Podcasts about vikrant reddy

In a Q&A, Brandon Garrett and Vikrant Reddy will discuss the new threats that due process faces and how we can respond by better safeguarding fundamental liberty and property rights. They will discuss why people are tempted to place outcomes before fairness—in society and in the courts. They will explore how new technology, including artificial intelligence, has created new threats to fairness and rights. And they will discuss how people, from judges to local community leaders, can find common ground around defending due process. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Join us for a webinar featuring Vikrant Reddy to discuss the Supreme Court decision in Wooden v. United States. Speaker: — Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow, Charles Koch Institute

Join us for a webinar featuring Vikrant Reddy to discuss the Supreme Court decision in Wooden v. United States. Speaker: — Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow, Charles Koch Institute

Join us for a webinar featuring Vikrant Reddy to discuss the Supreme Court decision in Wooden v. United States.Speaker:-- Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow, Charles Koch Institute

On May 4, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Terry v. United States. The question before the court was whether pre-August 3, 2010, crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act. Vikrant Reddy, Senior Reserch Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.

In Lange v. California, defendant Arthur Lange challenges the application of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment in California state court arguing exigent circumstances should apply only in genuine emergencies – not where the police are in hot pursuit following a misdemeanor traffic violation. Lange argues the evidence supporting his DUI arrest and conviction should be thrown out because it surfaced only after the police followed Lange into his garage following his commission of misdemeanor traffic offenses. California upheld Lange’s conviction favoring a case by case approach to applying the exigent circumstances exception to pursuit following probable cause of a misdemeanor. Other states have adopted a blanket ban on misdemeanors providing the exigent circumstances necessary to justify a warrantless search.In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court will address the split among the states and consider whether pursuit following probable cause of a misdemeanor always qualifies as an exigent circumstance allowing warrantless entry. Oral argument is scheduled for February 24, 2021. Panelists Larry James, Managing Partner at Crabbe Browne & James LLP and General Counsel of the National Fraternal Order of Police, Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice at the Cato Institute, and Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute, will join us to discuss.Featuring: -- Larry James, Managing Partner at Crabbe Browne & James LLP and General Counsel of the National Fraternal Order of Police-- Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice at the Cato Institute-- Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute

On February 24, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Lange v. California. The question before the court was whether the pursuit of a person whom a police officer has probable cause to believe has committed a misdemeanor categorically qualifies as an exigent circumstance sufficient to allow the officer to enter a home without a warrant. In this case, Arthur Lange was driving home on the highway in Sonoma, California when police pursued Lange with the intention of conducting a traffic stop. Police followed Lange home and activated their overhead lights once Lange pulled into his home's driveway. Lange pulled into his garage and the garage door began closing behind him. Police approached Lange and stopped the garage from closing with his foot. After brief questioning as to whether Lange knew he was being pursued, police stated they smelled alcohol on Lange's breath and charged Lange with driving under the influence.The trial court concluded that the officer had probable cause, denied the motion to suppress, and issued a conviction for Lange. Later, a civil court ruled that Lange's arrest was unlawful and an appellate court ruled that the arrest was lawful. On appeal to the California First District Court of Appeal, the court affirmed the conviction.Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute and Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice at the Cato Institute, join us today to discuss this argument and its implications.

In Timbs v. Indiana today, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines is incorporated against the states under the Due Process Clause -- not the Privilege and Immunities Clause -- of the 14th Amendment. In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected Indiana’s argument that a civil forfeiture is not a “fine” and thus its “excessiveness” may not be reviewed. The Court’s ruling has significant implications for the practice of civil forfeiture in the United States, for broader criminal justice policy, and for constitutional interpretation.Vikrant Reddy joins us to discuss the decision and its implicationsFeaturing: Vikrant Reddy, senior research fellow, Charles Koch Institute Teleforum calls are open to all dues paying members of the Federalist Society. To become a member, sign up here. As a member, you should receive email announcements of upcoming Teleforum calls which contain the conference call phone number. If you are not receiving those email announcements, please contact us at 202-822-8138.

In Timbs v. Indiana today, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines is incorporated against the states under the Due Process Clause -- not the Privilege and Immunities Clause -- of the 14th Amendment. In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected Indiana’s argument that a civil forfeiture is not a “fine” and thus its “excessiveness” may not be reviewed. The Court’s ruling has significant implications for the practice of civil forfeiture in the United States, for broader criminal justice policy, and for constitutional interpretation.Vikrant Reddy joins us to discuss the decision and its implicationsFeaturing: Vikrant Reddy, senior research fellow, Charles Koch Institute Teleforum calls are open to all dues paying members of the Federalist Society. To become a member, sign up here. As a member, you should receive email announcements of upcoming Teleforum calls which contain the conference call phone number. If you are not receiving those email announcements, please contact us at 202-822-8138.

Vikrant Reddy, who focuses on state and federal corrections policy, joins Ben Domenech to discuss how states have simultaneously reduced crime and the number of people in their prisons. They also talk police training, drug laws, and civil asset forfeiture. Reddy is the Criminal Justice Reform Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.

On May 30, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions. In 2009, Juan Esquivel-Quintana, who was then 21, pleaded no-contest to a California statutory rape offense after engaging in consensual sex with a 17-year old. California criminalizes “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator,” and for this purpose considers anyone under the age of 18 to be a minor. The Department of Homeland Security then initiated removal proceedings against Esquivel-Quintana under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which allows for the removal of any alien convicted of an aggravated felony, including “sexual abuse of a minor”--though it does not define that phrase. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Esquivel-Quintana’s appeal, concluding that the age difference between Esquivel-Quintana and the minor was sufficiently meaningful for their sexual encounter to qualify as abuse of a minor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, deferring to the BIA’s interpretation, denied Esquivel-Quintana’s petition for further review. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction under a state statute criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21-year-old and a 17-year-old qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor under the INA. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held that in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the ages of the participants, the generic federal definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" requires the age of the victim to be less than 16. Because the California statute of conviction did not fall categorically within that generic federal definition, Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction was not an aggravated felony under the INA. All other members joined in Justice Thomas’s opinion except Justice Gorsuch, who took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- To discuss the case, we have Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.

At the close of the Bosnian civil war, Divna Maslenjak sought refuge for herself and her family in the U.S. due to fear of persecution regarding their Serbian identity in modern-day Bosnia and the threat of reprisal against her husband, who she claimed had evaded military conscription in the Bosnian Serb militia. After the family was granted refuge and Maslenjak became a U.S. citizen, a U.S. court convicted Maslenjak’s husband Ratko on two counts of falsifying claims regarding Serbian military service on U.S. government documents, since Ratko had in fact served in the Serbian military. When Ratko applied for asylum to avoid deportation, Divna Maslenjak admitted to lying about her husband’s military service and was charged with two counts of naturalization fraud for previously denying that she had given false information to a U.S. official. At her trial, jurors were told that a naturalization fraud conviction could be carried out for false claims in Maslenjak’s application process, even if the claims did not affect whether she was approved. Convicted on both counts, Divna Maslenjack faced two years of probation and lost her citizenship. The Sixth Circuit affirmed her conviction, claiming that naturalization fraud did not require proof of a material false statement. -- Vikrant Reddy, a Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute, discussed the potential impact of the recent Supreme Court ruling and the main question of the case: whether immaterial false statements should be a basis for withdrawing an individual’s citizenship.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was used as grounds for the deportation of Juan Esquivel-Quintana, a permanent resident admitted to the U.S. in 2000, after he pled guilty to a California statute in 2009, making sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than the perpetrator a misdemeanor or felony. After the California ruling, Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan where the Department of Homeland Security used INA to remove him from the country. INA states that a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony (ex: sexual abuse of a minor) may be removed from the United States. An immigration judge authorized Esquivel-Quintana’s removal from the country after finding him guilty of sexual abuse of a minor. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the decision without looking at the individual facts of the case; and the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s decision, establishing that BIA should be afforded deference considering an ambiguous statute under Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Additionally, BIA found that the rule of lenity, which favors defendants in the face of ambiguous statutes, did not apply. -- Vikrant Reddy, a Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute, discussed the potential impact of the recent Supreme Court ruling and the main question of the case: whether a California statute’s “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor” should be considered an aggravated felony (i.e. “sexual abuse of a minor”) under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and therefore, require mandatory removal. -- Featuring: Vikrant P. Reddy, Senior Research Fellow, Charles Koch Institute.

A "conservative" way to reduce America's prison population. Vikrant Reddy is from the Texas Public Policy Foundation.  Then, Eric Holder serves up more PC drivel.  And Iowa's agribusiness "refugee" hustle continues to kill Iowans.