Podcasts about why we lost a general

Retired General Dan Bolger steps into the spotlight with a trove of hard-hitting insights from his book "Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars," offering a poignant reflection on the sobering realities of America's military interventions. As we discuss the recent withdrawal from Afghanistan, General Bolger draws sharp parallels to Vietnam, cautioning against the pitfalls of overconfidence and the complex cultural intricacies of conflict zones. The conversation unveils the nuanced tapestry of military strategy and leadership, providing a riveting narrative that promises to reshape your understanding of global military dynamics.This episode peels back the layers of America's military history, tracing the lines from strategic containment to the pivotal post-9/11 era that redefined global terrorism and warfare. General Bolger's expertise guides us through the operational mazes of Afghanistan and Iraq, spotlighting the contrasts between conventional warfare and the guerrilla tactics that have shaped today's insurgencies. A detailed analysis of the challenges faced by American forces and the Afghan leadership paints a stark picture of the strategic missteps and the vital lessons that emerged amidst the dust of conflict.As we conclude, General Bolger urges a contemplative approach to understanding the strategic failures in Afghanistan, akin to the thorough British Chilcot Report. We consider the future of the country in the hands of a younger generation versed in guerrilla warfare and ponder the global implications of America's military engagements. General Bolger's seasoned perspectives, drawn from a storied career and a keen historical lens, offer an invaluable masterclass in the art of war and the weighty decisions of those who lead nations into battle. Support the show

In 2014 Lt. Gen. Daniel Bolger published his book Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghan Wars. Seven years before the fall of Kabul, he had already foreseen the chaotic end of that campaign in the Global War on Terrorism. Bolger says there is much blame to go around but focuses his fire on his profession and colleagues: the senior leadership of the U.S. military. In this episode, General Bolger joins Jim and Mike to discuss why we lost and what we need to do to win our wars in the future.

Retired General Dan Bolger, author of Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.Daniel P. Bolger of Aurora, Illinois is an author, historian, and retired Lieutenant General of the United States Army. He currently holds a special faculty appointment in the Department of History at North Carolina State University, where he teaches military history. Lt. Gen. Bolger retired in 2013 from the Army.Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars Paperback – November 3, 2015https://www.amazon.com/Why-We-Lost-Daniel-Bolger/dp/0544570413Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/TheDarrellmcclainshow)

Retired General Dan Bolger, author of Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, joins The Realignment's season premiere to discuss the rise and fall of America's post-9/11 military interventions.

Join us as Carlos explores why we lost in Iraq and Afghanistan with General Dan Bolger. Lt. Gen. Daniel Bolger (Ret.), served 35 years in the U.S. Army before retiring in 2013. He commanded the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team in Iraq in 2005-06, the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad in 2009-10, and the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2013. His recent book is Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.

Join us as Carlos explores how are we handling the middle east crisis with General Dan Bolger. Lt. Gen. Daniel Bolger (Ret.), served 35 years in the U.S. Army before retiring in 2013. He commanded the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team in Iraq in 2005-06, the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad in 2009-10, and the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2013. His recent book is Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.

During the past several years, numerous books and articles have appeared that grapple with the legacy and lessons of the recent U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This development should surprise few. The emergence of the jihadist group ISIS in Iraq and Syria raises profound questions about what the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 accomplished. It also raises important questions about the manner in which the United States left Iraq, including the decision to evacuate all American troops from the country in 2011. As the U.S. continues to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, commentators continue to debate the future of this country in light of the Taliban’s enduring strength and doubts about the effectiveness of the Afghan government. In his new book Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), the retired General Daniel Bolger analyzes the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from the perspective of a retired general who commanded troops during these conflicts. Written in a clear, easy-to-follow style, Bolger explains how a mixture of flawed assumptions, arrogance, and poor strategic decisions doomed the United States to “lose” these wars. Instead of blaming civilian leaders for botching the execution, he explains how the military leadership failed to develop a long-term strategy well suited to winning these wars as they turned into counterinsurgency conflicts. He even criticizes U.S. military leaders, including himself, for not driving home the point that building stable, prosperous countries in Iraq and Afghanistan would probably require a permanent commitment of U.S. troops (i.e., like Korea) and the expenditure of American resources well into the future. Along with taking military leaders to task, Bolger also addresses a number of misconceptions about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.For example, he shows the limitations of suggesting that the United States “missed” an opportunity to capture Osama bin Laden before he escaped to Pakistan near the end of 2001. He also helps clear up misapprehensions about the U.S. failure to find WMDs in Iraq after the invasion took place and the successes of the Iraqi “surge.” In sharp contrast to accounts that focus on destructive impact of U.S. military might, Bolger provides an excellent account of how fears of civilian casualties in Afghanistan limited the use of firepower in ways that increased the casualty rates of American troops. However readers evaluate Bolger’s arguments and insights, they will benefit from reading his book. With humility and candor, he makes the important point that there is no time like the present to begin analyzing the lessons of the past so American military leaders and politicians will not repeat the mistakes that they made in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drawing on the lessons of history and limitations of human nature, he also reminds Americans that the do not have it within their grasp to transform “foreign” societies into liberal-democratic states in the near future and rid the world of terrorism once and for all. Recognizing the limits of their power, Americans can best serve the world by conducting “limited” military operations designed to “contain” threats, thereby buying time for groups of people like the Iraqis and Afghans to build their own brighter futures. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

During the past several years, numerous books and articles have appeared that grapple with the legacy and lessons of the recent U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This development should surprise few. The emergence of the jihadist group ISIS in Iraq and Syria raises profound questions about what the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 accomplished. It also raises important questions about the manner in which the United States left Iraq, including the decision to evacuate all American troops from the country in 2011. As the U.S. continues to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, commentators continue to debate the future of this country in light of the Taliban’s enduring strength and doubts about the effectiveness of the Afghan government. In his new book Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), the retired General Daniel Bolger analyzes the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from the perspective of a retired general who commanded troops during these conflicts. Written in a clear, easy-to-follow style, Bolger explains how a mixture of flawed assumptions, arrogance, and poor strategic decisions doomed the United States to “lose” these wars. Instead of blaming civilian leaders for botching the execution, he explains how the military leadership failed to develop a long-term strategy well suited to winning these wars as they turned into counterinsurgency conflicts. He even criticizes U.S. military leaders, including himself, for not driving home the point that building stable, prosperous countries in Iraq and Afghanistan would probably require a permanent commitment of U.S. troops (i.e., like Korea) and the expenditure of American resources well into the future. Along with taking military leaders to task, Bolger also addresses a number of misconceptions about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.For example, he shows the limitations of suggesting that the United States “missed” an opportunity to capture Osama bin Laden before he escaped to Pakistan near the end of 2001. He also helps clear up misapprehensions about the U.S. failure to find WMDs in Iraq after the invasion took place and the successes of the Iraqi “surge.” In sharp contrast to accounts that focus on destructive impact of U.S. military might, Bolger provides an excellent account of how fears of civilian casualties in Afghanistan limited the use of firepower in ways that increased the casualty rates of American troops. However readers evaluate Bolger’s arguments and insights, they will benefit from reading his book. With humility and candor, he makes the important point that there is no time like the present to begin analyzing the lessons of the past so American military leaders and politicians will not repeat the mistakes that they made in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drawing on the lessons of history and limitations of human nature, he also reminds Americans that the do not have it within their grasp to transform “foreign” societies into liberal-democratic states in the near future and rid the world of terrorism once and for all. Recognizing the limits of their power, Americans can best serve the world by conducting “limited” military operations designed to “contain” threats, thereby buying time for groups of people like the Iraqis and Afghans to build their own brighter futures. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

During the past several years, numerous books and articles have appeared that grapple with the legacy and lessons of the recent U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This development should surprise few. The emergence of the jihadist group ISIS in Iraq and Syria raises profound questions about what the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 accomplished. It also raises important questions about the manner in which the United States left Iraq, including the decision to evacuate all American troops from the country in 2011. As the U.S. continues to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, commentators continue to debate the future of this country in light of the Taliban’s enduring strength and doubts about the effectiveness of the Afghan government. In his new book Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), the retired General Daniel Bolger analyzes the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from the perspective of a retired general who commanded troops during these conflicts. Written in a clear, easy-to-follow style, Bolger explains how a mixture of flawed assumptions, arrogance, and poor strategic decisions doomed the United States to “lose” these wars. Instead of blaming civilian leaders for botching the execution, he explains how the military leadership failed to develop a long-term strategy well suited to winning these wars as they turned into counterinsurgency conflicts. He even criticizes U.S. military leaders, including himself, for not driving home the point that building stable, prosperous countries in Iraq and Afghanistan would probably require a permanent commitment of U.S. troops (i.e., like Korea) and the expenditure of American resources well into the future. Along with taking military leaders to task, Bolger also addresses a number of misconceptions about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.For example, he shows the limitations of suggesting that the United States “missed” an opportunity to capture Osama bin Laden before he escaped to Pakistan near the end of 2001. He also helps clear up misapprehensions about the U.S. failure to find WMDs in Iraq after the invasion took place and the successes of the Iraqi “surge.” In sharp contrast to accounts that focus on destructive impact of U.S. military might, Bolger provides an excellent account of how fears of civilian casualties in Afghanistan limited the use of firepower in ways that increased the casualty rates of American troops. However readers evaluate Bolger’s arguments and insights, they will benefit from reading his book. With humility and candor, he makes the important point that there is no time like the present to begin analyzing the lessons of the past so American military leaders and politicians will not repeat the mistakes that they made in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drawing on the lessons of history and limitations of human nature, he also reminds Americans that the do not have it within their grasp to transform “foreign” societies into liberal-democratic states in the near future and rid the world of terrorism once and for all. Recognizing the limits of their power, Americans can best serve the world by conducting “limited” military operations designed to “contain” threats, thereby buying time for groups of people like the Iraqis and Afghans to build their own brighter futures. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

During the past several years, numerous books and articles have appeared that grapple with the legacy and lessons of the recent U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This development should surprise few. The emergence of the jihadist group ISIS in Iraq and Syria raises profound questions about what the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 accomplished. It also raises important questions about the manner in which the United States left Iraq, including the decision to evacuate all American troops from the country in 2011. As the U.S. continues to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, commentators continue to debate the future of this country in light of the Taliban’s enduring strength and doubts about the effectiveness of the Afghan government. In his new book Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), the retired General Daniel Bolger analyzes the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from the perspective of a retired general who commanded troops during these conflicts. Written in a clear, easy-to-follow style, Bolger explains how a mixture of flawed assumptions, arrogance, and poor strategic decisions doomed the United States to “lose” these wars. Instead of blaming civilian leaders for botching the execution, he explains how the military leadership failed to develop a long-term strategy well suited to winning these wars as they turned into counterinsurgency conflicts. He even criticizes U.S. military leaders, including himself, for not driving home the point that building stable, prosperous countries in Iraq and Afghanistan would probably require a permanent commitment of U.S. troops (i.e., like Korea) and the expenditure of American resources well into the future. Along with taking military leaders to task, Bolger also addresses a number of misconceptions about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.For example, he shows the limitations of suggesting that the United States “missed” an opportunity to capture Osama bin Laden before he escaped to Pakistan near the end of 2001. He also helps clear up misapprehensions about the U.S. failure to find WMDs in Iraq after the invasion took place and the successes of the Iraqi “surge.” In sharp contrast to accounts that focus on destructive impact of U.S. military might, Bolger provides an excellent account of how fears of civilian casualties in Afghanistan limited the use of firepower in ways that increased the casualty rates of American troops. However readers evaluate Bolger’s arguments and insights, they will benefit from reading his book. With humility and candor, he makes the important point that there is no time like the present to begin analyzing the lessons of the past so American military leaders and politicians will not repeat the mistakes that they made in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drawing on the lessons of history and limitations of human nature, he also reminds Americans that the do not have it within their grasp to transform “foreign” societies into liberal-democratic states in the near future and rid the world of terrorism once and for all. Recognizing the limits of their power, Americans can best serve the world by conducting “limited” military operations designed to “contain” threats, thereby buying time for groups of people like the Iraqis and Afghans to build their own brighter futures. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

During the past several years, numerous books and articles have appeared that grapple with the legacy and lessons of the recent U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This development should surprise few. The emergence of the jihadist group ISIS in Iraq and Syria raises profound questions about what the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 accomplished. It also raises important questions about the manner in which the United States left Iraq, including the decision to evacuate all American troops from the country in 2011. As the U.S. continues to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, commentators continue to debate the future of this country in light of the Taliban’s enduring strength and doubts about the effectiveness of the Afghan government. In his new book Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), the retired General Daniel Bolger analyzes the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from the perspective of a retired general who commanded troops during these conflicts. Written in a clear, easy-to-follow style, Bolger explains how a mixture of flawed assumptions, arrogance, and poor strategic decisions doomed the United States to “lose” these wars. Instead of blaming civilian leaders for botching the execution, he explains how the military leadership failed to develop a long-term strategy well suited to winning these wars as they turned into counterinsurgency conflicts. He even criticizes U.S. military leaders, including himself, for not driving home the point that building stable, prosperous countries in Iraq and Afghanistan would probably require a permanent commitment of U.S. troops (i.e., like Korea) and the expenditure of American resources well into the future. Along with taking military leaders to task, Bolger also addresses a number of misconceptions about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.For example, he shows the limitations of suggesting that the United States “missed” an opportunity to capture Osama bin Laden before he escaped to Pakistan near the end of 2001. He also helps clear up misapprehensions about the U.S. failure to find WMDs in Iraq after the invasion took place and the successes of the Iraqi “surge.” In sharp contrast to accounts that focus on destructive impact of U.S. military might, Bolger provides an excellent account of how fears of civilian casualties in Afghanistan limited the use of firepower in ways that increased the casualty rates of American troops. However readers evaluate Bolger’s arguments and insights, they will benefit from reading his book. With humility and candor, he makes the important point that there is no time like the present to begin analyzing the lessons of the past so American military leaders and politicians will not repeat the mistakes that they made in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drawing on the lessons of history and limitations of human nature, he also reminds Americans that the do not have it within their grasp to transform “foreign” societies into liberal-democratic states in the near future and rid the world of terrorism once and for all. Recognizing the limits of their power, Americans can best serve the world by conducting “limited” military operations designed to “contain” threats, thereby buying time for groups of people like the Iraqis and Afghans to build their own brighter futures. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

7 AM - 1 - Lt Gen Daniel P Bolger talks about his new book "Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars". 2 - More with Lt Gen Bolger. 3 - Marshall's News. 4 - Charles Manson's mother-in-be-law-to-be ain't going to the wedding