Podcasts about soviet

Panic, Pioneers, and the Moral Choice at the Border Picnic. Matthew Longo recounts that by August 19, 1989, hundreds of thousands of East German refugees were camped near Sopron, terrified of Stasi informers. Nemeth's government used the chaotic Picnic as a test for Soviet intervention. When a mass bolted across the border, mistaking champagne pops for gunfire, Hungarian guards made the tremendous moral choice not to shoot, allowing a bloodless breakthrough to freedom. Guest: Matthew Longo.

Paul Gregory reveals that in April 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald, agitated and shaken, confessed to Marina that he attempted to assassinate General Edwin Walker in Dallas. Marina found a note giving her directions if he failed to return. Though she realized he was deeply disturbed, she kept the event secret until the Warren Commission. Shortly after, Oswald moved to New Orleans, seeking to build credentials as a "radical operative" for Fidel Castro, hoping to secure a Cuban visa that would lead to a Soviet visa. Paul Gregory notes that despite his growing delusions, there was absolutely no indication whatsoever that he was planning to assassinate the president of the United States at this time. Guest: Paul Gregory.

PREVIEW Bob Zimmerman reports that Vast, an American commercial startup, is launching its single-module space station, Haven One, next year without NASA funding. Vast signed a cooperation deal with Uzbekistan, strongly implying that the Central Asian nation will fly an astronaut to the station, marking its return to space development after the Soviet era. Guest: Bob Zimmerman. Retry

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit andrewsullivan.substack.comFiona was an intel analyst under Bush and Obama, and then served under Trump as senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council. Currently a senior fellow at Brookings and the chancellor of Durham University, her books include Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin and There Is Nothing for You Here: Finding Opportunity in the 21st Century — which we discussed on the Dishcast in 2022.For two clips of our convo — on Russia's imperial war, and a comparison of Putin and Trump — head to our YouTube page.Other topics: Fiona's recent long trip to northeast England; walking the length of Hadrian's Wall; industrial decline; mass migration; how London is increasingly non-English; the brain drain from smaller places; the revival of nationalism; the fading left-right distinction; populism as a style; the Tory collapse and Reform's rise; NATO; the Munich Security Conference and Vance; the Zelensky meeting at the White House; Soviet ideology; the Russian Empire; Putin's psyops with social media; sending North Koreans into battle; the pipeline attacks; Ukraine's innovative use of drones; the massive casualties of the attrition war; Russia's resilient economy; the new corruption scandal in Ukraine; war profiteering; Putin's attacks on civilians; his manipulation of Trump; ressentiment in the West; male resentment in the economy; white-collar job insecurity due to AI; the origins of the BBC and its current scandal; the NHS; the slowing US economy; MTG positioning herself as the real MAGA; revolutions eating their own; Epstein; the demolished East Wing; and what my latest DNA test revealed.Browse the Dishcast archive for an episode you might enjoy. Coming up: Mark Halperin on US politics, Michel Paradis on Eisenhower, Shadi Hamid on US power abroad, Jason Willick on trade and conservatism, Vivek Ramaswamy on the right, George Packer on his Orwell-inspired novel, and Arthur Brooks on the science of happiness. As always, please send any guest recs, dissents, and other comments to dish@andrewsullivan.com.

How do you prevent a personal catastrophe? Learn the Petrov Principle, named after the Soviet officer who saved the world by pausing and questioning the data during a false nuclear alarm. This episode draws a powerful parallel to your alcohol-free life: your nervous system's cravings are often a "false alarm". Discover actionable strategies like box breathing , sensory grounding (5-4-3-2-1) , and conscious journaling to reset your nervous system, resist the urge to react , and choose long-term peace over short-term relief.   Download my FREE guide: The Alcohol Freedom Formula For Over 30s Entrepreneurs & High Performers: https://social.alcoholfreelifestyle.com/podcast ★ - Learn more about Project 90: www.alcoholfreelifestyle.com/Project90 ★ - (Accountability & Support) Speak verbally to a certified Alcohol-Free Lifestyle coach to see if, or how, we could support you having a better relationship with alcohol: https://www.alcoholfreelifestyle.com/schedule ★ - The wait is over – My new book "CLEAR" is now available. Get your copy here: https://www.alcoholfreelifestyle.com/clear

China's rapid ascent from rural poverty to industrial superpower reshaped the global economy and established a new center of gravity for manufacturing. Today, Chinese factories anchor much of the world's supply chains, producing goods at a speed and scale that few countries can match. Behind this transformation is a system that author Dan Wang describes in his new book "Breakneck: China's Quest to Engineer the Future" as the "engineering state," a model defined by massive investments in infrastructure, strategic planning, and so-called "process knowledge" gleaned from the country's rapid industrial development. Now, more and more, the Chinese government touts this development model as an example for other countries in the Global South to emulate. Dan joins Eric to discuss whether the so-called "engineering state" is replicable elsewhere or if it's a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. CHAPTERS: • Setting the Stage – China's rise from rural poverty to industrial superpower • The Engineering State – How China builds, plans, and organizes at a massive scale • Roots of the Model – East Asian development traditions and Soviet legacies • Infrastructure as Strategy – High-speed rail, bridges, airports, and the costs behind them • Industrial Capacity – Manufacturing clusters, supply chains, and process knowledge • The Speed Advantage – Why Chinese firms move faster than global competitors • Tech Transfer Debates – Joint ventures, old IP, and myths about forced transfers • Subsidies and Support – What Chinese industrial subsidies do—and what they don't • Exporting the Model – Limits of replication in Africa, Asia, and the Global South • The China Price – How scale, logistics, and workforce learning lock in dominance • Internal Tensions – Debt, underused infrastructure, and diminishing returns • Shifting Priorities – Xi's push away from consumer tech and toward strategic industries • Global Backlash – Overcapacity, trade pushback, and rising protectionism • Future Crossroads – Why China's development engine is losing momentum • Lessons for the Global South – What countries can adapt—and what they must avoid JOIN THE DISCUSSION: X: @ChinaGSProject | @eric_olander  Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProject YouTube: www.youtube.com/@ChinaGlobalSouth Now on Bluesky! Follow CGSP at @chinagsproject.bsky.social FOLLOW CGSP IN FRENCH & SPANISH:  French: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChine Spanish: www.chinalasamericas.com | @ChinaAmericas JOIN US ON PATREON! Become a CGSP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CGSP Podcast mug! www.patreon.com/chinaglobalsouth

In 1991, as the USSR broke apart and its population became open to the reforming discourse of Mikhail Gorbachev's reform program of perestroika, Soviet dissident historian Roy Medvedev set the tone for subsequent writing on Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, concluding that he was “a personality so mediocre and a politician so ordinary” that he “quickly disappeared from the political scene and also in the literal and metaphorical sense.” But not for long. When it became clear by the end of the decade that market capitalism and democracy had not improved people's lives, nostalgia for the Brezhnev era rightly raised the question of whether he had been given his just due and unfairly blamed for the shortcomings of the Soviet system. This reversal of fortune also makes clear that no Soviet leader has been as neglected or as misunderstood as Brezhnev and therefore no Soviet party boss is in such need of a fresh historical reassessment. Divided into two parts, my presentation will first make a case for Brezhnev, emphasizing his vision of guaranteeing stability, assuring peace, and letting people live well. Earlier I coined the term “Soviet man of peace,” to characterize Brezhnev. I emphasize this point here, arguing that his dream of wanting to be remembered as an asset for world peace made him a leader who changed the world. In part 2 of my presentation, I zoom in on the Leonid Brezhnev that, as his biographer, I might never know and propose what these unresolved questions might mean. Donald J. Raleigh is the Jay Richard Judson Distinguished Professor of Russian History Emeritus at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He has authored, translated, and edited numerous books on modern Russian history including Revolution on the Volga (1986), Experiencing Russia's Civil War (2002), Russia's Sputnik Generation (2006) and Soviet Baby Boomers (2012). He currently is writing a biography of Soviet leader Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, research for which has taken him to archives in Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the UK, and the US. This lecture is sponsored by the Alice D. Mortenson/Petrovich Distinguished Chair of Russian History and University Lectures.

We've done shows before on how contemporary America resembles late-stage Soviet society. But none quite as intriguing as with the Russian-born, US-based journalist Mikhail Zygar. In The Dark Side of the Earth, his new history of the Soviet Union's demise, Zygar underlines the moral exhaustion of its citizens. People no longer believed in anything, he reports on the collapse of this vast Euro-Asian empire. And that's the analogy Zygar makes with contemporary America which, he suggests, is equally exhausted. From the Soviet Union to the United States, a descent into a morally bankrupt nihilism defines the end of empire. Zygar even identifies the idealistic Obama with Gorbachev and the pugnacious Trump with Yeltsin, implying that a self-styled Putin-like “savior” lurks in the dark shadow of the American future. 1. Putin's Russia is worse than the Soviet Union The Soviet Union had dozens of political prisoners in the 1970s; Putin's Russia has thousands. Putin threatens the West with nuclear weapons far more aggressively than Soviet leaders ever did. What we thought was a victory over totalitarianism proved short-lived—Putin has built something more oppressive than what collapsed.2. The 1991 coup failed because of one woman History turns on ordinary people, not just great men. Emma Yazov, wife of the Soviet Defense Minister, spent three days crying in her husband's office, demanding he withdraw tanks from Moscow and resign from the junta. On the third day, he did. Her belief in democracy defeated the KGB and the Soviet military.3. Soviet citizens stopped believing after 1968 The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia killed whatever faith remained in communism. Afterward, Soviet people became perhaps the most cynical on earth, practicing “internal immigration”—pretending to participate in official life while living secret, clandestine private lives. When no one believes in an empire's ideology, collapse becomes inevitable.4. Solzhenitsyn's ideas shaped both Putin and the American New Right The author of The Gulag Archipelago evolved from Soviet dissident to fierce critic of liberal democracy. He wanted to preserve the Soviet empire by replacing communist ideology with Orthodox Christianity—precisely what Putin is attempting now. His attacks on Western liberalism's “weakness” and “woke culture” have found new audiences among American conservatives.5. Dick Cheney's approach to Soviet collapse enabled Putin George H.W. Bush and James Baker believed preserving a democratic Soviet Union would create a reliable partner. Dick Cheney disagreed, preferring “15 little dictatorships instead of one mighty Soviet Union.” Cheney's view prevailed. Without a Marshall Plan for post-Soviet states, Russian nationalism flourished, and Putin portrayed the collapse as Western conspiracy—the foundation of his power today.Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe

PREVIEW. Strategic Weapons and the US Stance on "Dead Hand" Protocols. John Batchelor and Peter Huessy discuss strategic weapons and the Soviet Cold War "Dead Hand" operation, where nuclear weapons would launch even if leadership was eliminated. When asked if America has a similar plan, Huessy guesses no, stating the President or Vice President must authorize retaliation to ensure the action is certain and "kosher." 1963

When an elderly man with a battered suitcase walked into the British embassy in Vilnius in 1992, few could have guessed what he was about to hand over. Gordon Corera tells the story of Vasili Mitrokhin, an under-the-radar Soviet archivist who copied thousands of classified KGB documents over 12 years. Speaking to Elinor Evans, he reveals how a project that began as a private rebellion against the agency he once served evolved into one of the greatest intelligence coups of the 20th century. (Ad) Gordon Corera is the author of The Spy in the Archive: How One Man Tried to Kill the KGB (William Collins, 2025). Buy it now from Amazon: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Spy-Archive-Gordon-Corera/dp/0008644799/?tag=bbchistory045-21&ascsubtag=historyextra-social-histboty. The HistoryExtra podcast is produced by the team behind BBC History Magazine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

For three years following the Russian Revolution, the small South Caucasian country of Georgia was a democracy, but Stalin later ordered the Red Army to invade and to bring the country back under Russian rule. Communist attacks on political opponents, trade unions, cooperatives, and even the church sparked resistance, and an armed uprising broke out across the nation in 1924. It was swiftly crushed, with massacres of thousands, including hostages. Social Democratic and Labor parties across Europe reacted with shock and indignation. Soviet opponents began to describe communism as “red fascism” and their own movement as “democratic socialism.” What followed—including Socialist support for the creation of NATO—resulted from the Georgian uprising and its aftermath. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine a century later, the long-forgotten Georgian experience examined in The August Uprising, 1924: The Georgian Anti-Soviet Revolt and the Birth of Democratic Socialism (McFarland, 2025) seems more relevant than ever. The website for this book is here Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

For three years following the Russian Revolution, the small South Caucasian country of Georgia was a democracy, but Stalin later ordered the Red Army to invade and to bring the country back under Russian rule. Communist attacks on political opponents, trade unions, cooperatives, and even the church sparked resistance, and an armed uprising broke out across the nation in 1924. It was swiftly crushed, with massacres of thousands, including hostages. Social Democratic and Labor parties across Europe reacted with shock and indignation. Soviet opponents began to describe communism as “red fascism” and their own movement as “democratic socialism.” What followed—including Socialist support for the creation of NATO—resulted from the Georgian uprising and its aftermath. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine a century later, the long-forgotten Georgian experience examined in The August Uprising, 1924: The Georgian Anti-Soviet Revolt and the Birth of Democratic Socialism (McFarland, 2025) seems more relevant than ever. The website for this book is here Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

For three years following the Russian Revolution, the small South Caucasian country of Georgia was a democracy, but Stalin later ordered the Red Army to invade and to bring the country back under Russian rule. Communist attacks on political opponents, trade unions, cooperatives, and even the church sparked resistance, and an armed uprising broke out across the nation in 1924. It was swiftly crushed, with massacres of thousands, including hostages. Social Democratic and Labor parties across Europe reacted with shock and indignation. Soviet opponents began to describe communism as “red fascism” and their own movement as “democratic socialism.” What followed—including Socialist support for the creation of NATO—resulted from the Georgian uprising and its aftermath. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine a century later, the long-forgotten Georgian experience examined in The August Uprising, 1924: The Georgian Anti-Soviet Revolt and the Birth of Democratic Socialism (McFarland, 2025) seems more relevant than ever. The website for this book is here Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

It's a fun, hilarious, and lightning-fast Rapid Fire News hour with Joe Pags — packed with stories, laughs, and plenty of opinion. Pags reacts to SCOTUS refusing to hear a same-sex marriage appeal, breaks down why the First Amendment exists for a reason, and weighs in on Zorhan's win and what he calls the start of a “Soviet Union-style NYC” under the Mamdani era. Plus — Governor Hochul vs. Mayor Mamdani heats up, and President Trump pardons Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell, Ken Chesebro, and dozens more in a stunning political move. Then, news commentator Kay Hill joins the show to tackle POTUS' controversial idea of a 50-year mortgage plan — a proposal Pags calls “a terrible idea” that could leave Americans never actually owning anything. It's a rapid, funny, and fiery news hour loaded with stories you can't miss and commentary you won't hear anywhere else. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Winter War was a brutal struggle against a determined human enemy and the unforgiving cold, dangers the Red Army knew and understood. Yet on a desolate mountain plateau, where strange stone idols stand guard and the trees twist in agony, a Soviet company learned that some places are battlegrounds for forces far older and more monstrous than man.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the Changsha fire. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man or flood the land to slow the invaders. He chose both, pushing rivers and rallying a fractured army as Japanese forces pressed along the Yangtze. Fortresses at Madang held long, but the cost was high—troops lost, civilians displaced, a city's heart burning in the night. Wuhan fell after months of brutal fighting, yet the battle did not break China's will. Mao Zedong urged strategy over martyrdom, preferring to drain the enemy and buy time for a broader struggle. The Japanese, though victorious tactically, found their strength ebbing, resource strains, supply gaps, and a war that felt endless. In the wake of Wuhan, Changsha stood next in the Japanese crosshairs, its evacuation and a devastating fire leaving ash and memory in its wake. Behind these prices, political currents swirled. Wang Jingwei defected again, seeking power beyond Chiang's grasp, while Chongqing rose as a western bastion of resistance. The war hardened into a protracted stalemate, turning Japan from an aggressive assailant into a wary occupier, and leaving China to endure, persist, and fight on.   #175  The Soviet-Japanese Border Conflicts Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So based on the title of this one, you probably can see we are taking a bit of a detour. For quite some time we have focused on the Japanese campaigns into China proper 1937-1938. Now the way the second sino-japanese war is traditionally broken down is in phases. 1937-1938, 1939-1942 and 1942-1945. However there is actually even more going on in China aside from the war with Japan. In Xinjiang province a large full blown Islamic revolution breaks out in 1937. We will be covering that story at a later date, but another significant event is escalating border skirmishes in Manchukuo. Now these border skirmishes had been raging ever since the USSR consolidated its hold over the far east. We talked about some of those skirmishes prior to the Sino-Soviet war in 1929. However when Japan created the puppet government of Manchukuo, this was a significant escalation in tensions with the reds. Today we are going to talk about the escalating border conflicts between the Soviets and Japan. A tongue of poorly demarcated land extends southeast from Hunchun, hugging the east bank of the Tumen River between Lake Khasan to the east and Korea to the west. Within this tongue stands Changkufeng Hill, one of a long chain of highlands sweeping from upstream along the rivers and moors toward the sea. The twin-peaked hill sits at the confluence area several miles northwest of the point where Manchuria, Korea, and the Russian Far East meet. The hill's shape reminded Koreans of their changgo, which is a long snare drum constricted at the center and tapped with the hands at each end. When the Manchus came to the Tumen, they rendered the phonetic sounds into three ideographic characters meaning "taut drum peaks" or Chang-ku-feng. The Japanese admired the imagery and preserved the Chinese readings, which they pronounce Cho-ko-ho. From their eastern vantage, the Russians called it Zaozernaya, "hill behind the lake." Soviet troops referred to it as a sugar-loaf hill. For many years, natives and a handful of officials in the region cultivated a relaxed attitude toward borders and sovereignty. Even after the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, the issue did not immediately come to a head. With the expansion of Manchukuo and the Soviet Far East under Stalin's Five-Year plans, both sides began to attend more closely to frontier delimitation. Whenever either party acted aggressively, force majeure was invoked to justify the unexpected and disruptive events recognized in international law. Most often, these incidents erupted along the eastern Manchurian borders with the USSR or along the 350-mile frontier south of Lake Khanka, each skirmish carrying the seeds of all-out warfare. Now we need to talk a little bit about border history. The borders in question essentially dated to pacts concluded by the Qing dynasty and the Tsardom. Between the first Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and the Mukden Agreement of 1924, there were over a dozen accords governing the borders. Relevant to Changkufeng were the basic 15-article Convention of Peking, supplementing the Tientsin Treaties of November 1860, some maps made in 1861, and the eight-article Hunchun Border Protocol of 1886. By the 1860 treaty, the Qing ceded to Tsarist Russia the entire maritime province of Siberia, but the meaning of "lands south of Lake Khanka" remained rather vague. Consequently, a further border agreement was negotiated in June 1861 known as "the Lake Khanka Border Pact", by which demarcations were drawn on maps and eight wooden markers erected. The border was to run from Khanka along ridgelines between the Hunchun River and the sea, past Suifenho and Tungning, terminating about 6 miles from the mouth of the Tumen. Then a Russo-Chinese commission established in 1886 drew up the Hunchun Border Pact, proposing new or modified markers along the 1860–1861 lines and arranging a Russian resurvey. However, for the Japanese, in 1938, the Chinese or Manchu texts of the 1886 Hunchun agreement were considered controlling. The Soviets argued the border ran along every summit west of Khasan, thereby granting them jurisdiction over at least the eastern slopes of all elevations, including Changkufeng and Shachaofeng.  Since the Qing dynasty and the house of Romanov were already defunct, the new sovereignties publicly appealed to opposing texts, and the Soviet side would not concede that the Russian-language version had never been deemed binding by the Qing commissioners. Yet, even in 1938, the Japanese knew that only the Chinese text had survived or could be located.    Now both the Chinese and Russian military maps generally drew the frontier along the watershed east of Khasan; this aligned with the 1861 readings based on the Khanka agreement. The Chinese Republican Army conducted new surveys sometime between 1915 and 1920. The latest Chinese military map of the Changkufeng area drew the border considerably closer to the old "red line" of 1886, running west of Khasan but near the shore rather than traversing the highland crests. None of the military delimitations of the border was sanctified by an official agreement. Hence, the Hunchun Protocol, whether well known or not, invaluable or worthless, remained the only government-to-government pact dealing with the frontiers.  Before we jump into it, how about a little summary of what became known as the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts. The first major conflict would obviously be the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Following years of conflict between the Russian Empire and Japan culminating in the costly Battle of Tsushima, Tsar Nicholas II's government sought peace, recognizing Japan's claims to Korea and agreeing to evacuate Manchuria.  From 1918 to 1920, the Imperial Japanese Army, under Emperor Taishō after the death of Meiji, assisted the White Army and Alexander Kerensky against the Bolshevik Red Army. They also aided the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia to facilitate its return to Europe after an Austrian-Hungarian armoured train purportedly went astray. By 1920, with Austria-Hungary dissolved and Czechoslovakia established two years earlier, the Czechoslovak Legion reached Europe. Japan withdrew from the Russian Revolution and the Civil War in 1922. Following Japan's 1919-1920 occupations and the Soviet intervention in Mongolia in 1921, the Republic of China also withdrew from Outer Mongolia in 1921. In 1922, after capturing Vladivostok in 1918 to halt Bolshevik advances, Japanese forces retreated to Japan as Bolshevik power grew and the postwar fatigue among combatants increased. After Hirohito's invasion of Manchuria in 1931–1932, following Taishō's death in 1926, border disputes between Manchukuo, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Soviet Union increased. Many clashes stemmed from poorly defined borders, though some involved espionage. Between 1932 and 1934, the Imperial Japanese Army reported 152 border disputes, largely tied to Soviet intelligence activity in Manchuria, while the Soviets accused Japan of 15 border violations, six air intrusions, and 20 cases of "spy smuggling" in 1933 alone. Numerous additional violations followed in the ensuing years. By the mid-1930s, Soviet-Japanese diplomacy and trust had deteriorated further, with the Japanese being openly labeled "fascist enemies" at the Seventh Comintern Congress in July 1935. Beginning in 1935, conflicts significantly escalated. On 8 January 1935, the first armed clash, known as the Halhamiao incident, took place on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. Several dozen cavalrymen of the Mongolian People's Army crossed into Manchuria near disputed fishing grounds and engaged an 11‑man Manchukuo Imperial Army patrol near the Buddhist temple at Halhamiao, led by a Japanese military advisor. The Manchukuo Army sustained 6 wounded and 2 dead, including the Japanese officer; the Mongols suffered no casualties and withdrew after the Japanese sent a punitive expedition to reclaim the area. Two motorized cavalry companies, a machine‑gun company, and a tankette platoon occupied the position for three weeks without resistance. In June 1935, the first direct exchange of fire between the Japanese and Soviets occurred when an 11‑man Japanese patrol west of Lake Khanka was attacked by six Soviet horsemen, reportedly inside Manchukuo territory. In the firefight, one Soviet soldier was killed and two horses were captured. The Japanese requested a joint investigation, but the Soviets rejected the proposal. In October 1935, nine Japanese and 32 Manchukuoan border guards were establishing a post about 20 kilometers north of Suifenho when they were attacked by 50 Soviet soldiers. The Soviets opened fire with rifles and five heavy machine guns. Two Japanese and four Manchukuoan soldiers were killed, and another five were wounded. The Manchukuoan foreign affairs representative lodged a verbal protest with the Soviet consul at Suifenho. The Kwantung Army of Japan also sent an intelligence officer to investigate the clash. On 19 December 1935, a Manchukuoan unit reconnoitering southwest of Buir Lake clashed with a Mongolian party, reportedly capturing 10 soldiers. Five days later, 60 truck‑borne Mongolian troops assaulted the Manchukuoans and were repulsed, at the cost of three Manchukuoan dead. On the same day, at Brunders, Mongolian forces attempted three times to drive out Manchukuoan outposts, and again at night, but all attempts failed. Further small attempts occurred in January, with Mongolians using airplanes for reconnaissance. The arrival of a small Japanese force in three trucks helped foil these attempts; casualties occurred on both sides, though Mongolian casualties are unknown aside from 10 prisoners taken. In February 1936, Lieutenant-Colonel Sugimoto Yasuo was ordered to form a detachment from the 14th Cavalry Regiment to "drive the Outer Mongol intruders from the Olankhuduk region," a directive attributed to Lieutenant-General Kasai Heijuro. Sugimoto's detachment included cavalry guns, heavy machine guns, and tankettes. They faced a force of about 140 Mongolians equipped with heavy machine guns and light artillery. On February 12, Sugimoto's men drove the Mongolians south, at the cost of eight Japanese killed, four wounded, and one tankette destroyed. The Japanese began to withdraw, but were attacked by 5–6 Mongolian armored cars and two bombers, which briefly disrupted the column. The situation was stabilized when the Japanese unit received artillery support, allowing them to destroy or repel the armored cars. In March 1936, the Tauran incident occurred. In this clash, both the Japanese Army and the Mongolian Army deployed a small number of armored fighting vehicles and aircraft. The incident began when 100 Mongolian and six Soviet troops attacked and occupied the disputed village of Tauran, Mongolia, driving off the small Manchurian garrison. They were supported by light bombers and armored cars, though the bombing sorties failed to inflict damage on the Japanese, and three bombers were shot down by Japanese heavy machine guns. Local Japanese forces counter-attacked, conducting dozens of bombing sorties and finally assaulting Tauran with 400 men and 10 tankettes. The result was a Mongolian rout, with 56 Mongolian soldiers killed, including three Soviet advisors, and an unknown number wounded. Japanese losses were 27 killed and 9 wounded. Later in March 1936, another border clash occurred between Japanese and Soviet forces. Reports of border violations prompted the Japanese Korean Army to send ten men by truck to investigate, but the patrol was ambushed by 20 Soviet NKVD soldiers deployed about 300 meters inside territory claimed by Japan. After suffering several casualties, the Japanese patrol withdrew and was reinforced with 100 men, who then drove off the Soviets. Fighting resumed later that day when the NKVD brought reinforcements. By nightfall, the fighting had ceased and both sides had pulled back. The Soviets agreed to return the bodies of two Japanese soldiers who had died in the fighting, a development viewed by the Japanese government as encouraging. In early April 1936, three Japanese soldiers were killed near Suifenho in another minor affray. This incident was notable because the Soviets again returned the bodies of the fallen servicemen. In June 1937, the Kanchazu Island incident occurred on the Amur River along the Soviet–Manchukuo border. Three Soviet gunboats crossed the river's center line, disembarked troops, and occupied Kanchazu Island. Japanese forces from the IJA 1st Division, equipped with two horse-drawn 37 mm artillery pieces, quickly established improvised firing positions and loaded their guns with both high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. They shelled the Soviet vessels, sinking the lead gunboat, crippling the second, and driving off the third. Japanese troops subsequently fired on the swimming crewmen from the sunken ships using machine guns. Thirty-seven Soviet soldiers were killed, while Japanese casualties were zero. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested and demanded the Soviet forces withdraw from the island. The Soviet leadership, apparently shocked by the incident and reluctant to escalate, agreed to evacuate their troops. By 1938 the border situation had deteriorated. The tangled terrain features, mountain, bog, stream, forest, and valley, would have complicated even careful observers' discernment of the old red line drawn in 1886. Fifty years later, the markers themselves had undergone a metamorphosis. Japanese investigators could find, at most, only 14 to 17 markers standing fairly intact between the Tumen estuary and Khanka—roughly one every 25 miles at best. The remainder were missing or ruined; five were found in new locations. Marker "K," for example, was 40 meters deeper inside Manchuria, away from Khanka. Japanese military experts noted that of the 20 markers originally set along the boundaries of Hunchun Prefecture alone, only four could be found by the summer of 1938. The rest had either been wrecked or arbitrarily moved and discarded by Russian or Chinese officials and inhabitants. It is even said that one missing marker could be seen on display in Khabarovsk. The Chinese had generally interpreted the boundary as the road line just west of Khasan, at least in practice. Free road movement, however, had become a problem even 20 years before the Japanese overran Manchuria in 1931–1932 during the so-called Manchurian Incident. The Japanese adopted, or inherited, the Chinese interpretation, which was based on the 1886 agreement on border roads; the key clause held that the frontier west of Khasan would be the road along the lake. Japanese sources emphasize that local residents' anger toward gradual Soviet oppression and penetrations westward into Manchurian territory fueled the conflict. Many natives believed the original boundaries lay east of the lake, but the Soviets adjusted the situation to suit their own convenience. In practice, the Russians were restricting road use just west of Khasan by Manchurian and Korean residents. There was speculation that this was a prelude to taking over the ridgelines, depending on the reaction of the Manchukuoan–Japanese side. Villagers who went to streams or the lake to launder clothing found themselves subjected to sniper fire. Along a 25-mile stretch of road near Shachaofeng, farmers reported coming under fire from new Soviet positions as early as November 1935. Nevertheless, Japanese and Koreans familiar with the Tumen area noted agrarian, seasonal Korean religious rites atop Changkufeng Hill, including fattened pigs sacrificed and changgo drums beaten. Village elders told Japanese visitors in 1938 that, until early the preceding year, no Russians had come as far as Changkufeng Hill. Looking only at the border sector around Changkufeng, the easy days were clearly behind us. In the summer of 1938, Gaimusho "Foreign Ministry" observers described the explosive situation along the Korea–Manchuria–USSR borders as a matter of de facto frontiers. Both sides pressed against each other, and their trigger-happy posture was summed up in the colloquial refrain: "Take another step and we'll let you have it." Near dawn on 13 June 1938, a Manchurian patrol detected a suspicious figure in the fog swirling over Changlingtzu Hill on the Siberian–Manchurian frontier. Challenged at 15 feet, the suspect hurled two pistols to the ground and raised his hands in surrender. At headquarters, the police soon realized this was no routine border-trespassing case. The man was a defector and he was a Russian general, in fact he was the director of all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Beneath a mufti of spring coat and hunting cap, he wore a full uniform with medals. His identification card No. 83 designated him as G. S. Lyushkov, Commissar 3rd Class, countersigned by Nikolai Yezhov, NKVD head in Moscow. Lyushkov was promptly turned over to the Japanese military authorities, who transferred him to Seoul and then to Tokyo under close escort. On 1 July, the Japanese press was permitted to disclose that Lyushkov had sought refuge in Japan. Ten days later, to capitalize on the commissar's notoriety and to confound skeptics, the Japanese produced Lyushkov at a press conference in Tokyo. For the Japanese and foreign correspondents, who met separately with him, Lyushkov described Soviet Far East strength and the turmoil wracking the USSR, because for those of you unfamiliar this was during the Stalinist purges. Clearly, the Japanese had gained a unique reservoir of high-level intelligence and a wealth of materials, including notes scratched in blood by suspects incarcerated at Khabarovsk. A general tightening of Russian frontier security had recently been reported. Natives of Fangchuanting asserted that a Soviet cavalry patrol appeared in June, seemingly for the first time. Contact with Yangkuanping, northwest of Khasan, was severed. More importantly, Japanese Army Signal Corps intelligence detected a surge of Soviet message traffic from the Posyet Bay district. After Lyushkov's defection, a drastic reshuffle in the local Russian command apparently occurred, and responsibility for border surveillance seems to have been reallocated. Japanese records indicate that the Novokievsk security force commander was relieved and the sector garrison replaced by troops from Vladivostok. Gaimusho intelligence also received reports that a border garrison unit had been transferred from Khabarovsk or Chita to the Tumen sector. The Kwantung Army signal monitors also intercepted two significant frontline messages on 6 July from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region, addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Khabarovsk. Decoded, the messages suggested (1) that ammunition for infantry mortars amounted to less than half the required supply; and  (2) a recommendation that higher headquarters authorize Russian elements to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of Khasan.  The commander noted terrain advantages and the contemplated construction of emplacements that would command Najin and the Korean railway. As a start, at least one Russian platoon should be authorized to dig in on the highest ground (presumably Changkufeng) and deploy four tons of entanglements to stake out the Soviet claim. Korea Army Headquarters received a telegram from the Kwantung Army on 7 July conveying the deciphered messages. On the same day, the 19th Division in North Korea telephoned Seoul that, on 6 July, three or four Soviet horsemen had been observed reconnoitering Manchurian territory from atop a hill called Changkufeng. The alarming intelligence from the Kwantung Army and the front warranted immediate attention by the Korea Army. Some Kwantung Army officers doubted the significance of the developments, with one intelligence official even suggesting the Russian messages might be a deliberate ploy designed to entrap the Japanese at Changkufeng. On 7–8 July, all staff officers in Seoul convened at army headquarters. The name of Changkufeng Hill was not well known, but maps and other data suggested that neither the Japanese nor the Russians had previously stationed border units in the ridge complex west of Khasan. As early as March 1936, Army Commander Koiso Kuniaki had distributed maps to subordinate units, indicating which sectors were in dispute. No patrol was to enter zones lacking definitive demarcation. Until then, the only Japanese element east of the Tumen was a Manchurian policeman at Fangchuanting. Ownership of the high ground emerged as an early issue. A number of other points were raised by  the Kwantung Army: At present, Soviet elements in the area were negligible. The intrusion must not be overlooked. The Russians could be expected to exploit any weakness, and half-measures would not suffice, especially regarding the Japanese defense mission along a 125-mile frontier. In Japanese hands, Changkufeng Hill would be useful, but two excellent observation posts already existed in the neighboring sector of the Manchurian tongue. With dissidence and purges underway, the Russians may have judged it necessary to seal border gaps, particularly after Lyushkov's defection. They may also have sought to control Changkufeng to offset Japanese dominance of the high ground to the north. Soviet seizure of Changkufeng would upset the delicate status quo and could provoke a contest for equivalent observation posts. In broader terms, it mattered little whether the Russians sought a permanent observation post on Changkufeng Hill, which was of relatively minor strategic value. Japan's primary concern lay in the China theater; Changkufeng was peripheral. The Japanese should not expend limited resources or become distracted. The matter required consultation with the high command in Tokyo. In the absence of more comprehensive intelligence, the assembled staff officers concluded that the Korea Army should, at a minimum, ignore or disregard Soviet actions for the time being, while maintaining vigilant observation of the area. The consensus was communicated to Major General Kitano Kenzo, the Korea Army chief of staff, who concurred, and to Koiso. Upon learning that the recommendation advocated a low posture, Koiso inquired only whether the opinion reflected the unanimous view of the staff. Having been assured that it did, he approved the policy. Koiso, then 58, was at the threshold of the routine personnel changes occurring around 15 July. He had just been informed that he would retire and that General Nakamura Kotaro would succeed him. Those acquainted with Koiso perceived him as treating the border difficulties as a minor anticlimax in the course of his command tour. He appeared unemphatic or relaxed as he prepared to depart from a post he had held for twenty-one years. Although neither Koiso nor his staff welcomed the Soviet activities that appeared under way, his reaction likely reflected a reluctance to make decisions that could constrain his soon-to-arrive successor. On 8 July Koiso authorized the dispatch of warnings to the 19th Division at Nanam, to the Hunchun garrison, and to the intelligence branch at Hunchun. These units were instructed to exercise maximum precautions and to tighten frontier security north of Shuiliufeng. In response to the initial appearance of Soviet horsemen at Changkufeng, the Kucheng Border Garrison Unit of the 76th Infantry Regiment maintained close surveillance across the Tumen. By about noon on 9 July, patrols detected approximately a dozen Russian troops commencing construction atop Changkufeng. Between 11 and 13 July, the number of soldiers on the slopes increased to forty; there were also thirty horses and eleven camouflaged tents. Operating in shifts on the western side, thirty meters from the crest, the Russians erected barbed wire and firing trenches; fifty meters forward, they excavated observation trenches. In addition to existing telephone lines between Changkufeng, Lake Khasan, and Kozando, the Russians installed a portable telephone net. Logistical support was provided by three boats on the lake. Approximately twenty kilometers to the east, well within Soviet territory, large forces were being mobilized, and steamship traffic into Posyet Bay intensified. Upon learning of the "intrusion" at Changkufeng on 9 July, Lt. General Suetaka Kamezo, the commander of the 19th Division, dispatched staff officers to the front and prepared to send elements to reinforce border units.  The special significance of Suetaka and his division stemmed from a series of unusual circumstances. Chientao Province, the same zone into which Lyushkov had fled and the sector where Soviet horsemen had appeared, fell within Manchukuo geographically and administratively. Yet, in terms of defense, the configuration of the frontier, the terrain, and the transportation network more closely connected the region with North Korea than with southeastern Manchuria. Approximately 80% of the population was of Korean origin, which implied Japanese rather than Manchukuoan allegiance. Consequently, the Korea Army had been made operationally responsible for the defense of Chientao and controlled not only the three-battalion garrison at Hunchun but also the intelligence detachment located there. In the event of war, the Korea Army's mission was defined as mobilization and execution of subsidiary operational tasks against the USSR, under the control and in support of the Kwantung Army.  The Korea Army ordinarily possessed two infantry divisions, the 19th in North Korea and the 20th stationed at Seoul, but the 20th Division had already departed for China, leaving only the 20th Depot Division in the capital. Beyond sparse ground units, devoid of armor and with weak heavy artillery, there were only two air regiments in Korea, the nearest being the unit at Hoeryong. The Korea Army was designed to maintain public security within Korea as well as fulfill minimal defensive responsibilities. Such an army did not require a full-time operations officer, and none was maintained. When needed, as in mid-1938, the task fell to the senior staff officer, in this case Colonel Iwasaki Tamio. In peacetime, training constituted the primary focus.  Thus, the 19th Division was entrusted with defending northeastern Korea. Its commander, Suetaka, a seasoned infantryman, resented the fact that his elite force had never engaged in combat in China. He intensified training with zeal, emphasizing strict discipline, bravery, aggressiveness, and thorough preparation. Japanese veterans characterized him as severe, bullish, short-tempered, hot-blooded, highly strung, unbending, and stubborn. Nonetheless, there was widespread respect for his realistic training program, maintained under firm, even violent, personal supervision. His men regarded Suetaka as a professional, a modern samurai who forged the division into superb condition. Privately, he was reputed for sensitivity and warmth; a Japanese phrase "yakamashii oyaji" captures the dual sense of stern father and martinet in his character. At the outset, however, Suetaka displayed little aggression. Although not widely known, he did not welcome the orders from army headquarters to deploy to the Tumen. Until late July, he remained somewhat opposed to the notion of dislodging the Soviets from the crest, a proposition arising from neither the division staff nor, initially, Suetaka himself. Colonel Sato noted that, for a week after reports of Soviet excavation at Changkufeng, the division's response was limited to preparations for a possible emergency, as they perceived the matter as a local issue best settled through diplomacy. Korea Army officers acknowledged that, around the time the Soviets consolidated their outpost strength at Changkufeng, an informal and personal telegram arrived in Seoul from a Kwantung Army Intelligence field-grade officer who specialized in Soviet affairs. If the Korea Army hesitated, the Kwantung Army would be obliged to eject the Russians; the matter could not be ignored. While the telegram did not demand a reply and struck several officers as presumptuous and implausible, the message was promptly shown to Koiso. Koiso was driven to immediate action, he wired Tokyo asserting that only the Korea Army could and would handle the incident. One staff officer recalled "We felt we had to act, out of a sense of responsibility. But we resented the Kwantung Army's interference." The Korea Army staff convened shortly after receipt of the unofficial telegram from Hsinking. Based on the latest intelligence from the division dated 13 July, the officers prepared an assessment for submission to the army commander. The hypotheses were distilled into three scenarios: The USSR, or the Far East authorities, desires hostilities. Conclusion: Slightly possible. The USSR seeks to restrain Japan on the eve of the pivotal operations in China: the major Japanese offensive to seize Hankow. Conclusion: Highly probable. The Posyet district commander is new in his post; by occupying the Changkufeng ridges, he would demonstrate loyalty, impress superiors, and seek glory. Conclusion: Possible. Late on 13 July or early on 14 July, Koiso approved the dispatch of a message to the vice minister of war, and the Kwantung Army chief of staff:  "Lake Khasan area lies in troublesome sector USSR has been claiming . . . in accordance with treaties [said Secret Message No. 913], but we interpret it to be Manchukuoan territory, evident even from maps published by Soviet side. Russian actions are patently illegal, but, considering that area does not exert major or immediate influence on operations [Japan] is intending and that China Incident is in full swing, we are not going to conduct counterattack measures immediately. This army is thinking of reasoning with Soviets and requesting pullback, directly on spot. . . . In case Russians do not accede in long run, we have intention to drive Soviet soldiers out of area east of Khasan firmly by use of force."  The message concluded with a request that the Tokyo authorities lodge a formal protest with the USSR, on behalf of Manchukuo and Japan, and guide matters so that the Russians would withdraw quickly. Dominant in Japanese high command thinking in 1938 was the China theater; the Changkufeng episode constituted a mere digression. A sequence of Japanese tactical victories had preceded the summer: Tsingtao fell in January; the Yellow River was reached in March; a "reformed government of the Republic of China" was installed at Nanking several weeks later; Amoy fell in early May; Suchow fell on the 20th. With these gains, northern and central fronts could be linked by the Japanese. Yet Chinese resistance persisted, and while public statements anticipated imminent Chinese dissension, private admissions acknowledged that the partial effects of Suchow's fall were ominous: control might pass from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists, Chinese defiance might intensify, and Soviet involvement could ensue. A Hankow drive appeared desirable to symbolize the conclusion of the military phase of hostilities. The Japanese and their adversaries were in accord regarding the importance of the summer and autumn campaigns. Even after Suchow's fall, the government discouraged public insinuations that enemy resistance was collapsing; when Chiang addressed the nation on the first anniversary of hostilities, Premier Konoe prophetically proclaimed, "The war has just begun." Colonel Inada Masazum served as the Army General Staff's principal figure for the Changkufeng affair, occupying the position of chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March 1938. A distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, Inada completed the War College program and held a combination of line, instructional, and staff assignments at the War College, the Army General Staff, and the War Ministry. He was recognized as a sharp, highly capable, and driveful personality, though some regarded him as enigmatic. Following the capture of Suchow, Imperial General Headquarters on 18 June ordered field forces to undertake operational preparations for a drive to seize the Wuhan complex. Inada favored a decisive move aimed at achieving a rapid political settlement. He acknowledged that Soviet intervention in 1938, during Japan's involvement in China, would have been critical. Although Japanese forces could still defeat the Chinese, an overextended Japanese Army might be fatally compromised against the Russians. Soviet assistance to China was already pronouncedly unwelcome. The Soviets were reported to possess roughly 20 rifle divisions, four to five cavalry divisions, 1,500 tanks, and 1,560 aircraft, including 300 bombers with a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers, enabling reach from Vladivostok to Tokyo. Soviet manpower in Siberia was likely near 370,000. In response, Japanese central authorities stressed a no-trouble policy toward the USSR while seeking to "wall off" the border and bolster the Kwantung Army as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the envisaged correction of the strategic imbalance could not occur before 1943, given shortages in ammunition, manpower, and materiel across existing theaters in China. By the end of 1937 Japan had committed 16 of its 24 divisions to China, bringing the standing force to roughly 700,000. Army General Staff planners reallocated three ground divisions, intended for a northern contingency, from north to central China, even as the Kwantung Army operated from a less favorable posture. Attitudes toward the northern problem varied within senior military circles. While concern persisted, it was not universal. As campaigns in China widened, planning at the high command level deteriorated, propagating confusion and anxiety to field armies in China. The Japanese Navy suspected that the Army general staff was invoking the USSR as a pretext for broader strategic aims—namely, to provoke a more consequential confrontation with the USSR while the Navy contended with its own strategic rivalries with the Army, centered on the United States and Britain. Army leaders, however, denied aggressive intent against the USSR at that time. The Hankow plan encountered substantial internal opposition at high levels. Private assessments among army planners suggested that a two-front war would be premature given operational readiness and troop strength. Not only were new War Ministry officials cautious, but many high-ranking Army general staff officers and court circles shared doubts.  Aggressive tendencies, influenced by subordinates and the Kwantung Army, were evident in Inada, who repeatedly pressed Tada Shun, the deputy army chief of staff, to endorse the Wuhan drive as both necessary and feasible, arguing that the USSR would gain from Japan's weakening without incurring substantial losses. Inada contended that Stalin was rational and that time favored the USSR in the Far East, where industrial buildup and military modernization were ongoing. He argued that the Soviet purges impeded opportunistic ventures with Japan. He posited that Nazi Germany posed a growing threat on the western front, and thus the USSR should be avoided by both Japan, due to China and Russia, due to Germany. While most of the army remained engaged in China, Tada did not initially share Inada's views; only after inspecting the Manchurian borders in April 1938 did he finally align with Inada's broader vision, which encompassed both northern and Chinese considerations. During this period, Inada studied daily intelligence from the Kwantung Army, and after Lyushkov's defection in June, reports suggested the Soviets were following their sector commander's recommendations. Russian troops appeared at Changkufeng, seemingly prepared to dig in. Inada recollects his reaction: "That's nice, my chance has come." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The simmering Soviet–Japanese border clashes centered on Changkufeng Hill near Lake Khanka, set within a broader history of contested frontiers dating to Qing and Tsarist treaties. Japan, prioritizing China, considered Changkufeng peripheral but ready to confront Soviet encroachment; Moscow aimed to consolidate border gains, with high-level war planning overlaying regional skirmishes. Conflict loomed over Manchuria.

How do you help someone who is being pummeled by a persisting circumstantial or psychodynamic problem? Do you "advise" them? (Don't Do It - The Band, '72) Do you try to talk them out of it? (Again, don't -- Talk Talk, '82-'84) Do you avoid them? (Again, don't -- Animotion, '84. They won't let you, anyway.) What do you do? How do you actually help someone you love -- maybe it's you ("Baby It's You" -- The Beatles, '63)? "Magic cancellation"! That's the thing. It's a phrase used by English novelist James Hilton in his first novel "Ill Wind" ('32). Hilton was describing the power of altruistic love on the part of a Soviet diplomat (of all people) on a French chambermaid (who is actually a Russian aristocrat on the run from people just like him). The diplomat's entirely genuine love for the chambermaid demolishes her "architecture of misery" -- again Hilton's phrase -- which had confined her 100% up to that moment. "Magic" (i.e., outwardly interventionist, Holy Spirit-inspired) cancellation" is what it takes to "open the door to your heart" (Pete Townshend, '81). That's what it takes: one-way love from outside yourself. (And note, this is not antinomian. It is not rooted in denial. It is rooted in the Graceful determination of the one who loves. And in about four fifths of all cases, such "cancellation" opens the door to ... response, and -- here's the rub -- personal renewal and Hope. Try it. Maybe it worked on you once. (In the Fall of '72, all it took, in the case of yours truly, was someone offering a Sunday evening lift from 72 Mt. Auburn Street, Cambridge Mass down to -- hey it wasn't even far (geographically) -- Narragansett Bay. And it worked. I mean, forever.) LUV U.

How was the history of Russia made by its women through the cataclysms of revolution, war, idealism, and defeat? Join us for an engaging tour of Russia through the lives of its women. Journalist Julia Ioffe and her family fled the Soviet Union in 1990. She wouldn't return for nearly two decades, and when she did, she found a country significantly changed. The Soviet Union had tried to portray itself as being on the vanguard of world feminism; today, Russia presents itself as the last bastion of conservative Christian values. How did that happen? What happened to the women of the Soviet era, who served as doctors, engineers and scientists? How, she asks, did they get replaced with women who are just desperate to marry rich and become stay-at-home mothers? It's a topic she explores in her new book Motherland: A Feminist History of Modern Russia, from Revolution to Autocracy. From her own great grandmothers, who were physicians, to Lenin's lover, who was a feminist revolutionary, to the hundreds of thousands of young Soviet women to fought in the Second World War to the millions of single mothers who repopulated the devastated country—and onward to Pussy Riot and Yulia Navalnaya, the widow of opposition leader Alexey Navalny. Ioffe reveals the failure of the social experimentation of the Soviet era and how it paved the way for the revanchist policies of Vladimir Putin.   Commonwealth Club World Affairs of California is a nonprofit public forum; we welcome donations made during registration to support the production of our programming. Commonwealth Club World Affairs is a public forum. Any views expressed in our programs are those of the speakers and not of Commonwealth Club World Affairs. This program contains EXPLICIT language. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I met a man once who grew up in Eastern Europe, underneath the Iron Curtain and Soviet rule, where Christianity was illegal.You can find a transcript of this video and over 900 more devotions like this one on our website at PeaceDevotions.com.If you find value from these devotions we'd encourage you to support our ministry. You can support us by praying for our pastors, sharing and commenting on our videos, or by donating at https://peacedevotions.com/donateConnect with us on social media, our website, or get these emailed to your inbox.Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/PeaceDevotions/Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/peace_devotions/YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC2pFo5lJV46gKmztGwnT3vAWebsite: https://peacedevotions.com/Email List: https://peacedevotions.com/emailYou can also add Peace Devotions to your Flash Briefing on Amazon Echo Devices.https://peacedevotions.com/echo/

Few people outside Kazakhstan know of the famine that destroyed nomadic life in the 1930s, and left more than a third of the population dead or displaced to China and far beyond. The famine, called Asharshylyk in Kazakh, was one of the most deadly man-made famines of the 20th Century; even more so, proportionately, than the much better known Holodomor in Ukraine during the same period. It resulted from the coming of Soviet power, the violent suppression of nomadism and forced settlement into disastrous collective farms. During the Soviet years, no one mentioned the Asharshylyk in public and its history was not at schools or universities. Rose Kudabayeva's grandparents didn't breathe a word to her about the Asharshylyk although they lived through the worst of it, losing several of their children. Now she travels through Kazakhstan trying to fill out the story, meeting archivists, writers, musicians, camel farmers and of course her own relatives.

Dive into the phenomenal 35-year aviation career of Greg Hansen (USNA '82), a former F-14 Tomcat pilot, Topgun student, and legendary Topgun instructor, who finished his career as a FedEx 777 Captain. In this full-length episode, Greg shares unbelievable, high-stakes stories from the height of the Cold War and his time flying with the US Navy's best. - Topgun Inside Track: Learn what it was like to be a "stash Ensign" at Topgun right out of the Naval Academy, getting an early look at the world's elite fighter tactics. - Constant Peg: Hear the full story of flying against live Soviet MiGs (MiG-23 Flogger & MiG-21) at the secret Constant Peg program and the incredible small-world reunion that happened years later. - The SU-15 Intercept: Greg recounts being scrambled in his F-14 off the USS Ranger in the Sea of Japan to intercept a Soviet SU-15 Flagon, narrowly avoiding an international incident. - Carrier Night Ops Disaster: The heart-stopping story of a catastrophic night carrier landing pattern, an EMCON transit (limited electronic emissions), and the near mid-air collision in the landing groove that confirmed the mantra: "The boat is trying to kill you." F-14 vs. A-4: A technical comparison of the A-4 Skyhawk and the F-14A Tomcat behind the boat, and how he learned to fly the challenging TF-30 engines. FedEx & The F-16: Greg discusses his transition to the FedEx 747, the eye-opening flight into Kuwait City post-Gulf War (flying through oil haze), and his short but intense stint flying the F-16 in the Michigan Air National Guard.

6. The Cold War Context and the Tragedy of a Government-Controlled Space Program. Bob Zimmerman discusses how the Apollo 8 mission was embedded in the global Cold War and the extreme chaos of 1968, marked by political turmoil and assassinations. The space race was intended as a demonstration that America, as a free society, could achieve great things better than the Soviet top-down system. While the astronauts were military veterans, the author disputes the notion that NASA was a military operation, emphasizing that it was run by civilian engineers and managers. Ironically, despite the goal of celebrating freedom, President Kennedy adopted a centralized, top-down, government-run structure—a "Soviet style" program. This centralized approach proved to be a tragedy, as the mission became viewed as a singular stunt. Once the moon landing was achieved, the program lost political and financial support, resulting in a "dead end" for future solar system exploration. 2014 GOLDEN MOON

1. Apollo 1 and Soyuz 1 Disasters: Rushing the Space Race. Bob Zimmerman discusses the major setbacks suffered by both nations in 1967. In January, the Apollo 1 fire occurred during a launchpad rehearsal, killing astronauts Grissom, White, and Chaffee. The cause was carelessness: a spark ignited flammable materials in the pure oxygen atmosphere, trapping the crew because the hatch could only be opened externally. Frank Borman led the honest investigation, which resulted in major safety fixes, including a quick-opening hatch and nonflammable materials. Concurrently, in April 1967, the Soviet program suffered a disaster when cosmonaut Komarov died during the descent of Soyuz 1 after his parachute lines tangled. Both nations realized they had been rushing. The Russians, however, adopted a conservative rule: no manned mission would proceed unless an unmanned test was 100% successful, a standard the Zond missions failed to meet, giving the Americans a decisive edge for Apollo 8.

2. The Apollo 8 Crew, Cold War Context, and Reliance on the Saturn 5 Booster. Bob Zimmerman introduces the Apollo 8 crew—Commander Frank Borman, Jim Lovell, and rookie William Anders—set against the backdrop of the intense global Cold War in late 1968. Borman was selected for his honesty and dedication to duty, ensuring the mission's success after his role in investigating the Apollo 1 tragedy. Lovell was known as a "space cadet" eager to explore, and he and Borman had proven human endurance in space during Gemini 7. The mission was a high-risk endeavor, utilizing the Saturn 5 rocket, which had only flown twice before, with the second flight experiencing problems. Wernher von Braun's team fixed these issues, and NASA decided to proceed, confident they could demonstrate that free people could achieve success better than the top-down Soviet system. The astronauts' wives accepted the mission despite the widely believed 50/50 chance of return. 1945

In a seismic shake-up on Capitol Hill, former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi—after 38 years of iron-fisted control, amassing a $413 million fortune on a $174,000 congressional salary—announces she's bowing out in 2026, leaving behind a legacy of corruption that President Trump blasts as "evil" incarnate. But is this the death knell for career politicians, or just another elite exit strategy? We dive deep into the swamp's final gasp, exposing how Pelosi's reign symbolized the rot at the heart of D.C., while Caroline Leavitt lays bare the hypocrisy of her taxpayer-funded empire. Term limits aren't a suggestion—they're a survival imperative. Tune in as we demand accountability for the queen of the deep state.Election night anomalies explode into view: New Jersey's gubernatorial race balloons to over 3 million votes—smashing 50 years of 2-million-voter norms—with Democrat Mikie Sherrill raking in 1.7 million, fueling cries of fraud amid lax voter ID laws, illegal immigration floods, and whispers of manipulated machines. From a viral clip of a New Yorker rejected for daring to show ID, to eyebrow-raising spikes in ballots that defy history, we unpack the steal that's staring us in the face. Then, tragedy strikes skies over Louisville: A UPS cargo jet's engine rips free on takeoff, slamming into an industrial hellscape and claiming at least 12 lives—including three crew and ground victims like a young child—in a fiery inferno that demands answers on aviation safety. Raw footage and unfiltered outrage: When does negligence become criminal?As psyops tighten their grip on the American mind, researcher Feargus O'Connor Greenwood joins to shred the illusions—defining modern mind games from algorithm-fueled division to the creeping "American Gulag" of surveillance and lawfare, drawing chilling parallels to Soviet shadows. Post-election carnage in NYC: Zohran Mamdani's jihad-tinged mayoral win, powered by "crazy white liberal women," foreign-born hordes, and anti-white men coalitions, births "New Yorkistan" overnight—echoed by London Mayor Khan's gloating congrats and street-dancing radicals. Rep. Thomas Massie warns of GOP midterm doom without a spine; Trump torches the communist victor. From Massie's blueprint to viral breakdowns proving Dems' unholy alliance of minorities, illegals, and woke harpies, we arm you with the truth to fight back—because in this info war, ignorance is surrender.

November 7, 1944. A spy who predicted the Nazi invasion of the USSR and Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is executed. This episode originally aired in 2024.Support the show! Join Into History for ad-free listening and more.History Daily is a co-production of Airship and Noiser.Go to HistoryDaily.com for more history, daily.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

A very unusual episode, where returning guest-panelist Safine Hakamaki (Née Ashirova) co-hosts an interview with Henry of the esteemed Svetlana Grivorevna Ter-Minasova.  In this episode, Henry and Safie discuss the life of Professor Ter-Minasova, from her early childhood during WWII up through the present, where she continues to work as the Founding President of the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Area Studies at Moscow State University!  During this oral-autobiography, we learn why she credits Joseph Stalin with saving her life, what it was like growing up during WWII and the immediate aftermath, and her career as the "Mother" of Soviet (and subsequently Russian) foreign language education.  We're sure you'll enjoy! Svetlana Grigorevna Ter-Minasova is the founder and President of the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Area Studies at Lomonosov Moscow State University, and retains a position as Professor Emeritus at the university.  She has been Chairperson of the Foreign Languages Teaching Council (part of the Ministry of Education) since 1987.  Among many other credits, she also has been the Founding President of both National Association of Applied Linguistics and National Association of Teachers of English.  Her book "Notes by a Soviet Dinosaur",  came out in 2015, and has been excerpted in East-West Review. Safie Hakamaki is a Russian linguist and foreign language educator.  You can follow her telegram channel @amusing_musings. Help support the show by signing up to our patreon, where you also will get bonus content: https://www.patreon.com/guerrillahistory 

Bishop Schneider delivers a powerful meditation on martyrdom, warning that in an age of confusion, even Church leaders risk compromising truth. Drawing from his Soviet-era childhood and the witness of modern figures like Charlie Kirk, he reminds us: martyrdom isn't about suffering, it's about standing for Christ, even unto death.U.S. residents! Create a will with LifeSiteNews: https://www.mylegacywill.com/lifesitenews ****PROTECT Your Wealth with gold, silver, and precious metals: https://sjp.stjosephpartners.com/lifesitenews +++SHOP ALL YOUR FUN AND FAVORITE LIFESITE MERCH! https://shop.lifesitenews.com/ ****Download the all-new LSNTV App now, available on iPhone and Android!LSNTV Apple Store: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/lsntv/id6469105564 LSNTV Google Play: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lifesitenews.app +++Connect with John-Henry Westen and all of LifeSiteNews on social media:LifeSite: https://linktr.ee/lifesitenewsJohn-Henry Westen: https://linktr.ee/jhwesten Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In this week's episode of Talk Eastern Europe, Adam, Alexandra, and Nina come together to discuss the ongoing Serbian protests and explore the latest European Union reports on the progress of candidate countries, including those from our region. They also unpack the latest developments surrounding the Czech government formation and discuss recent updates from Poland.Later in the episode, Alexandra and Nina speak with Christopher Herwig, a photographer known for his remarkable project documenting hundreds of unique bus stops across the post-Soviet region. Christopher shares how his journey began and reflects on how these striking examples of urban architecture may represent glimpses of freedom of expression within the Soviet Union.For our Patreon supporters, Christopher stays on to delve deeper into his fascination with Soviet metro stations and the stories behind their grand, distinctive designs.Listen here: https://www.patreon.com/posts/episode-243-143049188Check out Christopher's books:Soviet Bus Stops 1a nd 2 and Soviet Metro Stations: https://www.herwigphoto.com/Soviet-Bus-StopsAnd his newest book on Trucks and Tuks: https://www.herwigphoto.com/Trucks-and-Tuks

Emmett Fitz-Hume (Chevy Chase) and Austin Milllbarge (Dan Aykroyd) have been promoted! Congratulations! They will serve as decoys while other CIA agents take down a Soviet nuclear missile launcher. But, not everything in this mission is adding up. Along the way, there will be parachute drops! A metal briefcase with handcuffs is used. There is a secret underground base! Will Sam Raimi let you in? There is mention of codebreaking. There's a lot of spy stuff happening here! Mr. Ruby (Bruce Davidson) and Mr. Keyes (William Prince) are trying to mastermind it. Karen Boyer (Donna Dixon) “spent the last two and a half years of [her] life preparing for this penetration.” So, there's that! RTS trains with Colonel Rhombus (Bernie Casey) to become woods ninjas. Jeremy becomes an extra within the Ace Tomato Company. La-Mar smashes the hell out of the SatScram terminal with a rock! Rami hangs with Frank Oz while scrutinizing test takers. B.B. King is here! “Doctor. Doctor. Doctor. Doctor…”

On today's episode, Lawfare Managing Editor Tyler McBrien sits down with Joseph Kellner, an assistant professor of history at the University of Georgia to discuss his latest book, “The Spirit of Socialism: Culture and Belief at the Soviet Collapse,” which examines the millions of Soviet people who embarked on a “spirited and highly visible search for new meaning” during the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.They discuss the questions of epistemic authority, of cultural identity, and of history's ultimate meaning that drove people to seek new spiritual meaning during this period, as well as the era's many colorful characters, including Hare Krishnas, astrologers, doomsayers, and neo-Pagans who pushed bio-healing, folk baths, and other answers to these questions. They also talk about why, when a superpower declines, shared reality dissolves.To receive ad-free podcasts, become a Lawfare Material Supporter at www.patreon.com/lawfare. You can also support Lawfare by making a one-time donation at https://givebutter.com/lawfare-institute.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

A Virginia judge sentences a former Henrico County teacher to more than 140 years total for the prolonged and sadistic abuse of her two young stepsons. A Georgia mother is charged with murder after police found her 4-year-old daughter dead in the trunk of a car parked outside a Sam’s Club in Oakwood. Drew Nelson reports.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this charged episode, Tara and Lee break down the stunning victory speech of Zoran Mamdani — the self-declared democratic socialist who just became the face of New York's political future. From quoting Eugene Debs to celebrating ties with open communists, the mask of moderation has officially slipped. The hosts unpack how Mamdani's win signals a deeper cultural shift, why Democrats are too afraid to denounce it, and how New York has become what they call “post-American territory.” They connect the dots between socialism's familiar promises and its historical consequences — from speech suppression to economic collapse — and ask the burning question: can America recognize itself when its greatest city no longer does? When the socialist mask slips, the truth about power is revealed. Zoran Mamdani, socialism, New York politics, post-American territory, AOC, Hassan Piker, Eugene Debs, Bill Maher, Kathy Hochul, Trump trial, communism, Democratic Party shift, political analysis, conservative commentary, cultural divide Tara and Lee open with the chilling details of Zoran Mamdani's victory speech — his unapologetic embrace of socialism and invocation of Eugene Debs, the founder of the socialist party. They argue that New York's political and cultural transformation represents the first major “post-American” territory, where traditional values and freedoms are fading fast. As clips roll from Mamdani's campaign allies like podcaster Hassan Piker and Governor Kathy Hochul, the hosts expose how openly socialist and even pro-Soviet sentiments have gone mainstream inside Democratic ranks. The conversation ties these developments to Donald Trump's conviction in New York, portraying the state as a testing ground for political show trials and ideological radicalism. By the end, Tara and Lee warn that what's unfolding in New York won't stay there — the socialist “experiment” is spreading, and unless Republicans learn to counter it effectively, America could be watching the dawn of its own decline.

Our inaugural episode of Season 2 of The Contagion Podcast opens as show producer Dr. Richard Oehler and show co-host Dr. Vivian Vega reflect on how much has changed in the fields of infectious diseases and public health since our Season 1 finale was posted in June. Drs. Oehler and Vega share some very timely updates in their ID news segment--recounting changes at the CDC as well as several important epidemiological and research developments.  Next, Dr. Vega and our special guest, Infectious Diseases specialist and former military physician Dr. Patrick Danaher transition to a chilling yet timely exploration of bioterrorism and biological warfare, threats that no longer garner the attention they once did a couple of decades ago. The two recount bizarre early attempts — like firing rabid dog saliva or trading leprosy-tainted wine — that reveal how little was once understood about contagion. But the tone shifts as the conversation moves on to the 1984 Salmonella attack in The Dalles, Oregon, America's first large-scale bioterrorism event. A cult known as the Rajneeshees deliberately contaminated restaurant salad bars to sway a local election, sickening more than 750 people. Through detailed epidemiologic analysis, the hosts explain how investigators connected the outbreak to the commune and why this case remains a critical public-health lesson in surveillance and preparedness. From there, the discussion expands to bioweapons — cheap, concealable, and capable of mass panic. The doctors compare the costs of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, underscoring why pathogens are often called “the poor man's nuclear bomb.” They walk through the CDC's Category A threat list — including anthrax, smallpox, plague, and viral hemorrhagic fevers — and dissect what makes these microbes so devastating. Listeners are then transported to the aftermath of 9/11, when anthrax-laden letters reignited national fears of invisible enemies. The podcast reconstructs the FBI investigation, profiles scientist Bruce Ivins, and explains how this attack reshaped U.S. biodefense policy, from Project BioShield to the Strategic National Stockpile. The last segment turns to smallpox, humanity's “crown jewel” of eradication turned nightmare scenario. Through insights from Soviet defector Ken Alibek and modern concerns about synthetic biology, the episode reveals why smallpox remains one of the most feared potential bioweapons — despite being officially eradicated in 1980. Blending medical insight, historical storytelling, and wry humor, Contagion Pod's Season 2 premiere reminds us that while pandemics capture headlines, the threat of bioterrorism never truly disappears.Dr Vega would like to thank her friend Job Meiller for his musical contribution to our segment breaks. Thank you Job!Thanks also to Dr. Ana Velez, our artistic contributor, for her original painting, “Biohazard Dream,” used in our episode thumbnail.

For centuries, strange phenomena associated with our seas have been reported by credible observers, which include several Cold War-era sightings by personnel with the U.S. and Soviet militaries. But what are these strange oceanic counterparts to the UAP mystery, which many refer to as "unidentified submerged objects," or USOs?  This week on The Micah Hanks Program, following an update on unusual behavior displayed by the interstellar comet 3I/ATLAS during its recent nearest approach to the Sun, we shift our attention to the USO mystery, what contemporary data says, and also how several historical examples describe unusual phenomena encountered throughout the height of the Cold War.  Have you had a UFO/UAP sighting? Please consider reporting your sighting to the UAP Sightings Reporting System, a public resource for information about sightings of aerial phenomena. The story doesn't end here... become an X Subscriber and get access to even more weekly content and monthly specials. Want to advertise/sponsor The Micah Hanks Program? We have partnered with the AdvertiseCast to handle our advertising/sponsorship requests. If you would like to advertise with The Micah Hanks Program, all you have to do is click the link below to get started: AdvertiseCast: Advertise with The Micah Hanks Program Show Notes Below are links to stories and other content featured in this episode: NEWS: Couple's brand new Tesla struck by suspected meteorite on drive home from dealership Scientists Use Materials to Mimic Wormholes and Multiple Realities JD Vance talks UFOs, suggests 'spiritual forces working on the physical world'  3I/ATLAS UPDATE: Astronomer reveals first look at Comet 3I/ATLAS as it reappears from behind the sun  We can visit interstellar comets like 3I/ATLAS with spacecraft. Here's how scientists say we'll do it  Did 3I/ATLAS Just Show Signs of Technology? Interstellar Object Displays 'Non-Gravitational Motion' NEWS: Mysterious UFOs Spotted Along US Coast - Newsweek  THE REPORT: Unidentified Submerged Objects: USOs | Enigma Labs  PROJECT BLUE BOOK: Blue Book UFO Reports at Sea by Ships BECOME AN X SUBSCRIBER AND GET EVEN MORE GREAT PODCASTS AND MONTHLY SPECIALS FROM MICAH HANKS. Sign up today and get access to the entire back catalog of The Micah Hanks Program, as well as "classic" episodes, weekly "additional editions" of the subscriber-only X Podcast, the monthly Enigmas specials, and much more. Like us on Facebook Follow @MicahHanks on X. Keep up with Micah and his work at micahhanks.com.

Danny and Derek welcome journalist and author John Lechner to discuss his book, Death is Our Business: Russian Mercenaries in the New Era of Warfare. The conversation cuts through the mainstream narrative of the Wagner Group to explore the true history of Yevgeny Prigozhin, from his start as a product of post-Soviet "gangster capitalism" in 1990s St. Petersburg to his ascent as Vladimir Putin's de facto military entrepreneur. They analyze how Prigozhin leveraged the Russian state's grand ambitions with limited resources to create a self-funding war machine in Syria and across Africa, ultimately turning his own military success in Bakhmut into a fatal political challenge to the decadent Moscow bureaucracy—a challenge that ended with a suspiciously accidental plane crash.

Dana Loesch reacts to the story of an LA gym REVOKING Singer Tish Hyman's membership after she rightfully STOOD UP when her privacy was violated by a man in the women's locker room. Meanwhile, Dana shares how Tucker Carlson DECLINED an invite to join the show before he ended joining Dave Smith's podcast to “apologize” to Christian Zionists before spewing more Soviet talking points about World War II.Thank you for supporting our sponsors that make The Dana Show possible…Patriot Mobilehttps://PatriotMobile.com/Dana  OR CALL 972-PATRIOTStand for freedom with Dana's personal cell phone provider--Patriot Mobile. Get a FREE MONTH of service code DANANoble Goldhttps://NobleGoldInvestments.com/DanaOpen a new qualified IRA or cash account with Noble Gold and get a free 10-ounce Silver Flag Bar plus a Silver American Eagle Proof Coin. Limited-time offer. Byrnahttps://Byrna.com/DanaTake advantage of Byrna's Black Friday and Cyber Monday sale with 15% off sitewide.  PreBornhttps://Preborn.com/DANAAnswer the call and help save lives—dial pound 250 and say “Baby,” or give securely online. Make your gift today.AmmoSquaredhttps://AmmoSquared.comDon't get caught without ammo, and be sure to tell them you heard about Ammo Squared on this show. Keltechttps://KelTecWeapons.comKelTec builds every KS7 GEN2 right here in the USA with American materials and workers—upgrade your home defense today. All Family Pharmacyhttps://AllFamilyPharmacy.com/Dana Don't wait until flu season knocks at your door. Use code DANA10 at checkout to save 10%. Relief Factorhttps://ReliefFactor.com OR CALL 1-800-4-RELIEFTurn the clock back on pain with Relief Factor. Get their 3-week Relief Factor Quick Start for only $19.95 today! HumanNhttps://HumanN.comStart supporting your cardiovascular health with SuperBeets, now available at your local Walmart.

Election Day. The New York City Mayoral Race tightens. Dana shares she will be debating Alan Dershowitz on gun control in Chicago Wednesday evening. A new poll shows the views of capitalism are slipping, but socialism is still unpopular. Former VP Dick Cheney dies at 84. Dana thinks Buc-cees needs to sponsor the show. Whoopi TEARS UP a producer note on The View about Biden's autopen, saying the world needs to be more nuanced and it was a joke.Airports are seeing TSA lines for up to 3 hours due to staffing shortages over the government shutdown. Reagan National Airport in DC issues a ground stop over a bomb threat on a United Airlines flight. Dana shares how Tucker Carlson DECLINED an invite to join the show before he ended joining Dave Smith's podcast to “apologize” to Christian Zionists before spewing more Soviet talking points about World War II.A NYC Liberal White woman is asked what her biggest concerns are and she says that it's her illegal alien neighbors getting taken off the street and kids not getting sex changes. Zohran Mamdani says he supports BDS. Eric Holder threatens to pack the Supreme Court if Democrats take power. An LA gym REVOKES Singer Tish Hyman's membership after her privacy was violated by a man in the women's locker room.Thank you for supporting our sponsors that make The Dana Show possible…Patriot Mobilehttps://PatriotMobile.com/Dana  OR CALL 972-PATRIOTStand for freedom with Dana's personal cell phone provider--Patriot Mobile. Get a FREE MONTH of service code DANANoble Goldhttps://NobleGoldInvestments.com/DanaOpen a new qualified IRA or cash account with Noble Gold and get a free 10-ounce Silver Flag Bar plus a Silver American Eagle Proof Coin. Limited-time offer. Byrnahttps://Byrna.com/DanaTake advantage of Byrna's Black Friday and Cyber Monday sale with 15% off sitewide.  PreBornhttps://Preborn.com/DANAAnswer the call and help save lives—dial pound 250 and say “Baby,” or give securely online. Make your gift today.AmmoSquaredhttps://AmmoSquared.comDon't get caught without ammo, and be sure to tell them you heard about Ammo Squared on this show. Keltechttps://KelTecWeapons.comKelTec builds every KS7 GEN2 right here in the USA with American materials and workers—upgrade your home defense today. All Family Pharmacyhttps://AllFamilyPharmacy.com/Dana Don't wait until flu season knocks at your door. Use code DANA10 at checkout to save 10%. Relief Factorhttps://ReliefFactor.com OR CALL 1-800-4-RELIEFTurn the clock back on pain with Relief Factor. Get their 3-week Relief Factor Quick Start for only $19.95 today! HumanNhttps://HumanN.comStart supporting your cardiovascular health with SuperBeets, now available at your local Walmart.

Danny and Derek welcome journalist and author John Lechner to discuss his book, Death is Our Business: Russian Mercenaries in the New Era of Warfare. The conversation cuts through the mainstream narrative of the Wagner Group to explore the true history of Yevgeny Prigozhin, from his start as a product of post-Soviet "gangster capitalism" in 1990s St. Petersburg to his ascent as Vladimir Putin's de facto military entrepreneur. They analyze how Prigozhin leveraged the Russian state's grand ambitions with limited resources to create a self-funding war machine in Syria and across Africa, ultimately turning his own military success in Bakhmut into a fatal political challenge to the decadent Moscow bureaucracy—a challenge that ended with a suspiciously accidental plane crash.Our Sponsors:* Check out Avocado Green Mattress: https://avocadogreenmattress.com* Check out BetterHelp: https://betterhelp.com/THENATIONAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

We Like Shooting Episode 635 This episode of We Like Shooting is brought to you by: Midwest Industries, Primary Arms, Gideon Optics, Die Free Co., Mitchell Defense, Second Call Defense, and Matador Arms   Welcome to the We Like Shooting Show, episode 635! Our cast tonight is Jeremy Pozderac, Aaron Krieger, Nick Lynch, and me Shawn Herrin, welcome to the show! Krampus- http://welikeshooting.com/krampus   - Gear Chat Jeremy - Glenfield Firearms Unveils the New Model A Rifle Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc. has reintroduced the Glenfield Firearms brand with the launch of the Glenfield Model A bolt-action rifle, aimed at making hunting accessible for all experience levels. The Model A is priced competitively and features trusted performance elements from its predecessor, catering to both new and seasoned hunters in the gun community. Nick - 6 Arc Update Bullet Points Shawn - Colt's New EPR II and EPR II PRO Patrol Rifles Colt has introduced four new models in its Enhanced Patrol Rifle (EPR) series, including the EPR II and EPR II PRO variants, designed for law enforcement and military use. These rifles feature modern ergonomics and modular options. The announcement impacts the gun community by expanding choices for consumers and professionals seeking updated firearm technology. Shawn - Silent Steel's Surprising Appearance in Battlefield 6 Silent Steel's firearm accessories were unexpectedly featured in the video game Battlefield 6, which has become a major hit since its launch. The company, surprised by this exposure, believes it could significantly enhance brand awareness and lead to increased business opportunities. While the game's audience may not include many potential buyers for their products, the association is likely to boost Silent Steel's visibility in the market. Shawn - Finland's Transition to NATO Standard Weaponry The Finnish Defense Force will transition to NATO-standard calibers for small arms, moving away from traditional Soviet-era calibers. This change aims to enhance interoperability with NATO allies, improve soldier capability, and ensure better availability of ammunition. This decision is part of Finland's military modernization strategy, which will affect the gun community by increasing demand for NATO-caliber firearms and ammunition in Finland. Gun Fights Step right up for "Gun Fights," the high-octane segment hosted by Nick Lynch, where our cast members go head-to-head in a game show-style showdown! Each contestant tries to prove their gun knowledge dominance. It's a wild ride of bids, bluffs, and banter—who will come out on top? Tune in to find out! WLS is Lifestyle ATF Eases NFA Form Process by Removing CLEO Notification Requirement The ATF is proposing changes to the NFA Form 1 that include the removal of the local chief law enforcement officer notification requirement, as well as several modifications to simplify the form and address updated regulations. These changes aim to streamline the process for individuals and manufacturers making items like suppressors, potentially leading to increased applications and demand in the gun community once the $200 tax stamp is eliminated. Public comments will be accepted for 30 days before the changes take effect. Aaron's Alley Revved Up for Freedom! Revved Up for Freedom! Going Ballistic Everytown Takes a Victory Lap Over Glock's Redesign, Claims It as a ‘Major Win' for Gun Control Everytown's 3D Gun Summit Misses the Mark Democrat-Run Chicago: At Least 23 Shot Friday into Sunday Evening Nine Injured After Shooting at Ohio Airbnb House Party Massachusetts Lawmakers to Weigh Bill Opening up Gun Makers to Lawsuits Reviews ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ - from Ny(e)gerski - We Like Shooting....unequivocally the #1 go to firearms podcast for fantasy/rpg/shoving cigar tubes up your ass book suggestions.

"The Future Is Not a Grave" is a three-day workshop happening next week at NYUAD which explores futurisms and futurescapes across the MENA, Gulf, and Indian Ocean regions. In this collaborative episode with NYU Abu Dhabi Institute, conveners Tishani Doshi and Masha Kirasirova delve into challenging despair, fostering collective imagination, and integrating diverse perspectives from artists, scholars, and performers. Discover how this initiative seeks to redefine conversations about the future, moving beyond conventional narratives and embracing a more open-ended, tolerant, and inclusive approach.November 10-12, 2025 in Abu Dhabi

Hey guys before you listen to this one, do realize this is part 3 on a series about General Kanji Ishiwara, so if you have not already done so I would recommend listening to Part 1 & 2.    This episode is General Kanji Ishiwara part 3: The gradual fall into War with China   I tried so hard this time to finish this up neatly in part 3 and utterly failed. I wrote pages and even deleted them to keep squeezing, but theres simply too much to the story. Part 3 will be focusing on the insane politics of the 1930's and how Ishiwara tried to prevent war with China.   Its rather ironic that the man who was the chief instigator that ushering in the conquest of Manchuria was unable to impose his will when it came to molding Manchukuo. Now while Ishiwara Kanji was the operations officer given official responsibility over the planning and conduct of military operations to seize Manchuria, the arrangements for that new state, being political in nature, were not in his sphere of influence. Regardless, Ishiwara was extremely vocal about his opinions on how Manchukuo should develop and he heavily emphasized racial harmony. He continuously hammered his colleagues that the economic development of Manchukuo should reflect the spirit of racial cooperation. Ishiwara assumed the economic interests of Manchukuo would simply coincide with that of the Kwantung army, by definition both's ultimate goals would be unity of Asia against the west. He was very wrong. Ishiwara was consumed by his theory of final war, everything he did was to prepare for it, thus his obsession of racial harmony was another part of the plan.    In 1932 the self government guidance board was abolished in march, leaving its functions and regional organizations to be tossed into brand new bureaus of the new government of Manchukuo. An organization emerged in April called the (Kyowakai / Concordia Association). It was brought together by Yamaguchi Juji and Ozawa Kaisaku, and its purpose was to promote racial harmony and it was backed by members of the Kwantung army, notably Ishiwara, Itagaki and Katakura. The Kwantung army flooded money into the organization and it grew rapidly…well amongst the Japanese anyways. General Honjo was a bit weary about how much the organization might have in the political sphere of Manchukuo, he did not want to see it become an official political party, he preferred it remain in a educative role. By educative role, I of course mean, to be a propaganda arm of the Kwantung army to exert influence over Manchukuo without having real skin in the game.    But to Ishiwara the Concordia Association was the logical means to unify the new nation, guiding its political destiny, to be blunt Ishiwara really saw it should have much more authority than his colleagues believed it should. Ishiwara complained in August of 1932, that Manchuria was a conglomerate of conflicting power centers such as the Kwantung army, the new Manchukuo government, the Kwantung government, the Mantetsu, consular office and so on. Under so many hats he believed Manchukuo would never become a truly unified modern state, and of course he was one of the few people that actually wanted it to be so. He began arguing the Kwantung army should turn over its political authority as soon as possible so “Japanese of high resolve should hasten to the great work of the Manchurian Concordia Association, for I am sure that we Japanese will be its leaders. In this way Manchukuo will not depend on political control from Japan, but will be an independent state, based on Japanese Manchurian cooperation. Guided by Japanese, it will be a mode of Sino-Japanese friendship, an indicator of the present trends of world civilization” Needless to say the Concordia Association made little headway with the Chinese and it began to annoy Japanese leaders. The association gradually was bent into a spiritless propaganda and intelligence arm of the IJA, staffed largely by elite Japanese working in the Manchukuo government.    Ishiwara began using the Concordia Association to promote things such as: returning leased territories like the Railway zone, abolition of extraterritoriality, equalizing payment between the races working in Manchukuo, the kind of stuff that would promote racial harmony. Such advocacy as you can imagine deviated heavily with the Japanese military, and Ishiwara's reputation would be hurt by this. The Kwantung Army staff began shifting dramatically, seeing Ishiwara isolated, aside from Itagaki and a few other followers being around. The upper brass as they say had had enough of the nuisance Concordia Association's and gradually took control of it and made sure to stop the talk of concessions. In August of 1932 Ishiwara received a new assignment and it seems he was only too happy to leave Manchuria.   Ishiwara returned to Japan, disgusted with the turn of direction Manchuria was going, and believing he would be blamed for its future failures he submitted his resignation. But the IJA knew how popular Ishiwara was and how dangerous he could become so they rejected his resignation. Instead they gave him a military decoration. He was in a very strange spot now, for the youthful officers of the Kodoha faction loved Ishiwara, but the senior top brass of the IJA were extremely suspicious of him and lets just say he was kept under close watch.   Now with Ishiwara back in Japan he would get himself involved in a bit of a war between two factions. As many of you probably already know, the Japanese military of the late 1920s and early 1930's saw the emergence of two factions: the Kodoha “imperial way” and Tosei “control” factions. The Kodoha sought what they called a “showa restoration” to give the emperor absolute power like the good olds days as they say. They were willing to even form a coup if necessary to make this happen. Another thing they believed was in the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” war plan. The idea behind this was that the USSR and communism as a whole was Japans largest threat and the IJA needed to invade the USSR. Now the Tosei faction believed in most of what the Kodoha did, but they differed on some issues. Number 1) they were not willing to perform a coup to usher in a showa restoration, no they thought they could work with the existing Zaibatsu elites and politicians to get things done. THe Kodoha hated the politicians and Zaibatsu to the point they wanted to murder them, so differing opinions. The Tosei also believed the next world war would require a total war strategy, to build up Japan to fight the USSR, but probably the US as well. They favored Nanshin-ron “the southern strike” policy, to target the resources of south east asia necessary to give Japan what it needed to be self sufficient. Another thing that separated these two factions, the Kodoha typically were younger officers.   Despite their differences, everyone in the Japanese military understood forceful expansion into Asia was going to happen and this meant collison with the USSR, America and Britain. Ishiwara's first assignment back in Japan was a temporary duty with the foreign ministry, he was a member of the Japanese legation to the league of nations under Matsuoka Yosuke. The league of nations at this time was performing the Lytton Commission which was investigating the Macnhurian problem, ie: Japan invading Manchuria. Upon returning to Japan in summer of 1933, Ishiwara sought a regimental command, but found it difficult to acquire because of his troublemaker like history. Then General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko who commanded the 2nd sendai division gave him command over the 4th infantry regiment. Ishiwara went to work training the men under him to counter the latest soviet infantry tactics and of course he lectured extensively about his final war theories. During this time rumors emerged that Ishiwara supported the Nanshin-ron strategy. Many of his old colleagues who supported Hokushin-ron demanded he explain himself and Ishiwara did. These rumors were actually false, it was not that Ishiwara favored the Nanshin-ron strategy, it was simply that he did not back all aspects of the Hokushin-ron strategy.   Ishiwara believed to challenge the USSR, first Japan needed an Asian union, which he thought would take probably 30 years to create. But to usher such an Asian union, first Manchukuo needed to be hammered out properly, something Ishiwara thought Japan was failing to do. Also Japan's military strength was insufficient to overwhelm the multiple enemies before her, the war she would enter would be a protracted one. To win such a war she needed resources and allies, notably Manchukuo and China. To confront the USSR, Japan would need to subvert outer mongolia, but to confront the USA and Britain she would have to seize the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong and Guam. It was going to be a global clash.   Ishiwara was gravely concerned with how powerful the USSR was becoming in the early 1930s. In the 3 years since he had left Manchuria, the Soviet divisions in east asia had jumped from 8 to 14 by the end of 1935, while Japanese divisions in Manchuria were only 3. For aircraft the Soviets had 950 vs 220 for Japan. On top of that the Soviets had TB-5 long range bombers, capable of hitting Japan, but the Japanese had no comparable aircraft. A large reason for such build up's were literally because Kodoha leaders were publicly threatening the Soviets such as Generals Sadao Araki. The Kodoha faction faced a lot of challenges as to how they could hope to face off against the USSR. They figured out three main principles needed to be overcome: 1) Japan had to prevent the USSR from being able to defeat its enemies to the west and east one at a time, Japan should seek diplomatic aims in this like allying with Germany. 2) A devastating blow was necessary to the USSR far east, perhaps against the Trans-siberian railway and air bases in the maritime provinces. 3) If Japan was able to demolish Soviet resistance in the far east, Japan would need to take forward positions on the Manchurian border for a protracted war. Ishiwara tried to figure out ways to get by these principles. First he advocated for Japanese troops strength in Manchuria and Korea to be 80% equivalent to that of the Soviets east of Lake Baikal at the offset of hostilities. He also urged cooperation with Germany and to preserve friendly neutral relations with Britain and the US, that is until the soviets were dealt with of course. Ishiwara vigorously felt the Nanshin ron strategy to push into southeast asia and the pacific was far too ambitious for the time being and that all efforts should be made to consolidate Manchuria for resources. Ishiwara tried to win over some Naval support for his plans, but none would be found. When Ishiwara showed his formal plans for Asia to the war ministry, they told him his projections in Manchuria would cost at least 1 billion 300 million yen. They also notified Ishiwara the navy were asking for about the same amount for their programs. Now while Ishiwara spent years trying to produce a 6 year plan to build up Manchuria, other significant things were going on in Japan.   The Kodoha faction as I said had a lot of younger officer support and a lot of these were men who came from rural parts of Japan. A lot of these men came from poor families suffering, and it looked to them that Japan was a nation full of social injustice and spiritual disintegration. These young officers were becoming more and more vocal in the early 1930's about wanting a showa restoration. They thought Japan would be better off as a military state with the emperor on top. Ishiwara empathized with the desire for a showa restoration, and many of the young officers calling for it claimed he was one of their champions. He made some fiery speeches in 1935 linking the evils of capitalism to the destitution of rural japan. He argued farmers were bearing crushing burdens because of economic privation. In his words “if the clash between the exploiters (landlords and capitalists) and the exploited continues much longer the exploited will be ground to bits. The present system of free economic competition has produced a situation where there is a small number of fabulously rich and limitless number of desperately poor. The national has indeed reached a national crisis. Liberal capitalism must inevitably give way to a newer system". What that “newer system was” however differed from what the youthful officers saw as their Showa restoration. Ishiwara wanted the Japanese government to create plans and policy, the Kodoha hardliners wanted to form a violent coup.    Kodoha officers began to push Ishiwara to champion their cause more and more. However by late 1935 Ishiwara's name would actually begin to be connected to the Tosei faction. While Ishiwara supported much of the Kodoha ideology, he simply did not share their beliefs in the same Showa restoration, he was more akin to the Tosei in that regard. Now after the manchurian incident the two factions kind of went to war with another to dominate the military. The Kodoha faction was early on the most powerful, but in 1934 their leader Araki resigned from the army due to failing health and he was replaced by General Senjuro Hayashi who favored the Tosei. In November of 1934, a plot was discovered that involved Kodoha officers seeking to murder some top ranking politicians. The result of this saw the Tosei faction force the resignation of the Kodoha leader General Jinzaburo Masaki, who was serving as the inspector general of military education. In retaliation to this, the Kodoha officer Saburo Aizawa murdered the Toseiha leader General Tetsuzen Nagata. This caused a frenzy, things began to really escalate, and many looked at Ishiwara Kanji to prove which side he favored. While in prison awaiting trial, Aizawa asked Ishiwara to be his defense counsel, to which he promised he would consider it. At the same time other Kodoha officers began pressing Ishiwara to support their cause openly. It is really hard to see where exactly Ishiwara was in all of this as all of his speeches prior were purposely ambiguous. He looked like a fence sitter and after what will be the February coup of 1936, there was testimony that Ishiwara was a middle-echelon member involved in the coup, other testimony literally had him on the list of people to be assassinated. A few weeks before Aizawa's trial, Ishiwara refused his request.   On February 26th, Ishiwara was awakened at his Tokyo home by a telephone call from Colonel Suzuki Teiichi informing him a rebellion was underway. Ishiwara, though ill at the time rushed over to the Military police HQ in Kudan. There he was informed of what was going on and how the officers were now taking the side of the showa restorationists or to quell the rebellion. From there he rushed to meet War Minister Kawashima Yoshiyuki where he demanded a proclamation of martial law to cope with the rebellion. He then urged Vice Chief of staff Sugiyama to order units from garrisons around Tokyo to overwhelm the rebels. Within 24 hours of the event, Ishiwara was then named operations officer of the Martial Law headquarters and he began coordinating plans to deal with the crisis. Thus Ishiwara occupied a crucial position in quelling the coup. On the night of the 27th a bunch of officers who sympathized with the rebels came to the HQ to argue for delaying actions against them. To this Ishiwara rose up and announced “we shall immediately carry forward plans for an assault. All units will assemble for that purpose. The army will wait until noon of the 28th; then it will begin its assault and crush the rebellion”. The next day,  Ishiwara went to the main entrance of the War Ministers office, where a large number of the rebels occupied and he demanded to talk to their leaders face to face. He hoped the youthful officers who looked up to him would see reason. They let him in, after they had shot Captain Katakura Tadashi for trying to do the same thing. Ishiwara then told them he shared many of their goals, but condemned their use of force. With a pistol pointed at him Ishiwara declared this “If you don't listen to reason you will be crushed by the severest measures”. He delivered his ultimatum and just walked out the door.    By the 28th the tides turned on the rebels. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down, demanding an end to the mutiny, many of the top Kodoha leaders walked away because of this. The Navy brought all of its power to Tokyo bay including its SNLF marines, all guns were on the rebels. Some of the rebels held out, still hoping the Emperor would change his mind and order a showa restoration, but by the 29th it fell apart. The rebels surrendered, aided by Colonel Tomoyuki Yamashita (one of my favorite generals of WW2, fascinating character). In the words of Matsumura Shuitsu a member of the Martial law HQ “In the midst of all the confusion and commotion, Ishiwara never lost sight of his objective and dealt with the criss with cool efficiency. If ever there was a case of the right man in the right place it was Ishiwara at that time. No doubt, what brought about the ultimate surrender of the rebel forces, was, of course, the Imperial command. But I believe that in a large part the collapse of the rebellion was due to the decisiveness of Ishwara, who never swerved, never hesitated. In short, Tokyo was saved by Ishiwara's courage”. It is rather ironic, many would point out it was Ishiwara who instigated the insurrection, but when it came time for it, he was the largest one to stamp down upon it. One could argue, by suppressing the rebellion, Ishawara had exploited the crisis in order to earn the political power necessary to bring about his version of a Showa Restoration.   During the mutiny, after meeting the rebels, Ishiwara actually had a secret meeting with two Kodoha officers at the Imperial Hotel. They were Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro and Colonel Mitsui Sakichi. He spoke to them about the possibility of forming a new government. The 3 of them came to these conclusions to actually perform a real Showa restoration. The rebels needed to go back to their barracks; the emperor needed to endorse the showa restoration; and members of the cabinet and top military leaders had to support it. Ishiwara then went to the Martial Law HQ and demanded Army vice chief of staff Sugiyama that he submit to the emperor a petition “to establish a restoration which would make clear the spirit of the nation, realize the national defense, and stabilize the peoples livelihood”. Sugiyama wanted nothing to do with this and told him “its simply impossible to relay such a request from the army” Ishiwara knew Sugiyama's position was too strong to challenge directly so he backed off, this was his last attempt to alter the nation's course through confrontation. Because of his actions during the quelling of the rebellion, this little scene was forgotten, his reputation was not tarnished…well it was amongst the Kodoha hardliners who saw him as a traitor, but other than that. Yet again he seems to be a man of many contradictions.  After the February coup the Kodoha faction ceased to exist and the Toseiha's ideology grabbed most of the military, though they also faded heavily.     Ishiwara went back to planning and lecturing taking a heavy notice of how Germany and Italy's totalitarian models were looking like the most efficient ones that Japan should emulate. He pushed heavily for a national defense state. He kept advocating for a 5 year plan he had to push Japan into a total war economy, but the industrialists and economists kept telling him it was far too much. I could write pages on all the ideas he had, he covered every aspect of Japanese society. He wanted the whole of Japan to devote itself to becoming the hegemonic power in Asia and this required self-sufficiency, more territory, alliances, an overhaul of Japan's politics, economy, etc etc he worked on this for years. One thing I find amusing to note, Ishiwara's plans had the national defense state not run directly by the military. No instead the military would only focus on military affairs to maximize their efficiency, thus civilians would lead the government. In his words “the tactics and strategy of national defense in the narrow sense are unquestionably the responsibility of the military. But national defense in the widest sense, industry, economy, transportation, communications are clearly related to the field of politics. Of course, the military can naturally express their opinion on these matters in order to counsel some minister whose duties are political, but to go before the general public and discuss the detailed industrial and economic is an arrogation of authority”. So ye, Ishiwara actually sought to remove military officers from political positions.    In 1937 Ishiwara was promoted to the rank of major general and his duties were of the operations division of the general staff. Because of his popularity and now his rank, some began to see him almost as that of a rising dictator. In January of 1937, the government of Hirota Koki who had come to power largely because of the february coup were having problems. Politicians were unable to deal with the rising military budgets. Ishiwara was eager to press forward his national defense state idea. Alongside this Captain Fukutome Shigeru, his naval counterpart was angry at the cabinet for hindering funding and called for their dissolution. In one meeting Ishiwara blurted out “if there's any disturbance the military should proclaim martial law throughout the country until things were straightened out”. Well within days the cabinet fell on its own and now everyone looked to a successor.    The Army and Navy fought for their candidate. The Nazi favored Ugaki Kazushige, but the Army held grudges against him. Ishiwara also did not like his appointment stating he had a bad political past, by bad that meant he had advocated for military budget cuts. Ugaki refused the job because of the pressure and made a note about Ishiwara's remarks towards him. Seeing Ugaki pushed aside, Ishiwara and his followers pushed for 3 other candidates; Hayashi Senjuro, House President Konoe Fumumaro and President of the privy council Hiranuma Kiichiro. Ishiwara sent to each man his 5 year plan to test their enthusiasm for it. Hiranuma didn't like it, Konoe was neutral and Hayashi liked it. So Ishiwara backed Hayashi go figure. All of his Manchurian oriented followers pushed to get him into office. When Hayashi was given Imperial command to head a new government, Ishiwara met with his Manchurian faction friends to draw a list of people to put in the cabinet. Itagaki Seishiro was chosen as war minister; Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa known to have radical reformist leanings for navy minister; Matsuoka Yosuke or SHiratori Toshio for foreign minister, industrialist Ikeda Seihin for finance, Tsuda Shingo for commerce and industry, Sogo Shinji as chief cabinet secretary and Miyazaki as chairman. Ishiwara himself stayed carefully in the background to make it seem like he was only attending military duties.    But rivals to Ishiwara began working against him, especially some of those Kodoha hardliners who felt he betrayed them. They pressed Hayashi to not accept many of Ishiwara's cabinet candidates such as Itagaki and Hayashi backed off the majority of them as a result. The effort to form a Macnhurian cabal failed and this further led to a lack of enthusiasm for Ishiwara's national defense plans. Hayashi's government which Ishiwara had placed his hopes upon became antagonistic towards him and his followers.    Now over in Manchuria, the Kwantung army was looking to seize territory in northern China and inner mongolia. This was something Ishiwara was flip floppy about. At first he began speaking about the need to simply develop Manchukuo so that China and Inner mongolia would follow suite, but gradually he began to warm up to schemes to invade. Though when he heard his former Kwantun colleagues were basically going to perform the exact same plan he had done with the Mukden incident he traveled back to Manchuria to dissuade them. Ishiwara landed at Dairen and within days of his arrival he learned that 15,000 troops under Prince Demchugdongrub, known also as Prince Teh of Mongolia, backed by Kwantung arms and aircraft were launching a full scale invasion of Suiyuan province. Ishiwara was furious and he screamed at the General staff “the next time I visit the Kwantung Army I'm going to piss on the floor of the commanders office!”    Within a month, the Warlord Yan Xishan, now fighting for the NRA turned back Prince Teh's forces. This angered the Kwantung army, fueling what Ishiwara always feared, a war between China and Japan. Ishiwara began lecturing left right and center about how Japan needed to curb her imperialist aggression against China. He advocated as always racial harmonization, about the East Asian League idea, cooperation between China and Japan. He thought perhaps China could be induced by joined a federation with Japan and to do all of this Japan should help develop Manchukuo as a positive model. Ishiwara warned any aggressive actions against China would waste valuable resources needed dearly to be directed against the USSR. In his words “China was an endless bog that would swallow men and materiel without prospect of victory and it would cripple the possibility of East Asian Union” Prophetic words to be sure.   Ishiwara was still influential and many in Hayashi's cabinet headed him, trying to push for more diplomacy with China. But by spring of 1937 Tokyo HQ had split over the issue. On one side were Ishiwara and those seeking to obtain a sort of treaty with China to form an alliance against the USSR. On the other hand the Nationalists and Communists were on the verge of forming a united front allied to the USSR, thus the invading China faction was gaining steam. This faction simply sought to get China out of the way, then focus on the USSR. As much as Ishiwara fought it, the China War would come nonetheless.   In June of 1937, a report from a Japanese civilian visiting China reached Colonel Kawabe Torashiro. The report stated that the China Garrison Army in the Peking area were planning an incident similar to what had occurred in Mukden in 1931. Kawabe took the report to Ishiwara who said he would investigate the matter. Ishiwara pressed the war ministry to send Colonel Okamoto Kiyotomi to the military administration section to north china to warn Generals Hashimoto Gun of the China Garrison Army and Kwabe Msakazu commander the brigade station in the Peking area that Tokyo would not tolerate provocation actions. Okamoto came back and stated they reassured him it was just rumors and nothing was occurring.   Two weeks later on July 7th, the infamous Marco Polo Bridge incident began WW2. When it began, Tokyo took it as a minor incident, just some skirmishes between minor forces, but the fighting grew and grew. The two factions in Tokyo who we can call the “expansionists and non expansionists” began arguing on what to do. The expansionists argued this was the time to deliver a quick and decisive blow, which meant mobilizing and dispatching divisions into northern China to overwhelm them. The non expansionists argued they needed to terminate hostilities immediately and seek diplomacy before the conflict got out of hand. From the offset of the conflict, Ishiwara led the doomed non expansionists. Ishiwara tried to localize the conflict to prevent more Japanese from getting involved. To do this he urged Prince Kan'in to send a cable on July 8th to the local Japanese forces to settle the issue locally. But they reported back that the Nanjing government was tossing 4 divisions of reinforcements to the area, prompting the Japanese to mobilize 3 divisions in response. For 3 days Ishiwara tried to halt the reinforcements, but the Nanjing report came true, the Chinese reinforcements arrived to the scene, pushing the Japanese to do the same. General Kawabe Masakazu argued 12,000 Japanese civilians were in the area and now under threat, thus Ishiwara had to stand down.   The conflict at the Marco Polo Bridge quickly got out of hand. Ishiwara was very indecisive, he tried to thwart the spread of the conflict, but he was continuously forced to stand down when reports false or true poured in about Chinese offensives. In fact, Ishiwara's efforts were getting him in a ton of trouble as his colleagues began to point out they were hindering the military operations which at the time were trying to end the conflict quickly. Ishiwara did not go down without a fight tossing one last attempt to stop the conflict. He urged Prime Minister Konoe to fly to Nanjing to speak directly with Chiang Kai Shek, it was a last ditch effort before the Japanese reinforcements arrived. When Konoe received requests to do this from multiple Japanese military leaders on urged on by Ishiwara, he was initially favorable to the idea and had a plane prepared for the trip. But within hours of the idea leaked out raising a storm of protests from the expansionists. Sugiyama then told Konoe it was Ishiwara pushing the idea and that his views represented a small minority in the military. Konoe ultimately back down and chose not to do it. Ishiwara was outraged when he found out screaming “tell the Prime minister that in 2000 years of our history no man will have done more to destroy Japan than he has by his indecisiveness in this crisis”.   Ishiwara began fighting with his colleagues as the situation worsened. He tabled a motion to press Nanjing to support Manchukuo in order for the Japanese to withdraw, but his colleagues blocked it. By August the conflict had spread as far as Shanghai and now even the IJN were getting involved. To this Ishiwara argued they should just evacuate Japanese civilians in Shanghai and pay them several hundred million yen in compensation as it would be cheaper than a war. He was quickly overruled. Thus the North China Incident simply became the China incident. In early september Ishiwara tried one last attempt to negotiate a settlement, trying to get Germany to mediate, but by mid september Ishiwara's influence had dropped considerably. By late september Ishiwara was removed from the General staff by General Tada. The remnants of Ishiwara's followers in the central army were defeated, particularly when Konoe declared in January of 1938 that Japan would not treat with Chiang Kai-shek. Ironically Konoe would quickly come around to believe Japan had made a grave mistake. By 1938 24 IJA divisions were tossed into China, the next year this became 34. 

2. LONDINIUM 91 CE. Seven Warnings, Part II. The conversation continued with Germanicus detailing the remaining maxims, noting that the United States seems to follow this list of strategic errors as if it were a program. (5) Never think "it will never happen to us"—this belief stems from American exceptionalism, the idea that the US is superior because "democracy makes us smarter." The shameful US withdrawal from Afghanistan was cited as a major instance of this failure, especially when contrasted with the Soviet withdrawal, which was conducted with dignity and left a regime that lasted three more years. The US, believing itself to be the "gods of war" after World War II, relied on the myth of technological superiority, a mindset preserved even in the proxy war in Ukraine where elites underestimated Russia based on GDP. The danger of biased judgment (Maxim 4) was re-emphasized through the Korean War, where the US despised the Chinese, who ultimately defeated the US in a strategic campaign. The Chinese military adapted to American fire with unconventional tactics, overwhelming US lines, a capability the US disallowed because it viewed the enemy as a "lesser force." This mindset gives a gift to the enemy, allowing them to rely on US unpreparedness (e.g., letting Russians build vast fortifications in Ukraine). (6) Never follow a strategic course of action that makes your enemy stronger—this requires understanding the enemy's source of strength (like the morale and spirit of the Taliban), which the US often fails to attack. The speakers applied this warning to potential US intervention in Venezuela, which is being encouraged by the opposition. The strategy of using overwhelming air power and insufficient ground forces—bombing them into submission—will fail and only make the enemy stronger. Insufficient tactics like leadership decapitation, even if inspired by Israeli actions, will not succeed if the enemy army chooses to resist. The centurions noted that the Romans consistently avoided one mistake: forgiving the enemy.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Wuhan. In a country frayed by war, the Yangtze became a pulsing artery, carrying both hunger and hope. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man, or flood the rivers to buy time. He chose both, setting sullen floodwaters loose along the Yellow River to slow the invaders, a temporary mercy that spared some lives while ripping many from their homes. On the river's banks, a plethora of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, fractured into rival zones, clung to lines with stubborn grit as Japanese forces poured through Anqing, Jiujiang, and beyond, turning the Yangtze into a deadly corridor. Madang's fortifications withstood bombardment and gas, yet the price was paid in troops and civilians drowned or displaced. Commanders like Xue Yue wrestled stubbornly for every foothold, every bend in the river. The Battle of Wanjialing became a symbol: a desperate, months-long pincer where Chinese divisions finally tightened their cordon and halted the enemy's flow. By autumn, the Japanese pressed onward to seize Tianjiazhen and cut supply lines, while Guangzhou fell to a ruthless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan loomed inevitable, yet the story remained one of fierce endurance against overwhelming odds.   #174 The Changsha Fire Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the summer of 1938, amid the upheaval surrounding Chiang Kai-shek, one of his most important alliances came to an end. On June 22, all German advisers to the Nationalist government were summoned back; any who refused would be deemed guilty of high treason. Since World War I, a peculiar bond had tied the German Weimar Republic and China: two fledgling states, both weak and only partially sovereign. Under the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany had lost extraterritorial rights on Chinese soil, which paradoxically allowed Berlin to engage with China as an equal partner rather than a traditional colonizer. This made German interests more welcome in business and politics than those of other Western powers. Chiang's military reorganization depended on German officers such as von Seeckt and von Falkenhausen, and Hitler's rise in 1933 had not immediately severed the connection between the two countries. Chiang did not share Nazi ideology with Germany, but he viewed Berlin as a potential ally and pressed to persuade it to side with China rather than Japan as China's principal East Asian, anti-Communist partner. In June 1937, H. H. Kung led a delegation to Berlin, met Hitler, and argued for an alliance with China. Yet the outbreak of war and the Nationalists' retreat to Wuhan convinced Hitler's government to align with Japan, resulting in the recall of all German advisers. Chiang responded with a speech praising von Falkenhausen, insisting that "our friend's enemy is our enemy too," and lauding the German Army's loyalty and ethics as a model for the Chinese forces. He added, "After we have won the War of Resistance, I believe you'll want to come back to the Far East and advise our country again." Von Falkenhausen would later become the governor of Nazi-occupied Belgium, then be lauded after the war for secretly saving many Jewish lives. As the Germans departed, the roof of the train transporting them bore a prominent German flag with a swastika, a prudent precaution given Wuhan's vulnerability to air bombardment. The Japanese were tightening their grip on the city, even as Chinese forces, numbering around 800,000, made a stubborn stand. The Yellow River floods blocked northern access, so the Japanese chose to advance via the Yangtze, aided by roughly nine divisions and the might of the Imperial Navy. The Chinese fought bravely, but their defenses could not withstand the superior technology of the Japanese fleet. The only substantial external aid came from Soviet pilots flying aircraft bought from the USSR as part of Stalin's effort to keep China in the war; between 1938 and 1940, some 2,000 pilots offered their services. From June 24 to 27, Japanese bombers relentlessly pounded the Madang fortress along the Yangtze until it fell. A month later, on July 26, Chinese defenders abandoned Jiujiang, southeast of Wuhan, and its civilian population endured a wave of atrocities at the hands of the invaders. News of Jiujiang's fate stiffened resolve. Chiang delivered a pointed address to his troops on July 31, arguing that Wuhan's defense was essential and that losing the city would split the country into hostile halves, complicating logistics and movement. He warned that Wuhan's defense would also be a spiritual test: "the place has deep revolutionary ties," and public sympathy for China's plight was growing as Japanese atrocities became known. Yet Chiang worried about the behavior of Chinese soldiers. He condemned looting as a suicidal act that would destroy the citizens' trust in the military. Commanders, he warned, must stay at their posts; the memory of the Madang debacle underscored the consequences of cowardice. Unlike Shanghai, Wuhan had shelters, but he cautioned against retreating into them and leaving soldiers exposed. Officers who failed in loyalty could expect no support in return. This pep talk, combined with the belief that the army was making a last stand, may have slowed the Japanese advance along the Yangtze in August. Under General Xue Yue, about 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back the invaders at Huangmei. At Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with poison gas finally forcing Japanese victory. Yet even then, Chinese generals struggled to coordinate. In Xinyang, Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted; they expected relief from Hu Zongnan's forces, but Hu instead withdrew, allowing Japan to capture the city without a fight. The fall of Xinyang enabled Japanese control of the Ping-Han railway, signaling Wuhan's doom. Chiang again spoke to Wuhan's defenders, balancing encouragement with a grim realism about possible loss. Although Wuhan's international connections were substantial, foreign aid would be unlikely. If evacuation became necessary, the army should have a clear plan, including designated routes. He recalled the disastrous December retreat from Nanjing, where "foreigners and Chinese alike turned it into an empty city." Troops had been tired and outnumbered; Chiang defended the decision to defend Nanjing, insisting the army had sacrificed itself for the capital and Sun Yat-sen's tomb. Were the army to retreat again, he warned, it would be the greatest shame in five thousand years of Chinese history. The loss of Madang was another humiliation. By defending Wuhan, he argued, China could avenge its fallen comrades and cleanse its conscience; otherwise, it could not honor its martyrs. Mao Zedong, observing the situation from his far-off base at Yan'an, agreed strongly that Chiang should not defend Wuhan to the death. He warned in mid-October that if Wuhan could not be defended, the war's trajectory would shift, potentially strengthening the Nationalists–Communists cooperation, deepening popular mobilization, and expanding guerrilla warfare. The defense of Wuhan, Mao argued, should drain the enemy and buy time to advance the broader struggle, not become a doomed stalemate. In a protracted war, some strongholds might be abandoned temporarily to sustain the longer fight. The Japanese Army captured Wuchang and Hankou on 26 October and captured Hanyang on the 27th, which concluded the campaign in Wuhan. The battle had lasted four and a half months and ended with the Nationalist army's voluntary withdrawal. In the battle itself, the Japanese army captured Wuhan's three towns and held the heartland of China, achieving a tactical victory. Yet strategically, Japan failed to meet its objectives. Imperial Headquarters believed that "capturing Hankou and Guangzhou would allow them to dominate China." Consequently, the Imperial Conference planned the Battle of Wuhan to seize Wuhan quickly and compel the Chinese government to surrender. It also decreed that "national forces should be concentrated to achieve the war objectives within a year and end the war against China." According to Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Hirohito authorized the use of chemical weapons against China by specific orders known as rinsanmei. During the Battle of Wuhan, Prince Kan'in Kotohito transmitted the emperor's orders to deploy toxic gas 375 times between August and October 1938. Another memorandum uncovered by Yoshimi indicates that Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni authorized the use of poison gas against the Chinese on 16 August 1938. A League of Nations resolution adopted on 14 May condemned the Imperial Japanese Army's use of toxic gas. Japan's heavy use of chemical weapons against China was driven by manpower shortages and China's lack of poison gas stockpiles to retaliate. Poison gas was employed at Hankou in the Battle of Wuhan to break Chinese resistance after conventional assaults had failed. Rana Mitter notes that, under General Xue Yue, approximately 100,000 Chinese troops halted Japanese advances at Huangmei, and at the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory secured only through the use of poison gas. Chinese generals also struggled with coordination at Xinyang; Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted, and Hu Zongnan's forces, believed to be coming to relieve them, instead withdrew. Japan subsequently used poison gas against Chinese Muslim forces at the Battle of Wuyuan and the Battle of West Suiyuan. However, the Chinese government did not surrender with the loss of Wuhan and Guangzhou, nor did Japan's invasion end with Wuhan and Guangzhou's capture. After Wuhan fell, the government issued a reaffirmation: "Temporary changes of advance and retreat will not shake our resolve to resist the Japanese invasion," and "the gain or loss of any city will not affect the overall situation of the war." It pledged to "fight with even greater sorrow, greater perseverance, greater steadfastness, greater diligence, and greater courage," dedicating itself to a long, comprehensive war of resistance. In the Japanese-occupied rear areas, large armed anti-Japanese forces grew, and substantial tracts of territory were recovered. As the Japanese army themselves acknowledged, "the restoration of public security in the occupied areas was actually limited to a few kilometers on both sides of the main transportation lines." Thus, the Battle of Wuhan did not merely inflict a further strategic defeat on Japan; it also marked a turning point in Japan's strategic posture, from offense to defense. Due to the Nationalist Army's resolute resistance, Japan mobilized its largest force to date for the attack, about 250,000 personnel, who were replenished four to five times over the battle, for a total of roughly 300,000. The invaders held clear advantages in land, sea, and air power and fought for four and a half months. Yet they failed to annihilate the Nationalist main force, nor did they break the will to resist or the army's combat effectiveness. Instead, the campaign dealt a severe blow to the Japanese Army's vitality. Japanese-cited casualties totaled 4,506 dead and 17,380 wounded for the 11th Army; the 2nd Army suffered 2,300 killed in action, 7,600 wounded, and 900 died of disease. Including casualties across the navy and the air force, the overall toll was about 35,500. By contrast, the Nationalist Government Military Commission's General Staff Department, drawing on unit-level reports, calculated Japanese casualties at 256,000. The discrepancy between Japanese and Nationalist tallies illustrates the inflationary tendencies of each side's reporting. Following Wuhan, a weakened Japanese force confronted an extended front. Unable to mount large-scale strategic offensives, unlike Shanghai, Xuzhou, or Wuhan itself, the Japanese to a greater extent adopted a defensive posture. This transition shifted China's War of Resistance from a strategic defensive phase into a strategic stalemate, while the invaders found themselves caught in a protracted war—a development they most disliked. Consequently, Japan's invasion strategy pivoted: away from primary frontal offensives toward a greater reliance on political inducements with secondary military action, and toward diverting forces to "security" operations behind enemy lines rather than pushing decisive frontal campaigns. Japan, an island nation with limited strategic resources, depended heavily on imports. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan's gold reserves,including reserves for issuing banknotes, amounted to only about 1.35 billion yen. In effect, Japan's currency reserves constrained the scale of the war from the outset. The country launched its aggression while seeking an early solution to the conflict. To sustain its war of aggression against China, the total value of military supplies imported from overseas in 1937 reached approximately 960 million yen. By June of the following year, for the Battle of Wuhan, even rifles used in training were recalled to outfit the expanding army. The sustained increase in troops also strained domestic labor, food, and energy supplies. By 1939, after Wuhan, Japan's military expenditure had climbed to about 6.156 billion yen, far exceeding national reserves. This stark reality exposed Japan's economic fragility and its inability to guarantee a steady supply of military materiel, increasing pressure on the leadership at the Central Command. The Chief of Staff and the Minister of War lamented the mismatch between outward strength and underlying weakness: "Outwardly strong but weak is a reflection of our country today, and this will not last long." In sum, the Wuhan campaign coincided with a decline in the organization, equipment, and combat effectiveness of the Japanese army compared with before the battle. This erosion of capability helped drive Japan to alter its political and military strategy, shifting toward a method of inflicting pressure on China and attempting to "use China to control China", that is, fighting in ways designed to sustain the broader war effort. Tragically a major element of Chiang Kai-shek's retreat strategy was the age-old "scorched earth" policy. In fact, China originated the phrase and the practice. Shanghai escaped the last-minute torching because of foreigners whose property rights were protected. But in Nanjing, the burning and destruction began with increasing zeal. What could not be moved inland, such as remaining rice stocks, oil in tanks, and other facilities, was to be blown up or devastated. Civilians were told to follow the army inland, to rebuild later behind the natural barrier of Sichuan terrain. Many urban residents complied, but the peasantry did not embrace the plan. The scorched-earth policy served as powerful propaganda for the occupying Japanese army and, even more so, for the Reds. Yet they could hardly have foreseen the propaganda that Changsha would soon supply them. In June, the Changsha Evacuation Guidance Office was established to coordinate land and water evacuation routes. By the end of October, Wuhan's three towns had fallen, and on November 10 the Japanese army captured Yueyang, turning Changsha into the next primary invasion target. Beginning on October 9, Japanese aircraft intensified from sporadic raids on Changsha to large-scale bombing. On October 27, the Changsha Municipal Government urgently evacuated all residents, exempting only able-bodied men, the elderly, the weak, women, and children. The baojia system was mobilized to go door-to-door, enforcing compliance. On November 7, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military meeting at Rongyuan Garden to review the war plan and finalize a "scorched earth war of resistance." Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, drafted the detailed implementation plan. On November 10, Shi Guoji, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, presided over a joint meeting of Changsha's party, government, military, police, and civilian organizations to devise a strategy. The Changsha Destruction Command was immediately established, bringing together district commanders and several arson squads. The command actively prepared arson equipment and stacked flammable materials along major traffic arteries. Chiang decided that the city of Changsha was vulnerable and either gave the impression or the direct order, honestly really depends on the source your reading, to burn the city to the ground to prevent it falling to the enemy. At 9:00 AM on November 12, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Zhang Zhizhong: "One hour to arrive, Chairman Zhang, Changsha, confidential. If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned. Please make thorough preparations in advance and do not delay." And here it seems a game of broken telephone sort of resulted in one of the worst fire disasters of all time. If your asking pro Chiang sources, the message was clearly, put up a defense, once thats fallen, burn the city down before the Japanese enter. Obviously this was to account for getting civilians out safely and so forth. If you read lets call it more modern CPP aligned sources, its the opposite. Chiang intentionally ordering the city to burn down as fast as possible, but in through my research, I think it was a colossal miscommunication. Regardless Zhongzheng Wen, Minister of the Interior, echoed the message. Simultaneously, Lin Wei, Deputy Director of Chiang Kai-shek's Secretariat, instructed Zhang Zhizhong by long-distance telephone: "If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned." Zhang summoned Feng Ti, Commander of the Provincial Capital Garrison, and Xu Quan, Director of the Provincial Security Bureau, to outline arson procedures. He designated the Garrison Command to shoulder the preparations, with the Security Bureau assisting. At 4:00 PM, Zhang appointed Xu Kun, Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment, as chief commander of the arson operation, with Wang Weining, Captain of the Social Training Corps, and Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Garrison Command, as deputies. At 6:00 PM, the Garrison Command held an emergency meeting ordering all government agencies and organizations in the city to be ready for evacuation at any moment. By around 10:15 PM, all urban police posts had withdrawn. Around 2:00 AM (November 13), a false report circulated that "Japanese troops have reached Xinhe" . Firefighters stationed at various locations rushed out with kerosene-fueled devices, burning everything in sight, shops and houses alike. In an instant, Changsha became a sea of flames. The blaze raged for 72 hours. The Hunan Province Anti-Japanese War Loss Statistics, compiled by the Hunan Provincial Government Statistics Office of the Kuomintang, report that the fire inflicted economic losses of more than 1 billion yuan, a sum equivalent to about 1.7 trillion yuan after the victory in the war. This figure represented roughly 43% of Changsha's total economic value at the time. Regarding casualties, contemporary sources provide varying figures. A Xinhua Daily report from November 20, 1938 noted that authorities mobilized manpower to bury more than 600 bodies, though the total number of burned remains could not be precisely counted. A Central News Agency reporter on November 19 stated that in the Xiangyuan fire, more than 2,000 residents could not escape, and most of the bodies had already been buried. There are further claims that in the Changsha Fire, more than 20,000 residents were burned to death. In terms of displacement, Changsha's population before the fire was about 300,000, and by November 12, 90% had been evacuated. After the fire, authorities registered 124,000 victims, including 815 orphans sheltered in Lito and Maosgang.  Building damage constituted the other major dimension of the catastrophe, with the greatest losses occurring to residential houses, shops, schools, factories, government offices, banks, hospitals, newspaper offices, warehouses, and cultural and entertainment venues, as well as numerous historic buildings such as palaces, temples, private gardens, and the former residences of notable figures; among these, residential and commercial structures suffered the most, followed by factories and schools. Inspector Gao Yihan, who conducted a post-fire investigation, observed that the prosperous areas within Changsha's ring road, including Nanzheng Street and Bajiaoting, were almost completely destroyed, and in other major markets only a handful of shops remained, leading to an overall estimate that surviving or stalemated houses were likely less than 20%. Housing and street data from the early post-liberation period reveal that Changsha had more than 1,100 streets and alleys; of these, more than 690 were completely burned and more than 330 had fewer than five surviving houses, accounting for about 29%, with nearly 90% of the city's streets severely damaged. More than 440 streets were not completely destroyed, but among these, over 190 had only one or two houses remaining and over 130 had only three or four houses remaining; about 60 streets, roughly 6% had 30 to 40 surviving houses, around 30 streets, 3% had 11 to 20 houses, 10 streets, 1% had 21 to 30 houses, and three streets ) had more than 30 houses remaining. Housing statistics from 1952 show that 2,538 houses survived the fire, about 6.57% of the city's total housing stock, with private houses totaling 305,800 square meters and public houses 537,900 square meters. By 1956, the surviving area of both private and public housing totaled 843,700 square meters, roughly 12.3% of the city's total housing area at that time. Alongside these losses, all equipment, materials, funds, goods, books, archives, antiques, and cultural relics that had not been moved were also destroyed.  At the time of the Changsha Fire, Zhou Enlai, then Deputy Minister of the Political Department of the Nationalist Government's Military Commission, was in Changsha alongside Ye Jianying, Guo Moruo, and others. On November 12, 1938, Zhou Enlai attended a meeting held by Changsha cultural groups at Changsha Normal School to commemorate Sun Yat-sen's 72nd birthday. Guo Moruo later recalled that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were awakened by the blaze that night; they each carried a suitcase and evacuated to Xiangtan, with Zhou reportedly displaying considerable indignation at the sudden, unprovoked fire. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai rushed back to Changsha and, together with Chen Cheng, Zhang Zhizhong, and others, inspected the disaster. He mobilized personnel from three departments, with Tian Han and Guo Moruo at the forefront, to form the Changsha Fire Aftermath Task Force, which began debris clearance, care for the injured, and the establishment of soup kitchens. A few days later, on the 22nd, the Hunan Provincial Government established the Changsha Fire Temporary Relief Committee to coordinate relief efforts.  On the night of November 16, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Changsha and, the next day, ascended Tianxin Pavilion. Sha Wei, head of the Cultural Relics Section of the Changsha Tianxin Pavilion Park Management Office, and a long-time researcher of the pavilion, explained that documentation indicates Chiang Kai-shek, upon seeing the city largely reduced to scorched earth with little left intact, grew visibly angry. After descending from Tianxin Pavilion, Chiang immediately ordered the arrest of Changsha Garrison Commander Feng Ti, Changsha Police Chief Wen Chongfu, and Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment Xu Kun, and arranged a military trial with a two-day deadline. The interrogation began at 7:00 a.m. on November 18. Liang Xiaojin records that Xu Kun and Wen Chongfu insisted their actions followed orders from the Security Command, while Feng Ti admitted negligence and violations of procedure, calling his acts unforgivable. The trial found Feng Ti to be the principal offender, with Wen Chongfu and Xu Kun as accomplices, and sentenced all three to prison terms of varying lengths. The verdict was sent to Chiang Kai-shek for approval, who was deeply dissatisfied and personally annotated the drafts: he asserted that Feng Ti, as the city's security head, was negligent and must be shot immediately; Wen Chongfu, as police chief, disobeyed orders and fled, and must be shot immediately; Xu Kun, for neglect of duty, must be shot immediately. The court then altered the arson charge in the verdict to "insulting his duty and harming the people" in line with Chiang's instructions. Chiang Kai-shek, citing "failure to supervise personnel and precautions," dismissed Zhang from his post, though he remained in office to oversee aftermath operations. Zhang Zhizhong later recalled Chiang Kai-shek's response after addressing the Changsha fire: a pointed admission that the fundamental cause lay not with a single individual but with the collective leadership's mistakes, and that the error must be acknowledged as a collective failure. All eyes now shifted to the new center of resistance, Chongqing, the temporary capital. Chiang's "Free China" no longer meant the whole country; it now encompassed Sichuan, Hunan, and Henan, but not Jiangsu or Zhejiang. The eastern provinces were effectively lost, along with China's major customs revenues, the country's most fertile regions, and its most advanced infrastructure. The center of political gravity moved far to the west, into a country the Nationalists had never controlled, where everything was unfamiliar and unpredictable, from topography and dialects to diets. On the map, it might have seemed that Chiang still ruled much of China, but vast swaths of the north and northwest were sparsely populated; most of China's population lay in the east and south, where Nationalist control was either gone or held only precariously. The combined pressures of events and returning travelers were gradually shifting American attitudes toward the Japanese incident. Europe remained largely indifferent, with Hitler absorbing most attention, but the United States began to worry about developments in the Pacific. Roosevelt initiated a January 1939 appeal to raise a million dollars for Chinese civilians in distress, and the response quickly materialized. While the Chinese did not expect direct intervention, they hoped to deter further American economic cooperation with Japan and to halt Japan's purchases of scrap iron, oil, gasoline, shipping, and, above all, weapons from the United States. Public opinion in America was sufficiently stirred to sustain a campaign against silk stockings, a symbolic gesture of boycott that achieved limited effect; Japan nonetheless continued to procure strategic materials. Within this chorus, the left remained a persistent but often discordant ally to the Nationalists. The Institute of Pacific Relations, sympathetic to communist aims, urged America to act, pressuring policymakers and sounding alarms about China. Yet the party line remained firmly pro-Chiang Kai-shek: the Japanese advance seemed too rapid and threatening to the Reds' interests. Most oil and iron debates stalled; American businessmen resented British trade ties with Japan, and Britain refused to join any mutual cutoff, arguing that the Western powers were not at war with Japan. What occurred in China was still commonly referred to in Western diplomatic circles as "the Incident." Wang Jingwei's would make his final defection, yes in a long ass history of defections. Mr Wang Jingwei had been very busy traveling to Guangzhou, then Northwest to speak with Feng Yuxiang, many telegrams went back and forth. He returned to the Nationalist government showing his face to foreign presses and so forth. While other prominent rivals of Chiang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and others, rallied when they perceived Japan as a real threat; all did so except Wang Jingwei. Wang, who had long believed himself the natural heir to Sun Yat-sen and who had repeatedly sought to ascend to power, seemed willing to cooperate with Japan if it served his own aims. I will just say it, Wang Jingwei was a rat. He had always been a rat, never changed. Opinions on Chiang Kai-Shek vary, but I think almost everyone can agree Wang Jingwei was one of the worst characters of this time period. Now Wang Jingwei could not distinguish between allies and enemies and was prepared to accept help from whomever offered it, believing he could outmaneuver Tokyo when necessary. Friends in Shanghai and abroad whispered that it was not too late to influence events, arguing that the broader struggle was not merely China versus Japan but a clash between principled leaders and a tyrannical, self-serving clique, Western imperialism's apologists who needed Chiang removed. For a time Wang drifted within the Kuomintang, moving between Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, and Chongqing, maintaining discreet lines of communication with his confidants. The Japanese faced a governance problem typical of conquerors who possess conquered territory: how to rule effectively while continuing the war. They imagined Asia under Japanese-led leadership, an East Asia united by a shared Co-Prosperity Sphere but divided by traditional borders. To sustain this vision, they sought local leaders who could cooperate. The search yielded few viable options; would-be collaborators were soon assassinated, proved incompetent, or proved corrupt. The Japanese concluded it would require more time and education. In the end, Wang Jingwei emerged as a preferred figure. Chongqing, meanwhile, seemed surprised by Wang's ascent. He had moved west to Chengde, then to Kunming, attempted, and failed to win over Yunnan's warlords, and eventually proceeded to Hanoi in Indochina, arriving in Hong Kong by year's end. He sent Chiang Kai-shek a telegram suggesting acceptance of Konoe's terms for peace, which Chungking rejected. In time, Wang would establish his own Kuomintang faction in Shanghai, combining rigorous administration with pervasive secret-police activity characteristic of occupied regimes. By 1940, he would be formally installed as "Chairman of China." But that is a story for another episode.  In the north, the Japanese and the CCP were locked in an uneasy stalemate. Mao's army could make it impossible for the Japanese to hold deep countryside far from the railway lines that enabled mass troop movement into China's interior. Yet the Communists could not defeat the occupiers. In the dark days of October 1938—fifteen months after the war began—one constant remained. Observers (Chinese businessmen, British diplomats, Japanese generals) repeatedly predicted that each new disaster would signal the end of Chinese resistance and force a swift surrender, or at least a negotiated settlement in which the government would accept harsher terms from Tokyo. But even after defenders were expelled from Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan, despite the terrifying might Japan had brought to bear on Chinese resistance, and despite the invader's manpower, technology, and resources, China continued to fight. Yet it fought alone. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a land shredded by war, Wuhan burned under brutal sieges, then Changsha followed, a cruel blaze born of orders and miscommunications. Leaders wrestled with retreat, scorched-earth vows, and moral debts as Japanese force and Chinese resilience clashed for months. Mao urged strategy over martyrdom, Wang Jingwei's scheming shadow loomed, and Chongqing rose as the westward beacon. Yet China endured, a stubborn flame refusing to surrender to the coming storm. The war stretched on, unfinished and unyielding.

Send us a textToday, we cover the enormous role that women played in the two Russian Revolutions of the early 20th century. Support the show

What does cybersecurity look like beyond Earth's atmosphere? That's the question at the heart of this conversation with Kristiina Omri, Vice President of Special Programs at CybExer Technologies, and Aare Reintam, the company's COO. We met in Tallinn on the eve of the Software Defined Space Conference to explore how Estonia, in collaboration with the European Space Agency, is helping define the future of space cybersecurity through the world's first Space Cyber Range. The story begins unexpectedly—with a childhood memory of marmalade in a tube, the same kind sent to Soviet astronauts in orbit. For Aare Reintam, that small detail became the first spark of fascination with space, one that decades later evolved into CybExer's partnership with ESA. Together they've created a digital testing environment where satellites, ground stations, and communication protocols can be stress-tested for cyber resilience long before launch.  It's a bold move in an era when satellites underpin everything from GPS and precision farming to air travel and climate observation, yet often rely on decades-old technology vulnerable to attack. Kristiina Omri explains how the Space Cyber Range replicates real-world missions, allowing engineers and analysts to train under simulated attack conditions that feel indistinguishable from their actual control systems. The range combines the precision of digital twins with the competitive intensity of cyber exercises, preparing teams for threats that can ripple from orbit to everyday life on Earth. The conversation covers everything from the growing space-debris crisis to the global shortage of cybersecurity professionals, and the urgent need to blend space engineering with cyber education. We also discuss the deeper strategic implications. What happens when quantum computing enters the battlefield? How should Europe prepare for the convergence of cyber and kinetic threats in orbit? And what lessons can be learned from Estonia's leadership in NATO cyber defense as it extends that expertise to the stars? By the end of the discussion, one theme stands out clearly: the future of cybersecurity is no longer confined to our planet. From digital twins to orbital trust networks, CybExer Technologies and the European Space Agency are proving that the next frontier for cyber readiness lies in space itself.

Echoes of 1919: How Underestimating the PLA After Tiananmen Created a Strategic Failure. Jim Fanell and Brad Thayer connect the current geopolitical threat posed by the PLA Navy to past strategic failures, drawing an analogy to the British Empire's "10-year rule" instituted in 1919. The US made a similar miscalculation regarding China after the brutal Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, as the US Navy and Pacific Command did not perceive any threat from the PRC. Fanell, who worked at the US Joint Intelligence Center Pacific from 1989 to 1991, confirms that intelligence focused on the Soviet threat, and China did not become a priority until around 2014 or 2015. Following Tiananmen, the US should have highlighted the Chinese Communist Party as a "sadistic monster," but instead the George H.W. Bush administration rushed to repair the relationship. Thayer emphasizes that US leaders in 1989 had a great understanding of communism's evils, but this understanding has since faded, and China is now incorrectly viewed as a capitalist state. Deng Xiaoping learned from Tiananmen and the Soviet collapse, focusing on economic reform while establishing a relationship of dependence between US business and the CCP.

U.S. veteran Nathan Cruz (or Cruise) allegedly called police on Antifa rioters in Poulsbo, WA, but was stalked, raided, and committed to a psychiatric facility without charges or due process, described as Soviet-style tyranny by a "Bolshevik machine." The text frames this as part of a ZOG-occupied regime weaponizing government branches against Americans, orchestrated from Rothschild and Knesset influences, tying in Michelle Obama's "anti-white" narratives, Trump's nuke threats, Israel's "genocide," and a globalist cabal enforcing Noahide laws; calls for fighting back via constitutional remedies.   Western civilization has been infected by a parasitic invasion of foreign ideals and values that have been introduced into our culture by strange and morally degenerate people whose goal is world domination. We have been OCCUPIED. Watch the film NOW! https://stewpeters.com/occupied/ Stop the Tricks. $20 off for your first year. The government's tricking you, but we're treating you with real information and big savings. Sign up today and don't miss what they don't want you to know.

-Rob kicks off Halloween confessing that life as a single guy means one load of laundry, one dishwasher cycle, and a fridge full of mystery leftovers. -He dives into Operation Arctic Frost — a saga he describes as “Soviet crap,” accusing Jack Smith and the FBI of turning politics into an episode of Cold Case: MAGA Edition. -Later, critic Christian Toto calls in on the Newsmax Hotline for a Halloween chat about Kamala Harris's “word salad,” Jon Stewart's selective outrage, and why comedian Matt Rife roasting everyone is actually inclusive. Today's podcast is sponsored by : BEAM DREAM POWDER : Improve your health by improving your sleep! Get 40% off by using code NEWSMAX at http://shopbeam.com/NewsmaxGET FRESH OLIVE OIL : Try real farm fresh olive oils for FREE plus $1 dollar shipping at http://GetFreshRobCarson.comBIRCH GOLD - Protect and grow your retirement savings with gold. Text ROB to 98 98 98 for your FREE information kit! To call in and speak with Rob Carson live on the show, dial 1-800-922-6680 between the hours of 12 Noon and 3:00 pm Eastern Time Monday through Friday…E-mail Rob Carson at : RobCarsonShow@gmail.com Musical parodies provided by Jim Gossett (www.patreon.com/JimGossettComedy) Listen to Newsmax LIVE and see our entire podcast lineup at http://Newsmax.com/Listen Make the switch to NEWSMAX today! Get your 15 day free trial of NEWSMAX+ at http://NewsmaxPlus.com Looking for NEWSMAX caps, tees, mugs & more? Check out the Newsmax merchandise shop at : http://nws.mx/shop Follow NEWSMAX on Social Media:  -Facebook: http://nws.mx/FB  -X/Twitter: http://nws.mx/twitter -Instagram: http://nws.mx/IG -YouTube: https://youtube.com/NewsmaxTV -Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/NewsmaxTV -TRUTH Social: https://truthsocial.com/@NEWSMAX -GETTR: https://gettr.com/user/newsmax -Threads: http://threads.net/@NEWSMAX  -Telegram: http://t.me/newsmax  -BlueSky: https://bsky.app/profile/newsmax.com -Parler: http://app.parler.com/newsmax Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Katsiaryna Shmatsina, Eurasia Fellow at Lawfare, sits down with Gabrielius Landsbergis, former Lithuanian Foreign Minister (2020–2024), now a visiting fellow at Stanford University, and Vytis Jurkonis, Associate Professor at Vilnius University and Director of Freedom House's Lithuania office.They discuss Lithuania's response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including shifts in security policy, public sentiment, and military readiness. The conversation covers regional defense, U.S.–Lithuania relations, NATO's role, and growing concerns about possible escalation into the Baltic region. They also reflect on Lithuania's path from Soviet occupation to independence and its integration into NATO and the EU.Additional resources on this topic:Read more from GabrieliusRead more from Katsiaryna on the U.S. administration's deal with Belarusian regimeRelated: Regional threat assessment of Russian military buildup near NATO bordersTo receive ad-free podcasts, become a Lawfare Material Supporter at www.patreon.com/lawfare. You can also support Lawfare by making a one-time donation at https://givebutter.com/lawfare-institute.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.