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SHOW SCHEDULE 3-11-20261906 SF ON FIRE AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE.1. SEG 1: Gordon Chang and Peter Huessy discuss China's petroleum reserves and rising fuel prices. They analyze the potential for nuclear escalation and Iran's efforts to disrupt global trade through the Strait of Hormuz. (1)2. SEG 2: Rebecca Grant and Gordon Chang analyze the US Navy's carrier shortage. The USS Nimitz remains active for Latin American exercises while the USS Gerald R. Ford faces a prolonged 11-month combat deployment. (2)3. SEG 3: Alan Tonelson and Gordon Chang discuss China's failure to stop fentanyl precursor exports. They evaluate tariffs as non-military tools to pressure nations while addressing war-related shortages in fertilizer and electronics components. (3)4. SEG 4: Bill Roggio details the tragic US missile strike on an Iranian girl's school. He argues that while air strikes destroy military assets, air power alone cannot achieve regime change or ensure final victory. (4)5. SEG 5: Jack Burnham analyzes China's "lukewarm" support for Iran and its focus on energy security. Beijing is learning lessons from Western precision strikes while continuing internal repression of ethnic minorities through forced labor. (5)6. SEG 6: Jack Burnham reports on the DOJ dropping charges against Chinese scientists accused of smuggling biological samples. This reversal, involving the Chinese consulate, may be linked to upcoming trade negotiations or prosecutorial challenges. (6)7. SEG 7: Kevin Fraser warns that state legislatures are rushing to regulate AI with potentially unconstitutional laws. He advocates for market-driven transparency and allowing consumers to choose models based on their specific needs and preferences. (7)8. SEG 8: Kevin Fraser explores distinctions between AI models like Grok and Claude. He highlights regulatory "sandboxes" in states like Utah and Montana that foster innovation while monitoring for potential technological harms and ensuring transparency. (8)9. SEG 9: Michael Bernstam explains how the American shale revolution mitigates global energy shocks. He warns central banks against fueling inflation and emphasizes that while global supply chains are vulnerable, US production provides a critical buffer. (9)10. SEG 10: Michael Bernstam discusses how rising oil prices bolster Russia's budget. However, the Russian economy faces contraction and "military Keynesianism," while the United States remains a resilient net energy exporter despite global supply chain disruptions. (10)11. SEG 11: Ivana Stradner examines the Kremlin's information warfare campaign to keep Viktor Orbán in power. Orbán, formerly an anti-Soviet activist, now aligns with Putin to ensure political survival and counter Western democratic decision-making processes. (11)12. SEG 12: Ivana Stradner outlines strategies to counter Russian influence in Hungary, including exposing Orbán's corruption and ties to China. She argues that information is a potent, invisible weapon used to polarize and weaken the West. (12)13. SEG 13: Simon Constable reports on skyrocketing European energy prices due to Middle East conflict. Shortages in sulfur and bromine threaten global semiconductor manufacturing and food security as fertilizer costs nearly double for struggling farmers. (13)14. SEG 14: Simon Constable critiques Prime Minister Keir Starmer's hesitant leadership. He notes the Royal Navy has been "hollowed out" over three decades, leaving Britain with fewer warships than France and a tiny, underfunded standing army. (14)15. SEG 15: Bob Zimmerman discusses the Senate's shift toward private space exploration, potentially ending the SLS program. NASA is increasingly contracting commercial entities for lunar habitats, reusable rockets, and specialized satellite launch capabilities to reduce costs. (15)16. SEG 16: Bob Zimmerman reviews the DART mission's success in altering an asteroid's orbit. He also reports that the European Space Agency lost contact with a solar probe after its batteries drained due to misaligned solar panels. (16)

11. SEG 11: Ivana Stradner examines the Kremlin's information warfare campaign to keep Viktor Orbán in power. Orbán, formerly an anti-Soviet activist, now aligns with Putin to ensure political survival and counter Western democratic decision-making processes. (11)1956 HUNGARY ARMED REBELLION

The Soviet-born associate of Rudy Giuliani was there for many of Trump's dealings with Putin- what does he think is going on behind the scenes? And- did talking to Putin make Trump back down on Iran?See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Production Designer Sara K White (Emmy-nominated for The Flight Attendant) joins Decorating Pages to break down the production design of Peacock's Ponies—a 1970s spy series built through color, texture, ceilings, and period logistics that would break a normal person.In this episode: the CIA “bubble” room design inspired by sound baffles, a women-forward Soviet beauty salon sequence, and the Kombromat surveillance facility—a tunnel maze filled with 70+ matching 1970s TVs that took months to source.

3. Headline: The Tragic Search for the Italia Guest Author: Mark PiesingSummary: Following the Italia crash, a massive rescue effort unfolds, including Roald Amundsen's fatal flight into a cloud bank. Piesing details Nobile's controversial decision to be rescued first, his crew's eventual survival via a Soviet icebreaker, and the reputation-destroying confrontation with Mussolini. (19)

Last time we spoke about the end of the battle of khalkin gol. In the summer of 1939, the Nomonhan Incident escalated into a major border conflict between Soviet-Mongolian forces and Japan's Kwantung Army along the Halha River. Despite Japanese successes in July, Zhukov launched a decisive offensive on August 20. Under cover of darkness, Soviet troops crossed the river, unleashing over 200 bombers and intense artillery barrages that devastated Japanese positions. Zhukov's northern, central, and southern forces encircled General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, supported by Manchukuoan units. Fierce fighting ensued: the southern flank collapsed under Colonel Potapov's armor, while the northern Fui Heights held briefly before falling to relentless assaults, including flame-throwing tanks. Failed Japanese counterattacks on August 24 resulted in heavy losses, with regiments shattered by superior Soviet firepower and tactics. By August 25, encircled pockets were systematically eliminated, leading to the annihilation of the Japanese 6th Army. The defeat, coinciding with the Hitler-Stalin Pact, forced Japan to negotiate a ceasefire on September 15-16, redrawing borders. Zhukov's victory exposed Japanese weaknesses in mechanized warfare, influencing future strategies and deterring further northern expansion.   #192 The Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Despite the fact this technically will go into future events, I thought it was important we talk about a key moment in Sino history. Even though the battle of changkufeng and khalkin gol were not part of the second sino-Japanese war, their outcomes certainly would affect it.  Policymaking by the Soviet Union alone was not the primary factor in ending Moscow's diplomatic isolation in the late 1930s. After the Munich Conference signaled the failure of the popular front/united front approach, Neville Chamberlain, Adolf Hitler, and Poland's Józef Beck unintentionally strengthened Joseph Stalin's position in early 1939. Once the strategic cards were in his hands, Stalin capitalized on them. His handling of negotiations with Britain and France, as well as with Germany, from April to August was deft and effective. The spring and summer negotiations among the European powers are well documented and have been examined from many angles. In May 1939, while Stalin seemed to have the upper hand in Europe, yet before Hitler had signaled that a German–Soviet agreement might be possible, the Nomonhan incident erupted, a conflict initiated and escalated by the Kwantung Army. For a few months, the prospect of a Soviet–Japanese war revived concerns in Moscow about a two-front conflict. Reviewing Soviet talks with Britain, France, and Germany in the spring and summer of 1939 from an East Asian perspective sheds fresh light on the events that led to the German–Soviet Nonaggression Pact and, more broadly, to the outbreak of World War II. The second week of May marked the start of fighting at Nomonhan, during which negotiations between Germany and the USSR barely advanced beyond mutual scrutiny. Moscow signaled that an understanding with Nazi Germany might be possible. Notably, on May 4, the removal of Maksim Litvinov as foreign commissar and his replacement by Vyacheslav Molotov suggested a shift in approach. Litvinov, an urbane diplomat of Jewish origin and married to an Englishwoman, had been the leading Soviet proponent of the united-front policy and a steadfast critic of Nazi Germany. If a settlement with Hitler was sought, Litvinov was an unsuitable figure to lead the effort. Molotov, though with limited international experience, carried weight as chairman of the Council of Ministers and, more importantly, as one of Stalin's closest lieutenants. This personnel change seemed to accomplish its aim in Berlin, where the press was instructed on May 5 to halt polemical attacks on the Soviet Union and Bolshevism. On the same day, Karl Schnurre, head of the German Foreign Ministry's East European trade section, told Soviet chargé d'affaires Georgi Astakhov that Skoda, the German-controlled Czech arms manufacturer, would honor existing arms contracts with Russia. Astakhov asked whether, with Litvinov's departure, Germany might resume negotiations for a trade treaty Berlin had halted months earlier. By May 17, during discussions with Schnurre, Astakhov asserted that "there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and the Soviet Union and that there was no reason for enmity between the two countries," and that Britain and France's negotiations appeared unpromising. The next day, Ribbentrop personally instructed Schulenburg to green-light trade talks. Molotov, however, insisted that a "political basis" for economic negotiations had to be established first. Suspicion remained high on both sides. Stalin feared Berlin might use reports of German–Soviet talks to destabilize a potential triple alliance with Britain and France; Hitler feared Stalin might use such reports to entice Tokyo away from an anti-German pact. The attempt to form a tripartite military alliance among Germany, Italy, and Japan foundered over divergent aims: Berlin targeted Britain and France; Tokyo aimed at the Soviet Union. Yet talks persisted through August 1939, with Japanese efforts to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alignment continually reported to Moscow by Richard Sorge. Hitler and Mussolini, frustrated by Japanese objections, first concluded the bilateral Pact of Steel on May 22. The next day, Hitler, addressing his generals, stressed the inevitability of war with Poland and warned that opposition from Britain would be crushed militarily. He then hinted that Russia might "prove disinterested in the destruction of Poland," suggesting closer ties with Japan if Moscow opposed Germany. The exchange was quickly leaked to the press. Five days later, the first pitched battle of the Nomonhan campaign began. Although Hitler's timing with the Yamagata detachment's foray was coincidental, Moscow may have found the coincidence ominous. Despite the inducement of Molotov's call for a political basis before economic talks, Hitler and Ribbentrop did not immediately respond. On June 14, Astakhov signaled to Parvan Draganov, Bulgaria's ambassador in Berlin, that the USSR faced three options: ally with Britain and France, continue inconclusive talks with them, or align with Germany, the latter being closest to Soviet desires. Draganov relayed to the German Foreign Ministry that Moscow preferred a non-aggression agreement if Germany would pledge not to attack the Soviet Union. Two days later, Schulenburg told Astakhov that Germany recognized the link between economic and political relations and was prepared for far-reaching talks, a view echoed by Ribbentrop. The situation remained tangled: the Soviets pursued overt talks with Britain and France, while Stalin sought to maximize Soviet leverage. Chamberlain's stance toward Moscow remained wary but recognized a "psychological value" to an Anglo–Soviet rapprochement, tempered by his insistence on a hard bargain. American ambassador William C. Bullitt urged London to avoid the appearance of pursuing the Soviets, a view that resonated with Chamberlain's own distrust. Public confidence in a real Anglo–Soviet alliance remained low. By July 19, cabinet minutes show Chamberlain could not quite believe a genuine Russia–Germany alliance was possible, though he recognized the necessity of negotiations with Moscow to deter Hitler and to mollify an increasingly skeptical British public. Despite reservations, both sides kept the talks alive. Stalin's own bargaining style, with swift Soviet replies but frequent questions and demands, often produced delays. Molotov pressed on questions such as whether Britain and France would pledge to defend the Baltic states, intervene if Japan attacked the USSR, or join in opposing Germany if Hitler pressured Poland or Romania. These considerations were not trivial; they produced extended deliberations. On July 23, Molotov demanded that plans for coordinated military action among the three powers be fleshed out before a political pact. Britain and France accepted most political terms, and an Anglo-French military mission arrived in Moscow on August 11. The British commander, Admiral Sir Reginald Plunket-Ernle-Erle-Drax, conducted staff talks but could not conclude a military agreement. The French counterpart, General Joseph Doumenc, could sign but not bind his government. By then, Hitler had set August 26 as the date for war with Poland. With that looming, Hitler pressed for Soviet neutrality, or closer cooperation. In July and August, secret German–Soviet negotiations favored the Germans, who pressed for a rapid settlement and made most concessions. Yet Stalin benefited from keeping the British and French engaged, creating leverage against Hitler and safeguarding a potential Anglo–Soviet option as a fallback. To lengthen the talks and avoid immediate resolution, Moscow emphasized the Polish issue. Voroshilov demanded the Red Army be allowed to operate through Polish territory to defend Poland, a demand Warsaw would never accept. Moscow even floated a provocative plan: if Britain and France could compel Poland to permit Baltic State naval operations, the Western fleets would occupy Baltic ports, an idea that would have been militarily perilous and diplomatically explosive. Despite this, Stalin sought an agreement with Germany. Through Richard Sorge's intelligence, Moscow knew Tokyo aimed to avoid large-scale war with the USSR, and Moscow pressed for a German–Soviet settlement, including a nonaggression pact and measures to influence Japan to ease Sino–Japanese tensions. On August 16, Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to urge Molotov and Stalin toward a nonaggression pact and to coordinate with Japan. Stalin signaled willingness, and August 23–24 saw the drafting of the pact and the collapse of the Soviet and Japanese resistance elsewhere. That night, in a memorandum of Ribbentrop's staff, seven topics were summarized, with Soviet–Japanese relations and Molotov's insistence that Berlin demonstrate good faith standing out. Ribbentrop reiterated his willingness to influence Japan for a more favorable Soviet–Japanese relationship, and Stalin's reply indicated a path toward a détente in the East alongside the European agreement: "M. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese provocations. If Japan desired war she could have it. The Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace—so much the better! M. Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union."  Second, the assertion that the Soviet Union was prepared for and unafraid of war with Japan is an overstatement, though Stalin certainly had grounds for optimism regarding the battlefield situation and the broader East Asian strategic balance. It is notable that, despite the USSR's immediate diplomatic and military gains against Japan, Stalin remained anxious to conceal from Tokyo any peace initiative that originated in Moscow. That stance suggests that Tokyo or Hsinking might read such openness as a sign of Soviet weakness or confidence overextended. The Japanese danger, it would seem, did not disappear from Stalin's mind. Even at the height of his diplomatic coup, Stalin was determined not to burn bridges prematurely. On August 21, while he urged Hitler to send Ribbentrop to Moscow, he did not sever talks with Britain and France. Voroshilov requested a temporary postponement on the grounds that Soviet delegation officers were needed for autumn maneuvers. It was not until August 25, after Britain reiterated its resolve to stand by Poland despite the German–Soviet pact, that Stalin sent the Anglo–French military mission home. Fortified by the nonaggression pact, which he hoped would deter Britain and France from action, Hitler unleashed his army on Poland on September 1. Two days later, as Zhukov's First Army Group was completing its operations at Nomonhan, Hitler faced a setback when Britain and France declared war. Hitler had hoped to finish Poland quickly in 1939 and avoid fighting Britain and France until 1940. World War II in Europe had begun. The Soviet–Japanese conflict at Nomonhan was not the sole, nor even the principal, factor prompting Stalin to conclude an alliance with Hitler. Standing aside from a European war that could fracture the major capitalist powers might have been reason enough. Yet the conflict with Japan in the East was also a factor in Stalin's calculations, a dimension that has received relatively little attention in standard accounts of the outbreak of the war. This East Asian focus seeks to clarify the record without proposing a revolutionary reinterpretation of Soviet foreign policy; rather, it adds an important piece often overlooked in the "origins of the Second World War" puzzle, helping to reduce the overall confusion. The German–Soviet agreement provided for the Soviet occupation of the eastern half of Poland soon after Germany's invasion. On September 3, just forty-eight hours after the invasion and on the day Britain and France declared war, Ribbentrop urged Moscow to invade Poland from the east. Yet, for two more weeks, Poland's eastern frontier remained inviolate; Soviet divisions waited at the border, as most Polish forces were engaged against Germany. The German inquiries about the timing of the Soviet invasion continued, but the Red Army did not move. This inactivity is often attributed to Stalin's caution and suspicion, but that caution extended beyond Europe. Throughout early September, sporadic ground and air combat continued at Nomonhan, including significant activity by Kwantung Army forces on September 8–9, and large-scale air engagements on September 1–2, 4–5, and 14–15. Not until September 15 was the Molotov–Togo cease-fire arrangement finalized, to take effect on September 16. The very next morning, September 17, the Red Army crossed the Polish frontier into a country collapsed at its feet. It appears that Stalin wanted to ensure that fighting on his eastern flank had concluded before engaging in Western battles, avoiding a two-front war. Through such policies, Stalin avoided the disaster of a two-front war. Each principal in the 1939 diplomatic maneuvering pursued distinct objectives. The British sought an arrangement with the USSR that would deter Hitler from attacking Poland and, if deterred, bind Moscow to the Anglo–French alliance. Hitler sought an alliance with the USSR to deter Britain and France from aiding Poland and, if they did aid Poland, to secure Soviet neutrality. Japan sought a military alliance with Germany against the USSR, or failing that, stronger Anti-Comintern ties. Stalin aimed for an outcome in which Germany would fight the Western democracies, leaving him freedom to operate in both the West and East; failing that, he sought military reassurance from Britain and France in case he had to confront Germany. Of the four, only Stalin achieved his primary objective. Hitler secured his secondary objective; the British and Japanese failed to realize theirs. Stalin won the diplomatic contest in 1939. Yet, as diplomats gave way to generals, the display of German military power in Poland and in Western Europe soon eclipsed Stalin's diplomatic triumph. By playing Germany against Britain and France, Stalin gained leverage and a potential fallback, but at the cost of unleashing a devastating European war. As with the aftermath of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, Russo-Japanese relations improved rapidly after hostilities ceased at Nomonhan. The Molotov–Togo agreement of September 15 and the local truces arranged around Nomonhan on September 19 were observed scrupulously by both sides. On October 27, the two nations settled another long-standing dispute by agreeing to mutual release of fishing boats detained on charges of illegal fishing in each other's territorial waters. On November 6, the USSR appointed Konstantin Smetanin as ambassador to Tokyo, replacing the previous fourteen-month tenure of a chargé d'affaires. Smetanin's first meeting with the new Japanese foreign minister, Nomura Kichisaburö, in November 1939 attracted broad, favorable coverage in the Japanese press. In a break with routine diplomatic practice, Nomura delivered a draft proposal for a new fisheries agreement and a memo outlining the functioning of the joint border commission to be established in the Nomonhan area before Smetanin presented his credentials. On December 31, an agreement finalizing Manchukuo's payment to the USSR for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway was reached, and the Soviet–Japanese Fisheries Convention was renewed for 1940. In due course, the boundary near Nomonhan was formally redefined. A November 1939 agreement between Molotov and Togo established a mixed border commission representing the four parties to the dispute. After protracted negotiations, the border commission completed its redemarcation on June 14, 1941, with new border markers erected in August 1941. The resulting boundary largely followed the Soviet–MPR position, lying ten to twelve miles east of the Halha River. With that, the Nomonhan incident was officially closed.  Kwantung Army and Red Army leaders alike sought to "teach a lesson" to their foe at Nomonhan. The refrain recurs in documents and memoirs from both sides, "we must teach them a lesson." The incident provided lessons for both sides, but not all were well learned. For the Red Army, the lessons of Nomonhan intertwined with the laurels of victory, gratifying but sometimes distracting. Georgy Zhukov grasped the experience of modern warfare that summer, gaining more than a raised profile: command experience, confidence, and a set of hallmarks he would employ later. He demonstrated the ability to grasp complex strategic problems quickly, decisive crisis leadership, meticulous attention to logistics and deception, patience in building superior strength before striking at the enemy's weakest point, and the coordination of massed artillery, tanks, mechanized infantry, and tactical air power in large-scale double envelopment. These capabilities informed his actions at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and ultimately Berlin. It is tempting to wonder how Zhukov might have fared in the crucial autumn and winter of 1941 without Nomonhan, or whether he would have been entrusted with the Moscow front in 1941 had he not distinguished himself at Nomonhan. Yet the Soviet High Command overlooked an important lesson. Despite Zhukov's successes with independent tank formations and mechanized infantry, the command misapplied Spanish Civil War-era experience by disbanding armored divisions and redistributing tanks to infantry units to serve as support. It was not until after Germany demonstrated tank warfare in 1940 that the Soviets began reconstituting armored divisions and corps, a process still incomplete when the 1941 invasion began. The Red Army's performance at Nomonhan went largely unseen in the West. Western intelligence and military establishments largely believed the Red Army was fundamentally rotten, a view reinforced by the battlefield's remoteness and by both sides' reluctance to publicize the defeat. The Polish crisis and the outbreak of war in Europe drew attention away from Nomonhan, and the later Finnish Winter War reinforced negative Western judgments of Soviet military capability. U.S. military attaché Raymond Faymonville observed that the Soviets, anticipating a quick victory over Finland, relied on hastily summoned reserves ill-suited for winter fighting—an assessment that led some to judge the Red Army by its performance at Nomonhan. Even in Washington, this view persisted; Hitler reportedly called the Red Army "a paralytic on crutches" after Finland and then ordered invasion planning in 1941. Defeat can be a stronger teacher than victory. Because Nomonhan was a limited war, Japan's defeat was likewise limited, and its impact on Tokyo did not immediately recalibrate Japanese assessments. Yet Nomonhan did force Japan to revise its estimation of Soviet strength: the Imperial Army abandoned its strategic Plan Eight-B and adopted a more defensive posture toward the Soviet Union. An official inquiry into the debacle, submitted November 29, 1939, recognized Soviet superiority in materiel and firepower and urged Japan to bolster its own capabilities. The Kwantung Army's leadership, chastened, returned to the frontier with a more realistic sense of capability, even as the Army Ministry and AGS failed to translate lessons into policy. The enduring tendency toward gekokujo, the dominance of local and mid-level officers over central authority, remained persistent, and Tokyo did not fully purge it after Nomonhan. The Kwantung Army's operatives who helped drive the Nomonhan episode resurfaced in key posts at Imperial General Headquarters, contributing to Japan's 1941 decision to go to war. The defeat of the Kwantung Army at Nomonhan, together with the Stalin–Hitler pact and the outbreak of war in Europe, triggered a reorientation of Japanese strategy and foreign policy. The new government, led by the politically inexperienced and cautious General Abe Nobuyuki, pursued a conservative foreign policy. Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Chongqing left the Chinese war at a stalemate: the Japanese Expeditionary Army could still inflict defeats on Chinese nationalist forces, but it had no viable path to a decisive victory. China remained Japan's principal focus. Still, the option of cutting Soviet aid to China and of moving north into Outer Mongolia and Siberia was discredited in Tokyo by the August 1939 double defeat. Northward expansion never again regained its ascendancy, though it briefly resurfaced in mid-1941 after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. Germany's alliance with the USSR during Nomonhan was viewed by Tokyo as a betrayal, cooling German–Japanese relations. Japan also stepped back from its confrontation with Britain over Tientsin. Tokyo recognized that the European war represented a momentous development that could reshape East Asia, as World War I had reshaped it before. The short-lived Abe government (September–December 1939) and its successor under Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa (December 1939–July 1940) adopted a cautious wait-and-see attitude toward the European war. That stance shifted in the summer of 1940, however, after Germany's successes in the West. With Germany's conquest of France and the Low Countries and Britain's fight for survival, Tokyo reassessed the global balance of power. Less than a year after Zhukov had effectively blocked further Japanese expansion northward, Hitler's victories seemed to open a southern expansion path. The prospect of seizing the resource-rich colonies in Southeast Asia, Dutch, French, and British and, more importantly, resolving the China problem in Japan's favor, tempted many in Tokyo. If Western aid to Chiang Kai-shek, channeled through Hong Kong, French Indochina, and Burma could be cut off, some in Tokyo believed Chiang might abandon resistance. If not, Japan could launch new operations against Chiang from Indochina and Burma, effectively turning China's southern flank. To facilitate a southward advance, Japan sought closer alignment with Germany and the USSR. Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka brought Japan into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, in the hope of neutralizing the United States, and concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union to secure calm in the north. Because of the European military situation, only the United States could check Japan's southward expansion. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appeared determined to do so and confident that he could. If the Manchurian incident and the Stimson Doctrine strained U.S.–Japanese relations, and the China War and U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek deepened mutual resentment, it was Japan's decision to press south against French, British, and Dutch colonies, and Roosevelt's resolve to prevent such a move, that put the two nations on a collision course. The dust had barely settled on the Mongolian plains following the Nomonhan ceasefire when the ripples of that distant conflict began to reshape the broader theater of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The defeat at Nomonhan in August 1939, coupled with the shocking revelation of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, delivered a profound strategic blow to Japan's imperial ambitions. No longer could Tokyo entertain serious notions of a "northern advance" into Soviet territory, a strategy that had long tantalized military planners as a means to secure resources and buffer against communism. Instead, the Kwantung Army's humiliation exposed glaring deficiencies in Japanese mechanized warfare, logistics, and intelligence, forcing a pivot southward. This reorientation not only cooled tensions with the Soviet Union but also allowed Japan to redirect its military focus toward the protracted stalemate in China. As we transition from the border clashes of the north to the heartland tensions in central China, it's essential to trace how these events propelled Japan toward the brink of a major offensive in Hunan Province, setting the stage for what would become a critical confrontation. In the immediate aftermath of Nomonhan, Japan's military high command grappled with the implications of their setback. The Kwantung Army, once a symbol of unchecked aggression, was compelled to adopt a defensive posture along the Manchurian-Soviet border. The ceasefire agreement, formalized on September 15-16, 1939, effectively neutralized the northern front, freeing up significant resources and manpower that had been tied down in the escalating border skirmishes. This was no small relief; the Nomonhan campaign had drained Japanese forces, with estimates of over 18,000 casualties and the near-total annihilation of the 23rd Division. The psychological impact was equally severe, shattering the myth of Japanese invincibility against a modern, mechanized opponent. Georgy Zhukov's masterful use of combined arms—tanks, artillery, and air power—highlighted Japan's vulnerabilities, prompting internal reviews that urged reforms in tank production, artillery doctrine, and supply chains. Yet, these lessons were slow to implement, and in the short term, the primary benefit was the opportunity to consolidate efforts elsewhere. For Japan, "elsewhere" meant China, where the war had devolved into a grinding attrition since the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. The capture of Wuhan, a major transportation hub and temporary capital of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, had been hailed as a turning point. Japanese forces, under the command of General Shunroku Hata, had pushed deep into central China, aiming to decapitate Chinese resistance. However, Chiang's strategic retreat to Chongqing transformed the conflict into a war of endurance. Nationalist forces, bolstered by guerrilla tactics and international aid, harassed Japanese supply lines and prevented a decisive knockout blow. By mid-1939, Japan controlled vast swaths of eastern and northern China, including key cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing, but the cost was immense: stretched logistics, mounting casualties, and an inability to fully pacify occupied territories. The Nomonhan defeat exacerbated these issues by underscoring the limits of Japan's military overextension. With the northern threat abated, Tokyo's Army General Staff saw an opening to intensify operations in China, hoping to force Chiang to the negotiating table before global events further complicated the picture. The diplomatic fallout from Nomonhan and the Hitler-Stalin Pact further influenced this shift. Japan's betrayal by Germany, its nominal ally under the Anti-Comintern Pact—fostered distrust and isolation. Tokyo's flirtations with a full Axis alliance stalled, as the pact with Moscow revealed Hitler's willingness to prioritize European gains over Asian solidarity. This isolation prompted Japan to reassess its priorities, emphasizing self-reliance in China while eyeing opportunistic expansions elsewhere. Domestically, the Hiranuma cabinet collapsed in August 1939 amid the diplomatic shock, paving the way for the more cautious Abe Nobuyuki government. Abe's administration, though short-lived, signaled a temporary de-escalation in aggressive posturing, but the underlying imperative to resolve the "China Incident" persisted. Japanese strategists believed that capturing additional strategic points in central China could sever Chiang's lifelines, particularly the routes funneling aid from the Soviet Union and the West via Burma and Indochina. The seismic shifts triggered by Nomonhan compelled Japan to fundamentally readjust its China policy and war plans, marking a pivotal transition from overambitious northern dreams to a more focused, albeit desperate, campaign in the south. With the Kwantung Army's defeat fresh in mind, Tokyo's Imperial General Headquarters initiated a comprehensive strategic review in late August 1939. The once-dominant "Northern Advance" doctrine, which envisioned rapid conquests into Siberia for resources like oil and minerals, was officially shelved. In its place emerged a "Southern Advance" framework, prioritizing the consolidation of gains in China and potential expansions into Southeast Asia. This pivot was not merely tactical; it reflected a profound policy recalibration aimed at ending the quagmire in China, where two years of war had yielded territorial control but no decisive victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. Central to this readjustment was a renewed emphasis on economic and military self-sufficiency. The Nomonhan debacle had exposed Japan's vulnerabilities in mechanized warfare, leading to urgent reforms in industrial production. Tank manufacturing was ramped up, with designs influenced by observed Soviet models, and artillery stockpiles were bolstered to match the firepower discrepancies seen on the Mongolian steppes. Logistically, the Army General Staff prioritized streamlining supply lines in China, recognizing that prolonged engagements demanded better resource allocation. Politically, the Abe Nobuyuki cabinet, installed in September 1939, adopted a "wait-and-see" approach toward Europe but aggressively pursued diplomatic maneuvers to isolate China. Efforts to negotiate with Wang Jingwei's puppet regime in Nanjing intensified, aiming to undermine Chiang's legitimacy and splinter Chinese resistance. Japan also pressured Vichy France for concessions in Indochina, seeking to choke off aid routes to Chongqing. War plans evolved accordingly, shifting from broad-front offensives to targeted strikes designed to disrupt Chinese command and supply networks. The China Expeditionary Army, under General Yasuji Okamura, was restructured to emphasize mobility and combined arms operations, drawing partial lessons from Zhukov's tactics. Intelligence operations were enhanced, with greater focus on infiltrating Nationalist strongholds in central provinces. By early September, plans coalesced around a major push into Hunan Province, a vital crossroads linking northern and southern China. Hunan's river systems and rail lines made it a linchpin for Chinese logistics, funneling men and materiel to the front lines. Japanese strategists identified key urban centers in the region as critical objectives, believing their capture could sever Chiang's western supply corridors and force a strategic retreat. This readjustment was not without internal friction. Hardliners in the military lamented the abandonment of northern ambitions, but the reality of Soviet strength—and the neutrality pacts that followed—left little room for debate. Economically, Japan ramped up exploitation of occupied Chinese territories, extracting coal, iron, and rice to fuel the war machine. Diplomatically, Tokyo sought to mend fences with the Soviets through the 1941 Neutrality Pact, ensuring northern security while eyes turned south. Yet, these changes brewed tension with the United States, whose embargoes on scrap metal and oil threatened to cripple Japan's ambitions. As autumn approached, the stage was set for a bold gambit in central China. Japanese divisions massed along the Yangtze River, poised to strike at the heart of Hunan's defenses. Intelligence reports hinted at Chinese preparations, with Xue Yue's forces fortifying positions around a major provincial hub. The air thickened with anticipation of a clash that could tip the balance in the interminable war—a test of Japan's revamped strategies against a resilient foe determined to hold the line. What unfolded would reveal whether Tokyo's post-Nomonhan pivot could deliver the breakthrough so desperately needed, or if it would merely prolong the bloody stalemate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In 1939, the Nomonhan Incident saw Soviet forces under Georgy Zhukov decisively defeat Japan's Kwantung Army at Khalkin Gol, exposing Japanese weaknesses in mechanized warfare. This setback, coupled with the Hitler-Stalin Nonaggression Pact, shattered Japan's northern expansion plans and prompted a strategic pivot southward. Diplomatic maneuvers involving Stalin, Hitler, Britain, France, and Japan reshaped alliances, leading to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in 1941. Japan refocused on China, intensifying operations in Hunan Province to isolate Chiang Kai-shek.   

In 1917, the Bolshevik Party had roughly 24,000 members. A decade later, it boasted about 1.2 million. Recruitment came in waves and so did the purges. Still, Party members were found at the top and bottom of the system. In the Kremlin and in the factories. The Party rank and file were vital to the establishment of the Soviet system, its day-to-day functioning, and the human material for campaigns whether they be for literary, industrialization, collectivization or terror. But who were these people? How engaged were they in politics? Were they a constituency for Party leaders to appeal to or was the rank and file mere material to be mobilized and directed without its own agency? There are few studies looking at the Party at the shop floor and its place in shaping Soviet socialism. Yiannis Kokosalakis' book Building Socialism does just that. The Eurasian Knot spoke to Kokosalakis to learn more about the role of the Bolshevik rank and file in the early Soviet system.Guest:Yiannis Kokosalakis is a visiting researcher at Bielefeld University. He's the author of Building Socialism: The Communist Party and the Making of the Soviet System, 1921-1941 published by Cambridge University Press. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

From The Words of Extraordinary Women to Barbie Day and the racy origins of Barbie, today’s Monday with Mitzi! episode is sure to amuse. Links The Odds: Daylight Saving Time | CNN Circadian rhythm – Wikipedia Meet Lilli, the High-end German Call Girl Who Became Barbie Julia Child – Wikipedia Rich Dad vs Poor Dad The Hidden Game That Decides Your Life || PROF JIANG XUEQIN || #profjiangstyle – YouTube Stanford marshmallow experiment – Wikipedia Headlines Wall Street braced for huge sell-off as oil hits highest level in four years and gas prices hit $8-a-gallon | Daily Mail Online You’ll Choke When You Hear How Many Full-Time Jobs a $136 Million Data Center Will Actually Create On This Day On This Day – What Happened on March 9 Today in History: March 9, ‘Operation Meetinghouse' firebombing devastates Tokyo | AP News What Happened on March 9 – On This Day What Happened on March 9 | HISTORY March 9 – Wikipedia Holidays Amerigo Vespucci Day | Holiday | Checkiday.com Barbie Day | Holiday | Checkiday.com False Teeth Day | Holiday | Checkiday.com Fill Our Staplers Day | Holiday | Checkiday.com Get Over It Day | Holiday | Checkiday.com National Workplace Napping Day | Holiday | Checkiday.com Panic Day | Holiday | Checkiday.com Historical Events 1961 — Ivan Ivanovich, a human dummy, travels into space 1959 — The Barbie doll goes on sale: Patterned after the Lilli ‘call girl’ doll,[1][2] the American toy company Mattel claims that more than one billion Barbie dolls have been sold so far, with about 3 dolls being sold every second. 1931 — The electron microscope is invented: German physicist Ernst Ruska is credited with the invention of the microscope. His first instrument allowed a resolution of 50 nanometers (billionths of a meter). 1891 — Kaʻiulani appointed the heir apparent to the throne of the Hawaiian Kingdom. 1842 — Giuseppe Verdi’s third opera, Nabucco, receives its première performance in Milan; its success establishes Verdi as one of Italy’s foremost opera composers. 1776 — Scottish philosopher Adam Smith publishes The Wealth of Nations, ushering in the classical period of political economy. Births 1964 — Juliette Binoche, French actress, dancer 1943 — Bobby Fischer, American chess player 1934 — Yuri Gagarin, Russian pilot, astronaut 1890 — Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet politician, Minister of Foreign Affairs fr the Soviet Union 1568 — Aloysius Gonzaga, Italian saint, namesake of Gonzaga University (died 1591) 1451 — Amerigo Vespucci, Italian cartographer and explorer, namesake of the Americas (died 1512) Deaths 1997 — Christopher Wallace a.k.a. The Notorious B.I.G., American rapper 1996 — George Burns, American actor 1994 — Charles Bukowski, American poet 1992 — Menachem Begin, Israeli politician, 6th Prime Minister of Israel, Nobel Prize laureate, founder of Israel’s ruling Likud party, who famously boasted of being “the father of terrorism in all the world.”[3] Footnotes Checkiday. “Barbie Day.” Checkiday.com, Checkiday, 11 Feb. 2017, www.checkiday.com/b7bd0e4f06056fc555595937c097c229/barbie-day. Accessed 9 Mar. 2026. ︎ Nessy, Messy. “Meet Lilli, the High-End German Call Girl Who Became America's Iconic Barbie Doll.” Messy Nessy Chic, 29 Jan. 2016, www.messynessychic.com/2016/01/29/meet-lilli-the-high-end-german-call-girl-who-became-americas-iconic-barbie-doll/. Accessed 9 Mar. 2026. ︎ Bollyn, Christopher. ““Frighten the West”: The Israeli Roots of Terrorism.” Christopher Bollyn, Christopher Bollyn, 22 Nov. 2015, www.bollyn.com/frighten-the-west-the-israeli-roots-of-terrorism-2/. Accessed 9 Mar. 2026. THE FATHER OF TERRORISM – Menachem Begin, the terrorist founder of Israel’s ruling Likud party, bragged about being “the father of terrorism in all the world.” The Likud party is now headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. “How does it feel, in the light of all that's going on, to be the father of terrorism in the Middle East?” “In the Middle East?” he [Begin] bellowed, in his thick, cartoon accent. “In all the world!” Russell Warren Howe interview with Menachem Begin, January 1974 ︎

1. Alan Philps introduces *The Red Hotel*, detailing Moscow's Metropol Hotel in 1941. Foreign correspondentsstruggled with Soviet censorship while relying on Russian secretaries for survival. British communist Charlotte Haldane arrives, idealistically seeking to report on the "heroic" Red Army while navigating the starvation and chaos of the early war years. (18)1942 MOSCOW

2. Philps highlights Alice Moats, a socialite turned war correspondent. Defying British embassy orders to evacuate, "Mozy" stayed in Moscow and connected with Polish General Anders. Her story exposes the Soviet betrayal of Polish officers while providing a lighter, yet insightful, perspective on the grand tragedies of Moscow. (19)1942

4. Philps recounts a chaotic press conference involving correspondent Ralph Parker and his secretary Valentina. Despite rumors of NKVD ties, Valentina died in poverty. The mystery of Parker's true loyalties—whether he was a British, American, or Soviet spy—remains unresolved, illustrating the pervasive atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia within the Metropol. (21)1942 BRITS IN NORTH AFRICA

5. Philps details Nadia's life as a Soviet spy in Shanghai and New York, where she stole industrial secrets using microfilms hidden in pocket mirrors. Working alongside figures like Richard Sorge and Whitaker Chambers, Nadia's experiences in the West eventually fueled her secret dissidence against Stalin's increasingly brutal and murderous regime. (22)1942 LONDON

During the Cold War, some of the most dangerous encounters between East and West took place far beneath the ocean's surface. I speak with historian Dr. Paul Brown, author of Secret Warriors: British Submarines during the Cold War. Brown reveals the extraordinary covert missions carried out by Royal Navy submarines as they monitored Soviet naval bases near Murmansk and the Barents Sea. British boats gathered vital intelligence by recording the acoustic signatures of Soviet submarines, trailing enemy vessels, and observing major naval exercises. These missions were risky and occasionally resulted in collisions, such as the dramatic incident involving HMS Warspite in 1968. Along the way, Brown shares remarkable stories of Cold War espionage at sea, including a daring intelligence operation where a British submarine secretly observed the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev from just a few feet away. This is a rare glimpse into one of the Cold War's most secretive battlefields: the depths of the ocean. Buy the book here and support the podcast⁠⁠ Episode extras here ⁠⁠ https://coldwarconversations.com/episode446⁠ Similar episodes: On Her Majesty's Nuclear Submarine Service ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/episode162/ From the Merchant Navy to Covert Hunter Killer Nuclear Submarine Missions https://coldwarconversations.com/episode388/ ⁠ Go to ⁠⁠https://surfshark.com/coldwardeal⁠⁠ or use code COLDWARDEAL at checkout to get 4 extra months of Surfshark VPN! Help me preserve Cold War history via a simple monthly donation, You'll become part of our community, get ad-free episodes, and receive a sought-after CWC coaster as a thank-you, and you'll bask in the warm glow of knowing you are helping to preserve Cold War history. Just go to ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ If a monthly contribution is not your cup of tea, we also welcome one-off donations via the same link. Find the ideal gift for the Cold War enthusiast in your life! Just go to ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/store/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ CONTINUE  THE COLD WAR CONVERSATION BlueSky ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://bsky.app/profile/coldwarpod.bsky.social⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Threads ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.threads.net/@coldwarconversations⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Twitter/X ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://twitter.com/ColdWarPod⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Facebook ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.facebook.com/groups/coldwarpod/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Instagram ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/coldwarconversations/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Youtube ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://youtube.com/@ColdWarConversations⁠⁠⁠⁠ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The first ship in a solar-system armada reached its target 40 years ago today. Over the following week, four others joined it. Their target was Comet Halley. It was making its first passage through the inner solar system since 1910. So it was the first chance to study the comet from close range. And space agencies around the world responded. The Soviet Union and Japan each sent two spacecraft, and Europe added one more. The first to arrive was Vega 1, one of the Soviet missions. It and a companion, Vega 2, had first flown past Venus. They scanned the planet and dropped probes into its atmosphere. Both of them flew just a few thousand miles from Halley’s nucleus – its “body” of rock and ice. Europe’s contribution, Giotto, came even closer – just 370 miles. It snapped by far the best pictures of any comet. It found that most of the nucleus was covered by a “crust” that was darker than charcoal. But “jets” of ice and dust erupted from thin spots in the crust. They wrapped the nucleus in a cloud of debris. Sunlight and the solar wind pushed some of that material away from the comet, forming a tail that was millions of miles long. The United States was a notable no-show. A dedicated mission to Halley was scuttled. NASA did turn some craft that were already in space to face Halley, but they were millions of miles away. The next chance to study the comet up close won’t come until 2061. Script by Damond Benningfield

SHOW SCHEDULE 3-4-20261910 CARTHAGEVictoria Coates argues China's interest in international law masks an inability to project power compared to the United States, which remains the regional "strong horse." (1)General Blaine Holt explains "missile math," where cheap drones force expensive defensive responses, requiring a strategy of targeting adversary production capabilities and launch sites directly. (2)Steve Yates discusses how Asian allies find assurance in US missile defense tech while Beijing faces internal military purges and doubts about its own technology. (3)Steve Yates explores the fragile nature of the War Powers Act and praises Senator John Fetterman for his clear, principled stance regarding the Middle East conflict. (4)Peter Berkowitz traces the current conflict to the October 7 atrocities, emphasizing the Islamic Republic of Iran's long-term funding and coordination of its proxy groups. (5)Peter Berkowitz examines Secretary Rubio's speech on Western traditions, arguing the US fights to secure Americanfreedom and global interests against hostile, non-democratic regional actors. (6)Anatoly Zak reveals the history of the T2K, a secret Soviet lunar lander prototype tested in Earth orbit to compete with the American Apollo program. (7)Anatoly Zak attributes the Soviet failure to reach the moon to late funding, lack of military interest, and the unreliability of the super-heavy N1 rocket engines. (8)Ivana Stradner warns that Moscow uses the Iran conflict to spread propaganda claiming US abandonment of Ukraine, aiming to polarize the West and demoralize allies. (9)Ivana Stradner explains how manipulated satellite imagery and AI-generated footage are used by Iran and Russia to spread fear and claim false victories in war zones. (10)Gregory Copley analyzes European responses, noting UK Prime Minister Starmer's perceived weakness and the largely symbolic nature of French nuclear and naval deployments in the region. (11)Gregory Copley explores regional reactions, noting Australia's military integration with the US and Beijing's shock as its propaganda regarding Iranian invulnerability is proven false. (12)Mariam Wahba explains why Egypt remains unattacked by Iran and discusses President Al-Sisi's potential future role in regional rebuilding and stabilizing the Suez Canal. (13)Michael Bernstam analyzes how spiked oil prices temporarily benefit Russia's budget, though the loss of Iranian drone supplies creates significant strategic and long-term logistical setbacks. (14)Bob Zimmerman highlights SpaceX's routine orbital successes while contrasting them with China's rational, long-term plan to land humans on the moon by the year 2030. (15)Bob Zimmerman details the sun's unpredictable sunspot decline and its influence on climate, alongside deep-space observations of the Cat's Eye nebula by the Euclid telescope. (16)

Anatoly Zak attributes the Soviet failure to reach the moon to late funding, lack of military interest, and the unreliability of the super-heavy N1 rocket engines. (8)1909 CAIRO

Anatoly Zak reveals the history of the T2K, a secret Soviet lunar lander prototype tested in Earth orbit to compete with the American Apollo program. (7)1909 TOMB OF THE MAMELUKES, CAIRO

Gulag: A History. Dennis Prager Talks to Pulitzer Prize Winning- Author Anne Applebaum Gulag: A History  by Anne Applebaum (Author) This is an ACU encore presentation. PULITZER PRIZE WINNER • This magisterial and acclaimed history offers the first fully documented portrait of the Gulag, from its origins in the Russian Revolution, through its expansion under Stalin, to its collapse in the era of glasnost. “A tragic testimony to how evil ideologically inspired dictatorships can be.” —The New York Times A Kirkus Reviews Best Nonfiction Book of the Century The Gulag—a vast array of Soviet concentration camps that held millions of political and criminal prisoners—was a system of repression and punishment that terrorized the entire society, embodying the worst tendencies of Soviet communism. Applebaum intimately re-creates what life was like in the camps and links them to the larger history of the Soviet Union. Immediately recognized as a landmark and long-overdue work of scholarship, Gulag is an essential book for anyone who wishes to understand the history of the twentieth century. The Dennis Prager Show 81.2K subscribers 429 views Jan 16, 2026 Timeless Wisdom with Dennis Prager ------------------------------------------------------------------------ For a great archive of Prager University videos visit- https://www.youtube.com/user/PragerUniversity/featured   Donate today to PragerU! http://l.prageru.com/2eB2p0h Get PragerU bonus content for free! https://www.prageru.com/bonus-content Download Pragerpedia on your iPhone or Android! Thousands of sources and facts at your fingertips. iPhone: http://l.prageru.com/2dlsnbG Android: http://l.prageru.com/2dlsS5e Join Prager United to get new swag every quarter, exclusive early access to our videos, and an annual TownHall phone call with Dennis Prager! http://l.prageru.com/2c9n6ys Join PragerU's text list to have these videos, free merchandise giveaways and breaking announcements sent directly to your phone! https://optin.mobiniti.com/prageru Do you shop on Amazon? Click https://smile.amazon.com and a percentage of every Amazon purchase will be donated to PragerU. Same great products. Same low price. Shopping made meaningful. VISIT PragerU! https://www.prageru.com FOLLOW us! Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/prageru Twitter: https://twitter.com/prageru Instagram: https://instagram.com/prageru/ PragerU is on Snapchat! JOIN PragerFORCE! For Students: http://l.prageru.com/2aozfkP JOIN our Educators Network! http://l.prageru.com/2aoz2y9 -------------------------------------------------------------------- The Rational Bible: Exodus by Dennis Prager   NATIONAL BESTSELLER "Dennis Prager has put together one of the most stunning commentaries in modern times on the most profound document in human history. It's a must-read that every person, religious and non-religious, should buy and peruse every night before bed. It'll make you think harder, pray more ardently, and understand your civilization better." — Ben Shapiro, host of "The Ben Shapiro Show" "Dennis Prager's commentary on Exodus will rank among the greatest modern Torah commentaries. That is how important I think it is. And I am clearly not alone... It might well be on its way to becoming the most widely read Torah commentary of our time—and by non-Jews as well as by Jews." — Rabbi Joseph Telushkin, bestselling author of Jewish Literacy Why do so many people think the Bible, the most influential book in world history, is outdated? Why do our friends and neighbors – and sometimes we ourselves – dismiss the Bible as irrelevant, irrational, immoral, or all of these things? This explanation of the Book of Exodus, the second book of the Bible, will demonstrate that the Bible is not only powerfully relevant to today's issues, but completely consistent with rational thought. Do you think the Bible permitted the trans-Atlantic slave trade? You won't after reading this book. Do you struggle to love your parents? If you do, you need this book. Do you doubt the existence of God because belief in God is “irrational?” This book will give you reason after reason to rethink your doubts. The title of this commentary is, “The Rational Bible” because its approach is entirely reason-based. The reader is never asked to accept anything on faith alone. As Prager says, “If something I write does not make rational sense, I have not done my job.” The Rational Bible is the fruit of Dennis Prager's forty years of teaching the Bible to people of every faith, and no faith. On virtually every page, you will discover how the text relates to the contemporary world and to your life. His goal: to change your mind – and then change your life.   Highly Recommended by ACU. Purchase his book at- https://www.amazon.com/Rational-Bible-Exodus-Dennis-Prager/dp/1621577724   The Rational Bible: Genesis by Dennis Prager  USA Today bestseller Publishers Weekly bestseller Wall Street Journal bestseller Many people today think the Bible, the most influential book in world history, is not only outdated but irrelevant, irrational, and even immoral. This explanation of the Book of Genesis, the first book of the Bible, demonstrates clearly and powerfully that the opposite is true. The Bible remains profoundly relevant—both to the great issues of our day and to each individual life. It is the greatest moral guide and source of wisdom ever written. Do you doubt the existence of God because you think believing in God is irrational? This book will give you many reasons to rethink your doubts. Do you think faith and science are in conflict? You won't after reading this commentary on Genesis. Do you come from a dysfunctional family? It may comfort you to know that every family discussed in Genesis was highly dysfunctional! The title of this commentary is “The Rational Bible” because its approach is entirely reason-based. The reader is never asked to accept anything on faith alone. In Dennis Prager's words, “If something I write is not rational, I have not done my job.” The Rational Bible is the fruit of Dennis Prager's forty years of teaching the Bible—whose Hebrew grammar and vocabulary he has mastered—to people of every faith and no faith at all. On virtually every page, you will discover how the text relates to the contemporary world in general and to you personally. His goal: to change your mind—and, as a result, to change your life.   The Rational Bible: Deuteronomy: God, Blessings, and Curses by Dennis Prager Is the Bible, the most influential book in world history, still relevant? Why do people dismiss it as being irrelevant, irrational, immoral, or all of these things? This explanation of the Book of Deuteronomy, the fifth book of the Bible, will demonstrate how it remains profoundly relevant - both to the great issues of our day and to each individual life. Do you doubt the existence of God because you think believing in God is irrational? This book will cause you to reexamine your doubts. The title of this commentary is The Rational Bible because its approach is entirely reason-based. The listener is never asked to accept anything on faith alone. In Dennis Prager's words, “If something I write is not rational, I have not done my job.” The Rational Bible is the fruit of Prager's forty years of teaching to people of every faith and no faith at all. In virtually every section, you will discover how the text relates to the contemporary world in general and to you on a personal level. His goal: to change your mind - and, as a result, to change your life.

Joseph Stalin died today, March 5, seventy-three years ago. So, I thought it would be a good idea to dig out, re-edit and remaster, the interview I did with Joshua Rubenstein back in 2018 about the dictator's final days. What did Stalin focus on in the final years of his life? How did Soviet leadership react to his death? Soviet society? And internationally? Let's revisit what Rubenstein had to tell us from his book, The Last Days of Stalin.Guest:Joshua Rubenstein is an associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University. He's the author of several books on Soviet history. His most recent is The Last Days of Stalin published by Yale University Press. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Tread Perilously returns to the 1980s for a month of TV shows Erik and Justin have never covered before. First up: the Scarecrow and Mrs. King episode called "Wrong Number." When Mrs. King's first assignment re-checking security clearances becomes part of Scarecrow's latest mission, the two argue over the loyalties of one Dr. William Towne. Is he really a Soviet spy or just a hapless mathematician? Meanwhile, old foe Gregory returns and aims to get revenge on both Scarecrow and Mrs. King -- and now he has the resources of the KGB to do it. Is Towne also part of his plan? Justin more or less discerns the show's premise from just one episode -- he even catches the Season 3 pivot. Erik finally has a good excuse to employ his Bruce Boxleitner impression (not that needing one has ever stopped him before). Big hair proves to be very important. Guest star Peter Jurasik leads to a lot of Babylon 5 talk. A wild "Jamie" Cromwell appears. The pair recall that strange time when MSG was the devil. A character known as the "Number 5" man leads to the SPECTRE org chart. But is the scheme really a SMERSH operation? '80s spycraft proves nostalgic and Erik asks, once again, "Who's Melissa George?"

FAN MAIL--We would love YOUR feedback--Send us a Text MessageWhat if a single covert operation rewired the modern Middle East? We revisit the 1953 CIA–MI6 coup that toppled Mohammad Mossadegh and restored the Shah, then follow the consequences forward: repression, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and a foreign policy defined by proxies and confrontation. Drawing on Stephen Kinzer's research, we explore a hard question with fresh urgency: did the quest for short-term stability seed decades of blowback that still shape U.S.–Iran relations today?We walk through the Cold War calculus that made Operation Ajax feel “smart”—oil interests, fear of Soviet expansion, and a fascination with covert tools—then examine how closing civic space strengthened clerical networks as the only resilient opposition. The result was a revolution led by those best organized to seize power, and a regime that frames its identity against the United States while projecting force through Hezbollah, Hamas, and regional militias. We condemn terrorism unequivocally while refusing to erase the history that helps explain why proxies became Tehran's primary lever.From a conservative lens that values prudence and humility, we test whether 1953 is a warning against social engineering abroad. Can great powers restrain the impulse to pick winners and script outcomes? If Iran ever reaches genuinely free elections again, the real test may be whether we allow the messiness of democracy to unfold without trying to play God in month 22. Along the way, we wrestle with the difference between removing a regime and building institutions, and why regime change is not a strategy but a door to unknown rooms.Listen for a clear-eyed timeline, practical takeaways, and a challenge to rethink how we measure success in foreign policy: short-term order or long-term legitimacy. If this conversation moves you, follow the show, share it with a friend, and leave a review telling us where you stand on the 1953 trade—was it worth the cost?Key Points from the Episode:• Kinzer's thesis that Operation Ajax derailed Iran's early democratic path• Cold War logic of the Dulles brothers and Churchill's Britain• How repression crushed liberal opposition and left clerical networks strongest• The arc from Shah to 1979 revolution to proxy militias• Terrorism condemned while history used to avoid repeat mistakes• Conservative case for prudence and unintended consequences• The test of restraint if Iran reopens a democratic path• Why regime change is not a full strategy so lets not make the same mistake againBe sure to check out our show page at teammojoacademy.com, where we have everything we discussed in this podcast as well as other great resourcesOther resources: Want to leave a review? Click here, and if we earned a five-star review from you **high five and knuckle bumps**, we appreciate it greatly!

Sputnik 1 (/ˈspʌtnɪk, ˈspʊtnɪk/, Russian: Спутник-1, Satellite 1), often referred to as simply Sputnik, was the first artificial Earth satellite. It was launched into an elliptical low Earth orbit by the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957 as part of the Soviet space program. It sent a radio signal back to Earth for three weeks before its three silver-zinc batteries became depleted. Aerodynamic drag caused it to fall back into the atmosphere on 4 January 1958.

The Reagan presidency marked a turning point in American political history, bringing in changes in voting allegiances, long-lasting economic and foreign policy shifts, and a new direction in the country's political culture that lasted for decades. Now former Reagan aide Frank Lavin comes to Commonwealth Club World Affairs to share behind-the-scenes stories of the Reagan White House. Drawing on his new book Inside the Reagan White House: A Front-Row Seat to Presidential Leadership with Lessons for Today, Lavin includes a mix of personal stories, insights on the president, discussions of policy and historical events, and crazy, colorful anecdotes in his insider's look at the Reagan presidency. The Reagan assassination attempt, the Gorbachev Reykjavik summit, Ollie North and the Contras, the 1988 Bush-Dukakis contest and other critical moments of the Reagan years are all covered.  Lavin also offers original insights into Reagan cabinet members and other top players, along with personal anecdotes, off-hand comments, and unique family details. Not to mention the movie stars, Soviet spies, neo-Nazis, plain old Nazis, intimate affairs, fights on planes, and con men who were chased by Interpol.  But Lavin says that at the heart of his story are the thousands of dedicated Americans who helped Ronald Reagan as he worked to push back against the Soviet Union, promote democracy, improve trade, lower taxes, and reduce the size and scope of government—back when those were the main focuses of conservative Republicans.  Join us to discuss whether the Reagan years provide us with any lessons for our current political situation. A Humanities Member-led Forum program. Forums at the Club are organized and run by volunteer programmers who are members of The Commonwealth Club, and they cover a diverse range of topics. Learn more about our Forums. Organizer: George Hammond  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Video link to this conversation: https://youtu.be/n8g9RwmGwF8Dan is a Jewish interpreter who immigrated from the Soviet Union. He believes his Soviet past taught him important lessons about recognizing when society takes a wrong turn. He reached out to me to share his story, and I invited him for an in-depth interview. We discussed his Soviet upbringing, his life journey, and his experiences as a Jewish interpreter. Dan has thoughtful criticisms of contemporary human rights organizations (alongside genuine appreciation for their work) and feels it's important to share his unique perspective.If you would like to get in touch with Dan, you can reach him here:pr.pleischner@gmail.comThis video focuses specifically on our discussion about Dan's work as a Jewish interpreter. You can watch our complete interview here:From a Soviet upbringing to Jewish identity | Dan's storyhttps://youtu.be/Nmw9jZM2aYUBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-frieda-vizel-podcast--5824414/support.

She didn't stay because she was weak. She stayed because leaving felt like throwing away everything her family sacrificed to give her. Alenka Kyslik is the daughter of Soviet immigrants who fled in the middle of the night for a better life. That story became her nervous system's operating code. Opportunity meant safety. Achievement meant survival. And saying no to either felt like a betrayal of everything they crossed an ocean to build. So she stayed. Through the body disconnection. Through the out-of-body driving moments. Through the week she couldn't get off the floor. Through the boss who told her, "I could give you a green card, but I know you'll leave." She stayed, because her nervous system didn't know there was another option. This isn't a burnout story. It's a story about the belief underneath the burnout. And what becomes possible when you finally see it for what it is. Here's what Lenka's story quietly teaches you about your own:

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's armor offensives at Nomohan. Following heavy Japanese losses in May and June, General Georgy Zhukov arrives in June, reorganizes the Soviet 1st Army Group, and bolsters it with tanks, artillery, and reinforcements. The July offensive sees General Komatsubara's forces cross the Halha River undetected, achieving initial surprise. However, General Yasuoka's tank assault falters due to muddy terrain, inadequate infantry support, and superior Soviet firepower, resulting in heavy losses. Japanese doctrine emphasizing spiritual superiority clashes with material realities, undermining morale as intelligence underestimates Soviet strength. Zhukov learns key lessons in armored warfare, adapting tactics despite high casualties. Reinforcements pour in via massive truck convoys. Japanese night attacks and artillery duels fail, exposing logistical weaknesses. Internal command tensions, including gekokujo defiance, hinder responses. By August, Stalin, buoyed by European diplomacy and Sorge's intel, greenlights a major offensive. Zhukov employs deception for surprise. Warnings of Soviet buildup are ignored, setting the stage for a climactic encirclement on August 20.   #191 Zhukov Steel Ring of Fire at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha River into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank. Two weeks of nightly Soviet sound effects had paid off: Japanese perimeter troops failed to distinguish the real deployment from the frequently heard simulations. Zhukov's order of battle was as follows: "Northern force, commanded by Colonel Alekseenko—6th Mongolian Cavalry Division, 601st Infantry Regiment (82nd Division), 7th Armored Brigade, 2 battalions of the 11th Tank Brigade, 82nd Artillery Regiment, and 87th Anti-tank Brigade. Central force, where Zhukov was located, commanded by his deputy, Colonel Petrov—36th Motorized Infantry Division, 82nd Infantry Division (less one regiment), 5th Infantry Machine Gun Brigade. Southern force, commanded by Colonel Potapov—8th Mongolian Cavalry Division, 57th Infantry Division, 8th Armored Brigade, 6th Tank Brigade, 11th Tank Brigade (less two battalions), 185th Artillery Regiment, 37th Anti-tank Brigade, one independent tank company. A mobile strategic reserve built around the 212th Airborne Regiment, the 9th Mechanized Brigade, and a battalion of the 6th Tank Brigade was held west of the Halha River." The Soviet offensive was supported by massed artillery, a hallmark of Zhukov's operations in the war against Germany. In addition to nearly 300 antitank and rapid-fire guns, Zhukov deployed over 200 field and heavy artillery pieces on both sides of the Halha. Specific artillery batteries were assigned to provide supporting fire for each attacking infantry and armored unit at the battalion level and higher. In the early hours of August 20, the sky began to lighten over the semiarid plain, with the false promise of a quiet Sunday morning. The air was clear as the sun warmed the ground that had been chilled overnight. General Komatsubara's troops were in no special state of readiness when the first wave of more than 200 Soviet bombers crossed the Halha River at 5:45 a.m. and began pounding their positions. When the bombers withdrew, a thunderous artillery barrage began, continuing for 2 hours and 45 minutes. That was precisely the time needed for the bombers to refuel, rearm, and return for a second run over the Japanese positions. Finally, all the Soviet artillery unleashed an intensive 15-minute barrage at the forwardmost Japanese positions. Komatsubara's men huddled in their trenches under the heaviest bombardment to which they or any other Japanese force had ever been subjected. The devastation, both physical and psychological, was tremendous, especially in the forward positions. The shock and vibration of incoming bombs and artillery rounds also caused their radiotelegraph keys to chatter so uncontrollably that frontline troops could not communicate with the rear, compounding their confusion and helplessness. At 9:00 a.m., Soviet armor and infantry began to move out along the line while their cover fire continued. A dense morning fog near the river helped conceal their approach, bringing them in some sectors to within small-arms range before they were sighted by the enemy. The surprise and disarray on the Japanese side was so complete, and their communications so badly disrupted, that Japanese artillery did not begin firing in support of their frontline troops until about 10:15 a.m. By then, many forward positions were overrun. Japanese resistance stiffened at many points by midday, and fierce combat raged along the front, roughly 40 miles long. In the day's fighting, Colonel M. I. Potapov's southern force achieved the most striking success. The 8th MPR Cavalry Division routed the Manchukuoan cavalry holding Komatsubara's southern flank, and Potapov's armor and mechanized infantry bent the entire southern segment of the Japanese front inward by about 8 miles in a northwesterly direction. Zhukov's central force advanced only 500–1,500 yards in the face of furious resistance, but the frontal assault engaged the center of the Japanese line so heavily that Komatsubara could not reinforce his flanks. Two MPR cavalry regiments and supporting armor and mechanized infantry from Colonel Ilya Alekseenko's northern force easily overran two Manchukuoan cavalry units guarding the northern flank of the Japanese line, about 2 miles north of the Fui Heights. But the heights themselves formed a natural strong point, and Alekseenko's advance was halted at what became the northern anchor of the Japanese line. As the first phase of the Soviet offensive gathered momentum, General Ogisu, the 6th Army's new commander, assessed the situation. Still unaware of Zhukov's strength, he reassured KwAHQ that "the enemy intends to envelop us from our flanks, but his offensive effectiveness is weak… Our positions in other areas are being strengthened. Set your mind at ease." This optimistic report contributed to Kwantung Army's delay in reinforcing the 23rd Division. Some at KwAHQ suspected this might be another limited Soviet push, like Aug 7–8, that would soon end. Others worried it was a diversion prior to a larger offensive and were concerned but not alarmed about Komatsubara's position. On Aug 21–22, Potapov's southern force pierced the Japanese main defense line at several points, breaking the southern sector into segments that the attackers sealed off, encircled, and ground down. Soviet armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery moved swiftly and with deadly efficiency. Survivors described how each pocket of resistance experienced its own hellish period. After the Japanese heavy weapons in a pocket were neutralized, Soviet artillery and tanks gradually tightened the ring, firing at point-blank range over open sights. Flame-throwing tanks incinerated hastily constructed fortifications and underground shelters. Infantry mopped up with grenades, small arms, and bayonets. By the end of Aug 23, Potapov had dismembered the entire Japanese defensive position south of the Holsten River. Only one significant pocket of resistance remained. Meanwhile, Potapov's 8th Armored Brigade looped behind the Japanese, reaching southeast of Nomonhan, some 11 miles east of the river junction, on the boundary claimed by the MPR, and took up a blocking position there athwart the most likely line of retreat for Japanese units south of the Holsten. In those two days, the Japanese center yielded only a few yards, while the northern flank anchored at Fui Heights held firm. Air combat raged over the battlefield. Soviet air units provided tactical support for their armor and infantry, while Kwantung Army's 2nd Air Group strove to thwart that effort and hit the Soviet ground forces. Before Nomonhan, the Japanese air force had not faced a modern opponent. Japanese fliers had roamed largely unchallenged in Manchuria and China from 1931 to 1939. At Nomonhan, the Soviets enjoyed an advantage of roughly 2:1 in aircraft and pilots. This placed an increasingly heavy burden on Japanese air squadrons, which had to fly incessantly, often against heavy odds. Fatigue took its toll and losses mounted. Soviet and Japanese accounts give wildly different tallies of air victories and losses, but an official Japanese assessment after the battle stated, "Nomonhan brought out the bitter truths of the phenomenal rate at which war potential is sapped in the face of superior opposition." As with tank combat, the Soviet air superiority was qualitative as well as quantitative. In June–early July, the Soviet I-16 fighters did not fare well against the Japanese Type 97 fighter. However, in the lull before the August offensive, the Soviets introduced an improved I-16 with armor-plated fuselage and windshield, making it virtually impervious to the Type 97's light 7.7-mm guns. The Japanese countered by arming some planes with heavier 12.7-mm guns, which were somewhat more effective against the new I-16s. But the Soviet pilots discovered that the Type-97's unprotected fuel tank was an easy mark, and Japanese planes began to burn with horrendous regularity. On Aug 23, as Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow to seal the pact that would doom Poland and unleash war in Europe, the situation at Nomonhan was deemed serious enough by Kwantung Army to transfer the 7th Division to Hailar for support. Tsuji volunteered to fly to Nomonhan for a firsthand assessment. This move came too late, as Aug 23–24 proved the crucial phase of the battle. On Tue night, Aug 22, at Japanese 6th Army HQ, General Ogisu ordered a counterattack to push back the Soviet forces enveloping and crushing the Japanese southern flank. Komatsubara planned the counterattack in minute detail and entrusted its execution to his 71st and 72nd Regiments, led by General Kobayashi Koichi, and the 26th and 28th Regiments of the 7th Division, commanded by General Morita Norimasa. On paper this force looked like two infantry brigades. Only the 28th Regiment, however, was near full strength, though its troops were tired after marching about 25 miles to the front the day before. This regiment's peerless commander was Colonel Morita Toru (unrelated to General Morita). The chief kendo fencing master of the Imperial Army, Morita claimed to be invulnerable to bullets. The other three regiments were seriously understrength, partly due to combat attrition and partly because several of their battalions were deployed elsewhere on the front. The forces Kobayashi and Morita commanded that day totaled less than one regiment each. It was not until the night of Aug 23 that deployment and attack orders filtered down to the Japanese regiment, battalion, and company commanders. Due to insufficient truck transport and the trackless terrain, units were delayed reaching their assigned positions in the early morning of Aug 24, and some did not arrive at all. Two battalions of the 71st Regiment did not reach Kobayashi in time; his attack force that morning consisted of two battalions of the 72nd Regiment. Colonel Sumi's depleted 26th Regiment did not arrive in time, and General Morita's assault force consisted of two battalions of the 28th Regiment and a battalion-equivalent independent garrison unit newly arrived at the front. Because of these delays, the Japanese could not reconnoiter enemy positions adequately before the attack. What had been planned as a dawn assault would begin between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m. in broad daylight. The light plane carrying Tsuji on the final leg of his flight from Hsinking-Hailar-Nomonhan was attacked by Soviet fighters and forced to land behind the 72nd Regiment's staging area. Tsuji managed to reach General Kobayashi's command post by truck and on foot, placing him closer to the fighting than he anticipated. Just before the counterattack began, a dense fog drifted across part of the battlefield, obscuring visibility and limiting artillery effectiveness. Using the fog to mask their movement, lead elements of the 72nd Regiment moved toward a distant stand of scrub pines. As they approached, the trees began to move away—the stand was a well-camouflaged Soviet tank force. The tanks then maneuvered to the south, jeopardizing further Japanese advance. As the fog cleared, the Japanese found themselves facing a much larger enemy force. A vastly heavier Soviet barrage answered their renewed artillery fire. Kobayashi and Morita discovered too late that their counterattack had walked into the teeth of far stronger Soviet forces. One account calls it "The Charge of Two Light Brigades."   Kobayashi's 72nd Regiment encountered the Soviet T-34, with its thick sloped armor and 76-mm gun—the most powerful tank in 1939. In addition, the improved Soviet BT-5/7 tanks, powered by diesel, were less prone to ignition. On gasoline-powered vehicles, the Soviets added wire netting over the ventilation grill and exhaust manifold, reducing the effectiveness of hand-thrown gasoline bombs. Japanese infantry regiments suffered near 50% casualties that day. Nearly every battalion and company commander was lost. Kobayashi was gravely wounded by a tank shell fragment and nearly trampled by fleeing troops. He survived the battle and the Pacific War but died in a Soviet POW camp in 1950. Morita's 28th Regiment fared little better. It was pinned down about 500 yards from the Soviet front lines by intense artillery. Unable to advance and not permitted to retreat, Morita's men dug into the loose sand and withstood the bombardment, but were cut to pieces. Shortly after sunset, the remnants were ordered to withdraw, but both regiments were shattered. Tsuji, a survivor, rejoined Komatsubara at his command post. Upon receiving combat reports from the 72nd and 28th Regiments, General Komatsubara "evinced deep anxiety." 6th Army chief of staff Major General Fujimoto Tetsukuma, at Komatsubara's command post, "appeared bewildered," and announced he was returning to headquarters, asking if Tsuji would accompany him. The major declined and later recalled that he and Komatsubara could barely conceal their astonishment at Fujimoto's abrupt departure at such a time. Meanwhile, at the northern end of the line, Colonel Alekseenko's force had been hammering at Fui Heights for 3 days without success. The position was held by about 800 defenders under Lieutenant Colonel Ioki Eiichiro, consisting of two infantry companies; one company each of cavalry, armored reconnaissance, and combat engineers; and three artillery batteries (37-mm and 75-mm guns). The defenders clung tenaciously to the strongpoint created by the heights and their bunkers, inflicting heavy losses on Alekseenko's force. The unexpectedly strong defense disrupted the timing of the entire Soviet offensive. By Aug 23, Zhukov was exasperated and losing patience with the pace in the north. Some of Zhukov's comrades recall a personable chief who played the accordion and urged singing during happier times. Under stress, his harshness and temper surfaced. Zhukov summoned Alekseenko to the telephone. When the northern commander expressed doubt about storming the heights immediately, Zhukov berated him, relieved him on the spot, and entrusted the attack to Alekseenko's chief of staff. After a few hours, Zhukov called again and, finding that the new commander was slow, fired him as well and sent a staff member to take charge. Accounts record that his tirades sometimes included the phrase "useless bag of shit," though others note harsher language was used toward generals who did not meet expectations. That night, reinforced by the 212th Airborne Regiment, heavier artillery, and a detachment of flame-throwing tanks, the northern force renewed its assault on Fui Heights. The battered Japanese defenders were thoroughly overmatched. Soviet artillery fired at two rounds per second. When the last Japanese artillery was knocked out, they no longer could defend against flame-throwing tanks. From several miles away, Colonel Sumi could see the heights shrouded in black smoke and red flames "spitting like the tongues of snakes."  After Aug 22, supply trucks could no longer reach Fui Heights. The next afternoon, Colonel Ioki's radio—the last link to the 23rd Division—was destroyed. His surviving men fought on with small arms and grenades, repelling Soviet infantry with bayonet charges that night. By the morning of Aug 24, Ioki had about 200 able-bodied men left of his original 800. Soviet tanks and infantry had penetrated defenses at several points, forcing him to constrict his perimeter. Red flags flew on the eastern edge of the heights. Ioki gathered his remaining officers to discuss last measures. With little ammunition and almost no food or water, their situation seemed hopeless. But Ioki insisted on holding Fui Heights to the last man, arguing that the defense should not be abandoned and that orders to break out should come only with reinforcements and supplies. Some subordinates urged retreat. Faced with two dire options, Ioki drew his pistol and attempted suicide, but a fellow officer restrained him. Rather than see his men blown to bits, Ioki decided to abandon Fui Heights and retreat east. Those unable to walk received hand grenades with the injunction to blow themselves up rather than be captured. On the night of Aug 24–25, after moonrise, the remaining resistance at the heights was quelled, and Soviet attention shifted south. Ioki's battered remnant slipped out and, the next morning, encountered a Manchukuoan cavalry patrol that summoned trucks to take them to Chaingchunmiao, forty miles away. Russians occupying Fui Heights on Aug 25 counted the corpses of over 600 Japanese officers and men. After securing Fui Heights, the Soviet northern force began to roll up the Japanese northern flank in a wide arc toward Nomonhan. A day after the fall of Fui Heights, elements of the northern force's 11th Tank Brigade linked up with the southern force's 8th Armored Brigade near Nomonhan. A steel ring had been forged around the Japanese 6th Army. As the Japanese northern and southern flanks dissolved under Zhukov's relentless assaults, Komatsubara's command ceased to exist as an integrated force. By Aug 25 the Japanese lines were completely cut, with resistance remaining only in three encircled pockets. The remnants of two battalions of General Morita's "brigade" attempted a renewed offensive on Aug 25, advancing about 150 yards before being hammered by Soviet artillery and tanks, suffering heavier casualties than the day before. The only hope for the surrounded Japanese troops lay in a relief force breaking through the Soviet encirclement from the outside. However, Kwantung Army was spread thin in Manchuria and, due to a truck shortage, could not transport the 7th Division from Hailar to the combat zone in time. By Aug 26 the encirclement had thickened, with three main pockets tightly invested, making a large-scale breakout nearly impossible. Potapov unleashed a two-pronged assault with his 6th Tank Brigade and 80th Infantry Regiment. Japanese artillery from the 28th Regiment temporarily checked the left wing of the armored attack, but the Soviet right wing overran elements of Sumi's 26th Regiment, forcing the Japanese to retreat into a tighter enclave. Morita, the fencing-master commander who claimed to be immune to bullets, was killed by machine-gun fire while standing atop a trench encouraging his men. The Japanese 120-mm howitzers overheated under the August sun; their breech mechanisms swelled and refused to eject spent casings. Gunners had to leap from behind shelter to ram wooden rods down the barrels, drastically reducing rate of fire and life expectancy. Komatsubara's artillery units suffered a bitter fate. Most were deployed well behind the front lines with their guns facing west toward the Halha. As the offensive developed, attackers often struck the batteries from the east, behind them. Even when crews could turn some guns to face east, they had not preregistered fields of fire there and were not very effective. Supporting infantry had already been drawn off for counterattacks and perimeter defense. One by one, Japanese batteries were smashed by Soviet artillery and tanks. Crews were expected to defend their guns to the last man; the guns themselves were treated as the unit's soul, to be destroyed if captured. In extremis, crews were to destroy sensitive parts like optics. Few survived. Among those who did was a PFC from an annihilated howitzer unit, ordered to drive one of the few surviving vehicles, a Dodge sedan loaded with seriously wounded men, eastward to safety during the night. Near a Holsten River bridge he encountered Soviet sentries. The driver hesitated, then honked his horn, and the guards saluted as the sedan sped past. With water supplies exhausted and unable to reach the Halha or Holsten Rivers, the commander of the easternmost enclave ordered his men to drain radiator water from their vehicles. Drinking the foul liquid, at the cost of immobilizing their remaining transport, signaled that the defenders believed their situation was hopeless. On Aug 27 the rest of the Japanese 7th Division, two fresh infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and support units totaling barely 5,000 men—reached the northeastern segment of the ring around Komatsubara. One day of hard fighting revealed they lacked the strength to break the encirclement. General Ogisu ordered the 7th Division to pull back and redeploy near his own 6th Army headquarters, about 4 miles east of Nomonhan and the border claimed by the enemy. There would be no outside relief for Komatsubara's forces. Throughout Aug 27–28, Soviet aircraft, artillery, armor, and infantry pounded the three Japanese pockets, compressing them into ever-smaller pockets and grinding them down. The surrounded Japanese fought fiercely and inflicted heavy casualties, but the outcome was inevitable. After the remaining Japanese artillery batteries were silenced, Soviet tanks ruled the battlefield. One by one, major pockets were overrun. Some smaller groups managed to slip through Soviet lines and reach safety east of the border claimed by the MPR, where they were left unmolested by the Red Army. Elements of Potapov's 57th and 82nd Divisions eliminated the last remnants of resistance south of the Holsten by the evening of Aug 27. North of the Holsten, during the night of Aug 28–29, a group of about 400 Japanese tried to slip east through the Soviet lines along the riverbank. They were spotted by the 293rd Regiment (57th Division), which struck them. The fleeing Japanese refused to surrender and were wiped out attempting to recross the Holsten.   Japanese soldiers' refusal to surrender is well documented. Surrender was considered dishonorable; the Army Field Manual was silent on surrender. For officers, death was not merely preferable to surrender; it was expected, and in some cases required. The penal code (1908, not revised until 1942) stated that surrender was dereliction of duty; if a commander did his best to resist, imprisonment could follow; if not, death. Stemming from Bushido, regimental colors were treated as sacred. On the afternoon of Aug 28, with much of his 64th Regiment destroyed, Colonel Yamagata saw no alternative but to burn the regimental colors and then commit suicide. Part of the flagpole had been shattered; the chrysanthemum crest damaged. Yamagata, Colonel Ise (artillery regimental commander), an infantry captain, a medical lieutenant, and a foot soldier—the last survivors of the headquarters unit—faced east, shouted "banzai" for the emperor, drenched the pennant in gasoline, and lit it. Yamagata, Ise, and the captain then shot themselves. The flag and crest were not entirely consumed, and the unburned remnants were buried beneath Yamagata's unmarked body. The medical officer and the soldier escaped and reported these rites to 6th Army HQ, where the deaths of the two colonels were mourned, but there was concern over whether the regimental colors had been entirely destroyed. On Aug 29, Lieutenant Colonel Higashi Muneharu, who had taken command of the 71st Regiment, faced the same dilemma. The regimental standard was broken into four pieces and, with the flag and chrysanthemum crest, drenched with fuel and set on fire. The fire kept going out, and the tassels were especially hard to burn. It took 45 minutes to finish the job, all under enemy fire. Afterward, Higashi urged all able to join him in a suicide charge, and the severely wounded to "kill themselves bravely when the enemy approached." Soviet machine-gun fire and grenades felled Higashi and his followers within moments. When it became clear on Aug 29 that all hope was lost, Komatsubara resolved to share the fate of his 23rd Division. He prepared to commit suicide, entrusted his will to his aide, removed his epaulets, and burned his code books. General Ogisu ordered Komatsubara to save himself and lead as many of his men as possible out of the encirclement. Shortly before midnight on Aug 30, the bulk of the Soviet armor briefly pulled back to refuel and resupply. Some of the Soviet infantry also pulled back. Komatsubara and about 400 survivors of his command used the opportunity to slip through the Soviet lines, guiding wounded by starlight to safety at Chiangchunmiao on the morning of Aug 31. Tsuji was among the survivors. In transit, Komatsubara was so distraught he needed to be restrained from taking his own life. A fellow officer took his pistol, and two sturdy corporals helped to support him, preventing him from drawing his sword. On August 31, Zhukov declared the disputed territory between the Halha River and the boundary line through Nomonhan cleared of enemy troops. The Sixth Army had been annihilated, with between 18,000 and 23,000 men killed or wounded from May to September (not counting Manchukuoan losses). The casualty rate in Komatsubara's 23rd Division reached 76%, and Sumi's 26th Regiment (7th Division) suffered 91% casualties. Kwantung Army lost many of its tanks and heavy guns and nearly 150 aircraft. It was the worst military defeat in modern Japanese history up to that time. Soviet claims later put total Japanese casualties at over 50,000, though this figure is widely regarded as inflated. For years, Soviet-MPR authorities claimed 9,284 casualties, surely an underestimate. A detailed unit-by-unit accounting published in Moscow in 2002 put Soviet losses at 25,655 (9,703 killed, 15,952 wounded), plus 556 MPR casualties. While Soviet casualties may have exceeded Japanese losses, this reflects the fierceness of Japanese defense and questions Zhukov's expenditutre of blood. There was no denying, however, that the Red Army demonstrated substantial strength and that Kwantung Army suffered a serious defeat. Knowledgeable Japanese and Soviet sources agree that given the annihilation of Komatsubara's forces and the dominance of Soviet air power, if Zhukov had pressed beyond Nomonhan toward Hailar, local Japanese forces would have fallen into chaos, Hailar would have fallen, and western Manchuria would have been gravely threatened. But while that might have been militarily possible, Moscow did not intend it. Zhukov's First Army Group halted at the boundary line claimed by the MPR. A Japanese military historian notes that "Kwantung Army completely lost its head." KwAHQ was enraged by the battlefield developments. Beyond the mauling of the Sixth Army at Nomonhan, there was anxiety over regimental colors. It was feared that Colonel Yamagata might not have had time to destroy the imperial crest of the 64th Regiment's colors, which could have fallen into Soviet hands. Thousands of dead and wounded littered the field. To preserve "face" and regain leverage, a swift, decisive counterstroke was deemed necessary. At Hsinking, they decided on an all-out war against the USSR. They planned to throw the 7th, 2nd, 4th, and 8th Divisions into the Sixth Army, along with all heavy artillery in Manchukuo, to crush the enemy. Acknowledging shortages in armor, artillery, and air power, they drafted a plan for a series of successive night offenses beginning on September 10. This was viewed as ill-advised for several reasons: September 10 was an unrealistic target given Kwantung Army's limited logistical capacity; it was unclear what the Red Army would be doing by day, given its superiority in tanks, artillery, and air power; autumn would bring extreme cold that could immobilize forces; and Germany's alliance with the Soviet Union isolated Japan diplomatically. These factors were known at KwAHQ, yet the plan proceeded. Kwantung Army notified AGS to "utilize the winter months well," aiming to mobilize the entire Japanese Army for a decisive spring confrontation. However, the Nomonhan defeat coincided with the Hitler-Stalin pact's diplomatic fallout. The push for close military cooperation with Germany against the Soviet Union was discredited in a single week. Defeated and abandoned by Hitler, pro-German, anti-Soviet policy advocates in Tokyo were furious. Premier Hiranuma Kiichiro's government resigned on August 28. In response, more cautious voices in Tokyo asserted control. General Nakajima, deputy chief of AGS, went to Hsinking with Imperial Order 343, directing Kwantung Army to hold near the disputed frontier with "minimal strength" to enable a quick end to hostilities and a diplomatic settlement. But at KwAHQ, the staff pressed their case, and Nakajima eventually approved a general offensive to begin on September 10. The mood at KwAHQ was ebullient. Upon returning to Tokyo, Nakajima was sternly rebuked and ordered to stand down. General Ueda appealed to higher authority, requesting permission to clear the battlefield and recover the bodies of fallen soldiers. He was denied and later relieved of command on September 6. A reshuffle followed at KwAHQ, with several senior officers reassigned. The Japanese Foreign Ministry directed Ambassador Togo Shigenori to negotiate a settlement in Moscow. The Molotov-Togo agreement was reached on September 15–16, establishing a temporary frontier and a commission to redemarcate the boundary. The local cease-fire arrangements were formalized on September 18–19, and both sides agreed to exchange prisoners and corpses. In the aftermath, Kwantung Army leadership and the Red Army leadership maintained tight control over communications about the conflict. News of the defeat spread through Manchuria and Japan, but the scale of the battle was not fully suppressed. The Kwantung Army's reputation suffered further from subsequent punishments of officers deemed to have mishandled the Nomonhan engagement. Several officers were compelled to retire or commit suicide under pressure, and Ioki's fate became a particular symbol of the army's dishonor and the heavy costs of the campaign. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In August 1939, Soviet General Georgy Zhukov launched a decisive offensive against Japanese forces at Nomonhan. Under cover of darkness, Soviet troops crossed the Halha River, unleashing massive air and artillery barrages on August 20. Fierce fighting ensued, with failed Japanese counterattacks, the fall of Fui Heights, and annihilation of encircled pockets by Soviet tanks and infantry. 

When societies are in crisis, people tend to seek alternative belief systems to give them comfort, explain a complex world, or fill a space left vacant by discredited ideologies and faiths. Like the embrace of spiritualism after the mass death during the American Civil War. The growth of millenarian movements and cults for fear of the end times. Or even the embrace of conspiracy theories to explain the unimaginable. The Soviet Union was no exception. As the system broke apart and Marxism-Leninism was tossed aside, a questioning of dominant narratives took root. Soviet citizens began to seek new belief systems–astrology, gurus, alternative medicines, sects and cults, and fantastical historical narratives. Joseph Kellner was struck by this explosion of belief seeking and wanted to understand it. Why did Russian citizens gravitate to new forms of belief? What was lost with the collapse of the Soviet system and what opportunities did a new society offer? And what does this all say about the need for humans to believe in, well, something? The Eurasian Knot spoke to Joseph about his book, The Spirit of Socialism: Culture and Belief at the Soviet Collapse, to get a sense of this urge to embrace new beliefs and how they shaped experience during the collapse of the Soviet Union.Guest:Joseph Kellner teaches Russian and Soviet history at the University of Georgia. He's the author of The Spirit of Socialism: Culture and Belief at the Soviet Collapse published by Cornell University Press. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Soviet-born filmmaker Julia Loktev came to Moscow in 2021 to make a film about independent journalists being declared “foreign agents” by Putin's regime. Her film “My Undesirable Friends” ended up becoming a rare glimpse into the lives of brave female journalists speaking truth to power in the face of Putin's war against Ukraine. In her discussion with Tiller, Julia shares how loneliness inspires her to tell real stories (3:30), her secrets to filming verité (8:00), the advantages that filming on iPhones provided (18:00), the organization behind the chaos of shooting for hours (27:00), and what's to come in Part Two of this film (36:00). Produced by: Jacob Miller Executive Producer: Tiller Russell Music by: James Carroll, Graham Tracey & Zydepunk Distributed by: Jake Brennan & Brady Sadler, Double Elvis Productions

In 1975, an idealistic Soviet political officer decided it was time to restart the Communist Revolution, and that the best way to do that was by fomenting mutiny on a state-of-the-art anti-submarine destroyer with nuclear capabilities. https://order-of-the-jackalope.com/mutiny-on-the-storozhevoy/ Presented by #42, Alex Baumans. Alex is pathologically interested in anything unusual and obscure. He's a closet goth, armchair general and amateur theologian. His favorite animals are ducks, octopodes and pigs. You will also find him surprisingly knowledgable about K-Pop girl groups. Key sources for this episode include Michael Fredholm Von Essen's The Hunt for the Storozhevoy and Gregory D. Young and Nate Braden's The Last Sentry. The Ancient and Esoteric Order of the Jackalope is a secret society devoted to the idea that that which is least known is best to know. Each episode we share a strange story or amazing fact, and no topic is off limits -- if it's interesting or entertaining, we'll cover about it! Email: jackalope@order-of-the-jackalope.com Bluesky: https://bsky.app/profile/order-of-the-jackalope.com Discord: https://discord.gg/Mbap3UQyCB YouTube: https://youtube.com/@orderjackalope

Send a textIt was the largest open shooting of the Holocaust (and perhaps in history).  Yet the murder in Babi Yar of 33,000+ Jews and other victims remained for much of its postwar life, unmarked and uncommemorated, at least officially.In this episode, I talked with VIctoria Khiterer about the fascinating history of Jews in Kyiv, before, during, and after the Holocaust.  It's an insightful look into challenge of Holocaust memory from the Soviet period to modern-day Ukraine.Victoria Khiterer is a Professor of History at Millersville University.Khiterer, Victoria. Bitter War of Memory: The Babyn Yar Massacre, Aftermath, and Commemoration (2025) Follow on Twitter @holocaustpod.Email the podcast at holocausthistorypod@gmail.comThe Holocaust History Podcast homepage is hereYou can find a complete reading list with books by our guests and also their suggestions here.

Sonia Pernell highlights Pamela's mentorship of Bill Clinton, her strategic fundraising for the Democratic Party, and her diplomatic influence in fostering relations with Soviet leaders. 7.

Video link to this episode: https://youtu.be/Nmw9jZM2aYUThe story of a Jew who grew up in the Soviet Union and learned little about his Judaism but some other hard lessons that would shape his life.Dan is a high-level interpreter and a thoughtful, intelligent man. He reached out to me after noticing how different his experience as a Soviet Jew was from mine. I grew up deeply engaged with my Jewishness, while he grew up almost entirely disconnected from it. Our conversation convinced me that Dan's story needed to be documented and shared, so I invited him onto my podcast. What I heard was remarkable: the horrors his family endured, the gripping archival material he inherited documenting his grandparents' ordeals, and his unique perspective from working inside contemporary human rights organizations and other governmental bodies. Dan believes the progressive mission, which he sees as well-intentioned, is nonetheless misguided and heading toward dangerous territory. He also reflects candidly on the antisemitism he's encountered in his work as a translator in a world increasingly hostile to Israel.If you would like to get in touch with Dan, you can write to him at: pr.pleischner@gmail.comWant more on Soviet Jewry?My interview with Anna Shternshishttps://youtu.be/hKN0_75EuqEMy interview with Igor Golyakhttps://youtu.be/E5_n3p3Oto0Leave a comment with your thoughts!Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-frieda-vizel-podcast--5824414/support.

Bright fireball. Military lockdown. Egyptian-like symbols on a bronze acorn. In this deep dive, we unravel the 1965 Kecksburg UFO incident—witnesses, cover-up claims, Soviet probes, Nazi bells, and secret US tech. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

While Colors of the Dark is on break, bonus show Deep Cuts is back with another round of wild, weird, and wonderful cinema. This episode serves up a diverse mix of pure what-the-heckery, including lost 1980s gems (with some SOV), recent found-footage discoveries, Jess Franco, and another Soviet-era deep cut.

Democrats really did choose illegals over Americans, by letting in thousands of known illegal immigrant sex offenders, deliberately, at the border. They even had a secret system for processing them. Liberal media tries, and fails, to destroy the USA Hockey team and Jack Hughes for wrong think. The FBI was running a Soviet-style spy state, and Kash Patel and Susie Wiles got ensnared in it. (Please subscribe & share.) Sources: https://revolver.news/2026/02/you-better-sit-down-for-this-one-heres-how-biden-regime-got-illegals-on-commercial-flights/ https://justthenews.com/government/federal-agencies/fbi-opened-1200-assessments-politicians-journalists-religious-leaders https://www.foxnews.com/sports/karoline-leavitts-white-house-photo-team-usa-stars-ignites-online-fury-maga-hat https://redstate.com/sister-toldjah/2026/02/25/chuck-schumer-steps-in-it-with-post-sotu-remarks-n2199583

Spying without warrants. Calls for executions in political meetings. And Democrats afraid to condemn violence publicly. Today on AmperWave Daily, we examine claims that a radical Marxist faction is reshaping the Democrat Party — and what insiders say about their public and private behavior.

Friend of Them Before Us, Katy Talento is a Harvard-trained epidemiologist, naturopathic doctor, and former Trump White House health policy advisor who spent two decades inside the DC healthcare machine — then left to help everyday people and employers outsmart it. She writes about health policy, natural medicine, and how to live like a human — from real food and hormonal health to how to cut your medical bills in half using rules she personally helped write. All of it's at KatyTalento.com.For some of her recent articles, check out:Infertile, her guest post for our TBU substack - https://thembeforeus.substack.com/p/infertileOutsmart the Medical Billing Trap — a free step-by-step playbook for patients to fight back against medical bills, using rules she personally helped write in the White House https://www.katytalento.com/p/outsmart-the-medical-billing-trap?r=158d0wHospitals are Soviet-style Hellscapes Unfit for Humans - A Patient, Caregiver and Policy Manifestohttps://www.katytalento.com/p/hospitals-are-soviet-style-hellscapesSee more from Katy at @katytalento for IG, X, LinkedIn and https://www.facebook.com/katytalento.nd/

David Satter is a journalist and historian with unique insights into how the deformation and repression of the past, is having terrible consequences for present day Russia. David has written extensively about Russia and the Soviet Union, especially the decline and fall of the USSR and rise of post-Soviet Russia. David Satter became the first American journalist to be expelled from Russia since the Cold War in December 2013. This was perhaps not a surprising move, given that his books have covered topics such as the FSB's role in the apartment bombings that brought Putin to power. From 1976 to 1982 David was the Moscow correspondent of the Financial Times, and then became a special correspondent on Soviet affairs for The Wall Street Journal. He is currently a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a fellow of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. ----------BOOKS:He is author of several books that are essential reading to help understand the origins of the current crisis, including the brilliantly named books: - It Was a Long Time Ago, and It Never Happened Anyway- Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State- The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep----------LINKS:https://davidsatter.com/https://twitter.com/davidsatter?lang=enhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Satterhttps://www.hudson.org/experts/362-david-satterhttps://www.fpri.org/contributor/david-satter/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/authors/david-satter----------SUPPORT THE CHANNEL:https://www.buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtainhttps://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtainhttps://www.gofundme.com/f/scaling-up-campaign-to-fight-authoritarian-disinformation----------A REQUEST FOR HELP!I'm heading back to Kyiv this week, to film, do research and conduct interviews. The logistics and need for equipment and clothing are a little higher than for my previous trips. It will be cold, and may be dark also. If you can, please assist to ensure I can make this trip a success. My commitment to the audience of the channel, will be to bring back compelling interviews conducted in Ukraine, and to use the experience to improve the quality of the channel, it's insights and impact. Let Ukraine and democracy prevail! https://buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtain/extrashttps://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtainhttps://www.gofundme.com/f/scaling-up-campaign-to-fight-authoritarian-disinformationNONE OF THIS CAN HAPPEN WITHOUT YOU!So what's next? We're going to Kyiv in January 2026 to film on the ground, and will record interviews with some huge guests. We'll be creating opportunities for new interviews, and to connect you with the reality of a European city under escalating winter attack, from an imperialist, genocidal power. PLEASE HELP ME ME TO GROW SILICON CURTAINWe are planning our events for 2026, and to do more and have a greater impact. After achieving more than 12 events in 2025, we will aim to double that! 24 events and interviews on the ground in Ukraine, to push back against weaponized information, toxic propaganda and corrosive disinformation. Please help us make it happen!----------PLATFORMS:Substack: https://substack.com/@siliconcurtain?Twitter: https://twitter.com/CurtainSiliconInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/siliconcurtain/Podcast: https://open.spotify.com/show/4thRZj6NO7y93zG11JMtqmLinkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/finkjonathan/Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtain----------

Ukraine's cities were failing long before the Russian invasion began. Kyiv and Lviv ranked among the 40 most congested cities in the world, yet neither makes the top 100 by population. Ninety per cent of Ukraine's housing stock was built before 1990. Its urban infrastructure was designed for a Soviet economy and never properly adapted for the one that followed. So when reconstruction begins, the question is not simply how to repair what was there: it is whether repairing what was there is the right goal.Edward Glaeser of Harvard, Martina Kirchberger of Trinity College Dublin, and Andrii Parkhomenko of the University of Southern California argue that the most instructive precedent is not post-USSR Warsaw, or postwar Berlin, it is postwar Tokyo. Firebombed into ruin, Tokyo rebuilt in a way that was strikingly decentralised: master plans quickly abandoned, local communities empowered to combine small lots through land readjustment, and figure it out from the bottom up. Before the war, Ukraine's economic activity was already shifting away from heavy industry and the east, towards services and the west. Reconstruction that concentrates investment where the damage is greatest, rather than where people want to build a new life, would repair the buildings and miss the point.The research behind this episode:Glaeser, Edward L., Martina Kirchberger, and Andrii Parkhomenko. 2025. "Rebuilding Ukraine's Cities: Maximizing Benefits and Minimizing Costs." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues, special issue: "What's Next for Ukraine?" To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim. 2026, "What's Next for Ukraine: Reconstruction." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues (podcast). Assign this as extra listening: the citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestsEdward Glaeser is Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics at Harvard University and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He is one of the world's leading urban economists, with a research agenda spanning cities, housing markets, economic growth, and governance.Martina Kirchberger is a CEPR Research Affiliate and Assistant Professor in Economics at Trinity College Dublin. Her research focuses on structural transformation, urban economics, and development in low- and middle-income countries.Andrii Parkhomenko is Assistant Professor of Real Estate at the USC Marshall School of Business and a researcher at the Kyiv School of Economics. His work centers on urban and spatial economics, with a particular focus on housing markets and city growth.Research cited in this episodeUkraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, World Bank Group, European Commission, and UN, 2024. The source of the physical damage figure cited in this episode: approximately $175 billion by the end of 2024, with estimates for end-2025 likely exceeding $200 billion. Some independent projections cited by Glaeser run to $500 billion or above.The concept of investing-in-investing, referenced by Kirchberger, originates in work by Paul Collier on how resource-rich developing countries can scale up capital investment effectively. It refers to the prior investments in institutions, skills, and capacity that must be made before large-scale capital flows can be productively absorbed. The implication for Ukraine: there is work to do now, before reconstruction begins at scale.The Tokyo land readjustment model, which Glaeser cited as the most instructive reconstruction precedent, allowed owners of small fragmented lots to pool their land, redevelop it jointly, and receive a share of the new property in exchange for their stake in the old. It enabled large-scale urban reconstruction without central expropriation, and without waiting for government direction. The mechanism remains in active use in Japanese urban planning.The Solidere reconstruction of central Beirut was raised as a cautionary counterexample: a centralised, top-down rebuild that produced a high-end commercial district with questionable benefit to ordinary Lebanese, and which substantially enriched its private shareholders. The contrast with Tokyo's decentralised model is the episode's sharpest illustration of what reconstruction can and cannot achieve when organised from above.More in the "What's Next for Ukraine?" seriesThis episode is the second in a three-part series based on papers presented at the inaugural Economic Policy winter conference, Paris, December 2025.Episode 1: Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Maurice Obstfeld on the investment and financing challenge: $40 billion a year, debt restructuring as a prerequisite for private capital, and why the number is more achievable than it sounds.Episode 3: Demobilisation and the labour market: getting soldiers back into work without breaking the economy that kept the country going. Related reading on VoxEURebuilding cities in Ukraine: A VoxEU column on the urban reconstruction challenge, including the spatial decisions that will shape how Ukraine's cities develop in the decades after the war.A blueprint for the reconstruction of Ukraine: A comprehensive VoxEU overview of the reconstruction architecture: what institutions are needed, how international financing can be coordinated, and what the sequencing of investment should look like.Completing Ukraine's reconstruction architecture: On the remaining gaps in the international framework for financing and coordinating Ukraine's rebuild, and what needs to happen before reconstruction can begin at the required scale.Lessons for rebuilding Ukraine from economic recoveries after natural disasters: What the evidence from post-disaster reconstruction in other countries tells us about what works, what fails, and how quickly economies can return to their pre-shock trajectories.

New revelations suggest federal investigators obtained phone and toll records connected to current White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles during 2022 and 2023 — actions reportedly tied to the broader special counsel investigation led by Jack Smith into then-former President Donald Trump. Sources indicate at least ten FBI employees were fired following internal review, with more personnel actions possible. FBI Director Kash Patel called the situation “outrageous and deeply disturbing.” Meanwhile, reporting from investigative journalist John Solomon cites a Government Accountability Office review alleging that the FBI opened more than 1,200 “assessments” into political figures, journalists, and clergy using investigative authorities that do not require a criminal predicate. Tara breaks down the timeline, the legal questions, the political implications, and why some lawmakers are calling for sweeping structural reforms inside the Bureau. Is this routine intelligence authority — or something far bigger?

Israel's lighting campaign in the Sinai in 1956 resulted in a routing of the Egyptian forces and capture of the entire Sinai Peninsula in less than 100 hours. The threat of Egypt deploying its brand-new military hardware from the Soviet Union had been averted. But in a fluke of history, President Eisenhower, instead of siding with his natural allies, Britain, France and Israel, sided with the Soviet Union and Nasser's Egypt and demanded immediate Israeli withdrawal in return for nothing – or else! Eventually Israel received guarantees of right of passage through the Staits of Tiran and that the United Nations Expeditionary Force would be stationed in Gaza to prevent the penetration of Fedayeen terrorists into Israel. Israel's case against the unaccommodating Eisenhower administration, most notably Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was assisted by Lyndon Johnson, Democratic leader in the Senate, and members of the press and Congress who were friends of Israel. The United States was employing a painful double standard by not doing anything as Hungarian protestors demanded freedom from Soviet oppression, and were murdered wholesale for their dissidence; yet the United States demanded with the threat of immediate sanctions, that Israel, which had gone to war for legitimate grievances, immediately withdraw from the entire Sinai. Israel gained from the battle a decade of quiet which was so necessary to build the State, and in the process demonstrated that the Middle East had a new military power. Credits Welcome Back Kotter theme song – The Great Take Royal Entrance Fanfare - Randy Dunn Ben Power Amen (official video) The Soviets Crushed the Hungarian Revolution by Trickery - USSR Decoded  The Suez Crisis (1956): Eisenhower's Response to the Anglo-French-Israeli Action – History Central Learn more at TellerFromJerusalem.com Don't forget to subscribe, like and share! Let all your friends know that that they too can have a new favorite podcast. © 2026 Media Education Trust llc

Danny Rensch was born into a cult that weaponized chess for prestige. He's here to explain how he broke free on part one of this two-part episode.Full show notes and resources can be found here: jordanharbinger.com/1289What We Discuss with Danny Rensch:Cults don't always start with sinister blueprints. The Church of Immortal Consciousness where Danny Rensch was raised grew from self-help roots and communal idealism into full financial control — where members surrendered everything, kids shared bathwater, and the shoe list became a euphemism for "you don't matter enough to get a pair."The cult weaponized chess the same way the Soviet Union did — as a tool for prestige. Danny was identified as a prodigy, deliberately separated from his mother, and groomed as the collective's golden child. His talent wasn't nurtured for his sake — it was exploited for the cult leader's ego.By age 13, Danny was living alone, traveling to national chess tournaments with pockets full of cash and no adult supervision. The neglect wasn't just emotional — it was physical. Untreated swimmer's ear became severe infection, leaving him 60% deaf in one ear and 40% in the other.A drunk, defecting Soviet grandmaster named Igor Ivanov — who once fled the KGB during an emergency plane stop — became Danny's live-in chess coach. Igor had carte blanche to drink and do as he pleased, making him the cult's most functional dysfunction and Danny's unlikely lifeline to the wider chess world.Despite growing up as a high school dropout in a cult with no formal education, Danny became a successful writer and helped build Chess.com — proof that curiosity, baseline intelligence, and sheer determination can outrun even the most rigged starting hand. Motivated people can learn faster than any institution expects them to.And much more...And if you're still game to support us, please leave a review here — even one sentence helps! Sign up for Six-Minute Networking — our free networking and relationship development mini course — at jordanharbinger.com/course!Subscribe to our once-a-week Wee Bit Wiser newsletter today and start filling your Wednesdays with wisdom!Do you even Reddit, bro? Join us at r/JordanHarbinger!This Episode Is Brought To You By Our Fine Sponsors: BetterHelp: 10% off first month: betterhelp.com/jordanGood Chop: $50 off + free shipping on first order: goodchop.com/podcast, code 50JORDANMomentous: 20% off first order: livemomentous.com, code JORDAN20Fundera by NerdWallet: Find the funding you deserve: nerdwallet.com/jordanTom Hardin | Tipper X: The Man Behind Wall Street's Biggest Sting | The Jordan Harbinger ShowWired on Wall Street: The Rise and Fall of Tipper X, One of the FBI's Most Prolific Informants by Tom HardinSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Mary welcomes author, speaker, consumer and privacy advocate Katherine Albrecht to the podcast. Her eyes on tech back in 2005 have been an invaluable resource for prophecy watchers. Here's some 20th century trivia for you: Did you know that the Theremin, that odd instrument that eventually produced the eerie high-pitched wails for early sci-fi films and a certain Beach Boys hit, was invented by a Soviet spy to transmit military secrets back home as early as the late ‘20s? Truth is often stranger than fiction and radio frequency tech, the true startup of our surveillance age, contains enough dots to connect to keep us busy for years. Katherine is a true expert in all such things, and her book, “Spychips” served as a warning 20 years ago that not only is Big Brother a stalker but keeps stabbing us all in the back.     Stand Up For The Truth Videos: https://rumble.com/user/CTRNOnline & https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgQQSvKiMcglId7oGc5c46A

Kerri covers the 2011 murder of Lauren Giddings, a Macon, Georgia law student whose classmate and next-door neighbor had been secretly obsessing over her for years, culminating in one of the most disturbing on-camera moments in true crime history. Donna explores the Kozyrev Mirror, a spiral aluminum cylinder built by Soviet scientists to test whether time is a physical force you can bend, and the deeply unsettling experiences reported by the people who sat inside it. If you have any local true crime, local urban legend/lore, ghost stories.. we want them all!! We want to hear from YOU. Especially if you have any funny Ambien stories! Email us at aparanormalchicks@gmail.com Join The Creepinati @ www.patreon.com/theAPCpodcast  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Epstein was the middle man connecting all the elites to the peon's they were seducing.  Most politicians today have been compromised by their lusts into the slavery of blackmail.  Epstein's mentor who recruited him into the Rothschilds syndicate was Robert Maxwell, a known Soviet spy with connections toAmerican,  British and Israeli intelligence.  The communists are talented in looking for unique ways to gain control of the world, while appearing to most as if they aren't doing anything at all. 

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance.   #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2.   On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack.   Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure. 

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