Podcasts about soviets

In 1959, the U.S. Army drafted a serious plan to build a nuclear-powered military base on the Moon.Serious... They really did.With reactors. And personnel. On purpose. It was called Project Horizon.Then JFK pivoted to Apollo, astronauts planted flags, and history books closed the case… Or did they?This week, we break down the documented Cold War Moon plans, JFK's race to beat the Soviets, MJ-12 whispers, and hacker Gary McKinnon's claim that he stumbled onto evidence of a secret space fleet and the possibility this was never really mothballed.Was Horizon just a very ambitious binder? Or was Apollo the public show while something quieter happened in the background?Join us as we separate the record from the rumors, run a thought experiment on how a hidden lunar base could work, and ask the big question: Did we just visit the Moon… or did we move in? All that and more this week on Hysteria 51!Special thanks to this week's research sources:Project Horizon (1959 U.S. Army Lunar Base Study)U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Agency. Project Horizon: A U.S. Army Study for the Establishment of a Lunar Military Outpost (1959). Declassified study outlining a proposed military lunar base. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB479/docs/EBB-Moon01_sm.pdfU.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. “Project Horizon History Overview.” https://www.army.mil/article/189129/smdc_history_project_horizon_abma_explores_a_lunar_outpost“Project Horizon.” Wikipedia overview with citations. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_HorizonJFK & The Decision to Go to the MoonJohn F. Kennedy Presidential Library. “Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs” (May 25, 1961). https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/special-message-to-the-congress-on-urgent-national-needs-19610525 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. “Address at Rice University on the Nation's Space Effort” (Sept 12, 1962). https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/address-at-rice-university-on-the-nations-space-effort-19620912 NASA History Office. “JFK and the Decision to Go to the Moon.” https://www.nasa.gov/history/60-years-ago-president-kennedy-proposes-moon-landing-goal-in-speech-to-congress/Majestic 12 (MJ-12)FBI Vault. “Majestic 12 Documents.” FBI files noting Air Force findings that core MJ-12 documents were fraudulent. https://vault.fbi.gov/Majestic%2012National Archives. JFK Assassination Records Collection. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfkAllen Dulles & Assassination ContextWarren Commission Report (1964). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-reportAssassination Records Review Board (Final Report, 1998). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/reportGary McKinnonBBC News. “Gary McKinnon hacking case timeline.” https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-19946958 U.S. Department of Justice (archived release on McKinnon indictment). https://www.justice.gov/archive/criminal/cybercrime/mckinnonIndict.htmCold War Classified Space Programs (Context)CIA. “The CORONA Satellite Program.” https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/the-corona-satellite-program/ Email us your favorite WEIRD news stories:weird@hysteria51.comSupport the Show:Get exclusive content & perks as well as an ad and sponsor free experience at https://www.patreon.com/Hysteria51 from just $1Shop:Be the Best Dressed at your Cult Meeting!https://www.teepublic.com/stores/hysteria51?ref_id=9022See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance.   #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2.   On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack.   Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure. 

The United States Hockey team just won its first gold medal in Men's Olympic Hockey in 46 years.Almost to the day that team USA pulled off one of the greatest upsets in history, beating the Soviets in the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid New York.In this short podcast bulletin, Historically Speaking Sports Podcast co-host Dana Auguster talks about the other two instances that team USA had won the gold in Olympic Hockey.Please like and subscribe and to contact the show, please write to us at Historically.Speaking.Sports@gmail.com

Yes we know that's a lengthy title. By the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, New York, it had been 20 years since the U.S. won the gold. Those two decades saw a dominance unlike any other at the time by the Soviet Union and their seemingly unbeatable team. The Cold War was front and center. Expectations were pretty low for the U.S. Men's team going into the games but through a series of lucky events a man named Herb Brooks was put in the driver seat. Herb was coming off a NCAA Hockey National Championship in 1979 at the University of Minnesota and looked to create a team that could stand toe to toe with the Soviets using creativity and team chemistry. Now we should note this comes at a time when professional athletes didn't compete on olympic national teams. This team would be comprised of college athletes, many from Minnesota and many from Boston, and oh man some of these guys did not like each other, carrying over rivalries from school. They only had about 7 months to become a team capable of doing what many believed impossible. Well if you know the story, you know they did, and what follows would come to be known as The Miracle on Ice. Support the show

Send a textWhen we pursue excellence for Godly reasons, guided by love and truth, our actions will honor God and build up rather than tear down.James 3:16: For where there is envy and selfish ambition, there is disorder and every evil practice.Support the show

Lieutenant General Mike Fenzel recently retired as a three-star Army General. He most recently served as the United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, navigating one of the world's most complex geopolitical landscapes. His career is defined by high-stakes leadership, ranging from the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, where he was stationed in the bunker alongside Vice President Dick Cheney, to multiple deployments to Afghanistan, to commanding an airborne brigade of 5,500 paratroopers. Beyond the battlefield, Fenzel is a scholar of strategic decision-making. His book, No Miracles, analyzes the internal Soviet failures during their occupation of Afghanistan.In this episode of Summation, Mike and Auren discuss:Why the Soviets took four years to exit AfghanistanLessons from leading security cooperation in JerusalemIsrael's dominance in security techWhy US foreign policy experts keep failingYou can find Auren Hoffman on X at @auren and Mike Fenzel on LinkedIn.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war.   #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed:  (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata,  (2) comms failures,  (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently.   This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion.  2. Trust Kwantung localization.  3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks;  2) bombing risks escalation;  3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July.   Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff  By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.

The story of John Graham, a Canadian diplomat in 1960s Cuba who became an unlikely spy during the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Because the United States had no embassy or formal presence in Cuba after the revolution, President John F. Kennedy quietly asked Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson for help. Pearson turned to Graham, a reserved career diplomat rather than a James Bond‑style operative, and tasked him with confirming whether the Soviets were actually removing their nuclear weapons from the island.Graham declined CIA spy gadgets, including a covert camera, because being caught with obvious espionage equipment would have been too dangerous. Instead, he relied entirely on his remarkable memory, driving around Cuba in check shirts and khakis, observing troop movements, equipment, missile silhouettes, and radar installations from the outside, then returning to the Canadian embassy each day to reconstruct everything from memory, down to distances, serial numbers, and layouts. His detailed reports, cross‑checked with imperfect high‑altitude spy photography, helped reassure Washington that the Soviets were indeed complying, contributing quietly but significantly to the de‑escalation of the crisis. For this work, Graham received no parade or public recognition, simply continuing his career as a successful Canadian diplomat. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

I speak with Bruce Berglund, the author of The Moscow Playbook: How Russia Used, Abused, and Transformed Sports in the Hunt for Power, which is a fascinating journey through the world of Soviet sports and its intricate ties to politics as a means of soft power and national pride. We learn how the Soviets achieved strategic advantage through women's sports, the abuse of amateur status, the controversial topic of doping and how sports science revolutionised the performance of athletes. Listeners will also hear about the iconic "Miracle on Ice" ice hockey game in 1980, where the U.S. amateur team defeated the seasoned Soviet professionals, and how this event was perceived on both sides of the Cold War divide. Buy the book here and support the podcast Episode extras here https://coldwarconversations.com/episode443 Go to https://surfshark.com/coldwardeal or use code COLDWARDEAL at checkout to get 4 extra months of Surfshark VPN! Help me preserve Cold War history via a simple monthly donation, You'll become part of our community, get ad-free episodes, and get a sought-after CWC coaster as a thank you and you'll bask in the warm glow of knowing you are helping to preserve Cold War history. Just go to ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/⁠⁠⁠⁠ If a monthly contribution is not your cup of tea, We also welcome one-off donations via the same link. Find the ideal gift for the Cold War enthusiast in your life! Just go to ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/store/⁠⁠⁠⁠ CONTINUE  THE COLD WAR CONVERSATION BlueSky ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://bsky.app/profile/coldwarpod.bsky.social⁠⁠⁠⁠ Threads ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.threads.net/@coldwarconversations⁠⁠⁠⁠ Twitter/X ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://twitter.com/ColdWarPod⁠⁠⁠⁠ Facebook ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.facebook.com/groups/coldwarpod/⁠⁠⁠⁠ Instagram ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/coldwarconversations/⁠⁠⁠⁠ Youtube ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://youtube.com/@ColdWarConversations⁠⁠⁠ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

A two-hundred-year-old presidential speech has shaped how the United States sees its role in the world ever since. At the time, it sounded like a modest declaration from a young and uncertain nation. What would come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine would grow into something far more powerful... and far more controversial.Christopher Nichols, Professor of History at Ohio State University, joins us for this episode. Chris is the Wayne Woodrow Hayes Chair in National Security Studies and his works include ‘Rethinking American Grand Strategy' and ‘Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of the Global Age'. He has previously appeared on Ep. 261 ‘President Eisenhower: War on Soviets and Segregation'Edited by Aidan Lonergan. Produced by Tom Delargy. Senior Producer is Freddy Chick.Sign up to History Hit for hundreds of hours of original documentaries, with a new release every week and ad-free podcasts. Sign up at https://www.historyhit.com/subscribe.  All music from Epidemic Sounds.American History Hit is a History Hit podcast. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

As World War II ends, Iran becomes the first battleground of the Cold War. After Stalin reaches for northern oil, a calculated gamble in Tehran determines whether the country will split or survive. Follow us on Instagram, TikTok or X (Twitter). Support this show on Patreon. Episode Summary As World War II ended, the world shifted. Britain weakened. The United States and the Soviet Union rose. And oil, now the lifeblood of modern power, moved to the center of global politics. In Iran, the Soviets wanted their share. With troops still stationed in the north, Moscow backed a new movement in Azerbaijan. Led by Jafar Pishevari, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party declared regional autonomy and began governing the province with Soviet support. In Tehran, the Tudeh Party echoed its demands, and pressure mounted inside parliament to negotiate. Iran resisted. The Majlis refused to grant oil concessions. The government appealed to the newly formed United Nations. The crisis deepened as Soviet forces refused to withdraw. Then, Ahmad Qavam returned to power at a critical moment. A veteran of earlier political battles, he chose negotiation over confrontation. He travelled to Moscow, promised to submit a joint oil company to parliament, and bought time, waiting for the deadline set by the Tripartite Treaty. As relations between Washington and Moscow hardened, Iran became one of the first tests of the emerging Cold War. Under growing international pressure, Stalin agreed to withdraw Soviet troops in March 1946. Once they were gone, parliament overwhelmingly rejected the oil deal. Iranian forces marched into Azerbaijan, dismantled the autonomous government, arrested the Azerbaijan Democratic Party members, and restored central control. Pishevari fled north. The movement collapsed. Qavam had outmaneuvered Stalin. But it was the young Mohammad Reza Shah who stood at the center of the victory, presenting himself as the guardian of Iran's unity. The Soviet threat had receded. The struggle over Iran's oil had not. Music Christoffer Moe Ditlevsen – Monarch of Fate Jay Varton – First Second Kai Engel – Somnolence Dian Shuai – The Only Way Out Edvard Grieg – Peer Gynt Suite No. 1, Op. 46: No. 3 “Anitra's Dance” – Odyssey Orchestra Bonnie Grace – Scorpions Stefan Ekstorm – Turning Stones Bonnie Grace – Fractal Patterns Christoffer Moe Ditlevsen – Formula The post Book Three – Ep.2: ADP appeared first on The Lion and The Sun Podcast.

Riley Cote and Derek Settlemyre start the show talking about the Super Bowl. Getting into some hockey talk we talk about the Flyers recent stretch of games and their playoff chances, the Blue Jackets catching fire after hiring Rick Bowness, Toronto Maple Leafs' ups and downs, and the Flyers 2010 playoff run. We also discuss the Artemi Panarin trade, and we give our Olympics predictions. Captain of the 1980 USA men's Olympic hockey team Mike Eruzione joined us for an interview! Rizzo tells us about making the 1980 team, how the team trained and prepared for the Olympics, how he was named captain of the team, the rivalry between teammates from Minnesota and Massachusetts, and what it was like playing for Herb Brooks. Moving along we touch on the famous hour long bag skate, playing the Soviets BEFORE the Olympics, playing Sweden, Finland, and Czech Republic in the Olympics, and the iconic, legendary USA game vs the Soviets. We wrap up with the importance of leadership, and Mike gives us his predictions for the 2026 Olympics. Go to gt-wholesale.com and use coupon code "nasty" for 15% off. Nasty Knuckles is a Baller Sports Network production, created by co-hosts, Riley Cote and Derek "Nasty" Settlemyre. The show features a mix of interviews, never before heard story-telling, hockey-talk, and maybe some pranks... The guys bring in some of the biggest names in the hockey world for your enjoyment! Make sure to check back every week as the guys release a new episode weekly!►Click here to shop our latest merch: nastyknuckles.com/shop► Follow the show on Twitter: https://twitter.com/NastyKnuckles► Follow Riley Cote on Twitter: https://twitter.com/rileycote32► Follow Riley Cote on Instagram: https://instagram.com/rileycote32► Follow Derek Settlemyre on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dnastyworld► Follow Derek Settlemyre on Instagram: https://instagram.com/dnastyworld Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Scott Wesley Brown is a renowned Christian artist who has recorded dozens of albums and numerous #1 songs on the contemporary Christian music charts. He is also a musical missionary who uses his music to reach people all over the world. On this podcast, Scott talks with Wayne Rice and John Coulombe about his music, his missionary work, his grandparenting and much more. And in a Legacy Grandparenting first, this podcast features three of Scott's recordings. SCOTT WESLEY BROWN BIOSome people strive for success. Others find greater value in focusing on significance. Scott Wesley Brown is one such person. Artists whose careers span five decades have definitely proven their relevancy to the changing times. Scott Wesley Brown is no exception. He has shown through the years that he is a man of quality and virtue. A man who has left an indelible mark on Christian music—a prolific songwriter, dynamic vocalist, challenging author, international missionary, worship leader, and Christian music pioneer!The past several decades have seen Scott Wesley Brown's signature on no fewer than 9 number one singles in Adult-Contemporary and Inspirational music rankings. His songs have been recorded by Sandi Patti, Amy Grant, Bill Gaither, Mark Lowery, Bruce Carroll, Pat Boone, The Imperials, Petra, and international opera star Placido Domingo on his album with John Denver! Scott's music has inspired musicians to reach a higher level of excellence while moving audiences to a deeper understanding of the call that crystallized Scott Wesley Brown's commitment to spreading the gospel to over 45 countries worldwide.Brown's journal records covert missions behind the Iron Curtain and the first publicly promoted Christian music event in the U.S.S.R. It was during this August 1989 concert that over 15,000 Soviets heard the passionate cry for love and compassion while the Spirit moved some 2,000 to join in the family of Christ. Scott Wesley Brown stood side-by-side with East German brothers and sisters as the Berlin Wall came down, marking another victory for the Kingdom. He has taken over 100 musicians on trips to the mission field and provided hundreds of musical instruments to musicians and missionaries in third-world and restricted-access countries.While Scott Wesley Brown understands the global mission, he also understands church and family. Scott serves as a teaching pastor for The Legacy Coalition' grandparenting ministry in training Christian grandparents to be “Intentional”. Scott has also produced two albums for Legacy as well as several videos!Scott Wesley Brown Classics available on various music sites include:He Will Carry YouThis Little ChildThis Is The Day (A Wedding Song)My Treasure (A Wedding Song)Please Don't Send Me To AfricaGrace AloneI Wish You JesusPastor Keith Manley wrote a biography of Scott's life, music, and missions ministry called “I WISH YOU JESUS,” now available on Amazon. This tells the story of a man who discovered that worship isn't confined to a stage or sanctuary but lived in the trenches, in the margins, in the forgotten places where Christ's love is needed most!LINKS:Scott Wesley Brown: Scottwesleybrown.bandcamp.comGrandprints by Scott Wesley Brown: https://open.spotify.com/track/1o2OmF3QDoakDapxl42XrFA Shepherd Looks at Psalm 23 by Phillip Keller https://amzn.to/407bPc0The CD's “Legacy” and “Find Us Faithful” are sold out and no longer available from the Legacy Coalition. The Track listings are below and you may be able to find individual tracks online:Legacy (2018)Grandprints (Scott Wesley Brown)Hold You All Night (Wayne Watson)Finish Well (Steve and Annie Chapman)The Best I

Americans in the early 50s were told there was a "civil defence gap", and that the Soviets were superior in protecting their population? Was this true? As mentioned in the pod, I quote from two academic articles. They are:'Soviet Civil Defence: The Mineshaft Gap Revisited' by Josh M Weinstein, Arms Control Today, Vol 12, No 7, August 1982'Was There A Real Mineshaft Gap?' by Edward Geist, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol 14, No 2, Spring 2012And you can get ad-free access to the whole archive, plus all bonus episodes, if you join my Patreon here: www.patreon.com/atomichoboJulie Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Christopher Boyce and Daulton Lee's plan to sell spy satellite secrets to the Soviets is working. But Lee's also using his role as the courier between Boyce and the KGB to keep the majority of their espionage earnings for himself. But for how long can he get away with it?See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow. Following the brutal 1938 capture of Wuhan, Japanese forces aimed to solidify their hold by launching an offensive against Chinese troops in the 5th War Zone, a rugged natural fortress in northern Hubei and southern Henan. Under General Yasuji Okamura, the 11th Army deployed three divisions and cavalry in a pincer assault starting May 1, 1939, targeting Suixian and Zaoyang to crush Nationalist resistance and secure flanks. Chinese commander Li Zongren, leveraging terrain like the Dabie and Tongbai Mountains, orchestrated defenses with over 200,000 troops, including Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group. By May 23, they recaptured Suixian and Zaoyang, forcing a Japanese withdrawal with heavy losses, over 13,000 Japanese casualties versus 25,000 Chinese, restoring pre-battle lines. Shifting south, Japan targeted Shantou in Guangdong to sever supply lines from Hong Kong. In a massive June 21 amphibious assault, the 21st Army overwhelmed thin Chinese defenses, capturing the port and Chao'an despite guerrilla resistance led by Zhang Fakui. Though losses mounted, Japan tightened its blockade, straining China's war effort amid ongoing attrition.   #188 From Changkufeng to Nomonhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Well hello again, and yes you all have probably guessed we are taking another detour. Do not worry I hope to shorten this one a bit more so than what became a sort of mini series on the battle of Changkufeng or Battle of Lake Khasan. What we are about to jump into is known in the west as the battle of khalkin Gol, by the Japanese the Nomohan incident. But first I need to sort of set the table up so to say. So back on August 10th, 1938 the Litvinov-Shigemitsu agreement established a joint border commission tasked with redemarcating the disputed boundary between the Soviet Union and Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. However, this commission never achieved a mutually agreeable definition of the border in the contested area. In reality, the outcome was decided well before the group's inaugural meeting. Mere hours after the cease-fire took effect on the afternoon of August 11, General Grigory Shtern convened with a regimental commander from Japan's 19th Division to coordinate the disengagement of forces. With the conflict deemed "honorably" concluded, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters mandated the swift withdrawal of all Japanese troops to the west bank of the Tumen River. By the night of August 13, as the final Japanese soldier crossed the river, it effectively became the de facto border. Soviet forces promptly reoccupied Changkufeng Hill and the adjacent heights—a move that would carry unexpected and profound repercussions. Authoritative Japanese military analyses suggest that if negotiations in Moscow had dragged on for just one more day, the 19th Division would likely have been dislodged from Changkufeng and its surrounding elevations. Undoubtedly, General Shtern's infantry breathed a sigh of relief as the bloodshed ceased. Yet, one can't help but question why Moscow opted for a cease-fire at a juncture when Soviet troops were on the cusp of total battlefield triumph. Perhaps Kremlin leaders deemed it wiser to settle for a substantial gain, roughly three-quarters of their objectives, rather than risk everything. After all, Japan had mobilized threatening forces in eastern Manchuria, and the Imperial Army had a history of impulsive, unpredictable aggression. Moreover, amid the escalating crisis over Czechoslovakia, Moscow may have been wary of provoking a broader Asian conflict. Another theory posits that Soviet high command was misinformed about the ground situation. Reports of capturing a small segment of Changkufeng's crest might have been misinterpreted as control over the entire ridge, or an imminent full takeover before midnight on August 10. The unexpected phone call from Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to the Japanese embassy that night—proposing a one-kilometer Japanese retreat in exchange for a cease-fire along existing lines—hints at communication breakdowns between Shtern's headquarters and the Kremlin. Ironically, such lapses may have preserved Japanese military honor, allowing the 19th Division's evacuation through diplomacy rather than defeat. Both sides endured severe losses. Initial Japanese press reports claimed 158 killed and 740 wounded. However, the 19th Division's medical logs reveal a grimmer toll: 526 dead and 914 injured, totaling 1,440 casualties. The true figure may have climbed higher, possibly to 1,500–2,000. Following the armistice, the Soviet news agency TASS reported 236 Red Army fatalities and 611 wounded. Given Shtern's uphill assaults across open terrain against entrenched positions, these numbers seem understated. Attackers in such scenarios typically suffered two to three times the defenders' losses, suggesting Soviet casualties ranged from 3,000 to 5,000. This aligns with a Soviet Military Council investigation on August 31, 1938, which documented 408 killed and 2,807 wounded. Japanese estimates placed Soviet losses even higher, at 4,500–7,000. Not all victims perished in combat. Marshal Vasily Blyukher, a decorated Soviet commander, former warlord of the Far East, and Central Committee candidate, was summoned to Moscow in August 1938. Relieved of duty in September and arrested with his family in October, he faced charges of inadequate preparation against Japanese aggression and harboring "enemies of the people" within his ranks. On November 9, 1938, Blyukher died during interrogation a euphemism for torture-induced death.Other innocents suffered as well. In the wake of the fighting, Soviet authorities deported hundreds of thousands of Korean rice farmers from the Ussuri region to Kazakhstan, aiming to eradicate Korean settlements that Japanese spies had allegedly exploited. The Changkufeng clash indirectly hampered Japan's Wuhan offensive, a massive push to subdue China. The influx of troops and supplies for this campaign was briefly disrupted by the border flare-up. Notably, Kwantung Army's 2nd Air Group, slated for Wuhan, was retained due to the Soviet threat. Chiang Kai-shek's drastic measure, breaching the Yellow River dikes to flood Japanese advance routes—further delayed the assault. By October 25, 1938, when Japanese forces captured Hankow, Chiang had relocated his capital to distant Chungking. Paradoxically, Wuhan's fall cut rail links from Canton inland, heightening Chiang's reliance on Soviet aid routed overland and by air from Central Asia. Japan secured a tactical win but missed the decisive blow; Chinese resistance persisted, pinning down a million Japanese troops in occupation duties. What was the true significance of Changkufeng? For General Koiso Suetaka and the 19th Division, it evoked a mix of bitterness and pride. Those eager for combat got their share, though not on their terms. To veterans mourning fallen comrades on those desolate slopes, it might have felt like senseless tragedy. Yet, they fought valiantly under dire conditions, holding firm until a retreat that blended humiliation with imperial praise, a bittersweet inheritance. For the Red Army, it marked a crucial trial of resolve amid Stalin's purges. While Shtern's forces didn't shine brilliantly, they acquitted themselves well in adversity. The U.S. military attaché in Moscow observed that any purge-related inefficiencies had been surmounted, praising the Red Army's valor, reliability, and equipment. His counterpart in China, Colonel Joseph Stilwell, put it bluntly: the Soviets "appeared to advantage," urging skeptics to rethink notions of a weakened Red Army. Yet, by World War II's eve, many British, French, German, and Japanese leaders still dismissed it as a "paper tiger." Soviet leaders appeared content, promoting Shtern to command the Transbaikal Military District and colonel general by 1940, while honoring "Heroes of Lake Khasan" with medals. In a fiery November 7, 1938, speech, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov warned that future incursions would prompt strikes deep into enemy territory. Tokyo's views diverged sharply. Many in the military and government saw it as a stain on Imperial Army prestige, especially Kwantung Army, humiliated on Manchukuo soil it swore to protect. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji Inada, however, framed it as a successful reconnaissance, confirming Soviet border defense without broader aggression, allowing the Wuhan push to proceed safely. Critics, including Major General Gun Hashimoto and historians, questioned this. They argued IGHQ lacked contingency plans for a massive Soviet response, especially with Wuhan preparations underway since June. One expert warned Japan had "played with fire," risking Manchuria and Korea if escalation occurred. Yet, Japanese commanders gleaned few lessons, downplaying Soviet materiel superiority and maintaining disdain for Red Army prowess. The 19th Division's stand against outnumbered odds reinforced this hubris, as did tolerance for local insubordination—attitudes that would prove costly. The Kremlin, conversely, learned Japan remained unpredictable despite its China quagmire. But for Emperor Hirohito's intervention, the conflict might have ballooned. Amid purges and the Czech crisis, Stalin likely viewed it as a reminder of eastern vulnerabilities, especially with Munich advancing German threats westward. Both sides toyed with peril. Moderation won in Tokyo, but Kwantung Army seethed. On August 11, Premier Fumimaro Konoye noted the need for caution. Kwantung, however, pushed for and secured control of the disputed salient from Chosen Army by October 8, 1938. Even winter's chill couldn't quench their vengeful fire, setting the stage for future confrontations. A quick look at the regional map reveals how Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic each jut into the other's territory like protruding salients. These bulges could be seen as aggressive thrusts into enemy land, yet they also risked encirclement and absorption by the opposing empire. A northward push from western Manchuria through Mongolia could sever the MPR and Soviet Far East from the USSR's heartland. Conversely, a pincer movement from Mongolia and the Soviet Maritime Province might envelop and isolate Manchukuo. This dynamic highlights the frontier's strategic volatility in the 1930s. One particularly tense sector was the broad Mongolian salient extending about 150 miles eastward into west-central Manchukuo. There, in mid-1939, Soviet-Japanese tensions erupted into major combat. Known to the Japanese as the Nomonhan Incident and to the Soviets and Mongolians as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, this clash dwarfed the earlier Changkufeng affair in scale, duration, and impact. Spanning four months and claiming 30,000 to 50,000 casualties, it amounted to a small undeclared war, the modern era's first limited conflict between great powers. The Mongolian salient features vast, semiarid plains of sandy grassland, gently rolling terrain dotted with sparse scrub pines and low shrubs. The climate is unforgivingly continental: May brings hot days and freezing nights, while July and August see daytime highs exceeding 38°C (100°F in American units), with cool evenings. Swarms of mosquitoes and massive horseflies necessitate netting in summer. Rainfall is scarce, but dense morning fogs are common in August. Come September, temperatures plummet, with heavy snows by October and midwinter lows dipping to –34°C. This blend of North African aridity and North Dakotan winters supports only sparse populations, mainly two related but distinct Mongol tribes. The Buriat (or Barga) Mongols migrated into the Nomonhan area from the northwest in the late 17th to early 18th centuries, likely fleeing Russian expansion after the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Organized by Manchu emperors between 1732 and 1735, they settled east of the river they called Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian for "river"), in lands that would later become Manchukuo. The Khalkha Mongols, named for the word meaning "barrier" or "shield," traditionally guarded the Mongol Empire's northern frontiers. Their territories lay west of the Buriats, in what would become the MPR. For centuries, these tribes herded livestock across sands, river crossings, and desert paths, largely oblivious to any formal borders. For hundreds of years, the line dividing the Mongolian salient from western Manchuria was a hazy administrative divide within the Qing Empire. In the 20th century, Russia's detachment of Outer Mongolia and Japan's seizure of Manchuria transformed this vague boundary into a frontline between rival powers. The Nomonhan Incident ignited over this contested border. Near the salient's northeastern edge, the river, called Khalkhin Gol by Mongols and Soviets, and Halha by Manchurians and Japanese, flows northwest into Lake Buir Nor. The core dispute: Was the river, as Japan asserted, the historic boundary between Manchukuo and the MPR? Soviet and MPR officials insisted the line ran parallel to and 10–12 miles east of the river, claiming the intervening strip. Japan cited no fewer than 18 maps, from Chinese and Japanese sources, to support the river as the border, a logical choice in such barren terrain, where it served as the sole natural divider. Yet, Soviets and Mongolians countered with evidence like a 1919 Chinese postal atlas and maps from Japanese and Manchukuoan agencies (1919–1934). Unbeknownst to combatants, in July 1939, China's military attaché in Moscow shared a 1934 General Staff map with his American counterpart, showing the border east of the river. Postwar Japanese studies of 18th-century Chinese records confirm that in 1734, the Qing emperor set a boundary between Buriat and Khalkha Mongols east of the river, passing through the hamlet of Nomonhan—as the Soviets claimed. However, Kwantung Army Headquarters dismissed this as non-binding, viewing it as an internal Qing affair without Russian involvement. Two former Kwantung Army officers offer a pragmatic explanation: From 1931 to 1935, when Soviet forces in the Far East were weak, Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities imposed the river as the de facto border, with MPR acquiescence. By the mid- to late 1930s, as Soviet strength grew, Japan refused to yield, while Mongolians and Soviets rejected the river line, sparking clashes. In 1935, Kwantung Army revised its maps to align with the river claim. From late that year, the Lake Buir Nor–Halha sector saw frequent skirmishes between Manchukuoan and MPR patrols. Until mid-1938, frontier defense in northwestern Manchukuo fell to the 8th Border Garrison Unit , based near Hailar. This 7,000-man force, spread thin, lacked mobility, training, and, in Kwantung Army's eyes, combat readiness. That summer, the newly formed 23rd Division, under Kwantung Army, took station at Hailar, absorbing the 8th BGU under its command, led by Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara. At 52, Komatsubara was a premier Russian specialist in the Imperial Army, with stints as military attaché in the USSR and head of Kwantung's Special Services Agency in Harbin. Standing 5'7" with a sturdy build, glasses, and a small mustache, he was detail-oriented, keeping meticulous diaries, writing lengthy letters, and composing poetry, though he lacked combat experience. Before departing Tokyo in July 1938, Komatsubara received briefings from Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations Section chief. Amid planning for Changkufeng, Inada urged calm on the Manchukuo-MPR border given China's ongoing campaigns. Guidelines: Ignore minor incidents, prioritize intelligence on Soviet forces east of Lake Baikal, and study operations against the Soviet Far East's western sector. Familiar with the region from his Harbin days, Komatsubara adopted a low-key approach. Neither impulsive nor aggressive, he kept the green 23rd Division near Hailar, delegating patrols to the 8th BGU. An autumn incident underscores his restraint. On November 1, 1938, an 8th BGU patrol was ambushed by MPR forces. Per Japanese accounts, the three-man team, led by a lieutenant, strayed too close to the border and was attacked 50 meters inside Manchukuo. The lieutenant escaped, but his men died. Komatsubara sent an infantry company to secure the site but forbade retaliation. He pursued body recovery diplomatically, protested to MPR and Soviet officials, and disciplined his officers: garrison leaders got five days' confinement for poor troop training, the lieutenant thirty days. Despite this caution, pressures at AGS and KwAHQ were mounting, poised to thrust the 23rd Division into fierce battle. Modern militaries routinely develop contingency plans against potential adversaries, and the mere existence of such strategies doesn't inherently signal aggressive intentions. That said, shifts in Japan's operational planning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may have inadvertently fueled the Nomonhan Incident. From 1934 to 1938, Japanese war scenarios emphasized a massive surprise assault in the Ussuri River region, paired with defensive holding actions in northwestern Manchuria. However, between mid-1938 and early 1939, a clandestine joint task force from the Army General Staff  and Kwantung Army's Operations Departments crafted a bold new blueprint. This revised strategy proposed containing Soviet forces in the east and north while unleashing a full-scale offensive from Hailar, advancing west-northwest toward Chita and ultimately Lake Baikal. The goal: sever the Transbaikal Soviet Far East from the USSR's core. Dubbed Plan Eight-B, it gained Kwantung Army's endorsement in March 1939. Key architects—Colonels Takushiro Hattori and Masao Terada, along with Major Takeharu Shimanuki—were reassigned from AGS to Kwantung Army Headquarters to oversee implementation. The plan anticipated a five-year buildup before execution, with Hattori assuming the role of chief operations staff officer.  A map review exposes a glaring vulnerability in Plan Eight-B: the Japanese advance would leave its southern flank exposed to Soviet counterstrikes from the Mongolian salient. By spring 1939, KwAHQ likely began perceiving this protrusion as a strategic liability. Notably, at the outbreak of Nomonhan hostilities, no detailed operational contingencies for the area had been formalized. Concurrently, Japan initiated plans for a vital railroad linking Harlun Arshan to Hailar. While its direct tie to Plan Eight-B remains unclear, the route skirted perilously close to the Halha River, potentially heightening KwAHQ's focus on the disputed Mongolian salient. In early 1939, the 23rd Division intensified reconnaissance patrols near the river. Around this time, General Grigory Shtern, freshly appointed commander of Soviet Far Eastern forces, issued a public warning that Japan was gearing up for an assault on the Mongolian People's Republic. As Plan Eight-B took shape and railroad proposals advanced, KwAHQ issued a strikingly confrontational set of guidelines for frontier troops. These directives are often cited as a catalyst for the Nomonhan clash, forging a chain linking the 1937 Amur River incident, the 1938 Changkufeng debacle, and the 1939 conflict.Resentment had festered at KwAHQ over perceived AGS meddling during the Amur affair, which curtailed their command autonomy. This frustration intensified at Changkufeng, where General Kamezo Suetaka's 19th Division endured heavy losses, only for the contested Manchukuoan territory to be effectively ceded. Kwantung Army lobbied successfully to wrest oversight of the Changkufeng salient from Chosen Army. In November 1938, Major Masanobu Tsuji of KwAHQ's Operations Section was sent to survey the site. The audacious officer was dismayed: Soviet forces dominated the land from the disputed ridge to the Tumen River. Tsuji undertook several winter reconnaissance missions. His final outing in March 1939 involved leading 40 men to Changkufeng's base. With rifles slung non-threateningly, they ascended to within 200 yards of Soviet lines, formed a line, and urinated in unison, eliciting amused reactions from the enemy. They then picnicked with obentos and sake, sang army tunes, and left gifts of canned meat, chocolates, and whiskey. This theatrical stunt concealed Tsuji's real aim: covert photography proving Soviet fortifications encroached on Manchukuoan soil. Tsuji was a singular figure. Born of modest means, he embodied a modern samurai ethos, channeling a sharp intellect into a frail, often ailing body through feats of extraordinary daring. A creative tactician, he thrived in intelligence ops, political scheming, aerial scouting, planning, and frontline command—excelling across a tumultuous career. Yet, flaws marred his brilliance: narrow bigotry, virulent racism, and capacity for cruelty. Ever the ambitious outsider, Tsuji wielded outsized influence via gekokujo—Japan's tradition of subordinates steering policy from below. In 1939, he was a major, but his pivotal role at Nomonhan stemmed from this dynamic. Back in Hsinking after his Changkufeng escapade, Tsuji drafted a response plan: negotiate border "rectification" with the Soviets; if talks failed, launch an attack to expel intruders. Kwantung Army adopted it. Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Otozaburo Yano flew to Tokyo with Tsuji's photos, seeking AGS approval. There, he was rebuffed—Changkufeng was deemed settled, and minor violations should be overlooked amid Tokyo's aversion to Soviet conflict. Yano's plea that leniency would invite aggression was countered by notes on Europe's tensions restraining Moscow. Yano's return sparked outrage at KwAHQ, seen as AGS thwarting their imperial duty to safeguard Manchukuo. Fury peaked in the Operations Section, setting the stage for Tsuji's drafting of stringent new frontier guidelines: "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes." The core tenet: "If Soviet troops transgress the Manchukuoan frontiers, Kwantung Army will nip their ambitions in the bud by completely destroying them." Specific directives for local commanders included: "If the enemy crosses the frontiers … annihilate him without delay, employing strength carefully built up beforehand. To accomplish our mission, it is permissible to enter Soviet territory, or to trap or lure Soviet troops into Manchukuoan territory and allow them to remain there for some time… . Where boundary lines are not clearly defined, area defense commanders will, upon their own initiative, establish boundaries and indicate them to the forward elements… . In the event of an armed clash, fight until victory is won, regardless of relative strengths or of the location of the boundaries. If the enemy violates the borders, friendly units must challenge him courageously and endeavor to triumph in their zone of action without concerning themselves about the consequences, which will be the responsibility of higher headquarters." Major Tsuji Masanobu later justified the new guidelines by pointing to the "contradictory orders" that had hamstrung frontier commanders under the old rules. They were tasked with upholding Manchukuo's territorial integrity yet forbidden from actions that might spark conflict. This, Tsuji argued, bred hesitation, as officers feared repercussions for decisive responses to incursions. The updated directives aimed to alleviate this "anxiety," empowering local leaders to act boldly without personal liability. In truth, Tsuji's "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes" were more incendiary than conciliatory. They introduced provocative measures: authorizing commanders to unilaterally define unclear boundaries, enforce them with immediate force "shoot first, ask questions later", permit pursuits into enemy territory, and even encourage luring adversaries across the line. Such tactics flouted both government policy and official army doctrine, prioritizing escalation over restraint. The proposals sparked intense debate within Kwantung Army's Operations Section. Section chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and Colonel Masao Terada outranked Tsuji, as did Major Takeharu Shimanuki, all recent transfers from the Army General Staff. Tsuji, however, boasted longer tenure at Kwantung Army Headquarters since April 1936 and in Operations since November 1937, making him the de facto veteran. Hattori and Terada hesitated to challenge the assertive major, whose reputation for intellect, persuasion, and deep knowledge of Manchuria commanded respect. In a 1960 interview, Shimanuki recalled Tsuji's dominance in discussions, where his proactive ideas often swayed the group. Unified, the section forwarded Tsuji's plan to Kwantung Army Command. Commander Lieutenant General Kenkichi Ueda consulted Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai and Vice Chief General Otozaburo Yano, seasoned leaders who should have spotted the guidelines' volatility. Yet, lingering grudges from AGS "interference" in past incidents like the Amur River and Changkufeng clouded their judgment. Ueda, Isogai, and Tsuji shared history from the 1932 Shanghai Incident: Tsuji, then a captain, led a company in the 7th Regiment under Colonel Isogai, with Yano as staff officer and Ueda commanding the 9th Division. Tsuji was wounded there, forging bonds of camaraderie. This "clique," which grew to include Hattori, Terada, and Shimanuki, amplified Tsuji's influence. Despite Isogai's initial reservations as the group's moderate voice, the guidelines won approval. Ueda issued them as Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488 on April 25, 1939, during a division commanders' conference at KwAHQ. A routine copy reached AGS in Tokyo, but no formal reply came. Preoccupied with the China War and alliance talks with Germany, AGS may have overlooked border matters. Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations head, later noted basic acceptance of Order 1488, with an informal expectation—relayed to Hattori and Terada—of prior consultation on violations. KwAHQ dismissed this as another Tokyo intrusion on their autonomy. Some Japanese analysts contend a stern AGS rejection might have prevented Nomonhan's catastrophe, though quelling Kwantung's defiance could have required mass staff reassignments, a disruptive step AGS avoided. Tsuji countered that permitting forceful action at Changkufeng would have deterred Nomonhan altogether, underscoring the interconnectedness of these clashes while implicitly critiquing the 1939 battle's location. Undeniably, Order 1488's issuance on April 25 paved the way for conflict three weeks later. Japanese records confirm that Khalkha Mongols and MPR patrols routinely crossed the Halha River—viewed by them as internal territory, 10 miles from the true border. Such crossings passed uneventfully in March and April 1939. Post-Order 1488, however, 23rd Division commander General Michitaro Komatsubara responded aggressively, setting the stage for escalation. The Nomonhan Incident ignited with a border clash on May 11–12, 1939, that rapidly spiraled into a major conflict. Over a dozen "authoritative" accounts exist, varying in viewpoint, focus, and specifics. After cross-referencing these sources, a coherent timeline emerges. On the night of May 10–11, a 20-man Mongolian People's Republic border patrol crossed eastward over the Halha River (known as Khalkhin Gol to Mongols and Soviets). About 10 miles east, atop a 150-foot sandy hill, lay the tiny hamlet of Nomonhan, a cluster of crude huts housing a few Mongol families. Just south flowed the Holsten River, merging westward into the broader Halha. By morning on May 11, Manchukuoan forces spotted the MPR patrol north of the Holsten and west of Nomonhan. In the MPR/Soviet perspective, Nomonhan Hill marked the Mongolia-Manchuria border. To Manchukuoans and Japanese, it sat 10 miles inside Manchukuo, well east of the Halha. A 40-man Manchukuoan cavalry unit repelled the Mongolians back across the river, inflicting initial casualties on both sides—the Manchukuoans drawing first blood. The MPR patrol leader exaggerated the attackers as 200 strong. The next day, May 12, a 60-man MPR force under Major P. Chogdan evicted the Manchukuoans from the disputed zone, reestablishing positions between the Halha and Nomonhan. The Manchukuoans, in turn, reported facing 700 enemies. Sporadic skirmishes and maneuvering persisted through the week. On May 13, two days post-clash, the local Manchukuoan commander alerted General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division headquarters in Hailar. Simultaneously, Major Chogdan reported to Soviet military command in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital. What began as a Mongolian-Manchukuoan spat was poised to draw in Soviet and Japanese patrons. Attributing the May 10–11 violation hinges on border interpretations: both sides claimed the Halha-Nomonhan strip. Yet, most accounts concur that Manchukuoan forces initiated the fighting. Post-May 13 notifications to Moscow and Tokyo clarify the record thereafter. Midday on May 13, Komatsubara was leading a staff conference on the newly issued Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488—Major Tsuji Masanobu's aggressive border guidelines. Ironically, the first Nomonhan combat report arrived mid-discussion. Officers present recall Komatsubara deciding instantly to "destroy the invading Outer Mongolian forces" per Order 1488. That afternoon, he informed Kwantung Army Headquarters of the incident and his intent to eradicate the intruders, requesting air support and trucks. General Kenkichi Ueda, Kwantung commander, approved Komatsubara's "positive attitude," dispatching six scout planes, 40 fighters, 10 light bombers, two anti-aircraft batteries, and two motorized transport companies. Ueda added a caveat: exercise "extreme caution" to prevent escalation—a paradoxical blend of destruction and restraint, reflective of KwAHQ's fervent mood. Ueda relayed the details to Tokyo's Army General Staff, which responded that Kwantung should handle it "appropriately." Despite Kwantung's impulsive reputation, Tokyo deferred, perhaps trusting the northern strategic imbalance, eight Japanese divisions versus 30 Soviet ones from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, would enforce prudence. This faith proved misguided. On May 14, Major Tsuji flew from KwAHQ for aerial reconnaissance over Nomonhan, spotting 20 horses but no troops. Upon landing, a fresh bullet hole in his plane confirmed lingering MPR presence east of the Halha. Tsuji briefed 23rd Division staff and reported to Ueda that the incident seemed minor. Aligning with Order 1488's spirit, Komatsubara deployed a force under Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma: an armored car company, two infantry companies, and a cavalry troop. Arriving at Nomonhan on May 15, Azuma learned most MPR forces had retreated westward across the Halha the prior night, with only token elements remaining, and those withdrawing. Undeterred, he pursued. The advance met scant resistance, as foes had crossed the river. However, Japanese light bombers struck a small MPR concentration on the west bank, Outpost Number 7, killing two and wounding 15 per MPR reports; Japanese claimed 30–40 kills. All agree: the raid targeted undisputed MPR territory. Hearing of May 15's events, Komatsubara deemed the Mongolians sufficiently rebuked and recalled Azuma to Hailar on May 16. KwAHQ concurred, closing the matter. Soviet leaders, however, saw it differently. Mid-May prompted Soviet support for the MPR under their 1936 Mutual Defense Pact. The Red Army's 57th Corps, stationed in Mongolia, faced initial disarray: Commander Nikolai Feklenko was hunting, Chief of Staff A. M. Kushchev in Ulan Ude with his ill wife. Moscow learned of clashes via international press from Japanese sources, sparking Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov's furious inquiry. Feklenko and Kushchev rushed back to Ulaanbaatar, dispatching a mixed force—a battalion from the 149th Infantry Regiment (36th Division), plus light armor and artillery from the 11th Tank Brigade—to Tamsag Bulak, 80 miles west of the Halha. Led by Major A. E. Bykov, it bolstered the MPR's 6th Cavalry Division. Bykov and Cavalry Commander Colonel Shoaaiibuu inspected the site on May 15, post-Azum's departure. The cavalry arrived two days later, backed by Bykov (ordered to remain west of the river and avoid combat if possible). Some MPR troops recrossed, occupying the disputed zone. Clashes with Manchukuoan cavalry resumed and intensified. Notified of renewed hostilities, Komatsubara viewed it as defiance, a personal affront. Emboldened by Order 1488, he aimed not just to repel but to encircle and annihilate. The incident was on the verge of major expansion. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The ghosts of the Changufeng incident have come back to haunt both the USSR and Japan. Those like Tsuji Masanobu instigated yet another border clash that would erupt into a full blown battle that would set a precedent for both nations until the very end of WW2. 

The Soviet X-Files: secret USSR UFO programs, smuggled documents, jellyfish craft, abductions and pink-eyed giants. Were the Soviets studying non human encounters, running a cosmic psyop, or both at once?​​If you are having a mental health crisis and need immediate help, please go to​ ​​​https://troubledminds.org/help/ and call somebody right now. Reaching out for support is a sign of strength. ​ ​ ​ ​​​LIVE ON Digital Radio! Http://bit.ly/40KBtlW ​​http://www.troubledminds.net or ​ ​ ​ ​​https://www.troubledminds.org ​​​​Support The Show! ​ ​ ​ ​​https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/troubled-minds-radio--4953916/support ​ ​ ​ ​​https://ko-fi.com/troubledminds ​ ​ ​ ​​https://patreon.com/troubledminds ​ ​ ​ ​​https://www.buymeacoffee.com/troubledminds ​ ​ ​ ​​https://troubledfans.com ​ ​Friends of Troubled Minds! - ​ ​ ​ ​​https://troubledminds.org/friends ​ ​​​Show Schedule Sun--Tues--Thurs--Fri 7-10pst ​iTunes - ​ ​ ​​​​https://apple.co/2zZ4hx6 ​Spotify - ​ ​ ​​​​https://spoti.fi/2UgyzqM ​TuneIn - ​ ​ ​​​​https://bit.ly/2FZOErS ​Twitter - ​ ​ ​​​​https://bit.ly/2CYB71U ​​​​​----------------------------------------​​https://troubledminds.substack.com/p/the-soviet-x-files-abductions-giants​​https://nypost.com/2026/02/07/world-news/ufo-intel-documents-stolen-out-of-russia-reveal-decade-long-probes-into-alien-encounters-and-abductions/​​https://www.8newsnow.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/59/2026/01/Thread_Three_Russian_Documents.pdf?ipid=promo-link-block3​​https://www.newsnationnow.com/space/ufo/russian-ufo-files-reveal-chilling-encounters-near-miss-nuclear-launch/​​https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/George-Knapp-Written-Testimony.pdf​​https://www.jasoncolavito.com/blog/in-brief-pentagon-calls-george-knapps-russian-ufo-files-disinformationThat's another dive into the mysteries they don't want you exploring here on Troubled Minds Radio. Keep Your Mind Troubled: If today's episode challenged your perception of reality, you're exactly where you need to be.Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts and hit that notification bell so you never miss our investigations into the unknown.Your five-star rating and review helps other truth-seekers find us in this sea of mainstream disinformation. Join the Community: Connect with nearly 1,000 fellow researchers in our Discord server, follow @TroubledMindsR on X for breaking updates, and support independent media by upgrading to Spreaker Prime for exclusive bonus content.Share Your Truth: Got a paranormal encounter, conspiracy evidence, or inside knowledge they're covering up? Email troubledmindsradio@gmail.com - your story could be featured on an upcoming episode. This is your host reminding you that in a world of manufactured narratives, questioning everything isn't paranoia...

Captain of the 1980 Men's National Hockey Team, Mike Eruzione, joins Sid to reminisce about 1980 and the glory he and those young men donning the red, white, and blue discovered when they beat the unbeatable Soviets in the "Miracle On Ice" game that sent them to the 1980 Gold Medal match against Finland, where they ultimately won. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

"Miracle: "What America needed was a miracle. What it got was a hockey game". Justin and Greg from "The 330 Sports Show" break down the 2004 sports classic "Miracle," based on the 1980 U.S. Men's Olympic hockey team and their improbable victory over the Soviets. They also do a Winter Olympics Sports Draft! Watch this episode on YouTube: https://youtube.com/live/SrE03taBHeE

It feels like Groundhog Day in Washington, but with far higher stakes: Chuck Todd unpacks how the constant churn of déjà vu political scandals has morphed from quirky repetition into full-blown national exhaustion. This episode dives into a rapidly growing blue-wave electorate colliding with what may be the most consequential corruption story of our time—allegations that Trump-era public policy was effectively put up for sale. From a $500 million UAE investment in a Trump-linked company to the approval of advanced AI chip sales, lucrative pardons, and billions in defense contracts tied to the Trump family orbit, Chuck argues this isn’t a one-off scandal but a systemic pattern that dwarfs Watergate. As Congress looks away and enforcement agencies stay silent, the question becomes existential: when foreign money shapes national security decisions, is American policy still being made for the country—or for the first family? Dr. Annie Andrews, a pediatrician and Democratic candidate challenging Lindsey Graham for U.S. Senate in South Carolina, joins the Chuck ToddCast to discuss why healthcare providers must lead the fight for reform in an era of collapsing trust in federal institutions. Andrews explains that pediatricians should be at the forefront because Medicaid—the largest insurer of children—has been gutted, and doctors are now disputing dangerous government vaccine policies from an administration where medical information can no longer be trusted. She argues the healthcare system is fundamentally broken, rewarding providers for delivering more treatment rather than better outcomes while facing what she describes as a coordinated attack on healthcare. As a physician countering "Dr. Internet" disinformation, Andrews discusses running as a Democrat despite the challenges, emphasizing that Democrats have a severe geographic disconnect with rural voters, particularly rural Black voters in South Carolina for whom nothing has improved. Andrews takes direct aim at Lindsey Graham, calling him a follower rather than a leader who simply follows Trump and supports unconstitutional actions while thinking he's politically invulnerable. She expresses disappointment that Nikki Haley and Nancy Mace couldn't stand up to Trump, noting both have "devolved in recent years." Drawing inspiration from the Jon Ossoff and Raphael Warnock blueprint for Democrats in the South, Andrews insists that if Democrats win the midterms they must be bold, hold Trump accountable, and not take impeachment off the table. Reflecting on her pandemic experience—a period she believes Americans still don't understand—Andrews criticizes D.C. politicians for being disconnected from the real world and argues that on issues like AI regulation, profits cannot be prioritized over common sense safety solutions. Finally, Chuck hops into the ToddCast Time Machine to revisit the meeting at Yalta following World War 2 and why the “spheres of influence” world order prioritizes short-term stability over long-term legitimacy. He also answers listeners’ questions in the “Ask Chuck” segment. Protect your family with life insurance from Ethos. Get up to $3 million in coverage in as little as 10 minutes at https://ethos.com/chuck. Application times may vary. Rates may vary. Thank you Wildgrain for sponsoring. Visit http://wildgrain.com/TODDCAST and use the code "TODDCAST" at checkout to receive $30 off your first box PLUS free Croissants for life! Link in bio or go to https://getsoul.com & enter code TODDCAST for 30% off your first order. Timeline: (Timestamps may vary based on advertisements) 00:00 Chuck Todd’s introduction 01:00 It feels like “Groundhog Day” in Washington D.C. 03:00 Movie changed meaning from a quirky holiday to exhaustion 04:15 Political headlines just keep repeating themselves 05:00 Huge “blue wave” is building in the electorate 06:30 Trump bribery scandal should be seismic, likely gets ignored again 07:45 At what point does a policy decision become a product for sale? 09:00 Wall Street Journal stories are legally airtight 10:45 Every piece of public policy is for sale under Trump 12:30 UAE exec bought 49% stake in Trump company for $500m 13:15 Steve Witkoff also made millions from the deal 15:30 This scandal makes Watergate look like a third rate burglary 17:00 After deal, government agreed to sell 500k advanced AI chips to UAE 18:30 Whoever controls reserves of World Liberty Financial controls the yields 20:15 Shortly after deal, Trump pardons the co-founder of Binance 21:15 This isn’t an isolated incident, it’s part of a much larger pattern 22:15 Company linked to Donald Trump Jr received billions in defense contracts 23:00 The founders obsessed over corruption and foreign influence 25:00 Is American policy being made for first family, not the country 26:00 Republicans obsessed over Hunter Biden selling paintings 27:15 If AI race is existential, then Trump signed our death warrant for money 28:30 If Congress won’t investigate, FBI should… but they won’t 29:15 Deals like this undermine U.S. sovereignty, everything is for sale 36:15 Dr. Annie Andrews joins the Chuck ToddCast 37:30 When did you first want to enter politics? 39:45 Did you learn about the healthcare business in med school? 42:15 Pediatricians should be leading the way on healthcare reform 43:00 Medicaid is largest insurer of children & has been gutted 43:45 Pediatricians dispute government vaccine policy for kids 45:15 We can’t trust medical info from the federal government 46:15 Has any RFK proclamation or policy actually made sense? 47:30 How do you deal with “Dr. Internet”? 48:30 Doctors need an online presence to counter disinformation 50:15 Why is it more profitable to run a non-profit over for-profit hospital? 51:00 Healthcare system is rewarded for proving more treatment, not better 52:30 We’re seeing a coordinated attack on our healthcare system 53:15 Jaime Harrison’s campaign in SC was a disaster 54:30 Easiest way to run in the south is to erase the D by your name 55:15 Many challenges to running as an independent 56:45 Democrats have a geographic disconnect with rural voters 57:45 Nothing has gotten better for rural black voters in SC 59:45 The pandemic was a huge reason for Harrison’s bad loss 1:00:30 How do you win over a voter that supported Trump? 1:01:30 Lindsey Graham is supporting unconstitutional actions 1:02:15 Graham isn’t a leader, he’s a follower & he follows Trump 1:03:15 Disappointing Nikki Haley couldn’t stand up to Trump more 1:05:15 South Carolinians says they want outsiders, then vote for insiders 1:06:00 Graham thinks he’s politically invulnerable 1:07:15 People will have their lives negatively impacted by GOP policy 1:08:30 What do you make of Nancy Mace’s political saliency? 1:09:30 Nancy Mace has devolved in recent years 1:10:45 Thoughts on Chuck Schumer as Dem leader in senate? 1:12:00 Jon Ossoff & Raphael Warnock provide blueprint for Dems in south 1:13:45 Trump & the administration must be held accountable 1:15:00 Dems must be bold in their agenda if they win the midterms 1:15:45 Impeachment shouldn’t be off the table 1:17:45 Can you be both a fighter and a uniter as a candidate? 1:19:00 Too many D.C. politicians are disconnected from the real world 1:20:15 How should congress regulate AI? 1:22:00 Profits can’t be the priority over common sense safety solutions 1:23:00 Best TV doctor show that gets it right? E.R. & The Pitt 1:24:15 Americans don’t understand what hospitals were like during Covid 1:25:15 What’s your campaigning rhythm as a candidate? 1:26:30 Clemson or South Carolina? 1:27:30 This Trump bribery scandal needs a sharp name for it to stand up 1:28:30 The bribery story is too complex to explain in a few minutes 1:30:00 ToddCast Time Machine – February 4th 1945 1:30:30 Stalin, Roosevelt & Churchill meet in Yalta 1:31:00 Yalta legitimized “spheres of influence” 1:32:00 Why Yalta was a mistake 1:32:45 Eastern Europe traded rule by Nazis to rule by the Soviets 1:33:45 Could Yalta have been avoided? 1:35:15 Roosevelt gambled Stalin could be restrained 1:36:00 Yalta traded long term legitimacy for short term stability 1:37:30 Yalta avoided immediate catastrophe, planted seeds for future tumult 1:40:00 Ask Chuck 1:40:15 Would you consider having Ralph Nader on as a guest? 1:43:30 Any meaningful parallels between Minneapolis and Kent State? 1:46:00 Will there be an election or will Trump declare an emergency to stop it? 1:48:30 Will future president focus more on domestic issues if filibuster is removed? 1:53:00 Is it normal for a president to have so many cognitive exams? 1:56:00 Differences between charter schools and magnet schools? 1:59:00 College basketball thoughtsSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Sean McMeekin describes how the Soviets utilized Lend-Lease to acquire industrial secrets and nuclear materials, often facilitated by Harry Hopkins whom McMeekin views as a devoted Soviet agent of influence, while Stalin delayed Operation Bagration to let Western Allies absorb German strength.1945 RED ARMY

The Soviets decided they didn't have a need for light tanks. And instead built a very useful light vehicle with a big gun. And they built a lot of them. And this is their story.

The Bitcoin Boomers Ep. 04: "There Needs to be a Revolution" Ex-Reagan Library Director Speaks Out on Bitcoin | John Heubusch, Lawrence Lepard, Bob Burnett, Gary LelandJohn Heubusch (former Executive Director of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Reagan insider, and bestselling author) joins Lawrence Lepard, Bob Burnett, and Gary Leland for an explosive Bitcoin Boomers episode exposing fiat's collapse under America's $38.6 trillion national debt and Bitcoin's revolutionary escape. As Bitcoin hovers around $89K in January 2026 after dipping from 2025's $126K highs, John declares: "There needs to be a revolution... maybe that's when Bitcoin has its moments," linking Reagan's "government is the problem" ethos to sound money's revival. The crew dismantles Nixon's 1971 gold shock as fiat's "beginning of the end," fueling inequality, endless printing, and ethical rot in politics—why Reagan would HODL Bitcoin for its tech disruption like Star Wars defense. Amid hyperinflation fears and US overexpansion mirroring the Soviets' fall, they orange-pill boomers: scarcity (21M BTC cap vs. infinite fiat), network effects outpacing Visa/Mastercard, and AI needing Bitcoin as its frictionless currency. John shares jaw-dropping tales—dating Lady Di, rescuing Reagan's blood vial from eBay, running the Library with Air Force One inside—and his cancer survival blending faith/immunotherapy. Larry slams advisors ignoring Bitcoin's 16-year dominance, Bob ties PC revolution to BTC adoption, Gary urges top 1% ownership (just 0.25 BTC). This is the boomer blueprint: escape fiat's cliff before calamity forces change. Stack sats now—Bitcoin's your hedge against debasement.Chapters:00:00:00 Cold Open – Revolution & Bitcoin's Moment00:00:44 Welcome John Heubusch & Career Overview00:02:37 Date with Lady Di Story00:07:01 Politics to Business Shift00:09:01 Washington's Lack of Acumen00:10:36 Term Limits & Power Concentration00:12:06 Reagan Connections & Insights00:15:38 Reagan Blood Vial Recovery00:17:36 Reagan Library & Air Force One00:20:00 Broken Monetary System Exposed00:22:57 Debt Deficits from Reagan Era00:27:27 Nixon Gold Shock Chaos00:30:08 Reagan Hypothetical on Debt00:34:24 Would Reagan Be a Bitcoiner?00:37:13 US Overexpansion Parallels00:41:00 Bitcoin Media & Peer Perceptions00:47:01 Not Too Late for Boomers00:53:01 Bitcoin Network Effects00:55:15 Money Supply & Regulation Warnings00:57:55 Hyperinflation & Collapse Risks01:03:20 AI Needing Bitcoin Currency01:08:28 Endowments Considering BTC01:11:08 Shroud Conspiracy Thrillers01:18:16 Cancer Survival & Faith01:20:38 Closing Thanks & Book SwapAbout JohnJohn Heubusch is an American political and private-sector executive, author, and former Executive Director of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute (2009-2023). With a career spanning the Pentagon, Capitol Hill, U.S. Department of Labor (Chief of Staff to Elizabeth Dole), American Red Cross, NRSC, Gateway Inc. (CAO), and Avalon Capital, he's a bestselling author of thrillers The Shroud Conspiracy and The Second Coming.• Website: https://johnheubusch.com/• Twitter: @JHeubuschSupported By:Blockstream Jade: Easy, open-source Bitcoin-only cold storage. Get 10% off with code BOOMERS at blockstream.com.Unchained Signature: Premium custody for serious holders. 10% off first year with code BOOMERS10 at unchained.com/btcboomersAbundant Mines: Fully managed Bitcoin mining. Learn more at abundantmines.comBITCOIN WELL is the best place to buy Bitcoin in Canada and the USA.Visit BITCOINWELL.COM/BTCSESSIONSBook Private Sessions: Master Bitcoin with experts at btcmentor.io. Check Out the Previous Episode w Gary Cardone: https://youtu.be/0U8R6BzjDSE#bitcoin #bitcoinboomers #reagan #nationaldebt #fiatcollapse #soundmoney #bitcoinrevolution #debtcrisis #hyperinflation #reaganlibrary #johnheubusch #larrylepard #bobburnett #garyleland #btc #bitcoinadoption #aibitcoin #boomerbitcoin #fiatratrace #qe2026

“THIS IS YOUR TIME.“Hello everyone, we hope 2026 has been treating you well. We apologize for the lack of updates, its difficult to schedule time and be in the right mental space for regularly releasing episodes. We hope to keep doing them, as watching and talking about movies helps keep us sane and grounded against the insanity of the world. Movies might be make believe, but the stories they tell come from real people. Through the language of cinema we are made to feel real emotions. By sharing our favorite movies with one another we are sharing perspectives, values and interests. We are building community, which is vital for the times we live in and the times ahead. This podcast started because two guys shared interest in a movie after all, and through recording and releasing episodes we have gotten incredible movie suggestions from listeners. Movies that we have never heard of or have just never given a second thought. The podcast has expanded our palette, introduced us to different cultures, history and appreciation for the art of movies and those that make them. We can't stop yet. For this episode, we took a suggestion from fighting game prodigy BobaTeamo, and talk about 2004's Miracle, directed by Gavin O'Conner and starring Kurt Russel. This Disney film is based on the true story of the 1980 US Olympic Hockey team, and their David and Goliath-type game against the dominant Soviet Olympic team. Coincidentally, also takes place during a period when it just feels bad being an American. Miracle is a period piece set during the Cold War and Oil Crisis of 1979. The rising tensions with the Soviets, dire financial situation for the working class, and general L's America is taking are only relieved when on the ice. And even on the ice, our characters are put to the test with Kurt Russel's Herb Brooks's extreme coaching style, that gives the US Olympic council, his own staff, and family pause. We talk about how the political backdrop and post 9/11 nationalism of the early 2000's play a role in our reaction to the film today, and also how the message of comradery and reliance of teammates who care about you seemingly undermine the rugged individualistic messages of typical American propaganda. When it comes to sports movies, we often think of them as formulaic and readily accept the two different endings. They lose, but spiritually win, or they win and all the hard work and sacrifice is rewarded. However, some movies are more than just cliches and predictable endings. These reductive analysis do not take into consideration the craft of film making, and the acute attention to detail of capturing what it feels like to play a certain sport. Not all movies are terribly concerned about accuracy and making you feel like you are in the game, but that's what makes Miracle special. On this episode, we get into the lengths Gavin O'Conner and his crew went to to capture the essence of hockey. Heated Rivalry might have our hearts now, but Miracle was regarded as the greatest hockey movie ever made. After watching it for the episode and doing a bit of reading on how it was made, it's no surprise why.You can listen to this episode ANYWHERE you get your podcasts! You don't have to go to Spotify or Apple! If you don't see our show on your podcast preference of choice, just DM us on our socials and we will get right on it!

In this pair of talks, Fr. Anthony examines why discernment so often fails in the Church—not because of bad faith or lack of intelligence, but because discernment is a matter of formation before it is a matter of decision. Drawing on insights from intelligence analysis, psychology, and Orthodox anthropology, he shows how authority, moral seriousness, and modern systems of manipulation quietly exploit predictable habits of perception, producing confidence without clarity. True discernment, he argues, is neither technical nor private, but ecclesial: formed through humility, ascetic practice, and participation in the Church's communal rhythms, where judgment matures over time through accountability, repentance, and shared life in Christ. --- Talk One: Why Discernment Fails Expertise, Authority, Manipulation, and the Formation of Perception Fr. Anthony Perkins Introduction Brothers, I want to begin today not with Scripture or a Father of the Church, but with a warning—from someone who spent his life studying failure in complex systems. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, in The Black Swan, writes this: "You cannot ignore self-delusion. The problem with experts is that they do not know what they do not know. Lack of knowledge and delusion about the quality of your knowledge come together—the same process that makes you know less also makes you satisfied with your knowledge." (pause) Taleb is talking about intelligence analysts, economists, and technical experts—people who are trained, credentialed, experienced, and entrusted with judgment under uncertainty. But if, just for a moment, you change one word in your mind—from expert to priest—the danger becomes uncomfortably familiar. We wear cassocks instead of suits, but the temptation is the same. Not arrogance. Not bad intentions. But unintentional self-delusion born of taking our calling to serve well seriously. A Necessary Pastoral Safeguard Before we go any further, I want to be very clear—because this matters. Taleb is not accusing experts of pride. He is not describing a moral failure. He is describing what happens to the human mind under complexity. And clergy live permanently in complex systems: human souls suffering families conflicted parishes incomplete information real consequences The danger is not that we don't care. The danger is that experience can quietly convince us that we are seeing clearly—especially when we are not. A Lesson from Intelligence Work When I worked in military intelligence, there was a saying—half joking, half deadly serious: The most dangerous person in the world is an intelligence analyst in a suit. At first, that sounds like gallows humor. But it isn't. The danger wasn't that analysts were malicious. The danger was that analysts don't just possess information—they interpret reality for others. And here's where psychology matters. Robert Cialdini has shown that one of the strongest and most reliable human biases is deference to authority. People are far more likely to accept judgments when they come from someone who looks like an authority—someone in a suit, a lab coat, or standing behind an official desk. Jonathan Haidt adds something crucial: people formed in conservative moral cultures—cultures that value order, continuity, and tradition—are especially inclined to defer to legitimate authority. That's not a flaw. It's one of the strengths of such cultures. It's one of the strengths of our Orthodox culture. But it carries a cost. Because when authority speaks, critical perception often relaxes. And when authority speaks with confidence, coherence, and moral seriousness, people don't just listen. They trust.  And they trust in a way that they, like us - the ones who guide them - feel connected with the truth and the Source of all truth. But in our fallenness our sense of certainty may be driven by something other than a noetic connection with the deeper ontological of truth.  Scripture about the devil appearing as angel of light (2 Cor 11:14-15) and wolves going around in sheep's clothing (Mat 7:15) are not just designed to keep us from trusting everyone who offers to speak a good work; a spiritual meaning is that our own thoughts can be deceptive, appearing as angelic and meek but lacking true virtue. All of this, combined with the seriousness of our calling, should reinforce our commitment to pastor humbly and patiently, erring on the side of gentleness … and trusting in the iterative process of repentance to bring discernment and healing to those we serve. From Suit to Cassock In intelligence work, the suit mattered. In science, it's the lab coat. In the Church, it's the cassock. When a priest speaks—especially confidently, decisively, and with moral gravity—people don't just hear an opinion. They receive guidance. And that means any blind spot—any overconfidence, any unexamined habit of thought—does not remain private. It spreads. Why This Is Dangerous (and Why It Is Not an Accusation) This is where Taleb's insight comes sharply back into focus. The most dangerous situation is not ignorance. It is: incomplete knowledge combined with confidence amplified by authority received by people disposed to trust Taleb is not accusing experts of arrogance. Cialdini is not accusing people of gullibility. Haidt is not accusing conservative cultures of naïveté. They are describing how human beings actually function. And clergy live precisely at the intersection of all three forces: complexity authority moral trust Which means discernment failures in the Church are rarely loud or obvious. They are usually calm, confident, sincere—and despite this, still wrong.  And unfortunately, still dangerous. We are susceptible to the same temptations as everyone else.  In order to serve well, we  need to cultivate a combination of humility and confidence:  confidence because we are called and trained to do this work; humility because we are not experts in everything, are still incompletely formed, and the problems in our communities and in this world are incredibly complex. Another Lesson from Intelligence: this time, counterintelligence The challenge of being right all the time is not just that we can't know everything, but that there are powers of the earth and what I call the marketers of the air that are trying to manipulate us.  And, alas, not matter how serious or smart or well-educated we are, we are still vulnerable to their wiles. During the Cold War, American intelligence analysts and operatives were taught to keep everything they could about themselves private.  This was because we knew that the spy agencies of the Soviet Union were actively collecting information – what we called dossiers - on everyone they could so that they could develop and exploit opportunities to use us. The Soviets didn't need to convert us. They didn't need to convince us. They needed: our habits our reactions our trusted assumptions our unguarded patterns Their dossiers were less about facts than they were about about leverage.  And it worked.  My first assignment in the Army was as an interrogator.  It was a similar deal there.  The work of getting information out of someone gets a lot easier when you have information about them, about their histories, about their fears, about their motivations. And here's the unavoidable turn. Today, advertisers, platforms, and political actors possess dossiers that would have made Cold War intelligence officers and interrogators weep with envy. They know: what angers us what comforts us what affirms us when we are tired when we are lonely what makes us feel righteous And clergy are NOT exempt from their data collection or their use of that data. In fact, we may be especially vulnerable, because we are tempted to mistake moral seriousness for immunity. And advertisers, platforms, and political actors with all their algorithms do not do this alone.  The fallen powers of the air have been studying us and our weakness even longer than Facebook.  More committed men than us – here I think of St. Silouon when he was young – have fallen victim to their machinations.  And now they have more allies and useful idiots working with them than ever. Porn addiction and religious polarization – even within Orthodoxy – show that these allies (BIG DATA and the DEMONS) are having their desired effect. Discernment Is Not Being Bypassed—It Is Being Used Here is the hard truth. Most modern manipulation does not bypass discernment. It uses malformed discernment. It works because: our instincts are trained elsewhere our attention is fragmented our emotional reactions are predictable our confidence exceeds our perception This is not a technology problem. It is not a political problem. It is a formation problem. Psychological Bias Is Not a Moral Failure At this point, I could list all the biases that set us up for failure: confirmation bias availability bias motivated reasoning affect heuristics But that would miss the deeper point. Biases are not bugs. They are features of an untrained mind. And the Church has never believed that the mind heals itself through information alone. Which brings us to the Orthodox diagnosis. Discernment Is Formational, Not Technical In the Orthodox tradition, discernment is not a technique for making decisions. It is the fruit of a formed person. And that formation involves the whole human being and all three parts of the human mind: the gut, the brain, and the heart. The Gut / The Passions This is the fastest part of the mind.  In our default state, it is the real decision-maker. It reacts. It protects. It simplifies. It is trained by repetition, not arguments. If this part of the mind is shaped by: urgency outrage novelty exhaustion Then discernment will always feel obvious—and often be wrong. Orthopraxis trains our gut through the repetition of godly habits: fasting silence patience submission to the deeper rhythms The Brain/Intellect This is where narratives are built. Where reasons are assembled. Where Scripture and Fathers are cited. In our default state, it justifies the decisions and instincts of the gut. It is vulnerable not to ignorance, but to selectivity. This is where proof-texting lives. This is where outliers become weapons. This is where cleverness masquerades as wisdom. And here St. Paul gives us a crucial criterion: "All things are lawful," but not all things are helpful. "All things are lawful," but not all things build up." (1 Cor 10:23) The danger is not that clergy cannot justify what they do. We have big brains and have learned a lot of words. Wecan justify almost anything. The danger is mistaking justifiability for discernment. Orthopraxis here looks like: immersion rather than scanning repetition rather than novelty mastering the middle of the bell curve of tradition rather than its extremes making the perfect words of our worship, prayer books, and Bibles the main texts that we rely on to know what is beautiful, good, and true The Heart / The Nous The nous cannot be controlled. It cannot be optimized. It cannot be forced. It is healed, opened, and attenuated only by grace. In our default setting, our connection with God through the nous is narrow or closed, and we are prone to mistaking the movements of our passions – often called our conscience – for revelation and divine inspiration. Orthopraxis here is simple, but takes time to gain traction: the quieting of the gut and of the brain immersion in worship immersion in prayer time spent in silent awe of God The Quiet Conclusion of Talk One So here is the point I want to leave you with now: Discernment is not something we do when the need to make a decision appears. It is a facility we are developing long before the decision arrives. Taleb helps us see the danger. Intelligence work helps us see the mechanics. Orthodox praxis shows us the cure. But none of this happens alone. Which brings us to the second talk— because discernment is not merely personal. It is ecclesial.   Talk Two: Discernment Is Ecclesial Communion, Authority, and the Social Formation of Perception Introduction Brothers, Earlier, I spoke about why discernment fails. Not because priests are careless. Not because we lack sincerity. Not because we haven't read enough. But because discernment is formational, and formation always happens somewhere—whether we are paying attention or not. Now I want to take the next step. If discernment is not merely a personal skill, then the question becomes unavoidable: Where does discernment actually happen? And the Church's answer has always been the same. Not in isolation. Not in private certainty. But in communion. The Myth of the Independent Discerner Earlier we spoke about discernment as formation—about how perception is trained long before decisions appear. Now I want to push that insight one step further. Because even if a person is well-formed, the Church has never believed that discernment belongs to individual insight alone. And here it is helpful—perhaps unexpectedly—to look at how knowledge actually works in the modern world. A Brief Detour: How We Actually Know Things Some people imagine the scientific method as the triumph of the lone genius. But that is not how science works. Individual scientists propose hypotheses. They run experiments. They notice patterns. But no discovery becomes knowledge until it is: tested by others challenged by peers replicated over time corrected when necessary When science works, it only does so when individual insight is embedded within a community of accountability. Without that community, science collapses into speculation, ideology, or manipulation.  We have seen that very thing happen right before our eyes.  I still hope that the system can be reformed.  But it can't without individual and systematic repentance.  I hope that happens. The Ecclesial Parallel Even at its best, the scientific community is a pale shadow of The Church and its system of both individual and communal discernment. Individual Christians—clergy included—receive insights, intuitions, and perceptions. But those perceptions only become discernment when they are tested: liturgically pastorally communally over time This is why discernment in the Church is never merely private, even when it feels personal. We know this about the Ecumenical Councils, but it needs to be built into the way we live our lives and govern our parishes. Why the Independent Discerner Is a Myth Isolation does not produce wisdom. It produces clarity without the possibility of correction. And clarity without correction feels an awful lot like discernment—especially to the one experiencing it. And surrounding ourselves with people who always agree with us is not better than isolation.  We saw how that affected science when came to the climate and COVID; we can't be so proud as to think we aren't susceptible to the same sort of self-rightous group-think. Authority Does Not Cancel Accountability Earlier we spoke about authority and trust. That deference is part of the deeper harmony. But it creates an asymmetry: the more people trust us, the less likely they are to correct us. All of us need to develop relationships with people who both think differently than we do and whom we can trust to correct us in love and in a way that we can hear.  Ideally this council of advisors includes our wives, confessors, and a cohort of brother priests. Discernment Does Not Reside in a Brain Discernment does not primarily reside in an individual mind. It resides in a body. The Church does not possess discernment as a technique. The Church is the place where discernment occurs. Clergy as Hosts of Discernment When it comes to leadership, clergy are not just decision-makers and teachers. We are witnesses, hosts, and facilitators of discernment. We shape environments. We normalize rhythms. We form what should be said—and what should not. Who are we to have such control?  No one.  We do it in the Name of the one who deserves such power, this must be done humbly and sacrificially – and by sacrificially, I don't just mean the sacrifice of our time but of our ego and sometimes even the sacrifice of our justifiable preferences and opinions.  To paraphrase St. Paul once again, all things may be justifiable, but not all things are useful.  And in another place he makes the same point, saying; "though I speak in the tongues of men and angels, but have not love" it's all just just noise.  And the world doesn't need more noise: it needs signal.  I believe that the fact that we are not smart enough or consistent enough to get everything right all the time is a feature, not a bug.  The people we serve need to see us make mistakes; not so they can see that we are only human (that's pretty obvious), but so that we can truly witness to them what discernment and repentance look like. We shouldn't make a lot of mistakes, and we should certainly avoid making the same one twice, but a zero-defect culture is a cult, not a community.  And cults are neither healthy nor sustainable. The Liturgical Ecology of Discernment Discernment is not trained by intensity. It is trained by ecology.  By immersion into the communal rhythms of orthopraxis. By: developing a relationship with a spiritual father repetition over novelty calendar over urgency fasting over reaction worship over commentary stability over constant motion accepting and sharing the spirit and not just the letter of the guidance given to us by our bishops The Quiet Conclusion of Talk Two The Church does not promise us freedom from error. She promises us a way of life in which error can be healed. Discernment is not a tool for avoiding mistakes. It is a way of learning how to dwell truthfully with God and one another. And that dwelling—like Eden, like the Temple, like the Church itself—is always shared.  

TODAY pulls out all the stops to celebrate 30 years of America's favorite weatherman, Al Roker. Host of "The Howard Stern Show" and longtime Al pal Howard Stern calls in from his “neck of the woods” to offer his congratulations. Also, the stars of the men's 1980 U.S. Olympic hockey team sit down in Studio 1A to reflect on their historic win over the powerhouse Soviets — their “golden” moment now featured in a new Netflix documentary, "The Miracle on Ice." Plus, meteorologists from across the country join TODAY to share the impact Al has had on their careers. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

As you might remember from episode 124, which was about the Allied victory in Europe, Germany was basically cut in half by the invading Soviets in the East, and the Allies in the West.  The Soviets had captured Berlin, and they had also occupied the eastern part of Germany.  But they also had occupied all of eastern Europe, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.  And they had no intention of giving those countries up.  

"The enemy is not at the gate—the enemy has infiltrated our classrooms." Join host Robert Bortins for the first episode in a powerful School Choice Week series as he sits down with Dr. Joshua Pierson, who contributed to "Woke and Weaponized: How Karl Marx Won the Battle for American Education and How We Can Win It Back." In this eye-opening conversation, Dr. Pierson—a retiring counterintelligence agent with 25 years of experience—reveals the shocking history of Soviet infiltration into American education. Drawing from his extensively researched appendix, he traces a direct line from 1917 Soviet intelligence operations to today's classroom controversies. Dr. Pierson exposes how Soviet strategist Willi Münzenberg architected a century-long disinformation campaign targeting American education, media, and government. He explains how Columbia Teachers College became a hub for communist influence, and why influential educators like John Dewey and George Counts became "useful idiots" after visiting carefully staged Potemkin villages in Soviet Russia. The conversation explores why communist ideology persists generations after its architects have died, how tactics like ANDEMKA (Admit Nothing, Deny Everything, Make Counter Accusation) still shape today's debates, and why accepting government funding transforms institutions into "agents of the state." From SEL programs to modern educational policy, discover how the Soviets succeeded in their strategy beyond their wildest expectations—and what Americans were willfully ignorant about as it happened.   This episode of Refining Rhetoric is sponsored by: Woke and Weaponized: How Karl Marx Won the Battle for American Education—And How We Can Win It Back – A new book written by Robert Bortins and Alex Newman. Discover the shocking truth about how current education reform efforts may actually accelerate the destruction of educational freedom. Through meticulous research, Woke and Weaponized traces the philosophical roots of educational corruption from Robert Owen and John Dewey to critical race theory, while offering practical strategies for families ready to pursue genuine educational independence. Join our exclusive list to be notified the moment it becomes available — plus receive special launch updates and insider information. www.WokeAndWeaponized.com

FILE 4. MOLOTOV IN BERLIN AND THE TRIPARTITE PACT. GUEST AUTHOR SEAN MCMEEKIN. The discussion focuses on Molotov's November 1940 visit to Berlin, where Hitler invited the Soviets to join the Tripartite Pact against the "Anglo-Saxon" powers,. Negotiations collapsed because Stalin demanded unacceptable control over Bulgaria and the Bosphorus, prompting Hitler to proceed with invasion plans while FDR quietly began lifting moral embargoes on the Soviets.1945

FILE 6. DOMESTIC OPPOSITION AND SECRET LEND-LEASE. GUEST AUTHOR SEAN MCMEEKIN. McMeekin describes how Harry Hopkins bypassed military skeptics to ensure the Soviet Union received unrestricted supplies, such as studebakers and aircraft, starting in July 1941. The administration kept this full support secret from a skeptical American public until late 1941, as polls showed a majority of states opposed aiding the Soviets against Hitler.1930

FILE 7. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND FAILED NEGOTIATIONS. GUEST AUTHOR SEAN MCMEEKIN. During 1940 negotiations in Berlin, Hitler attempted to align the Soviets with the Axis powers, but talks failed due to Stalin's insistence on expanding influence into Finland and the Balkans. Consequently, Hitler decided to invade Russia to break their economic stranglehold, while Soviet leadership simultaneously began preparing their own military deployments for a future war with Germany,.1931

FILE 8. INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND D-DAY DELAYS. GUEST AUTHOR SEAN MCMEEKIN. The author details how the Soviets utilized Lend-Lease to plunder American intellectual property and entire factories, often with Harry Hopkins's facilitation,. McMeekin notes that Stalin delayed Operation Bagration until weeks after D-Day to let the Allies absorb German strength, while Hopkins consistently overruled officials like Averell Harriman who tried to condition this aid,.1942

Iszi Lawrence, Abby Cox and Matt Gray face questions about rhythmic rumbles, solo Soviets and nonsense navigation. LATERAL is a comedy panel game podcast about weird questions with wonderful answers, hosted by Tom Scott. For business enquiries, contestant appearances or question submissions, visit https://lateralcast.com. HOST: Tom Scott. QUESTION PRODUCER: David Bodycombe. EDITED BY: Julie Hassett at The Podcast Studios, Dublin. MUSIC: Karl-Ola Kjellholm ('Private Detective'/'Agrumes', courtesy of epidemicsound.com). ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS: Sid, Emily, Hellen, Soham, Daniel Bohrer, Natalie, Iiris. FORMAT: Pad 26 Limited/Labyrinth Games Ltd. EXECUTIVE PRODUCERS: David Bodycombe and Tom Scott. © Pad 26 Limited (https://www.pad26.com) / Labyrinth Games Ltd. 2026. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In the schools of the (near) future, teachers will be replaced by robots and learning will be personalized, allowing each student to move at their own pace. AI refuser and self-described ‘ed tech Cassandra' Audrey Watters says that the vision of education being peddled by Silicon Valley today is virtually indistinguishable from the Cold War fantasy of futuristic schools. Watters makes the case that seventy years after the Soviets launched Sputnik into space, the US and its schools remain trapped in a ‘Sputnik moment.' The financial support of listeners like you keeps this podcast going. Subscribe on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/HaveYouHeardPodcast

Dr Ferdinand Santos III - not his real name - is a Canadian physicist with numerous university degrees, who writes about ‘scientism' or the corruption of science by philosophy and materialism. Here he explains to James how the moon landings were obviously fake because they were impossible to achieve. And the Soviets were in on it because most of their space endeavours - especially Yuri Gagarin's - were fake too. https://unstabbinated.substack.com ↓ ↓ ↓ Monetary Metals is providing a true alternative to saving and earning in dollars by making it possible to save AND EARN in gold and silver. Monetary Metals has been paying interest on gold and silver for over 8 years. Right now, accredited investors can earn 12% annual interest on silver, paid in silver in their latest silver bond offering. For example, if you have 1,000 ounces of silver in the deal, you receive 120 ounces of silver interest paid to your account in the first year. Go to the link in the description or head to https://monetary-metals.com/delingpole/ to learn more about how to participate and start earning a return on honest money again with Monetary Metals. ↓ ↓ How environmentalists are killing the planet, destroying the economy and stealing your children's future. In Watermelons, an updated edition of his ground-breaking 2011 book, JD tells the shocking true story of how a handful of political activists, green campaigners, voodoo scientists and psychopathic billionaires teamed up to invent a fake crisis called ‘global warming'. This updated edition includes two new chapters which, like a geo-engineered flood, pour cold water on some of the original's sunny optimism and provide new insights into the diabolical nature of the climate alarmists' sinister master plan. Purchase Watermelons by James Delingpole here: https://jamesdelingpole.co.uk/Shop/ ↓ ↓ ↓ Buy James a Coffee at: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/jamesdelingpole The official website of James Delingpole: https://jamesdelingpole.co.uk x

Director Paul Jay discusses his upcoming documentary How to Stop a Nuclear War, featuring Daniel Ellsberg's final interviews before his death. In conversation with Cole Smith, a former Air Force nuclear missile operator, Jay explains why Ellsberg's journey from Cold War hawk to whistleblower provides the perfect lens for understanding our current nuclear crisis. The discussion covers Cold War lies, the risks of AI-controlled nuclear systems, and concrete steps toward disarmament, including phasing out ICBMs and ending launch-on-warning policies. TranscriptListenDonateSubscribe Cole SmithIt's a privilege to be here, obviously, in a space that's strange for me because I used to work in these silos or ones that were very similar to these. For five years, I was a nuclear missile operator in the Air Force from 2012 to 2017, during which time many journalists, including Geoff Brumfiel, who's here somewhere, did fantastic reporting on some of the shortcomings of the missile force. Anyway, that's a whole other story.It does strike me after the last panel that what we've moved into after lunch is something that is sort of a tone shift in some ways. There's an old quote that you might have heard that a lot of people attribute to Damon of Athens, which is, "Show me the songs of a people, and I care not who writes the laws." I think in some ways, that is not to say that policy is not important, but that one of the ways that we have to move forward on this subject is through the stories that we tell.So, Paul, if you could begin by telling us where you're at with your film. If you could also just catch us up on how you came into your career to be a filmmaker on this subject.Paul JayHi. I think it's a brilliant idea to have the meeting here. Seeing that missile out there. I grew up at a time when I was... I have a young son, he's 13. He's actually up here. I made a deal with him. If he sat through all the panels, he gets to go trail riding in Bentonville.Cole SmithCan I get in on that deal?Paul JayAbsolutely. Please, because I won't get on a bike. He could use some company. So I was around his age during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and I was well aware. I was into newspapers when I was six, seven years old, so I was as scared to death as everyone was during that time. By the time I was in high school, I had quit in grade 10 and never went to university because I was absolutely sure I'd be dead by the age of 20.It's interesting because my film features Daniel Ellsberg. When he worked at RAND Corporation, he was offered a pension, and he laughed and said, "I'm not putting money into a pension fund. We're not going to be here."But by the '90s and the end of the '90s, I was pretty much in as much denial about the risks of nuclear war as most others. Then, in around 2018, I read Dan Ellsberg's book, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, and that book scared the shit out of me. I said to myself, "This is the most important book I've ever read in my life because of what's at stake." So, I interviewed Dan, and eventually he agreed that I could make a documentary film featuring him, and so the more I get into the topic, the more I realize how dangerous the moment is.Before we watch the trailer, I would like a promise from everyone. Of course, you're not going to make it, but I'm going to ask anyway. Can everyone please stop saying, since the end of the Cold War? It did not end. The Cold War wasn't just about the Soviet Union. The Cold War was about suppressing domestic dissent, weakening workers' unions. It was about exaggerating the external threat, whether it was the Soviet Union or now China.Listen to the rhetoric of President Trump. Is it different than McCarthy's? Is it different than the 1950s? How about Joe Biden saying he's going to defend Taiwan and risk nuclear war? How is that different than what we heard all throughout the Cold War? The Cold War didn't end. We are in the midst of it, and most of us are looking at the world through the filters that we were taught as children, a fabric of lie after lie after lie.If I had more time, I could give you the whole history of the lies, but Dan Ellsberg asked us with this film, he said directly, he said he thought we had the opportunity to do what the Pentagon Papers did, which is uncover the lies of the nuclear era. And then we also want to propose solutions, which you'll see a little bit teased in the trailer, because I am a clinical optimist. Every rational bone in my body says there's nothing to be very optimistic about, and we'd better face up to this.You know, the danger of the moment we're in, yes, since the Cuban Missile Crisis, and probably far more dangerous because maybe we'll talk a bit about AI. We're at a convergence of the existential threat of climate, the existential threat of nukes, we don't know about new pandemics, and the financial architecture. '07, '08, if you listen to the business community that really knows, '07, '08, it was a whisper of what's coming. It's all coming at the same time.So are we humans going to make it? Well, every rational bone in my body says, probably not. As I said, I'm a clinical optimist, and I really do think we can make it, but we'd better face up to this crazy fabric of bullshit that we swim in.Cole SmithTo pivot back to you, Paul, a trusted voice to me, and obviously to you as well, one of the most trusted voices in terms of patriotism to this country, for me, is Daniel Ellsberg. But one of the things that I come up against as a former nuclear missile operator is when I talk to people under a certain age and tell them what I used to do, they look at me like, "What are you... People still do that?"Not to be disrespectful, but Daniel Ellsberg may fall into that category as well for a lot of Americans, where it's become a name that means a lot to maybe fewer amount of people, which, of course, is all the more reason to make a film about him. But I wonder if you could speak a bit about Daniel Ellsberg, and the question that every filmmaker gets is, why now? And so why is it important to lead into this conversation with his voice, specifically at this point in time?Paul JayWell, first of all, it's not a film about Daniel Ellsberg. It's a film about our current moment, what's at risk, and what we can do about it. My approach, my belief is we cannot really face up to the reality of the risk and what solutions are if we don't get past our Cold War mentality. Because we have such a built-in belief system that's been deliberately fabricated, promoted, and inculcated in Americans, in Canadians, and Europeans, right from 1945, '46, at the very least. The reason Ellsberg is a good way to tell the story, part of the story, is because he was a true believer. Ellsberg was the most militant Cold Warrior you could possibly find. I don't know if you know who Curtis LeMay was, but he was almost on the same page. He didn't want to launch. Curtis LeMay was, for people who don't know, the head of STRATCOM, the guy who actually firebombed Japan, ordered the dropping, and actually engineered the dropping of the nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ellsberg was on his page.And then over the course of his time working at RAND Corporation, advising the Pentagon and the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, he started to realize this is all based on lies. They lied about the bomber gap. They said the Soviets had 1,000 nuclear bombers, when the Americans only had about 300, 400. The truth turned out to be completely the opposite.Then they had, and out of that, by the way, I'm going to cover some things pretty fast here, but if you want to know more, I'm around. They created something called the SAGE Radar System that came out of the bomber gap, where, "Oh, they're going to come get us with bombers. We're going to have a radar system in Northern Canada that's going to have BOMARC missiles. When they come in, we're going to shoot them out of the sky because they have the advantage; they have more bombers."First, it was a lie. There were no bombers. Second of all, the bloody thing never worked because they never figured out how to deal with radar jamming. But get this, and how come none of you... Raise one person who has ever heard of the SAGE radar system before. Maybe Matt. Not even Matt. Okay, here's one. Oh, two, three. That's remarkable. I almost never get-Cole SmithYou're in good company today.Paul JayI don't know if you know this, but the SAGE Radar System... Now, the Manhattan Project was the biggest industrial project in the history of the United States, and SAGE cost three times more than the Manhattan Project. Did you know that? I didn't know that until recently. It was a boondoggle. It was a scam. It never worked.Then they have the missile gap. You saw it here. "Oh, they have a thousand. We only have 40." It turned out the Soviets had four. But out of that, they created a program called BMEWS, B-M-E-W-S. This was linked to SAGE, and it was going to have a system that could knock out ICBMs on the way in. Never worked. The whole thing was nonsense. Another in today's dollars, billions and billions of dollars.It's been lie after lie, and you can draw a line from this lying right to the Golden Dome, because the anti-ballistic missile systems... I mean, my line about it is, "It's not about the dome, it's about the gold." These are boondoggles, but they're very dangerous boondoggles because they can destabilize the whole balance of nuclear power. Because the problem... I'm jumping way faster, but we don't have much time. The problem with the Golden Dome is that it's SDI of Reagan, but with AI.So, is it possible, and you know that they've always said it's impossible to hit a bullet, meaning an incoming missile, with a bullet, meaning a missile. Now they're saying, "Oh, no, with AI, now we can hit a bullet with a bullet." But it's an entire lie, because even if you can,

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Lake Khasan. In August, the Lake Khasan region became a tense theater of combat as Soviet and Japanese forces clashed around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The Soviets pushed a multi-front offensive, bolstered by artillery, tanks, and air power, yet the Japanese defenders held firm, aided by engineers, machine guns, and heavy guns. By the ninth and tenth, a stubborn Japanese resilience kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese hands, though the price was steep and the field was littered with the costs of battle. Diplomatically, both sides aimed to confine the fighting and avoid a larger war. Negotiations trudged on, culminating in a tentative cease-fire draft for August eleventh: a halt to hostilities, positions to be held as of midnight on the tenth, and the creation of a border-demarcation commission. Moscow pressed for a neutral umpire; Tokyo resisted, accepting a Japanese participant but rejecting a neutral referee. The cease-fire was imperfect, with miscommunications and differing interpretations persisting.    #185 Operation Hainan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After what seemed like a lifetime over in the northern border between the USSR and Japan, today we are returning to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Now I thought it might be a bit jarring to dive into it, so let me do a brief summary of where we are at, in the year of 1939. As the calendar turned to 1939, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which had erupted in July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and escalated into full-scale conflict, had evolved into a protracted quagmire for the Empire of Japan. What began as a swift campaign to subjugate the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek had, by the close of 1938, transformed into a war of attrition. Japanese forces, under the command of generals like Shunroku Hata and Yasuji Okamura, had achieved stunning territorial gains: the fall of Shanghai in November 1937 after a brutal three-month battle that cost over 200,000 Chinese lives; the infamous capture of Nanjing in December 1937, marked by the Nanjing Massacre where an estimated 300,000 civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed in a six-week orgy of violence; and the sequential occupations of Xuzhou in May 1938, Wuhan in October 1938, and Guangzhou that same month.  These victories secured Japan's control over China's eastern seaboard, major riverine arteries like the Yangtze, and key industrial centers, effectively stripping the Nationalists of much of their economic base. Yet, despite these advances, China refused to capitulate. Chiang's government had retreated inland to the mountainous stronghold of Chongqing in Sichuan province, where it regrouped amid the fog-laden gorges, drawing on the vast human reserves of China's interior and the resilient spirit of its people. By late 1938, Japanese casualties had mounted to approximately 50,000 killed and 200,000 wounded annually, straining the Imperial Japanese Army's resources and exposing the vulnerabilities of overextended supply lines deep into hostile territory. In Tokyo, the corridors of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Army Ministry buzzed with urgent deliberations during the winter of 1938-1939. The initial doctrine of "quick victory" through decisive battles, epitomized by the massive offensives of 1937 and 1938, had proven illusory. Japan's military planners, influenced by the Kwantung Army's experiences in Manchuria and the ongoing stalemate, recognized that China's sheer size, with its 4 million square miles and over 400 million inhabitants, rendered total conquest unfeasible without unacceptable costs. Intelligence reports highlighted the persistence of Chinese guerrilla warfare, particularly in the north where Communist forces under Mao Zedong's Eighth Route Army conducted hit-and-run operations from bases in Shanxi and Shaanxi, sabotaging railways and ambushing convoys. The Japanese response included brutal pacification campaigns, such as the early iterations of what would later formalize as the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, burn all, loot all), aimed at devastating rural economies and isolating resistance pockets. But these measures only fueled further defiance. By early 1939, a strategic pivot was formalized: away from direct annihilation of Chinese armies toward a policy of economic strangulation. This "blockade and interdiction" approach sought to sever China's lifelines to external aid, choking off the flow of weapons, fuel, and materiel that sustained the Nationalist war effort. As one Japanese staff officer noted in internal memos, the goal was to "starve the dragon in its lair," acknowledging the limits of Japanese manpower, total forces in China numbered around 1 million by 1939, against China's inexhaustible reserves. Central to this new strategy were the three primary overland supply corridors that had emerged as China's backdoors to the world, compensating for the Japanese naval blockade that had sealed off most coastal ports since late 1937. The first and most iconic was the Burma Road, a 717-mile engineering marvel hastily constructed between 1937 and 1938 by over 200,000 Chinese and Burmese laborers under the direction of engineers like Chih-Ping Chen. Stretching from the railhead at Lashio in British Burma (modern Myanmar) through treacherous mountain passes and dense jungles to Kunming in Yunnan province, the road navigated elevations up to 7,000 feet with hundreds of hairpin turns and precarious bridges. By early 1939, it was operational, albeit plagued by monsoonal mudslides, banditry, and mechanical breakdowns of the imported trucks, many Ford and Chevrolet models supplied via British Rangoon. Despite these challenges, it funneled an increasing volume of aid: in 1939 alone, estimates suggest up to 10,000 tons per month of munitions, gasoline, and aircraft parts from Allied sources, including early Lend-Lease precursors from the United States. The road's completion in 1938 had been a direct response to the loss of southern ports, and its vulnerability to aerial interdiction made it a prime target in Japanese planning documents. The second lifeline was the Indochina route, centered on the French-built Yunnan-Vietnam Railway (also known as the Hanoi-Kunming Railway), a 465-mile narrow-gauge line completed in 1910 that linked the port of Haiphong in French Indochina to Kunming via Hanoi and Lao Cai. This colonial artery, supplemented by parallel roads and river transport along the Red River, became China's most efficient supply conduit in 1938-1939, exploiting France's uneasy neutrality. French authorities, under Governor-General Pierre Pasquier and later Georges Catroux, turned a blind eye to transshipments, allowing an average of 15,000 to 20,000 tons monthly in early 1939, far surpassing the Burma Road's initial capacity. Cargoes included Soviet arms rerouted via Vladivostok and American oil, with French complicity driven by anti-Japanese sentiment and profitable tolls. However, Japanese reconnaissance flights from bases in Guangdong noted the vulnerability of bridges and rail yards, leading to initial bombing raids by mid-1939. Diplomatic pressure mounted, with Tokyo issuing protests to Paris, foreshadowing the 1940 closure under Vichy France after the fall of France in Europe. The route's proximity to the South China Sea made it a focal point for Japanese naval strategists, who viewed it as a "leak in the blockade." The third corridor, often overlooked but critical, was the Northwest Highway through Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang province. This overland network, upgraded between 1937 and 1941 with Soviet assistance, connected the Turkestan-Siberian Railway at Almaty (then Alma-Ata) to Lanzhou in Gansu via Urumqi, utilizing a mix of trucks, camel caravans, and rudimentary roads across the Gobi Desert and Tian Shan mountains. Under the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937 and subsequent aid agreements, Moscow supplied China with over 900 aircraft, 82 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces, and vast quantities of ammunition and fuel between 1937 and 1941—much of it traversing this route. In 1938-1939, volumes peaked, with Soviet pilots and advisors even establishing air bases in Lanzhou. The highway's construction involved tens of thousands of Chinese laborers, facing harsh winters and logistical hurdles, but it delivered up to 2,000 tons monthly, including entire fighter squadrons like the Polikarpov I-16. Japanese intelligence, aware of this "Red lifeline," planned disruptions but were constrained by the ongoing Nomonhan Incident on the Manchurian-Soviet border in 1939, which diverted resources and highlighted the risks of provoking Moscow. These routes collectively sustained China's resistance, prompting Japan's high command to prioritize their severance. In March 1939, the South China Area Army was established under General Rikichi Andō (later succeeded by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi), headquartered in Guangzhou, with explicit orders to disrupt southern communications. Aerial campaigns intensified, with Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers from Wuhan and Guangzhou targeting Kunming's airfields and the Red River bridges, while diplomatic maneuvers pressured colonial powers: Britain faced demands during the June 1939 Tientsin Crisis to close the Burma Road, and France received ultimatums that culminated in the 1940 occupation of northern Indochina. Yet, direct assaults on Yunnan or Guangxi were deemed too arduous due to rugged terrain and disease risks. Instead, planners eyed peripheral objectives to encircle these arteries. This strategic calculus set the stage for the invasion of Hainan Island, a 13,000-square-mile landmass off Guangdong's southern coast, rich in iron and copper but strategically priceless for its position astride the Indochina route and proximity to Hong Kong. By February 1939, Japanese admirals like Nobutake Kondō of the 5th Fleet advocated seizure to establish air and naval bases, plugging blockade gaps and enabling raids on Haiphong and Kunming, a prelude to broader southern expansion that would echo into the Pacific War. Now after the fall campaign around Canton in autumn 1938, the Japanese 21st Army found itself embedded in a relentless effort to sever the enemy's lifelines. Its primary objective shifted from mere battlefield engagements to tightening the choke points of enemy supply, especially along the Canton–Hankou railway. Recognizing that war materiel continued to flow into the enemy's hands, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to strike at every other supply route, one by one, until the arteries of logistics were stifled. The 21st Army undertook a series of decisive occupations to disrupt transport and provisioning from multiple directions. To sustain these difficult campaigns, Imperial General Headquarters reinforced the south China command, enabling greater operational depth and endurance. The 21st Army benefited from a series of reinforcements during 1939, which allowed a reorganization of assignments and missions: In late January, the Iida Detachment was reorganized into the Formosa Mixed Brigade and took part in the invasion of Hainan Island.  Hainan, just 15 miles across the Qiongzhou Strait from the mainland, represented a critical "loophole": it lay astride the Gulf of Tonkin, enabling smuggling of arms and materiel from Haiphong to Kunming, and offered potential airfields for bombing raids deep into Yunnan. Japanese interest in Hainan dated to the 1920s, driven by the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, which eyed the island's tropical resources (rubber, iron, copper) and naval potential at ports like Sanya (Samah). Prewar surveys by Japanese firms, such as those documented in Ide Kiwata's Minami Shina no Sangyō to Keizai (1939), highlighted mineral wealth and strategic harbors. The fall of Guangzhou in October 1938 provided the perfect launchpad, but direct invasion was delayed until early 1939 amid debates between the IJA (favoring mainland advances) and IJN (prioritizing naval encirclement). The operation would also heavily align with broader "southward advance" (Nanshin-ron) doctrine foreshadowing invasions of French Indochina (1940) and the Pacific War. On the Chinese side, Hainan was lightly defended as part of Guangdong's "peace preservation" under General Yu Hanmou. Two security regiments, six guard battalions, and a self-defense corps, totaling around 7,000–10,000 poorly equipped troops guarded the island, supplemented by roughly 300 Communist guerrillas under Feng Baiju, who operated independently in the interior. The indigenous Li (Hlai) people in the mountainous south, alienated by Nationalist taxes, provided uneven support but later allied with Communists. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to occupy and hold strategic points on the island near Haikou-Shih. The 21st Army commander assigned the Formosa Mixed Brigade to carry out this mission. Planning began in late 1938 under the IJN's Fifth Fleet, with IJA support from the 21st Army. The objective: secure northern and southern landing sites to bisect the island, establish air/naval bases, and exploit resources. Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the fleet, emphasized surprise and air superiority. The invasion began under the cover of darkness on February 9, 1939, when Kondō's convoy entered Tsinghai Bay on the northern shore of Hainan and anchored at midnight. Japanese troops swiftly disembarked, encountering minimal initial resistance from the surprised Chinese defenders, and secured a beachhead in the northern zone. At 0300 hours on 10 February, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, operating in close cooperation with naval units, executed a surprise landing at the northeastern point of Tengmai Bay in north Hainan. By 04:30, the right flank reached the main road leading to Fengyingshih, while the left flank reached a position two kilometers south of Tienwei. By 07:00, the right flank unit had overcome light enemy resistance near Yehli and occupied Chiungshan. At that moment there were approximately 1,000 elements of the enemy's 5th Infantry Brigade (militia) at Chiungshan; about half of these troops were destroyed, and the remainder fled into the hills south of Tengmai in a state of disarray. Around 08:30 that same day, the left flank unit advanced to the vicinity of Shuchang and seized Hsiuying Heights. By 12:00, it occupied Haikou, the island's northern port city and administrative center, beginning around noon. Army and navy forces coordinated to mop up remaining pockets of resistance in the northern areas, overwhelming the scattered Chinese security units through superior firepower and organization. No large-scale battles are recorded in primary accounts; instead, the engagements were characterized by rapid advances and localized skirmishes, as the Chinese forces, lacking heavy artillery or air support, could not mount a sustained defense. By the end of the day, Japanese control over the north was consolidating, with Haikou falling under their occupation.Also on 10 February, the Brigade pushed forward to seize Cingang. Wenchang would be taken on the 22nd, followed by Chinglan Port on the 23rd. On February 11, the operation expanded southward when land combat units amphibiously assaulted Samah (now Sanya) at the island's southern tip. This landing allowed them to quickly seize key positions, including the port of Yulin (Yulinkang) and the town of Yai-Hsien (Yaxian, now part of Sanya). With these southern footholds secured, Japanese forces fanned out to subjugate the rest of the island, capturing inland areas and infrastructure with little organized opposition. Meanwhile, the landing party of the South China Navy Expeditionary Force, which had joined with the Army to secure Haikou, began landing on the island's southern shore at dawn on 14 February. They operated under the protection of naval and air units. By the same morning, the landing force had advanced to Sa-Riya and, by 12:00 hours, had captured Yulin Port. Chinese casualties were significant in the brief fighting; from January to May 1939, reports indicate the 11th security regiment alone suffered 8 officers and 162 soldiers killed, 3 officers and 16 wounded, and 5 officers and 68 missing, though figures for other units are unclear. Japanese losses were not publicly detailed but appear to have been light.  When crisis pressed upon them, Nationalist forces withdrew from coastal Haikou, shepherding the last civilians toward the sheltering embrace of the Wuzhi mountain range that bands the central spine of Hainan. From that high ground they sought to endure the storm, praying that the rugged hills might shield their families from the reach of war. Yet the Li country's mountains did not deliver a sanctuary free of conflict. Later in August of 1943, an uprising erupted among the Li,Wang Guoxing, a figure of local authority and stubborn resolve. His rebellion was swiftly crushed; in reprisal, the Nationalists executed a seizure of vengeance that extended far beyond the moment of defeat, claiming seven thousand members of Wang Guoxing's kin in his village. The episode was grim testimony to the brutal calculus of war, where retaliation and fear indelibly etched the landscape of family histories. Against this backdrop, the Communists under Feng Baiju and the native Li communities forged a vigorous guerrilla war against the occupiers. The struggle was not confined to partisan skirmishes alone; it unfolded as a broader contest of survival and resistance. The Japanese response was relentless and punitive, and it fell upon Li communities in western Hainan with particular ferocity, Sanya and Danzhou bore the brunt of violence, as did the many foreign laborers conscripted into service by the occupying power. The toll of these reprisals was stark: among hundreds of thousands of slave laborers pressed into service, tens of thousands perished. Of the 100,000 laborers drawn from Hong Kong, only about 20,000 survived the war's trials, a haunting reminder of the human cost embedded in the occupation. Strategically, the island of Hainan took on a new if coercive purpose. Portions of the island were designated as a naval administrative district, with the Hainan Guard District Headquarters established at Samah, signaling its role as a forward air base and as an operational flank for broader anti-Chiang Kai-shek efforts. In parallel, the island's rich iron and copper resources were exploited to sustain the war economy of the occupiers. The control of certain areas on Hainan provided a base of operations for incursions into Guangdong and French Indochina, while the airbases that dotted the island enabled long-range air raids that threaded routes from French Indochina and Burma into the heart of China. The island thus assumed a grim dual character: a frontier fortress for the occupiers and a ground for the prolonged suffering of its inhabitants. Hainan then served as a launchpad for later incursions into Guangdong and Indochina. Meanwhile after Wuhan's collapse, the Nationalist government's frontline strength remained formidable, even as attrition gnawed at its edges. By the winter of 1938–1939, the front line had swelled to 261 divisions of infantry and cavalry, complemented by 50 independent brigades. Yet the political and military fissures within the Kuomintang suggested fragility beneath the apparent depth of manpower. The most conspicuous rupture came with Wang Jingwei's defection, the vice president and chairman of the National Political Council, who fled to Hanoi on December 18, 1938, leading a procession of more than ten other KMT officials, including Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Chu Minqi, and Zeng Zhongming. In the harsh arithmetic of war, defections could not erase the country's common resolve to resist Japanese aggression, and the anti-Japanese national united front still served as a powerful instrument, rallying the Chinese populace to "face the national crisis together." Amid this political drama, Japan's strategy moved into a phase that sought to convert battlefield endurance into political consolidation. As early as January 11, 1938, Tokyo had convened an Imperial Conference and issued a framework for handling the China Incident that would shape the theater for years. The "Outline of Army Operations Guidance" and "Continental Order No. 241" designated the occupied territories as strategic assets to be held with minimal expansion beyond essential needs. The instruction mapped an operational zone that compressed action to a corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, while the broader line of occupation east of a line tracing West Sunit, Baotou, and the major river basins would be treated as pacified space. This was a doctrine of attrition, patience, and selective pressure—enough to hold ground, deny resources to the Chinese, and await a more opportune political rupture. Yet even as Japan sought political attrition, the war's tactical center of gravity drifted toward consolidation around Wuhan and the pathways that fed the Yangtze. In October 1938, after reducing Wuhan to a fortressed crescent of contested ground, the Japanese General Headquarters acknowledged the imperative to adapt to a protracted war. The new calculus prioritized political strategy alongside military operations: "We should attach importance to the offensive of political strategy, cultivate and strengthen the new regime, and make the National Government decline, which will be effective." If the National Government trembled under coercive pressure, it risked collapse, and if not immediately, then gradually through a staged series of operations. In practice, this meant reinforcing a centralized center while allowing peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing's grip on the war's moral economy. In the immediate post-Wuhan period, Japan divided its responsibilities and aimed at a standoff that would enable future offensives. The 11th Army Group, stationed in the Wuhan theater, became the spearhead of field attacks on China's interior, occupying a strategic triangle that included Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, and protecting the rear of southwest China's line of defense. The central objective was not merely to seize territory, but to deny Chinese forces the capacity to maneuver along the critical rail and river corridors that fed the Nanjing–Jiujiang line and the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway. Central to this plan was Wuhan's security and the ability to constrain Jiujiang's access to the Yangtze, preserving a corridor for air power and logistics. The pre-war arrangement in early 1939 was a tableau of layered defenses and multiple war zones, designed to anticipate and blunt Japanese maneuver. By February 1939, the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue stood in a tense standoff with the Japanese 11th Army along the Jiangxi and Hubei front south of the Yangtze. The Ninth War Zone's order of battle, Luo Zhuoying's 19th Army Group defending the northern Nanchang front, Wang Lingji's 30th Army Group near Wuning, Fan Songfu's 8th and 73rd Armies along Henglu, Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group guarding southern Hubei and northern Hunan, and Lu Han's 1st Army Group in reserve near Changsha and Liuyang, was a carefully calibrated attempt to absorb, delay, and disrupt any Xiushui major Japanese thrust toward Nanchang, a city whose strategic significance stretched beyond its own bounds. In the spring of 1939, Nanchang was the one city in southern China that Tokyo could not leave in Chinese hands. It was not simply another provincial capital; it was the beating heart of whatever remained of China's war effort south of the Yangtze, and the Japanese knew it. High above the Gan River, on the flat plains west of Poyang Lake, lay three of the finest airfields China had ever built: Qingyunpu, Daxiaochang, and Xiangtang. Constructed only a few years earlier with Soviet engineers and American loans, they were long, hard-surfaced, and ringed with hangars and fuel dumps. Here the Chinese Air Force had pulled back after the fall of Wuhan, and here the red-starred fighters and bombers of the Soviet volunteer groups still flew. From Nanchang's runways a determined pilot could reach Japanese-held Wuhan in twenty minutes, Guangzhou in less than an hour, and even strike the docks at Hong Kong if he pushed his range. Every week Japanese reconnaissance planes returned with photographs of fresh craters patched, new aircraft parked wing-to-wing, and Soviet pilots sunning themselves beside their I-16s. As long as those fields remained Chinese, Japan could never claim the sky. The city was more than airfields. It sat exactly where the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway met the line running north to Jiujiang and the Yangtze, a knot that tied together three provinces. Barges crowded Poyang Lake's western shore, unloading crates of Soviet ammunition and aviation fuel that had come up the river from the Indochina railway. Warehouses along the tracks bulged with shells and rice. To the Japanese staff officers plotting in Wuhan and Guangzhou, Nanchang looked less like a city and more like a loaded spring: if Chiang Kai-shek ever found the strength for a counteroffensive to retake the middle Yangtze, this would be the place from which it would leap. And so, in the cold March of 1939, the Imperial General Headquarters marked Nanchang in red on every map and gave General Okamura the order he had been waiting for: take it, whatever the cost. Capturing the city would do three things at once. It would blind the Chinese Air Force in the south by seizing or destroying the only bases from which it could still seriously operate. It would tear a hole in the last east–west rail line still feeding Free China. And it would shove the Nationalist armies another two hundred kilometers farther into the interior, buying Japan precious time to digest its earlier conquests and tighten the blockade. Above all, Nanchang was the final piece in a great aerial ring Japan was closing around southern China. Hainan had fallen in February, giving the navy its southern airfields. Wuhan and Guangzhou already belonged to the army. Once Nanchang was taken, Japanese aircraft would sit on a continuous arc of bases from the tropical beaches of the South China Sea to the banks of the Yangtze, and nothing (neither the Burma Road convoys nor the French railway from Hanoi) would move without their permission. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to strike first in the Nanchang region in March 1939 reflected both urgency and a desire to seize initiative before Japanese modernization of the battlefield could fully consolidate. On March 8, Chiang directed Xue Yue to prepare a preemptive attack intended to seize the offensive by March 15, focusing the Ninth War Zone's efforts on preventing a river-crossing assault and pinning Japanese forces in place. The plan called for a sequence of coordinated actions: the 19th Army Group to hold the northern front of Nanchang; the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army (the 8th and 73rd Armies) to strike the enemy's left flank from Wuning toward De'an and Ruichang; the 30th and 27th Army Groups to consolidate near Wuning; and the 1st Army Group to push toward Xiushui and Sandu, opening routes for subsequent operations. Yet even as Xue Yue pressed for action, the weather of logistics and training reminded observers that no victory could be taken for granted. By March 9–10, Xue Yue warned Chiang that troops were not adequately trained, supplies were scarce, and preparations were insufficient, requesting a postponement to March 24. Chiang's reply was resolute: the attack must commence no later than the 24th, for the aim was preemption and the desire to tether the enemy's forces before they could consolidate. When the moment of decision arrived, the Chinese army began to tense, and the Japanese, no strangers to rapid shifts in tempo—moved to exploit any hesitation or fog of mobilization. The Ninth War Zone's response crystallized into a defensive posture as the Japanese pressed forward, marking a transition from preemption to standoff as both sides tested the limits of resilience. The Japanese plan for what would become known as Operation Ren, aimed at severing the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, breaking the enemy's line of communication, and isolating Nanchang, reflected a calculated synthesis of air power, armored mobility, and canalized ground offensives. On February 6, 1939, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued a set of precise directives: capture Nanchang to cut the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway and disrupt the southern reach of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces; seize Nanchang along the Nanchang–Xunyi axis to split enemy lines and "crush" Chinese resistance south of that zone; secure rear lines immediately after the city's fall; coordinate with naval air support to threaten Chinese logistics and airfields beyond the rear lines. The plan anticipated contingencies by pre-positioning heavy artillery and tanks in formations that could strike with speed and depth, a tactical evolution from previous frontal assaults. Okamura Yasuji, commander of the 11th Army, undertook a comprehensive program of reconnaissance, refining the assault plan with a renewed emphasis on speed and surprise. Aerial reconnaissance underlined the terrain, fortifications, and the disposition of Chinese forces, informing the selection of the Xiushui River crossing and the route of the main axis of attack. Okamura's decision to reorganize artillery and armor into concentrated tank groups, flanked by air support and advanced by long-range maneuver, marked a departure from the earlier method of distributing heavy weapons along the infantry front. Sumita Laishiro commanded the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, with more than 300 artillery pieces, while Hirokichi Ishii directed a force of 135 tanks and armored vehicles. This blended arms approach promised a breakthrough that would outpace the Chinese defenders and open routes for the main force. By mid-February 1939, Japanese preparations had taken on a high tempo. The 101st and 106th Divisions, along with attached artillery, assembled south of De'an, while tank contingents gathered north of De'an. The 6th Division began moving toward Ruoxi and Wuning, the Inoue Detachment took aim at the waterways of Poyang Lake, and the 16th and 9th Divisions conducted feints on the Han River's left bank. The orchestration of these movements—feints, riverine actions, and armored flanking, was designed to reduce the Chinese capacity to concentrate forces around Nanchang and to force the defenders into a less secure posture along the Nanchang–Jiujiang axis. Japan's southward strategy reframed the war: no longer a sprint to reduce Chinese forces in open fields, but a patient siege of lifelines, railways, and airbases. Hainan's seizure, the control of Nanchang's airfields, and the disruption of the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway exemplified a shift from large-scale battles to coercive pressure that sought to cripple Nationalist mobilization and erode Chongqing's capacity to sustain resistance. For China, the spring of 1939 underscored resilience amid mounting attrition. Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on offensive means to seize the initiative demonstrated strategic audacity, even as shortages and uneven training slowed tempo. The Ninth War Zone's defense, bolstered by makeshift airpower from Soviet and Allied lendings, kept open critical corridors and delayed Japan's consolidation. The war's human cost—massive casualties, forced labor, and the Li uprising on Hainan—illuminates the brutality that fueled both sides' resolve. In retrospect, the period around Canton, Wuhan, and Nanchang crystallizes a grim truth: the Sino-Japanese war was less a single crescendo of battles than a protracted contest of endurance, logistics, and political stamina. The early 1940s would widen these fault lines, but the groundwork laid in 1939, competition over supply routes, air control, and strategic rail nodes, would shape the war's pace and, ultimately, its outcome. The conflict's memory lies not only in the clashes' flash but in the stubborn persistence of a nation fighting to outlast a formidable adversary. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese invasion of Hainan and proceeding operations to stop logistical leaks into Nationalist China, showcased the complexity and scale of the growing Second Sino-Japanese War. It would not merely be a war of territorial conquest, Japan would have to strangle the colossus using every means necessary.  

Send us a textHow did women experience the Holocaust differently from men?  What do we learn from considering a gender perspective when we look at the past?  How did gender play a role in survival and oppression? For a long time, women's experiences (and a gendered approach to understanding them was absent from our study of the Holocaust.  In this episode, we have a far-ranging conversation looking at many of the questions listed above.Elissa Bemporad is the Ungar Chair in East European Jewish History and the Holocaust and is Professor of History at Queens College and the CUNY Graduate Center.Bemporad, Elissa and Joyce W. Warren, eds. Women and Genocide: Survivors, Victims, Perpetrators (2018) Bemporad, Elissa. Legacy of Blood: Jews, Pogroms, and Ritual Murder in the Lands of the Soviets (2020)Follow on Twitter @holocaustpod.Email the podcast at holocausthistorypod@gmail.comThe Holocaust History Podcast homepage is hereYou can find a complete reading list with books by our guests and also their suggestions here.

Have world governments secretly recovered and reverse-engineered extraterrestrial technology? Explosive claims that non-human craft have been retrieved, studied, and hidden from the public have surfaced in congressional testimony and documentaries. Revelations of UFO reverse-engineering programs by the U.S., U.K., and the Soviets, to name a few, are further examples of a covert global arms race for alien tech. Were these programs scrapped or simply buried deeper? And if such technology exists, could it revolutionize life as we know it? Tonight, Jeremy Scott sits in for Clyde Lewis and talks with retired U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant Gene Sticco, and former NASA & Air Force flight surgeon, Dr. Gregory Rogers, about "Alien Tech: The Hidden Arms Race". Listen on groundzeroplus.com.

This is The Briefing, a daily analysis of news and events from a Christian worldview.Part I (00:14 – 13:51)Aldrich Ames and His Deadly Betrayal: The Death of CIA Turncoat for Soviets Raises Massive IssuesAldrich Ames, C.I.A. Turncoat Who Helped the Soviets, Dies at 84 by The New York Times (Tim Weiner)Part II (13:51 – 20:23)Yet Another Problem with Surrogacy Emerges: Many Surrogate Mothers are Incurring Insurmountable Medical ExpensesSurrogacy Is a Multibillion-Dollar Business—but Surrogates Can Be Left With Big Debts by The Wall Street Journal (Katherine Long)Part III (20:23 – 24:27)Let's Face the Truth About Surrogacy: There's Massive Moral Problems in Even the Best Cases, and Many Surrogates are Hired by LGBTQ CouplesPart IV (24:27 – 26:56)Not Every Reproductive Act is Morally Acceptable: Babies are An Unalloyed Good, But Not Every Means of Conception is Good of Morally AcceptableSpycraft and Soulcraft on the Front Lines of History by Thinking in Public (R. Albert Mohler, Jr. and James Olson)Sign up to receive The Briefing in your inbox every weekday morning.Follow Dr. Mohler:X | Instagram | Facebook | YouTubeFor more information on The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, go to sbts.edu.For more information on Boyce College, just go to BoyceCollege.com.To write Dr. Mohler or submit a question for The Mailbox, go here.

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Changkufeng. A 7–10 August clash near Changkufeng and Hill 52 saw a brutal, multi-front Soviet push against Japanese positions in the Changkufeng–Hill 52 complex and adjacent areas. The Korea Army and Imperial forces rapidly reinforced with artillery, long-range 15 cm and other pieces, to relieve pressure. By 7–8 August, Soviet assault waves, supported by tanks and aircraft, intensified but Japanese defenses, including engineers, machine-gun fire, and concentrated artillery, prevented a decisive breakthrough at key positions like Noguchi Hill and the Changkufeng spine.  By 9–10 August, continued Japanese counterfire, improved artillery neutralization, and renewed defenses kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese control, though at heavy cost. The frontline exhaustion and looming strategic concerns prompted calls for intensified replacements and potential diplomatic considerations. It seemed like the battle was coming to an end.   #184 The Lake Khasan Truce Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The casualties were atrocious for both sides, yet they continued to mobilize more forces to the conflict area. While the Russians appeared uninterested in all-out war, they were not rushing to settle the crisis through diplomacy and, at the front, were launching "reckless" counterattacks at inconvenient locations, presumably to occupy positions useful for bargaining. The local Soviet military, having ceded the hills at the outset, must also have been anxious about its prestige. The Kwantung Army's potential threat to the flank undoubtedly made the Russians nervous. Although the leading echelon of the 104th Division did not reach Hunchun until the evening of 13 August, Japanese intelligence heard that the Red Army Headquarters staff at Khabarovsk had detected movements of Kwantung Army elements around 10 August and had been compelled to take countermeasures: they reinforced positions along the eastern and northern Manchurian frontiers, concentrated the air force, ordered move-up preparations by ground forces in the Blagoveshchensk district, and commandeered most of the motor vehicles in the Amur Province. By shifting its main strength to the eastern front, the Kwantung Army exerted, as intended, a silent pressure. The covert objective was to restrain and divert the Russians and to assist Japanese diplomacy, not to provoke war. Nevertheless, an American correspondent who visited the Changkufeng area in mid-August privately reported that the Kwantung Army was massing large numbers of troops near the border and expected further trouble.  Toward its weak neighbor in Korea the Kwantung Army rendered every support. Apart from its major demonstration in eastern Manchuria, the Kwantung Army promptly sent whatever reinforcements of artillery, engineers, and other units that Seoul had desired. Being also intimately involved in anti-Soviet military preparations, the Kwantung Army understandably wanted the latest and most authentic information on Russian Army theory and practice. The Changkufeng Incident furnished such a firsthand opportunity, and the professional observers sent from Hsinking were well received at the front. Military classmate ties contributed to the working relationships between the armies. As one division officer put it, the teams from the Kwantung Army came as "friends," not only to study the battlefield by their respective branches of service but also to assist the front-line forces; "the Kwantung Army was increasingly helpful to us in settling the incident." Foreign Minister Ugaki felt that the pressure of troop movements in Manchuria played a major part in the Russians' eventual decision to conclude a cease-fire. From Inada's viewpoint, it had been a "fine and useful demonstration against the Soviet Union." Pinned at Changkufeng, the Russians did not or could not choose to react elsewhere, too. Army General Staff officers believed that clear and consistent operational guidance furnished by Tokyo produced good results, although the fighting had been very hard for the front-line Japanese troops because of the insistence on exclusive defense, the curbs on interference by the Kwantung Army, and the prohibition on the use of aircraft. It had been close, however. Only by conscious efforts at restraint had the small war at Changkufeng been kept from spilling over into neighboring areas. Escalation of combat in early August had caused the Japanese government to try to break the diplomatic impasse while localizing the conflict. On 2 August Premier Konoe assured the Emperor that he intended to leave matters for diplomacy and to suspend military operations as soon as possible, an approach with which the government concurred. The Changkufeng dispute had been accorded priority, preceding overall settlements and the creation of joint commissions to redefine the borders. On the 3rd, after coordinating with the military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised Shigemitsu that the front-line situation had become "extremely critical" and that a quick suspension of fighting action should be proposed. Soviet and Japanese troops should be pulled back to the setup as of 30 July.  In the midst of the Changkufeng Incident, the USSR intensified harassing tactics against the last Japanese consulates located within the Soviet Union. Forty-eight hour ultimatums to quit the country were delivered to the consuls at Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk on 3 and 4 August, respectively. Although the Japanese government warned that it might retaliate, the Russians were unyielding. The foreign ambassadors, Mamoru Shigemitsu and Maxim Litvinov met on August 4th, whereupon Shigemitsu argued, the best procedure would be to suspend military operations on both sides and to restore the status quo. Litvinov in a long manner explained the stance of the USSR as Shigemitsu put it "the Soviet side had a disposition to cease fighting, provided that conditions were satisfactory."  The Russians were stalling at the very time the Red Army was bending every effort to retake Changkufeng. Coordination between the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministers produced cease-fire conditions which were rushed to the Japanese ambassador on 6 August. Two alternate lines were proposed, to which both armies would pull back. After the creation of a buffer zone, discussions could begin concerning delineation of boundaries in the region of the incident. The Hunchun pact could be the basis for deliberations, demarcation to be effected by joint investigations on the spot in consultation with documents in the possession of Manchukuo and the USSR; the Japanese would serve only as observers. Shigemitsu conferred once more with Litvinov for three and a half hours on 7 August, but no progress was made. Litvinov insisted that a clash could be averted only if Japanese forces pulled However Litvinov's positive reaction to the idea of a demarcation commission was seen as a good sign.  On August the 10th, both sides seemed to have reached a similar conclusion that a cease-fire needed to rapidly be implemented. At 11pm that night Litvinov called the embassy, asking for Shigemitus to see him as fast as possible. Shigemitsu arrived around midnight whereupon Litvinov showed him a draft of a final accord: 1. Japanese and Soviet forces shall cease all military activities on 11 August at noon local time. Instructions to that effect are to be issued immediately by the governments of the USSR and Japan.  2. Japanese as well as Soviet troops shall remain on those lines which they occupied at midnight local time on 10 August.  3. For redemarcation of the portion of frontier in dispute, there shall be created a mixed commission of two representatives from the USSR and two representatives from the Japanese-Manchurian side, with an umpire selected by agreement of both parties from among citizens of a third state.  4. The commission for redemarcation shall work on the basis of agreements and maps bearing the signatures of plenipotentiary representatives of Russia and China. Shigemitsu agreed to the inclusion of a Japanese commissioner on the Manchukuoan delegation, but he could not assent to the addition of a neutral umpire. Moscow received the news of the truce with gratification mingled with surprise. Few realized that the USSR had taken the step of appeasing or at least saving face for the Japanese even after Shigemitsu had pleaded for and won a cease-fire. The world was told by the Russians only that specific overtures for cessation of hostilities had originated with the Soviet authorities. In general, it was not difficult to guess why the Russian government, distracted by the European political scene and apprehensive about a two-front war, agreed to a cease-fire at Changkufeng.  The slowness of communication across the many miles between Moscow and Tokyo did nothing to alleviate nervousness in the Japanese capital during the night of 10–11 August. Ugaki wrote in his diary that, "after ten days of tension, the struggle between the Japanese and Soviet armies on the USSR–Manchukuo border had reached the decisive brink". Complicating the situation was the fact that, late on 10 August, the president of Domei News Agency conveyed to Konoe a message from one of his Moscow correspondents. Purporting to sum up Shigemitsu's latest outlook, the report stated that success in the negotiations seemed unlikely. The contents of the message were transmitted to Ugaki and Itagaki. Consequently, Konoe and his associates spent a fearful and depressed night. Shigemitsu's own report, sent by telegram, arrived frustratingly slowly.  After definite information had been received from Shigemitsu, Harada happily called Kazami Akira, the prime minister's chief secretary, and Konoe himself. "Until the accord was implemented," Kazami had said, "we would have to be on the alert all day today." Konoe and Kazami seemed "a little relaxed anyhow." Inada had finally retired past midnight on 10–11 August, "agreement or no agreement. I must have been dozing from fatigue when the jangle of the phone got me up. It was a message saying that a truce had been concluded the preceding midnight. Just as I had been expecting, I said to myself, but I felt empty inside, as if it were an anticlimax." The call had to have been an unofficial communication, perhaps the latest Domei news, since the records showed that definitive word from the embassy in Moscow did not reach Tokyo until after 10:00. Attache Doi's report to the Army General Staff came at about 11:00. This was extremely late in terms of getting Japanese troops to cease operations at 13:00 Tokyo time (or noon on the spot); a tardy imperial order might undo the Moscow accord. Complicating this matter of split-second timing was the fact that the first official telegram from Shigemitsu referred to unilateral Japanese withdrawal by one kilometer. At the Japanese high command level, there was agitated discussion when initial word of these arrangements arrived. Inada speculated that on 10 August the Russians had staged persistent close-quarter assaults against Changkufeng and seized the southern edge eventually, although repulsed at all other points. Moscow may have agreed to a truce at that midnight because they expected that the crest of Changkufeng would be in their hands by then and that a fait accompli would have been achieved. Some officers argued that the Russian forces were suffering "quite badly and this caused the authorities' agreeability to a cease-fire." Most exasperating, however, was the provision stipulating a one-sided military withdrawal. Admittedly, such action had been under discussion by the Army General Staff itself, particularly after Terada's sobering appeal of 10 August. It was another matter to have a Japanese withdrawal dictated by the USSR while Russian troops did not have to budge. Initial puzzlement and chagrin began to yield to rationalization. The Japanese side seemed to have made a concession in the negotiations, but there must have been significance to the phrase which said, "the line occupied by Japanese forces has been taken into due consideration." Japanese troops had presumably advanced to the edge of the frontier, while Russian soldiers had not come even close. Thus, it must have been necessary to have the Japanese units withdraw first, to fix the boundaries, since it had been the Japanese who had done the greater advancing. One Japanese office remarked "A pull-back was a pull-back, no matter how you looked at things—and we were the ones who had to do it. But the atmosphere in the command had been far from optimistic on 10 August; so we decided that it was unnecessary to complain about this issue and we approved the agreement in general. Both the senior and junior staff levels seemed to be quite relieved." The 11th of August had been an awkward day to conduct liaison between the Foreign Ministry, the Army, and the Throne, since the Emperor was leaving Hayama to visit naval installations in the Yokosuka area and the navy air unit in Chiba from morning. By the time a conclusive report on the cease-fire could be conveyed to the monarch, he was aboard the destroyer Natsugumo at Kisarazu. Naval wireless facilities in Tokyo had to be used to transmit coded messages to Admiral Yonai, the Navy Minister, for delivery to the Emperor. This was done shortly before 14:45 According to Yonai, the Emperor "was very pleased and relieved when I reported to him… about the conclusion of the truce accord." The appropriate Imperial order was approved promptly. But not until 15:00, two hours after cease-fire time at Changkufeng, did word of Imperial sanction reach the high command.  Japanese soldiers in the lines recalled nothing special on 11 August. "We didn't hear about the truce till the last minute," said one, "and we had become so inured to enemy artillery we hardly noticed any 'last salute.' From Tokyo, on 11 August, it was reported that the Japanese side had suspended operations promptly at noon, as agreed, but that sporadic bursts of fire had continued to come from the Soviet side. Colonel Grebennik, when asked after the war whether the combat did end at noon, replied petulantly: "Yes, but not quite so. The fighting actually ceased at 12:05." According to him, the tardiness was the Japanese side's fault.  The Japanese press told readers that "the cease-fire bugle has sounded—the frontier is cheerful now, 14 days after the shooting began." All was quiet in the area of Changkufeng, where the sounds of firing ceased at noon "as if erased." The most intense period of stillness lasted only a few minutes and was followed by the excited chattering of soldiers, audible on both sides. Korea Army Headquarters spoke of the "lifting of dark clouds [and] return of the rays of peace." In Hongui, a Japanese combat officer told a Japanese correspondent: "Suddenly we noticed the insects making noise; the soldiers were delighted. Once the fighting stopped, Japanese national flags were hoisted here and there along our front. … After the Russians observed what we had done, they broke out red flags also, at various points in their trenches." Some Japanese soldiers were given cookies by Soviet medical corpsmen. At Hill 52, an infantryman remembered, the Japanese and the Russians were facing each other, 50 meters apart, that afternoon. "We just lay there and stared at each other for two hours, waiting grimly. But it was well past cease-fire now, and those same Russians finally started to wave at us. Later that day, when Soviet troops came to salvage their KO'd tanks, we 'chatted' in sign language." After the cease-fire, Ichimoto, whose battalion had seen the most difficult fighting, stuck his head above the trench and waved hello to some Soviet officers. "They waved back. It gave me an odd sensation, for during the furious struggle I had considered them to be barbarians. Now I was surprised to see that they were civilized after all!" A rifleman at Changkufeng remembered swapping watches with an unarmed Russian across the peak. The Japanese front-line troops stayed in their positions confronting the Russians and conducted preparations for further combat while cleaning up the battlefield. Soviet troops also remained deployed as of the time of the cease-fire and vigorously carried out their own construction. The day after the cease-fire went into effect, Suetaka escorted an American reporter to the front. At Changkufeng:  "carpenters were making wooden receptacles for the ashes of the Japanese dead. Funeral pyres still were smoldering. . . . From our vantage point the lieutenant general pointed out long lines of Soviet trucks coming up in clouds of dust [which] apparently were made deliberately in an effort to conceal the trucks' movements, [probably designed] to haul supplies from the front. Soviet boats were pushing across [Khasan] . . . and Soviet soldiers were towing smashed tanks back from no-man'sland. On the Japanese side there was a pronounced holiday spirit. Soldiers, emerging from dugouts, were drying white undershirts on near-by brush and bathing in the Tumen River. The soldiers were laughing heartily. A few were trying to ride a Korean donkey near Changkufeng's scarred slope. The general pointed out three Soviet tanks behind the Japanese advance lines east of Changkufeng. He said the Russians had hauled back seventy others [on the night of 11 August]. . . . The writer was shown a barbed wire fence immediately behind a wrecked village on the west slope of Changkufeng which the general said the Soviet troops built at the beginning of the fighting. Possiet Bay also was pointed out, clearly visible across the swamp." Soviet losses for what became known as the battle of Lake Khasan for the Russians and the Changkufeng incident for the Japanese, totaled 792 killed or missing and 3,279 wounded or sick, according to Soviet records. The Japanese claimed to have destroyed or immobilized 96 enemy tanks and 30 guns. Soviet armored losses were significant, with dozens of tanks knocked out or destroyed and hundreds of "tank troops" becoming casualties. Japanese casualties, as revealed by secret Army General Staff statistics, were 1,439 casualties, 526 killed or missing, 913 wounded; the Soviets claimed Japanese losses of 3,100, with 600 killed and 2,500 wounded. The Soviets concluded that these losses were due in part to poor communications infrastructure and roads, as well as the loss of unit coherence caused by weak organization, headquarters, commanders, and a lack of combat-support units. The faults in the Soviet army and leadership at Khasan were blamed on the incompetence of Blyukher. In addition to leading the troops into action at Khasan, Blyukher was also supposed to oversee the trans-Baikal Military District's and the Far Eastern fronts' move to combat readiness, using an administrative apparatus that delivered army group, army, and corps-level instructions to the 40th Rifle Division by accident. On 22 October, he was arrested by the NKVD and is thought to have been tortured to death. At 15:35 on 11 August, in the Hill 52 sector, high-ranking military delegates bearing a white flag emerged from the Soviet lines and proceeded to Akahage Hill, about 100 meters from the Japanese positions. Cho, as right sector chief, was notified. He sent three lieutenants to converse with the Russians; they learned that the Soviets wanted the Japanese to designate a time and place for a conference. This word was conveyed to Suetaka, who had already dispatched Lieutenant Kozuki to the heights east of Shachaofeng to contact the Russians. Around 4:20, the commander canceled Kozuki's mission and instructed Cho to reply that the delegation ought to convene near the peak of Changkufeng at 18:00 Cho set out promptly with several subordinates; they reached the Changkufeng crest a little before 6. The Russians then said they wanted to meet the Japanese near the Crestline southeast of Changkufeng, the excuse being that the peak was too far for them to go and that they could not arrive by the designated time. Cho took his team to the location requested by the Russians. There, the Japanese found 13 Soviet soldiers and a heavy machine gun on guard, but the Russian delegates had not arrived, although it was 6:18. The irked Japanese clocked a further delay of two minutes before the Russian truce chief, Gen. Grigory M. Shtern, rode up on horseback with a party of eight. Both delegations saluted, the chiefs and team members identified themselves, and all shook hands. The Soviet team was made up of Corps General 3rd rank Shtern, 38, chief of staff, Far East area army; Brigade Commissar Semenovsky political major general, 37 or 38; Colonel Fedotev, 42; and Major Wabilev, about 30. Interpreting for the Russians was Alexei Kim. In Colonel Cho's opinion, "It was always necessary to take the initiative in dealing with the Soviets. So, even in such matters as shaking hands or conversing, he always did things first." During the exchange of greetings, Cho teased Shtern about his bandaged forehead. "A Japanese artillery shell got you, didn't it?" he asked. But Cho began formal discussions on a more dignified note: "Cho: It is very much to be regretted that the Japanese and Soviet armies had to get involved in combat around Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I laud the consummation of the Mos­cow accord on the part of both governments. And, I must say, your forces were quite brave and patriotic. Shtern: I agree with you. The Japanese Army, too, was courageous and strong." Negotiations would go on at the local level and diplomatic level for many days. In Tokyo, on the morning of 13 August, Ugaki had gone to the Meiji shrine to "report" on the cease-fire and to express his gratitude. At 10:00, when received in Imperial audience, he discussed the Changkufeng Incident. "I humbly regret to have troubled Your Majesty so unduly in connection with an unimportant affair on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier" at a time when the monarch was confronted by grave national problems. A long and winding road lay ahead before the incident as a whole was settled, but a good start had been made and "we are going to be even more careful in handling matters, although the Soviet regime  consists of devious, vicious scoundrels." Recognition of the Japanese Army's performance was accorded by the highest authorities in the homeland. As soon as the fighting ceased, Kan'in transmitted a message of appreciation. The day after the cease-fire, the command in North Korea issued a generous communique: "We pay homage to the Japanese for defending themselves against 100 planes, 200 tanks, and 60 pieces of heavy artillery. Our admiration for the bravery of both armies is of the highest." At 14:00 on the 15th, Kan'in was received in audience and reported on the settlement of the crisis. Said the Emperor: "We are gratified by the fact that, during this incident at Changkufeng, Our officers and men achieved their mission fully and manifested prudence and forbearance while confronting difficult circumstances with small forces. Our profound condolences to the casualties. Convey this message to the officers and men." A wire was dispatched promptly to Nakamura. With Imperial use of the wording "Changkufeng Incident," the nomenclature for the affair was fixed in Japan. When the cabinet met on 16 August, the decision was reached officially. After the Changkufeng affair, Japanese officers claimed that the Soviets had dispatched tactical experts "to ascertain why their elite Far Eastern forces had not been able to achieve satisfactory results. They realize the urgency of this investigation in preparation for any great war." Specifically, the AGS heard that on the day of the cease-fire, Blyukher had sent an investigative team of commissars under Romanovsky to the scene. Japanese experts on the USSR speculated that the experience at Changkufeng ought indeed to have impressed the Red Army: "Our forces did seize the hill and hold it. After comparing the strengths involved ... the Russians may well have had to modify their estimates." According to one Japanese commentator, improvements in political leadership were judged imperative by the USSR, gainsaying claims that the Soviet Army had been strengthened through the purge of alleged Japanese tools. Soviet authorities would conclude "As a test of doctrine, the fighting had confirmed the correctness of the basic principles embodied in the 1936 Field Service Regulations." The Soviet infantry had paid dearly for this, as well as for the deficiencies in tactical training. Defense Commissar Voroshilov admitted, "We were not sufficiently quick in our tactics, and particularly in joint operations in dealing the enemy a concentrated blow." In the view of historian Mackintosh: "The Soviet success at Lake Khasan was bought at the cost of heavy casualties and exposed serious defects in the mobilization machinery and the training of troops. There can be little doubt that these factors checked to some extent the Soviet Government's overoptimistic estimate of its own military strength and cast doubt on the effectiveness of its policy of expansion in all fields of military organization". Writing a year and a half after Changkufeng, an Mainichi reporter observed that the greatest harvest from the incident was tangible Japanese experience in determining the fighting strength of the Russians. Purchased with blood, this knowledge could provide valuable evidence for future combat operations. It was a question whether Changkufeng really possessed such strategic significance as was claimed for it, but the Soviet policy of bluff could be interpreted as substantiating the weakness of the defenses of Vladivostok. "The Russians used all kinds of new weapons at Changkufeng and tipped their whole hand. But although mechanization of the Red Army had attained high levels with respect to quantity, their weaknesses in technique and quality were laid bare." Imaoka observed that since the Changkufeng Incident marked the first time that the Japanese and Soviet armies engaged each other in combat involving large strategic elements, divisional and above, Russian fighting strength was studied with keen interest. The Japanese did not rate the capacity of the officers or Soviet quality, in general, as especially high. Still, the Russians did possess quantitative abundance, and Japanese losses had been heavy because the enemy had fired masses of ammunition against fixed targets. Suetaka seemed to have comprehended the scope of tangible Soviet strength in equipment and materiel, as shown by his comment: "I felt deeply that if the gap in manpower went beyond limits, it would be inevitable for our casualties to increase tremendously; this might even cause us danger in specific local areas." Few Japanese officers saw anything new in Soviet tactical methods, although considerations of mass were ever-present. Not only intelligence experts but the whole army worked on ways of coping with Soviet forces that would have the numerical advantage by 3:1. Most awesome was the "fantastic abundance" of hostile materiel, although the Russians could not deploy to surround the Japanese because of the geography. An AGS expert on the USSR summed it up: "We learned that Soviet strength was up to expectations, whereas Japanese arms and equipment had to be improved and reinforced." Worded in a multiplicity of ways, the Japanese conclusion was that patient imperial forces had won a great victory by defending the contested border with flesh vs. steel and by limiting the Changkufeng Incident, till the end, against enemy hordes supported exclusively by planes and tanks. Japanese infantrymen admit that the combat soldiers did not savor their disadvantages. "All our materiel was inferior in quality and particularly in quantity. We had the impression that whereas we relied on muscle power, the enemy used engines. This rendered our fighting particularly hard, but we had full confidence in our spiritual strength [i.e., superiority]."  Nevertheless, the Japanese mode of tactical operation, asserted Iwasaki, the Korea Army senior staff officer, was "the worst possible: fighting with hands tied." This meant that the Russians could fight "to their hearts' content," committing tanks and planes, and striking from all directions. A front-line infantry commander commented: "One's troops ought to be provided meaningful reasons for fighting and for dying happily. It is cruel to ask officers and men to meet masses of steel and to shed their blood without visible cause, and apparently because of inadequate combat preparations." The cease-fire agreement was concluded "at just the right time," General Morimoto admitted. A secret report prepared by AGS analysts sheds light on the larger question of what the army thought it had learned about itself and the Soviet enemy: "In studying Changkufeng, one ought to bear a number of cautions in mind: (1) The incident broke out when we were concentrating on the holy war against China; severe limitations on combat operations were imposed by the necessity to adhere to a policy of nonenlargement. (2) Apparently, the enemy also adopted a policy of localization while continuously attempting to recapture the high ground in the Changkufeng area. (3) Our forces employed units which were on Phase-1 alert from beginning to end; in terms of quality, the personnel were excellent—mainly active-duty types, from key men down. But our numbers were far inferior, and our organization and equipment were not of the best. In addition, we committed no planes or tanks, whereas the enemy used plenty. (4) The 19th Division was thorough, rigorous, and realistic in its combat training prior to the engagement. (5) Battlefield terrain seriously limited the enemy's attacks, especially tank action. But while the Tumen restricted assaults against our flanks and rear, it hampered our own services of supply, notably the provision of position construction materials." The Japanese learned few or erroneous lessons from the Changkufeng affair; the Kwantung Army, for example, was convinced that everything had been handled badly in 1938 by the Korea Army and the high command. When a dispute arose in 1939 at Nomonhan on another border lying between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo, the staff in Hsinking fostered escalating measures. The USSR, however, learned in 1937 and 1938 that the Japanese Army seemed to respect only force.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Changkufeng incident or battle of Lake Khasan clash saw a fierce Soviet push against Japanese positions around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The cease-fire ended the incident, but not the conflict. Despite the brutal lessons learned by both sides, a much larger conflict would explode the next year that would alter both nations throughout WW2.   

ADMITTING STRATEGIC FAILURE AND THE NEED FOR TEAM B Colleagues James Fanell and Bradley Thayer. Fanell argues the intelligence community must admit its "strategic failure" regarding China, likening the current denial to a patient ignoring a cancer diagnosis. He asserts that institutional bias protects the status quo. To counter this, they propose creating a "Team B"—independent analysts outside the CIA's "educated elite"—to provide objective threat assessments, similar to the Cold War approach against the Soviets. Thayer advocates moving CFIUS to the Department of Defense to better protect intellectual property and calls for a "whole of society" response that cuts off trade and explicitly recognizes the CCP as the enemy. FANELL NUMBER 31925 SHANGHAI RIOTS

THE COLD WAR SHIFT: GEORGE KENNAN'S STRATEGIC PIVOT Colleague Professor Gary J. Bass. By 1948, the trial's context shifted dramatically with the onset of the Cold War and the Chinese Civil War. George Kennan, the architect of containment, visited Tokyo to convince MacArthur that democratization was less important than establishing Japan as a strong anti-communist bulwark against the Soviets. Kennan argued that the US must secure Japan as a strategic prize rather than focus on China, which was falling to Mao. This "reverse course" prioritized stability and industrial strength over the initial progressive reforms, viewing Japan as the essential anchor for Americanforeign policy in the Pacific. NUMBER 51929 TOKYO

Last time we spoke about the second Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights. Night operations opened the action: scouts moved in darkness, wires were cut, and Hill 52 fell before dawn, followed by Shachaofeng as dawn pressed the front. The Russians responded with a heavy counterattack, tanks, aircraft, and sustained artillery, yet the Japanese adapted quickly, shifting guns and reinforcing sectors to hold the crest. By 3–5 August, Japanese and Soviet forces fought in a fragmented front across multiple sectors: Hill 52, Changkufeng, Shachaofeng, the lake. Japanese commanders coordinated between infantry, engineers, and mountain artillery, while seeking long-range support from Kwantung Army. Soviet artillery sought to disrupt lines of communication and press from the Crestline with massed tanks and air strikes. Despite intense bombardments and repeated tank assaults, Japanese regimental guns, antitank teams, and close-quarters defense bore the brunt of the defense, inflicting heavy Soviet losses. Yet in the end the Japanese had yet again repelled the enemy from the heights.   #183 The end was near for Changkufeng Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. While the front-line fighting raged on 6 August, Tokyo moved to supply the 19th Division with the coveted long-range artillery and antiaircraft support. In the evening, the Korea Army officially learned from the AGS that, by Imperial order, the Kwantung Army would add the strength already informally approved: four 7.5-centimeter field guns, two 15-centimeter cannons, two 10-centimeter railway guns, and two 7.5-centimeter antiaircraft guns. The North China Area Army would also provide mobile antiaircraft units. The Korea Army estimated that the field and heavy artillery reinforcements would reach the town of Tumen on 7–8 August. The new guns were expected to ease the division's pressure in due course. The fighting continued on the 7th. The 75th Infantry observed that, despite the Russians' vigorous attacks aimed at capturing Hill 52 and Changkufeng on 6 August, they failed at both objectives and were repelled with heavy losses. Because of the Soviets' ignominious defeat at Changkufeng, they seemed determined to seize Hill 52 on 7 August. Most of the shallow and isolated Japanese positions at Hill 52 had been shattered by bombardments. Some men retrieved Japanese corpses still piled atop one another; the wounded were to proceed to the rear by themselves. Many had not eaten since the morning of 6 August, yet morale remained high. It was decided to knock out the Soviets' advancing tanks under the cover of darkness, employing infantry and engineers. At 03:00, these elements moved against the armor 150 meters behind the Russian wire, killed some advancing infantry, and destroyed two tanks. The infantry platoon leader, Warrant Officer Kanaoka, jumped aboard a tank, pried open the turret, and fought with his blade as blood dripped from the blade. The eastern sky brightened as he stood there smiling and holding his bloodied sword; at that moment, Private First Class Kimura exploded a grenade inside the tank, which promptly blew up. The assault force returned safely at dawn. At dawn, from heavy-weapon positions 200–300 meters in front, the Soviets opened fire, exploiting gaps between the smashed armor. Since 04:00, sixty Russian tanks had been moving south on the far side of Khasan. By daybreak, more than ten machines could be seen in the dip northeast of Hill 52, with several dozen other tanks newly active along Hill 29 Crestline as infantry deployed in gullies. At 05:30, Russian artillery began firing from all directions. In addition to shelling from Gaho, Hill 29, and Maanshan, the Soviets directed flank fire against Hill 52, using two rapid-fire guns 700 meters northeast and three mountain guns on the slope of Changkufeng. As the works at Hill 52 were progressively pulverized, K. Sato dispatched reinforcements from the 76th Regiment there. Near 11:00, the Russian barrage intensified and became more accurate; positions were destroyed one by one, and casualties rose. A new apex of fury occurred between 13:30 and 14:30, when a pall of smoke blanketed the region, producing a ghastly impression. Russian planes bombed and strafed Hill 52 from 11:00; a raid by twelve bombers against the western slope at 13:30 was particularly fierce, though many bombs fell harmlessly into the Tumen. The Russian lines were built up gradually, and all types of Soviet weapons were employed. From 14:30, about 100 Russians approached, led by four tanks, and penetrated the defense positions. Close-quarter counterattacks were launched by elements of three Japanese infantry companies, a machine-gun platoon, and an engineer platoon. One officer recalled "It was tough and costly fighting. Men were overrun by tanks, some losing limbs." Nine engineers linked up with the infantry, placing explosives under tank turrets and blowing up two machines. During the crisis, with tanks and infantry overrunning his lines. From the right wing, in the Eleventh Company sector, the Japanese fought fiercely against Soviet heavy weapons and infantry who had advanced to point-blank range. Master Sergeant Suzuki, acting company commander, on his own initiative ordered the main force to counterattack. Through coordinated action, the Japanese knocked out four tanks that had penetrated their positions. Two enemy battalions that had "come close bravely" were nearly wiped out. Total Soviet strength committed in this sector amounted to three battalions and forty tanks. Japanese losses on the Hill 52 front were heavy indeed: seventy-four had been killed and eighty-five wounded, one hundred fifty-nine out of three hundred twenty-eight men in action. The remnants of one infantry company were commanded by a superior private; sergeants led two other infantry and two machine-gun companies. Seven of thirteen heavy weapons were inoperable.  Meanwhile 9th Company elements defended Noguchi Hill, 800 meters southeast of Changkufeng. By 05:00 on 7 August, Soviet troops facing the hill numbered 200 infantry, five tanks, and two rapid-fire guns. From positions set up the previous night along the lake, the Russians opened fire at dawn while 50 soldiers moved to attack with the tanks in support. Captain Noguchi's men poured fire on the enemy and inflicted heavy losses. But the Russians, who possessed superior supporting fire, fought their way forward until, after 40 minutes, they got within 70 meters. The Soviet tanks disappeared into a dead angle near the lakeshore. When the fog lifted at 06:00, the Russians on the southeast slope of Changkufeng fired down at Noguchi Hill with four heavy machine guns. Seven tanks, advancing anew from the gully northeast of Hill 52, came as close as 80 to 200 meters, deployed to encircle, and opened fire. By now, eight Japanese had been killed and five wounded; most of the light machine guns and grenade dischargers had been crippled and all three heavy weapons were out of action. The Russians attacked again at 08:00, hurling grenades and shouting. A dozen tanks operated in support of two infantry companies. The Japanese responded with grenades; yellow and black smoke masked the heights, and the scene was extremely impressive. Desperate hand-to-hand combat raged along the sector for a half-hour until the Soviets fell back after suffering enormous losses.  At 10:40, the Russians assaulted with infantry from the southeast front and from the Changkufeng direction, aided by tanks from the zone between. Captain Noguchi sortied with his remnant, charged the Russians, and drove them off. In this fighting, however, he was shot in the chest and most of his subordinates were killed or wounded. Somehow the captain stayed on his feet. He and six survivors threw grenades at the Russians, who were now behind the Japanese, and then he led a last charge back to the highest positions. Once the enemy had been evicted, Captain Noguchi collapsed. Only three or four soldiers were in fighting condition. The captain begged them to report to Sato, but, refusing to abandon him, the men managed to help him down to the rear. It was 11:30. Captain Noguchi's unit, which had fought bravely since the first combat on 6 August, had been destroyed. Of 78 officers and men, 40 lay killed and another 31 wounded. The hill had been lost. Meanwhile, Soviet bombardment of the Hill 52 district had been heavy, and phone contact with the regiment was severed. Suddenly, the indomitable Captain Noguchi appeared at headquarters, and the regiment finally learned that the foe had penetrated the defenses. The bleeding captain pleaded for a counterattack and kept trying to return to the fight; K. Sato had to restrain him by ordering him to leave for the rear. It was true that the position Captain Noguchi had occupied was the key point connecting Hill 52 and Changkufeng. But Sato reasoned that if they held solidly to the latter hills, their defenses would never be in danger, and it would be easy to retake Noguchi Hill at any time by concentrating fire from all the high ground and by employing artillery, once strength could be spared. Around sunset, however, Sato received an order from the brigade, and a report came from Changkufeng that "our troops' brave fighting has tied us over the crisis." Reassured, Sato proceeded to Hill 52, cheered on Kojima and the soldiers, and examined the condition of the wounded and the heaped-up corpses.  The 75th Infantry estimated that there had been 900 Russian casualties in the right sector and that more than ten tanks and three heavy machine guns had been put out of action. The regiment itself had lost four officers killed and had four wounded. In the entire right sector which included 1,332 men in action, 140 had been killed and 180 wounded. Seven soldiers of the 75th Infantry were also listed as missing in action but presumed dead. Total casualties including the missing, as a percentage of those listed as engaged, amounted to 25 percent for the right sector unit. On the 7th, the unit had lost 19 machine guns and 11 grenade dischargers. As of 18:00 on 7 August, Japanese intelligence estimated that the Russians had committed a grand total of 25 infantry battalions, up six from 6 August, 80 artillery pieces, up 10, and 200 tanks . Situation maps showed one Soviet infantry battalion east of Changkufeng, another north of Hill 52, armor and infantry in unknown strength east of that hill, and artillery positions from northeast to southeast of Khasan. On the 7th, spotters also observed seven large steamers entering Posyet and Khansi, as well as one 10,000-ton vessel at Yangomudy. At least 200 or 300 enemy soldiers in the Karanchin sector were working to strengthen positions. Units moving south from Novokievsk included 350 trucks, 60 tanks, and 400 troops. Heading north from the region of the battlefield were 100 trucks and 150 horsemen. Meanwhile, on the front in eastern Manchuria, elements of the Kwantung Army's 8th Division had forcibly ousted a small party of Soviet border trespassers. The "punch" had gone out of the Russians in the Hill 52 sector after their thorough defeat on 6 and 7 August, but they continued to build up firepower, deploying heavy weapons and artillery observation posts. The bombardments grew more accurate; even regiment and brigade headquarters lost their last dead angles. By daylight on the 8th, two Soviet infantry battalions plus tanks were deployed on the Hill 52 front. Their main forces were distributed along a line 800 meters from the Japanese, and snipers and machine gunners held positions 200 to 300 meters away. "Each time they detected movement, they sniped at us and interfered with our observation." From 09:00, the Japanese sustained scattered artillery fire. At 13:30 there was a bombing raid by 15 planes, but no casualties were incurred. Soviet guns pounded Hill 52 around 18:30, and the Japanese suffered four or five casualties, but morale was generally high, and they sought to strengthen and repair their positions throughout the night. On the Changkufeng front, which had drawn rather serious attention, Russian heavy guns opened slow fire after 05:00 from east of Khasan and from Maanshan. Through the night of 7–8 August, Soviet infantry had assembled near the lake crossing. Russian troop strength increased beyond one-and-a-half battalions. The defenders ran out of grenades and had to resort to rocks, but by 10:00 the Soviet assault waves began to weaken after five hours of fierce resistance. Supporting the Japanese lines had been barrages by grenade launchers, flank fire by a heavy-machine-gun platoon at Chiangchunfeng, and supported by the mountain artillery. Around 10:30, the attackers fled to Khasan. The battlefield quieted, but enemy snipers dug foxholes 300 meters away and kept up persistent fire, and infantry mounted repeated attacks in varying strength.    Since morning, the mountain gun and the two battalion guns at Fangchuanting had engaged infantry and machine guns that appeared on the middle of the Changkufeng crest as well as in the Hill 52 area. The timely fire from these guns caused severe losses, especially to Russian observation posts. But Lieutenant Maeoka, who commanded the mountain platoon from Changkufeng, was wounded badly at 10:30. The mountain battalion also fired at targets in the Changkufeng sector from the Korean side of the Tumen. At 13:20, the Russians pressed new attacks against Changkufeng from three sides, using a total of two companies and three tanks. Although they got close and attacked persistently, they were driven off each time; these afternoon efforts were not very vigorous. Fighters strafed at low altitude and more than ten bombers attacked near 15:00, igniting fires in the village of Fangchuanting. The raids by planes and guns caused frequent cuts in signal lines again. At 06:50 on the 8th, Soviet forces in the left sector resumed their efforts until they were pinned down at 100 meters and had to dig in. Excepting spotter posts, everyone must enter shelters from warning till all-clear. Meanwhile, T. Sato estimated that although enemy attacks were aimed mainly against Changkufeng, there existed some danger that hostile forces would cross the Tumen near Yangkuanping and launch a sudden attack against our left rear, as actions in that area had become pronounced. He accordingly issued an order at 17:00: all of us, superiors as well as subordinates, must overcome exhaustion, make nighttime guardings rigorous, and leave the foe not the slightest opening between friendly battalions or from the shores of the Tumen River.  Suetaka estimated in the morning of the 8th that the Russians were trying to generate propaganda advantageous to them at home and abroad by staking their honor and seizing Changkufeng quickly. From the standpoint of overall political tactics, it was imperative to thwart their intentions. The enemy relied consistently on elements that remained on the Crestline southeast of Changkufeng and served as a base; they must be deprived of that attack base. If his assault plans were to be successful, the 37th Brigade would require reinforcement. The first battalion-size elements of Cho's infantry were arriving. As an initial step, Hanyu's battalion should cross the Tumen and join the brigade, while the main body of the regiment, due that afternoon, should be ready to enter the lines. The division chief of staff issued an order in the name of Suetaka, stipulating that the division would secure its positions while adhering to the great policy of nonexpansion. At 22:30 Morimoto speculated that the Russians were hoping for the good fortune of retaking Changkufeng. Strict guard measures were enjoined. Eventually, before midnight, Suetaka met Cho at Seikaku station. To implement Suetaka's request that the Russian foothold southeast of Changkufeng be wiped out soon, Morimoto decided in the morning to employ the new battalion from Cho's regiment. But since Hanyu's unit was delayed by enemy fire, Morimoto had to turn to the reserve 76th Regiment. At 16:00 Okido was told to prepare an attack, using one infantry battalion and an engineer squad. The mission was to take advantage of darkness to expel the foe remaining on Changkufeng, secure the heights in concert with the elements on the hill, and smash any serious attack at night. At 17:00 Okido issued his detailed order. Enemy elements were located near the cliff close to the northern top of Changkufeng. Apparently hostile bases existed in scattered fashion on the southern slopes as well, as well as a rather large base on the middle of Akahage "Red Bald" Hill, formerly held by Captain Noguchi's company. The regiment was to drive those forces north of Hill 52. The 3rd Battalion commander, Major Hashimoto Seishiro, was to direct both companies' assaults, and, once the foe had been ousted, secure the locations until dawn, after which he would return to the reserve unit.  On the 8th, at 19:30, Hashimoto proceeded with his battalion staff to the foot of Changkufeng and conferred with Major Sato and Captain Shimomura, the majors commanding the units with which he was to cooperate. The assault units moved out from Chiangchunfeng, but their timing was thrown off by a half-hour of artillery checking fire from northeast of the lake. At 20:50, Captain Iwai's 10th Company, supported by a machine-gun platoon, attacked the rock corner on the east side of Changkufeng. After cutting down Soviet sentries, the Japanese rushed in; 40–50 Russian soldiers retreated toward Akahage. On that hill there had been only 20–30 Soviet troops to begin with, but their strength had been built up to two companies plus tanks and infantry guns. The Russians laid down violent small-arms fire, causing 17 Japanese casualties in a short period, after which 30–40 enemy soldiers sought to counterattack. The Japanese drove back this effort, readied their own offensive, and continued to launch close assaults against the heavy-machine-gun nest at the rock corner. Simultaneously, Captain Shidara's 7th Company jumped off with five attached demolition engineers. The 1st Platoon broke through the entanglements and cut down lookouts while the 2nd Platoon proceeded to mop up footholds on the north side—about ten Russian soldiers who dotted the slope at four locations. In the process, the company ran into the positions Iwai had been attacking. Terrain and enemy fire dictated a detour south of the ridgeline. Shidara's men moved up behind Iwai on the right, joining Hashimoto's command. The battalion commander consolidated his lines and directed reconnaissance preparatory to an attack against Akahage. Hours passed; Okido, at the command post, decided it might be wiser to wait till daybreak and call for artillery support. Hashimoto then issued his own instructions from the eastern salient, cautioning his men to dig in well. Near 04:00 the redeployments were completed, but construction did not progress due to the rocky terrain; soldiers were barely able to scoop knee-high firing trenches by daybreak. Total Russian losses on the 8th were estimated to exceed 1,500. More than 100 tanks were claimed publicly, and it was "confirmed" that since the 1st, six planes had been shot down, two of which had fallen behind Japanese lines. In Tokyo, the war ministry and the Gaimusho denied categorically that the Russians had retaken Changkufeng. Soviet troops had attempted to rush positions 600 feet from the crest at 1400 hours; after two and a half hours of furious hand-to-hand fighting, they were beaten off with presumably heavy casualties on both sides. Soviet tanks were reported moving north from Posyet Bay, though it remained unclear whether this indicated withdrawal or strategic movement. Right sector casualties were relatively light on 8 August: eight killed and 41 wounded, the 75th Infantry suffering five and 38 of these respectively. Officer casualties were proportionately high: two wounded in the 75th Regiment, one in the 76th Regiment, and a fourth in the mountain artillery. Personnel rosters of the 75th Regiment, as of 30 July and 8 August, showed a reduction from 1,403 to 826, down 41 percent. The cumulative effect of Japanese losses and the scale of Soviet commitment troubled the Korea Army. Suetaka reported Japanese casualties as: through 2 August, 45 killed, 120 wounded; from 3-5 August, 25 killed, 60 wounded; since 6 August, killed unknown, 200 wounded. Remarkably, the same casualty totals were released publicly by the war ministry on the night of the 8th. Throughout 9 August at 15:20 the Japanese were hit by a very intense barrage from Hill 29. The mountain gun was damaged by shellfire and had to be moved to the foot of Fangchuanting. Tanaka had ordered his artillery to conduct long-range artillery neutralization and communications-cutoff fire, and short-range neutralization as well as checking fire. The accuracy of our artillery elements had improved, and the power of our guns had been enhanced greatly. On the left, from 05:30, T. Sato dispatched an antitank platoon, under cover of mist, to finish off immobilized Soviet tanks whose main armament was still operational and which had done some severe firing the day before. As the day wore on, spirits rose, for the men heard the roar of friendly 15-cm cannon laying down mighty neutralization fire against enemy artillery. Near 14:15, Russian troops were detected creeping forward in the woods 400 meters away on the right. Supporting mountain artillery wiped out this threat in short order. Suetaka decided to move his division headquarters to Seikaku and his combat command post to the Matsu'otsuho message center. Anxiety about the Wuchiatzu sector to the north had diminished greatly; in addition, the entire strength of the division had already been brought to the front. Lastly, dealings with the Seoul and Tokyo levels had by now become rather secondary in importance. Suetaka could discern the steady, disturbing exhaustion of his front-line troops. On the other hand, newly arrived Cho was raring to go. After receiving authorization from Suetaka, Cho allowed Nakajima's battalion to cross the river at Matsu'otsuho but kept Osuga's battalion on the Korean bank as division reserve. Since Tanaka had surmised that the Russians' intention was to direct their main offensive effort against the Japanese right wing, it seemed best to transfer the mountain guns to strengthen the right sector positions. The brigade order of 17:30 endorsed Tanaka's shift of defensive emphasis, particularly with regard to the artillery and the new elements from Cho's regiment. Morimoto added that the core of the Soviet assault force southeast of Changkufeng amounted to two infantry battalions. T. Sato accordingly ordered Obo's battalion to integrate its heavy firepower and deliver swift fire in timely fashion. Soon afterward, Obo discerned a massed battalion of Russian infantry, who had been hauled up by trucks, on the northeastern skirt of Changkufeng. He unleashed every available weapon, organic and attached, at 19:30. The Soviets seemed taken completely by surprise; they showed extreme bewilderment and dispersed in an instant. The right sector unit estimated that on 9 August it had caused 450 casualties, stopped five tanks, and knocked out one light artillery piece and seven heavy machine guns. Japanese casualties in the right sector had amounted to 28 killed and 43 wounded. Ammunition expenditures were considerably higher than on the 8th.  During the night of 9–10 August, the 74th Infantry reinforcements crossed the Tumen steadily. In the early hours, Okido concluded that Soviet attack designs had been frustrated for the time being. The Hill 52 front was relatively calm. Soviet automatic weapons and riflemen were still deployed 200 to 300 meters from Japanese positions, where they sniped selectively. Russian artillery was quiet, apparently as the result of the movement of the main Japanese artillery force to the right wing and the arrival of long-range guns. The 75th Regiment command post at Fangchuanting was the focal point of Japanese artillery activity. Firing began at 07:10, when four battalion guns engaged and smashed two Soviet mountain pieces.  As for Soviet ground assaults, one company attacked at Changkufeng as early as 05:20 under cover of fog but was driven off after 40 minutes. The Russians struck again from three directions in formidable strength between 09:00 and 10:00. Morimoto, growing concerned about the danger of irruptions through gaps between Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, sent elements of Nakajima's battalion to Chiangchunfeng. Since the right wing of the Russians atop Changkufeng was spilling onto the western slopes, at 10:30 Nakajima had his heavy machine guns and battalion guns lay down strong fire from the peak of Chiangchunfeng. Meanwhile, heavy weapons from the left sector were also contributing to the repulse of the morning assaults. A battalion of Soviet infantry attacked Changkufeng all afternoon. Fierce gunfire by the 75th Regiment at 14:00 routed troops massing on the slopes facing the red flag. Considerable losses were inflicted on 75 Russians sighted northeast of Hill 52. An enemy company on the Khasan shore and another two east of Akahage Hill were attempting to occupy positions from which to strike Fangchuanting with the support of two rapid-fire guns. By 17:00 the Russians had been repulsed by the energetic fire of Japanese small arms, battalion guns, and artillery. Soviet forces dispersed toward the lakeshore and Hill 52, leaving many corpses behind. The last important firing by Japanese battalion guns at Fangchuanting on the 10th was a mission against the eastern slopes of Changkufeng at 18:00. Thereafter, the battle zone grew still.  In the left sector, T. Sato concluded that, to secure Changkufeng, it would be best to reinforce flank fire instead of concentrating on the direct attack or defense of the Changkufeng district. He therefore made arrangements with Okido to borrow one machine-gun platoon and assign it to Obo. As of 05:30, enemy troops were still holding a line 300 meters from the positions of Obo's right battalion and 800 to 1,000 meters ahead of Takenouchi's left battalion. Shortly afterward, good news was received at the left sector command post: the last battalion of the 73rd Regiment was to have left Nanam at 16:00 on 9 August and would arrive in the near future. On the right wing of the left sector, the Russians facing Kadokura's company began to operate energetically from 09:00, advancing in two lines, 150 meters apart, with a total strength of one company: two platoons up, one platoon back. They were supported by forces on the high ground north of Khasan and on Akahage. Kadokura waited for the enemy to close to 200 meters before ordering his men to open fire; particularly effective was the flanking fire by the machine-gun company and by elements of Okuda's company. Many heavy artillery shells were hitting the Japanese lines now, but defensive fire pinned down the attacking infantry for a while, 100 meters from the breastworks. Then 30 or 40 Soviet soldiers, covered by firepower, worked forward as close as 30 meters, hurling grenades and giving every indication of mounting a charge. The Japanese responded with grenades. At the same time, the left-flank squad of Kadokura's company was being annihilated. Thus encouraged, Russian assault troops plunged close, whereupon Kadokura assembled his available men, a dozen or so, from the command teams and runners—and grappled with the foe at point-blank range. An ammunition man joined in the melee and broke up the Soviet assault by expert use of hand grenades. The second echelon gradually fell back around 10:30, in the face of heavy fire laid down by the machine guns and Okuda's company. The Russians appeared to be adjusting their deployment but made no further efforts to close. At Changkufeng, meanwhile, two or three enemy companies were approaching the crest. Left sector raiding fire caused the Russians to flee. Japanese casualties in the old right sector had been nine killed and 22 wounded on 10 August. It was estimated that Soviet casualties amounted to 600 killed or wounded, with five heavy machine guns knocked out. By this time, the Soviets had committed their maximum infantry and artillery strength: 27 battalions and 100 guns, the same as on 9 August but up 17 battalions and 60 units since 3 August. Higher headquarters reported no tanks at the front, though 75th Infantry situation maps indicated some Soviet armor still faced Hill 52 sector. Although Japanese officers insisted that Changkufeng Hill remained in Japanese possession, they acknowledged increased casualties due to the accuracy of Soviet shelling. Losses were not as severe as might have been expected because the enemy did not time their charges with their bombardments; Japanese troops lay in trenches and met the attackers with grenades. Every combat unit of the 19th Division had been committed. Nevertheless, the maimed and the fresh battalions had amounted to a combined maximum strength of only 12 infantry battalions and 37 artillery pieces, primarily 75-mm mountain guns, without armor or aircraft. These forces had to cope with 27 enemy infantry battalions and 100 artillery pieces, including many long-range guns, as well as sizable tank and aerial units. Every echelon, regiment, division, and army, had voiced the need for troop replacements and reinforcements.  By evening of 10 August, the situation had deteriorated to the point that the division chief of staff sent Seoul a very long and painful message that ended with: "There is danger of radical change in combat situation in few days if matters go on. It is estimated that this division has only one or two days left in which it can retain definite freedom of action,initiative to advance or retreat. Even if overall situation should develop to our advantage in next three or four days, we ought to be patient from broader standpoint, and be satisfied with our achievement, that Japanese Army has manifested its strength against enemy till now. While we do retain freedom of action, it would be appropriate to solve incident now through speedy diplomatic negotiations. Such measures are entirely up to Korea Army and high command but, so far as division is concerned, there is no other way except of course to make desperate efforts to maintain occupation line for sake of mission. Please take these matters into sympathetic consideration and conduct appropriate measures urgently". I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Night raids and artillery opened the fight, with Hill 52 and Changkufeng changing hands amid intense Soviet tank and air assaults. Japanese forces, aided by engineers, infantry, and mountain guns, mounted tenacious defense, repelling repeated Soviet breakthroughs though suffering heavy casualties. By August 10, Japanese divisions faced mounting exhaustion and warnings of potential strategic shifts, while both sides suffered substantial casualties and material losses.

Why did the Soviets bring a brass band to Finland? What is the significance of the Arcadia Conference in WW2? When was Operation Bodenplatte? Join James Holland and Al Murray as they discuss the major events of each January 1st in WW2. To watch the ad-free, video-supported, version of this episode, please head to our Patreon page directly. A Goalhanger Production Produced by James Regan Assistant Producer: Alfie Norris Exec Producer: Tony Pastor Social: @WeHaveWaysPod Email: wehaveways@goalhanger.com Membership Club: patreon.com/wehaveways Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The "Madman Theory" was Richard Nixon's foreign policy strategy during the Vietnam War era, where he deliberately cultivated an image of being unpredictable and irrational—hinting he might escalate to nuclear extremes—to intimidate adversaries like North Vietnam and the Soviet Union into concessions. Nixon instructed aides like Henry Kissinger to spread rumors that he was volatile enough to "go crazy" and use drastic measures, hoping fear of his supposed madness would deter aggression and force negotiations without actual escalation. Nixon's Madman Theory was relatively ineffective in coercing North Vietnam because Hanoi correctly gambled that the U.S. would not use nuclear force against a non-nuclear state—like North Vietnam—due to the massive domestic and international backlash, the high risk of Soviet/Chinese escalation, and the global nuclear taboo. But what if Nixon had used it against an actual nuclear power? That could have happened if history had only played out a little differently. JFK won his presidential election in 1960 against Nixon by a few thousand votes in key counties, and many suspected voter fraud. What if Nixon had won? And what if he used the Madman Doctrine against the Soviets in the Cuban Missile Crisis? In today’s episode, were’ joined by Harvy Simon, who wrote a book of alternate history called “The Madman Theory” that imagines exactly that scenario. The book focuses on how President Nixon handles the Cuban Missile Crisis. True to the "Madman" strategy, Nixon maneuvers the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the world to the brink of nuclear war, believing his reputation for unpredictability will force Nikita Khrushchev to back down. We explore the dangers of deliberately appearing irrational and unstable to an adversary—especially in the nuclear age—significantly increases the risk of miscalculation, accidental escalation, or the adversary failing to understand the bluff, thereby triggering an actual catastrophic conflict. Harvey Simon --- I’m the author of The Madman Theory, which posits that Richard Nixon won the 1960 election against Kennedy. In particular, it focuses on the Cuban missile crisis, and what would have happened differently with Nixon as president.My book is being reissued with a newly added foreword examining how Nixon’s madman theory has been taken up by President Trump.If you'd be interested in a show about what would likely have happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis if Kennedy hadn't won--some scholars doubt the outcome was legitimate--I'd be happy to talk with you about my analysis, and, more generally, how counterfactuals can improve our understanding of history.I'm a former national security analyst with Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and have also worked as a journalist. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

MAO'S XENOPHOBIC REVOLUTION AND THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD Colleague Professor Sean McMeekin. Moving to China, McMeekin explains that Mao Zedong's ideology was a "bizarre melange" of Marxism, class envy, and intense xenophobia. Unlike European communists, Chinese communism was driven by a deep resentment of foreign imperialism. The conversation analyzes the catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward, where Maoattempted to surpass British economic output by collectivizing agriculture and creating "industrial armies"—an idea taken directly from the Communist Manifesto and Stalin's Five-Year Plans. This experiment resulted in the death of 40 to 45 million people. McMeekin notes that Mao ignored warnings from Soviet advisors to avoid their past mistakes, driven instead by a competitive desire to outdo the Soviets and a "fantasmagorical" hatred of foreign influence. NUMBER 5

THEATER, BATTLESHIPS, AND THE ILLUSION OF AMERICAN POWER Colleagues Gaius and Germanicus, Friends of History Debating Society, Londinium, 91 AD. Gaius and Germanicus discuss the theatrical nature of American imperial power under Donald Trump, positing that the administration utilizes military displays—such as missile strikes on empty targets in Nigeria or Venezuela—as symbolic rituals to assert authority without risking the failure associated with actual combat. Germanicus argues that Trump possesses the insight that "theater is the best way to assert American authority," drawing a parallel to Reagan's "Star Wars" initiative, which defeated the Soviets through the illusion of technological superiority rather than its reality. They debate the strategic utility of battleships; while Trump envisions massive vessels for their psychological hold on the "collective imagination," Germanicus predicts the construction of guided missile cruisers that merely project that image of invincibility. The conversation shifts to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, where Germanicus characterizes the Kyiv government as a "gangster racket" protracting the war for financial gain while Russia solidifies its military reputation. They conclude that the US is transitioning into a phase of empire relying on "demonstration and display" to maintain global dominance, warning that an actual military defeat could be a fatal blow to the system. NUMBER 1 1942 BB58 USS MARYLSND IN ACTION.

POTSDAM, STALIN, AND THE COLD WAR Colleague Evan Thomas. At the Potsdam Conference, President Truman initially excluded Henry Stimson from meetings, favoring Jimmy Byrnes, who wanted to use the bomb to intimidate the Soviet Union. Truman wrote in his diary that the bomb would hit a purely military target, a claim Thomassuggests was a form of denial regarding the inevitable civilian deaths. Stimson urged Truman to trust the Soviets and share the weapon to prevent an arms race, but the administration ultimately chose to use the bomb as diplomatic leverage, foreshadowing the onset of the Cold War. NUMBER 5 1945 OKINAWA

The New Discourses Podcast with James Lindsay, Ep. 186 The dialectic is ultimately the engine of all Marxist and Hegelian thought and also underlies Fascism and the conflict between Fascism and Marxism. It is also fundamentally Sociological Alchemy, as the Soviets both knew and admitted. Based on Marx's ideas about dialectical materialism as the fundamental law of all of Nature, including Man, the Soviets outlined three key dialectical laws and taught them to every school child and party member. First, there is the transformation of quantity into quality, and vice-versa. Second, there is the struggle and unification of opposites. Third, there is the "negation of the negation," which most people know as "problem, reaction, solution" in practice. In this episode of the New Discourses Podcast, host James Lindsay introduces these three dialectical laws of Marxist and Soviet thought and brings them alive for you while comparing them to the social alchemy of George Soros and the ancient wizardry that tried to turn lead into gold. Latest from New Discourses Press! The Queering of the American Child: https://queeringbook.com/ Support New Discourses: https://newdiscourses.com/support Follow New Discourses on other platforms: https://newdiscourses.com/subscribe Follow James Lindsay: https://linktr.ee/conceptualjames © 2025 New Discourses. All rights reserved. #NewDiscourses #JamesLindsay #alchemy