Supreme Court Opinions

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can deception to induce a commercial exchange constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme?The case was decided on May 22, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the fraudulent-inducement theory is consistent with the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U-S-C §1343, and does not require proof of economic loss to the victim. The Court affirmed the convictions of Stamatios Kousisis and Alpha Painting and Construction Co. for wire fraud, finding that their scheme to use a disadvantaged business as a pass-through entity to secure government contracts involved material misrepresentations to obtain money, satisfying the statute's requirements. The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that a fraud conviction requires intent to cause economic loss, clarifying that §1343 focuses on schemes to obtain money or property through deception, not on the victim's net financial harm. The ruling resolved a circuit split, affirming that fraudulent inducement is a valid basis for wire fraud convictions when it targets traditional property interests.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in A.A.R.P. v Trump.  The case was decided on May 16, 2025.To summarize, the President invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to remove Venezuelan nationals identified as members of the Tren de Aragua (T-d-a), a designated foreign terrorist organization. Two detainees, along with a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas, sought injunctive relief against their summary removal under the AEA. The detainees were being held in U.S. detention facilities and were notified of their imminent removal.The District Court denied the detainees' motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against their removal. The detainees then moved for an emergency TRO, which was not promptly addressed by the District Court. Consequently, they appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied their motion for an injunction pending appeal, citing insufficient time given to the district court to act. The detainees also applied to the Supreme Court for a temporary injunction.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and found that the Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that the District Court's inaction had the practical effect of refusing an injunction, given the extreme urgency and high risk of irreparable harm faced by the detainees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court emphasized that due process requires adequate notice and time for detainees to seek habeas relief before removal. The Government was enjoined from removing the detainees under the AEA pending further proceedings and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted.

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Barnes v Felix.    In this case, the court considered this issue: Should courts apply the “moment of the threat” doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment?The case was decided on May 15, 2025. In Barnes v Felix, the Supreme Court rejected the “moment-of-threat” doctrine when evaluating excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that this doctrine, which limits analysis to the precise moment an officer perceives a threat, improperly narrows the required inquiry. Instead, courts must consider the “totality of the circumstances,” including relevant events and context leading up to the use of force, to assess whether an officer's actions were objectively reasonable. The Court emphasized that excluding prior events conflicts with the fact-dependent, context-sensitive approach mandated by the Fourth Amendment.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.The case was decided on April 30, 2025.Nick Feliciano, an air traffic controller with the Federal Aviation Administration and a Coast Guard reserve petty officer, was called to active duty in July 2012 under 10 U-S-C §12301(d). He served until February 2017, primarily escorting vessels to and from harbor. Despite his active-duty service, Feliciano did not receive differential pay, which compensates federal civilian employees for the pay gap between their civilian and military salaries when called to active duty during a national emergency.Feliciano sought relief from the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming he was unlawfully denied differential pay. The Board rejected his claim, and Feliciano appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. He argued that under 5 U-S-C §5538(a) and 10 U-S-C §101(a)(13)(B), he was entitled to differential pay because he was called to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency. The Federal Circuit, referencing its decision in Adams v Department of Homeland Security, held that Feliciano needed to show a substantive connection between his service and a particular national emergency, which he failed to do.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision. The Court held that a federal civilian employee called to active duty under "any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency" is entitled to differential pay if the reservist's service coincides temporally with a declared national emergency. The Court determined that no substantive connection between the service and the national emergency is required. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the phrase “entitled… to benefits” include all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received?The case was decided on April 29, 2025.In this case, a group of over 200 hospitals claimed that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) miscalculated their Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) adjustments, which provide additional funding to hospitals treating a high percentage of low-income patients. The dispute centered on the interpretation of the phrase "entitled to supplementary security income (SSI) benefits" under subchapter XVI. The hospitals argued that this phrase should include all patients enrolled in the SSI system at the time of hospitalization, even if they were not entitled to an SSI payment during that month. HHS, however, interpreted it to mean patients who were eligible to receive an SSI payment during the month of hospitalization.The Provider Reimbursement Review Board denied the hospitals' request for additional reimbursement on procedural grounds, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services denied relief on the merits. The District Court rejected the hospitals' claims and granted summary judgment to HHS. The D-C Circuit affirmed, concluding that SSI benefits are about cash payments for needy individuals and that it makes little sense to say individuals are entitled to the benefit in months when they are not eligible for a payment.The Supreme Court of the United States held that an individual is "entitled to SSI benefits" for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligible to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitalization. The Court reasoned that SSI benefits are cash benefits determined on a monthly basis, and eligibility for such benefits is also determined monthly. The Court affirmed the judgment of the D-C Circuit, respecting the specific formula that Congress prescribed for calculating the Medicare fraction.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart under 8 U-S-C § 1229c(d)(1)?The case was decided on April 22, 2025.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

The case involves the detention and removal of Venezuelan nationals believed to be members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. The President issued a proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to detain and remove these individuals. Five detainees and a putative class sought injunctive and declaratory relief against their removal under the Proclamation, initially seeking relief in habeas but later dismissing those claims.The District Court for the District of Columbia issued two temporary restraining orders (TROs) preventing the removal of the named plaintiffs and a provisionally certified class of noncitizens subject to the Proclamation. The court extended the TROs for an additional 14 days. The D.C. Circuit denied the Government's emergency motion to stay the orders, leading the Government to seek vacatur from the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States construed the TROs as appealable injunctions and granted the Government's application to vacate the orders. The Court held that challenges to removal under the AEA must be brought in habeas corpus, as the claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the detainees' confinement and removal. The Court also determined that venue for such habeas petitions lies in the district of confinement, which in this case is Texas, making the District of Columbia an improper venue. The detainees are entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek habeas relief in the proper venue before removal. The application to vacate the District Court's orders was granted, and the TROs were vacated.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a plaintiff state a claim under ERISA's provision prohibiting a plan fiduciary from knowingly engaging in transactions with barred parties, solely by alleging that such a transaction took place?The case was decided on April 17, 2025.The Supreme Court held that To state a claim under Section 1106(a)(1)(C) of ERISA, a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements listed in that provision itself: that a plan fiduciary knowingly caused the plan to engage in a transaction involving goods, services, or facilities with a party in interest. The plaintiff is not required to plead that the transaction does not qualify for an exemption under Section 1108. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.Section 1106(a)(1)(C) establishes a clear, categorical prohibition on certain transactions between a pension plan and a party in interest. ERISA's structure places relevant exemptions, including those for reasonable and necessary services under Section 1108(b)(2)(A), in a separate statutory provision. Because those exemptions are laid out apart from the prohibitions and refer back to conduct already defined as unlawful, they function as affirmative defenses. As a result, plan fiduciaries who wish to invoke an exemption bear the burden of pleading and proving it. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are not obliged to anticipate and refute every possible statutory or regulatory exemption.Reading exemptions as affirmative defenses also aligns with longstanding legal principles and avoids unworkable results. Requiring plaintiffs to negate all exemptions—especially when ERISA includes 21 statutory and hundreds of regulatory exemptions—would be impractical and unfair, particularly because the relevant facts are often in the defendant's possession. Procedural safeguards such as pleading requirements, discovery limits, and Rule 11 sanctions enable federal courts to deter and manage meritless litigation without shifting the pleading burden to plaintiffs. Consequently, only the elements in Section 1106(a)(1)(C) must be pleaded to survive a motion to dismiss.Justice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full and authored a concurrence, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?The case was decided on April 2, 2025.The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, upheld the Second Circuit's ruling that Horn's loss of employment and associated economic damages qualified as injuries to "business or property" under RICO. The majority concluded that the statute permits recovery for economic harms directly resulting from racketeering activities, even if those harms stem from personal injuries. Justice Barrett emphasized that "injured" in the context of RICO simply means "harmed," and thus, economic losses like lost wages are recoverable. citeturn0news12Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson concurred, highlighting that RICO should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. In dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, expressed concern that this interpretation could broaden RICO's scope to include traditional personal injury claims, potentially federalizing state tort law. Justice Clarence Thomas also dissented separately, suggesting the case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Was the Food and Drug Administration's orders denying respondents' applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act?The case was decided on April 2, 2025The Court unanimously held that the FDA's decisions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Specifically, the Court agreed with the FDA's assessment that the manufacturers failed to demonstrate that the benefits of their flavored products to adult smokers outweighed the risks to youth. This ruling reversed a prior decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had found the FDA's denials unwarranted. The Supreme Court's decision underscores the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products, particularly those appealing to younger audiences, in line with public health objectives. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Did the ATF exceed its statutory authority in promulgating its Final Rule purporting to regulate so-called “ghost guns”?The case was decided on March 26, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Gun Control Act of 1968 authorizes the ATF to regulate weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers that can be readily converted into functional firearms. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.  Weapon parts kits qualify as “weapons” under the statute when they contain all necessary components to build a gun and their intended function is clear. Everyday language permits describing incomplete objects by their intended use, just as a disassembled rifle remains a “weapon.” The statute reinforces this understanding by treating starter guns as firearms even though they require modification. A kit like Polymer80's “Buy Build Shoot,” which can be assembled in about 20 minutes using common tools, meets the law's definition because it can be “readily converted” into a functioning firearm, just as a blocked-barrel starter gun qualifies when easily modified for live fire. While not all kits may fall under this definition, the statute clearly covers at least some, making a facial challenge to the rule invalid.  The definition of “frame or receiver” also includes partially complete versions that can be finished quickly with standard tools. Ordinary language and the statute's serialization requirements support this reading, as identification numbers are required on unfinished frames and receivers. Law enforcement has long treated such components as regulated firearms, and even the challengers conceded that some unfinished frames fall within the law's scope. While some objects may be too incomplete to qualify, the statute reaches at least those requiring only minimal work, making ATF's rule facially consistent with the law. Concerns about unintended consequences under the National Firearms Act are misplaced, as the government disavowed any authority to classify AR-15 receivers as machine guns, and the doctrines of lenity and constitutional avoidance do not apply where the statute's meaning is clear.Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson each joined the majority opinion and also wrote separate concurring opinions.Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito each authored dissenting opinions.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: May a bankruptcy trustee avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under 11 U-S-C § 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy?The case was decided on March 26, 2025.The Supreme Court held that Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code abrogates sovereign immunity for the federal cause of action created by §544(b), but it does not take the additional step of abrogating sovereign immunity for whatever state-law claim supplies the “applicable law” for a trustee's §544(b) claim.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but which can be committed by failing to take action, have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?The case was decided on March 21, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of 18 U-S-C §924(c)(3)(A). Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.In United States v Castleman, the Court held that “knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force.” This principle applies equally to §924(c) cases where injury is caused by omission rather than affirmative action. There is no meaningful distinction between acts and omissions, as deliberately causing harm through inaction still qualifies as "using" force, just as a person can "use" rain to wash their car by leaving it outside. Moreover, murder—the prototypical “crime of violence”—has long been understood to include liability for omissions, such as when a parent refuses to feed their child, resulting in death.Interpreting the elements clause to exclude crimes of omission would exclude traditional violent crimes from its reach, contradicting the ordinary meaning of “crime of violence” that Congress intended to capture. Additionally, the word “use” does not necessarily require affirmative action; when someone deliberately causes harm through inaction, they are employing force as their instrument to accomplish their purpose.Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the prohibition in 18 U-S-C § 1014 on making a “false statement” for the purposes of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies include making statements that are misleading but not false?The case was decided on March 21, 2025.In Thompson v United States, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that 18 U-S-C § 1014, which criminalizes knowingly making "any false statement" to influence financial institutions, applies exclusively to statements that are factually untrue, not merely misleading. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, emphasized that the statute's use of "false" indicates a focus on statements that are "not true." The Court highlighted that while some misleading statements may also be false, the statute does not encompass all misleading statements. Consequently, the Court vacated Thompson's conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U-S-C § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U-S-C § 7261(b)(1)?The case was decided on March 5, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Department of Veterans Affairs' determination that evidence regarding a disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a factual determination subject to clear-error review by the Veterans Court. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.The statute at issue, 38 U-S-C §7261(b)(1), requires the Veterans Court to “take due account” of the VA's application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule. This provision does not establish a new standard of review but instead directs the Veterans Court to review such determinations under the standards in §7261(a), which provides for de novo review of legal questions and clear-error review of factual findings. Determining whether evidence is in approximate balance involves both legal and factual components, as the VA must marshal and weigh evidence while also applying the legal “approximate balance” standard. Because this determination is primarily factual, clear-error review is appropriate.Petitioners argued that the Veterans Court should review the "approximate balance" determination de novo, comparing it to judicial review of probable-cause determinations, but this analogy is flawed. The probable-cause inquiry involves substantial legal reasoning and constitutional concerns, whereas the VA's assessment of evidence balance is specific to each case and lacks broader legal implications. The statute's language does not support imposing de novo review, nor does the canon against surplusage justify a different reading. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Clean Water Act allow the Environmental Protection Agency (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits that subject permit-holders to enforcement for violating water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform?The case was decided on March 4, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act does not authorize the EPA to include “end-result” provisions in wastewater discharge permits. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.First, while rejecting San Francisco's broader argument that all limitations must be “effluent limitations,” the Court focused on §1311(b)(1)(C)'s authorization of “any more stringent limitation” necessary to meet water quality standards. The terms “limitation,” “implement,” and “meet” in this provision require the EPA to specify concrete actions permittees must follow, not merely mandate end results without guidance. A proper “limitation” is a “restriction imposed from without,” not a directive that forces permittees to determine compliance measures themselves.Second, Congress deliberately abandoned the pre-1972 backward-looking approach that had directly penalized polluters for water quality violations. The CWA's “permit shield” provision, which protects compliant permittees from penalties, would be undermined if end-result requirements could expose permittees to massive penalties despite following all specified steps. Additionally, the EPA's interpretation offered no solution for fairly allocating responsibility among multiple dischargers affecting the same body of water. Determining necessary compliance steps is the EPA's responsibility, and Congress has provided the agency with sufficient tools to make these determinations without resorting to end-result requirements.Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does an award of the “defendant's profits” under the Lanham Act allow a court to require the defendant to disgorge profits earned by legally separate, non-party corporate affiliates?The case was decided on February 26, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act limits recovery of profits in trademark infringement cases to those earned by the named defendant, not its separately incorporated affiliates. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.The text of the Lanham Act authorizes recovery of the “defendant's profits,” which refers only to profits of parties named in the lawsuit. This interpretation aligns with fundamental corporate law principles that treat separately incorporated organizations as distinct legal entities with separate rights and obligations, even when they share common ownership. While exceptions exist through corporate veil-piercing doctrines, Dewberry Engineers never pursued this legal pathway. Courts may not, as the lower courts here did, disregard corporate separateness and treat a party and its non-party affiliates as “a single corporate entity” when calculating the profit award.Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” under Federal Rule 60(b)?The case was decided on February 26, 2025.The Supreme Court held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) is a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” within the meaning of Rule 60(b), and therefore may be reopened by the district courts. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.The Court's reasoning focused on interpreting the phrase “final judgment, order, or proceeding” in Rule 60(b). A voluntary dismissal without prejudice qualifies as a “final proceeding” because it terminates the case, making it “conclusive” and the “last” filing on the docket. Although "final" in appellate jurisdiction contexts is interpreted narrowly, that would should not be interpreted so narrowly here because Rule 60(b) serves a different purpose. Additionally, the term “proceeding” encompasses all steps taken in an action, including voluntary dismissals. To read “proceeding” as requiring judicial determination would strip the term of independent meaning, since judicial determinations would already be covered by “order.”Historical context further supports this interpretation. Rule 60(b) was based on a California provision that had been interpreted to apply to voluntary dismissals. The rule speaks in ascending order of generality—”judgments,” then “orders,” then “proceedings”—suggesting “proceeding” should be broader than the preceding terms. This interpretation prevents voluntary dismissals without prejudice from falling into a procedural “no man's land,” where they would neither be considered interlocutory nor final, leaving parties without recourse to correct mistakes in dismissal.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: May Oklahoma carry out the execution of Richard Glossip in light of the prosecutorial misconduct and other errors that affected his conviction and sentencing?The case was decided on February 25, 2025.The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's failure to correct false testimony violated the Due Process Clause under Napue v Illinois. A conviction that relies on false evidence, knowingly allowed by the prosecution, requires reversal if there is a reasonable likelihood the falsehood affected the jury's judgment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-2 majority opinion of the Court.The prosecution allowed its key witness, Justin Sneed, to provide false testimony about his mental health and medical treatment. The new evidence showed that Sneed was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lithium, facts that were withheld from the defense. At trial, Sneed falsely claimed he was never treated by a psychiatrist and received lithium mistakenly. This falsehood was material because Sneed's testimony was the only direct evidence implicating Glossip, and impeachment of his credibility could have influenced the jury's decision. The prosecution had prior knowledge of Sneed's mental health treatment and still failed to correct the misstatement when it was made to the jury.Correcting this false testimony would likely have changed the jury's assessment of Sneed's reliability. Additionally, the prosecution's violations extended beyond Napue: it suppressed exculpatory evidence, interfered with witness testimony, and allowed destruction of key physical evidence. Given these cumulative errors and their impact on the fairness of the trial, Glossip is entitled to a new trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of the attorney general's confession of error was based on a misapplication of federal law.Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

 In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a party who obtains a preliminary injunction a “prevailing party” for purposes of being entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U-S-C § 1988?The case was decided on February 25, 2025.The Supreme Court held that a party that receives a preliminary injunction but does not obtain a final judgment on the merits before a case becomes moot is not a "prevailing party" eligible for attorney's fees under 42 U-S-C §1988(b). Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.The term “prevailing party” in §1988(b) refers to a party who obtains enduring judicial relief that conclusively resolves their claim on the merits. Preliminary injunctions do not qualify because they merely preserve the status quo temporarily while predicting likelihood of success—they do not conclusively determine rights. Importantly, a “prevailing party” traditionally means one who "successfully prosecutes the action" or "successfully maintains" their claim "at the end" of proceedings, not one who achieves temporary success at intermediate stages.External events that render a case moot do not transform a preliminary injunction into the kind of judicial success that warrants attorney's fees. For a party to “prevail” under §1988(b), both the change in legal relationship between parties and the permanence of that change must result from judicial order, not from outside circumstances.Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a Section 1983 claim brought in state court require the plaintiffs to first exhaust state administrative remedies?The case was decided on February 21, 2025.The Supreme Court held that where a state court's application of a state exhaustion requirement in effect immunizes state officials from 42 U-S-C §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion of the Court on behalf of the 5-4 majority holding that Alabama may not enforce an administrative-exhaustion rule.When a state law or rule functionally immunizes government officials from suits under § 1983, that law is preempted and unenforceable. Section 1983 ensures that individuals can seek a federal remedy for violations of their constitutional rights. Alabama's exhaustion requirement, applied to delays in benefits processing, creates a procedural barrier that prevents claimants from ever challenging those delays under §1983. This precedent follows decisions in Haywood v Drown and Howlett v Rose, which held that states cannot erect procedural obstacles that effectively nullify federally guaranteed rights. The Alabama Supreme Court's ruling in this case violated that principle by conditioning § 1983 suits on completing the very process claimants sought to challenge for unreasonable delay.Characterizing Alabama's rule as “jurisdictional” does not change this result. A state cannot use jurisdictional labels to avoid compliance with federal law, especially when the rule in question operates as an immunity provision. Nor does the potential availability of mandamus relief in Alabama courts justify the exhaustion rule, as requiring claimants to complete state-mandated processes before suing simply reinstates the same barrier. Because Alabama's exhaustion rule functionally immunizes officials from § 1983 suits regarding administrative delays, it is preempted, and the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed.Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined in part.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered these three issues:1. Does historical commingling of assets suffice to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?2. Must a plaintiff make out a valid claim that an exception to the FSIA applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference?3. Does a sovereign defendant bear the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the FSIA?The case was decided on February 21, 2025.The Supreme Court held that an allegation that a foreign sovereign liquidated expropriated property, commingled the proceeds with other funds, and then used some of those commingled funds for commercial activities in the United States cannot alone satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the expropriation exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.The expropriation exception requires plaintiffs to establish a clear trace between expropriated property (or the proceeds from its sale) and property present in the United States in connection with commercial activity. While money is fungible, merely stating that proceeds from the liquidation of an expropriated asset were once mixed with other funds is insufficient. To satisfy the FSIA's requirements, plaintiffs must show that specific funds or assets linked to the seized property are currently in the United States or were used for identifiable commercial transactions there.This interpretation aligns with the FSIA's structure and purpose, which generally adopts the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, shielding foreign states from suits arising from public (rather than commercial) acts. Congress designed the expropriation exception to conform closely to international law, avoiding excessive interference in foreign relations. The requirement to trace specific property reflects this cautious approach. Accepting the commingling theory alone would excessively broaden the FSIA's expropriation exception, potentially undermining sovereign immunity principles and inviting retaliatory measures from foreign nations.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In the unanimous decision of Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the False Claims Act (FCA) to reimbursement requests made under the E-Rate program, a federal initiative subsidizing internet and telecommunications services for schools and libraries. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that such reimbursement requests qualify as "claims" under the FCA because the government provides a portion of the funds disbursed by the program.

The case was decided on January 21, 2025. Brenda Andrew was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of murdering her husband, Rob Andrew, and was sentenced to death. During her trial, the prosecution introduced extensive evidence about her sex life and personal failings, which was later conceded to be irrelevant. Andrew argued in a federal habeas petition that this evidence was so prejudicial it violated the Due Process Clause. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) upheld her conviction, finding some of the evidence about her extramarital affairs relevant but acknowledging that much of the other evidence was irrelevant. Despite this, the OCCA deemed the errors harmless. Two judges dissented, arguing that the prejudicial evidence undermined the fairness of the trial. In federal court, the District Court denied relief, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that Andrew failed to cite clearly established federal law. The Tenth Circuit majority acknowledged the precedent set by Payne v Tennessee but dismissed it as a pronouncement rather than a holding. Judge Bacharach dissented, arguing that the prejudicial evidence deprived Andrew of a fair trial. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the Tenth Circuit erred in its interpretation. The Court clarified that Payne established that the Due Process Clause can protect against the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence that renders a trial fundamentally unfair. The Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the trial court's admission of irrelevant evidence was so prejudicial as to render Andrew's trial fundamentally unfair. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to TikTok, violate the First Amendment? The case was decided on January 17, 2025. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the challenged provisions of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act do not violate TikTok's First Amendment rights. First, the Court determined that intermediate scrutiny applies because the law is content-neutral; it targets TikTok not based on the content of speech on the platform, but because of China's ability to access sensitive data from 170 million U-S users through its control of ByteDance. While laws that discriminate among different speakers often raise First Amendment concerns, TikTok's unique characteristics—its massive scale and susceptibility to foreign adversary control—justify treating it differently from other platforms. The law does not reflect a preference for certain content or viewpoints, so it is subject to intermediate scrutiny. In other words, the law must further an important government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression and not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further that interest. Under that test, the law was sufficiently tailored to serve the government's important interest in preventing China from collecting vast amounts of sensitive user data. Congress had substantial evidence of the extensive personal information TikTok collects and China's ability to compel Chinese companies to surrender data. Rather than banning TikTok outright, the law allows the platform to continue operating if ByteDance divests it to eliminate Chinese control. While there may be less restrictive alternatives like disclosure requirements or data sharing restrictions, Congress retains latitude to choose its preferred regulatory solution so long as it does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to achieve its goal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote separately concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a plaintiff whose state-court lawsuit has been removed by the defendants to federal court seek to have the case sent back to state court by amending the complaint to omit all references to federal law? The case was decided on January 15, 2025. The Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Federal jurisdiction is based on the operative complaint, which means that when a plaintiff amends their complaint, courts look to that amended version to determine jurisdiction. Federal courts can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when they are part of the same case as federal claims. However, this supplemental jurisdiction flows from the existence of federal jurisdiction; when federal claims are eliminated, there is no longer any basis for supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. This principle applies equally to cases that were originally filed in federal court and those that were removed from state court, as the supplemental jurisdiction statute (28 U-S-C § 1367) makes no distinction between the two situations. When Wullschleger amended her complaint to remove all federal claims after removal, the federal court lost its basis for federal question jurisdiction. Without any federal claims remaining, the court also lost supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Therefore, the entire case had to be remanded to state court. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Is the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption a mere preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence? The case was decided on January 15, 2025. The Supreme Court held that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an employer seeks to show that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The default standard of proof in American civil litigation is preponderance of the evidence, and courts only deviate from this standard in three specific circumstances: when a statute explicitly requires a heightened standard, when the Constitution requires it, or in certain rare cases where the government seeks unusual coercive action against an individual (like revoking citizenship). None of these exceptions applies to FLSA exemption cases. The FLSA itself is silent on the standard of proof, which typically means Congress intended the default preponderance standard to apply. The case does not implicate constitutional rights, and it does not involve unusual government coercion; instead, it is akin to Title VII employment discrimination cases where the Court has consistently applied the preponderance standard. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, clarifying that courts apply the default “preponderance” rule unless Congress alters it or the Constitution forbids it. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review the Secretary of Homeland Security's discretionary decision to revoke an approved visa petition under 8 U-S-C §1155, based on a determination that a prior marriage was a sham. The case was decided on December 10, 2024. The Supreme Court held that Revocation of an approved visa petition based on a sham-marriage determination is the kind of discretionary decision that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Do Florida S.B. 7072's content-moderation restrictions comply with the First Amendment, and do the law's individualized-explanation requirements comply with the First Amendment? The case was decided on July 1, 2024. The Supreme Court held that The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Fifth Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court. Under precedents like Miami Herald v Tornillo, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v Public Utilities Commission, Turner Broadcasting v FCC, and Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, when a private entity engages in expressive activity, including curating others' speech, government interference with that activity implicates the First Amendment. Specifically, the First Amendment protects entities engaged in expressive activities, including compiling and curating others' speech, from being forced to accommodate messages they prefer to exclude. This protection applies even when the compiler includes most items and excludes only a few. The government cannot justify interfering with a private speaker's editorial choices merely by claiming an interest in improving or balancing the marketplace of ideas. These principles likely apply to the content moderation practices of social media platforms like Facebook's News Feed, indicating that state laws regulating these practices may face significant First Amendment hurdles. However, this analysis may not apply to all of the laws' applications, so it is important for courts to conduct a thorough examination of the laws' full scope and their constitutional and unconstitutional applications in a proper facial challenge analysis. Texas's regulation of social media platforms' content moderation policies aims to alter the speech displayed on these platforms, reflecting the state's disapproval of the platforms' current content selection and moderation practices. However, under the First Amendment, Texas cannot impose its preferences on how private entities curate and present speech, as this would amount to government control over the expression of ideas. Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined the majority opinion in full and authored a separate concurrence. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the majority opinion in part and authored a separate concurrence. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a former president enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office, and if so, to what extent? The case was decided on July 1, 2024. The Supreme Court held that a former U-S President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority, at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts, and no immunity for unofficial acts. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court majority, concluded that a former President has some immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts during his tenure in office. This immunity stems primarily from constitutional separation of powers principles and precedents recognizing similar immunities in civil contexts. The President has absolute immunity from prosecution for actions taken pursuant to his exclusive constitutional powers, such as pardoning offenses or removing executive officers. This absolute immunity exists because Congress cannot criminalize, and courts cannot review, the President's exercise of these core constitutional authorities. For official actions outside the President's exclusive constitutional powers, there is at least a presumptive immunity from prosecution. This presumptive immunity is rooted in the need to ensure the President can perform his duties without undue caution or distraction, as established in cases like Nixon v Fitzgerald. The government may attempt to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that prosecution would not unduly intrude on executive functions. However, evidence of immune official acts cannot be used to prove liability for unofficial acts, as this would undermine the purpose of the immunity. Finally, drawing on Clinton v Jones, the Court affirmed that the President has no immunity for actions taken in an unofficial or personal capacity. To apply this framework, courts must carefully analyze alleged conduct to determine whether it qualifies as official or unofficial. The Court rejected both Trump's argument for broader immunity absent impeachment and conviction, and the government's contention that the President has no immunity from criminal prosecution whatsoever. Instead, it established a nuanced approach requiring case-by-case analysis of presidential conduct to determine the applicable level of immunity, if any. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurrence to highlight that he believes the Special Counsel's prosecution of Trump may be unconstitutional because there are serious questions about whether the office of the Special Counsel was properly “established by Law” as required by the Constitution's Appointments Clause. Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote a separate opinion concurring in part to argue that rather than framing the issue as “immunity,” the Court should have adopted a two-step analysis for assessing the validity of criminal charges against a President for official acts: first determining if the relevant statute applies to the President's conduct, and then evaluating whether prosecuting the President under that statute would unconstitutionally intrude on executive power. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented because she believes the majority's decision to grant former Presidents broad immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts is unjustified by constitutional text, history, or precedent, and dangerously places the President above the law. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented because she believes the majority's creation of a new “Presidential accountability model” that sometimes exempts Presidents from criminal law for official acts fundamentally alters the balance of power, undermines the rule of law, and risks incentivizing presidential abuses of power. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. 

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a plaintiff's claim under the Administrative Procedure Act “first accrue” under 28 U-S-C § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule, or when the rule first causes harm to the plaintiff? The case was decided on July 1, 2024. The Supreme Court held that an Administrative Procedures Act claim does not accrue for purposes of 28 U-S-C §2401(a) until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The text of 28 U-S-C §2401(a) states that a civil action against the United States must be filed "within six years after the right of action first accrues." The Court interpreted this language according to its traditional meaning in the context of statutes of limitations, concluding that a right of action "accrues" when the plaintiff has a "complete and present cause of action"—that is, when the plaintiff has the right to file suit and obtain relief. For an Administrative Procedures Act claim, this requires both final agency action (as specified in 5 U-S-C § 704) and an injury to the plaintiff (as required by 5 U-S-C § 702). The Court rejected arguments that APA claims should be treated differently from other civil actions against the government, emphasizing that § 2401(a) uses standard accrual language that had a well-settled meaning when it was enacted in 1948. The Court also distinguished § 2401(a) from other statutes that explicitly start the clock at the time of final agency action, noting that Congress chose different language for §2401(a). By interpreting "accrues" consistently with its traditional meaning, the Court concluded that an APA claim does not accrue until the plaintiff has both experienced an injury and the agency action causing that injury has become final. Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented and was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe.

In this case, the court considered these issues: 1. Does the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorize the National Marine Fisheries Service to promulgate a rule that would require industry to pay for at-sea monitoring programs? 2. Should the Court overrule Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council or at least clarify whether statutory silence on controversial powers creates an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency? The case was decided on June 28, 2024. The Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous. Chevron U-S-A Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. is overruled. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court (which also decided the consolidated case, Relentless, Inc. v Department of Commerce). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 requires courts to "decide all relevant questions of law" when reviewing agency actions. This means courts should use their own judgment to interpret laws, not defer to agencies' interpretations. The Chevron doctrine, established in the 1984 case Chevron U-S-A v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., contradicts this principle. Chevron required courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes if those interpretations were reasonable. Chevron was based on a flawed assumption that Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority to agencies whenever a law is ambiguous. This assumption doesn't reflect reality and goes against the traditional role of courts. Chevron has been difficult to apply consistently and has led to confusion in lower courts. It has also been gradually limited by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Thus, Chevron should be overruled because it contradicts the APA, is based on faulty reasoning, has proven unworkable in practice, and hasn't created the kind of settled expectations that would justify keeping it in place. However, this decision does not necessarily overturn the specific outcomes of past cases that used Chevron. Those outcomes would need to be challenged separately. Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch each filed concurring opinions. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined, and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined as to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of No. 22-451. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a city's enforcement of public camping against involuntarily homeless people violate the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment? The case was decided on June 28, 2024. The Supreme Court held that The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has historically focused on what punishments may follow a criminal conviction, not on what behaviors a government may criminalize. Although, in Robinson v California, the Court prohibited criminalizing the mere status of drug addiction, that case is distinguishable from laws that prohibit specific conduct like public camping. The Court has previously declined to extend Robinson to cover “involuntary” acts resulting from a particular status. For example, in Powell v Texas, the Court declined to prohibit punishing public drunkenness by alcoholics, even though their conduct might be considered involuntary. Expanding Robinson's narrow holding would risk turning the judiciary into the ultimate arbiter of criminal responsibility across diverse areas of law, a role for which the Eighth Amendment provides no guidance. Such an expansion would lead to practical difficulties, as demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit's attempt to implement this approach in Martin v City of Boise. Cities have faced numerous challenges in determining who qualifies as "involuntarily" homeless and what constitutes "adequate" shelter under Martin. These judicially created standards have proven unworkable and have interfered with local efforts to address homelessness, ultimately undermining the democratic process and federalism principles. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does 18 U-S-C § 1512(c), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence? The case was decided on June 28, 2024. The Supreme Court held that to prove a violation of 18 U-S-C §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Court focused on interpreting the scope of 18 U-S-C §1512(c)(2), particularly how it relates to §1512(c)(1). Applying the canons of statutory interpretation, particularly noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, the “otherwise” clause in (c)(2) should be read as limited by the specific conduct described in (c)(1). If (c)(2) were as broad as the government claimed, it would render (c)(1) and many other specific obstruction statutes superfluous, which goes against principles of statutory interpretation. Next, as to the historical context of the statute, it was enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to address specific issues like document shredding in the Enron scandal. An overly broad interpretation of (c)(2) would criminalize a wide range of prosaic conduct and give prosecutors too much discretion. Moreover, the Court traditionally avoids broad interpretations of obstruction statutes that would create “coverall” provisions. Finally, the Court concluded that (c)(2) should be interpreted more narrowly, in light of (c)(1), to primarily cover acts that impair the integrity or availability of evidence for use in an official proceeding, rather than all forms of obstruction. This interpretation better respects Congress's role in defining crimes and setting penalties and avoids potential constitutional issues arising from an overly broad criminal statute. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the majority opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Bankruptcy Code authorize a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by non-debtors against non-debtor third parties, without the claimants' consent? The case was decided on June 27, 2024. The Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. Applying the ejusdem generis canon of statutory interpretation to Section 1123(b)(6), which is a catchall provision allowing "any other appropriate provision" in a bankruptcy plan, the Court reasoned that this provision should be read in light of the specific provisions that precede it, all of which concern the debtor's rights and responsibilities. Therefore, Section 1123(b)(6) cannot be fairly read to grant the radically different power to discharge debts of non-debtors without affected claimants' consent. The broader context of the Bankruptcy Code further supports this conclusion. Discharges are generally reserved for debtors who place their assets in the bankruptcy estate, and even then, certain types of claims (like fraud or willful injury) cannot be discharged. The Sacklers, as non-debtors, seek greater protection than the Code typically allows for actual debtors, without meeting the Code's usual requirements. Congress has only explicitly authorized third-party releases in asbestos-related bankruptcies, suggesting that such releases are not generally permissible in other contexts. Therefore, Section 1123(b)(6) does not authorize the nonconsensual release of claims against the Sacklers, who are non-debtors in Purdue Pharma's bankruptcy case. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the statutory scheme that empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission violate the Seventh Amendment, the nondelegation doctrine, or Article II of the U-S Constitution?    The case was decided on June 27, 2024. The Supreme Court held that when the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. First, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applies to this SEC enforcement action. The claims are "legal in nature" and closely resemble common law fraud actions. The substance of the claim matters more than its statutory origin or which branch of government brings the action. Moreover, the civil penalties sought are punitive in nature, which is a type of remedy traditionally provided by courts of law rather than courts of equity. Second, the "public rights" exception to the Seventh Amendment does not apply here because this case does not fall within the narrow categories of matters that have historically been exclusively determined by the executive and legislative branches. The mere facts that Congress assigned the matter to an agency and that the government is the plaintiff do not change this outcome. Unlike the novel regulatory scheme in Atlas Roofing, these SEC fraud claims have close analogues in traditional common law actions that were historically adjudicated by courts with juries. Because this action is essentially a common law fraud suit seeking punitive remedies, it must be heard by an Article III court with a jury, despite Congress assigning it to an administrative proceeding. This conclusion preserves the constitutional separation of powers and the role of juries in adjudicating traditional legal claims. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act preempt an Idaho law that criminalizes most abortions in that state?    The case was decided on June 27, 2024.  The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and vacated its earlier stay of the district court's preliminary injunction against Idaho's abortion law. Justice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion that was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Justice Kagan opined that EMTALA requires hospitals to provide abortions in certain health emergencies that Idaho's law prohibits, creating a clear conflict where federal law preempts state law. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion that was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh. She explained why she believes the Court should dismiss the case and vacate the stay, arguing that the dispute has narrowed significantly since the Court initially granted certiorari, making it inappropriate for immediate Supreme Court resolution. Justice Jackson concurred in part with the Court's decision to vacate the stay and lift the injunction, agreeing with Justice Kagan's analysis that EMTALA preempts Idaho's law. However, she dissented from the Court's decision to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, arguing that the conflict between state and federal law remains significant and that the Court should have resolved the preemption issue now rather than delaying a decision. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Alito argued that the Court should have decided the statutory interpretation question and rejected the government's novel interpretation of EMTALA rather than dismissing the case and allowing the injunction against Idaho's law to take effect. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: should the Court stay the EPA's federal emissions reduction rule, the Good Neighbor Plan, and are the emissions controls imposed by the rule reasonable regardless of the number of states subject to the rule?    The case was decided on June 27, 2024. The Supreme Court held that the EPA's enforcement of the Federal Implementation Plan against the applicant States is stayed pending disposition of the applicants' petition for review in the D-C Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, timely sought. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. There is a four-factor test for deciding whether to grant a stay: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The Court focused primarily on the first factor—likelihood of success on the merits—and concluded that the applicants (states and industry groups challenging the EPA's rule) were likely to succeed in arguing that the EPA's Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) was “arbitrary” or “capricious” under the Clean Air Act.  The EPA failed to adequately explain why its emissions reduction requirements would remain appropriate if fewer states were covered by the plan than originally intended. Commenters had raised concerns during the rulemaking process about what would happen if some states dropped out of the plan, but the EPA did not sufficiently address these concerns. While the EPA did add a “severability” provision saying the rule would continue to apply even if some states dropped out, this did not actually address the underlying issue of whether the emissions requirements would still be justified with fewer states. Because the EPA likely “ignored an important aspect of the problem” by not explaining why its emissions reduction requirements would remain appropriate with fewer covered states, the applicants were likely to succeed in having the rule "reversed" as arbitrary and capricious, justifying the stay pending further review. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, arguing that the applicants are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the EPA's rule. Justice Barrett rejected the Court's theory about EPA's failure to explain as underdeveloped, plagued by significant procedural obstacles, and contradicted by evidence in the record. Justice Barrett argued that the EPA's methodology for calculating emissions limits appears to be independent of the number of states covered, and that the Clean Air Act's stringent harmless-error rule would likely prevent the applicants from prevailing even if there were a procedural error. She also criticized the majority for granting emergency relief based on a theory that was not fully briefed or argued. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: does 18 U-S-C § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalize gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions?    The case was decided on June 26, 2024. The Supreme Court held that Federal law, 18 U-S-C §666, proscribes bribes to state and local officials but does not make it a crime for those officials to accept gratuities for their past acts. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Court identified six main reasons that 18 U-S-C §666(a)(1)(B) is a bribery statute and not a gratuities statute:    a) Text: The language of §666 closely resembles the federal bribery statute (§201(b)) rather than the federal gratuities statute (§201(c)).    b) Statutory history: Congress amended §666 in 1986 to model it after the bribery statute, not the gratuities statute.    c) Statutory structure: Unlike other laws, §666 does not separate bribery and gratuities into distinct provisions.    d) Statutory punishments: The penalties in §666 align with those for bribery, not gratuities, and would create inexplicable sentencing disparities if applied to gratuities.    e) Federalism: Interpreting §666 as a gratuities statute would significantly infringe on states' rights to regulate their officials' conduct.    f) Fair notice: The government's interpretation would create ambiguity and potentially criminalize innocuous behavior without clear guidelines for state and local officials. The Court rejected the government's argument that the inclusion of the term "rewarded" in §666 indicates it covers gratuities. Rather, the word "rewarded" serves to close potential loopholes in bribery cases. Because §666 prohibits bribes but not gratuities, state and local governments may choose whether and how to regulate gratuities for their officials within constitutional bounds. Justice Neil Gorsuch joined the Court's opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: Did the federal government's request that private social media companies take steps to prevent the dissemination of purported misinformation transform those companies' content-moderation decisions into state action and thus violate users' First Amendment rights?    The case was decided on June 26, 2024. The Supreme Court held that Respondents—two States and five individual social-media users who sued Executive Branch officials and agencies, alleging that the Government pressured the platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment—lack Article III standing to seek an injunction. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Court concluded that the petitioners lacked standing for two main reasons: First, the plaintiffs failed to establish a clear causal link between their past social media restrictions and the actions of the government defendants. Most of the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that their content was restricted due to government pressure rather than the platforms' independent moderation policies. Even for Jill Hines, who made the strongest case, the connections were tenuous and did not clearly show that her restrictions were likely traceable to government coercion rather than Facebook's own judgment. Second, the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a substantial risk of future injury traceable to the defendants' actions. By the time of the lawsuit, most of the government's communications with social media platforms about COVID-19 and election misinformation had significantly decreased. Without evidence of ongoing pressure from the government, it was speculative to assume that future content moderation decisions would be attributable to the defendants rather than the platforms' independent policies. The Court also found that an injunction against the government was unlikely to affect the platforms' content moderation decisions, creating a redressability problem. The Court emphasized that at the preliminary injunction stage, plaintiffs must make a clear showing that they are likely to establish each element of standing, which the petitioners failed to do based on the evidence presented. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Constitution require a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant's prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?    The case was decided on June 21, 2024. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's past offenses were committed on separate occasions for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This principle applies to both facts that increase the maximum sentence and facts that increase the minimum sentence.  In Erlinger's case, determining whether his prior offenses occurred on at least three separate occasions (as required by the Armed Career Criminal Act) involved finding facts that increased both his minimum and maximum potential sentences. Therefore, this determination should have been made by a jury, not a judge. This factual determination does not fall under the narrow Almendarez-Torres exception, which allows judges to find only the fact of a prior conviction. The occasions inquiry requires going beyond simply identifying prior convictions and their elements. While there may be practical concerns about prejudicing defendants by presenting evidence of prior crimes to juries, these can be addressed through procedural tools like bifurcated trials. Constitutional requirements cannot be set aside for efficiency or practicality reasons. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Samuel Alito joined and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined in part. Justice Jackson wrote a separate dissenting opinion. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the denial of a visa to the non-citizen spouse of a U.S. citizen infringe on a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen and, if so, did the government properly justify that decision in this case?    The case was decided on June 21, 2024. The Supreme Court held that a U.S. citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court. The doctrine of consular nonreviewability holds that federal courts generally cannot review visa denial decisions made by consular officers, but there may be a narrow exception for decisions that abridge fundamental constitutional rights (the Court assumed but did not decide the possibility of such an exception). However, the right to bring a noncitizen spouse to the U.S. is not deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition, as required by the Glucksberg test. Throughout the history of U.S. immigration law, the admission of noncitizens, including spouses, has consistently been treated as a matter of sovereign discretion rather than individual right. While Congress has the ability to prioritize family unity in immigration policy, there is no constitutional requirement to do so. Thus, U.S. citizens do not have a fundamental right to have their noncitizen spouses admitted to the country, nor do they have procedural due process rights in the visa proceedings of others. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: May a court enter a consent decree among Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado regarding the Rio Grande Compact without the consent of the United States, who intervened in the action?    The case was decided on June 21, 2024. The Supreme Court held that because the proposed consent decree would dispose of the United States' Compact claims without its consent, the States' motion to enter the consent decree is denied. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. Consent decrees have a dual nature; they embody agreements between parties (contractual) and are enforceable as judicial decrees. While intervenors can present evidence and objections, they cannot block a consent decree merely by withholding consent unless the settlement affects their claims. Additionally, a consent decree cannot dispose of the claims of nonconsenting intervenors without their agreement. Here, the Court needed to determine whether the United States has valid Compact claims and if the proposed consent decree would dispose of those claims. Its interests in the Rio Grande Project and compliance with treaty obligations constitute distinctively federal interests, justifying its intervention. However, the proposed consent decree would resolve the United States' claims without addressing its allegations, making it inappropriate for approval without the United States' consent. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the federal government seeks to prolong this original jurisdiction dispute, a form of litigation usually reserved for disputes between States, over the objection of both Texas and New Mexico. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permit the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst?     The case was decided on June 21, 2024. The Supreme Court held that when an expert conveys an absent lab analyst's statements in support of the expert's opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth, and thus implicate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial hearsay,” that is, out-of-court statements introduced for their truth. The key question is whether the non-testifying analyst's lab statements were introduced for their truth or for another purpose. The Court rejected Arizona's argument that the statements were only used to show the basis of the non-testifying expert opinion, not for their truth.  Evidentiary rules do not control whether a statement is admitted for its truth; this is a constitutional question. When an expert conveys out-of-court statements to support their opinion, and those statements only support the opinion if true, then the statements have been offered for their truth. The jury cannot evaluate the expert's credibility without assessing the truth of the underlying statements. In this case, the expert's testimony relied entirely on accepting the non-testifying analyst's statements as true. His opinions were predicated on the truth of what the analyst reported about her lab work. Allowing this practice would undermine previous decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming and allow easy evasion of the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, the non-testifying analyst's statements were introduced for their truth, violating Smith's confrontation rights if the statements were testimonial. The Court remanded for determination of whether the statements were testimonial by looking at each statement's “primary purpose.” Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch did not join the Court's analysis of when a statement is “testimonial,” and each wrote separately to explain how they differed. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, arguing that the majority unnecessarily complicated the matter and should have found that the testimony sought to prove the truth of the statements and was, therefore, inadmissible hearsay subject to the Confrontation Clause. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does 18 U-S-C § 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violate the Second Amendment?    The case was decided on June 21, 2024. The Supreme Court held that when an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fundamental but not unlimited. When examining a challenged regulation, the Court considers whether it is consistent with historical principles, not necessarily identical to historical laws. The key factors are why and how the regulation burdens the right. Section 922(g)(8) fits within this tradition. Historically, two legal regimes addressed firearms violence: surety laws and “going armed” laws. Surety laws allowed magistrates to require bonds from individuals suspected of future misbehavior, including firearm misuse. “Going armed” laws prohibited carrying weapons in a way that terrified the public. Both regimes targeted individuals who posed threats to others' safety. Section 922(g)(8) is relevantly similar to these historical laws. It applies to individuals found by a court to threaten others' physical safety, just as the historical laws did. The burden it imposes—temporary disarmament based on a judicial finding—is also consistent with historical practice. While not identical to historical laws, Section 922(g)(8) aligns with the principles underlying the Second Amendment and historical firearm regulations aimed at preventing violence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, opining that the Court correctly applied its decision in Bruen, but she continues to believe that Bruen was incorrectly decided. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, emphasizing that while Section 922(g)(8) can be constitutional in some applications, the Court's ruling is narrow and leaves open many questions about the law's constitutionality in other specific circumstances. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion to review the proper roles of text, history, and precedent in constitutional interpretation. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion, noting that two years' after Bruen, it is now clear that the unclear legal standard established in Bruen is difficult for lower courts to apply. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion, acknowledging lower courts' struggle to apply Bruen but pointing out that in this case, the Court settles on just the right level of generality Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that not a single historical regulation justifies the statute at issue. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

In this case, the court considered this issue: May a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim proceed as to a baseless criminal charge so long as other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause?     The case was decided on June 20, 2024.  The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice, the presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. First, the Court considered the Fourth Amendment issue. A Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim can proceed even when a baseless charge is accompanied by a valid charge. This is because a pretrial detention must be based on probable cause, and if an invalid charge causes a detention to start or continue, the Fourth Amendment is violated, even if a valid charge also exists. Second, looking at the common law tort of malicious prosecution, which was analogous to Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims when §1983 was enacted. Historical evidence shows that courts assessed probable cause on a charge-by-charge basis, and a plaintiff could bring a malicious prosecution claim for groundless charges even if they were coupled with well-founded ones. Based on these two lines of reasoning, the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's categorical rule that barred Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims if any charge was valid and concluded that courts should evaluate such suits on a charge-by-charge basis. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, reiterating Justice Alito's prior opinion (in which Justice Thomas joined) that a “malicious prosecution claim cannot be based on the Fourth Amendment.” Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports a malicious prosecution claim. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Diaz v United States.      In this case, the court considered this issue: Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), may a governmental expert witness testify that couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters to prove that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs?    The case was decided on June 20, 2024. The Supreme Court held that expert testimony that “most people” in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about “the defendant” and thus does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) is a narrow exception to the general admissibility of ultimate issue opinions established by Rule 704(a). It only prohibits expert opinions about whether a specific defendant had a particular mental state that is an element of the crime or defense. It does not bar testimony about the mental states of people in general or groups that may include the defendant. Moreover, the language of Rule 704(b), particularly the word “about,” supports the conclusion that the rule targets specific conclusions about a defendant's mental state, not just any testimony related to mental states. This interpretation is further supported by the context of Rule 704(a), which allows opinions embracing ultimate issues, making Rule 704(b) a narrow exception to that broader rule. Justice Kentanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion to emphasize that, as Congress designed it, Rule 704(b) is party agnostic. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the majority's interpretation allows prosecutors to put an expert on the stand to testify as to what “most” people like the defendant think when they commit a legally proscribed act and then merely convince the jury that the defendant is like “most” people and convict. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Garland v Cargill.      In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a bump stock device a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U-S-C § 5845(b)? The case was decided on June 14, 2024. The Supreme Court held that ATF exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a Rule that classifies a bump stock as a “machinegun” under 26 U-S-C § 5845(b). Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. First, a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock does not fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger.” The phrase “function of the trigger” refers to the physical movement of the trigger that activates the firing mechanism. With or without a bump stock, a semiautomatic rifle requires the trigger to be released and reset between each shot. The bump stock merely accelerates the rate of fire by causing these distinct trigger functions to occur in rapid succession, but it does not change the fundamental operation of the firearm. Each shot still requires a separate trigger function. Second, even if a bump stock-equipped rifle could fire multiple shots by a single trigger function, it would not do so “automatically” as required by the statute. Firing multiple shots with a bump stock requires ongoing manual input from the shooter, who must maintain the right amount of forward pressure on the rifle's front grip. This additional manual input goes beyond the “single function of the trigger” specified in the statute. In contrast, with a traditional machinegun, simply holding down the trigger causes continuous fire without additional manipulation. Because a bump stock requires this extra physical input, it does not meet the “automatically” requirement of the statutory definition. Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion suggesting that Congress can amend § 5845(b) if it wants to treat semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks as the same as machineguns. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, arguing that the majority adopts a narrow understanding of “machinegun” that is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the statutory text and unsupported by context or purpose. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Campos-Chaves v Garland.      In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the government provide adequate notice under 8 U-S-C § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information? The case was decided on June 14, 2024. The Supreme Court held that because each of the noncitizens in this case received a proper notice for the removal hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed from the United States, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). Justice Samuel Alito authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The phrase “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” in §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) means that either a paragraph (1) notice to appear (NTA) or a paragraph (2) notice of hearing can suffice to defeat rescission. The word “or” is typically disjunctive, and the statutory context supports this reading. The notice that “matters” for purposes of rescission is the one that informed the noncitizen of the time and date of the missed hearing at which they were ordered removed. This aligns with §1229a(b)(5)(A), which ties “the written notice” to the specific missed proceeding. A paragraph (2) notice can stand alone and provide valid notice, even if the initial NTA was deficient. The terms “change” and “new” in paragraph (2) do not require a prior compliant NTA.  Here, the noncitizens received proper paragraph (2) notices for the hearings they missed, even though their initial NTAs lacked time and place information. Therefore, they cannot seek rescission based on defective notice. While the government must still provide an NTA, noncitizens who receive only a paragraph (2) notice must attend the hearing or face removal in absentia. They can raise issues about incomplete notice at that time. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Jackson argued that the majority's interpretation misreads the plain text of the statute and ignores the indispensable role of a compliant notice to appear (NTA) under §1229(a)(1). She contends that a paragraph (2) notice cannot stand alone and presupposes a valid NTA, as evidenced by the statute's structure, language, and context. This reading aligns with the Court's previous statements in Pereira and Niz-Chavez, and the majority's different interpretation disrupts Congress's carefully crafted removal scheme, which balances efficiency with fairness and procedural integrity. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in United States Trustee v John Q. Hammons Fall 2006.      In this case, the court considered this issue: Must the U.S. Trustee issue refunds for the extra fees paid by debtors in certain districts to address the lack of uniformity identified in Siegel v Fitzgerald? The case was decided on June 14, 2024. The Supreme Court held that refunds are not required; rather, prospective parity—i.e., requiring equal fees for otherwise identical Chapter 11 debtors going forward—is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel v Fitzgerald. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. To determine the appropriate remedy, the Court considers what Congress would have intended had it known about the constitutional problem. Congress has demonstrated a strong commitment to keeping the U.S. Trustee program self-funded through user fees, as evidenced by the 2017 fee increase and the 2021 Act maintaining elevated fees. Providing refunds would significantly disrupt the statutory scheme by transforming the self-funded U.S. Trustee program into a $326 million bill for taxpayers. It would also likely exacerbate the existing fee disparity. Moreover, Congress chose not to impose higher fees retroactively on Bankruptcy Administrator districts when it amended the fee statute in 2021, indicating it did not intend such a remedy. Thus, Congress would have wanted prospective fee parity, which is what Congress itself implemented in the 2021 Act. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that the Court's decision undermines the importance of constitutional remedies and may have far-reaching negative consequences beyond the bankruptcy context. Justice Gorsuch would conclude that under traditional remedial principles, Hammons should receive a refund for the unconstitutional fees it paid. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in FDA v Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine.      In this case, the court considered these issues: 1. Do respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration's 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone's approved conditions of use? 2. Were the FDA's 2016 and 2021 approvals of mifepristone arbitrary and capricious? 3. Did the district court properly grant preliminary relief?   The case was decided on June 13, 2024. The Supreme Court held that Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and other plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory actions regarding mifepristone. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The plaintiff doctors and medical associations, none of whom prescribe or use mifepristone, do not allege direct monetary injuries, property injuries, or physical injuries from FDA's actions relaxing the regulation of mifepristone. Rather, they have legal, moral, ideological, and policy concerns about abortion. While these concerns are legitimate, they do not suffice on their own to confer Article III standing to sue in federal court. Given the broad and comprehensive conscience protections guaranteed by federal law, the plaintiffs have not shown that FDA's actions will cause them to suffer any conscience injury. Additionally, the causal link between FDA's regulatory actions and the alleged monetary and related injuries (e.g., diverting resources, increased risk of liability suits, potentially increasing insurance costs) is too speculative or attenuated to establish standing. Finally, the medical associations have not demonstrated organizational standing. Thus, even if true that no one would be able to challenge FDA's actions if the plaintiffs cannot, the Court has long rejected this “if not us, who?" argument as a basis for standing. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion reiterating that associational (or organizational) standing is simply another form of third-party standing and that the Court should, in another case, explain just how the Constitution permits associational standing. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support