Podcast appearances and mentions of monika nalepa

In this special episode of Deep Dive on this Trump Inauguration Day, we revisit the final episode of our limited series "After America" and ask - how does a nation rebuild itself after falling under authoritarian rule? In the series finale of After America, we take you through the harrowing aftermath of an imagined Trump's second presidential term, where democratic institutions were eroded, civil liberties dismantled, and marginalized communities oppressed. We examine the monumental task of transitioning back to democracy and preventing future authoritarian takeovers. We imagine how this era of expanded executive control would eventually collapse under its own corruption and the public's rising discontent. And, we shed light on how transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions and criminal trials, can pave the way for a reconciled and democratic future.But history has its lessons, and so we remember the failures of post-Civil War America, where the lack of transitional justice led to systemic racism and political polarization we're still grappling with today. So, we discuss the necessity of truth-seeking, reparations, and institutional reforms to transitional justice and the establishment of an enduring and healthy democracy. And, we close by emphasizing the importance of vigilance and proactive efforts to safeguard democracy against erosion, underscoring the need for systemic reforms and citizen engagement to ensure a resilient democratic future.Guests: Dr. David Faris, Dr. Monika Nalepa, Dr. Alastair Smith, and Stephen Marche. -------------------------Follow Deep Dive:BlueskyYouTube Email: deepdivewithshawn@gmail.com Music: Majestic Earth - Joystock

How does a nation rebuild itself after falling under authoritarian rule? In the series finale of After America, we take you through the harrowing aftermath of an imagined Trump's second presidential term, where democratic institutions were eroded, civil liberties dismantled, and marginalized communities oppressed. We examine the monumental task of transitioning back to democracy and preventing future authoritarian takeovers. We imagine the dramatic events of a potential January 6, 2025—when Trump's return to power is marked by a controversial certification of the electoral vote, igniting widespread protests and unrest. We imagine how this era of expanded executive control would eventually collapse under its own corruption and the public's rising discontent. And, we shed light on how transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions and criminal trials, can pave the way for a reconciled and democratic future.But history has its lessons, and so we remember the failures of post-Civil War America, where the lack of transitional justice led to systemic racism and political polarization we're still grappling with today. So, we discuss the necessity of truth-seeking, reparations, and institutional reforms to transitional justice and the establishment of an enduring and healthy democracy. And, we close by emphasizing the importance of vigilance and proactive efforts to safeguard democracy against erosion, underscoring the need for systemic reforms and citizen engagement to ensure a resilient democratic future.Guests: Dr. David Faris, Dr. Monika Nalepa, Dr. Alastair Smith, and Stephen Marche. -------------------------Follow Deep Dive:InstagramYouTube Email: deepdivewithshawn@gmail.com Music: Majestic Earth - JoystockAcoustic Folk Instrumental - Hyde

How are authoritarian elites and their collaborators handled in the aftermath of democratic transitions? The modern discipline of documenting transitional justice began with the Nuremberg trials for Nazi perpetrators. The trials shifted the way the international community thinks about accountability for human rights violations committed by authoritarian regimes and are generally the most well-known example of transitional justice. Yet, there exist different procedures of extra-judicial transitional justice—including lustration, truth commissions, and purges—that hold human rights violators accountable and remove them from positions of power without formally sentencing them.In this episode, we speak with Professor Monika Nalepa, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, about her new book After Authoritarianism and her monumental work building the Global Transitional Justice Dataset at the Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability Lab. We talk about the different implications of transitional justice for both leaders and rank-and-file members of authoritarian regimes and the more recent global phenomenon of democratic backsliding.Learn more about After Authoritarianism and read it here.This podcast is produced in partnership with the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts. For more information, please visit their website at ThePearsonInstitute.org Access the transcript here.Podcast Production Credits:Interviewing: Olga Bednarek and Isabella Pestana de Andrade do NascimentoEditing: Nishita KarunProduction: Hannah Balikci

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/german-studies

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/eastern-european-studies

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/law

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University.

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common “rules of the game” and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses. – Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (2010) This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Here are Monika's book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview: Anne Meng's Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes; Bryn Rosenfeld's The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy; Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman's Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century; Milena Ang and Monika Nalepa's chapter ‘What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice' Monika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw's article ‘Clean sweep or picking out the ‘bad apples': the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland'. See also Professor Nalepa's discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release - After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability on the NBN. Monika Nalepa's research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago. Keith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Transitional justice – the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist – has direct implications for democratic processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice have the power to influence who decides to go into politics, can shape politicians' behavior while in office, and can affect how politicians delegate policy decisions. However, these mechanisms are not all alike: some, known as transparency mechanisms, uncover authoritarian collaborators who did their work in secret while others, known as purges, fire open collaborators of the old regime. After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability (Cambridge University Press, 2022) by Dr. Monika Nalepa analyzes this distinction in order to uncover the contrasting effects these mechanisms have on sustaining and shaping the qualities of democratic processes. Using a highly disaggregated global transitional justice dataset, the book shows that mechanisms of transitional justice are far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime, and instead represent the crucial first chapter in a country's democratic story. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Transitional justice – the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist – has direct implications for democratic processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice have the power to influence who decides to go into politics, can shape politicians' behavior while in office, and can affect how politicians delegate policy decisions. However, these mechanisms are not all alike: some, known as transparency mechanisms, uncover authoritarian collaborators who did their work in secret while others, known as purges, fire open collaborators of the old regime. After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability (Cambridge University Press, 2022) by Dr. Monika Nalepa analyzes this distinction in order to uncover the contrasting effects these mechanisms have on sustaining and shaping the qualities of democratic processes. Using a highly disaggregated global transitional justice dataset, the book shows that mechanisms of transitional justice are far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime, and instead represent the crucial first chapter in a country's democratic story. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Transitional justice – the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist – has direct implications for democratic processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice have the power to influence who decides to go into politics, can shape politicians' behavior while in office, and can affect how politicians delegate policy decisions. However, these mechanisms are not all alike: some, known as transparency mechanisms, uncover authoritarian collaborators who did their work in secret while others, known as purges, fire open collaborators of the old regime. After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability (Cambridge University Press, 2022) by Dr. Monika Nalepa analyzes this distinction in order to uncover the contrasting effects these mechanisms have on sustaining and shaping the qualities of democratic processes. Using a highly disaggregated global transitional justice dataset, the book shows that mechanisms of transitional justice are far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime, and instead represent the crucial first chapter in a country's democratic story. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

Transitional justice – the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist – has direct implications for democratic processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice have the power to influence who decides to go into politics, can shape politicians' behavior while in office, and can affect how politicians delegate policy decisions. However, these mechanisms are not all alike: some, known as transparency mechanisms, uncover authoritarian collaborators who did their work in secret while others, known as purges, fire open collaborators of the old regime. After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability (Cambridge University Press, 2022) by Dr. Monika Nalepa analyzes this distinction in order to uncover the contrasting effects these mechanisms have on sustaining and shaping the qualities of democratic processes. Using a highly disaggregated global transitional justice dataset, the book shows that mechanisms of transitional justice are far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime, and instead represent the crucial first chapter in a country's democratic story. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/african-studies

Transitional justice – the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist – has direct implications for democratic processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice have the power to influence who decides to go into politics, can shape politicians' behavior while in office, and can affect how politicians delegate policy decisions. However, these mechanisms are not all alike: some, known as transparency mechanisms, uncover authoritarian collaborators who did their work in secret while others, known as purges, fire open collaborators of the old regime. After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability (Cambridge University Press, 2022) by Dr. Monika Nalepa analyzes this distinction in order to uncover the contrasting effects these mechanisms have on sustaining and shaping the qualities of democratic processes. Using a highly disaggregated global transitional justice dataset, the book shows that mechanisms of transitional justice are far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime, and instead represent the crucial first chapter in a country's democratic story. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/national-security

Transitional justice – the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist – has direct implications for democratic processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice have the power to influence who decides to go into politics, can shape politicians' behavior while in office, and can affect how politicians delegate policy decisions. However, these mechanisms are not all alike: some, known as transparency mechanisms, uncover authoritarian collaborators who did their work in secret while others, known as purges, fire open collaborators of the old regime. After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability (Cambridge University Press, 2022) by Dr. Monika Nalepa analyzes this distinction in order to uncover the contrasting effects these mechanisms have on sustaining and shaping the qualities of democratic processes. Using a highly disaggregated global transitional justice dataset, the book shows that mechanisms of transitional justice are far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime, and instead represent the crucial first chapter in a country's democratic story. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/law

Transitional justice – the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist – has direct implications for democratic processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice have the power to influence who decides to go into politics, can shape politicians' behavior while in office, and can affect how politicians delegate policy decisions. However, these mechanisms are not all alike: some, known as transparency mechanisms, uncover authoritarian collaborators who did their work in secret while others, known as purges, fire open collaborators of the old regime. After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability (Cambridge University Press, 2022) by Dr. Monika Nalepa analyzes this distinction in order to uncover the contrasting effects these mechanisms have on sustaining and shaping the qualities of democratic processes. Using a highly disaggregated global transitional justice dataset, the book shows that mechanisms of transitional justice are far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime, and instead represent the crucial first chapter in a country's democratic story. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars.

Transitional justice – the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist – has direct implications for democratic processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice have the power to influence who decides to go into politics, can shape politicians' behavior while in office, and can affect how politicians delegate policy decisions. However, these mechanisms are not all alike: some, known as transparency mechanisms, uncover authoritarian collaborators who did their work in secret while others, known as purges, fire open collaborators of the old regime. After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability (Cambridge University Press, 2022) by Dr. Monika Nalepa analyzes this distinction in order to uncover the contrasting effects these mechanisms have on sustaining and shaping the qualities of democratic processes. Using a highly disaggregated global transitional justice dataset, the book shows that mechanisms of transitional justice are far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime, and instead represent the crucial first chapter in a country's democratic story. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Transitional justice – the act of reckoning with a former authoritarian regime after it has ceased to exist – has direct implications for democratic processes. Mechanisms of transitional justice have the power to influence who decides to go into politics, can shape politicians' behavior while in office, and can affect how politicians delegate policy decisions. However, these mechanisms are not all alike: some, known as transparency mechanisms, uncover authoritarian collaborators who did their work in secret while others, known as purges, fire open collaborators of the old regime. After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability (Cambridge University Press, 2022) by Dr. Monika Nalepa analyzes this distinction in order to uncover the contrasting effects these mechanisms have on sustaining and shaping the qualities of democratic processes. Using a highly disaggregated global transitional justice dataset, the book shows that mechanisms of transitional justice are far from being the epilogue of an outgoing authoritarian regime, and instead represent the crucial first chapter in a country's democratic story. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose doctoral work focused on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices