Fifth Amendment, the PSJVTA satisfies it given the federal government's compelling interest in providing a forum for terrorism victims, the plaintiffs' interest in obtaining relief, and the absence of any unfair burden on these sophisticated international organizations that have litigated in U.S. courts for decades.Justice Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Gorsuch as to Part II, arguing that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause imposes no territorial limits on the federal government's power to extend federal jurisdiction beyond the nation's borders.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Do the fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge the EPA's approval of California regulations that require automakers to manufacture more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles?The case was decided on June 20, 2025.The Supreme Court held that fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of California regulations that require automakers to manufacture more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles because invalidating the regulations would likely redress their monetary injuries from decreased fuel sales. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.The California regulations force automakers to limit average greenhouse-gas emissions across their vehicle fleets and manufacture a certain percentage of electric vehicles, thereby reducing demand for gasoline and other liquid fuels. Article III standing requires showing injury in fact, causation, and redressability—meaning the plaintiff must demonstrate actual harm caused by the defendant that judicial relief would likely fix. When government regulation of one business predictably causes downstream economic injuries to linked businesses, commonsense economic principles support finding that invalidating the regulation would likely redress those injuries by removing the regulatory impediment to the injured party's sales.Record evidence confirms that invalidating the regulations would likely redress the fuel producers' injuries, including: California's own estimates showing the regulations would cause substantial reductions in gasoline demand exceeding $10 billion by 2030; California's statements that the regulations are “critical” for emissions reductions and that without them fewer electric vehicles would be sold; EPA's affirmation that California “needs” these standards; and five automakers' intervention predicting that absent the regulations, competitors would sell fewer electric vehicles to gain market advantage. The Court rejected arguments that fuel producers needed expert affidavits or declarations from automakers to establish redressability, explaining that requiring such evidence would improperly make standing depend on alignment between plaintiffs and regulated third parties.Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court should have vacated and remanded for the D.C. Circuit to reconsider based on corrected facts about when the regulations expire.Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion arguing the Court applies standing doctrine inconsistently by accepting commonsense inferences for business plaintiffs while demanding more evidence from civil rights plaintiffs.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: When revoking supervised release and imposing a prison sentence, may a district court consider the sentencing factors in 18 U-S-C § 3553(a)(2)(A)—namely, “the seriousness of the offense,” “promoting respect for the law,” and “just punishment”—even though these factors are not explicitly referenced in the supervised release statute?The case was decided on June 20, 2025.The Supreme Court held that in deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release, a district court may not consider the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, or provide just punishment for the offense when revoking supervised release. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.When determining whether to revoke supervised release, district courts must consider eight of the ten general sentencing factors listed in 18 U-S-C § 3553(a). The statute specifically excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribution for the defendant's underlying criminal offense. This omission creates a strong negative inference under the well-established principle that expressing certain items in a list excludes others not mentioned. The statutory structure reinforces this interpretation, as neighboring provisions governing other types of sentences explicitly require courts to consider all § 3553(a) factors, while the supervised release provisions uniquely exclude retribution.This exclusion aligns with supervised release's rehabilitative purpose in the criminal justice system. Unlike fines, probation, and imprisonment, which serve as primary punishments, supervised release provides postconfinement assistance to ease defendants' transition back into society. Courts must therefore focus on forward-looking sentencing goals—deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—rather than backward-looking retribution. District courts may consider the nature and circumstances of the original offense only as they relate to these permissible purposes, not as grounds for additional punishment based on the offense's seriousness.Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that courts should not consider retribution for any purpose in supervised release proceedings.Justice Jackson authored a concurring opinion, agreeing with the outcome but criticizing the majority's discussion of what constitutes “offense” as unnecessary and confusing.Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, arguing that the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) merely makes its consideration discretionary rather than forbidden and warning that the majority's interpretation creates impractical requirements for sentencing judges.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Hobbs Act require a federal district court to accept the Federal Communication Commission's legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act?The case was decided on June 20, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Hobbs Act does not preclude judicial review of an agency's statutory interpretation in district court enforcement proceedings, and district courts must independently determine whether the agency's interpretation is correct under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.Courts may grant pre-enforcement review of agency orders through three types of statutes: those that expressly preclude subsequent judicial review in enforcement proceedings (like the Clean Water Act), those that expressly authorize review in both contexts, and those that remain silent on enforcement proceedings (like the Hobbs Act). The Hobbs Act falls into the third category, which triggers a default rule allowing district courts to independently assess agency interpretations. The Administrative Procedure Act codifies this presumption of judicial review, stating that “agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement” unless prior review was adequate and exclusive. The phrase “determine the validity” in the Hobbs Act refers specifically to entering declaratory judgments in pre-enforcement proceedings, not to the broader process of evaluating an agency interpretation's correctness in enforcement actions.The Emergency Price Control Act precedent from Yakus v United States does not control because that wartime statute contained two provisions working together: exclusive jurisdiction language plus an express prohibition against other courts considering validity. Congress chose not to include this second, prohibitive provision when enacting the Hobbs Act six years later, demonstrating its intent not to preclude enforcement-stage review. Practical concerns about potential court disagreements do not override statutory text and administrative law principles, as circuit splits followed by Supreme Court review represent the ordinary judicial process. Requiring all potentially affected parties to challenge every agency order within 60 days or lose their rights would be impractical and unfair, particularly for entities that did not exist when orders issued or had no reason to anticipate future enforcement proceedings.Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that the Hobbs Act's grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” to appellate courts to “determine the validity” of agency orders plainly precludes district courts from making such determinations in enforcement proceedings.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a Tennessee law restricting certain medical treatments for transgender minors violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment?The case was decided on June 18, 2025.   The Supreme Court held that Tennessee's law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.First, the Equal Protection Clause does not require heightened scrutiny because Tennessee's law does not classify on any bases that warrant such review. The law contains only two classifications: one based on age (allowing treatments for adults but not minors) and another based on medical use (permitting puberty blockers and hormones for certain conditions but not for treating gender dysphoria). Classifications based on age or medical use receive only rational basis review—the most deferential standard of constitutional review. The law does not classify based on sex because it prohibits healthcare providers from administering these treatments to any minor for the excluded diagnoses, regardless of the minor's biological sex. When properly understood as regulating specific combinations of drugs and medical indications, the law treats all minors equally: none may receive these treatments for gender dysphoria, but minors of any sex may receive them for other qualifying conditions like precocious puberty or congenital defects.The law satisfies rational basis review because Tennessee's legislature had reasonable grounds for its restrictions. The state found that these treatments for gender dysphoria carry risks including irreversible sterility, increased disease risk, and adverse psychological consequences, while minors lack the maturity to understand these consequences and many express later regret. Tennessee also determined that the treatments are experimental with unknown long-term effects, and that gender dysphoria can often be resolved through less invasive approaches. Under rational basis review, courts must uphold laws if there are any reasonably conceivable facts supporting the classification. States have wide discretion in areas of medical and scientific uncertainty, noting that recent reports from health authorities in England and other countries have raised similar concerns about the evidence supporting these treatments for minors.Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, arguing that Bostock v Clayton County (in which the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act's prohibition on discrimination because of sex includes discrimination based on transgender identity or sexual orientation) should not apply to Equal Protection Clause analysis and criticizing deference to medical experts who lack consensus and have allowed political ideology to influence their guidance on transgender treatments for minors.Justice Barrett authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, arguing that transgender individuals do not constitute a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause because they lack the “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics” of a “discrete group” and because suspect class analysis should focus on a history of de jure (legal) discrimination rather than private discrimination.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can retailers who would sell a new tobacco product seek judicial review of the FDA's denial of a manufacturer's marketing application under the Tobacco Control Act?The case was decided on June 20, 2025. The Supreme Court held that the Tobacco Control Act's provision that “any person adversely affected” by the FDA's denial of a marketing application may seek judicial review extends to retailers who would sell the new tobacco product, not just the manufacturers who applied for approval. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.The phrase “adversely affected” is a term of art in administrative law that the Court has consistently interpreted broadly. When Congress uses variations of this phrase across different statutes, the Court presumes it carries the same meaning as in the Administrative Procedure Act—covering anyone “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.” Congress reinforced this broad interpretation by using “any person” rather than limiting review to “the applicant.” The Court's precedents from other contexts, including employment discrimination and fair housing cases, confirm that “adversely affected” encompasses more than just the direct recipient of agency action. Retailers face a direct, significant impact from denial orders because they lose the opportunity to profit from selling the product and face criminal penalties if they sell it without authorization.The statutory structure confirms Congress intended different scopes for different provisions. While the Act limits challenges to withdrawal of existing approvals to only “the holder of the application,” it uses the broader “any person adversely affected” language for initial denials. This deliberate use of materially different terms creates a presumption that Congress intended different meanings. The FDA's arguments focusing on the application process and confidentiality provisions cannot override the plain language Congress chose for the judicial review provision.Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, arguing that retailers fall outside the statute's zone of interests because the premarket approval scheme involves only manufacturers and the FDA, with no mechanism for retailer participation.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Should challenges by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Standard program be heard exclusively in the U-S Court of Appeals for the D-C Circuit because the agency's denial actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”?The case was decided on June 18, 2025.The Supreme Court held that EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions from renewable fuel requirements must be challenged in the D-C Circuit because they are locally applicable actions based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.The Clean Air Act establishes a tripartite venue system for reviewing EPA actions. “Nationally applicable” EPA actions must be challenged exclusively in the D-C Circuit, while “locally or regionally applicable” actions ordinarily belong in regional courts of appeals. However, locally or regionally applicable actions that are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” must be reviewed in the D-C Circuit if EPA finds and publishes that such basis exists. To identify the relevant “action” for venue purposes, courts must look to the specific statutory authority EPA is exercising rather than how EPA packages its decisions. Each EPA denial of an individual refinery's exemption petition constitutes its own “action” because the Clean Air Act allows each small refinery to petition EPA separately and requires EPA to act on each petition. An action is “nationally applicable” if it applies on its face throughout the entire country; alternatively, it is “locally or regionally applicable” if it applies only to particular places. EPA's denial of a single refinery's exemption petition applies only to that specific refinery in a particular location, making such denials paradigmatically locally or regionally applicable actions.The “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies because EPA's statutory interpretation and economic theory formed the core basis for its denials. A “determination” refers to EPA's justifications for taking action, and determinations have nationwide “scope” if they apply throughout the country as a legal matter or nationwide “effect” if they apply as a practical matter. An EPA action is “based on” such a determination only if that determination lies at the core of the agency action and forms the primary explanation for EPA's decision—requiring more than but-for causation. EPA's interpretation of “disproportionate economic hardship” and its RIN passthrough theory constitute clear determinations of nationwide scope because they apply generically to all refineries regardless of location. These determinations formed the core basis for EPA's denials because EPA used them to reach a presumptive resolution to deny all petitions, then considered refinery-specific factors only to confirm it had no reason to depart from this presumptive disposition. Where EPA relies on determinations of nationwide scope or effect to reach a presumptive resolution, those determinations qualify as the primary driver of its decision, making EPA's confirmatory review of refinery-specific facts merely peripheral by comparison.Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, arguing that the Clean Air Act's substantive provisions do not call for EPA to make determinations of nationwide scope or effect when acting on individual small refinery hardship petitions, and that the majority's new test will make simple venue questions unnecessarily difficult and expensive to resolve.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?The case was decided on June 18, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial on Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that falls under the Seventh Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.PLRA exhaustion operates as a standard affirmative defense subject to the usual practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The usual practice requires factual disputes regarding legal claims to go to a jury, even when a judge could ordinarily resolve such questions independently. Because Congress legislates against the backdrop of established common-law adjudicatory principles, and because the PLRA remains silent on whether judges or juries should resolve exhaustion disputes, this silence constitutes strong evidence that courts should follow the usual practice of sending factual disputes to juries when they are intertwined with the merits.At the time Congress enacted the PLRA in 1996, well-established precedent required that factual disputes intertwined with Seventh Amendment claims go to juries. Two lines of cases support this principle. First, in cases involving both legal and equitable claims, Beacon Theatres established that judges may not resolve equitable claims first if doing so could prevent legal claims from reaching a jury, because judicial discretion must preserve jury trial rights wherever possible. Second, in subject matter jurisdiction cases like Smithers v Smith and Land v Dollar, courts may not resolve factual disputes when those disputes are intertwined with the merits, as this would risk deciding the controversy's substance without ordinary trial procedures, including the right to a jury. When the PLRA was enacted, the usual federal court practice across various contexts involved resolving factual disputes intertwined with the merits at the merits stage itself.Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh, arguing that the majority's statutory interpretation contravenes basic principles because the PLRA's silence cannot confer a jury trial right, and that the jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment does not depend on factual overlap between threshold issues and the merits.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered these issues:1. Can a nonparty challenge a federal agency's “final order” under the Hobbs Act's judicial review provision? 2. Do federal nuclear laws allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private companies to store spent nuclear fuel at off-reactor sites?The case was decided on June 18, 2025.The Supreme Court held that a facility to store spent nuclear fuel at a private off-site location requires a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and only parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding may obtain judicial review of the licensing decision under the Hobbs Act. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.The Hobbs Act provides that any “party aggrieved” by a Commission licensing order may seek judicial review in federal court. The Atomic Energy Act establishes how one becomes a party to a Commission licensing proceeding: a person must either be the license applicant or successfully intervene by requesting a hearing and being admitted as a party by the Commission. Simply submitting comments on a draft environmental impact statement does not confer party status, just as filing an amicus brief in court does not make one a party to the case. When the Commission denies a petition to intervene, that decision itself is subject to judicial review, but the denied petitioner cannot later challenge the underlying licensing decision.The narrow exception for ultra vires review—where an agency acts entirely outside its delegated powers—does not apply here. This exception requires agency action that violates a specific statutory prohibition, not merely a disagreement about statutory interpretation. Additionally, ultra vires review is unavailable when adequate statutory review exists, as it does here through the ability to appeal intervention denials and, for successful intervenors, to challenge final licensing orders.Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, arguing that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act explicitly prohibits storage of spent nuclear fuel anywhere except at reactor sites or federally owned facilities, and that Texas and Fasken qualified as parties under the Hobbs Act because they participated in the environmental review portion of the NRC's licensing proceeding.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have exclusive jurisdiction to review an Environmental Protection Agency action that affects only one state or region, simply because the EPA published that action alongside actions affecting other states in a single Federal Register notice?The case was decided on June 18, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act requires that EPA state implementation plan (SIP) disapprovals be reviewed in regional circuit courts rather than the D-C Circuit when they are "locally or regionally applicable" actions not based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-2 majority opinion of the Court.The Court applied a two-step framework established in EPA v Calumet Shreveport Refining to determine proper venue under the Clean Air Act's venue provision. First, courts must identify the relevant EPA “action” and determine whether it is “nationally applicable” or “locally or regionally applicable.” An “action” under the statute means a particular exercise of EPA authority undertaken pursuant to a particular Clean Air Act provision, determined by reference to the underlying statutory provision rather than how EPA presents its decision. Here, EPA's disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's state implementation plans constitute separate “actions” because the Clean Air Act treats individual SIP approvals and disapprovals as discrete actions under Section 7410. Each SIP disapproval applies only to the specific state that proposed the plan, making them “locally or regionally applicable” actions—the prototypical example of such actions under the statute.Because the SIP disapprovals are locally or regionally applicable, the Court proceeded to the second step: determining whether the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies to require D-C Circuit review. This exception requires that EPA's action be “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” and that EPA find and publish this basis. Although EPA made the required finding, the Court held that EPA's disapprovals were not actually based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. The exception applies only when “a justification of nationwide breadth is the primary explanation for and driver of EPA's action.” Here, EPA's disapprovals resulted from predominantly fact-intensive, state-specific analysis of each SIP's contents, producing unique lists of deficiencies for each state. The four nationwide determinations EPA cited—including use of updated modeling and a 1% contribution threshold—were merely analytical tools that aided EPA's review rather than primary drivers of the disapprovals.Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, agreeing with the judgment but following a different analytical path as explained in their dissenting opinion in a companion case, Environmental Protection Agency v Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) apply to all second habeas petitions, or only specific types of second petitions?The case was decided on June 12, 2025.The Supreme Court held that when a district court enters judgment on a first federal habeas petition, any subsequent habeas filing qualifies as a “second or successive application” subject to the strict requirements of §2244(b), regardless of whether the first petition is pending on appeal. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) establishes significant procedural barriers for second or successive habeas applications. These restrictions prohibit relitigating previously denied claims and permit new claims only when they rely on new retroactive constitutional law or present previously undiscoverable facts establishing innocence. Additionally, petitioners cannot file successive applications directly with the district court but must first obtain authorization from the court of appeals after making a prima facie showing that their petition satisfies one of §2244(b)(2)'s narrow exceptions. The phrase “second or successive application” constitutes a term of art that applies to filings seeking adjudication of federal claims on the merits, not merely to all filings made second in time.The entry of final judgment, not the pendency of appeal, marks the dividing line between first and second or successive habeas applications. While amended petitions filed before judgment do not trigger §2244(b), and Rule 59(e) motions represent a limited continuation of the original proceeding that merges into the final judgment, new habeas filings submitted after judgment constitute second or successive applications even during appeal. This rule advances AEDPA's purposes of conserving judicial resources, reducing piecemeal litigation, and lending finality to state court judgments. Allowing petitioners to file unlimited new applications during appellate review would encourage inefficiency and make it difficult to produce a single final judgment for appeal. Historical habeas doctrine before AEDPA provides no clear guidance, as courts inconsistently treated new filings during pending appeals.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a proceeding under 26 U-S-C § 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes become moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding?The case was decided on June 12, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under 26 U-S-C §6330 to adjudicate disputes between a taxpayer and the IRS once the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.Section 6330 of the Internal Revenue Code grants taxpayers the right to a hearing before the IRS can levy (seize and sell) a taxpayer's property to collect unpaid taxes. At this hearing, a taxpayer can raise issues about the levy, including the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability, and the appeals officer makes a “determination” about whether the levy may proceed. The law then permits review of this “determination” by the Tax Court. The Tax Court's jurisdiction is strictly limited to reviewing the determination whether a levy may go forward, not every dispute considered at the hearing. If there is no longer a proposed or ongoing levy—for example, because the taxpayer's liability has been zeroed out during the pendency of the appeal—there is no determination left to review, and thus, no case or controversy for the Tax Court to resolve under §6330.The reasoning rests on several points: (1) The statutory text and structure focus the collection due process hearing and subsequent Tax Court review on the levy alone; (2) The default rule in tax litigation is that challenges to tax liability must proceed as refund suits after payment, except where specifically authorized exceptions, like the collection due process review, apply; and (3) The statute does not authorize the Tax Court to issue refunds or declaratory judgments unrelated to stopping a levy. Therefore, after the IRS drops the levy because the tax debt has been satisfied, any continuing disputes about liability or overpayment must proceed through a refund suit in district court, not in the Tax Court under §6330.Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Tax Court retains jurisdiction over all issues addressed in the IRS's determination—including disputes about underlying tax liability—even after a levy is abandoned, and that stripping jurisdiction in these circumstances creates opportunities for the IRS to evade judicial review and leaves taxpayers without meaningful remedies for erroneous IRS actions.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: When disabled combat veterans claim past-due compensation, should the military use the CRSC statute's rules to calculate how far back they can be paid, or should it use the Barring Act's six-year limit?The case was decided on June 12, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the statute that provides combat-related special compensation (CRSC) to disabled veterans establishes its own settlement process for claims, which supersedes the Barring Act's default six-year statute of limitations for most claims against the federal government. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.In the context of government claims, “settling” a claim means determining whether the claim is valid and, if so, computing the amount the claimant is owed. Congress does not need to use explicit wording such as the term “settle” to establish this authority; it is enough if, taken as a whole, the statute authorizes an agency to decide both whether a person is entitled to payment and how much payment is due. The CRSC statute gives the relevant military secretary the power to determine eligibility and the exact compensation owed based on statutory formulas. By establishing a comprehensive, self-contained scheme that charges the secretary with both validating claims and setting the payment amount, the statute creates a separate claim-settling process.Because the CRSC statute authorizes the relevant officials to determine both entitlement and the amount of CRSC payments, the law functions as “another law” with its own settlement mechanism under the Barring Act. As a result, the default 6-year limitation period of the Barring Act does not apply to CRSC claims, regardless of whether the CRSC statute contains its own explicit time restriction. This ruling clarifies that Congress can displace default government claim procedures—including limitations periods—when it provides a comprehensive statutory process for resolving specific claims, as it did for CRSC benefits.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Must a party who files a notice of appeal during the period between when their original appeal deadline expired and when the court reopens their time to appeal file a second notice after the reopening is granted?The case was decided on June 12, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require a timely-filed notice of appeal, and a notice filed after the original deadline but before a court grants reopening relates forward to the date reopening is granted, making a second notice unnecessary. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.When civil litigants miss appeal deadlines, federal law provides two exceptions: courts may extend the deadline for excusable neglect or good cause, or reopen the appeal period when a party entitled to notice does not receive it within 21 days of the judgment. The reopening provision creates a new 14-day appeal window starting from the court's reopening order. While a notice filed after this 14-day period cannot confer jurisdiction, a notice filed before reopening is granted is merely premature rather than late. Congress legislated against established common-law principles that premature but adequate notices of appeal relate forward to the entry of the document making an appeal possible. For over a century, courts have applied this principle to avoid dismissing appeals on technicalities when no doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, and to which court.The statute's silence on pre-reopening notices means Congress expected the longstanding relation-forward rule to continue applying. Requiring a second notice after reopening would serve no purpose beyond “empty paper shuffling” when the original notice already provided clear notice of the intent to appeal. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure support this interpretation, as Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4) codify the principle that premature notices should relate forward when they do not prejudice opposing parties. The 1993 amendments specifically eliminated restrictions on relation-forward to avoid creating traps for litigants, especially pro se litigants who often fail to file second notices. Rule 4(a)(6)'s silence on relation-forward does not create a negative implication prohibiting it, particularly given the Rules' emphasis on securing just determinations and disregarding errors that do not affect substantial rights.Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, arguing the same result could be reached without relation-forward principles by treating the filing as a motion with an attached proposed notice of appeal.Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, arguing the case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted because the Rules Committee is already studying this issue.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Do the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education?The case was decided on June 12, 2025.The Supreme Court held that Schoolchildren bringing claims related to their education under either Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are not required to make a heightened showing of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.When the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was amended in 1986, Congress explicitly declared that nothing in the IDEA “shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under” the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, or other federal laws protecting disabled children's rights. This provision directly repudiates judicial attempts to create special barriers for educational discrimination claims. The Eighth Circuit's rule requiring schoolchildren to prove “bad faith or gross misjudgment”—rather than the standard deliberate indifference required in other disability contexts—artificially limits disabled students' ability to vindicate their rights under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Neither statute's text suggests that educational services claims deserve different treatment than other disability discrimination claims. Both laws use expansive language applying protections to “any person” alleging discrimination, without distinction based on the type of claim.The heightened standard originated in 1982 when the Eighth Circuit attempted to “harmonize” the IDEA with the Rehabilitation Act, reasoning that courts should defer to educators unless they departed grossly from professional standards. This Court made a similar harmonization attempt in 1984, holding the IDEA was the exclusive remedy for educational claims, but Congress swiftly overturned that decision. The Eighth Circuit's continued application of its heightened standard conflicts with Congress's clear directive that the IDEA does not limit other federal antidiscrimination laws. By imposing a higher burden of proof for educational claims compared to other disability discrimination contexts, courts effectively read the IDEA as restricting the independent rights and remedies that Title II and Section 504 provide to disabled children.Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, suggesting the Court should consider in a future case whether intent to discriminate must be proven for all ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, not just educational ones.Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, emphasizing that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require no showing of improper purpose or animus because discrimination against people with disabilities often results from thoughtlessness rather than malice.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Must plaintiffs prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?The case was decided on June 5, 2025.The Supreme Court ruled that the FSIA itself provides the sole basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign states and their instrumentalities, without the need to establish "minimum contacts" under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court emphasized that the FSIA's provisions govern the extent to which foreign states can be sued in U.S. courts, and that the statute's specific rules supersede general constitutional principles regarding personal jurisdiction.This decision clarifies that when a foreign state or its agency is subject to suit under the FSIA, the standard for personal jurisdiction is determined by the FSIA's provisions, not by the constitutional "minimum contacts" test typically applied in domestic cases.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a state violate the First Amendment's religion clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state's criteria for religious behavior?The case was decided on June 5, 2025. In a unanimous decision on June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission, affirming that the Catholic Charities Bureau (CCB) is entitled to an exemption from Wisconsin's unemployment insurance tax. The Court held that the state's refusal to grant this exemption violated the First Amendment by discriminating against religious organizations that do not engage in overt religious activities.Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion, emphasizing that Wisconsin's approach improperly favored organizations that proselytize or serve only co-religionists, thereby violating the principle of government neutrality in religious matters. The Court noted that CCB's mission, while providing secular services such as housing and job training, is rooted in Catholic teachings and operates under the auspices of the Catholic Diocese of Superior. The decision underscores that religious organizations cannot be denied exemptions based solely on the secular nature of their services.This ruling aligns with the Court's broader trend of expanding religious liberties and may have implications for other religiously affiliated organizations seeking similar exemptions.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard apply to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint?The case was decided on June 5, 2025.The Supreme Court held that Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment standard can apply.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a plaintiff who belongs to a majority group need to demonstrate “background circumstances suggesting that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?The case was decided on June 5, 2025.The Supreme Court held that In a unanimous decision on June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Ames v Ohio Department of Youth Services, holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on sexual orientation without imposing a heightened evidentiary standard for plaintiffs from majority groups. The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision, which had required Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, to demonstrate "background circumstances" suggesting that her employer discriminated against the majority group. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, writing for the Court, emphasized that Title VII's protections apply equally to all individuals, regardless of group membership. The ruling allows Ames's discrimination claim to proceed in lower courts.This decision clarifies that plaintiffs alleging discrimination under Title VII need not meet additional burdens based on their majority status, thereby potentially broadening the scope for future employment discrimination claims.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can U.S. gun manufacturers be held liable for violence in Mexico under theories of proximate causation and aiding and abetting, based on their domestic production and sale of firearms that are later trafficked to Mexican cartels?The case was decided on June 5, 2025.In a unanimous decision on June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of American gun manufacturers, including Smith & Wesson, dismissing a lawsuit filed by the Mexican government. Mexico had accused the companies of facilitating illegal firearms trafficking that contributed to cartel violence within the country.The Court's opinion, authored by Justice Elena Kagan, emphasized that the 2005 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) provides broad immunity to gun manufacturers against lawsuits arising from the criminal misuse of their products. While PLCAA includes an exception for cases where a manufacturer knowingly violates federal or state laws related to firearm sales or marketing, the Court found that Mexico's allegations did not meet this threshold. Specifically, Mexico failed to demonstrate that the manufacturers knowingly aided or abetted illegal trafficking beyond lawful commerce practices.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the National Environmental Policy Act require an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority?The case was decided on May 29, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to consider the environmental effects of federal projects by preparing a detailed environmental impact statement (E-I-S), but it does not impose substantive limits on agencies' decisions. NEPA only applies to the environmental consequences of the proposed project itself, not to impacts from future or geographically separate projects that the proposed project might cause. The Surface Transportation Board complied with NEPA by addressing the environmental effects of constructing and operating an 88-mile freight railroad in Utah. NEPA did not require the Board to evaluate environmental impacts from increased oil drilling in the Uinta Basin or increased oil refining along the Gulf Coast—both of which were separate activities outside the Board's regulatory control. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-3 majority opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Amy Coney Barrett.NEPA's role is procedural: it ensures agencies and the public are informed about potential environmental effects but does not direct agencies to reject projects with environmental downsides. Courts reviewing an E-I-S must apply a “rule of reason” and defer to the agency's decisions about the scope and detail of environmental analysis, recognizing that such decisions depend on scientific, technical, and policy judgments that fall within the agency's expertise. Agencies have discretion to omit analysis of speculative or weakly connected effects—particularly when those effects depend on future decisions by other entities or fall under the authority of other regulators. The Board's choice not to analyze upstream drilling or downstream refining effects was reasonable because those were not part of the project under review and because the Board lacks the authority to control such activities.A mere possibility that a project might lead to additional development does not impose an obligation under NEPA to assess all environmental impacts of hypothetical, unrelated projects. Even if a project's effects are foreseeable, NEPA does not make one agency responsible for evaluating the far-reaching environmental costs of others' conduct unless those effects are directly caused by the agency's decision and fall within its regulatory scope. Therefore, the Board's approval of the railway project, based on an E-I-S that focused on the rail line itself, satisfied NEPA's requirements.Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, agreeing that the Board was not responsible for assessing the environmental effects of oil production because it lacked authority to regulate those downstream and upstream activities.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can deception to induce a commercial exchange constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme?The case was decided on May 22, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the fraudulent-inducement theory is consistent with the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U-S-C §1343, and does not require proof of economic loss to the victim. The Court affirmed the convictions of Stamatios Kousisis and Alpha Painting and Construction Co. for wire fraud, finding that their scheme to use a disadvantaged business as a pass-through entity to secure government contracts involved material misrepresentations to obtain money, satisfying the statute's requirements. The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that a fraud conviction requires intent to cause economic loss, clarifying that §1343 focuses on schemes to obtain money or property through deception, not on the victim's net financial harm. The ruling resolved a circuit split, affirming that fraudulent inducement is a valid basis for wire fraud convictions when it targets traditional property interests.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in A.A.R.P. v Trump.  The case was decided on May 16, 2025.To summarize, the President invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to remove Venezuelan nationals identified as members of the Tren de Aragua (T-d-a), a designated foreign terrorist organization. Two detainees, along with a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas, sought injunctive relief against their summary removal under the AEA. The detainees were being held in U.S. detention facilities and were notified of their imminent removal.The District Court denied the detainees' motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against their removal. The detainees then moved for an emergency TRO, which was not promptly addressed by the District Court. Consequently, they appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied their motion for an injunction pending appeal, citing insufficient time given to the district court to act. The detainees also applied to the Supreme Court for a temporary injunction.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and found that the Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that the District Court's inaction had the practical effect of refusing an injunction, given the extreme urgency and high risk of irreparable harm faced by the detainees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court emphasized that due process requires adequate notice and time for detainees to seek habeas relief before removal. The Government was enjoined from removing the detainees under the AEA pending further proceedings and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted.

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Barnes v Felix.    In this case, the court considered this issue: Should courts apply the “moment of the threat” doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment?The case was decided on May 15, 2025. In Barnes v Felix, the Supreme Court rejected the “moment-of-threat” doctrine when evaluating excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that this doctrine, which limits analysis to the precise moment an officer perceives a threat, improperly narrows the required inquiry. Instead, courts must consider the “totality of the circumstances,” including relevant events and context leading up to the use of force, to assess whether an officer's actions were objectively reasonable. The Court emphasized that excluding prior events conflicts with the fact-dependent, context-sensitive approach mandated by the Fourth Amendment.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.The case was decided on April 30, 2025.Nick Feliciano, an air traffic controller with the Federal Aviation Administration and a Coast Guard reserve petty officer, was called to active duty in July 2012 under 10 U-S-C §12301(d). He served until February 2017, primarily escorting vessels to and from harbor. Despite his active-duty service, Feliciano did not receive differential pay, which compensates federal civilian employees for the pay gap between their civilian and military salaries when called to active duty during a national emergency.Feliciano sought relief from the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming he was unlawfully denied differential pay. The Board rejected his claim, and Feliciano appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. He argued that under 5 U-S-C §5538(a) and 10 U-S-C §101(a)(13)(B), he was entitled to differential pay because he was called to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency. The Federal Circuit, referencing its decision in Adams v Department of Homeland Security, held that Feliciano needed to show a substantive connection between his service and a particular national emergency, which he failed to do.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision. The Court held that a federal civilian employee called to active duty under "any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency" is entitled to differential pay if the reservist's service coincides temporally with a declared national emergency. The Court determined that no substantive connection between the service and the national emergency is required. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the phrase “entitled… to benefits” include all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received?The case was decided on April 29, 2025.In this case, a group of over 200 hospitals claimed that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) miscalculated their Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) adjustments, which provide additional funding to hospitals treating a high percentage of low-income patients. The dispute centered on the interpretation of the phrase "entitled to supplementary security income (SSI) benefits" under subchapter XVI. The hospitals argued that this phrase should include all patients enrolled in the SSI system at the time of hospitalization, even if they were not entitled to an SSI payment during that month. HHS, however, interpreted it to mean patients who were eligible to receive an SSI payment during the month of hospitalization.The Provider Reimbursement Review Board denied the hospitals' request for additional reimbursement on procedural grounds, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services denied relief on the merits. The District Court rejected the hospitals' claims and granted summary judgment to HHS. The D-C Circuit affirmed, concluding that SSI benefits are about cash payments for needy individuals and that it makes little sense to say individuals are entitled to the benefit in months when they are not eligible for a payment.The Supreme Court of the United States held that an individual is "entitled to SSI benefits" for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligible to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitalization. The Court reasoned that SSI benefits are cash benefits determined on a monthly basis, and eligibility for such benefits is also determined monthly. The Court affirmed the judgment of the D-C Circuit, respecting the specific formula that Congress prescribed for calculating the Medicare fraction.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart under 8 U-S-C § 1229c(d)(1)?The case was decided on April 22, 2025.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

The case involves the detention and removal of Venezuelan nationals believed to be members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. The President issued a proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to detain and remove these individuals. Five detainees and a putative class sought injunctive and declaratory relief against their removal under the Proclamation, initially seeking relief in habeas but later dismissing those claims.The District Court for the District of Columbia issued two temporary restraining orders (TROs) preventing the removal of the named plaintiffs and a provisionally certified class of noncitizens subject to the Proclamation. The court extended the TROs for an additional 14 days. The D.C. Circuit denied the Government's emergency motion to stay the orders, leading the Government to seek vacatur from the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States construed the TROs as appealable injunctions and granted the Government's application to vacate the orders. The Court held that challenges to removal under the AEA must be brought in habeas corpus, as the claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the detainees' confinement and removal. The Court also determined that venue for such habeas petitions lies in the district of confinement, which in this case is Texas, making the District of Columbia an improper venue. The detainees are entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek habeas relief in the proper venue before removal. The application to vacate the District Court's orders was granted, and the TROs were vacated.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a plaintiff state a claim under ERISA's provision prohibiting a plan fiduciary from knowingly engaging in transactions with barred parties, solely by alleging that such a transaction took place?The case was decided on April 17, 2025.The Supreme Court held that To state a claim under Section 1106(a)(1)(C) of ERISA, a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements listed in that provision itself: that a plan fiduciary knowingly caused the plan to engage in a transaction involving goods, services, or facilities with a party in interest. The plaintiff is not required to plead that the transaction does not qualify for an exemption under Section 1108. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.Section 1106(a)(1)(C) establishes a clear, categorical prohibition on certain transactions between a pension plan and a party in interest. ERISA's structure places relevant exemptions, including those for reasonable and necessary services under Section 1108(b)(2)(A), in a separate statutory provision. Because those exemptions are laid out apart from the prohibitions and refer back to conduct already defined as unlawful, they function as affirmative defenses. As a result, plan fiduciaries who wish to invoke an exemption bear the burden of pleading and proving it. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are not obliged to anticipate and refute every possible statutory or regulatory exemption.Reading exemptions as affirmative defenses also aligns with longstanding legal principles and avoids unworkable results. Requiring plaintiffs to negate all exemptions—especially when ERISA includes 21 statutory and hundreds of regulatory exemptions—would be impractical and unfair, particularly because the relevant facts are often in the defendant's possession. Procedural safeguards such as pleading requirements, discovery limits, and Rule 11 sanctions enable federal courts to deter and manage meritless litigation without shifting the pleading burden to plaintiffs. Consequently, only the elements in Section 1106(a)(1)(C) must be pleaded to survive a motion to dismiss.Justice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full and authored a concurrence, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?The case was decided on April 2, 2025.The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, upheld the Second Circuit's ruling that Horn's loss of employment and associated economic damages qualified as injuries to "business or property" under RICO. The majority concluded that the statute permits recovery for economic harms directly resulting from racketeering activities, even if those harms stem from personal injuries. Justice Barrett emphasized that "injured" in the context of RICO simply means "harmed," and thus, economic losses like lost wages are recoverable. citeturn0news12Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson concurred, highlighting that RICO should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. In dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, expressed concern that this interpretation could broaden RICO's scope to include traditional personal injury claims, potentially federalizing state tort law. Justice Clarence Thomas also dissented separately, suggesting the case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Was the Food and Drug Administration's orders denying respondents' applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act?The case was decided on April 2, 2025The Court unanimously held that the FDA's decisions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Specifically, the Court agreed with the FDA's assessment that the manufacturers failed to demonstrate that the benefits of their flavored products to adult smokers outweighed the risks to youth. This ruling reversed a prior decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had found the FDA's denials unwarranted. The Supreme Court's decision underscores the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products, particularly those appealing to younger audiences, in line with public health objectives. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Did the ATF exceed its statutory authority in promulgating its Final Rule purporting to regulate so-called “ghost guns”?The case was decided on March 26, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Gun Control Act of 1968 authorizes the ATF to regulate weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers that can be readily converted into functional firearms. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.  Weapon parts kits qualify as “weapons” under the statute when they contain all necessary components to build a gun and their intended function is clear. Everyday language permits describing incomplete objects by their intended use, just as a disassembled rifle remains a “weapon.” The statute reinforces this understanding by treating starter guns as firearms even though they require modification. A kit like Polymer80's “Buy Build Shoot,” which can be assembled in about 20 minutes using common tools, meets the law's definition because it can be “readily converted” into a functioning firearm, just as a blocked-barrel starter gun qualifies when easily modified for live fire. While not all kits may fall under this definition, the statute clearly covers at least some, making a facial challenge to the rule invalid.  The definition of “frame or receiver” also includes partially complete versions that can be finished quickly with standard tools. Ordinary language and the statute's serialization requirements support this reading, as identification numbers are required on unfinished frames and receivers. Law enforcement has long treated such components as regulated firearms, and even the challengers conceded that some unfinished frames fall within the law's scope. While some objects may be too incomplete to qualify, the statute reaches at least those requiring only minimal work, making ATF's rule facially consistent with the law. Concerns about unintended consequences under the National Firearms Act are misplaced, as the government disavowed any authority to classify AR-15 receivers as machine guns, and the doctrines of lenity and constitutional avoidance do not apply where the statute's meaning is clear.Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson each joined the majority opinion and also wrote separate concurring opinions.Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito each authored dissenting opinions.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: May a bankruptcy trustee avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under 11 U-S-C § 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy?The case was decided on March 26, 2025.The Supreme Court held that Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code abrogates sovereign immunity for the federal cause of action created by §544(b), but it does not take the additional step of abrogating sovereign immunity for whatever state-law claim supplies the “applicable law” for a trustee's §544(b) claim.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but which can be committed by failing to take action, have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?The case was decided on March 21, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of 18 U-S-C §924(c)(3)(A). Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.In United States v Castleman, the Court held that “knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force.” This principle applies equally to §924(c) cases where injury is caused by omission rather than affirmative action. There is no meaningful distinction between acts and omissions, as deliberately causing harm through inaction still qualifies as "using" force, just as a person can "use" rain to wash their car by leaving it outside. Moreover, murder—the prototypical “crime of violence”—has long been understood to include liability for omissions, such as when a parent refuses to feed their child, resulting in death.Interpreting the elements clause to exclude crimes of omission would exclude traditional violent crimes from its reach, contradicting the ordinary meaning of “crime of violence” that Congress intended to capture. Additionally, the word “use” does not necessarily require affirmative action; when someone deliberately causes harm through inaction, they are employing force as their instrument to accomplish their purpose.Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the prohibition in 18 U-S-C § 1014 on making a “false statement” for the purposes of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies include making statements that are misleading but not false?The case was decided on March 21, 2025.In Thompson v United States, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that 18 U-S-C § 1014, which criminalizes knowingly making "any false statement" to influence financial institutions, applies exclusively to statements that are factually untrue, not merely misleading. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, emphasized that the statute's use of "false" indicates a focus on statements that are "not true." The Court highlighted that while some misleading statements may also be false, the statute does not encompass all misleading statements. Consequently, the Court vacated Thompson's conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U-S-C § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U-S-C § 7261(b)(1)?The case was decided on March 5, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Department of Veterans Affairs' determination that evidence regarding a disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a factual determination subject to clear-error review by the Veterans Court. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.The statute at issue, 38 U-S-C §7261(b)(1), requires the Veterans Court to “take due account” of the VA's application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule. This provision does not establish a new standard of review but instead directs the Veterans Court to review such determinations under the standards in §7261(a), which provides for de novo review of legal questions and clear-error review of factual findings. Determining whether evidence is in approximate balance involves both legal and factual components, as the VA must marshal and weigh evidence while also applying the legal “approximate balance” standard. Because this determination is primarily factual, clear-error review is appropriate.Petitioners argued that the Veterans Court should review the "approximate balance" determination de novo, comparing it to judicial review of probable-cause determinations, but this analogy is flawed. The probable-cause inquiry involves substantial legal reasoning and constitutional concerns, whereas the VA's assessment of evidence balance is specific to each case and lacks broader legal implications. The statute's language does not support imposing de novo review, nor does the canon against surplusage justify a different reading. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Clean Water Act allow the Environmental Protection Agency (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits that subject permit-holders to enforcement for violating water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform?The case was decided on March 4, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act does not authorize the EPA to include “end-result” provisions in wastewater discharge permits. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.First, while rejecting San Francisco's broader argument that all limitations must be “effluent limitations,” the Court focused on §1311(b)(1)(C)'s authorization of “any more stringent limitation” necessary to meet water quality standards. The terms “limitation,” “implement,” and “meet” in this provision require the EPA to specify concrete actions permittees must follow, not merely mandate end results without guidance. A proper “limitation” is a “restriction imposed from without,” not a directive that forces permittees to determine compliance measures themselves.Second, Congress deliberately abandoned the pre-1972 backward-looking approach that had directly penalized polluters for water quality violations. The CWA's “permit shield” provision, which protects compliant permittees from penalties, would be undermined if end-result requirements could expose permittees to massive penalties despite following all specified steps. Additionally, the EPA's interpretation offered no solution for fairly allocating responsibility among multiple dischargers affecting the same body of water. Determining necessary compliance steps is the EPA's responsibility, and Congress has provided the agency with sufficient tools to make these determinations without resorting to end-result requirements.Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does an award of the “defendant's profits” under the Lanham Act allow a court to require the defendant to disgorge profits earned by legally separate, non-party corporate affiliates?The case was decided on February 26, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act limits recovery of profits in trademark infringement cases to those earned by the named defendant, not its separately incorporated affiliates. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.The text of the Lanham Act authorizes recovery of the “defendant's profits,” which refers only to profits of parties named in the lawsuit. This interpretation aligns with fundamental corporate law principles that treat separately incorporated organizations as distinct legal entities with separate rights and obligations, even when they share common ownership. While exceptions exist through corporate veil-piercing doctrines, Dewberry Engineers never pursued this legal pathway. Courts may not, as the lower courts here did, disregard corporate separateness and treat a party and its non-party affiliates as “a single corporate entity” when calculating the profit award.Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” under Federal Rule 60(b)?The case was decided on February 26, 2025.The Supreme Court held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) is a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” within the meaning of Rule 60(b), and therefore may be reopened by the district courts. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.The Court's reasoning focused on interpreting the phrase “final judgment, order, or proceeding” in Rule 60(b). A voluntary dismissal without prejudice qualifies as a “final proceeding” because it terminates the case, making it “conclusive” and the “last” filing on the docket. Although "final" in appellate jurisdiction contexts is interpreted narrowly, that would should not be interpreted so narrowly here because Rule 60(b) serves a different purpose. Additionally, the term “proceeding” encompasses all steps taken in an action, including voluntary dismissals. To read “proceeding” as requiring judicial determination would strip the term of independent meaning, since judicial determinations would already be covered by “order.”Historical context further supports this interpretation. Rule 60(b) was based on a California provision that had been interpreted to apply to voluntary dismissals. The rule speaks in ascending order of generality—”judgments,” then “orders,” then “proceedings”—suggesting “proceeding” should be broader than the preceding terms. This interpretation prevents voluntary dismissals without prejudice from falling into a procedural “no man's land,” where they would neither be considered interlocutory nor final, leaving parties without recourse to correct mistakes in dismissal.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: May Oklahoma carry out the execution of Richard Glossip in light of the prosecutorial misconduct and other errors that affected his conviction and sentencing?The case was decided on February 25, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's failure to correct false testimony violated the Due Process Clause under Napue v Illinois. A conviction that relies on false evidence, knowingly allowed by the prosecution, requires reversal if there is a reasonable likelihood the falsehood affected the jury's judgment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-2 majority opinion of the Court.The prosecution allowed its key witness, Justin Sneed, to provide false testimony about his mental health and medical treatment. The new evidence showed that Sneed was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lithium, facts that were withheld from the defense. At trial, Sneed falsely claimed he was never treated by a psychiatrist and received lithium mistakenly. This falsehood was material because Sneed's testimony was the only direct evidence implicating Glossip, and impeachment of his credibility could have influenced the jury's decision. The prosecution had prior knowledge of Sneed's mental health treatment and still failed to correct the misstatement when it was made to the jury.Correcting this false testimony would likely have changed the jury's assessment of Sneed's reliability. Additionally, the prosecution's violations extended beyond Napue: it suppressed exculpatory evidence, interfered with witness testimony, and allowed destruction of key physical evidence. Given these cumulative errors and their impact on the fairness of the trial, Glossip is entitled to a new trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of the attorney general's confession of error was based on a misapplication of federal law.Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

 In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a party who obtains a preliminary injunction a “prevailing party” for purposes of being entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U-S-C § 1988?The case was decided on February 25, 2025.The Supreme Court held that a party that receives a preliminary injunction but does not obtain a final judgment on the merits before a case becomes moot is not a "prevailing party" eligible for attorney's fees under 42 U-S-C §1988(b). Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.The term “prevailing party” in §1988(b) refers to a party who obtains enduring judicial relief that conclusively resolves their claim on the merits. Preliminary injunctions do not qualify because they merely preserve the status quo temporarily while predicting likelihood of success—they do not conclusively determine rights. Importantly, a “prevailing party” traditionally means one who "successfully prosecutes the action" or "successfully maintains" their claim "at the end" of proceedings, not one who achieves temporary success at intermediate stages.External events that render a case moot do not transform a preliminary injunction into the kind of judicial success that warrants attorney's fees. For a party to “prevail” under §1988(b), both the change in legal relationship between parties and the permanence of that change must result from judicial order, not from outside circumstances.Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a Section 1983 claim brought in state court require the plaintiffs to first exhaust state administrative remedies?The case was decided on February 21, 2025.The Supreme Court held that where a state court's application of a state exhaustion requirement in effect immunizes state officials from 42 U-S-C §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion of the Court on behalf of the 5-4 majority holding that Alabama may not enforce an administrative-exhaustion rule.When a state law or rule functionally immunizes government officials from suits under § 1983, that law is preempted and unenforceable. Section 1983 ensures that individuals can seek a federal remedy for violations of their constitutional rights. Alabama's exhaustion requirement, applied to delays in benefits processing, creates a procedural barrier that prevents claimants from ever challenging those delays under §1983. This precedent follows decisions in Haywood v Drown and Howlett v Rose, which held that states cannot erect procedural obstacles that effectively nullify federally guaranteed rights. The Alabama Supreme Court's ruling in this case violated that principle by conditioning § 1983 suits on completing the very process claimants sought to challenge for unreasonable delay.Characterizing Alabama's rule as “jurisdictional” does not change this result. A state cannot use jurisdictional labels to avoid compliance with federal law, especially when the rule in question operates as an immunity provision. Nor does the potential availability of mandamus relief in Alabama courts justify the exhaustion rule, as requiring claimants to complete state-mandated processes before suing simply reinstates the same barrier. Because Alabama's exhaustion rule functionally immunizes officials from § 1983 suits regarding administrative delays, it is preempted, and the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed.Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined in part.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered these three issues:1. Does historical commingling of assets suffice to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?2. Must a plaintiff make out a valid claim that an exception to the FSIA applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference?3. Does a sovereign defendant bear the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the FSIA?The case was decided on February 21, 2025.The Supreme Court held that an allegation that a foreign sovereign liquidated expropriated property, commingled the proceeds with other funds, and then used some of those commingled funds for commercial activities in the United States cannot alone satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the expropriation exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.The expropriation exception requires plaintiffs to establish a clear trace between expropriated property (or the proceeds from its sale) and property present in the United States in connection with commercial activity. While money is fungible, merely stating that proceeds from the liquidation of an expropriated asset were once mixed with other funds is insufficient. To satisfy the FSIA's requirements, plaintiffs must show that specific funds or assets linked to the seized property are currently in the United States or were used for identifiable commercial transactions there.This interpretation aligns with the FSIA's structure and purpose, which generally adopts the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, shielding foreign states from suits arising from public (rather than commercial) acts. Congress designed the expropriation exception to conform closely to international law, avoiding excessive interference in foreign relations. The requirement to trace specific property reflects this cautious approach. Accepting the commingling theory alone would excessively broaden the FSIA's expropriation exception, potentially undermining sovereign immunity principles and inviting retaliatory measures from foreign nations.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In the unanimous decision of Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the False Claims Act (FCA) to reimbursement requests made under the E-Rate program, a federal initiative subsidizing internet and telecommunications services for schools and libraries. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that such reimbursement requests qualify as "claims" under the FCA because the government provides a portion of the funds disbursed by the program.

The case was decided on January 21, 2025. Brenda Andrew was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of murdering her husband, Rob Andrew, and was sentenced to death. During her trial, the prosecution introduced extensive evidence about her sex life and personal failings, which was later conceded to be irrelevant. Andrew argued in a federal habeas petition that this evidence was so prejudicial it violated the Due Process Clause. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) upheld her conviction, finding some of the evidence about her extramarital affairs relevant but acknowledging that much of the other evidence was irrelevant. Despite this, the OCCA deemed the errors harmless. Two judges dissented, arguing that the prejudicial evidence undermined the fairness of the trial. In federal court, the District Court denied relief, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that Andrew failed to cite clearly established federal law. The Tenth Circuit majority acknowledged the precedent set by Payne v Tennessee but dismissed it as a pronouncement rather than a holding. Judge Bacharach dissented, arguing that the prejudicial evidence deprived Andrew of a fair trial. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the Tenth Circuit erred in its interpretation. The Court clarified that Payne established that the Due Process Clause can protect against the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence that renders a trial fundamentally unfair. The Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the trial court's admission of irrelevant evidence was so prejudicial as to render Andrew's trial fundamentally unfair. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to TikTok, violate the First Amendment? The case was decided on January 17, 2025. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the challenged provisions of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act do not violate TikTok's First Amendment rights. First, the Court determined that intermediate scrutiny applies because the law is content-neutral; it targets TikTok not based on the content of speech on the platform, but because of China's ability to access sensitive data from 170 million U-S users through its control of ByteDance. While laws that discriminate among different speakers often raise First Amendment concerns, TikTok's unique characteristics—its massive scale and susceptibility to foreign adversary control—justify treating it differently from other platforms. The law does not reflect a preference for certain content or viewpoints, so it is subject to intermediate scrutiny. In other words, the law must further an important government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression and not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further that interest. Under that test, the law was sufficiently tailored to serve the government's important interest in preventing China from collecting vast amounts of sensitive user data. Congress had substantial evidence of the extensive personal information TikTok collects and China's ability to compel Chinese companies to surrender data. Rather than banning TikTok outright, the law allows the platform to continue operating if ByteDance divests it to eliminate Chinese control. While there may be less restrictive alternatives like disclosure requirements or data sharing restrictions, Congress retains latitude to choose its preferred regulatory solution so long as it does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to achieve its goal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote separately concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a plaintiff whose state-court lawsuit has been removed by the defendants to federal court seek to have the case sent back to state court by amending the complaint to omit all references to federal law? The case was decided on January 15, 2025. The Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Federal jurisdiction is based on the operative complaint, which means that when a plaintiff amends their complaint, courts look to that amended version to determine jurisdiction. Federal courts can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when they are part of the same case as federal claims. However, this supplemental jurisdiction flows from the existence of federal jurisdiction; when federal claims are eliminated, there is no longer any basis for supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. This principle applies equally to cases that were originally filed in federal court and those that were removed from state court, as the supplemental jurisdiction statute (28 U-S-C § 1367) makes no distinction between the two situations. When Wullschleger amended her complaint to remove all federal claims after removal, the federal court lost its basis for federal question jurisdiction. Without any federal claims remaining, the court also lost supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Therefore, the entire case had to be remanded to state court. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.