Podcasts about sir rodric

No Agenda Episode 1589 - "Valudation" "Valudation" Executive Producers: Sir Roderic Baron of Fancy Gap VA and the surrounding villages Beth Lamber & Maria Hong Karl Zawaddzki Eliza Marotte T & Dan Shaun Associate Executive Producers: William Alston Melissa Reeve Jimmy V Linda Lupatkin Matt Grisham & Aaron Landerville Become a member of the 1590 Club, support the show here Boost us with with Podcasting 2.0 Certified apps: Podverse - Podfriend - Breez - Sphinx - Podstation - Curiocaster - Fountain Title Changes Sir Rodric of Flavortown > Sir Rodric, baron of Fancy Gap VA and the surrounding villages Knights & Dames Aaron Moore > Sir Double A the Wandering Knight Art By: Dame Kenney-Ben kl35402@getalby.com End of Show Mixes: Jesse Coy Nelson - Sir Michaelanthony - Tom Engineering, Stream Management & Wizardry Mark van Dijk - Systems Master Ryan Bemrose - Program Director Back Office Jae Dvorak Chapters: Dreb Scott Clip Custodian: Neal Jones Clip Collectors: Steve Jones & Dave Ackerman NEW: and soon on Netflix: Animated No Agenda No Agenda Social Registration Sign Up for the newsletter No Agenda Peerage ShowNotes Archive of links and Assets (clips etc) 1589.noagendanotes.com Directory Archive of Shownotes (includes all audio and video assets used) archive.noagendanotes.com RSS Podcast Feed Full Summaries in PDF No Agenda Lite in opus format NoAgendaTorrents.com has an RSS feed or show torrents Last Modified 09/10/2023 16:46:25This page created with the FreedomController Last Modified 09/10/2023 16:46:25 by Freedom Controller

Show Notes No Agenda Episode 1330 - "Cattle-lyst Converter" "Cattle-lyst Converter" Direct [link] to the mp3 file ShowNotes Archive of links and Assets (clips etc) 1330.noagendanotes.com Sign Up for the newsletter Archive of Shownotes (includes all audio and video assets used) archive.noagendanotes.com The No Agenda News Network- noagendanewsnetwork.com RSS Podcast Feed Experimental IPFS RSS Feed Get the No Agenda News App for your iPhone and iPad Get the NoAgendDroid app for your Android Phone Torrents of each episode via BitLove document.write("Last Modified " + document.lastModified)This page created with the FreedomController Credits "Cattle-lyst Converter" Executive Producers: Sir Michael Douglas Carlin @blakemichigan Sir Gerald - barber & farmer of Central Kansas Phil Ballou Sir Cal of Lavender Blossoms MATTHEW NAGY Erica Callahan Sir Jackie Sir Andy of Terrigal beach Sir Craig Porter The Ronin, N7FSN Associate Executive Producers: James Foster Dennis Caffrey Sir Rodric of Flavortown Kevin Risinger Baronet Sir Puck of Western NC 1330 Club Members: Sir Michael Douglas Carlin @blakemichigan Sir Gerald - barber & farmer of Central Kansas Become a member of the 1331 Club, support the show here Title Changes SIr Puck of Western NC -> Baronet Puck of Western NC Knights & Dames Michael Carlin -> Sir Michael Douglas Carlin Gerald -> Sir Gerald, Barber & Farmer of Central Kansas Justin Duiguid -> Sir Tifeyed Skeptik Art By: Lottaleen End of Show Mixes: Cord McPhil - Jesse Coy Nelson - Prof JJ Engineering, Stream Management & Wizardry Mark van Dijk - Systems Master Ryan Bemrose - Program Director NEW: and soon on Netflix: Animated No Agenda Sign Up for the newsletter ShowNotes Archive of links and Assets (clips etc) 1330.noagendanotes.com New: Directory Archive of Shownotes (includes all audio and video assets used) archive.noagendanotes.com RSS Podcast Feed Get the No Agenda News App for your iPhone and iPad Get the NoAgendDroid app for your Android Phone No Agenda Lite in opus format NoAgendaTorrents.com has an RSS feed or show torrents document.write("Last Modified " + document.lastModified)This page created with the FreedomController 20351 Keywords

Show Notes No Agenda Episode 1268 - "Quarantine Bonking" "Quarantine Bonking" Direct [link] to the mp3 file ShowNotes Archive of links and Assets (clips etc) 1268.noagendanotes.com Sign Up for the newsletter Archive of Shownotes (includes all audio and video assets used) archive.noagendanotes.com The No Agenda News Network- noagendanewsnetwork.com RSS Podcast Feed Experimental IPFS RSS Feed Get the No Agenda News App for your iPhone and iPad Get the NoAgendDroid app for your Android Phone Torrents of each episode via BitLove document.write("Last Modified " + document.lastModified)This page created with the FreedomController Credits "Quarantine Bonking" Executive Producers: Geoffrey Rozen Anonymous Jeffrey Gunnar Walter Sir Dave, Duke of America's Heartland and the Arabian Peninsula Michael Harrington Cory Sherman Sir Gomberg of the Northeast Legal Isles Baron Oleg Rakitine Sir Kappo of Gunya Beach, Downunder Associate Executive Producers: Keith Larson Anonymous Baron Sir Stephen of Oswego, Sir Mr Peabody LeeAnn Webb Jeffrey Baker Sir Rodric of Flavortown Jethro Jones Martin Williamson Sir Thatbt the black knight of Braves Country Henry Claeys Become a member of the 1269 Club, support the show here Knights & Dames Bryan -> Sir Bryan of the Northern Southtowns Robert Crognale -> Sir Stone Blue - Rock & Roll Sure Helped Me Through Dave Kaplan -> Sir Kappo of Gunya Beach Rodric Lenhart -> Sir Rodric of Flavortown Steven Schnuelle -> Sir Thatbt (that-bee-tee) the black knight of Braves Country Art By: Jordan 33 Engineering, Stream Management & Wizardry Mark van Dijk - Systems Master Ryan Bemrose - Program Director NEW: and soon on Netflix: Animated No Agenda End of Show Mixes: Jesse Coy Nelson - Professor JCJ Sign Up for the newsletter ShowNotes Archive of links and Assets (clips etc) 1268.noagendanotes.com New: Directory Archive of Shownotes (includes all audio and video assets used) archive.noagendanotes.com RSS Podcast Feed Get the No Agenda News App for your iPhone and iPad Get the NoAgendDroid app for your Android Phone No Agenda Lite in opus format NoAgendaTorrents.com has an RSS feed or show torrents document.write("Last Modified " + document.lastModified)This page created with the FreedomController 17266 Keywords

I was still in high school the year the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, 1979. I remember reading about it in Time magazine and watching President Carter denounce it on TV. The Soviets, everyone said, were bent on ruling the world. Detente had been a ploy to lull us to sleep. In Afghanistan, the Communists had renewed their campaign. We had to do something. So we didn’t go to “their” Olympics. Oddly, that brave gesture failed to bring them around to our way of thinking. There are two really wonderful things about Sir Rodric Braithwaite‘s new book Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89 (Oxford UP, 2011). First, Sir Rodric shows in excruciating detail just how wrong we got it. The tiny cabal of Soviet leaders who sent the Red Army into Afghanistan weren’t imperialists pursuing some grand strategy to conquer the globe. They were scared, sometimes confused old men in a situation that was made impossible by conflicting, contradictory aims. They wanted to protect the USSR’s southern boarder; they wanted to keep the US out of the region; they wanted to stop the local Communist Party from turning Afghanistan into another Cambodia; they wanted to protect their personal friends and allies, people they knew, trusted, and liked; and, almost more than anything else, they wanted to give the Afghanis peace, stability, and prosperity so they just wouldn’t have to think about Afghanistan ever again. That’s right, the men in the Kremlin were not evil; they wanted to do good, if only for their own sake. The trouble was–and this brings us to the second wonderful aspect of Sir Rodric’s book–they couldn’t accomplish all these things. They knew this: the horrible example of America’s effort to “help” Vietnam was right before their eyes. But they were frightened, prone to catastrophic thinking, and didn’t want to appear weak. So they had to do something. They couldn’t very well refuse to go to their own Olympics. So, by steps, they invested Afghanistan. First there were advisors. Then there were troops to protect the advisors. Then there was political unrest, calls for help, and the dispatch of larger army units to “restore order.” Order was not restored, so the generals (though not all of them) reasonably asked for more troops. And so it went until the Soviets conquered Afghanistan but did not hold it; ruled it but did not govern it; won every battle in it but lost the war against it. If this sounds familiar to Americans, it should.     Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was still in high school the year the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, 1979. I remember reading about it in Time magazine and watching President Carter denounce it on TV. The Soviets, everyone said, were bent on ruling the world. Detente had been a ploy to lull us to sleep. In Afghanistan, the Communists had renewed their campaign. We had to do something. So we didn’t go to “their” Olympics. Oddly, that brave gesture failed to bring them around to our way of thinking. There are two really wonderful things about Sir Rodric Braithwaite‘s new book Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89 (Oxford UP, 2011). First, Sir Rodric shows in excruciating detail just how wrong we got it. The tiny cabal of Soviet leaders who sent the Red Army into Afghanistan weren’t imperialists pursuing some grand strategy to conquer the globe. They were scared, sometimes confused old men in a situation that was made impossible by conflicting, contradictory aims. They wanted to protect the USSR’s southern boarder; they wanted to keep the US out of the region; they wanted to stop the local Communist Party from turning Afghanistan into another Cambodia; they wanted to protect their personal friends and allies, people they knew, trusted, and liked; and, almost more than anything else, they wanted to give the Afghanis peace, stability, and prosperity so they just wouldn’t have to think about Afghanistan ever again. That’s right, the men in the Kremlin were not evil; they wanted to do good, if only for their own sake. The trouble was–and this brings us to the second wonderful aspect of Sir Rodric’s book–they couldn’t accomplish all these things. They knew this: the horrible example of America’s effort to “help” Vietnam was right before their eyes. But they were frightened, prone to catastrophic thinking, and didn’t want to appear weak. So they had to do something. They couldn’t very well refuse to go to their own Olympics. So, by steps, they invested Afghanistan. First there were advisors. Then there were troops to protect the advisors. Then there was political unrest, calls for help, and the dispatch of larger army units to “restore order.” Order was not restored, so the generals (though not all of them) reasonably asked for more troops. And so it went until the Soviets conquered Afghanistan but did not hold it; ruled it but did not govern it; won every battle in it but lost the war against it. If this sounds familiar to Americans, it should.     Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was still in high school the year the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, 1979. I remember reading about it in Time magazine and watching President Carter denounce it on TV. The Soviets, everyone said, were bent on ruling the world. Detente had been a ploy to lull us to sleep. In Afghanistan, the Communists had renewed their campaign. We had to do something. So we didn’t go to “their” Olympics. Oddly, that brave gesture failed to bring them around to our way of thinking. There are two really wonderful things about Sir Rodric Braithwaite‘s new book Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89 (Oxford UP, 2011). First, Sir Rodric shows in excruciating detail just how wrong we got it. The tiny cabal of Soviet leaders who sent the Red Army into Afghanistan weren’t imperialists pursuing some grand strategy to conquer the globe. They were scared, sometimes confused old men in a situation that was made impossible by conflicting, contradictory aims. They wanted to protect the USSR’s southern boarder; they wanted to keep the US out of the region; they wanted to stop the local Communist Party from turning Afghanistan into another Cambodia; they wanted to protect their personal friends and allies, people they knew, trusted, and liked; and, almost more than anything else, they wanted to give the Afghanis peace, stability, and prosperity so they just wouldn’t have to think about Afghanistan ever again. That’s right, the men in the Kremlin were not evil; they wanted to do good, if only for their own sake. The trouble was–and this brings us to the second wonderful aspect of Sir Rodric’s book–they couldn’t accomplish all these things. They knew this: the horrible example of America’s effort to “help” Vietnam was right before their eyes. But they were frightened, prone to catastrophic thinking, and didn’t want to appear weak. So they had to do something. They couldn’t very well refuse to go to their own Olympics. So, by steps, they invested Afghanistan. First there were advisors. Then there were troops to protect the advisors. Then there was political unrest, calls for help, and the dispatch of larger army units to “restore order.” Order was not restored, so the generals (though not all of them) reasonably asked for more troops. And so it went until the Soviets conquered Afghanistan but did not hold it; ruled it but did not govern it; won every battle in it but lost the war against it. If this sounds familiar to Americans, it should.     Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was still in high school the year the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, 1979. I remember reading about it in Time magazine and watching President Carter denounce it on TV. The Soviets, everyone said, were bent on ruling the world. Detente had been a ploy to lull us to sleep. In Afghanistan, the Communists had renewed their campaign. We had to do something. So we didn't go to “their” Olympics. Oddly, that brave gesture failed to bring them around to our way of thinking. There are two really wonderful things about Sir Rodric Braithwaite‘s new book Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89 (Oxford UP, 2011). First, Sir Rodric shows in excruciating detail just how wrong we got it. The tiny cabal of Soviet leaders who sent the Red Army into Afghanistan weren't imperialists pursuing some grand strategy to conquer the globe. They were scared, sometimes confused old men in a situation that was made impossible by conflicting, contradictory aims. They wanted to protect the USSR's southern boarder; they wanted to keep the US out of the region; they wanted to stop the local Communist Party from turning Afghanistan into another Cambodia; they wanted to protect their personal friends and allies, people they knew, trusted, and liked; and, almost more than anything else, they wanted to give the Afghanis peace, stability, and prosperity so they just wouldn't have to think about Afghanistan ever again. That's right, the men in the Kremlin were not evil; they wanted to do good, if only for their own sake. The trouble was–and this brings us to the second wonderful aspect of Sir Rodric's book–they couldn't accomplish all these things. They knew this: the horrible example of America's effort to “help” Vietnam was right before their eyes. But they were frightened, prone to catastrophic thinking, and didn't want to appear weak. So they had to do something. They couldn't very well refuse to go to their own Olympics. So, by steps, they invested Afghanistan. First there were advisors. Then there were troops to protect the advisors. Then there was political unrest, calls for help, and the dispatch of larger army units to “restore order.” Order was not restored, so the generals (though not all of them) reasonably asked for more troops. And so it went until the Soviets conquered Afghanistan but did not hold it; ruled it but did not govern it; won every battle in it but lost the war against it. If this sounds familiar to Americans, it should.