The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

Rutherford v. United States | 11/12/25 | Docket #: 24-820 24-820 RUTHERFORD V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 360 CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-860 CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The compassionate-release statute permits courts to reduce a prisoner's sentence if the court finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress placed only two limits on what can count as an "extraordinary and compelling reason": (1) it must be "consistent with" "applicable policy statements" from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, id .; and (2) "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extra- ordinary and compelling reason," 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Sections 401 and 403 of the First Step Act of 2018 reduced penalties for certain drug and firearm offenses going forward. Because of these changes, individuals sentenced today for these offenses often face mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment decades shorter than they would have received before the First Step Act. The question presented is: Whether, as four circuits permit but six others prohibit, a district court may consider disparities created by the First Step Act's prospective changes in sentencing law when deciding if "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1904

Fernandez v. United States | 11/12/25 | Docket #: 24-556 24-556 FERNANDEZ V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 420 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A COMBINATION OF “ EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS ” THAT MAY WARRANT A DISCRETIONARY SENTENCE REDUCTION UNDER 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A) CAN INCLUDE REASONS THAT MAY ALSO BE ALLEGED AS GROUNDS FOR VACATUR OF A SENTENCE UNDER 28 U. S. C. §2255.   CERT. GRANTED 5/27/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court has broad discretion to reduce the term of imprisonment in any case if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." The sole limitation Congress placed on that discretion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 994(t), which provides that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." In reversing the district court's grant of compassionate release to Joe Fernandez, the Second Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have considered evidence bearing on Fernandez's potential innocence as well to have found a disparity in sentences between Fernandez and several of his co-defendants who were cooperating witnesses. That decision was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted with respect to matters they may consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than as set forth by Congress. The question presented is: Whether the Second Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (A). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-3122

GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal | 11/10/25 | Docket #: 24-758 24-758 THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. MENOCAL DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4544184 CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals "have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." This Court has held that certain orders are immediately appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such "collateral orders" include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and state sovereign immunity. The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order denying a government contractor's claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1409

Landor v. LA DOC | 11/10/25 | Docket #: 23-1197 23-1197 LANDOR V. LA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS DECISION BELOW: 82 F.4th 337 CERT. GRANTED 6/23/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Congress has enacted two "sister" statutes to protect religious exercise: the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq ., and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq . In Tanzin v. Tanvir , 592 U.S. 43 (2020), this Court held that an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RFRA. RLUIPA's relevant language is identical. The question presented is whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-30686

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, President of U.S. | 11/05/25 | Docket #: 24-1287 24-1287 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. V. TRUMP DECISION BELOW: THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED WITH 25-250 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.       CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. ("IEEPA") permits the President, upon a valid emergency declaration, to "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest[.]" Id. § l 702(a)(1)(B). Until now, no President in IEEPA's nearly 50-year history has ever invoked it to impose tariffs-let alone the sweeping worldwide tariffs imposed pursuant to the executive orders challenged here. The question presented is: Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5202

Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist | 11/04/25 | Docket #: 24-724 24-724 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP V. PALMQUIST DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 294 CERT. GRANTED 4/28/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Respondents, citizens of Texas, filed this products-liability suit in state court against Petitioners Hain Celestial Group, Inc., then a citizen of Delaware and New York, and Whole Foods, Inc., a citizen of Texas. Hain removed based on diversity jurisdiction, arguing that Whole Foods should be dismissed as fraudulently joined. The district court agreed, dismissing Whole Foods with prejudice. After two additional years of federal- court litigation and a two-week jury trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Hain. On appeal, without ruling on the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing Whole Foods, vacated the final judgment, and ordered the matter remanded to state court to start from scratch. Relying on Respondents' post- removal amended complaint, the panel held, in conflict with several other courts of appeals, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment as to the completely diverse parties before it. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal. 2. Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40197

Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton | 11/04/25 | Docket #: 24-808 24-808 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS, INC. V. BURTON DECISION BELOW: 109 F.4th 438 CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Well-settled legal principles dictate that a judgment entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction is void. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) authorizes federal courts to vacate a judgment when it is void. A motion seeking vacatur, however, "must be made within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Each of the United States Courts of Appeals other than the Sixth Circuit holds that there is effectively no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment, notwithstanding Rule 60(c)(1)'s "reasonable time" requirement, when the judgment is obtained in the absence of personal jurisdiction. The common thinking among these circuits is that a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void ab initio. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the sole outlier. In this case, it held that Rule 60(c)(1) governs the timing of a motion seeking vacatur of a void judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). The question presented is: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5881

Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | 11/03/25 | Docket #: 24-924 24-924 HENCELY V. FLUOR CORP. DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 412 CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Former U.S. Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely was critically and permanently injured by a suicide bomber inside Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. The bomber, Ahmad Nayeb, worked on base for a government contractor. An Army investigation found that the attack's primary contributing factor was the contractor's actions in breach of its Army contract and in violation of the military's instructions to supervise Nayeb. Hencely sued the government contractor for negligence under South Carolina law. He did not sue the military under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Even so, the Fourth Circuit held that Hencely's state claims are preempted by unspoken "federal interests" emanating from an FTCA exception. Invoking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. , 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the court of appeals held that the FTCA's exception immunizing the government for "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces ... during time of war," 28 U.S.C. §2680(j), barred Hencely's South Carolina claims against the contractor . The decision below reaffirmed a 3-1-1 split among the Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits over Boyle 's reach when contractors defend against state tort claims by invoking §2680(j). The question presented is: Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1994

Rico v. United States | 11/03/25 | Docket #: 24-1056 24-1056 RICO V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 720900 CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-2662

Case v. Montana | 10/15/25 | Docket #: 24-624 24-624 CASE V. MONTANA DECISION BELOW: 553 P.3d 985 CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: DA 23-0136

Louisiana v. Callais | 10/15/25 | Docket #: 24-109 Background: Louisiana was ordered by federal courts to create a second majority-Black congressional district to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The Louisiana Legislature responded by passing S.B. 8, which created the required second majority-Black district. However, a different federal court then ruled that S.B. 8 was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander and blocked its implementation. The Core Issue: Can a state be required to create a majority-minority district under the Voting Rights Act, but then have that same district struck down as unconstitutional racial gerrymandering? Louisiana argues this creates an impossible legal bind. Questions Before the Court: Whether the lower court erred in finding that race predominated in drawing S.B. 8, whether the map fails strict scrutiny review, whether certain legal tests were properly applied, and whether courts should even be deciding these redistricting disputes. Current Status: The case has been restored for reargument. The Court has ordered supplemental briefing on whether intentionally creating majority-minority districts violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. Significance: This case could reshape how states balance Voting Rights Act compliance with constitutional requirements, potentially affecting redistricting nationwide.

Ellingburg v. United States | 10/14/25 | Docket #: 24-482 24-482 ELLINGBURG V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 113 F.4th 839 JOHN F. BASH, ESQUIRE, OF AUSTIN, TEXAS, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE , IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW. CERT. GRANTED 4/7/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-3129

Bowe v. United States | 10/14/25 | Docket #: 24-5438 24-5438 BOWE V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: CA 11 ORDER 6/27/2024 KASDIN M. MITCHELL, ESQUIRE, OF DALLAS, TEXAS, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW AS TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI. CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), “[ a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. ” (emphasis added). The first question presented is: Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. * * * Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), “[ t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari. ” (emphasis added). The second question presented is: Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-11704

USPS v. Konan | 10/08/25 | Docket #: 24-351 24-351 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE V. KONAN DECISION BELOW: 96 F.4th 799 CERT. GRANTED 4/21/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq .), generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity for suits seeking damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of an employee of the federal government "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The FTCA, however, excepts from that waiver of immunity "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." 28 U.S.C. 2680(b). The question presented is as follows: Whether a plaintiff's claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Service employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of "the loss" or "miscarriage" of letters or postal matter. 28 U.S.C. 2680(b). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10179

Bost v. IL Bd. of Elections | 10/08/25 | Docket #: 24-568 24-568 BOST V. ILLINOIS BOARD OF ELECTIONS DECISION BELOW: 114 F.4th 634 CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day. The sole question presented here is whether Petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-2644

Barrett v. United States | 10/07/25 | Docket #: 24-5774 24-5774 BARRETT V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 102 F.4th 60 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CHARLES L. McCLOUD, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE , IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW. CERT. GRANTED 3/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: I. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree. II. Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c) (3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor , 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1379

Chiles v. Salazar | 10/07/25 | Docket #: 24-539 24-539 CHILES V. SALAZAR DECISION BELOW: 116 F.4th 1178 CERT. GRANTED 3/10/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Kaley Chiles is a licensed counselor who helps people by talking with them. A practicing Christian, Chiles believes that people flourish when they live consistently with God's design, including their biological sex. Many of her clients seek her counsel precisely because they believe that their faith and their relationship with God establishes the foundation upon which to understand their identity and desires. But Colorado bans these consensual conversations based on the viewpoints they express. Its content- and viewpoint-based Counseling Restriction prohibits counseling conversations with minors that might encourage them to change their "sexual orientation or gender identity, including efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions," while allowing conversations that provide "[a]cceptance, support, and understanding for ... identity exploration and development, including ... [a]ssistance to a person undergoing gender transition." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12- 245-202(3.5). The Tenth Circuit upheld this ban as a regulation of Chiles's conduct, not speech. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split between the Eleventh and Third Circuits, which do not treat counseling conversations as conduct, and the Ninth Circuit, which does. The question presented is: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1445, 23-1002

Villarreal v. Texas | 10/06/25 | Docket #: 24-557 24-557 VILLARREAL V. TEXAS DECISION BELOW: 707 S.W.3d 138 CERT. GRANTED 4/7/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: PD-0048-20

Berk v. Choy | 10/06/25 | Docket #: 24-440 24-440 BERK V. CHOY DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 5354482 CERT. GRANTED 3/10/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: This case presents a clear, recognized, entrenched conflict over an important question about the application of state procedural rules in federal court. Delaware, like numerous states, requires that in certain actions the plaintiff must also file an affidavit of merit ("AOM") with the complaint. See 18 Del. C. § 6853. An AOM is an affidavit signed by an expert stating that there are reasonable grounds to believe that each defendant has committed the alleged misconduct. See id. § 6853(a)(l). The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits hold that AOM provisions and comparable statutes do not govern actions in federal court because they answer the same question as-and therefore conflict with-several different Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Third and Tenth circuits, in contrast, hold that they present "no conflict" with any Federal Rules. In the decision below, the Third Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, for at least the fifth time, refused to hold that an AOM statute conflicts with any Federal Rules. Judge Phipps "concur[red] in only the judgment." Third Circuit precedent required him to vote to affirm, he explained, but ''writing on a clean slate ... he may not [have] arrive[d] at that same conclusion." The question presented is: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1620

Trump v. CASA, Inc. | 05/15/25 | Docket #: 24A884

OK Charter School Board v. Drummond | 04/30/25 | Docket #: 24-394

Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis | 04/29/25 | Docket #: 24-304

Martin v. United States | 04/29/25 | Docket #: 24-362

Soto v. United States | 04/28/25 | Docket #: 24-320

A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools | 04/28/25 | Docket #: 24-249

Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | 04/23/25 | Docket #: 24-7

CIR v. Zuch | 04/22/25 | Docket #: 24-416

Mahmoud v. Taylor | 04/22/25 | Docket #: 24-297

Parrish v. United States | 04/21/25 | Docket #: 24-275

Kennedy, Sec. of H&HS v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | 04/21/25 | Docket #: 24-316

Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | 04/02/25 | Docket #: 23-1275

Fuld v. PLO | 04/01/25 | Docket #: 24-20

Rivers v. Guerrero | 03/31/25 | Docket #: 23-1345

Catholic Charities Bureau v. WI Labor Review Comm'n | 03/31/25 | Docket #: 24-154

FCC v. Consumers' Research | 03/26/25 | Docket #: 24-354

Oklahoma v. EPA | 03/25/25 | Docket #: 23-1067

EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | 03/25/25 | Docket #: 23-1229

Riley v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | 03/24/25 | Docket #: 23-1270

Louisiana v. Callais | 03/24/25 | Docket #: 24-109

NRC v. Texas | 03/05/25 | Docket #: 23-1300

Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | 03/04/25 | Docket #: 23-1141

BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman | 03/03/25 | Docket #: 23-1259

CCDevas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. | 03/03/25 | Docket #: 23-1201

Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | 02/26/25 | Docket #: 23-1039

Perttu v. Richards | 02/25/25 | Docket #: 23-1324

Esteras v. United States | 02/25/25 | Docket #: 23-7483

Gutierrez v. Saenz | 02/24/25 | Docket #: 23-7809

Cunningham v. Cornell University | 01/22/25 | Docket #: 23-1007

Barnes v. Felix | 01/22/25 | Docket #: 23-1239

McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp. | 01/21/25 | Docket #: 23-1226

FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | 01/21/25 | Docket #: 23-1187