Podcasts about soviet

How did the young journalist with the quiff haircut and his companion Snowy The Dog feature in Nazi propaganda in the 1940s? What was the origin story of Hergé, the Belgian illustrator who created The Adventures of Tintin? How did an unlikely friendship transform Hergé's life and lead him to draw Tintin crying in a comic strip for the first and only time? Anita and William navigate the turbulent hot waters of Tintin's history from anti-Soviet propaganda, to featuring authentic Chinese calligraphy, to becoming one of the most successful comic book series in the world.  Join the Empire Club: Unlock the full Empire experience – with bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to miniseries and live show tickets, exclusive book discounts, a members-only newsletter, and access to our private Discord chatroom. Sign up directly at empirepoduk.com  For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com. Email: empire@goalhanger.com Instagram: @empirepoduk Blue Sky: @empirepoduk X: @empirepoduk Producer: Anouska Lewis Assistant Producer: Alfie Rowe Executive Producer: Dom Johnson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Peter Robinson sits down at Yale University with the “dean of Cold War historians,” John Lewis Gaddis—Pulitzer Prize–winning biographer of Long Telegram author George F. Kennan and one of America's most influential thinkers on grand strategy. From the origins of the Cold War to the nuclear age, from Vietnam to détente, and from Ronald Reagan to Mikhail Gorbachev, Gaddis offers a masterclass in how nations think, plan, and learn from history. Gaddis explains why students today often have little grasp of the Cold War, how the atomic bomb reshaped global politics, why George Kennan predicted the Soviet collapse decades before it happened, and why détente faltered in the 1970s. He revisits the debates around Vietnam, assesses Ronald Reagan's strategic instincts, and reflects on how the Cold War ultimately ended. The discussion then turns forward: the future of American grand strategy, the challenges posed by China and Russia today, the tension between promoting democracy and maintaining global stability, and why understanding the past is essential for navigating the 21st century. Along the way, Gaddis shares stories of teaching grand strategy, the influence of the classics, his unexpected path from small-town Texas to Yale, and why he remains optimistic about the humanities—and about America. Subscribe to Uncommon Knowledge at hoover.org/uk

Palmer Luckey got fired from Meta for backing the wrong candidate—now he's the hero saving American defense, and that shift tells you everything about how fast the ground moved beneath Silicon Valley's feet. For decades, tech and defense were allies, then came 15 years of hostility so visceral that Google employees revolted over a Pentagon AI contract, and when leadership caved, only three people showed up to hear what border security actually involves. But something broke: COVID exposed our inability to make things, Ukraine revealed wars now iterate in days not decades, and suddenly the Harvard dorm room generation realized the people building satellites and drones weren't just necessary—they were the future, while legacy defense contractors still operate on Soviet-style five-year plans that guarantee cost overruns and obsolescence. Now the question isn't whether Silicon Valley returns to its Cold War roots, but whether America wins by becoming more like China's centralized system or doubles down on the chaotic creativity that built nine of the world's ten most valuable companies in 25 years—and the founders flooding into defense, energy, mining, and manufacturing suggest the second American century is just getting started.Resources:Follow Ben on X: https://x.com/bhorowitzFollow Marc on X: https://x.com/pmarcaFollow Katherine on X: https://x.com/KTmBoyleFollow David on X: https://x.com/daviduFollow Erik on X: https://x.com/eriktorenbergStay Updated:If you enjoyed this episode, be sure to like, subscribe, and share with your friends!Find a16z on X: https://x.com/a16zFind a16z on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/a16zListen to the a16z Podcast on Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/5bC65RDvs3oxnLyqqvkUYXListen to the a16z Podcast on Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/a16z-podcast/id842818711Please note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures.  Stay Updated:Find a16z on XFind a16z on LinkedInListen to the a16z Podcast on SpotifyListen to the a16z Podcast on Apple PodcastsFollow our host: https://twitter.com/eriktorenberg Please note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

After Israel's stunning and unpredictable victory (especially from the Arab perspective) in the War of Independence, there was a colossus of bruised pride in the Arab World. To answer the heretofore imponderable, "How could Israel have been victorious?" a narrative emerged, "We did not lose because Israel was strong, but rather because our leaders were weak." The search began for strong military men who could restore Arab dignity, and the undisputed rising star was Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Nasser was a pan-Arabist who maintained that Arabs were born for greatness and should have had one of the most enduring empires, had they not been victims of colonialism. A Soviet shift in the 1950s pushed them from allies of Israel to adversaries. President Eisenhower, with the very strong support of his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, decided to be stronger aligned with the Arab side in the conflict. Credits One For Israel "DAVID DANCED"  Snare Drum Solo Larry Salzman "Legionnaire" by Scott Buckley AP Archive April 23, 2003 Saddam Walk Around 
Yasuichi Kobayashi Radio Cairo Sound Effects for Free: Goal !!! Norwegian Baron: Russian Federation (1991-) Military March "To Serve Russia" Framesticker: The Benny Goodman Orchestra - Sing Sing Sing (With a Swing)   Syria 1949 – How the CIA Rewired a Nation Historical Documentaries: Nasser: Power, Pan-Arabism And Legacy Of A Leader  The War for Control of the Suez Canal | History of Israel Explained | Unpacked Learn more at TellerFromJerusalem.com Don't forget to subscribe, like and share! Let all your friends know that that they too can have a new favorite podcast. © 2025 Media Education Trust llc  

When Russia invaded Ukraine, hundreds of starving dogs were trapped inside the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. For years, Oregon-based veterinarian Dr. Jenn Betz had been their lifeline. Now, with Putin’s troops occupying the site, she had only one thought: How do I get back there? * Today's episode is a production of iHeartPodcasts and School of Humans. Hosted by Dana Schwartz, Zaron Burnett, and Jason EnglishWritten by Lucas ReillySenior Producer is Josh FisherStory Editor is Virginia PrescottEditing and Sound Design by Jesse NighswongerMixing and Mastering by Jesse NighswongerFrom School of Humans, producers are Emilia Brock, Edeliz Perez and Gabbie WattsResearch and Fact-Checking by Lucas Reilly and Austin ThompsonOriginal Music by Elise McCoyShow Logo by Lucy QuintanillaSocial Clips by Yarberry MediaExecutive Producers are Virginia Prescott and Jason English See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

An Imaginary Cinema: Sergei Eisenstein and the Unrealized Film (Cornell UP, 2024) explores the unfinished cinematic projects developed and abandoned by Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein between 1927 and 1937. Centred on seven major film concepts, the book examines what it means for a work of art—particularly a film—to remain unfinished or unrealised, and how these projects fit within Eisenstein's broader theoretical and practical framework. Offering unique insight into the history of film production in Stalinist Russia, An Imaginary Cinema contrasts Eisenstein's experiences with both the Soviet film industry and Hollywood, and considers the technological transitions that shaped early cinema. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

This week on the Exciting & New podcast, Jason and Andy welcome Jim and Dan back on the show to discuss the 1985 sports flick Rocky IV.  In this installment of the franchise, Rocky travels to Russia to fight the immovable object that is Drago, a Soviet monster of a man, all in the name of avenging Apollo Creed's death. You would think that by the fourth installment of this franchise it would be getting just a bit stale, but the whole Cold War of it all, along with about five Survivor music videos/montages keeps this one moving along at a brisk pace as we wait for Rocky to bring about global peace by the end.  Putin is seen briefly off to the right of Gorbachev planning to end all the niceties in a few years.   Enjoy global harmony while it lasts.  And enjoy the podcast.Jason, Andy and Dana will discuss a 1985 movie weekly, breaking down all the nonsense there within. The 3 hosts all work together and everyone else around them was getting really annoyed at all the movie talk, so they decided to annoy the world in podcast form.Check out previous seasons to hear them discuss 1982, 1983 & 1984 movies, as well as a full season of Love Boat episodes (if that is your thing). Plus one-off specials and a weekly mini "what are we watching" podcast.#jezoo74 #aegonzo1 #danacapoferri #exciting_new

An Imaginary Cinema: Sergei Eisenstein and the Unrealized Film (Cornell UP, 2024) explores the unfinished cinematic projects developed and abandoned by Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein between 1927 and 1937. Centred on seven major film concepts, the book examines what it means for a work of art—particularly a film—to remain unfinished or unrealised, and how these projects fit within Eisenstein's broader theoretical and practical framework. Offering unique insight into the history of film production in Stalinist Russia, An Imaginary Cinema contrasts Eisenstein's experiences with both the Soviet film industry and Hollywood, and considers the technological transitions that shaped early cinema. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/film

An Imaginary Cinema: Sergei Eisenstein and the Unrealized Film (Cornell UP, 2024) explores the unfinished cinematic projects developed and abandoned by Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein between 1927 and 1937. Centred on seven major film concepts, the book examines what it means for a work of art—particularly a film—to remain unfinished or unrealised, and how these projects fit within Eisenstein's broader theoretical and practical framework. Offering unique insight into the history of film production in Stalinist Russia, An Imaginary Cinema contrasts Eisenstein's experiences with both the Soviet film industry and Hollywood, and considers the technological transitions that shaped early cinema. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

An Imaginary Cinema: Sergei Eisenstein and the Unrealized Film (Cornell UP, 2024) explores the unfinished cinematic projects developed and abandoned by Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein between 1927 and 1937. Centred on seven major film concepts, the book examines what it means for a work of art—particularly a film—to remain unfinished or unrealised, and how these projects fit within Eisenstein's broader theoretical and practical framework. Offering unique insight into the history of film production in Stalinist Russia, An Imaginary Cinema contrasts Eisenstein's experiences with both the Soviet film industry and Hollywood, and considers the technological transitions that shaped early cinema. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

An Imaginary Cinema: Sergei Eisenstein and the Unrealized Film (Cornell UP, 2024) explores the unfinished cinematic projects developed and abandoned by Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein between 1927 and 1937. Centred on seven major film concepts, the book examines what it means for a work of art—particularly a film—to remain unfinished or unrealised, and how these projects fit within Eisenstein's broader theoretical and practical framework. Offering unique insight into the history of film production in Stalinist Russia, An Imaginary Cinema contrasts Eisenstein's experiences with both the Soviet film industry and Hollywood, and considers the technological transitions that shaped early cinema. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/art

In Episode 266 of the Mike Drop Podcast, Mike Ritland sits down with Kawa Mawlayee—the first Afghan-born Green Beret—for a raw talk on war, immigration, and identity. Kawa recounts fleeing Soviet-invaded Afghanistan, losing his father, and growing up as a refugee in Nebraska before serving 21 years across the Marines and Army, including Iraq's invasion and the battle of Fallujah. They dive into today's immigration crisis, where Kawa contrasts his own integration with the current border chaos and even imagines how he'd fix ICE. From Fallujah's brutality to the moral injuries of endless wars, Kawa reflects on leadership failures, resilience, and the cost of service—told with the blunt honesty only veterans share. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

In February 1985, the Soviet space station Salyut 7 went dark. Powerless and frozen, it drifted above the Earth—a ghost in orbit. Months later, two cosmonauts attempted an impossible rescue: a manual docking and revival of a lifeless spacecraft. What they found inside would become one of the most haunting moments in the history of human spaceflight. This episode explores the real-life technical miracle behind the Salyut 7 rescue and the eerie “angels in space” story that followed. Were the glowing beings seen by cosmonauts the result of divine intervention, hallucination, or optical illusion? Join Brad, Brent, and Dave as they resurrect this chilling Cold War legend, dissect the myth, and question what really happens when humans stare too long into the void. Includes: The true story of Salyut 7's frozen failure and daring repair The mysterious angel sightings reported in orbit Connections to faith, isolation, and space psychology Listen. Learn. Laugh. Question everything. Support the show & join The Skult: Patreon.com/SofaKingPodcast Merch & SK Gear: SofaKingPodcast.com More Episodes: / @sofakingpodcast Sofakingpodcast.com Produced by Brad Taylor Music by Brad Taylor Full songs available on Patreon "Enter the Sofa King Chamber" "Angels In Orbit" Artwork by Brent Vantassel #Salyut7 #SofaKingPodcast #SpaceMystery #Cosmonauts #UFO #AngelsInOrbit

When World War II ended 80 years ago, the fighting ended but global stability and peace did not emerge. Instead, a "Cold War" between the forces of capitalism and communism, represented by the U.S. and Soviet Union, dominated global politics and led to instability, interventions, wars, a militarized economy, a mass-surveillance National Security State, and so much more---and its legacy continued to this day as we look at Venezuela, Palestine, Iran, and other places across the globe.The U.S. posed the Cold War as a battle between "freedom" and Soviet domination, but that was always a ruse as the Americans held overwhelming dominance in all major military and economic matters. The U.S. had emerged from the war with global hegemony while the USSR had lose about 25 million people, a million farms and factories, and half its economy.So, 80 years later, it's important to examine and understand the role of the U.S. in using its power to create global dominance, disrupt 3rd World development, and destabilize countries across the globe. ----------------------------------

It is the sequel to Sisu (2022). Jorma Tommila reprises his role as Aatami Korpi, with Stephen Lang and Richard Brake joining the cast. After returning in 1946 to Soviet-occupied Karelia, where his family was brutally murdered during World War II, Aatami Korpi, "the man who refuses to die", dismantles his old family house, loads it on a truck, and is determined to rebuild it somewhere safe in their honor. When the Red Army discovers Korpi's arrival on their soil, Igor Draganov, the man who killed his family, comes back hellbent on finishing the job: kill the legendary ex-soldier by any means necessaryHosted by Ausha. See ausha.co/privacy-policy for more information.

Hello again Pacific War Week by Week listeners, it is I your dutiful host Craig Watson with more goodies from my exclusive patreon podcast series. This is actually going to be a two parter specifically looking at the failure and responsibility of Emperor Hirohito during the 15 year war Japan unleashed in 1931. Again a big thanks to all of you for listening all these years, you are all awesome.   Hello everyone, a big thanks to all of you who joined the patreon and voted for this to be the next episode, you all are awesome.    Now I realize very well when I jumped into my former patreon episode on Ishiwara Kanji, I fell into a rabbit hole and it became a rather long series. I wanted to get this one done in a single episode but its also kind of a behemoth subject, so I will do this in two parts: this episode will be on Hirohito's failure and responsibility in regards to the China War from 1931-1941. The next one will cover Hirohito's failure and responsibility in the world war from 1941-1945.   I am not going to cover the entire life of Hirohito, no what I want is to specifically cover his actions from 1931-1945. Nw I want you to understand the purpose of this episode is to destroy a narrative, a narrative that carried on from 1945-1989. That narrative has always been that Emperor Hirohito was nothing more than a hostage during the war years of 1931-1945. This narrative was largely built by himself and the United States as a means of keeping the peace after 1945. However upon his death in 1989 many meeting notes and diaries from those who worked close to him began emerging and much work was done by historians like Herbert P Bix and Francis Pike. The narrative had it that Hirohito was powerless to stop things, did not know or was being misled by those around him, but this is far from the truth. Hirohito was very active in matters that led to the horrors of the 15 year war and he had his own reasons for why or when he acted and when he did not.   For this episode to be able to contain it into a single one, I am going to focus on Hirohito's involvement in the undeclared war with China, that's 1931-1941. For those of you who don't know, China and Japan were very much at war in 1931-1937 and certainly 1937 onwards, but it was undeclared for various reasons. If you guys really like this one, let me know and I can hit Hirohito 1941-1945 which is honestly a different beast of its own.   For those of you who don't know, Hirohito was born on April 29th of 1901, the grandson of Emperor Meiji. Hirohito entered the world right at the dawn of a new era of imperial rivalry in Asia and the Pacific. According to custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. In 1908 he entered elementary education at the age of 7 and would be taught first be General Nogi Maresuke who notoriously did not pamper the prince. Nogi rigorously had Hirohito train in physical education and specifically implanted virtues and traits he thought appropriate for the future sovereign: frugality, diligence, patience, manliness, and the ability to exercise self-control under difficult conditions. Hirohito learnt what hard work was from Nogi and that education could overcome all shortcomings. Emperor Meiji made sure his grandson received military training.   When Emperor Meiji died in 1912, Hirohito's father, Yoshihito took the throne as emperor Taisho. Taisho for a lack of better words, suffered from cerebral meningitis at an early age and this led to cognitive deficiency's and in reality the Genro would really be running the show so to say. When Taisho took the throne it was understood immediately, Hirohito needed to be prepared quickly to take the throne. After Meiji's funeral General Nogi politely told the family he could no longer be a teacher and committed seppuku with his wife. He wrote a suicide letter explained he wanted to expiate his disgrace during the russo japanese war for all the casualties that occurred at Port Arthur, hardcore as fuck. Hirohito would view Nogi nearly as much of an iconic hero as his grandfather Meiji, the most important figure in his life.   Hirohito's next teacher was the absolute legendary Fleet Admiral Togo Heihachiro who would instill national defense policy into him. Hirohito would be taught Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahans theories as all the great minds were taught at the time. Now I know it sucks but I cant delve deep into all this. What I want you to envision is a growing Man, instilled with the belief above all else, the Kokutai was most important. The Kokutai was the national essence of Japan. It was all aspects of Japanese polity, derived from history, tradition and customs all focused around the cult of the Emperor. The government run by politicians was secondary, at any given time the kokutai was the belief the Emperor could come in and directly rule.   If you are confused, dont worry, I am too haha. Its confusing. The Meiji constitution was extremely ambiguous. It dictated a form of constitutional monarchy with the kokutai sovereign emperor and the “seitai” that being the actual government. Basically on paper the government runs things, but the feeling of the Japanese people was that the wishes of the emperor should be followed. Thus the kokutai was like an extra-judicial structure built into the constitution without real legal framework, its a nightmare I know.    Let me make an example, most of you are American I imagine. Your congress and senate actually run the country, wink wink lets forget about lobbyists from raytheon. The president does not have actual executive powers to override any and all things, but what if all Americans simply felt he did. Thus everyone acted in accordance to his wishes as they assumed them to be, thats my best way of explaining Japan under Hirohito.    Emperor Taisho dies in 1926, and Hirohito takes the throne ushering in the Showa Era. He inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. Hirohito sought to restore the image of a strong charismatic leader on par with his grandfather Meiji, which was sorely lacking in his father Taishos reign. He was pressured immediately by the Navy that the national sphere of defense needed to be expanded upon, they felt threatened by the west, specifically by the US and Britain who had enacted the Washington Naval Treaty. Hirohito agreed a large navy was necessary for Japan's future, he was a proponent of the decisive naval battle doctrine, remember his teacher was Togo.    From the very beginning Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. In 1928 the Japanese covertly assassinated the warlord of Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin. The current prime minister Tanaka Giichi had performed a thorough investigation of the incident and presented his report to Hirohito on December 24th of 1928. He told Hirohito he intended to court martial the criminals, purge the army and re-establish discipline. However the rest of Tanaka's cabinet wished to allow the army to deal with the matter and quiet the entire thing down. Hirohito responded by stating he had lost confidence in Tanaka and admonished his report. Hirohito allowed the army to cover up the incident, he sought to have it hushed up as well. Thus Hirohito had indulged the army in its insubordination and the kwantung army officers now felt they could take matters into their own hands.   Also in 1928 the Tanaka cabinet failed to endorse the international protocol banning chemical and biological warfare. The next year the privy council, pressured by the military, failed to ratify the full geneva convention of prisoners of war. Hirohito in response began doing something Emperor Meiji never had done, he began to scold officials to force them to retire from positions. Tanaka Giichi was bullied out. Hirohito then stated his endorsement of Hamaguchi Osachi as Tanaka's successors.   Just a few months after Hamaguchi cabinet formed, Hirohito overrode the advice of his naval chief of staff and vice chief of staff, Admiral Kato and Vice Admiral Suetsugu. The Americans and British were hinting they might form a naval alliance against Japan if she did not abide by the Washington Conference mandates on naval tonnage. Kato and Suetsugu refused to accept the terms, but prime minister Hamaguchi stood firm against them. The navy leaders were outraged and accused Hamaguchi of signing the treaty without the support of the Navy General Staff thereby infringing upon the “emperor's right of supreme command”. Two months after signing the treaty, Hamaguchi was assassinated and upon learning of this Hirohito's first concern apparently was “that constitutional politics not be interrupted”. The military felt greatly emboldened, and thus began the age of the military feeling “its right of supreme command”. Generals and Admirals fought back against arms reduction talks, discipline within the officer corps loosened, things spiraled out of control. Alongside this came the increasing cult of the emperor, that they were all doing this in his name.   When rumors emerged of the emerging Mukden Incident in 1931, Hirohito  demanded the army be reigned in. Attempts were made, but on September 18th of 1931, Kwantung army officer detonated an explosion at Liut'iaokou north of Mukden as a false flag operation. The next day the imperial palace were given a report and Hirohito was advised by chief aide de camp Nara Takeji “this incident would not spread and if the Emperor was to convene an imperial conference to take control of the situation, the virtue of his majesty might be soiled if the decisions of such a conference should prove impossible to implement”. This will be a key theme in Hirohito's decision making, protect the kokutai from any threats.   As the Mukden incident was getting worse, the Kwantung officers began to demand reinforcement be sent from the Korea army. The current Wakatsuki cabinet met on the issue and decided the Mukden incident had to remain an incident, they needed to avoid a declaration of war. The official orders were for no reinforcements of the Korea army to mobilize, however the field commander took it upon his own authority and mobilized them. The army chief of staff Kanaya reported to Hirohito the Korea army was marching into Manchuria against orders. At 31 years of age Hirohito now had an excellent opportunity to back the current cabinet, to control the military and stop the incident from getting worse. At this time the military was greatly divided on the issue, politically still weak compared to what they would become in a few years, if Hirohito wanted to rule as a constitutional monarch instead of an autocratic monarch, well this was his chance. Hirohito said to Kanaya at 4:20pm on September 22nd “although this time it couldn't be helped, [the army] had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito accepted the situation as fait accompli, he was not seriously opposed to seeing his army expand his empire. If it involved a brief usurpation of his authority so bit, as long as the operation was successful. Within two weeks of the incident, most of Japan had rallied being the kwantung army's cause. Hirohito knew it was a false flag, all of what they had done. Hirohito planned the lightests punishments for those responsible. Hirohito then officially sanctioned the aerial strike against Chinchou, the first air attack since ww1.   A message had gone out to the young officers in the Japanese military that the emperors main concern was success; obedience to central command was secondary. After the Mukden incident Prime Minister Wakatsuki resigned in december after failing to control the army and failing to contain the financial depression. The new Priminister Inukai took to action requesting permission from Hirohito to dispatch battalions to Tientsin and a brigade to Manchuria to help the Kwantung army take Chinchou. Hirohito responded by advising caution when attacking Chinchou and to keep a close eye on international public perception. Nevertheless Chinchou was taken and Hirohito issued an imperial rescript praising the insubordinate Kwantung army for fighting a courageous self defense against Chinese bandits. In a few more years Hirohito would grant awards and promotions to 3000 military and civil officials involved in the Manchurian war. When incidents broke out in Shanghai in 1932 involved the IJN, Tokyo high command organized a full fledged Shanghai expeditionary force under General Shirakawa with 2 full divisions. But within Shanghai were western powers, like Britain and America, whom Hirohito knew full well could place economic sanctions upon Japan if things got out of hand. Hirohito went out of his way to demand Shirakawa settle the Shanghai matter quickly and return to Japan.   And thus here is a major problem with Hirohito during the war years. On one end with Manchuria he let pretty much everything slide, but with Shanghai he suddenly cracks the whip. Hirohito had a real tendency of choosing when he wanted to act and this influenced the military heavily. On May 15th of 1932, young naval officers assassinated prime minister Inukai at his office. In the political chaos, Hirohito and his advisors agreed to abandon the experiment in party cabinets that had been the custom since the Taisho era. Now Hirohito endorsed a fully bureaucratic system of policy making, cabinet parties would no longer depend on the two main conservative parties existing in the diet. When the diet looked to the genro as to who should be the next prime minister, Hirohito wrote up “his wishes regarding the choice of the next prime minister”. Loyal officials backed Hirohito's wishes, the cult of the emperor grew in power. To the military it looked like Hirohito was blaming the party based cabinets rather than insubordinate officers for the erosion of his own authority as commander in chief. The young military officers who already were distrustful of the politicians were now being emboldened further.    After Manchuria was seized and Manchukuo was ushered in many in the Japanese military saw a crisis emerge, that required a “showa restoration' to solve. There were two emerging political factions within the military, the Kodoha and Toseiha factions. Both aimed to create military dictatorships under the emperor. The Kodoha saw the USSR as the number one threat to Japan and advocated an invasion of them, aka the Hokushin-ron doctrine, but the Toseiha faction prioritized a national defense state built on the idea they must build Japans industrial capabilities to face multiple enemies in the future. What separated the two, was the Kodoha sought to use a violent coup d'etat to do so, the Toseiha were unwilling to go so far. The Kodoha faction was made up of junior and youthful officers who greatly distrusted the capitalists and industrialists of Japan, like the Zaibatsu and believed they were undermining the Emperor. The Toseiha faction were willing to work with the Zaibatsu to make Japan stronger. Hirohito's brother Prince Chichibu sympathized with the Kodoha faction and repeatedly counseled his brother that he should implement direct imperial rule even if it meant suspending the constitution, aka a show restoration. Hirohito believed his brother who was active in the IJA at the time was being radicalized. Chichibu might I add was in the 3rd infantry regiment under the leadership of Colonel Tomoyuki Yamashita.   This time period has been deemed the government by assassination period. Military leaders in both the IJA and IJN and from both the Kodoha and Toseiha began performing violence against politicians and senior officers to get things done.    A enormous event took place in 1936 known as the february 26 incident. Kodoha faction officers of the IJA attempted a coup d'etat to usher in a showa restoration. They assassinated several leading officials, such as two former prime ministers and occupied the government center of Tokyo. They failed to assassinate the current prime minister Keisuke Okada or take control over the Imperial palace. These men believed Japan was straying from the Kokutai and that the capitalist/industrialists were exploiting the people of the nation by deceiving the emperor and usurping his power. The only solution to them was to purge such people and place Hirohito as an absolute leader over a military dictatorship.    Now the insurrectionists failed horribly, within just a few hours they failed to kill the current prime minister, and failed to seize the Sakashita Gate to the imperial palace, thus allowing the palace to continue communicating with the outside, and they never thought about what the IJN might do about all of this. The IJN sent marines immediately to suppress them. The insurrectionists had planned to have the army minister General Kwashima who was a Kodoha backer, report their intentions to Hirohito who they presumed would declare a showa restoration. They falsely assumed the emperor was a puppet being taken hostage by his advisers and devoid of his own will.   At 5:40am on February the 26th Hirohito was awakened and informed of the assassinations and coup attempt. From the moment he learnt of this, he was outraged and demanded the coup be suppressed and something I would love to highlight is he also immediately demanded his brother Prince Chichibu be brought over to him. Why would this be important? Hirohito believed the insurrectionists might enlist his brother to force him to abdicate. Hirohito put on his army uniform and ordered the military to “end it immediately and turn this misfortune into a blessing”. Hirohito then met with Kwashima who presented him with the insurrectionists demands to “clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life and fulfill national defense, aka showa restoration”. Hirohito scolded Kwashima and ordered him to suppress the mutiny. On the morning of the 27th Hirohito declared administrative martial law on the basis of Article 8 of the Imperial Constitution, pertaining to emergency imperial ordinances. Formally he was invoking his sovereign power to handle a crisis. Hirohito displayed an incredible amount of energy to crush the mutiny as noted by those around him at the time. Every few hours he demanded reports to be given to him by top officials and at one point he was so angry he threatened to lead the Imperial Guard division himself to go out and quell it. Hirohito met with Chichibu and its alleged he told his brother to end any relationships he had with the Kodoha members. By february 29th, Hirohito had firmly crushed the mutiny, most of the ringleaders were arrested. In april they were court martialed secretly without even given a chance to defend themselves in court and 17 were executed by firing squad in July. As a result of it all, the Kodoha faction dissolved and the Toseiha faction reigned supreme.    On the morning of July 8th of 1937 came the Marco Polo Bridge incident, a nearly identical false flag operation to what occurred at Mukden in 1931. Hirohito's reaction was first to consider the possible threat of the USSR. He wondered if the communists would seize the opportunity to attack Manchukuo. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied.    Hirohito demanded to know what contingency plans existed. After this he approved the decision of the Konoe cabinet to move troops into Northern China and fixed his seal to the orders of dispatch. The emperor had tacitly agreed to it all from the start. With each action taken for the following months, Hirohito would explicitly sanction them after the fact. In his mind he kept thinking about a fight with the USSR, he believed he had no choice in the China matter. All of his top ranking officials like Sugiyama would tell him “even if war with China came… it could be finished up within two or three months”. Hirohito was not convinced, he went to Konoe, to imperial conferences, to other military officials to get their views. None convinced him but as Hirohito put it  “they agreed with each other on the time factor, and that made a big difference; so all right, we'll go ahead.”     Two weeks into the conflict, the kwangtung army and Korean army were reinforced by 3 divisions from Japan and on July 25th were reaching Beijing. What did the man who was not responsible in such decision making say? On July 27 Hirohito sanctioned an imperial order directing the commander of the China Garrison Force to “chastise the Chinese army in the Peking-Tientsin area and bring stability to the main strategic places in that region.” Hirohito wanted a killing blow to end the war, and thus he escalated the incident. Historian Fujiwara Akira noted “it was the [Konoe] government itself that had resolved on war, dispatched an army, and expanded the conflict,” and Hirohito had fully supported it”   Chiang Kai-shek abandoned northern China pulling into the Interior and unleashed a campaign in Shanghai to draw the Japanese into a battle showcased in front of western audiences. Chiang Kai-shek tossed the creme of his military all into Shanghai to make it as long and explosive as possible to try and win support from other great powers. On August 18 Hirohito summoned his army and navy chiefs for a pointed recommendation. The war, he told them, “is gradually spreading; our situation in Shanghai is critical; Tsingtao is also at risk. If under these circumstances we try to deploy troops everywhere, the war will merely drag on and on. Wouldn't it be better to concentrate a large force at the most critical point and deliver one overwhelming blow? Based on our attitude of fairness, Do you, have in hand plans for such action? In other words, do we have any way worked out to force the Chinese to reflect on their actions?”   The chiefs of staff returned 3 days later with an aerial campaign to break China's will to fight and strategic cities needed to be seized. Hirohito gave his sanction and on August 31st gave the order “for the Dispatch of the North China Area Army. [D]estroy the enemy's will to fight and wipe out resistance in the central part of Hepei Province,” Over the course of weeks Hirohito sanctioned 6 troop mobilizations to the Shanghai area where the fighting had bogged down. Then he sanctioned 3 divisions from Taiwan to Shanghai, but for units in northern Manchuria to stand guard firmly in case the USSR attacked. The entire time this was happening both China and Japan referred to it as an incident and not a real war lest either of them lose the backing of their great power allies. Japan needed oil, iron and rubber from America, China was likewise received materials from the USSR/America/Britain and even Germany.    By november the war was not going well and Hirohito had the Imperial Headquarters established within his palace as a means to exercise his constitutional role as supreme commander, the army and navy would act in concert. For a few hours in the morning a few days every week, the chiefs of staff, army and navy ministers and chiefs of operations would meet with Hirohito. At these imperial conferences Hirohito presided over and approved decisions impacting the war. This was Hirohito's device for legally transforming the will of the emperor into the will of the state. Hirohito not only involved himself, sometimes on a daily basis he would shape strategy and decide the planning, timing and so on of military campaigns. He even intervened in ongoing field operations. He monitored and occasionally issued orders through commanders to subordinate units. Now I can't go through the entire 1937-1945 war and showcase all the things he did but I will highlight things I think we're important.    On November 9th, the Shanghai battle was finally falling apart for the Chinese as they began a withdrawal to the Nanking area some 180 miles away. The Japanese forces chased them and for the first time were really coming into direct contact with Chinese civilians, when it came to Shanghai most had evacuated the areas. The Japanese burned, plundered and raped villages and towns as they marched towards Nanking. On december 1st, Hirohito's imperial HQ ordered the 10th army and Shanghai expeditionary force to close in on Nanking from different directions, a pincer maneuver. Prince Asaka took command of the Shanghai expeditionary force and General Matsui commanded the Central China Area Army consisted of the Shanghai force and 10th army. Asaka led the forces to assault the walled city of Nanking with a population estimated to be 4-5 hundred thousand and it would fall on December 13th. Was there an order to “rape Nanking”, no. The Imperial HQ did not order the total extermination of the Chinese in Nanking, they had ordered an encirclement campaign. However, the standing orders at this time were to take no prisoners. Once Nanking fell, the Japanese began to execute en massage military prisoners and unarmed troops who surrendered willingly. There was a orgy of rape, arson, pillage and murder. The horror was seen in Nanking and the 6 adjacent villages over the course of 3 months far exceeding any atrocities seen during the battle for Shanghai or even the march to Nanking. General Nakajima's 16th division on its first day in Nanking was estimated to have murdered 30,000 POWs. Estimate range insanely, but perhaps 200,000 POW's and civilians were butchered over the course of 6 weeks.   Prince Asaka the 54 year old grand uncle to Hirohito and other members of the Imperial Family commanded the attack on Nanking and supervised the horrors. 49 year old General Prince Higashikuni chief of the army air force alongside Prince Kan'in knew of the atrocities occurring. Army minister Sugiyama knew, many middle echelon officers of the Imperial HQ knew. Hirohito was at the top of the chain of command, there is no way he was not informed. Hirohito followed the war extensively, reading daily reports, questioned his aides. It was under his orders that his army “chastise China”, but did he show any concern for the breakdown of his army's discipline? There is no documented evidence he ordered an investigation, all we are met with as historians is a bizarre period of silence. Hirohito goes from supervising the war with OCD precision, to silence, then back to normal precision. Did Hirohito show anything publicly to show angry, displeasure or remorse, at the time he energetically began spurring his generals and admirals on their great victories and the national project to induce “Chinese self-reflection”.    On November 24th Hirohito gave an after the fact sanction to the decision of General Matsui to attack and occupy Nanking. Hirohito was informed the city was going to be bombarded by aircraft and artillery and he sanctioned that as well. That was basically him removing any restrictions on the army's conduct. On December 14th the day after Nankings fall, he made an imperial message to his chiefs of staff expressing his pleasure at the news of the city's capture and occupation. Hirohito granted General Matsui an imperial rescript for his great military accomplishments in 1938 and gave the order of the golden early to Prince Asaka in 1940. Perhaps Hirohito privately agonized over what happened, but publicly did nothing about the conduct of his armed forces, especially in regards to the treatment of POW's.   Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Naking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. Chiang Kai-shek had hoped to end the fighting by enticing the other great powers to intervene. At the 9 power treaty conference in Brussel in november of 1937, Britain and the US proposed boycotting Japan. However the conference ended without any sanctions being enacted upon Japan. The Konoe government and Imperial HQ immediately expanded the combat zone. Chiang Kai-shek in desperation accepted a previous offer by Germany to mediate. Oscar Trautmann, the German ambassador to China attempted to negotiate with Japan, but it failed. China was offered harsh terms; to formally recognize Manchukuo, cooperate with it and Japan to fight communism, permit the indefinite stationg of Japanese forces and pay war reparations.    On January 9th of 1938, Imperial HQ formed a policy for handling the China incident which was reported to Hirohito. Konoe asked Hirohito to convene an imperial conference for it, but not to speak out at it  “For we just want to formally decide the matter in your majesty's presence.” Konoe and Hirohito were concerned with anti expansionists within the army general staff and wanted to prevent German interference in Japanese affairs. On January 11th, the policy was showcased and adopted, there would be no peace until Chiang kai-shek's regime was dissolved and a more compliant regime followed. Hirohito presided over the conference in full army dress uniform and gave his approval. He sat there for 27 minutes without uttering a word, appearing to be neutral in the matter, though in fact he was firmly backing a stronger military policy towards China.    The Konoe cabinet inaugurated a second phase to the China incident, greatly escalating the war. By this point in time Japanese had seen combat casualties at 62,007 killed, 160,000 wounded. In 1939 it would be 30,081 killed, 55,970 wounded, then 15,827 killed and 72,653 wounded in 1940. Major cities were under Japanese control ranging from the north east and south. Chiang Kai-shek fled to Chongqing, the war was deadlocked without any prospect of victory in sight.    On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer. Konoe resigned in disgrace in 1939 having failed to bring the China war to an end and being outed by his colleagues who sought an alliance with Germany, which he did not agree with. His successor was Hiranuma a man Hirohito considered a outright fascist. Hiranuma only received the job because he promised Hirohito he would not make enemies of Britain or the US by entering in a hasty alliance with Nazi Germany. However his enter prime ministership would be engulfed by the alliance question.   In May of 1939 there was another border clash with the USSR, the battle of Khalkhin Gol. This one was much larger in scale, involving armored warfare, aircraft and though it seems it was not used, the Japanese brought biological warfare weapons as well. The Japanese had nearly 20,000 casualties, it was an unbelievable defeat that shocked everyone. Hirohito refrained from punishing anyone because they technically followed orders based on a document “outline for dealing with disputes along the manchurian soviet border” that Hirohito had sanctioned shortly before the conflict arose.   In July of 1939, the US told Hiranuma's government they intended not to renew the US-Japan treaty of commerce and navigation. Until this point Roosevelt had been very lenient towards Japan, but now it looked to him war would break out in europe and he wanted Japan to know they could expect serious economic sanctions if they escalated things. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Then suddenly as Japan was engaging in a truce with the USSR to stop the border conflict, Germany shocked the world and signed a nonaggression pact with them. This completely contravened the 1936 Japan-German anti-comintern pact. Hiranuma resigned in disgrace on august 28th.    Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”. Then Germany invaded Poland and began a new European War. Abe's cabinet collapsed from the unbelievable amount of international actions by January 14th 1940. Hirohito appointed Admiral Yonai as prime minister  and General Tojo to vice army minister. As we have seen Hirohito played a active role appointing high level personnel and imposed conditions upon their appointments.    Hirohito dictated what Yonai was to do, who he was to appoint to certain positions so on and so forth. When a large part of the military were calling for an alliance with Germany, Hirohito resisted, arguing Japan should focus on the China war and not ally itself to Germany unless it was to counter the USSR. Three months passed by and Germany began invading western europe. Norway fell, Denmark fell, Luxembourg, Belgium, the netherlands and then France, it was simply stunning. While Japan had been locked in a deadlock against China, Germany was crushing multiple nations with ease, and this had a large effect on asia. Britain, France and the Netherlands could not hope to protect their holdings in asia. But Hirohito kept pressuring Yonai not to begin any talks of an alliance, and the military leaders forced Yonai's cabinet to collapse.    So Hirohito stood by while Hiranuma, Abe and Yonai met each crisis and collapses. He watched as the China war went nowhere and the military was gradually pushing for the Nanshin-ron doctrine to open a southern war up with the west. Not once did he make a public effort on his lonesome to end the war in China. Japan's demands of China were unchanged, relations with the west were getting worse each day. The China war was undeclared, hell it was from the Japanese viewpoint “chastising China”. Japan was no respecting any rules of war in China, atrocities were performed regularly and for that Hirohito shared responsibility. For he alone was free to act in this area, he needed to act, but he did not. He could have intervened and insisted on respecting the rules of war, especially in regards to POW's and the results could have been dramatically different. Hirohito bore direct responsibility for the use of poison gas upon Chinese and Mongolian combatants and non combatants even before the undeclared war of 1937.    Then on July 28th of 1937 Hirohito made his first directive authorizing the use of chemical weapons which was transmitted by the chief of the army general staff prince Kan'in. It stated that in mopping up the Beijing-Tientsin area, “[Y]ou may use tear gas at suitable times.” Then on September 11th of 1937 he transmitted again through Kan'in the authorization to deploy special chemical warfare units in Shanghai. Gas weapons were one weapon the imperial HQ, aka Hirohito held effective control over throughout the China war. Front line units were never free to employ it at their own discretion, it required explicit authorization from the imperial HQ. During the Wuhan offensive of August to October 1938, imperial HQ authorized the use of poison gas 375 separate times. Hirohito authorized on May 15th of 1939 the carrying out of field studies of chemical warfare along the Manchukuo-soviet border.  In 1940 Hirohito sanctioned the first experimental use of bacteriological weapons in China, though there is no documented evidence of this, given the nature of how he micro managed everything it goes without saying he would have treated it the same as the poison gas. He was a man of science, a person who questioned everything and refused to put his seal on orders without first examining them. Imperial HQ directives went to unit 731 and as a rule Hirohito overlooked them. There again is no documents directly linking him to it, but Hirohito should be held responsibility for strategic bombing campaigns performing on cities like Chongqing. Alongside such horror Hirohito sanctioned annihilation campaigns in China. Such military campaigns were on the scale of what occurred at Nanking. Take for example the Hebei offensive which saw the infamous “three alls policy, burn all, kill all, steal all”.    Before Pearl Harbor and the ushering in of the war against the west, look at the scene that had unfolded. China and Japan were not officially at war until December of 1941. Not to say it would have been easy by any means, but look at the countless opportunities the man, emperor, so called god if you will, held in his hands to stop it all or at the very least stop escalating it. Why did he not do so? To protect the Kokutai. Above all else, the role and survival of the emperor's divinity over the people of Japan was always at the forefront of his mind. He did what he thought was always necessary to thwart threats internal and external. He allowed his military to do horrible things, because they did so in his name, and likewise they were a threat to him. I know its abrupt to end it like this, but for those of you who perhaps say to yourself “well he really was powerless to stop it, they would have killed him or something”, who chose suddenly to intervene in 1945 and made the decision to surrender?

A new book covers cartographical conundrums like disappeared Soviet cities and whether Google Maps has completely ruined our ability to navigate.

Collapse of Independent States and the Purposeful Famine of the Holodomor. Professor Eugene Finkel examines the period following the 1917 collapse, when attempts to form independent Ukrainian states—the UNR and the ZUNR—failed, facing invasion by various Russian forces united in the belief that Ukraine must belong to Russia. Subsequently, Stalin implemented collectivization, leading to the Holodomor, a purposeful famine from 1932 to 1933 designed to break Ukrainian resistance and secure grain for export to modernize the Soviet military. This tragedy killed millions and decimated the landscape before World War II began. Guest: Professor Eugene Finkel. 1855

Khrushchev, Crimea, and Putin's Perception of Ukraine as "Soviet Florida". Professor Eugene Finkel discusses Khrushchev's 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, undertaken for purely economic and practical reasons, though it remains a point of contention today. During the Soviet "golden period," Ukraine became vital, providing coal, industrial manufacturing, and ballistic missiles. Vladimir Putin's image of Ukraine was formed during this time, seeing it as an unquestioned extension of Russia. Due to forced Russification and its popularity as the "Soviet Florida," Putin saw Ukraine as part of Russia, a perception that was not up for debate. Guest: Professor Eugene Finkel. 1855 CRIMEA

Forty years ago, in November 1985, two of the world's most powerful leaders met for the first time. With Cold War tensions running high and the nuclear arms race dominating global politics, US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev came together for the first time at the Geneva Summit. Using archive recordings, Megan Jones explores what happened during this landmark meeting.Eye-witness accounts brought to life by archive. Witness History is for those fascinated by the past. We take you to the events that have shaped our world through the eyes of the people who were there. For nine minutes every day, we take you back in time and all over the world, to examine wars, coups, scientific discoveries, cultural moments and much more. Recent episodes explore everything from the death of Adolf Hitler, the first spacewalk and the making of the movie Jaws, to celebrity tortoise Lonesome George, the Kobe earthquake and the invention of superglue. We look at the lives of some of the most famous leaders, artists, scientists and personalities in history, including: Eva Peron – Argentina's Evita; President Ronald Reagan and his famous ‘tear down this wall' speech; Thomas Keneally on why he wrote Schindler's List; and Jacques Derrida, France's ‘rock star' philosopher. You can learn all about fascinating and surprising stories, such as the civil rights swimming protest; the disastrous D-Day rehearsal; and the death of one of the world's oldest languages.(Photo: Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan at the Geneva Summit 1985. Credit: Universal History Archive/Getty Images)

Last time we spoke about the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict. The border between Soviet Manchuria and Japanese-occupied territories emerges not as a single line but as a mosaic of contested spaces, marks, and memories. A sequence of incidents, skirmishes along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, reconnaissance sorties, and the complex diplomacy of Moscow, Tokyo, and peripheral actors to trace how risk escalated from routine patrols to calibrated leverage. On the ground, terrain functioned as both obstacle and argument: ridges like Changkufeng Hill shaping sightlines, river valleys shaping decisions, and markers weathered by snow, wind, and drift. In command tents, officers translated terrain into doctrine: contingency plans, supply routes, and the precarious calculus of restraint versus escalation. Both nations sought to establish firmer defensive barriers against the other. Inevitably they were destined to clash, but how large that clash would become, nobody knew.   #176 The Changkufeng Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we broke down a general history of the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict and how it escalated significantly by 1938. Colonel Inada Masazum serving as chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March of 1938 would play a significant role in this story. When the Japanese command's attention was drawn to the area of Changkufeng, consideration was given to the ownership and importance of the disputed high ground. Inada and his operations section turned to an appraisal of the geography. The officers had been impressed by the strategic importance of the Tumen, which served to cut off the hill country from North Korea. In the Changkufeng area, the river was a muddy 600 to 800 meters wide and three to five meters deep. Japanese engineers had described rowing across the stream as "rather difficult."  Russian roads on the left bank were very good, according to Japanese intelligence. Heavy vehicles moved easily; the Maanshan section comprised the Russians' main line of communications in the rear. To haul up troops and materiel, the Russians were obliged to use trucks and ships, for there were no railways apart from a four-kilometer line between the harbor and town of Novokievsk. Near Changkufeng, hardly any roadways were suitable for vehicular traffic. On the right, or Korean, bank of the Tumen, there were only three roads suitable for vehicular traffic, but even these routes became impassable after a day or two of rain. In the sector between Hill 52 to the south and Shachaofeng to the north, the most pronounced eminences were Chiangchunfeng and the humps of Changkufeng. Rocky peaks were characteristically shaped like inverted T's, which meant many dead angles against the crests. The gentle slopes would allow tanks to move but would restrict their speed, as would the ponds and marshes. In general, the terrain was treeless and afforded little cover against aircraft. Against ground observation or fire, corn fields and tall miscanthus grass could provide some shielding. Between Chiangchunfeng and the Tumen, which would have to serve as the main route of Japanese supply, the terrain was particularly sandy and hilly. This rendered foot movement difficult but would reduce the effectiveness of enemy bombs and shells. The high ground east of Khasan afforded bases for fire support directed against the Changkufeng region. Plains characterized the rest of the area on the Soviet side, but occasional streams and swamps could interfere with movement of tanks and trucks. The only towns or villages were Novokievsk, Posyet, Yangomudy, and Khansi. At Kozando there were a dozen houses; at Paksikori, a few. The right bank was farmed mainly by Koreans, whose scattered cottages might have some value for billeting but offered none for cover. On the left bank, the largest hamlets were Fangchuanting, with a population of 480 dwelling in 73 huts, and Yangkuanping, where there were 39 cottages. Shachaofeng was uninhabited. Japanese occupation of Changkufeng would enable observation of the plain stretching east from Posyet Bay, although intelligence made no mention of Soviet naval bases, submarine pens, or airstrips in the immediate area of Posyet, either in existence or being built in 1938. As Inada knew, the Japanese Navy judged that Posyet Bay might have another use, as a site for Japanese landing operations in the event of war. In Russian hands, the high ground would endanger the Korean railway. This line, which started from Najin in northeastern Korea, linked up with the vital system in Manchuria at the town of Tumen and provided a short cut, if not a lifeline, between Japan and the Kwantung Army and Manchuria from across the Sea of Japan. Even from relatively low Changkufeng, six or seven miles of track were exposed to Soviet observation between Hongui and Shikai stations. The port of Najin, with its fortress zone, lay 11 miles southwest; Unggi lay even nearer. It was not the danger of Japanese shelling of Vladivostok, at an incredible range of 80 miles that was at stake but the more realistic hypothesis of Russian shelling of the rail line, and Russian screening of the Soviet side of the border. Hills and questions were thought to have two sides. It was the consensus of Japanese that Changkufeng Hill's potential value to the Russians far outweighed its possible benefits to them, or at least that the Japanese had more to lose if the Russians took the high ground by the Tumen. Inada nurtured few illusions concerning the intrinsic value of the heights. Despite the fact that the high command always had good reasons for quiescence in the north, Inada believed that the latest border difficulty could not be overlooked. By mid-July 1938 Inada's thoughts crystallized. The Japanese would conduct a limited reconnaissance in force known as iryoku teisatsu in the strategic sense. Whereas, at the tactical schoolbook level, this might mean the dispatch of small forces into enemy territory to seek local combat intelligence, at the Imperial General Headquarters level the concept was far more sweeping. There would also be useful evidence of mobilization and other buildup procedures. The affair at Changkufeng was merely a welcome coincidence, something started by the Russians but liable to Japanese exploration. Inada had no intention of seizing territory, of becoming involved in a war of attrition at a remote and minor spot, or of provoking hostilities against the USSR. The Russians would comprehend the nature of the problem, too. If they were interested in interfering seriously with the Japanese, there were numberless better locations to cause trouble along the Manchurian front; those were the places to watch. The cramped Changkufeng sector, described as "narrow like a cat's brow," could too readily be pinched off from Hunchun to render it of strategic value to either side. The bog land to the north interfered with the use of armored forces, while artillery sited on the heights along the Tumen in Korea could as easily control the area as batteries emplaced east of the lake. It was Inada's professional opinion that the Russians could commit three or four infantry divisions there at most, with no mechanized corps—no heavy tanks, in particular. No decisive battle could be waged, although, once the Russians became involved, they might have to cling to the hill out of a sense of honor. The military action would be meaningless even if the Japanese let the Russians have the heights. For their part, the Japanese would ostensibly be fighting to secure the boundary and to hold Changkufeng peak, beyond which they would not move a step onto Soviet soil. There would be no pursuit operations. Troop commitment would be limited to about one division without tank support. Japanese Air Force intervention would be forbidden. Matters would be directed entirely by Imperial General Headquarters working through the Korea Army chain of command and carried out by the local forces. Calm, clear, and dispassionate overall estimates and instructions would be based on materials available only in Tokyo. The command would not allow the Kwantung Army to touch the affair. Inada foresaw that the Japanese government might also seek a settlement through diplomacy. Although border demarcation was desirable and should be sought, the command would not insist on it, nor would it demand permanent occupation of Changkufeng summit. As soon as reconnaissance objectives had been achieved, the local forces would be withdrawn. As Inada described it "In the process, we would have taught the Russians some respect and given them a lesson concerning their repeated, high-handed provocations and intrusions. If a show of force sufficed to facilitate the negotiations and cause the Russians to back down, so much the better; the affair would be over and my point proved." The instrument for carrying out Inada's strategic design appeared to be ideal, the 19th Division, strenuously trained and high-spirited. It could be expected to perform very well if unleashed within defined limits. Colonel Suetaka was just the commander to direct local operations. Since he had been pleading to fight in China, an operation at Changkufeng might prove to be an excellent "safety valve." His staff was full of experienced, fierce warriors eager for battle. Until recently, the Korea Army commanding general had wisely kept the aggressive division away from Changkufeng Hill, but now Imperial general headquarters had its own overriding ideas and needs. How could the Japanese ensure that any military action would remain limited if the Russians chose to respond with vigor? Naturally, one infantry division, without armor or air support, could not withstand all of the Soviet forces in the maritime province. Inada answered that the mission to be assigned the 19th Division was merely the recapture of Changkufeng crest. If the Japanese side had to break off the operation, evacuation would be effected voluntarily and resolutely on Imperial general headquarters responsibility, without considerations of "face." At worst, the Japanese might lose one division, but the affair would be terminated at the Tumen River without fail. "Even so, we ought to be able to prove our theory as well as demonstrate our true strength to the Russians." In case the Soviets opted for more than limited war, the Japanese were still not so overextended in China that they could not alter their strategic disposition of troops. Although the Kwantung Army's six divisions were outnumbered four to one and the Japanese were not desirous of a war at that moment, the first-class forces in Manchuria could make an excellent showing. In addition, the high command possessed armor, heavy artillery, fighters, and bombers, held in check in Manchuria and Korea, as well as reserves in the homeland. There was also the 104th Division, under tight Imperial general headquarters control, in strategic reserve in southern Manchuria. Inada recalled "How would the Russians react? That was the answer I sought. Victory in China depended on it." By mid-July, the high command, at Inada's urging, had worked out a plan titled, "Imperial General headqaurters Essentials for Dealing with the Changkufeng Incident." Tada's telegram of 14 July to Koiso described succinctly the just-decided policy: the central authorities concurred with the Korea Army's opinion regarding the Changkufeng affair, then in embryo. Considering that Changkufeng Hill posed a direct threat to the frontier of Korea, Imperial General headqaurters would immediately urge the foreign ministry to lodge a stern protest. Next day, Tojo sent a telegram stating the Japanese policy of employing diplomacy; whether the Russians should be evicted by force required cautious deliberation in case the USSR did not withdraw voluntarily. On the basis of the guidance received from Imperial General headqaurters, the Korea Army drew up its own plan, "Essentials for Local Direction of the Changkufeng Incident," on 15 July. Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Sakae was sent promptly to the front from Seoul. At the same time, military authorities allowed the press to release news that Soviet troops were constructing positions inside Manchurian territory in an "obvious provocation." The government of Manchukuo was demanding an immediate withdrawal. Even then, those Japanese most closely connected with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident were not in agreement that everybody at command level was as ardent a proponent of reconnaissance in force as Inada claimed to be. Some thought that most, if not all, of his subordinates, youthful and vigorous, were in favor of the notion; others denied the existence of such an idea. Inada remained clear-cut in his own assertions. Everything done by the local Soviet forces, he insisted, must have been effected with the permission of Moscow; it was customary for the USSR not to abandon what it had once started. The Japanese Army never really thought that the Soviet Union would withdraw just as the result of diplomatic approaches. Therefore, from the outset, preparations were made to deal the Russians one decisive blow. Inada had recommended his plan, with its clear restrictions, to his colleagues and superiors; the scheme, he says, was approved 14 July "all the way up the chain of command, through the Army general staff and the ministry of war, with unexpected ease." The only real opposition, Inada recalled, came from the navy, whose staff advised the army operations staff, in all sincerity, to give up the idea of strategic reconnaissance. Inada adhered to his opinion stubbornly. He never forgot the grave look on the face of Captain Kusaka, the UN operations section chief, as the latter gave in reluctantly. The navy view was that the Changkufeng affair typified the army's aggressive policies as opposed to relative passivity on the part of the navy. Like Kusaka, Japanese Navy interviewees shared the fear that Changkufeng might prove to be the most dangerous military confrontation ever to occur between the USSR and Japan. In view of navy objections, one wonders where Inada could have drawn support for his concept of reconnaissance in force. If one accepts the comments contained in a letter from a navy ministry captain, Takagi Sokichi, to Baron Harada Kumao at the beginning of August, in the army and in a portion of the navy there existed "shallow-minded fellows who are apt to take a firm stand in the blind belief that the USSR would not really rise against us, neglecting the fact that the Russians had foreseen our weak points." Takagi also had violent things to say about "white-livered" Gaimusho elements that were playing up to the army. Although Takagi's remarks, expressed in confidence, were sharp, cautious injunctions were being delivered by the high command to the new Korea Army commander, General Nakamura Kotaro, who was about to leave for Seoul to replace Koiso. Nakamura's attitude was crucial for the course and outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. More of a desk soldier than a warrior, he characteristic ally displayed a wariness that was reinforced by the guidance provided him. This personal quality assumes even greater significance if one believes that the Russians may have initiated the Changkufeng Incident by exploiting the special opportunities afforded them by the routine replacement of the Korea Army commander, the temporary absence from Moscow of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the geographical as well as subjective gap between the Kwantung and Korea armies that was exposed during the Lyushkov affair. At 10:00 on 15 July Nakamura was designated army commander by the Emperor at the palace. Soon afterward, he was briefed by Imperial General headquarters officers. Hashimoto, the operations bureau chief, recalled that when he saw Nakamura off on 17 July, Hashimoto stressed prudence, limitation of any military action, and diplomatic solution of the problem. The new commanding general, Inada asserted, promised full cooperation. There was no mention, at this level, of Inada's concept of reconnaissance in force. When Nakamura reached Seoul, he found an Imperial order from Tokyo dated 16 July awaiting him. This important document stipulated that he could concentrate units under his command in Korea near the border against the trespassing Soviet forces in the Changkufeng area. Resort to force, however, was dependent upon further orders. This message was followed by a wire from Kan'in, the Army general staff chief. The Imperial order, it was explained, had been designed to support diplomatic negotiations. Simultaneous approval was granted for concentrating forces to respond swiftly in case the situation deteriorated. As for implementation of the Imperial order, discretion should be exercised in line with the opinion expressed earlier by Korea Army Headquarters. Negotiations were to be conducted in Moscow and Harbin, the location of a Soviet consulate in Manchukuo. Meanwhile, the command was dispatching two officers for purposes of liaison: Lt. Colonel Arisue Yadoru in Operations and Major Kotani Etsuo a specialist in Soviet intelligence. Inada advised Arisue that, apart from liaison flights inside the frontiers, particular care should be exercised with regard to actions that might lead to air combat. Nevertheless, although Inada stated that the Imperial order called for "a sort of military demonstration," he admitted that it meant preparatory action for an attack. The Korea Army senior staff officer, Iwasaki, recalled hearing nothing about secret intentions. Nakamura briefed his staff about the need for restraint, especially during this key period of the Wuhan operation. Koiso had disposed of speculation that he had issued an order to concentrate the 19th Division before Nakamura arrived, although he and Nakamura did have the opportunity to confer in Seoul before he departed for Japan. The Imperial order of 16 July, in response to Koiso's inquiry received in Tokyo on 14 July, had arrived in Seoul addressed to Nakamura; thereupon, the Korea Army chief of staff, Kitano, had the message conveyed to the division. By 21 July Koiso was back in Tokyo where, the day afterward, he advised the war minister, Itagaki, "to act prudently with respect to the Changkufeng problem." Why did the high command dispatch two field-grade liaison officers to Korea from the outset of the Changkufeng Incident? The Korea Army lacked operations staff. Its commander had been allotted prime responsibility, within the chain of command, for defense of northeastern Korea. At the beginning, the highest-ranking staff officer at the front was a major. Since there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the command and the forces in Korea, it was proper to send experts from Tokyo to assist. Imperial General headqaurters would observe the situation carefully, devise measures on the basis of the overall view, and issue orders which the Korea Army would implement through ordinary channels. It had not been the type of incident which required the army commander to go to the front to direct. This was the Korea Army's first test, and political as well as diplomatic problems were involved that the army in the field should not or could not handle. If Tokyo had left decisions to the division and its regiments, the latter would have been held to account, which was not proper. Imperial General headquarters had to assume responsibility and reassure local commanders of its full support. Imaoka Yutaka explained that operational guidance by Imperial General headquarters and line operations conducted by the 19th Division formed the core of the affair; the Korea Army, placed between, was "shadowy." Koiso had not been enthusiastic; this set the mood among the staff. Nakamura, who arrived with a thorough comprehension of AGS thinking, was basically passive. The Korea Army staff, in general, included no "wild boars."    There was an urgent need to monitor developments. Not only was the Korea Army unfamiliar with handling this type of incident, but many hitches occurred. There had been no practice in emergency transmission of coded wires between the Korea Army and Tokyo. Now telegram after telegram had to be sent; most were deciphered incorrectly and many were not decoded at all. Another problem centered on the lack of knowledge in Tokyo about the situation on the spot, which only visual observation could rectify. As a result, the two Army general staff experts, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Korea on 16 July. Kotani recalled that he was to collect intelligence and assist the local authorities. One of the first duties that he and Arisue performed was to disseminate the principle that use of force required a prior Imperial order. Also on 16 July, Japanese newspapers reported that the USSR was still concentrating troops, that the Manchukuoan government was watching intently, "decisive punitive measures" were being contemplated by the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities, and there were signs of a worsening of the crisis. Despite good reasons for this gloomy appraisal, the Japanese press had not yet given the incident page-one treatment. More alarming news was being disseminated abroad. Domei, the official Japanese news agency, reported that the situation would probably become worse unless Soviet troops were withdrawn. The position of the Japanese government impressed foreign correspondents as unusually firm. Informants characterized the Changkufeng Incident as the most serious affair since the clash on the Amur River in 1937. Irked by the Korea Army's timidity and eager for first-hand information, the Kwantung Army dispatched two observers to the front: from Intelligence, Ogoshi Kenji, and from Operations, Tsuji Masanobu. If you listen to my pacific war week by week podcast or echoes of war, you know I highlight Tsuji Masanobu as one of the most evil Japanese officers of WW2. No other way to describe this guy, he was a shithead. In his memoirs, Tsuji asserted that he and Ogoshi climbed Changkufeng Hill, discerned Soviet soldiers digging across the peak in Manchurian territory, and concluded that "probably even Tokyo could not overlook such a clear-cut case of invasion." Although his account aligned with the general thrust, Ogoshi contended that Tsuji could not have accompanied him. According to sources with the 19th Division, when Koiso learned that Tsuji and Ogoshi were disparaging the Korea Army's ability to defend Changkufeng, he ordered "those spies" ousted. Ogoshi replied that the army staff was not angry, but Koiso did become furious and ordered Ogoshi "arrested for trespassing." Ogoshi surmised that Koiso's concern was that emotional outsiders such as Tsuji could provoke trouble, perhaps even war, if they visited Changkufeng. This view was widely shared. Inada stated that he made a practice of keeping away to maintain the degree of detachment and impartiality required of high command authorities. One sidelight to the "fraternal" visit to the Changkufeng area by observers from Hsinking was provided by Lt. Colonel Katakura Tadashi, chief of the Kwantung Army's 4th Section, which handled Manchukuo affairs, primarily political direction. When Katakura visited the Operations Section, Tsuji and Ogoshi told him that an intrusion had been confirmed and that the Kwantung Army staff was studying ways to evict the Soviets. Katakura consulted Maj. General Ishiwara Kanji, acting chief of staff, who was already in possession of the draft of an operations order calling for offensive preparations by the Kwantung Army against the Russians at Changkufeng. Katakura asked for reconsideration of the order. This was not a matter to be handled solely by the operations staff. Borders and international affairs were involved; hence the 4th Section, along with the Manchukuoan government, the Gaimusho, and other agencies, were concerned. Field observers were expressing exaggerated personal opinions based on having seen Soviet sentries on a hilltop. If the matter fell within the Korea Army's defensive prerogative, that army ought to handle it. Apparently the Kwantung Army commander and Ishiwara agreed with Katakura, for the draft order was not approved. The so-called private message dispatched by a Kwantung Army staff officer just before Koiso's departure may have been provoked by this rejection of direct participation by forces under Kwantung Army command. Staff officers in Tokyo believed that Hsinking could not see the forest for the trees. In the high command's view, the Kwantung Army's deliberate escalation of a negligible frontier incident undoubtedly stemmed from a failure to grasp the strategic requirements of national defense—pursuit of the campaign in China, the nurturance of Manchukuo, and the buildup of operational readiness for the ultimate solution of the Soviet problem. The high command felt obliged to remind the Kwantung Army that, in dealing with the Changkufeng Incident, the central authorities pressed for a Russian pullback through diplomacy. Consequently, the Korea Army had been instructed to be ready to concentrate troops near Changkufeng as a "background." Meanwhile, it remained the Imperial will that utmost prudence be exercised. The Kwantung Army commander accordingly issued cautious instructions to subordinate units, especially those on the eastern border. The high command's injunctions did not end the discontent and recrimination at the lower levels of Kwantung Army Headquarters, nor did they quiet the concern felt in Tokyo. A former war minister told Baron Harada repeatedly in late July that the Kwantung Army was "no good," while the superintendent of police added that the Kwantung Army was embarrassing Foreign Minister Ugaki. Nevertheless, the Kwantung Army did exert self-restraint. For its part, the Korea Army naïvely sought to achieve entente with an antagonist who considered the case nonnegotiable. First, the government of Manchukuo was asked to lodge a formal protest with the USSR. The commissioner for foreign affairs at Harbin phoned V. V. Kuznetzov, the acting consul, on the night of 14 July and saw him on the 18th. Basing its contentions on maps, the Haensing regime demanded Soviet withdrawal from Changkufeng. The Japanese government was lodging similar protests within the framework of Japanese-Manchukuoan joint defense agreements. On the spot, the situation inflamed. During the afternoon of 15 July, a Japanese military police patrol from Korea reconnoitered at the foot of Hill 52, southeast of Changkufeng. The party came under Soviet gunfire and was driven back, abandoning the body of Corp. Matsushima Shakuni. Japanese sources claimed that a Russian ambush had been set inside Manchuria. The Russian side insisted that it was the Soviet frontier that had been violated by thirty meters. Kuzma Grebennik, the colonel commanding the 59th BGU, which covered the Posyet sector, asserted that Matsushima's effects included a notebook containing reconnaissance results and a camera with film of Soviet-claimed terrain, particularly Changkufeng Hill. According to Maj. Gilfan Batarshin, a subordinate of Grebennik, two Russian border guards from Podgornaya opened fire when the Japanese fled after being challenged. Japanese protests to the USSR about the death of Matsushima and the taking of his body were added to the negotiations concerning the disputed border and the alleged trespassing. Charge Nishi Haruhiko lodged a vigorous complaint in Moscow on 15 July but was answered by a counterprotest. Ambassador Shigemitsu underwent an identical experience during a conversation with Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov on 20 July. Shigemitsu retorted that the murder tended to exacerbate the negotiations. In his memoirs, he stated that the killing of Matsushima provoked the local Japanese border garrison unit. The shooting occurred as the Soviet military buildup continued, according to Japanese sources. Mechanized units were reported moving in the direction of Kyonghun from Barabash and Posyet Bay. Biplanes were reconnoitering the Hunchun Valley, within Manchurian territory, from the afternoon of 16 July. To the local Japanese authorities, it seemed that the Russians were adopting a challenging attitude. Although the Japanese-Manchukuoan side remained willing to negotiate—that is, to take no forceful actions if the Russians would withdraw, the latter appeared not to share such an intention. The Soviets were not only misinterpreting the Hunchun treaty to their advantage but were encroaching beyond what they claimed to be the line; they "lacked sincerity." Decisive use of force might have been imperative to secure the Manchurian border, which was Japan's legal responsibility. As far north as Tungning on the eastern Manchurian frontier, two Soviet ground divisions and considerable numbers of tanks and aircraft were reported massed in full view. At Changkufeng, Russian soldiers fortified the crest. Mountain guns were now seen with muzzles pointed toward Manchuria, and Japanese intelligence estimated that Soviet troop strength near Changkufeng had grown to 120 or 130 by the evening of 18 July. As Sawamoto Rikichiro, an Imperial aide, noted in his diary, "It would seem that settlement of the affair had become increasingly difficult." Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya sent two emissaries bearing the notice to the Soviet border. The pair, "blazing with patriotic ardor,"set out on 18 July, carrying a message in one hand and a white flag in the other. From Kyonghun came the report the next day that there had been an urgent, well-attended Soviet staff meeting at BGU Headquarters in Novokievsk all night, and that the Russian side had been discomfited by the Japanese request, which had been transmitted to higher authorities. Still, the emissaries did not return, while a stream of reports indicated a Soviet buildup along a dozen frontier sectors. Russian authorities had reportedly forced the natives to evacuate an area twenty miles behind their borders. From Japanese observation posts, Soviet convoys of men, guns, and horses could be sighted moving toward Novokievsk after being unloaded from transports originating at Vladivostok. Japanese Army Intelligence reported that on 18 July a regimental-size force had arrived at Novokievsk; artillery displacements forward were particularly visible by night east of Khasan. A confidential Gaimusho message indicated that Soviet truck movements between Posyet, Novokievsk, and the front had increased since the 20th. Russian intrusions, kidnappings, and sniping incidents were reported along the Manchurian borders, from Manchouli on the west to Suifenho on the east, between 18 and 25 July. Aircraft on daytime reconnaissance were detected as far as three miles inside Manchurian territory in the Hunchun area. Although the Japanese asserted that their forbearance was being tested, Izvestiya charged "Japanese militarists" with manufacturing an affair at Ussuri as well as at Changkufeng. The Japanese themselves received reports from the Changkufeng front that by 20 July the Soviets had 250 soldiers, armed with field pieces, trench mortars, howitzers, and light and heavy machine guns, on the southern slopes. The Russians were putting up tents capable of holding 40 men each; officers could be observed for the first time. On the evening of the 20th, the Soviets lobbed illuminating shells toward Manchurian territory. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Inada Masazum, studying maps and mud, saw Changkufeng Hill as a prize with peril, a test of nerve rather than a conquest. Tokyo's orders pulsed through Seoul and Harbin: guard, probe, and deter, but avoid full-scale war. Across the border, Soviet units pressed closer, lights and tents flickering on the hillside. The sea within sight whispered of strategy, diplomacy, and a warning: a single misstep could redraw Asia. And so the standoff waited, patient as winter.

At the CIA, Rick Ames had a reputation as a middling agent with a drinking problem and a knack for skating by. But despite poor performance reviews, Rick just kept failing up. As he landed bigger and better assignments, he saw an opportunity to turn his access to Soviet-era secrets into cold, hard cash. For nearly a decade he sold classified intelligence to the KGB in exchange for a life of luxury with his wife, Rosario – who soon joined in on the betrayal. Together they pulled off one of the most devastating acts of espionage in U.S.history, harming CIA operations and costing countless lives before their luck finally ran out.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This is a story about the dirty secrets of the most powerful people in the world—including Donald Trump.Based on exclusive interviews with intelligence officers in the CIA, FBI, and the KGB, thousands of pages of FBI investigations, police investigations, and news articles in English, Russian, and Ukrainian. American Kompromat shows that from Trump to Jeffrey Epstein, kompromat was used in operations far more sinister than the public could ever imagine. The book addresses what may be the single most important unanswered question of the entire Trump era: Is Donald Trump a Russian asset? The answer, American Kompromat says, is yes, supporting that conclusion with the first richly detailed narrative on how the KGB allegedly first “spotted” Trump as a potential asset, how it cultivated him, arranged his first trip to Moscow, and pumped him full of KGB talking points. Among its many revelations, American Kompromat reports for the first time that:   • According to former KGB major Yuri Shvets, Trump first did business over forty years ago with a Manhattan electronics store co-owned by a Soviet émigré, triggering protocols through which the Soviet spy agency began efforts to cultivate Trump as an asset, launching a decades-long “relationship” of mutual benefit to Russia and Trump, from real estate to real power.    • Trump's 1987 invitation to Moscow was billed as a scouting trip for a hotel, but according to Shvets, was actually initiated by a high-level KGB official. These sorts of trips were usually arranged for "deep development."   • Before Trump's first Moscow trip, he met with Natalia Dubinin, who worked at the United Nations library in a vital position usually reserved as a cover for KGB operatives.    • In 1987, according to Shvets, the KGB circulated an internal cable hailing the successful execution of an active measure by a newly cultivated American asset who took out full-page ads in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Boston Globe promoting policies promoted by the KGB. The ads had been taken out by Donald Trump, who, Shvets said, would become a “special unofficial contact” for the KGB.In addition to exploring Trump's ties to the KGB, American Kompromat also reveals:   • How Jeffrey Epstein and Trump jostled for influence and financial supremacy for years. Epstein became a millionaire in part with the help of Ghislaine Maxwell's father—media tycoon Robert Maxwell, who allegedly served as a spy and likely gave Epstein a sum between $10 and $20 million before his death in 1991.    • How the Epstein-Ghislaine Maxwell sex-trafficking operation provided a source and marketplace for sexual kompromat.   • How the Epstein-Maxwell ring helped enable young women with possible ties to Russian intelligence to gain access to the highest levels of Silicon Valley and the worlds of artificial intelligence, supercomputers, and the internet. This, at a time when Vladimir Putin has asserted, “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere [artificial intelligence] will become the ruler of the world.”   • How John Mark Dougan, a former deputy sheriff in Mar-a-Lago's Palm Beach County, says he acquired 478 videos confiscated from the Jeffrey Epstein investigation, fled to Moscow, became only the fourth American to win asylum in Russia, and immediately gained access to Putin's inner circle, showing the ongoing power that comes from kompromat and how its value is highest before it is “used.”https://amzn.to/4i4T3dKBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-opperman-report--1198501/support.

It's eggnog season—and not just any nog. We're talking Golden Egg Nog from the old Hood milk mafia, the stuff thick enough to count as a sin. Perfect time for a feel-good movie, right?Johnny Spoiler dives into one of the most unexpectedly uplifting movies of the last few years: TETRIS (2023). Yes, the movie about the video game. Yes, it's WAY better than it has any right to be.The true story of Henk Rogers, Nintendo's ride-or-die dealmaker who bet everything on a block-stacking dream.The real “Tetris Effect” and why the game showed up in players' dreams for decades.How Tetris became the best-selling video game of all time (until Minecraft pulled a power move).The wild rights battle involving Nintendo, Atari, Mirrorsoft, and Soviet bureaucracy.Why Taron Egerton continues to own the “real-guy-in-a-crazy-situation” movie niche.Our favorite retro shoutouts: Game Boy, Ninja Turtles arcade, Mario 3, Chrono Trigger, Star Fox, Final Fantasy VII, and more.And of course: one of the best post-2000 movie mustaches ever filmed.Ansel Elgort & Shirley MacLaine team up for the road-trip comedy Lucy Boomer.An 80s-style action thriller incoming: Trial By Combat from Renny Harlin & Aaron Eckhart.Mattel is making… a View-Master movie?! Let's speculate wildly.Binge Now.Stream it on Apple TV+ (or start that free trial), or hunt down the rumored DVD like it's a secret Soviet cartridge.Shout-out to Nikolaxnick on IG for tracking down our L.A. Story episode—300+ episodes still online!Career OpportunitiesBlackBerryLarry CrowneDrink the Nog.The Golden Kind.Debate The Grinch.Live your truth.$130 OFF Good Chop https://tr.ee/GoodChopJohnny

It's getting chilly outside, so pull up a chair and warm your soul with a classic Apple Cider Hot Toddy! We're mixing up this comforting blend of hot cider, whiskey, honey, and lemon—the perfect cozy companion for a week of cinematic spectacle.The box office is burning hot, thanks to the final chapter of a spellbinding saga! We dive deep into Wicked: For Good, discussing the final showdown between Elphaba and Glinda, the arrival of Dorothy, and the fate of Oz's beloved—and feared—witches.Then, we shift gears to pure, unadulterated action with the sequel Sisu 2. The Finnish one-man army Aatami Korpi, "the man who refuses to die," is back! We break down the new road-rage-fueled revenge plot against a Soviet officer and the outrageous, over-the-top action that proves this franchise is just too angry to quit.And speaking of a good run, we're dissecting the newly released, highly-anticipated, Edgar Wright-directed take on the dystopian classic, The Running Man (2025), starring Glen Powell. Does this new, darker adaptation—which is a more faithful to the Stephen King novel—deliver the savage social satire and thrills we've been waiting for?All that, plus the week's Box Office News and our recipe for the warming toddy!⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Merch Shop⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Patreon⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Instagram⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Bluesky⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Facebook⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.drinkthemovies.com⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠YouTube⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Discord⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠*Please Drink Responsibly*

Paul Gregory reveals that in April 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald, agitated and shaken, confessed to Marina that he attempted to assassinate General Edwin Walker in Dallas. Marina found a note giving her directions if he failed to return. Though she realized he was deeply disturbed, she kept the event secret until the Warren Commission. Shortly after, Oswald moved to New Orleans, seeking to build credentials as a "radical operative" for Fidel Castro, hoping to secure a Cuban visa that would lead to a Soviet visa. Paul Gregory notes that despite his growing delusions, there was absolutely no indication whatsoever that he was planning to assassinate the president of the United States at this time. Guest: Paul Gregory.

Panic, Pioneers, and the Moral Choice at the Border Picnic. Matthew Longo recounts that by August 19, 1989, hundreds of thousands of East German refugees were camped near Sopron, terrified of Stasi informers. Nemeth's government used the chaotic Picnic as a test for Soviet intervention. When a mass bolted across the border, mistaking champagne pops for gunfire, Hungarian guards made the tremendous moral choice not to shoot, allowing a bloodless breakthrough to freedom. Guest: Matthew Longo.

Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm: Evolving Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria (Ibidem Press, 2017) holds the promise of freeing approaches and policies with regard to politics of identity from the fatalistic grip of realism. While the conceptual literature on identity and conflicts has moved in this alternative direction, conflict resolution practice continues to rely on realist frames and acts as an unwanted auxiliary to traditional International Relations (IR). Perpetuation of conflict discourses, marginalization, and exclusion of affected populations are widespread. They are caused by the over-reliance of conflict resolution practice on the binary frames of classic IR paradigms and also by the competitive and hierarchical relationships within the field itself. Philip Gamaghelyan relies on participatory action research (PAR) and collective auto-ethnography to expose patterns of exclusion and marginalization as well as the paradoxical reproduction of conflict-promoting frames in current conflict-resolution practice applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh and Syrian crises. He builds on the work of post-modernist scholars, on reflective practice, and on discourse analysis to explore alternative and inclusive strategies with a transformative potential through reflections and actions customary for PAR. The IR discipline, that has dominated policy-making, is only one possible lens, and often a deficient one, for defining, preventing, or resolving contemporary conflicts wrapped in identity politics. Other conceptual frameworks can help to rethink our understanding of identity and conflicts and reconstruct them as performative and not static phenomena. These transformative frameworks are increasingly influential in the conflict resolution field and can be applied to policy-making. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Philip Gamaghelyan is an Associate Professor at the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego. He has served as Director of the Master's Program in Conflict Management and Resolution, the Graduate Certificate in Mediation, and the Security Studies concentration. His teaching spans conflict analysis and resolution, mediation, media and conflict, nationalism and conflict, and intervention design, among other areas. Dr. Gamaghelyan is a conflict resolution scholar-practitioner and co-founder of the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation, where he also serves on the Board of Directors. He is the Managing Editor of Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation (www.caucasusedition.net). His practical and research experience extends across the post-Soviet states of Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as Turkey, Syria, and other conflict-affected regions, where he has worked with policymakers, journalists, educators, and civil society leaders. His current research focuses on the critical re-evaluation and redesign of conflict resolution interventions in the 21st century, as well as on shaping the future of peace studies and peace practice. Areas of Expertise: Structural and symbolic violence, Ethnically-framed conflicts, Methodological innovations and intervention design in conflict resolution practice, Discourse analysis, Action research, Conflicts in Russia and Erurasia Coming Up Soon - Recently, Professor Philip Gamaghelyan was featured on BBC Audio discussing the recent Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks that were held at the White House. In the coming days, this academic and grassroots organizer associated with the School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego will join our PodCast to discuss his incredible publication titled Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm. Evolving Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria (2017). His expertise spans conflict analysis and resolution, mediation, media and conflict, nationalism and conflict, and intervention design, among other areas Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm: Evolving Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria (Ibidem Press, 2017) holds the promise of freeing approaches and policies with regard to politics of identity from the fatalistic grip of realism. While the conceptual literature on identity and conflicts has moved in this alternative direction, conflict resolution practice continues to rely on realist frames and acts as an unwanted auxiliary to traditional International Relations (IR). Perpetuation of conflict discourses, marginalization, and exclusion of affected populations are widespread. They are caused by the over-reliance of conflict resolution practice on the binary frames of classic IR paradigms and also by the competitive and hierarchical relationships within the field itself. Philip Gamaghelyan relies on participatory action research (PAR) and collective auto-ethnography to expose patterns of exclusion and marginalization as well as the paradoxical reproduction of conflict-promoting frames in current conflict-resolution practice applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh and Syrian crises. He builds on the work of post-modernist scholars, on reflective practice, and on discourse analysis to explore alternative and inclusive strategies with a transformative potential through reflections and actions customary for PAR. The IR discipline, that has dominated policy-making, is only one possible lens, and often a deficient one, for defining, preventing, or resolving contemporary conflicts wrapped in identity politics. Other conceptual frameworks can help to rethink our understanding of identity and conflicts and reconstruct them as performative and not static phenomena. These transformative frameworks are increasingly influential in the conflict resolution field and can be applied to policy-making. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Philip Gamaghelyan is an Associate Professor at the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego. He has served as Director of the Master's Program in Conflict Management and Resolution, the Graduate Certificate in Mediation, and the Security Studies concentration. His teaching spans conflict analysis and resolution, mediation, media and conflict, nationalism and conflict, and intervention design, among other areas. Dr. Gamaghelyan is a conflict resolution scholar-practitioner and co-founder of the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation, where he also serves on the Board of Directors. He is the Managing Editor of Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation (www.caucasusedition.net). His practical and research experience extends across the post-Soviet states of Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as Turkey, Syria, and other conflict-affected regions, where he has worked with policymakers, journalists, educators, and civil society leaders. His current research focuses on the critical re-evaluation and redesign of conflict resolution interventions in the 21st century, as well as on shaping the future of peace studies and peace practice. Areas of Expertise: Structural and symbolic violence, Ethnically-framed conflicts, Methodological innovations and intervention design in conflict resolution practice, Discourse analysis, Action research, Conflicts in Russia and Erurasia Coming Up Soon - Recently, Professor Philip Gamaghelyan was featured on BBC Audio discussing the recent Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks that were held at the White House. In the coming days, this academic and grassroots organizer associated with the School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego will join our PodCast to discuss his incredible publication titled Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm. Evolving Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria (2017). His expertise spans conflict analysis and resolution, mediation, media and conflict, nationalism and conflict, and intervention design, among other areas Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

fWotD Episode 3117: Black Widow (Natasha Romanova) Welcome to featured Wiki of the Day, your daily dose of knowledge from Wikipedia's finest articles.The featured article for Sunday, 16 November 2025, is Black Widow (Natasha Romanova).Black Widow is a superhero appearing in American comic books published by Marvel Comics. Created by editor Stan Lee, scripter Don Rico, and artist Don Heck, the character debuted as an enemy of Iron Man in Tales of Suspense #52 (1964). She reformed into a hero in The Avengers #30 (1966) and her most well-known design was introduced in The Amazing Spider-Man #86 (1970). Black Widow has been the main character in several comic titles since 1970, receiving her own Black Widow series in 1999. She also frequently appears as a supporting character in The Avengers and Daredevil.Natalia Alianovna "Natasha Romanoff" Romanova (Russian: Наталья Альяновна "Наташа" Романова) is introduced as a spy for the Soviet Union until she defects to the United States. She subsequently joins the intelligence agency S. H. I. E. L. D., partners with Daredevil, and encounters a rival Black Widow in Yelena Belova. Though she has no distinct superpowers, she was augmented in the Red Room, a Soviet training facility, to increase her strength and reduce her aging. She has training in combat and espionage, and wields bracelets that fire electric shocks and project wires she uses to traverse skyscrapers.Black Widow stories often explore her struggle to define her own identity as a spy and the trauma she endured from her life of training in the Red Room. Early stories emphasized her Soviet origin, portraying her superiors as evil and contrasting her with more noble American superheroes. Black Widow's status as a leading female character and femme fatale has influenced her portrayal, which was often contradictory as comics grappled with the conflict between traditional gender roles and second-wave feminism. The character is heavily sexualized both by artists and by the characters with whom she interacts.Black Widow has been adapted into a variety of other media, including film, animated series, and video games. A version of the character was portrayed by Scarlett Johansson in the Marvel Cinematic Universe from her first appearance in Iron Man 2 (2010) to her final one in Black Widow (2021). Johansson's portrayal brought increased attention to the character and influenced Black Widow's depiction in comics.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 00:31 UTC on Sunday, 16 November 2025.For the full current version of the article, see Black Widow (Natasha Romanova) on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Bluesky at @wikioftheday.com.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm standard Salli.

EPISODE 626 - Suzanne Parry - The Soviet Experience Through Historical Fiction, Pentagon Tour, Iron Maiden of StockholmRaised in a quiet rural corner of western New York State, I didn't always want to be a writer. I was, however, always surrounded by books. Bookcases in every room. Entire walls of them. My mother was an avid reader and regular trips to the library were part of my childhood. My stepfather was a creative writing professor and words floated through the rooms and into the nooks and crannies of that pre-Civil War era farmhouse. Books weren't my escape so much as they were part of my daily diet. At twenty I made a list of things I wanted to accomplish and “write a book” was on it. That list included both measurable things like “learn five foreign languages” and “complete a significant athletic achievement” and less quantifiable items like “make the world a better place.” During the Cold War of my high school and college years, I very much wanted to help reduce the possibility of conflict between the US and the USSR.I earned a bachelor's degree at Purdue University, and then continued my Russian studies at the Pushkin Russian Language Institute in Moscow. I studied Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, received a Master's in 1982 and started a career in public service with the US Department of Defense. My work in the Office of the Secretary of Defense focused on European security issues between NATO, Warsaw Pact, and neutral nations. While at the Pentagon I helped negotiate the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, the first security agreement of the Gorbachev era. At the Stockholm talks as we often called the CDE, a number of my European colleagues jokingly called me the “Iron Maiden of Stockholm” in a not altogether flattering reference to British PM Margaret Thatcher, the original tough-as-nails female negotiator. The many months I spent crafting an agreement with diplomats from thirty-five nations, sitting at a table alongside NATO colleagues and opposite Soviet and Warsaw Pact counterparts, was my great honor.After this heady time, I put most of my energy into raising a large family (requiring its own negotiating skills). Funny enough, having a family was not on that list and yet today I would say without hesitation that the most impactful (and most difficult) thing I've ever done is raise four children. I lived in several countries, including the former Soviet Union, Belgium, Sweden, Singapore, and Germany. Throughout adulthood I've been a committed runner. I've completed dozens of marathons in more than twenty countries, including the fifty-six-mile Comrades Marathon in South Africa. I eventually landed in the wonderful and welcoming city of Portland, Oregon as a single parent. There, I coached high school cross country and track at a large public high school before deciding it wasn't too late to dust off that forty-year-old list and write a book.I now divide my time between Portland and Washington, DC, but also travel for fun, for research, and best of all, to visit my children and grandchildren.https://suzanneparrywrites.com/Support the show___https://livingthenextchapter.com/podcast produced by: https://truemediasolutions.ca/Coffee Refills are always appreciated, refill Dave's cup here, and thanks!https://buymeacoffee.com/truemediaca

Jay is joined by geopolitical analyst and forecaster George Friedman to unpack what President Trump really represents in the long arc of American history. We revisit George's “vanilla president” thesis and why, personality aside, Trump's project to dismantle the post-1945 world order was predictable and perhaps inevitable. We dig into the shift from global policeman back toward U.S. isolationism, the real story behind Venezuela and the U.S. military build-up in the Caribbean, and why a renewed Russia–Cuba pact makes the Florida Straits one of the most important choke points on Earth. George's Links: https://geopoliticalfutures.com/ https://x.com/George_Friedman Learn to invest alongside the top minds in commodities. Join The Commodity University today. CLICK: https://linkly.link/26yH8 Sign up for my free weekly newsletter at https://2ly.link/211gx Be part of our online investment community: https://cambridgehouse.com https://twitter.com/JayMartinBC https://www.instagram.com/jaymartinbc https://www.facebook.com/TheJayMartinShow https://www.linkedin.com/company/cambridge-house-international 00:00 – Intro 01:06 – Trump's predictable project: dismantling the post-1945 order 04:21 – Hippie president? Peace, retrenchment & hot spots from Ukraine to Venezuela 11:50 – Isolationism vs global policeman: returning to America's old norm 17:16 – How far should US intervention go – and when does it stop? 18:50 – Why 800 US bases when the Soviet threat is gone? 21:21 – Venezuela as a smokescreen: what's really happening in the Caribbean? 22:01 – Cuba–Russia pact, Florida Straits & the Gulf trade choke point 26:32 – Monroe Doctrine 2.0, cartels & Russian meddling in Latin America 29:41 – Economic stakes of the Gulf of Mexico & Mississippi River 31:05 – Plausible deniability: why Washington leads with the drug war narrative 34:12 – Putin's failed Ukraine gamble & giving him an off-ramp 48:06 – Why wars are sold on misleading narratives 53:28 – South China Sea, island chains & China's geography problem 55:31 – China's economic fragility, internal unrest & dependence on US markets 1:00:12 – The 40-year export superpower cycle: US, Japan, China 1:06:07 – Why China can't invade Taiwan or break the island chain 1:07:29 – Rare earths, supply chains & how vulnerable is the US really? 1:14:07 – Did globalization blindside Washington and Wall Street? 1:17:28 – Term limits, FDR precedent & Trump running again 1:20:11 – Administrative state vs elected power: the constitutional paradox 1:24:02 – Roman Republic parallels Copyright © 2025 Cambridge House International Inc. All rights reserved.

Le groupe satirique Soviet Suprem envahit la #SessionLive. (Rediffusion) Depuis 10 ans, Soviet Suprem soulève les foules, à l'endroit, à l'envers et toujours de la gauche vers la gauche. Après avoir revisité la sono mondiale au travers de l'œil de Moscou et pris le contre-pied de la world music anglo-saxonne puis s'être tourné vers l'électro-minimal teinté de chœurs de l'armée rouge, John Lénine, Sylvester Staline et leurs complices ont pris le train de l'Orient extrême et est de retour avec un troisième opus résolument rap et tourné vers l'Asie Made in China. John Lénine et Sylvester Staline enfilent leurs tabliers de chef étoilé (rouge) pour cette session live qui s'annonce épicée. Titres joués au grand studio : - Woke wok Live RFI - La course aux armements, extrait de l'album - Qui complote Live RFI. Line Up : Nicolas Krassilchik alias Didier Croute-Chef (platines, percussions) ; Cyril Morey alias Cyrillique Saxo (saxophone) ; Toma Feterman alias John Lénine (chant, guitare) et Erwan Seguillon alias Sylvester Staline (chant). Son : Jérémie Besset, Mathias Taylor. ► Album Made In China (Modulor 2024). Site - YouTube - facebook.   Puis Toma et RWan nous propose une sélection musicale. Playlist Soviet Suprem Kiddus | Bazbaz Choices choix RWan Bjork/Omar Souleymane remix Crystalline choix Toma Astéréotype C5 choix RWan The Paradise Bangkok Molam International Band Studio Lam Plearn choix Toma.

Le groupe satirique Soviet Suprem envahit la #SessionLive. (Rediffusion) Depuis 10 ans, Soviet Suprem soulève les foules, à l'endroit, à l'envers et toujours de la gauche vers la gauche. Après avoir revisité la sono mondiale au travers de l'œil de Moscou et pris le contre-pied de la world music anglo-saxonne puis s'être tourné vers l'électro-minimal teinté de chœurs de l'armée rouge, John Lénine, Sylvester Staline et leurs complices ont pris le train de l'Orient extrême et est de retour avec un troisième opus résolument rap et tourné vers l'Asie Made in China. John Lénine et Sylvester Staline enfilent leurs tabliers de chef étoilé (rouge) pour cette session live qui s'annonce épicée. Titres joués au grand studio : - Woke wok Live RFI - La course aux armements, extrait de l'album - Qui complote Live RFI. Line Up : Nicolas Krassilchik alias Didier Croute-Chef (platines, percussions) ; Cyril Morey alias Cyrillique Saxo (saxophone) ; Toma Feterman alias John Lénine (chant, guitare) et Erwan Seguillon alias Sylvester Staline (chant). Son : Jérémie Besset, Mathias Taylor. ► Album Made In China (Modulor 2024). Site - YouTube - facebook.   Puis Toma et RWan nous propose une sélection musicale. Playlist Soviet Suprem Kiddus | Bazbaz Choices choix RWan Bjork/Omar Souleymane remix Crystalline choix Toma Astéréotype C5 choix RWan The Paradise Bangkok Molam International Band Studio Lam Plearn choix Toma.

PREVIEW Bob Zimmerman reports that Vast, an American commercial startup, is launching its single-module space station, Haven One, next year without NASA funding. Vast signed a cooperation deal with Uzbekistan, strongly implying that the Central Asian nation will fly an astronaut to the station, marking its return to space development after the Soviet era. Guest: Bob Zimmerman. Retry

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit andrewsullivan.substack.comFiona was an intel analyst under Bush and Obama, and then served under Trump as senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council. Currently a senior fellow at Brookings and the chancellor of Durham University, her books include Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin and There Is Nothing for You Here: Finding Opportunity in the 21st Century — which we discussed on the Dishcast in 2022.For two clips of our convo — on Russia's imperial war, and a comparison of Putin and Trump — head to our YouTube page.Other topics: Fiona's recent long trip to northeast England; walking the length of Hadrian's Wall; industrial decline; mass migration; how London is increasingly non-English; the brain drain from smaller places; the revival of nationalism; the fading left-right distinction; populism as a style; the Tory collapse and Reform's rise; NATO; the Munich Security Conference and Vance; the Zelensky meeting at the White House; Soviet ideology; the Russian Empire; Putin's psyops with social media; sending North Koreans into battle; the pipeline attacks; Ukraine's innovative use of drones; the massive casualties of the attrition war; Russia's resilient economy; the new corruption scandal in Ukraine; war profiteering; Putin's attacks on civilians; his manipulation of Trump; ressentiment in the West; male resentment in the economy; white-collar job insecurity due to AI; the origins of the BBC and its current scandal; the NHS; the slowing US economy; MTG positioning herself as the real MAGA; revolutions eating their own; Epstein; the demolished East Wing; and what my latest DNA test revealed.Browse the Dishcast archive for an episode you might enjoy. Coming up: Mark Halperin on US politics, Michel Paradis on Eisenhower, Shadi Hamid on US power abroad, Jason Willick on trade and conservatism, Vivek Ramaswamy on the right, George Packer on his Orwell-inspired novel, and Arthur Brooks on the science of happiness. As always, please send any guest recs, dissents, and other comments to dish@andrewsullivan.com.

How do you prevent a personal catastrophe? Learn the Petrov Principle, named after the Soviet officer who saved the world by pausing and questioning the data during a false nuclear alarm. This episode draws a powerful parallel to your alcohol-free life: your nervous system's cravings are often a "false alarm". Discover actionable strategies like box breathing , sensory grounding (5-4-3-2-1) , and conscious journaling to reset your nervous system, resist the urge to react , and choose long-term peace over short-term relief.   Download my FREE guide: The Alcohol Freedom Formula For Over 30s Entrepreneurs & High Performers: https://social.alcoholfreelifestyle.com/podcast ★ - Learn more about Project 90: www.alcoholfreelifestyle.com/Project90 ★ - (Accountability & Support) Speak verbally to a certified Alcohol-Free Lifestyle coach to see if, or how, we could support you having a better relationship with alcohol: https://www.alcoholfreelifestyle.com/schedule ★ - The wait is over – My new book "CLEAR" is now available. Get your copy here: https://www.alcoholfreelifestyle.com/clear

China's rapid ascent from rural poverty to industrial superpower reshaped the global economy and established a new center of gravity for manufacturing. Today, Chinese factories anchor much of the world's supply chains, producing goods at a speed and scale that few countries can match. Behind this transformation is a system that author Dan Wang describes in his new book "Breakneck: China's Quest to Engineer the Future" as the "engineering state," a model defined by massive investments in infrastructure, strategic planning, and so-called "process knowledge" gleaned from the country's rapid industrial development. Now, more and more, the Chinese government touts this development model as an example for other countries in the Global South to emulate. Dan joins Eric to discuss whether the so-called "engineering state" is replicable elsewhere or if it's a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. CHAPTERS: • Setting the Stage – China's rise from rural poverty to industrial superpower • The Engineering State – How China builds, plans, and organizes at a massive scale • Roots of the Model – East Asian development traditions and Soviet legacies • Infrastructure as Strategy – High-speed rail, bridges, airports, and the costs behind them • Industrial Capacity – Manufacturing clusters, supply chains, and process knowledge • The Speed Advantage – Why Chinese firms move faster than global competitors • Tech Transfer Debates – Joint ventures, old IP, and myths about forced transfers • Subsidies and Support – What Chinese industrial subsidies do—and what they don't • Exporting the Model – Limits of replication in Africa, Asia, and the Global South • The China Price – How scale, logistics, and workforce learning lock in dominance • Internal Tensions – Debt, underused infrastructure, and diminishing returns • Shifting Priorities – Xi's push away from consumer tech and toward strategic industries • Global Backlash – Overcapacity, trade pushback, and rising protectionism • Future Crossroads – Why China's development engine is losing momentum • Lessons for the Global South – What countries can adapt—and what they must avoid JOIN THE DISCUSSION: X: @ChinaGSProject | @eric_olander  Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProject YouTube: www.youtube.com/@ChinaGlobalSouth Now on Bluesky! Follow CGSP at @chinagsproject.bsky.social FOLLOW CGSP IN FRENCH & SPANISH:  French: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChine Spanish: www.chinalasamericas.com | @ChinaAmericas JOIN US ON PATREON! Become a CGSP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CGSP Podcast mug! www.patreon.com/chinaglobalsouth

China's rapid ascent from rural poverty to industrial superpower reshaped the global economy and established a new center of gravity for manufacturing. Today, Chinese factories anchor much of the world's supply chains, producing goods at a speed and scale that few countries can match. Behind this transformation is a system that author Dan Wang describes in his new book "Breakneck: China's Quest to Engineer the Future" as the "engineering state," a model defined by massive investments in infrastructure, strategic planning, and so-called "process knowledge" gleaned from the country's rapid industrial development. Now, more and more, the Chinese government touts this development model as an example for other countries in the Global South to emulate. Dan joins Eric to discuss whether the so-called "engineering state" is replicable elsewhere or if it's a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. CHAPTERS: • Setting the Stage – China's rise from rural poverty to industrial superpower • The Engineering State – How China builds, plans, and organizes at a massive scale • Roots of the Model – East Asian development traditions and Soviet legacies • Infrastructure as Strategy – High-speed rail, bridges, airports, and the costs behind them • Industrial Capacity – Manufacturing clusters, supply chains, and process knowledge • The Speed Advantage – Why Chinese firms move faster than global competitors • Tech Transfer Debates – Joint ventures, old IP, and myths about forced transfers • Subsidies and Support – What Chinese industrial subsidies do—and what they don't • Exporting the Model – Limits of replication in Africa, Asia, and the Global South • The China Price – How scale, logistics, and workforce learning lock in dominance • Internal Tensions – Debt, underused infrastructure, and diminishing returns • Shifting Priorities – Xi's push away from consumer tech and toward strategic industries • Global Backlash – Overcapacity, trade pushback, and rising protectionism • Future Crossroads – Why China's development engine is losing momentum • Lessons for the Global South – What countries can adapt—and what they must avoid JOIN THE DISCUSSION: X: @ChinaGSProject | @eric_olander  Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProject YouTube: www.youtube.com/@ChinaGlobalSouth Now on Bluesky! Follow CGSP at @chinagsproject.bsky.social FOLLOW CGSP IN FRENCH & SPANISH:  French: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChine Spanish: www.chinalasamericas.com | @ChinaAmericas JOIN US ON PATREON! Become a CGSP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CGSP Podcast mug! www.patreon.com/chinaglobalsouth

In 1991, as the USSR broke apart and its population became open to the reforming discourse of Mikhail Gorbachev's reform program of perestroika, Soviet dissident historian Roy Medvedev set the tone for subsequent writing on Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, concluding that he was “a personality so mediocre and a politician so ordinary” that he “quickly disappeared from the political scene and also in the literal and metaphorical sense.” But not for long. When it became clear by the end of the decade that market capitalism and democracy had not improved people's lives, nostalgia for the Brezhnev era rightly raised the question of whether he had been given his just due and unfairly blamed for the shortcomings of the Soviet system. This reversal of fortune also makes clear that no Soviet leader has been as neglected or as misunderstood as Brezhnev and therefore no Soviet party boss is in such need of a fresh historical reassessment. Divided into two parts, my presentation will first make a case for Brezhnev, emphasizing his vision of guaranteeing stability, assuring peace, and letting people live well. Earlier I coined the term “Soviet man of peace,” to characterize Brezhnev. I emphasize this point here, arguing that his dream of wanting to be remembered as an asset for world peace made him a leader who changed the world. In part 2 of my presentation, I zoom in on the Leonid Brezhnev that, as his biographer, I might never know and propose what these unresolved questions might mean. Donald J. Raleigh is the Jay Richard Judson Distinguished Professor of Russian History Emeritus at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He has authored, translated, and edited numerous books on modern Russian history including Revolution on the Volga (1986), Experiencing Russia's Civil War (2002), Russia's Sputnik Generation (2006) and Soviet Baby Boomers (2012). He currently is writing a biography of Soviet leader Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, research for which has taken him to archives in Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the UK, and the US. This lecture is sponsored by the Alice D. Mortenson/Petrovich Distinguished Chair of Russian History and University Lectures.

We've done shows before on how contemporary America resembles late-stage Soviet society. But none quite as intriguing as with the Russian-born, US-based journalist Mikhail Zygar. In The Dark Side of the Earth, his new history of the Soviet Union's demise, Zygar underlines the moral exhaustion of its citizens. People no longer believed in anything, he reports on the collapse of this vast Euro-Asian empire. And that's the analogy Zygar makes with contemporary America which, he suggests, is equally exhausted. From the Soviet Union to the United States, a descent into a morally bankrupt nihilism defines the end of empire. Zygar even identifies the idealistic Obama with Gorbachev and the pugnacious Trump with Yeltsin, implying that a self-styled Putin-like “savior” lurks in the dark shadow of the American future. 1. Putin's Russia is worse than the Soviet Union The Soviet Union had dozens of political prisoners in the 1970s; Putin's Russia has thousands. Putin threatens the West with nuclear weapons far more aggressively than Soviet leaders ever did. What we thought was a victory over totalitarianism proved short-lived—Putin has built something more oppressive than what collapsed.2. The 1991 coup failed because of one woman History turns on ordinary people, not just great men. Emma Yazov, wife of the Soviet Defense Minister, spent three days crying in her husband's office, demanding he withdraw tanks from Moscow and resign from the junta. On the third day, he did. Her belief in democracy defeated the KGB and the Soviet military.3. Soviet citizens stopped believing after 1968 The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia killed whatever faith remained in communism. Afterward, Soviet people became perhaps the most cynical on earth, practicing “internal immigration”—pretending to participate in official life while living secret, clandestine private lives. When no one believes in an empire's ideology, collapse becomes inevitable.4. Solzhenitsyn's ideas shaped both Putin and the American New Right The author of The Gulag Archipelago evolved from Soviet dissident to fierce critic of liberal democracy. He wanted to preserve the Soviet empire by replacing communist ideology with Orthodox Christianity—precisely what Putin is attempting now. His attacks on Western liberalism's “weakness” and “woke culture” have found new audiences among American conservatives.5. Dick Cheney's approach to Soviet collapse enabled Putin George H.W. Bush and James Baker believed preserving a democratic Soviet Union would create a reliable partner. Dick Cheney disagreed, preferring “15 little dictatorships instead of one mighty Soviet Union.” Cheney's view prevailed. Without a Marshall Plan for post-Soviet states, Russian nationalism flourished, and Putin portrayed the collapse as Western conspiracy—the foundation of his power today.Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe

On today's episode we explore the role of the historical Ukrainian far-right, specifically the Nazi-collaborationist Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, in the development of post-Soviet Ukraine's national memory regime. In particular we address a paradox - how did these far right political formations and their historical narratives, despite limited and regionally specific popularity, assume disproportionate influence on Ukraine's post-Soviet national-memory regime since 1991? What role did the far right nationalist diaspora play? And how do the Russia-Ukraine War as well as the broader normalization of ethno-nationalism in politics and academia reinforce far right memory politics?Our guest today is historian Per Rudling. As a basis for discussion we read his recent article“Repatriating An Edifying Past: The Diaspora Ukrainian Authoritarian Right and Power Over Memory, 1991–2021”Article description:The recent history of the Ukrainian authoritarian far right is one of paradoxes. If one looks at the polls, it has performed poorly; its modest successes have been regional and short-lived. On the other hand, it has been highly successful in terms of shaping memory politics in the country. It has had a disproportional influence on history writing, having invested significant efforts into building an effective structure in the field of memory management. Radical nationalists have also come to staff senior positions as deans and vice chancellors at Ukraine's top universities, the ministry of education, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINP), and the archives of the Ukrainian Security Service (HDA SBU). The hard right has gained a disproportionate influence on “soft issues” of identity and the shaping of “national memory” – not only by running the governmental memory institutes, but also by hands-on drafting of memory laws outlawing “disrespect” for the OUN, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and other historical far-right groups. This study seeks to trace and contextualize the repatriation of the ethnonationalist hard right from emigration and its role in shaping an infrastructure of memory production – in particular, under presidents Yushchenko (2005–2010) and Poroshenko (2014–2019).Per Rudling is associate professor of History at Lund University and author of Tarnished Heroes: The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Memory Politics of Post-Soviet Ukraine (2024) and The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism 1906-1931 (2014)

Quantum Nurse https://graceasagra.com/  http://graceasagra.bio.link/presents Freedom International Livestream Thursday, Nov 13, 2025 @ 1:00 PM EST  Guest: Stanislav Krapivnik Topic: Collateral Damage: EU, Nigeria and Latin America Uravel--       https://www.youtube.com/@MrSlavikman      Telegram -  Stas Was There...In English Bio: Stanislav Krapivnik is a former US Army officer, supply chain executive and military-political expert, located in Russia. He was born in Donbass during the Soviet times, migrated to the US as a child, served in the US army, did not like what it was doing in former Yugoslavia, quit, returned to Russia and now is working as a support system near his hometown in the battle in Ukraine. Please support his channel and his work. His Patreon account is: http://www.patreon.com/user?u=290499 Buy Me A Coffee http://www.buymeacoffee.com/staskrapiv   Founding Host:   Grace Asagra, RN MA http://graceasagra.com https://rumble.com/c/QuantumNurseGraceAsagra Telegram - https://t.me/QuantumNurseGraceAsagra   TIP/DONATE LINK for Grace Asagra @ Quantum Nurse Podcast https://patron.podbean.com/QuantumNurse https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=FHUXTQVAVJDPU Venmo - @Grace-Asagra 609-203-5854 WELLNESS RESOURCES Optimal Health and Wellness with Grace Virtual Dispensary Link (Designs for Health)               2https://www.designsforhealth.com/u/optimalhealthwellness Premier Research Labs - https://prlabs.com/customer/account/create/code/59n84f/ - 15% discount - 15%_59N84F_05 Standing Co-host: Harmut Schumacher www.dragonnous,com

She knows tyranny when she sees it. Award-winning journalist Stella Escobedo, who escaped Soviet oppression as a child, now warns that the same toxic mix of antisemitism, propaganda, and communist ideology her family fled in the USSR is taking root in America. She's on a mission to use her media presence to fight back. For the weekend, post my talk in Denver. Make sure to edit out the dead time at the end of the video.Join Our Whatsapp Channel: https://chat.whatsapp.com/GkavRznXy731nxxRyptCMvFollow us on Twitter: https://x.com/AviAbelowJoin our Telegram Channel: https://t.me/aviabelowpulseFollow us on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/pulse_of_israel/?hl=enPulse of Israel on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/IsraelVideoNetworkVisit Our Website - https://pulseofisrael.com/Donate to Pulse of Israel: https://pulseofisrael.com/boost-this-video/

PREVIEW. Strategic Weapons and the US Stance on "Dead Hand" Protocols. John Batchelor and Peter Huessy discuss strategic weapons and the Soviet Cold War "Dead Hand" operation, where nuclear weapons would launch even if leadership was eliminated. When asked if America has a similar plan, Huessy guesses no, stating the President or Vice President must authorize retaliation to ensure the action is certain and "kosher." 1963

When an elderly man with a battered suitcase walked into the British embassy in Vilnius in 1992, few could have guessed what he was about to hand over. Gordon Corera tells the story of Vasili Mitrokhin, an under-the-radar Soviet archivist who copied thousands of classified KGB documents over 12 years. Speaking to Elinor Evans, he reveals how a project that began as a private rebellion against the agency he once served evolved into one of the greatest intelligence coups of the 20th century. (Ad) Gordon Corera is the author of The Spy in the Archive: How One Man Tried to Kill the KGB (William Collins, 2025). Buy it now from Amazon: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Spy-Archive-Gordon-Corera/dp/0008644799/?tag=bbchistory045-21&ascsubtag=historyextra-social-histboty. The HistoryExtra podcast is produced by the team behind BBC History Magazine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Winter War was a brutal struggle against a determined human enemy and the unforgiving cold, dangers the Red Army knew and understood. Yet on a desolate mountain plateau, where strange stone idols stand guard and the trees twist in agony, a Soviet company learned that some places are battlegrounds for forces far older and more monstrous than man.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the Changsha fire. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man or flood the land to slow the invaders. He chose both, pushing rivers and rallying a fractured army as Japanese forces pressed along the Yangtze. Fortresses at Madang held long, but the cost was high—troops lost, civilians displaced, a city's heart burning in the night. Wuhan fell after months of brutal fighting, yet the battle did not break China's will. Mao Zedong urged strategy over martyrdom, preferring to drain the enemy and buy time for a broader struggle. The Japanese, though victorious tactically, found their strength ebbing, resource strains, supply gaps, and a war that felt endless. In the wake of Wuhan, Changsha stood next in the Japanese crosshairs, its evacuation and a devastating fire leaving ash and memory in its wake. Behind these prices, political currents swirled. Wang Jingwei defected again, seeking power beyond Chiang's grasp, while Chongqing rose as a western bastion of resistance. The war hardened into a protracted stalemate, turning Japan from an aggressive assailant into a wary occupier, and leaving China to endure, persist, and fight on.   #175  The Soviet-Japanese Border Conflicts Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So based on the title of this one, you probably can see we are taking a bit of a detour. For quite some time we have focused on the Japanese campaigns into China proper 1937-1938. Now the way the second sino-japanese war is traditionally broken down is in phases. 1937-1938, 1939-1942 and 1942-1945. However there is actually even more going on in China aside from the war with Japan. In Xinjiang province a large full blown Islamic revolution breaks out in 1937. We will be covering that story at a later date, but another significant event is escalating border skirmishes in Manchukuo. Now these border skirmishes had been raging ever since the USSR consolidated its hold over the far east. We talked about some of those skirmishes prior to the Sino-Soviet war in 1929. However when Japan created the puppet government of Manchukuo, this was a significant escalation in tensions with the reds. Today we are going to talk about the escalating border conflicts between the Soviets and Japan. A tongue of poorly demarcated land extends southeast from Hunchun, hugging the east bank of the Tumen River between Lake Khasan to the east and Korea to the west. Within this tongue stands Changkufeng Hill, one of a long chain of highlands sweeping from upstream along the rivers and moors toward the sea. The twin-peaked hill sits at the confluence area several miles northwest of the point where Manchuria, Korea, and the Russian Far East meet. The hill's shape reminded Koreans of their changgo, which is a long snare drum constricted at the center and tapped with the hands at each end. When the Manchus came to the Tumen, they rendered the phonetic sounds into three ideographic characters meaning "taut drum peaks" or Chang-ku-feng. The Japanese admired the imagery and preserved the Chinese readings, which they pronounce Cho-ko-ho. From their eastern vantage, the Russians called it Zaozernaya, "hill behind the lake." Soviet troops referred to it as a sugar-loaf hill. For many years, natives and a handful of officials in the region cultivated a relaxed attitude toward borders and sovereignty. Even after the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, the issue did not immediately come to a head. With the expansion of Manchukuo and the Soviet Far East under Stalin's Five-Year plans, both sides began to attend more closely to frontier delimitation. Whenever either party acted aggressively, force majeure was invoked to justify the unexpected and disruptive events recognized in international law. Most often, these incidents erupted along the eastern Manchurian borders with the USSR or along the 350-mile frontier south of Lake Khanka, each skirmish carrying the seeds of all-out warfare. Now we need to talk a little bit about border history. The borders in question essentially dated to pacts concluded by the Qing dynasty and the Tsardom. Between the first Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and the Mukden Agreement of 1924, there were over a dozen accords governing the borders. Relevant to Changkufeng were the basic 15-article Convention of Peking, supplementing the Tientsin Treaties of November 1860, some maps made in 1861, and the eight-article Hunchun Border Protocol of 1886. By the 1860 treaty, the Qing ceded to Tsarist Russia the entire maritime province of Siberia, but the meaning of "lands south of Lake Khanka" remained rather vague. Consequently, a further border agreement was negotiated in June 1861 known as "the Lake Khanka Border Pact", by which demarcations were drawn on maps and eight wooden markers erected. The border was to run from Khanka along ridgelines between the Hunchun River and the sea, past Suifenho and Tungning, terminating about 6 miles from the mouth of the Tumen. Then a Russo-Chinese commission established in 1886 drew up the Hunchun Border Pact, proposing new or modified markers along the 1860–1861 lines and arranging a Russian resurvey. However, for the Japanese, in 1938, the Chinese or Manchu texts of the 1886 Hunchun agreement were considered controlling. The Soviets argued the border ran along every summit west of Khasan, thereby granting them jurisdiction over at least the eastern slopes of all elevations, including Changkufeng and Shachaofeng.  Since the Qing dynasty and the house of Romanov were already defunct, the new sovereignties publicly appealed to opposing texts, and the Soviet side would not concede that the Russian-language version had never been deemed binding by the Qing commissioners. Yet, even in 1938, the Japanese knew that only the Chinese text had survived or could be located.    Now both the Chinese and Russian military maps generally drew the frontier along the watershed east of Khasan; this aligned with the 1861 readings based on the Khanka agreement. The Chinese Republican Army conducted new surveys sometime between 1915 and 1920. The latest Chinese military map of the Changkufeng area drew the border considerably closer to the old "red line" of 1886, running west of Khasan but near the shore rather than traversing the highland crests. None of the military delimitations of the border was sanctified by an official agreement. Hence, the Hunchun Protocol, whether well known or not, invaluable or worthless, remained the only government-to-government pact dealing with the frontiers.  Before we jump into it, how about a little summary of what became known as the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts. The first major conflict would obviously be the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Following years of conflict between the Russian Empire and Japan culminating in the costly Battle of Tsushima, Tsar Nicholas II's government sought peace, recognizing Japan's claims to Korea and agreeing to evacuate Manchuria.  From 1918 to 1920, the Imperial Japanese Army, under Emperor Taishō after the death of Meiji, assisted the White Army and Alexander Kerensky against the Bolshevik Red Army. They also aided the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia to facilitate its return to Europe after an Austrian-Hungarian armoured train purportedly went astray. By 1920, with Austria-Hungary dissolved and Czechoslovakia established two years earlier, the Czechoslovak Legion reached Europe. Japan withdrew from the Russian Revolution and the Civil War in 1922. Following Japan's 1919-1920 occupations and the Soviet intervention in Mongolia in 1921, the Republic of China also withdrew from Outer Mongolia in 1921. In 1922, after capturing Vladivostok in 1918 to halt Bolshevik advances, Japanese forces retreated to Japan as Bolshevik power grew and the postwar fatigue among combatants increased. After Hirohito's invasion of Manchuria in 1931–1932, following Taishō's death in 1926, border disputes between Manchukuo, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Soviet Union increased. Many clashes stemmed from poorly defined borders, though some involved espionage. Between 1932 and 1934, the Imperial Japanese Army reported 152 border disputes, largely tied to Soviet intelligence activity in Manchuria, while the Soviets accused Japan of 15 border violations, six air intrusions, and 20 cases of "spy smuggling" in 1933 alone. Numerous additional violations followed in the ensuing years. By the mid-1930s, Soviet-Japanese diplomacy and trust had deteriorated further, with the Japanese being openly labeled "fascist enemies" at the Seventh Comintern Congress in July 1935. Beginning in 1935, conflicts significantly escalated. On 8 January 1935, the first armed clash, known as the Halhamiao incident, took place on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. Several dozen cavalrymen of the Mongolian People's Army crossed into Manchuria near disputed fishing grounds and engaged an 11‑man Manchukuo Imperial Army patrol near the Buddhist temple at Halhamiao, led by a Japanese military advisor. The Manchukuo Army sustained 6 wounded and 2 dead, including the Japanese officer; the Mongols suffered no casualties and withdrew after the Japanese sent a punitive expedition to reclaim the area. Two motorized cavalry companies, a machine‑gun company, and a tankette platoon occupied the position for three weeks without resistance. In June 1935, the first direct exchange of fire between the Japanese and Soviets occurred when an 11‑man Japanese patrol west of Lake Khanka was attacked by six Soviet horsemen, reportedly inside Manchukuo territory. In the firefight, one Soviet soldier was killed and two horses were captured. The Japanese requested a joint investigation, but the Soviets rejected the proposal. In October 1935, nine Japanese and 32 Manchukuoan border guards were establishing a post about 20 kilometers north of Suifenho when they were attacked by 50 Soviet soldiers. The Soviets opened fire with rifles and five heavy machine guns. Two Japanese and four Manchukuoan soldiers were killed, and another five were wounded. The Manchukuoan foreign affairs representative lodged a verbal protest with the Soviet consul at Suifenho. The Kwantung Army of Japan also sent an intelligence officer to investigate the clash. On 19 December 1935, a Manchukuoan unit reconnoitering southwest of Buir Lake clashed with a Mongolian party, reportedly capturing 10 soldiers. Five days later, 60 truck‑borne Mongolian troops assaulted the Manchukuoans and were repulsed, at the cost of three Manchukuoan dead. On the same day, at Brunders, Mongolian forces attempted three times to drive out Manchukuoan outposts, and again at night, but all attempts failed. Further small attempts occurred in January, with Mongolians using airplanes for reconnaissance. The arrival of a small Japanese force in three trucks helped foil these attempts; casualties occurred on both sides, though Mongolian casualties are unknown aside from 10 prisoners taken. In February 1936, Lieutenant-Colonel Sugimoto Yasuo was ordered to form a detachment from the 14th Cavalry Regiment to "drive the Outer Mongol intruders from the Olankhuduk region," a directive attributed to Lieutenant-General Kasai Heijuro. Sugimoto's detachment included cavalry guns, heavy machine guns, and tankettes. They faced a force of about 140 Mongolians equipped with heavy machine guns and light artillery. On February 12, Sugimoto's men drove the Mongolians south, at the cost of eight Japanese killed, four wounded, and one tankette destroyed. The Japanese began to withdraw, but were attacked by 5–6 Mongolian armored cars and two bombers, which briefly disrupted the column. The situation was stabilized when the Japanese unit received artillery support, allowing them to destroy or repel the armored cars. In March 1936, the Tauran incident occurred. In this clash, both the Japanese Army and the Mongolian Army deployed a small number of armored fighting vehicles and aircraft. The incident began when 100 Mongolian and six Soviet troops attacked and occupied the disputed village of Tauran, Mongolia, driving off the small Manchurian garrison. They were supported by light bombers and armored cars, though the bombing sorties failed to inflict damage on the Japanese, and three bombers were shot down by Japanese heavy machine guns. Local Japanese forces counter-attacked, conducting dozens of bombing sorties and finally assaulting Tauran with 400 men and 10 tankettes. The result was a Mongolian rout, with 56 Mongolian soldiers killed, including three Soviet advisors, and an unknown number wounded. Japanese losses were 27 killed and 9 wounded. Later in March 1936, another border clash occurred between Japanese and Soviet forces. Reports of border violations prompted the Japanese Korean Army to send ten men by truck to investigate, but the patrol was ambushed by 20 Soviet NKVD soldiers deployed about 300 meters inside territory claimed by Japan. After suffering several casualties, the Japanese patrol withdrew and was reinforced with 100 men, who then drove off the Soviets. Fighting resumed later that day when the NKVD brought reinforcements. By nightfall, the fighting had ceased and both sides had pulled back. The Soviets agreed to return the bodies of two Japanese soldiers who had died in the fighting, a development viewed by the Japanese government as encouraging. In early April 1936, three Japanese soldiers were killed near Suifenho in another minor affray. This incident was notable because the Soviets again returned the bodies of the fallen servicemen. In June 1937, the Kanchazu Island incident occurred on the Amur River along the Soviet–Manchukuo border. Three Soviet gunboats crossed the river's center line, disembarked troops, and occupied Kanchazu Island. Japanese forces from the IJA 1st Division, equipped with two horse-drawn 37 mm artillery pieces, quickly established improvised firing positions and loaded their guns with both high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. They shelled the Soviet vessels, sinking the lead gunboat, crippling the second, and driving off the third. Japanese troops subsequently fired on the swimming crewmen from the sunken ships using machine guns. Thirty-seven Soviet soldiers were killed, while Japanese casualties were zero. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested and demanded the Soviet forces withdraw from the island. The Soviet leadership, apparently shocked by the incident and reluctant to escalate, agreed to evacuate their troops. By 1938 the border situation had deteriorated. The tangled terrain features, mountain, bog, stream, forest, and valley, would have complicated even careful observers' discernment of the old red line drawn in 1886. Fifty years later, the markers themselves had undergone a metamorphosis. Japanese investigators could find, at most, only 14 to 17 markers standing fairly intact between the Tumen estuary and Khanka—roughly one every 25 miles at best. The remainder were missing or ruined; five were found in new locations. Marker "K," for example, was 40 meters deeper inside Manchuria, away from Khanka. Japanese military experts noted that of the 20 markers originally set along the boundaries of Hunchun Prefecture alone, only four could be found by the summer of 1938. The rest had either been wrecked or arbitrarily moved and discarded by Russian or Chinese officials and inhabitants. It is even said that one missing marker could be seen on display in Khabarovsk. The Chinese had generally interpreted the boundary as the road line just west of Khasan, at least in practice. Free road movement, however, had become a problem even 20 years before the Japanese overran Manchuria in 1931–1932 during the so-called Manchurian Incident. The Japanese adopted, or inherited, the Chinese interpretation, which was based on the 1886 agreement on border roads; the key clause held that the frontier west of Khasan would be the road along the lake. Japanese sources emphasize that local residents' anger toward gradual Soviet oppression and penetrations westward into Manchurian territory fueled the conflict. Many natives believed the original boundaries lay east of the lake, but the Soviets adjusted the situation to suit their own convenience. In practice, the Russians were restricting road use just west of Khasan by Manchurian and Korean residents. There was speculation that this was a prelude to taking over the ridgelines, depending on the reaction of the Manchukuoan–Japanese side. Villagers who went to streams or the lake to launder clothing found themselves subjected to sniper fire. Along a 25-mile stretch of road near Shachaofeng, farmers reported coming under fire from new Soviet positions as early as November 1935. Nevertheless, Japanese and Koreans familiar with the Tumen area noted agrarian, seasonal Korean religious rites atop Changkufeng Hill, including fattened pigs sacrificed and changgo drums beaten. Village elders told Japanese visitors in 1938 that, until early the preceding year, no Russians had come as far as Changkufeng Hill. Looking only at the border sector around Changkufeng, the easy days were clearly behind us. In the summer of 1938, Gaimusho "Foreign Ministry" observers described the explosive situation along the Korea–Manchuria–USSR borders as a matter of de facto frontiers. Both sides pressed against each other, and their trigger-happy posture was summed up in the colloquial refrain: "Take another step and we'll let you have it." Near dawn on 13 June 1938, a Manchurian patrol detected a suspicious figure in the fog swirling over Changlingtzu Hill on the Siberian–Manchurian frontier. Challenged at 15 feet, the suspect hurled two pistols to the ground and raised his hands in surrender. At headquarters, the police soon realized this was no routine border-trespassing case. The man was a defector and he was a Russian general, in fact he was the director of all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Beneath a mufti of spring coat and hunting cap, he wore a full uniform with medals. His identification card No. 83 designated him as G. S. Lyushkov, Commissar 3rd Class, countersigned by Nikolai Yezhov, NKVD head in Moscow. Lyushkov was promptly turned over to the Japanese military authorities, who transferred him to Seoul and then to Tokyo under close escort. On 1 July, the Japanese press was permitted to disclose that Lyushkov had sought refuge in Japan. Ten days later, to capitalize on the commissar's notoriety and to confound skeptics, the Japanese produced Lyushkov at a press conference in Tokyo. For the Japanese and foreign correspondents, who met separately with him, Lyushkov described Soviet Far East strength and the turmoil wracking the USSR, because for those of you unfamiliar this was during the Stalinist purges. Clearly, the Japanese had gained a unique reservoir of high-level intelligence and a wealth of materials, including notes scratched in blood by suspects incarcerated at Khabarovsk. A general tightening of Russian frontier security had recently been reported. Natives of Fangchuanting asserted that a Soviet cavalry patrol appeared in June, seemingly for the first time. Contact with Yangkuanping, northwest of Khasan, was severed. More importantly, Japanese Army Signal Corps intelligence detected a surge of Soviet message traffic from the Posyet Bay district. After Lyushkov's defection, a drastic reshuffle in the local Russian command apparently occurred, and responsibility for border surveillance seems to have been reallocated. Japanese records indicate that the Novokievsk security force commander was relieved and the sector garrison replaced by troops from Vladivostok. Gaimusho intelligence also received reports that a border garrison unit had been transferred from Khabarovsk or Chita to the Tumen sector. The Kwantung Army signal monitors also intercepted two significant frontline messages on 6 July from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region, addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Khabarovsk. Decoded, the messages suggested (1) that ammunition for infantry mortars amounted to less than half the required supply; and  (2) a recommendation that higher headquarters authorize Russian elements to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of Khasan.  The commander noted terrain advantages and the contemplated construction of emplacements that would command Najin and the Korean railway. As a start, at least one Russian platoon should be authorized to dig in on the highest ground (presumably Changkufeng) and deploy four tons of entanglements to stake out the Soviet claim. Korea Army Headquarters received a telegram from the Kwantung Army on 7 July conveying the deciphered messages. On the same day, the 19th Division in North Korea telephoned Seoul that, on 6 July, three or four Soviet horsemen had been observed reconnoitering Manchurian territory from atop a hill called Changkufeng. The alarming intelligence from the Kwantung Army and the front warranted immediate attention by the Korea Army. Some Kwantung Army officers doubted the significance of the developments, with one intelligence official even suggesting the Russian messages might be a deliberate ploy designed to entrap the Japanese at Changkufeng. On 7–8 July, all staff officers in Seoul convened at army headquarters. The name of Changkufeng Hill was not well known, but maps and other data suggested that neither the Japanese nor the Russians had previously stationed border units in the ridge complex west of Khasan. As early as March 1936, Army Commander Koiso Kuniaki had distributed maps to subordinate units, indicating which sectors were in dispute. No patrol was to enter zones lacking definitive demarcation. Until then, the only Japanese element east of the Tumen was a Manchurian policeman at Fangchuanting. Ownership of the high ground emerged as an early issue. A number of other points were raised by  the Kwantung Army: At present, Soviet elements in the area were negligible. The intrusion must not be overlooked. The Russians could be expected to exploit any weakness, and half-measures would not suffice, especially regarding the Japanese defense mission along a 125-mile frontier. In Japanese hands, Changkufeng Hill would be useful, but two excellent observation posts already existed in the neighboring sector of the Manchurian tongue. With dissidence and purges underway, the Russians may have judged it necessary to seal border gaps, particularly after Lyushkov's defection. They may also have sought to control Changkufeng to offset Japanese dominance of the high ground to the north. Soviet seizure of Changkufeng would upset the delicate status quo and could provoke a contest for equivalent observation posts. In broader terms, it mattered little whether the Russians sought a permanent observation post on Changkufeng Hill, which was of relatively minor strategic value. Japan's primary concern lay in the China theater; Changkufeng was peripheral. The Japanese should not expend limited resources or become distracted. The matter required consultation with the high command in Tokyo. In the absence of more comprehensive intelligence, the assembled staff officers concluded that the Korea Army should, at a minimum, ignore or disregard Soviet actions for the time being, while maintaining vigilant observation of the area. The consensus was communicated to Major General Kitano Kenzo, the Korea Army chief of staff, who concurred, and to Koiso. Upon learning that the recommendation advocated a low posture, Koiso inquired only whether the opinion reflected the unanimous view of the staff. Having been assured that it did, he approved the policy. Koiso, then 58, was at the threshold of the routine personnel changes occurring around 15 July. He had just been informed that he would retire and that General Nakamura Kotaro would succeed him. Those acquainted with Koiso perceived him as treating the border difficulties as a minor anticlimax in the course of his command tour. He appeared unemphatic or relaxed as he prepared to depart from a post he had held for twenty-one years. Although neither Koiso nor his staff welcomed the Soviet activities that appeared under way, his reaction likely reflected a reluctance to make decisions that could constrain his soon-to-arrive successor. On 8 July Koiso authorized the dispatch of warnings to the 19th Division at Nanam, to the Hunchun garrison, and to the intelligence branch at Hunchun. These units were instructed to exercise maximum precautions and to tighten frontier security north of Shuiliufeng. In response to the initial appearance of Soviet horsemen at Changkufeng, the Kucheng Border Garrison Unit of the 76th Infantry Regiment maintained close surveillance across the Tumen. By about noon on 9 July, patrols detected approximately a dozen Russian troops commencing construction atop Changkufeng. Between 11 and 13 July, the number of soldiers on the slopes increased to forty; there were also thirty horses and eleven camouflaged tents. Operating in shifts on the western side, thirty meters from the crest, the Russians erected barbed wire and firing trenches; fifty meters forward, they excavated observation trenches. In addition to existing telephone lines between Changkufeng, Lake Khasan, and Kozando, the Russians installed a portable telephone net. Logistical support was provided by three boats on the lake. Approximately twenty kilometers to the east, well within Soviet territory, large forces were being mobilized, and steamship traffic into Posyet Bay intensified. Upon learning of the "intrusion" at Changkufeng on 9 July, Lt. General Suetaka Kamezo, the commander of the 19th Division, dispatched staff officers to the front and prepared to send elements to reinforce border units.  The special significance of Suetaka and his division stemmed from a series of unusual circumstances. Chientao Province, the same zone into which Lyushkov had fled and the sector where Soviet horsemen had appeared, fell within Manchukuo geographically and administratively. Yet, in terms of defense, the configuration of the frontier, the terrain, and the transportation network more closely connected the region with North Korea than with southeastern Manchuria. Approximately 80% of the population was of Korean origin, which implied Japanese rather than Manchukuoan allegiance. Consequently, the Korea Army had been made operationally responsible for the defense of Chientao and controlled not only the three-battalion garrison at Hunchun but also the intelligence detachment located there. In the event of war, the Korea Army's mission was defined as mobilization and execution of subsidiary operational tasks against the USSR, under the control and in support of the Kwantung Army.  The Korea Army ordinarily possessed two infantry divisions, the 19th in North Korea and the 20th stationed at Seoul, but the 20th Division had already departed for China, leaving only the 20th Depot Division in the capital. Beyond sparse ground units, devoid of armor and with weak heavy artillery, there were only two air regiments in Korea, the nearest being the unit at Hoeryong. The Korea Army was designed to maintain public security within Korea as well as fulfill minimal defensive responsibilities. Such an army did not require a full-time operations officer, and none was maintained. When needed, as in mid-1938, the task fell to the senior staff officer, in this case Colonel Iwasaki Tamio. In peacetime, training constituted the primary focus.  Thus, the 19th Division was entrusted with defending northeastern Korea. Its commander, Suetaka, a seasoned infantryman, resented the fact that his elite force had never engaged in combat in China. He intensified training with zeal, emphasizing strict discipline, bravery, aggressiveness, and thorough preparation. Japanese veterans characterized him as severe, bullish, short-tempered, hot-blooded, highly strung, unbending, and stubborn. Nonetheless, there was widespread respect for his realistic training program, maintained under firm, even violent, personal supervision. His men regarded Suetaka as a professional, a modern samurai who forged the division into superb condition. Privately, he was reputed for sensitivity and warmth; a Japanese phrase "yakamashii oyaji" captures the dual sense of stern father and martinet in his character. At the outset, however, Suetaka displayed little aggression. Although not widely known, he did not welcome the orders from army headquarters to deploy to the Tumen. Until late July, he remained somewhat opposed to the notion of dislodging the Soviets from the crest, a proposition arising from neither the division staff nor, initially, Suetaka himself. Colonel Sato noted that, for a week after reports of Soviet excavation at Changkufeng, the division's response was limited to preparations for a possible emergency, as they perceived the matter as a local issue best settled through diplomacy. Korea Army officers acknowledged that, around the time the Soviets consolidated their outpost strength at Changkufeng, an informal and personal telegram arrived in Seoul from a Kwantung Army Intelligence field-grade officer who specialized in Soviet affairs. If the Korea Army hesitated, the Kwantung Army would be obliged to eject the Russians; the matter could not be ignored. While the telegram did not demand a reply and struck several officers as presumptuous and implausible, the message was promptly shown to Koiso. Koiso was driven to immediate action, he wired Tokyo asserting that only the Korea Army could and would handle the incident. One staff officer recalled "We felt we had to act, out of a sense of responsibility. But we resented the Kwantung Army's interference." The Korea Army staff convened shortly after receipt of the unofficial telegram from Hsinking. Based on the latest intelligence from the division dated 13 July, the officers prepared an assessment for submission to the army commander. The hypotheses were distilled into three scenarios: The USSR, or the Far East authorities, desires hostilities. Conclusion: Slightly possible. The USSR seeks to restrain Japan on the eve of the pivotal operations in China: the major Japanese offensive to seize Hankow. Conclusion: Highly probable. The Posyet district commander is new in his post; by occupying the Changkufeng ridges, he would demonstrate loyalty, impress superiors, and seek glory. Conclusion: Possible. Late on 13 July or early on 14 July, Koiso approved the dispatch of a message to the vice minister of war, and the Kwantung Army chief of staff:  "Lake Khasan area lies in troublesome sector USSR has been claiming . . . in accordance with treaties [said Secret Message No. 913], but we interpret it to be Manchukuoan territory, evident even from maps published by Soviet side. Russian actions are patently illegal, but, considering that area does not exert major or immediate influence on operations [Japan] is intending and that China Incident is in full swing, we are not going to conduct counterattack measures immediately. This army is thinking of reasoning with Soviets and requesting pullback, directly on spot. . . . In case Russians do not accede in long run, we have intention to drive Soviet soldiers out of area east of Khasan firmly by use of force."  The message concluded with a request that the Tokyo authorities lodge a formal protest with the USSR, on behalf of Manchukuo and Japan, and guide matters so that the Russians would withdraw quickly. Dominant in Japanese high command thinking in 1938 was the China theater; the Changkufeng episode constituted a mere digression. A sequence of Japanese tactical victories had preceded the summer: Tsingtao fell in January; the Yellow River was reached in March; a "reformed government of the Republic of China" was installed at Nanking several weeks later; Amoy fell in early May; Suchow fell on the 20th. With these gains, northern and central fronts could be linked by the Japanese. Yet Chinese resistance persisted, and while public statements anticipated imminent Chinese dissension, private admissions acknowledged that the partial effects of Suchow's fall were ominous: control might pass from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists, Chinese defiance might intensify, and Soviet involvement could ensue. A Hankow drive appeared desirable to symbolize the conclusion of the military phase of hostilities. The Japanese and their adversaries were in accord regarding the importance of the summer and autumn campaigns. Even after Suchow's fall, the government discouraged public insinuations that enemy resistance was collapsing; when Chiang addressed the nation on the first anniversary of hostilities, Premier Konoe prophetically proclaimed, "The war has just begun." Colonel Inada Masazum served as the Army General Staff's principal figure for the Changkufeng affair, occupying the position of chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March 1938. A distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, Inada completed the War College program and held a combination of line, instructional, and staff assignments at the War College, the Army General Staff, and the War Ministry. He was recognized as a sharp, highly capable, and driveful personality, though some regarded him as enigmatic. Following the capture of Suchow, Imperial General Headquarters on 18 June ordered field forces to undertake operational preparations for a drive to seize the Wuhan complex. Inada favored a decisive move aimed at achieving a rapid political settlement. He acknowledged that Soviet intervention in 1938, during Japan's involvement in China, would have been critical. Although Japanese forces could still defeat the Chinese, an overextended Japanese Army might be fatally compromised against the Russians. Soviet assistance to China was already pronouncedly unwelcome. The Soviets were reported to possess roughly 20 rifle divisions, four to five cavalry divisions, 1,500 tanks, and 1,560 aircraft, including 300 bombers with a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers, enabling reach from Vladivostok to Tokyo. Soviet manpower in Siberia was likely near 370,000. In response, Japanese central authorities stressed a no-trouble policy toward the USSR while seeking to "wall off" the border and bolster the Kwantung Army as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the envisaged correction of the strategic imbalance could not occur before 1943, given shortages in ammunition, manpower, and materiel across existing theaters in China. By the end of 1937 Japan had committed 16 of its 24 divisions to China, bringing the standing force to roughly 700,000. Army General Staff planners reallocated three ground divisions, intended for a northern contingency, from north to central China, even as the Kwantung Army operated from a less favorable posture. Attitudes toward the northern problem varied within senior military circles. While concern persisted, it was not universal. As campaigns in China widened, planning at the high command level deteriorated, propagating confusion and anxiety to field armies in China. The Japanese Navy suspected that the Army general staff was invoking the USSR as a pretext for broader strategic aims—namely, to provoke a more consequential confrontation with the USSR while the Navy contended with its own strategic rivalries with the Army, centered on the United States and Britain. Army leaders, however, denied aggressive intent against the USSR at that time. The Hankow plan encountered substantial internal opposition at high levels. Private assessments among army planners suggested that a two-front war would be premature given operational readiness and troop strength. Not only were new War Ministry officials cautious, but many high-ranking Army general staff officers and court circles shared doubts.  Aggressive tendencies, influenced by subordinates and the Kwantung Army, were evident in Inada, who repeatedly pressed Tada Shun, the deputy army chief of staff, to endorse the Wuhan drive as both necessary and feasible, arguing that the USSR would gain from Japan's weakening without incurring substantial losses. Inada contended that Stalin was rational and that time favored the USSR in the Far East, where industrial buildup and military modernization were ongoing. He argued that the Soviet purges impeded opportunistic ventures with Japan. He posited that Nazi Germany posed a growing threat on the western front, and thus the USSR should be avoided by both Japan, due to China and Russia, due to Germany. While most of the army remained engaged in China, Tada did not initially share Inada's views; only after inspecting the Manchurian borders in April 1938 did he finally align with Inada's broader vision, which encompassed both northern and Chinese considerations. During this period, Inada studied daily intelligence from the Kwantung Army, and after Lyushkov's defection in June, reports suggested the Soviets were following their sector commander's recommendations. Russian troops appeared at Changkufeng, seemingly prepared to dig in. Inada recollects his reaction: "That's nice, my chance has come." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The simmering Soviet–Japanese border clashes centered on Changkufeng Hill near Lake Khanka, set within a broader history of contested frontiers dating to Qing and Tsarist treaties. Japan, prioritizing China, considered Changkufeng peripheral but ready to confront Soviet encroachment; Moscow aimed to consolidate border gains, with high-level war planning overlaying regional skirmishes. Conflict loomed over Manchuria.

Few people outside Kazakhstan know of the famine that destroyed nomadic life in the 1930s, and left more than a third of the population dead or displaced to China and far beyond. The famine, called Asharshylyk in Kazakh, was one of the most deadly man-made famines of the 20th Century; even more so, proportionately, than the much better known Holodomor in Ukraine during the same period. It resulted from the coming of Soviet power, the violent suppression of nomadism and forced settlement into disastrous collective farms. During the Soviet years, no one mentioned the Asharshylyk in public and its history was not at schools or universities. Rose Kudabayeva's grandparents didn't breathe a word to her about the Asharshylyk although they lived through the worst of it, losing several of their children. Now she travels through Kazakhstan trying to fill out the story, meeting archivists, writers, musicians, camel farmers and of course her own relatives.

Dive into the phenomenal 35-year aviation career of Greg Hansen (USNA '82), a former F-14 Tomcat pilot, Topgun student, and legendary Topgun instructor, who finished his career as a FedEx 777 Captain. In this full-length episode, Greg shares unbelievable, high-stakes stories from the height of the Cold War and his time flying with the US Navy's best. - Topgun Inside Track: Learn what it was like to be a "stash Ensign" at Topgun right out of the Naval Academy, getting an early look at the world's elite fighter tactics. - Constant Peg: Hear the full story of flying against live Soviet MiGs (MiG-23 Flogger & MiG-21) at the secret Constant Peg program and the incredible small-world reunion that happened years later. - The SU-15 Intercept: Greg recounts being scrambled in his F-14 off the USS Ranger in the Sea of Japan to intercept a Soviet SU-15 Flagon, narrowly avoiding an international incident. - Carrier Night Ops Disaster: The heart-stopping story of a catastrophic night carrier landing pattern, an EMCON transit (limited electronic emissions), and the near mid-air collision in the landing groove that confirmed the mantra: "The boat is trying to kill you." F-14 vs. A-4: A technical comparison of the A-4 Skyhawk and the F-14A Tomcat behind the boat, and how he learned to fly the challenging TF-30 engines. FedEx & The F-16: Greg discusses his transition to the FedEx 747, the eye-opening flight into Kuwait City post-Gulf War (flying through oil haze), and his short but intense stint flying the F-16 in the Michigan Air National Guard.