Podcasts about Soviet Union

The world is on the brink of nuclear war. How can the Soviet Union and the USA prevent it? Hosts Nina Khrushcheva and Max Kennedy, relatives of the superpower leaders President John F Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, tell the personal and political history of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Together Nina and Max explore what drove JFK and Khrushchev during the darkest days of October 1962. And when the crisis moves beyond their control, as a U-2 spy plane is shot down over Cuba, how do they avoid global catastrophe?  To hear more, search for The Bomb, wherever you get your BBC podcasts.

Badlands Media provides full special coverage as President Trump hosts members of the legendary 1980 U.S. Olympic men's hockey team in the Oval Office for the signing of H.R. 452, the “Miracle on Ice” commemorative medals bill. Joined by surviving players, family members of deceased teammates, and members of Congress, Trump reflects on the historic upset over the Soviet Union at Lake Placid and the moment's lasting impact on American pride and unity. Players share personal memories, gratitude, and reflections on representing the nation, while Trump recounts the geopolitical and cultural backdrop of the Cold War era and praises the team's resilience and teamwork. The event also expands into broader remarks on current foreign conflicts, the war in Ukraine, border security, drug trafficking, Venezuela, healthcare reform, and the state of college athletics, blending sports history with contemporary policy commentary. The ceremony closes with photographs, signed memorabilia, and a reaffirmation of the enduring symbolism of one of the greatest moments in U.S. sports history.  

This week, we talk with our favorite Newspace Buccaneer, Jeffrey Manber. When so many people were touting their private spaceflight dreams in the 1980s, Manber took the next enormous stride and actually made it happen. He formed the Office of Space Commerce within the US Department of Commerce at the invitation of the Reagan administration, forged the first commercial relations with the then-Soviet Union, bridged that into the post-USSR period, and was responsible for the first commercial spaceflight to the then-mothballed Soviet-era Mir space station with a crew that stayed there for 70 days. He then went on to develop a variety of commercial space enterprises, from the first commercial platform to release smallsats from the ISS to initiating the Bishop airlock that became part of the space station. He also started Nanoracks, the first privately developed and standardized satellite deployment mechanism to fly. Finally, he initiated Starlab, the private space station currently under development by Voyager Technologies and a consortium of aerospace companies. Join us for this very special episode with one of the key founders of NewSpace! Headlines: SpaceX Plans 2026 IPO and Possible $1.5 Trillion Valuation NASA Loses Contact with Mars Maven Orbiter Discussion of Star Trek's New Starfleet Academy Series Trailer Main Topic: Privatizing Orbit and the Roots of Commercial Space Jeffrey Manber Details His Early US-Russian Commercial Space Collaborations His Space Journalism Origins and Shaping Commercial Space Policies Inside the Launch of Commercial Space Fund and the Office of Space Commerce First US Commercial Contracts with the Soviet Union and Mir Space Station Navigating Washington Policy and Export Licenses for Soviet Deals Attempt to Privatize Mir: Mirkorp, Leasing the Space Station, and Commercial Astronaut Crews The Rise of Nanoracks and Commercial Payloads on the ISS Building Starlab: Partnerships, Scale, Launch Plans, and Commercial Design Comparing Starlab's Ambitions to Vast, Axiom, and China's Tiangong Evaluating SpaceX's Public Offering and Its Impact on Elon Musk's Strategy Jeffrey Manber's Other Projects: Writing About Newspace and President Lincoln Thoughts on America's Future in Commercial Orbit and Personal Memoir Plans Hosts: Rod Pyle and Tariq Malik Guest: Jeffrey Manber Download or subscribe to This Week in Space at https://twit.tv/shows/this-week-in-space. Join Club TWiT for Ad-Free Podcasts! Support what you love and get ad-free audio and video feeds, a members-only Discord, and exclusive content. Join today: https://twit.tv/clubtwit

In this episode of Explaining History, Nick revisits Nikolaus Wachsmann's monumental study, KL: A History of the Nazi Concentration Camps.We explore a critical and often misunderstood aspect of the Holocaust: the relationship between the Concentration Camps (KL) and the extermination camps of the East. Why were Jews initially marginalized within the KL system? How did the failure of the war against the Soviet Union in 1941 shift Nazi policy from the exploitation of Soviet POWs to the mass enslavement and murder of Jews?We delve into the infamous Wannsee Conference, decoding the euphemisms of "resettlement" and "natural wastage," and examine how chaotic decision-making at the top of the Nazi hierarchy led to the transformation of Auschwitz-Birkenau into an industrial center of death.Plus: Stay tuned for an announcement about an upcoming live masterclass on the Russian Revolution and Stalinism for students.Key Topics:The KL vs. Death Camps: Understanding the distinction between camps like Dachau and extermination centers like Treblinka.The Wannsee Conference: How bureaucrats planned genocide over lunch.Annihilation Through Labour: The shift from Soviet POWs to Jewish slave labour.The Transformation of Auschwitz: How Birkenau became the primary site for the "Final Solution."Books Mentioned:KL: A History of the Nazi Concentration Camps by Nikolaus WachsmannThe Third Reich at War by Richard J. EvansBloodlands by Timothy SnyderExplaining History helps you understand the 20th Century through critical conversations and expert interviews. We connect the past to the present. If you enjoy the show, please subscribe and share.▸ Support the Show & Get Exclusive ContentBecome a Patron: patreon.com/explaininghistory▸ Join the Community & Continue the ConversationFacebook Group: facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcastSubstack: theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com▸ Read Articles & Go DeeperWebsite: explaininghistory.org Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

How can the United States advance its interests without abandoning its core values? Alexander Vindman, retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and former director for European Affairs on the White House's National Security Council, presents a discussion on the critical interplay between morality, values and power in the practice of geopolitics and national security.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, six U.S. presidential administrations across both parties crafted policies for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia that unintentionally emboldened Russia and played into its imperialist, centuries-long mythos of regional hegemony, by pursuing short-term transactional policies. The result: military aggression and full-scale invasion. It was all too foreseeable.  Vindman will discuss the shifting U.S. foreign policy landscape, what a just peace and lasting end to the war in Ukraine might look like, the administration's increasingly transactional approach to international relations, and Trump's heavy-handed approach to national security and domestic politics. About the Speaker  Dr. Alexander Vindman, a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel, was the director for European Affairs on the National Security Council. Before that, he served as the political-military affairs officer for Russia for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as an attaché at the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Kyiv. While on the Joint Staff, he authored the National Military Strategy for Russia. He earned a Master's from Harvard University, where he served as a Hauser Leader, and a Master's and Doctorate from Johns Hopkins, where he is a senior fellow. Dr. Vindman leads the national security think tank Institute for Informed American Leadership, is the president of the nonprofit Here Right Matters Foundation, an executive board member for the Renew Democracy Initiative, a senior fellow at the Kettering Foundation, and a senior advisor to VoteVets. Dr. Vindman is the author of the "Why It Matters" Substack and the New York Times bestselling books Here, Right Matters and The Folly of Realism. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The world is on the brink of nuclear war. How can the Soviet Union and the USA prevent it? Hosts Nina Khrushcheva and Max Kennedy, relatives of the superpower leaders President John F Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, tell the personal and political history of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Together Nina and Max explore what drove JFK and Khrushchev during the darkest days of October 1962. And when the crisis moves beyond their control, as a U-2 spy plane is shot down over Cuba, how do they avoid global catastrophe?  To hear more, search for The Bomb, wherever you get your BBC podcasts.

This is a recording of an Ask Me Anything live stream originally broadcasted on YouTube, featuring Chunky and Corey. This live stream dives deep into a topics including current news, politics, culture, personal finance, real estate, investing, the stock market, spirituality and history.If you enjoy lively conversation and want your questions answered in real time, click on this link to watch upcoming live streams and be part of the conversation: https://www.youtube.com/@CoachCoreyWayne/streams 

Daleep Singh, Vice Chairman and Global Chief Economist of investment manager PGIM, joins the Inside Economics team to discuss the seismic shifts occurring in the global economy and financial system. The unipolar global economy, which the U.S. dominated for decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has given way to the old normal, a world much like that of the Gilded Age that only ended with World War I. Listen in to hear if Daleep believes this time will be different.Hosts: Mark Zandi – Chief Economist, Moody's Analytics, Cris deRitis – Deputy Chief Economist, Moody's Analytics, and Marisa DiNatale – Senior Director - Head of Global Forecasting, Moody's AnalyticsFollow Mark Zandi on 'X' and BlueSky @MarkZandi, Cris deRitis on LinkedIn, and Marisa DiNatale on LinkedIn Questions or Comments, please email us at helpeconomy@moodys.com. We would love to hear from you. To stay informed and follow the insights of Moody's Analytics economists, visit Economic View. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

In Chapter 38 of The Book of Trump, Ghost delivers a sweeping, deeply contextual walkthrough of the First and Second Russo-Chechen Wars, conflicts that shaped modern Russia, elevated Vladimir Putin, and revealed how external powers, radical Islamist networks, and long-buried ethnic tensions collided in the Caucasus. He traces the story from the collapse of the Soviet Union to Chechnya's bid for independence, the rise of warlords like Dudayev, Basayev, and Ibn al-Khattab, and the brutal urban combat that devastated Grozny. Ghost explains how foreign-funded jihadists transformed the conflict, how Russia's early miscalculations led to humiliation, and how the Kadyrov dynasty emerged as Moscow's solution to a region teetering between chaos and insurgency. With maps, timelines, historical context stretching back to ancient empires, and connections to modern geopolitics, this chapter lays the groundwork for understanding Russia's strategy, its asymmetric federation, its wars in the Caucasus, and how these conflicts still shape the global stage today.

 Can the promise of economic progress ever justify conquest, coercion, and control over other people's lives? Economist William Easterly joins EconTalk's Russ Roberts to argue no--and to rethink what "development" really means in theory, in history, and in our politics today. Drawing on his new book, Violent Saviors: The West's Conquest of the Rest, Easterly explores how colonial powers and later regimes like the Soviet Union claimed to increase people's material well-being while stripping them of freedom, dignity, and any say in their own fate. Russ and Easterly dig into the idea of agency--the ability of people to choose for themselves--through the lens of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Kant, Frederick Douglass, and modern debates over foreign aid, autocrats, and technocratic "solutions" imposed from afar.

The Courtiers' Pivot and the Failing Imperial Narrative — Gaius & Germanicus — Gaius and Germanicus, in their metaphorical 91 AD Londinium dialogue, critique the Western foreign policy establishment, dismissively labeled "courtiers," regarding their systematic narrative repositioning on the Ukraine war as military circumstances deteriorate catastrophically. Germanicus argues that these elite advisors prioritize preservation of institutional status and access to executive power over accountability and honest assessment; as the military situation turns decisively against Ukraine, these courtiers seamlessly pivot from predicting Ukrainian victory to blaming European allies for failing to "step up" with additional military commitment. Germanicus draws historical parallels to the fall of the Soviet Union, noting that elites systematically rewrite their past positions retrospectively to claim they foresaw inevitable geopolitical collapses, a psychological mechanism enabling survival without disgrace or professional consequences. Gaius and Germanicuscontrast successful empires possessing unified narratives aligned with coherent strategy against the current Americanapproach, characterized as "predatory opportunism" driven by electoral manipulation requirements. Germanicuscontends that strategic failures in Ukraine—where population and material resources mathematically determine victory—expose the U.S. as a "weak and venal empire" relying upon a "pastiche" of propagandistic lies rather than the solid convergence of vision that characterized American dominance during World War II. 1918 UKRAINE

3 hours and 13 MinutesPG-13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.This is the complete audio to the series exploring the research of Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun) and Joachim Hoffmann.Thomas' SubstackRadio Free Chicago - T777 and J BurdenThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

Hello Poison Friends! We are carrying on with our series on Human experimentation during WWII and we are still discussing that done by Nazi doctors and the like. This episode is specifically on the diseases that were intentionally spread to prisoners and experimental subjects being kept at concentration camps, mainly Dachau, Sachsenhausen, Natzweiler, and Auschwitz (not that it did not happen elsewhere). The main studies were those concerning Malaria, Epidemic Jaundice (or Hepatitis A), and Typhus. The excuse behind such horrific actions was the study of possible testing, diagnosing, and treating these illnesses for the benefit of Nazi soldiers. They subjected originally healthy people (apart from the recent issues of starvation and malnutrition also caused by the Nazi's disregard for human life) to terrible diseases and many died as a result, some from the disease and some from the treatments. For the malaria experiments, prisoners were often cut on the arm (sometimes superficially, sometimes deep) and malaria from cultures would be applied to the area. Some were also infected by being made to hold small cages of infected mosquitoes or by being forced to keep their hands in infected mosquitoes cages. Still others were directly injected with malaria infected blood from others who had specifically been exposed to the illness for such a purpose as to provide the infectious blood. Hepatitis A was also intentionally given to prisoners to see the effects and the outcome was brutal, also leading to deaths. The resulting liver disease in many of these patients was a slow and painful death. Some also died during testing procedures or when given experimental drugs. Epidemic Typhus is spread via lice, and this had become a problem for Nazi soldiers who had invaded the Soviet Union. War is a dirty business in many ways. Prisoners were exposed to infected lice, but more often they were injected with infected blood. Victims often suffered great illness and pain before death, again from the illness or experimental treatments. We will be mentioning the doctors indicted and convicted of such horrors as well as those not at the Nuremberg Medical trials simply because they had already been charged and convicted and sentenced to death in previous trials. Main trigger warnings for this episode include mentions of torture and death (including mentions of suicide). There is nothing graphic, but the crimes themselves are despicable. Thank you to all of our listeners and supporters! Please feel free to leave a comment or send us a DM for any questions, suggestions, or just to say, "hi."Support us on Patreon:⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/thepoisonersalmanac⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Merch-⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://poisonersalmanac.com/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Follow us on socials:The Poisoner's Almanac on IG-⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/poisoners_almanac?utm_source=ig_web_button_share_sheet&igsh=ZDNlZDc0MzIxNw==⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠YouTube-⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://youtube.com/@thepoisonersalmanac-m5q?si=16JV_ZKhpGaLyM73⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Also, look for the Poisoner's Almanac TikTok- ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.tiktok.com/@poisonersalmanacp?_t=ZT-8wdYQyXhKbm&_r=1⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Adam-⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.tiktok.com/@studiesshow?is_from_webapp=1&sender_device=pc⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Becca-⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.tiktok.com/@yobec0?is_from_webapp=1&sender_device=pc⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠

A poet and a presbytera, Elizabeth Scott Tervo is the author of the new The Sun Does Not Shine Without You: a Memoir of Soviet Georgia, which tells the gripping story of her time as an exchange student in the Soviet Union on the eve of its collapse.

#franchising  #startabusiness  #podcast  Watch this Live: Watch Here Is franchising better than Airbnb-ing your home? What they don't tell you could cost you thousands. Certified franchise executive Max Emma breaks down the truth behind both paths—and why one might be more stable, scalable, and profitable than you think.

December marks both the birth and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Adam and Cameron are spending the month focusing on Soviet economists and thinkers, starting with Vladimir Lenin. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

They flew with no lights, no radios, and no parachutes. Their planes were made of wood, covered in canvas, and could barely outrun a speeding truck—but the German army feared them more than anything that roared across the skies. These were the Night Witches of the Soviet Union, the all-women 588th Night Bomber Regiment—daring young pilots who turned impossible odds into legendary victories. In this archived episode of For the Love of History, TK takes you into the nighttime skies of WWII, where teenage aviators glided silently over enemy lines, dropping bombs with such stealth that German soldiers swore they “flew like witches.” Learn how these women were trained, what they flew, why Hitler's forces awarded medals for shooting them down, and how the most decorated of them—Nadezhda Popova—once flew 18 missions in a single night. This episode touches on: ✨ The all-women bomber regiment Stalin tried to ignore ✨ Biplanes that were literally held together with fabric ✨ Combat missions flown in total darkness ✨ Soviet sexism…but also Soviet girl power ✨ One of the greatest forgotten stories of WWII This story is fierce, heartbreaking, inspiring—and absolutely unforgettable. If you enjoyed this episode and want to support more hidden women's history and weird world history, you can join the community on Patreon. New goodies and bonus content are waiting for you! Patreon  Instagram  Website TikTok Merch Store YouTube Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1986 the world watched in horror as radiation spewed from reactor number four at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine - then part of the Soviet Union. Releasing more radioactivity into the atmosphere than the atomic bombs that were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Ngagasaki in World War Two, it prompted a mass evacuation and the enforcement of a 30 kilometre exclusion zone to prevent further contamination and loss of life. It remains the worst nuclear accident in history. Remarkably however, nature found a way to survive - and award-winning UK science writer, Alex Riley will tell you that there are many other examples of life in the extreme - if you know where to look. Alex is the author of Super Natural - How Life Thrives in Impossible Places. He speaks to Susie about nature's incredible resilience - and what life could look like on other planets.

With Adolf Hitler at the apex of his power during the Second World War, how did he move on Britain? How did Winston Churchill respond? And, would Britain's airforce triumph over Hitler's Luftwaffe in the legendary Battle of Britain? Join Dominic and Tom as they reach one of the watershed moments of the Second World War, as the Nazis strive to eliminate Britain from the skies, before severing their crucial alliance with the Soviet Union. Give The Rest Is History Club this Christmas – a year of bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access, the private chat community hosted on Discord, and an exclusive t-shirt! Just go to https://therestishistory.supportingcast.fm/gifts And of course, you can still join for yourself at any time at therestishistory.com or on apple podcasts. For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com _______ Hive. Know your power. Visit https://hivehome.com to find out more. _______ Learn more at https://www.uber.com/onourway _______ Visit auraframes.co.uk and get £35 off Aura's best-selling Carver Mat frame by using promo code HISTORY at checkout. Terms and conditions apply. _______ Get our exclusive NordVPN deal here ➼ https://nordvpn.com/restishistory It's risk-free with Nord's 30-day money-back guarantee ✅ _______ Twitter: @TheRestHistory @holland_tom @dcsandbrook Video Editor: Jack Meek / Harry Swan Social Producer: Harry Balden Assistant Producer: Aaliyah Akude Producer: Tabby Syrett Senior Producer: Theo Young-Smith Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

This is a Patreon demo. Join to hear part one of our book club on the history of the Soviet Union as well as a Return of the King episode in two weeks!Part 1 of our 2 (?) part series on Sheila Fitzpatrick's ‘The Shortest History of the Soviet Union'. In this part 1, we cover the years 1860-1960 starting from the emancipation of the serfs to the end of Kruschev. ⁠⁠https://www.patreon.com/c/RememberShuffle ⁠⁠And make sure you sign up through the browser–not through the app, to save yourself 50%!Give Remember Shuffle a follow on Twitter⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ And on Instagram⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠@RememberShufflePod⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ to interact with the show between episodes. It also makes it easier to book guests.  

In this episode of the Programming Lions podcast, our hosts are joined by Alexei, a 16-year-old from Victoria, Australia, who shares his unique perspective on communism, influenced by his family's history in Soviet Russia. Alexei discusses his interests in natural science, politics, engineering, and computer software, as well as his love for volleyball and the gym. He provides a nuanced view of historical events, critiques of Soviet policies, and shares his thoughts on modern political ideologies, highlighting the growing interest in communism among Gen Z. The conversation delves into various topics such as American politics, the representation of the Soviet Union in Western societies, and the challenges and potential solutions for implementing communist ideals today. Join us for an enlightening discussion with Alexei, a well-read and knowledgeable young historian. #Communism #YouthPolitics #ProgrammingLionsPodcastShop GSD Affiliates:

 If you're a scientist, and you apply for federal research funding, you'll ask for a specific dollar amount. Let's say you're asking for a million-dollar grant. Your grant covers the direct costs, things like the salaries of the researchers that you're paying. If you get that grant, your university might get an extra $500,000. That money is called “indirect costs,” but think of it as overhead: that money goes to lab space, to shared equipment, and so on.This is the system we've used to fund American research infrastructure for more than 60 years. But earlier this year, the Trump administration proposed capping these payments at just 15% of direct costs, way lower than current indirect cost rates. There are legal questions about whether the admin can do that. But if it does, it would force universities to fundamentally rethink how they do science.The indirect costs system is pretty opaque from the outside. Is the admin right to try and slash these indirect costs? Where does all that money go? And if we want to change how we fund research overhead, what are the alternatives? How do you design a research system to incentivize the research you actually wanna see in the world?I'm joined today by Pierre Azoulay from MIT Sloan and Dan Gross from Duke's Fuqua School of Business. Together with Bhaven Sampat at Johns Hopkins, they conducted the first comprehensive empirical study of how indirect costs actually work. Earlier this year, I worked with them to write up that study as a more accessible policy brief for IFP. They've assembled data on over 350 research institutions, and they found some striking results. While negotiated rates often exceed 50-60%, universities actually receive much less, due to built-in caps and exclusions.Moreover, the institutions that would be hit hardest by proposed cuts are those whose research most often leads to new drugs and commercial breakthroughs.Thanks to Katerina Barton, Harry Fletcher-Wood, and Inder Lohla for their help with this episode, and to Beez for her help on the charts.Let's say I'm a researcher at a university and I apply for a federal grant. I'm looking at cancer cells in mice. It will cost me $1 million to do that research — to pay grad students, to buy mice and test tubes. I apply for a grant from the National Institutes of Health, or NIH. Where do indirect costs come in?Dan Gross: Research generally incurs two categories of costs, much as business operations do.* Direct or variable costs are typically project-specific; they include salaries and consumable supplies.* Indirect or fixed costs are not as easily assigned to any particular project. [They include] things like lab space, data and computing resources, biosecurity, keeping the lights on and the buildings cooled and heated — even complying with the regulatory requirements the federal government imposes on researchers. They are the overhead costs of doing research.Pierre Azoulay: You will use those grad students, mice, and test tubes, the direct costs. But you're also using the lab space. You may be using a shared facility where the mice are kept and fed. Pieces of large equipment are shared by many other people to conduct experiments. So those are fixed costs from the standpoint of your research project.Dan: Indirect Cost Recovery (ICR) is how the federal government has been paying for the fixed cost of research for the past 60 years. This has been done by paying universities institution-specific fixed percentages on top of the direct cost of the research. That's the indirect cost rate. That rate is negotiated by institutions, typically every two to four years, supported by several hundred pages of documentation around its incurred costs over the recent funding cycle.The idea is to compensate federally funded researchers for the investments, infrastructure, and overhead expenses related to the research they perform for the government. Without that funding, universities would have to pay those costs out of pocket and, frankly, many would not be interested or able to do the science the government is funding them to do.Imagine I'm doing my mouse cancer science at MIT, Pierre's parent institution. Some time in the last four years, MIT had this negotiation with the National Institutes of Health to figure out what the MIT reimbursable rate is. But as a researcher, I don't have to worry about what indirect costs are reimbursable. I'm all mouse research, all day.Dan: These rates are as much of a mystery to the researchers as it is to the public. When I was junior faculty, I applied for an external grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF) — you can look up awards folks have won in the award search portal. It doesn't break down indirect and direct cost shares of each grant. You see the total and say, “Wow, this person got $300,000.” Then you go to write your own grant and realize you can only budget about 60% of what you thought, because the rest goes to overhead. It comes as a bit of a shock the first time you apply for grant funding.What goes into the overhead rates? Most researchers and institutions don't have clear visibility into that. The process is so complicated that it's hard even for those who are experts to keep track of all the pieces.Pierre: As an individual researcher applying for a project, you think about the direct costs of your research projects. You're not thinking about the indirect rate. When the research administration of your institution sends the application, it's going to apply the right rates.So I've got this $1 million experiment I want to run on mouse cancer. If I get the grant, the total is $1.5 million. The university takes that .5 million for the indirect costs: the building, the massive microscope we bought last year, and a tiny bit for the janitor. Then I get my $1 million. Is that right?Dan: Duke University has a 61% indirect cost rate. If I propose a grant to the NSF for $100,000 of direct costs — it might be for data, OpenAI API credits, research staff salaries — I would need to budget an extra $61,000 on top for ICR, bringing the total grant to $161,000.My impression is that most federal support for research happens through project-specific grants. It's not these massive institutional block grants. Is that right?Pierre: By and large, there aren't infrastructure grants in the science funding system. There are other things, such as center grants that fund groups of investigators. Sometimes those can get pretty large — the NIH grant for a major cancer center like Dana-Farber could be tens of millions of dollars per year.Dan: In the past, US science funding agencies did provide more funding for infrastructure and the instrumentation that you need to perform research through block grants. In the 1960s, the NSF and the Department of Defense were kicking up major programs to establish new data collection efforts — observatories, radio astronomy, or the Deep Sea Drilling project the NSF ran, collecting core samples from the ocean floor around the world. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) — back then the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) — was investing in nuclear test detection to monitor adherence to nuclear test ban treaties. Some of these were satellite observation methods for atmospheric testing. Some were seismic measurement methods for underground testing. ARPA supported the installation of a network of seismic monitors around the world. Those monitors are responsible for validating tectonic plate theory. Over the next decade, their readings mapped the tectonic plates of the earth. That large-scale investment in research infrastructure is not as common in the US research policy enterprise today.That's fascinating. I learned last year how modern that validation of tectonic plate theory was. Until well into my grandparents' lifetime, we didn't know if tectonic plates existed.Dan: Santi, when were you born?1997.Dan: So I'm a good decade older than you — I was born in 1985. When we were learning tectonic plate theory in the 1990s, it seemed like something everybody had always known. It turns out that it had only been known for maybe 25 years.So there's this idea of federal funding for science as these massive pieces of infrastructure, like the Hubble Telescope. But although projects like that do happen, the median dollar the Feds spend on science today is for an individual grant, not installing seismic monitors all over the globe.Dan: You applied for a grant to fund a specific project, whose contours you've outlined in advance, and we provided the funding to execute that project.Pierre: You want to do some observations at the observatory in Chile, and you are going to need to buy a plane ticket — not first class, not business class, very much economy.Let's move to current events. In February of this year, the NIH announced it was capping indirect cost reimbursement at 15% on all grants.What's the administration's argument here?Pierre: The argument is there are cases where foundations only charge 15% overhead rate on grants — and universities acquiesce to such low rates — and the federal government is entitled to some sort of “most-favored nation” clause where no one pays less in overhead than they pay. That's the argument in this half-a-page notice. It's not much more elaborate than that.The idea is, the Gates Foundation says, “We will give you a grant to do health research and we're only going to pay 15% indirect costs.” Some universities say, “Thank you. We'll do that.” So clearly the universities don't need the extra indirect cost reimbursement?Pierre: I think so.Dan: Whether you can extrapolate from that to federal research funding is a different question, let alone if federal research was funding less research and including even less overhead. Would foundations make up some of the difference, or even continue funding as much research, if the resources provided by the federal government were lower? Those are open questions. Foundations complement federal funding, as opposed to substitute for it, and may be less interested in funding research if it's less productive.What are some reasons that argument might be misguided?Pierre: First, universities don't always say, “Yes” [to a researcher wishing to accept a grant]. At MIT, getting a grant means getting special authorization from the provost. That special authorization is not always forthcoming. The provost has a special fund, presumably funded out of the endowment, that under certain conditions they will dip into to make up for the missing overhead.So you've got some research that, for whatever reason, the federal government won't fund, and the Gates Foundation is only willing to fund it at this low rate, and the university has budgeted a little bit extra for those grants that it still wants.Pierre: That's my understanding. I know that if you're going to get a grant, you're going to have to sit in many meetings and cajole any number of administrators, and you don't always get your way.Second, it's not an apples-to-apples comparison [between federal and foundation grants] because there are ways to budget an item as a direct cost in a foundation grant that the government would consider an indirect cost. So you might budget some fractional access to a facility…Like the mouse microscope I have to use?Pierre: Yes, or some sort of Cryo-EM machine. You end up getting more overhead through the back door.The more fundamental way in which that approach is misguided is that the government wants its infrastructure — that it has contributed to through [past] indirect costs — to be leveraged by other funders. It's already there, it's been paid for, it's sitting idle, and we can get more bang for our buck if we get those additional funders to piggyback on that investment.Dan: That [other funders] might not be interested in funding otherwise.Why wouldn't they be interested in funding it otherwise? What shouldn't the federal government say, “We're going to pay less. If it's important research, somebody else will pay for it.”Dan: We're talking about an economies-of-scale problem. These are fixed costs. The more they're utilized, the more the costs get spread over individual research projects.For the past several decades, the federal government has funded an order of magnitude more university research than private firms or foundations. If you look at NSF survey data, 55% of university R&D is federally funded; 6% is funded by foundations. That is an order of magnitude difference. The federal government has the scale to support and extract value for whatever its goals are for American science.We haven't even started to get into the administrative costs of research. That is part of the public and political discomfort with indirect-cost recovery. The idea that this is money that's going to fund university bloat.I should lay my cards on the table here for readers. There are a ton of problems with the American scientific enterprise as it currently exists. But when you look at studies from a wide range of folks, it's obvious that R&D in American universities is hugely valuable. Federal R&D dollars more than pay for themselves. I want to leave room for all critiques of the scientific ecosystem, of the universities, of individual research ideas. But at this 30,000-foot level, federal R&D dollars are well spent.Dan: The evidence may suggest that, but that's not where the political and public dialogue around science policy is. Again, I'm going to bring in a long arc here. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was, “We're in a race with the Soviet Union. If we want to win this race, we're going to have to take some risky bets.” And the US did. It was more flexible with its investments in university and industrial science, especially related to defense aims. But over time, with the waning of these political pressures and with new budgetary pressures, the tenor shifted from, “Let's take chances” to “Let's make science and other parts of government more accountable.” The undercurrent of Indirect Cost Recovery policy debates has more of this accountability framing.This comes up in this comparison to foundation rates: “Is the government overpaying?” Clearly universities are willing to accept less from foundations. It comes up in this perception that ICR is funding administrative growth that may not be productive or socially efficient. Accountability seems to be a priority in the current day.Where are we right now [August 2025] on that 15% cap on indirect costs?Dan: Recent changes first kicked off on February 7th, when NIH posted its supplemental guidance, that introduced a policy that the direct cost rates that it paid on its grants would be 15% to institutions of higher education. That policy was then adopted by the NSF, the DOD, and the Department of Energy. All of these have gotten held up in court by litigation from universities. Things are stuck in legal limbo. Congress has presented its point of view that, “At least for now, I'd like to keep things as they are.” But this has been an object of controversy long before the current administration even took office in January. I don't think it's going away.Pierre: If I had to guess, the proposal as it first took shape is not what is going to end up being adopted. But the idea that overhead rates are an object of controversy — are too high, and need to be reformed — is going to stay relevant.Dan: Partly that's because it's a complicated issue. Partly there's not a real benchmark of what an appropriate Indirect Cost Recovery policy should be. Any way you try to fund the cost of research, you're going to run into trade-offs. Those are complicated.ICR does draw criticism. People think it's bloated or lacks transparency. We would agree some of these critiques are well-founded. Yet it's also important to remember that ICR pays for facilities and administration. It doesn't just fund administrative costs, which is what people usually associate it with. The share of ICR that goes to administrative costs is legally capped at 26% of direct costs. That cap has been in place since 1991. Many universities have been at that cap for many years — you can see this in public records. So the idea that indirect costs are going up over time, and that that's because of bloat at US universities, has to be incorrect, because the administrative rate has been capped for three decades.Many of those costs are incurred in service of complying with regulations that govern research, including the cost of administering ICR to begin with. Compiling great proposals every two to four years and a new round of negotiations — all of that takes resources. Those are among the things that indirect cost funding reimburses.Even then, universities appear to under-recover their true indirect costs of federally-sponsored research. We have examples from specific universities which have reported detailed numbers. That under-recovery means less incentive to invest in infrastructure, less capacity for innovation, fewer clinical trials. So there's a case to be made that indirect cost funding is too low.Pierre: The bottom line is we don't know if there is under- or over-recovery of indirect costs. There's an incentive for university administrators to claim there's under-recovery. So I take that with a huge grain of salt.Dan: It's ambiguous what a best policy would look like, but this is all to say that, first, public understanding of this complex issue is sometimes a bit murky. Second, a path forward has to embrace the trade-offs that any particular approach to ICR presents.From reading your paper, I got a much better sense that a ton of the administrative bloat of the modern university is responding to federal regulations on research. The average researcher reports spending almost half of their time on paperwork. Some of that is a consequence of the research or grant process; some is regulatory compliance.The other thing, which I want to hear more on, is that research tools seem to be becoming more expensive and complex. So the microscope I'm using today is an order of magnitude more expensive than the microscope I was using in 1950. And you've got to recoup those costs somehow.Pierre: Everything costs more than it used to. Research is subject to Baumol's cost disease. There are areas where there's been productivity gains — software has had an impact.The stakes are high because, if we get this wrong, we're telling researchers that they should bias the type of research they're going to pursue and training that they're going to undergo, with an eye to what is cheaper. If we reduce the overhead rate, we should expect research that has less fixed cost and more variable costs to gain in favor — and research that is more scale-intensive to lose favor. There's no reason for a benevolent social planner to find that a good development. The government should be neutral with respect to the cost structure of research activities. We don't know in advance what's going to be more productive.Wouldn't a critic respond, “We're going to fund a little bit of indirect costs, but we're not going to subsidize stuff that takes huge amounts of overhead. If universities want to build that fancy new telescope because it's valuable, they'll do it.” Why is that wrong when it comes to science funding?Pierre: There's a grain of truth to it.Dan: With what resources though? Who's incentivized to invest in this infrastructure? There's not a paid market for science. Universities can generate some licensing fees from patents that result from science. But those are meager revenue streams, realistically. There are reasons to believe that commercial firms are under-incentivized to invest in basic scientific research. Prior to 1940, the scientific enterprise was dramatically smaller because there wasn't funding the way that there is today. The exigencies of war drew the federal government into funding research in order to win. Then it was productive enough that folks decided we should keep doing it. History and economic logic tells us that you're not going to see as much science — especially in these fixed-cost heavy endeavors — when those resources aren't provided by the public.Pierre: My one possible answer to the question is, “The endowment is going to pay for it.” MIT has an endowment, but many other universities do not. What does that mean for them? The administration also wants to tax the heck out of the endowment.This is a good opportunity to look at the empirical work you guys did in this great paper. As far as I can tell, this was one of the first real looks at what indirect costs rates look like in real life. What did you guys find?Dan: Two decades ago, Pierre and Bhaven began collecting information on universities' historical indirect cost rates. This is a resource that was quietly sitting on the shelf waiting for its day. That day came this past February. Bhaven and Pierre collected information on negotiated ICR rates for the past 60 years. During this project, we also collected the most recent versions of those agreements from university websites to bring the numbers up to the current day.We pulled together data for around 350 universities and other research institutions. Together, they account for around 85% of all NIH research funding over the last 20 years.We looked at their:* Negotiated indirect cost rates, from institutional indirect cost agreements with the government, and their;* Effective rates [how much they actually get when you look at grant payments], using NIH grant funding data.Negotiated cost rates have gone up. That has led to concerns that the overhead cost of research is going up — these claims that it's funding administrative bloat. But our most important finding is that there's a large gap between the sticker rates — the negotiated ICR rates that are visible to the public, and get floated on Twitter as examples of university exorbitance — and the rates that universities are paid in practice, at least on NIH grants; we think it's likely the case for NSF and other agency grants too.An institution's effective ICR funding rates are much, much lower than their negotiated rates and they haven't changed much for 40 years. If you look at NIH's annual budget, the share of grant funding that goes to indirect costs has been roughly constant at 27-28% for a long time. That implies an effective rate of around 40% over direct costs. Even though many institutions have negotiated rates of 50-70%, they usually receive 30-50%.The difference between those negotiated rates and the effective rates seems to be due to limits and exceptions built into NIH grant rules. Those rules exclude some grants, such as training grants, from full indirect cost funding. They also exclude some direct costs from the figure used to calculate ICR rates. The implication is that institutions receive ICR payments based on a smaller portion of their incurred direct costs than typically assumed. As the negotiated direct cost falls, you see a university being paid a higher indirect cost rate off a smaller — modified — direct cost base, to recover the same amount of overhead.Is it that the federal government is saying for more parts of the grant, “We're not going to reimburse that as an indirect cost.”?Dan: This is where we shift a little bit from assessment to speculation. What's excluded from total direct costs? One thing is researcher salaries above a certain level.What is that level? Can you give me a dollar amount?Dan: It's a $225,700 annual salary. There aren't enough people being paid that on these grants for that to explain the difference, especially when you consider that research salaries are being paid to postdocs and grad students.You're looking around the scientists in your institution and thinking, “That's not where the money is”?Dan: It's not, even if you consider Principal Investigators. If you consider postdocs and grad students, it certainly isn't.Dan: My best hunch is that research projects have become more capital-intensive, and only a certain level of expenditure on equipment can be included in the modified total direct cost base. I don't have smoking gun evidence, it's my intuition.In the paper, there's this fascinating chart where you show the institutions that would get hit hardest by a 15% cap tend to be those that do the most valuable medical research. Explain that on this framework. Is it that doing high-quality medical research is capital-intensive?Pierre: We look at all the private-sector patents that build on NIH research. The more a university stands to lose under the administration policy, the more it has contributed over the past 25 years — in research the private sector found relevant in terms of pharmaceutical patents.This is counterintuitive if your whole model of funding for science is, “Let's cut subsidies for the stuff the private sector doesn't care about — all this big equipment.” When you cut those subsidies, what suffers most is the stuff that the private sector likes.Pierre: To me it makes perfect sense. This is the stuff that the private sector would not be willing to invest in on its own. But that research, having come into being, is now a very valuable input into activities that profit-minded investors find interesting and worth taking a risk on.This is the argument for the government to fund basic research?Pierre: That argument has been made at the macro-level forever, but the bibliometric revolution of the past 15 years allows you to look at this at the nano-level. Recently I've been able to look at the history of Ozempic. The main patent cites zero publicly-funded research, but it cites a bunch of patents, including patents taken up by academics. Those cite the foundational research performed by Joel Habener and his team at Massachusetts General Hospital in the early 1980s that elucidated the role of GLP-1 as a potential target. This grant was first awarded to Habener in 1979, was renewed every four or five years, and finally died in 2008, when he moved on to other things. Those chains are complex, but we can now validate the macro picture at this more granular level.Dan: I do want to add one qualification which also suggests some directions for the future. There are things we still can't see — despite Pierre's zeal. Our projections of the consequence of a 15% rate cap are still pretty coarse. We don't know what research might not take place. We don't know what indirect cost categories are exposed, or how universities would reallocate. All those things are going to be difficult to project without a proper experiment.One thing that I would've loved to have more visibility into is, “What is the structure of indirect costs at universities across the country? What share of paid indirect costs are going to administrative expenses? What direct cost categories are being excluded?” We would need a more transparency into the system to know the answers.Does that information have to be proprietary? It's part of negotiations with the federal government about how much the taxpayer will pay for overhead on these grants. Which piece is so special that it can't be shared?Pierre: You are talking to the wrong people here because we're meta-scientists, so our answer is none of it should be private.Dan: But now you have to ask the university lawyers.What would the case from the universities be? “We can't tell the public what we spend subsidy on”?Pierre: My sense is that there are institutions of academia that strike most lay people as completely bizarre.Hard to explain without context?Pierre: People haven't thought about it. They will find it so bizarre that they will typically jump from the odd aspect to, “That must be corruption.” University administrators are hugely attuned to that. So the natural defensive approach is to shroud it in secrecy. This way we don't see how the sausage is made.Dan: Transparency can be a blessing and a curse. More information supports more considered decision-making. It also opens the door to misrepresentation by critics who have their own agendas. Pierre's right: there are some practices that to the public might look unusual — or might be familiar, but one might say, “How is that useful expense?” Even a simple thing like having an administrator who manages a faculty's calendar might seem excessive. Many people manage their own calendars. At the same time, when you think about how someone's time is best used, given their expertise, and heavy investment in specialized human capital, are emails, calendaring, and note-taking the right things for scientists [to be doing]? Scientists spend a large chunk of their time now administering grants. Does it make sense to outsource that and preserve the scientist's time for more science?When you put forward data that shows some share of federal research funding is going to fund administrative costs, at first glance it might look wasteful, yet it might still be productive. But I would be able to make a more considered judgment on a path forward if I had access to more facts, including what indirect costs look like under the hood.One last question: in a world where you guys have the ear of the Senate, political leadership at the NIH, and maybe the universities, what would you be pushing for on indirect costs?Pierre: I've come to think that this indirect cost rate is a second-best institution: terrible and yet superior to many of the alternatives. My favorite alternative would be one where there would be a flat rate applied to direct costs. That would be the average effective rate currently observed — on the order of 40%.You're swapping out this complicated system to — in the end — reimburse universities the same 40%.Pierre: We know there are fixed costs. Those fixed costs need to be paid. We could have an elaborate bureaucratic apparatus to try to get it exactly right, but it's mission impossible. So why don't we give up on that and set a rate that's unlikely to lead to large errors in under- or over-recovery. I'm not particularly attached to 40%. But the 15% that was contemplated seems absurdly low.Dan: In the work we've done, we do lay out different approaches. The 15% rate wouldn't fully cut out the negotiation process: to receive that, you have to document your overhead costs and demonstrate that they reached that level. In any case, it's simplifying. It forces more cost-sharing and maybe more judicious investments by universities. But it's also so low that it's likely to make a significant amount of high-value, life-improving research economically unattractive.The current system is complicated and burdensome. It might encourage investment in less productive things, particularly because universities can get it paid back through future ICR. At the same time, it provides pretty good incentives to take on expensive, high-value research on behalf of the public.I would land on one of two alternatives. One of those is close to what Pierre said, with fixed rates, but varied by institution types: one for universities, one for medical schools, one for independent research institutions — because we do see some variation in their cost structures. We might set those rates around their historical average effective rates, since those haven't changed for quite a long time. If you set different rates for different categories of institution, the more finely you slice the pie, the closer you end up to the current system. So that's why I said maybe, at a very high level, four categories.The other I could imagine is to shift more of these costs “above the line” — to adapt the system to enable more of these indirect costs to be budgeted as direct costs in grants. This isn't always easy, but presumably some things we currently call indirect costs could be accounted for in a direct cost manner. Foundations do it a bit more than the federal government does, so that could be another path forward.There's no silver bullet. Our goal was to try to bring some understanding to this long-running policy debate over how to fund the indirect cost of research and what appropriate rates should be. It's been a recurring question for several decades and now is in the hot seat again. Hopefully through this work, we've been able to help push that dialogue along. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.statecraft.pub

On today's episode we discuss Afghan communism and the consequences of the 1978 Saur Revolution in the context of a longer story of Afghan anti-imperial modernity and Soviet-Afghan relations.How and why was the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan different from interventions by other powers in the country? How do analyses of the 1979 Soviet invasion that center the “empire” framework limit our understanding of the history of Afghan anti-imperial modernity, Soviet-Afghan relations and Afghanistan's place in the world?Our guest is Adam Alimi and we use his article ”Beyond Empire: Why the Soviet invasion (and withdrawal) of Afghanistan was different” as the basis for the conversation.Article summary and link:The Taliban's return to power in August 2021 set off the usual literatures of failure in studies on Afghanistan. These accounts – graveyard of empires, tribalism, Islam – helped temper the hubris of US foreign policy in its so-called ‘longest war'. Naturally, unforgiving Afghanistan was doomed to remain in the Stone Age, as the British and Soviets had discovered before. Still, the Soviet comparison as an account of the broader failure in Afghanistan is wanting. By drawing on newer global histories of Afghanistan, the periodization of modernity-failure is recast in more interesting ways. Specifically, this article advances the argument that the Soviet connection in Afghanistan, understood here in the long term and not just as the invasion in 1979, cohered with the winds of modernity and anti-imperialism animating the region in the twentieth century. Markers of Afghan modernity, such as late modernization (state-building), political economy (rural social property relations), and revolution (communism), are explored. The US occupation after 2001 is also used as a point of comparison to refocus the history of Afghanistan beyond empire.https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19436149.2025.2499294Adam Alimi is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics at York University, Toronto Canada. His research focuses on Marxist theories of development in the Global South.

Egypt purchased state of the art weaponry from the Soviet Union that obliterated any balance of power between Israel and her Arab adversaries. Egypt would have the armament, it already had the desire, to wipe out Israel. Israel naturally turned to its trusted ally, the United States, but the days of Harry Truman were over. The new President, Dwight Eisenhower, together with his State Department which has traditionally been slanted against Israel, saw wisdom in aligning with the far more numerous Arabs. Israel desperately needed a friend that manufactured weapons, and that ally turned out to be France.  France's primary motivation was the principle that the enemy of your enemy is your friend. FLN freedom fighters in Algeria were seeking freedom from France and they were armed and trained by Egypt.  When Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal and expels western managers, Britain and France know that they must act and their unlikely partner is Israel.  Credits: Trailer Music Empire, String of Fire Epic History, Suez Crises Happy Coffee House, Paris Cafe Ambience with French Music for a Good Mood  Sammy Burdson Timpani Roll Soundrise Music Ticking Tension  Jedi Orchestra plays The Throne Room conducted by Andrzej Kucybała One For Israel "DAVID DANCED"  Learn more at TellerFromJerusalem.com Don't forget to subscribe, like and share! Let all your friends know that that they too can have a new favorite podcast. © 2025 Media Education Trust llc

With Doug on the road, Rabbi Pesach flies solo and sits down with political anthropologist Francisco Gil-White, a scholar whose life's work explores antisemitism as a deliberate tool of totalitarian power. Drawing a line from the Bible and the Exodus story through Rome, the Church, Nazism, the Soviet Union, and today's jihadist movements, Gil-White argues that whenever elites move to enslave populations, they first move to eliminate the Jews and then turn on everyone else. He explains why the modern "Palestinian narrative," the Oslo process, and the global reaction to October seventh all fit into a larger project to collapse Western civilization from within and replace it with a new form of tyranny. This is a challenging, eye opening conversation about Israel, Islam, the CIA, and whether the West can still be saved — and what it would actually take.

The Collapse of the Soviet Union was twice as devastating as the Great Depression for those who lived there. It immediately led to widespread economic chaos and a breakdown of public services, plunging millions into a difficult period where mere survival was the priority. As one Russian described, after hyperinflation wiped out their family's savings, "my parents still had the same 50,000 rubles... But by then, all they could afford to buy with it was a pair of winter boots for my mother." There was optimism that democracy could emerge, but thirty years after the collapse of the USSR, the victory over totalitarianism feels alarmingly short-lived, with the unresolved unraveling of the Soviet empire now directly fueling global crises like the war in Ukraine. The people currently in power in Russia, belonging to what some call the last Soviet generation--meaning they absorbed Soviet culture but not Soviet faith--carry a deep, cynical disbelief in democracy and human rights, demonstrating how the core structures of empire remain entrenched in the governing forces today. Today's guest is Mikhail Zygar, author of The Dark Side of the Earth: Russia's Short-Lived Victory Over Totalitarianism, and we explore his decade-long investigation, drawing on hundreds of never-before-public interviews with figures like Mikhail Gorbachev, the first leaders of post-Soviet republics, and democracy activists, to reveal how the USSR's demise was primarily driven by a collapse of faith in communist ideals, and we examine the parallel it creates for liberal democracy today.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

PREVIEW — Mary Kissel — Missing Diplomatic Memory and the Russian Challenge. Kissel argues that current U.S.diplomats possess insufficient institutional memory and negotiating experience to effectively engage a nuclear-armed peer competitor like the former Soviet Union, now resurgent as Russia under Putin. Kissel emphasizes that the U.S. currently lacks a Senate-confirmed ambassador to Russia, critically limiting the American embassy's political influence and direct access to White House decision-making structures. Kissel documents that this ambassadorial vacancy reflects deeper institutional erosion of American diplomatic expertise and strategic communication capabilities regarding Russiannegotiations, creating dangerous capacity gaps precisely when Moscow possesses nuclear weapons and elevated geopolitical ambitions. 1931 STALIN & GORKY

As the USA and Soviet Union race for supremacy in the 1960s, Premier Khrushchev sizes up his rival, President John F Kennedy. Hosts Max Kennedy and Nina Khrushcheva, relatives of the superpower leaders, explore their rise to power - one wealthy, smooth-talking and Harvard educated, the other a hardened Soviet war leader from a peasant family. As they prepare to meet for the first and only time as world leaders, the stakes couldn't be higher: they are fierce rivals in the race to build ever more devastating missiles. This is the personal and political history of the Cuban Missile Crisis.Nina Khrushcheva is the great-granddaughter of Nikita Khrushchev and Max Kennedy is the nephew of President John F Kennedy, and the son of Robert F Kennedy.

In her latest book, Sheila Fitzpatrick, one of the world's leading scholars on the history of the Soviet Union, examines both the immediate aftermath of Stalin's death and his surprising influence in contemporary Russia.

A horror short story inspired by “Mr. Sandman,” a disturbing tune by The Chordettes. Mr. Sandman… bring me a dream… make him the cutest that I've ever seen… In 1954, the Soviet Union was a constant threat. Defense budgets surged, as did secret installations. If the Ruskies think they can reanimate the dead? Well, son, America can do that bigger and better. Written and performed by Scott Sigler Production Assistance by Allie Press Copyright 2025 by Empty Set Entertainment  Theme music is the song “Dark Wave” by Roman Rumyantsev Bring your business back to life with a new domain. Our GoDaddy Promo Code CJCFOSSIG3 removes 99% off the first year of a new dot-com registration. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The end of the Soviet Union. The Gulf War. Kan Noladeti. What do these things have in common? They all came to be in 1991! Let's take another ride in the Israeli Music Time Machine, and let's explore the Israeli music of 1991, shall we? This week on Israel Hour Radio, We take you back to a time when classic artists like Gidi Gov, Ethnix, Etti Ankri, and Yehuda Poliker ruled the airwaves...and the songs? Nothing like 'em. Enjoy a throwback to some old favorites you might remember, or learn some new favorites in this fun musical experience! (Original Air Date: November 30, 2025) 'The Emotional Soundtrack of Israel: Two Years in 20 Songs' - get it here! https://joshwave354.gumroad.com/l/emotional-soundtrack-israel Full YouTube playlist at https://tinyurl.com/mtb4d47m Love the show? Please help us grow by becoming a member of MyIsraeliMusic.com: https://myisraelimusic.com/membership

In this episode of Explaining History, we sit down with author Maggie Ritchie to discuss her latest novel, White Raven. We explore the remarkable true story of Moira Beattie, a Glasgow art student recruited into the heart of Bletchley Park at just 18 years old. Maggie reveals how a chance encounter with the elderly artist unveiled a secret life of wartime codebreaking and a romance with a Russian intelligence officer.We also move beyond 1945 to shine a light on a forgotten chapter of British intelligence: the Joint Services School for Linguists (JSSL) at Crail, Scotland. Discover the "Bletchley of the Cold War," where National Service conscripts were trained in Russian to fight an ideological war, and explore the complex motivations that led some Britons to become agents for the Soviet Union.Key Topics:The Hidden Bletchley: Life, class, and romance in the codebreaking huts.Moira Beattie: The artist who broke German ciphers.JSSL Crail: The secret language school on the Scottish coast.Cold War Moral Ambiguity: Why patriots turned spy in the 1950s.Books Mentioned:White Raven by Maggie Ritchie (Scotland Street Press)For the full article and transcript visit the Explaining History website hereExplaining History helps you understand the 20th Century through critical conversations and expert interviews. We connect the past to the present. If you enjoy the show, please subscribe and share.▸ Support the Show & Get Exclusive ContentBecome a Patron: patreon.com/explaininghistory▸ Join the Community & Continue the ConversationFacebook Group: facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcastSubstack: theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com▸ Read Articles & Go DeeperWebsite: explaininghistory.org Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_ZhD0VWN9M 10 Nov 2025 Joti Brar, chair of the Communist party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist), introduces our meeting to celebrate the 108th anniversary of the great socialist October Revolution. This fantastic celebration was hosted by our party and held in Saklatvala Hall, in Southall, on Saturday, the 8th of November 2025. After a brief introduction the audience stand and sing the Soviet anthem together with Paul Robson in commemoration and tribute both to the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks' great victory in the Russian Civil War, and this year the 80th anniversary of the heroic sacrifices made both by the people of the Soviet Union and the peoples Republic of China who gave respectively 27 million and 40 million lives to defeat the dark armies of fascism and to whom we owe our very existence in the modern world today. Glory to the Red Army of the Soviet Union! Glory to the People's Liberation of the People's Republic of China! Workers of all countries unite! Join us! Also seen in the video: Comrade Ismara Vargas Walter, Ambassador of Cuba Comrade Tha Vone Singharaj, deputy head of mission of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos. Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! www.thecommunists.org www.lalkar.org www.redyouth.org Telegram: t.me/thecommunists Twitter: twitter.com/cpgbml Soundcloud: @proletarianradio Rumble: rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: www.facebook.com/cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: Each one teach one! www.londonworker.org/education-programme/ Join the struggle www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: www.thecommunists.org/donate/  

Instead of a news roundup, we are releasing the second episode of our new miniseries ⁠Chinese Prestige⁠. Annual subscribers already have access, while everyone else can get the 8 episodes for $5 for two weeks only. This conversation examines China's early post-Korean War period and the political and social campaigns that defined the new PRC. The group discusses land reform, the Three-anti and Five-anti campaigns, Soviet-style economic planning centered on heavy industry, and the technocratic overhaul of higher education. They also explore China's deteriorating relationship with the United States, shifting ties with the Soviet Union after Stalin's death, early signs of the Sino-Soviet split, and Mao's tightening control. Theme music by Jake Aron, based on the song “The East is Red.”

In the early 1960s, the United States was always a step behind the Soviet Union in the space race.  By the mid-1960s, the Americans had caught up. They didn't have many glamorous firsts, but they were doing increasingly difficult things in space. All of that came crashing to a halt on January 27, 1967, when three astronauts died in what was a seemingly routine training exercise.  Learn more about the Apollo 1 Disaster, how it happened, and how it influenced the future of the Apollo program on this episode of Everything Everywhere Daily. Sponsors Quince Go to quince.com/daily for 365-day returns, plus free shipping on your order! Mint Mobile Get your 3-month Unlimited wireless plan for just 15 bucks a month at mintmobile.com/eed Chubbies Get 20% off your purchase at Chubbies with the promo code DAILY at checkout! Aura Frames Exclusive $35 off Carver Mat at https://on.auraframes.com/DAILY. Promo Code DAILY DripDrop Go to dripdrop.com and use promo code EVERYTHING for 20% off your first order. Uncommon Goods Go to uncommongoods.com/DAILY for 15% off! Subscribe to the podcast!  https://everything-everywhere.com/everything-everywhere-daily-podcast/ -------------------------------- Executive Producer: Charles Daniel Associate Producers: Austin Oetken & Cameron Kieffer   Become a supporter on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/everythingeverywhere Discord Server: https://discord.gg/UkRUJFh Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/everythingeverywhere/ Facebook Group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/everythingeverywheredaily Twitter: https://twitter.com/everywheretrip Website: https://everything-everywhere.com/  Disce aliquid novi cotidie Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Berlin Blockade was one of the first major international crises of the Cold War when the Soviet Union blocked the Western Allies' railway, road, and canal access to the sectors of Berlin under Western control. I speak with Joseph Pearson, the author of “The Airlift Victories, Myths, and the Berlin Blockade. This is not your standard military history. Drawing on first-hand interviews and untapped sources from both German and Anglo-American archives, Pearson interweaves personal tales into an extraordinary story: an American pilot crashing in Soviet territory; a Jewish photographer struggling to reconcile with the Germans; the 17,000 women who built Tegel Airport; Cambridge University actors performing in the ruins for British intelligence and Hollywood star Montgomery Clift filming at Tempelhof Airport. Through this deeply human lens, Pearson offers crucial historical insight into how lasting new battlelines were formed. The Berlin Airlift didn't just supply a city; it wrote the playbook of the Cold War and continues to influence Western thinking and diplomacy with Russia to this day. Help me preserve Cold War history. ⁠⁠ You'll become part of our community, get ad-free episodes, and get a sought-after CWC coaster as a thank you and you'll bask in the warm glow of knowing you are helping to preserve Cold War history. Just go to ⁠⁠⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/⁠⁠⁠ If a monthly contribution is not your cup of tea, We also welcome one-off donations via the same link. Related episodes: Veteran of the Cold War Berlin Airlift – the Candy Bomber ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/episode56/⁠ A 98 Year Old USAF Veteran Remembers the Berlin Airlift ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/episode417/⁠ A visit to Cold War base RAF Burtonwood ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/episode74/⁠ Book Giveaway ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/giveaway1/⁠ Episode Extras ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/episode432/⁠ Find the ideal gift for the Cold War enthusiast in your life! Just go to ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/store/⁠ CONTINUE  THE COLD WAR CONVERSATION Follow us on BlueSky ⁠https://bsky.app/profile/coldwarpod.bsky.social⁠ Follow us on Threads ⁠https://www.threads.net/@coldwarconversations⁠ Follow us on Twitter/X ⁠https://twitter.com/ColdWarPod⁠ Facebook ⁠https://www.facebook.com/groups/coldwarpod/⁠ Instagram ⁠https://www.instagram.com/coldwarconversations/⁠ Youtube ⁠https://youtube.com/@ColdWarConversations Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Though he has not been glorified by the Church, Fr Lazarus was a pioneer and exemplar of Orthodoxy in the West.   He was born in England in 1902. In his early manhood he moved to western Canada, where he worked as a farm laborer for several years. While working in Alberta, he sensed a call to become a missionary and went to an English missionary college for five years.   Sad to say, our sources are unclear about how he came to the Orthodox faith from this unlikely beginning. But in 1934 he spent seven weeks on Mt Athos, then lived as a monk in Yugoslavia. He was ordained to the priesthood by Archbishop Theophan (Russian Orthodox Church Abroad), then sent to Palestine to serve the Russian Mission in Jerusalem.   In 1948, the new State of Israel gave the Mission's property to the Soviet Union and the mission was left dispossessed. Fr Lazarus served as priest to the Russian Convent in Aïn Karim and Transjordan, then was sent to India in 1952, where he helped in Orthodox missionary work for twenty years. Several of his books and translations, such as his biography/study of St Seraphim of Sarov, were written while he lived in India. While there, he met Mother Gavrilia of Greece, whose beautiful biography Ascetic of Love includes good descriptions of him during his life in India. Though very strict in his Orthodoxy, he was flexible in externals: in India he wore a white rather than a black cassock, because black clothing had offensive connotations to the Indian people.   In 1972 Fr Lazarus was called to Greece, then in 1974 to Australia, where he served for nine years. In 1983 he moved to California in answer to call from Fr Peter Gillquist to assist members of the former 'Evangelical Orthodox Church' in their move to Orthodoxy. In 1989 he moved to Alaska, where he continued this work. He reposed in Eagle River, Alaska in 1992. Following is an excerpt from an account of his last days by members of his community in Eagle River:   "Father always signed his name with TWA, "Traveling With Angels". A few days before his death, after battling cancer many years, faithfully using the Jesus Prayer as the medicine for his affliction, the Archangel Michael appeared to help him. His final journey homeward had begun, TWA... 'the time of my departure is at hand. I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith.' (2 Timothy 4: 6-8)."

Though he has not been glorified by the Church, Fr Lazarus was a pioneer and exemplar of Orthodoxy in the West.   He was born in England in 1902. In his early manhood he moved to western Canada, where he worked as a farm laborer for several years. While working in Alberta, he sensed a call to become a missionary and went to an English missionary college for five years.   Sad to say, our sources are unclear about how he came to the Orthodox faith from this unlikely beginning. But in 1934 he spent seven weeks on Mt Athos, then lived as a monk in Yugoslavia. He was ordained to the priesthood by Archbishop Theophan (Russian Orthodox Church Abroad), then sent to Palestine to serve the Russian Mission in Jerusalem.   In 1948, the new State of Israel gave the Mission's property to the Soviet Union and the mission was left dispossessed. Fr Lazarus served as priest to the Russian Convent in Aïn Karim and Transjordan, then was sent to India in 1952, where he helped in Orthodox missionary work for twenty years. Several of his books and translations, such as his biography/study of St Seraphim of Sarov, were written while he lived in India. While there, he met Mother Gavrilia of Greece, whose beautiful biography Ascetic of Love includes good descriptions of him during his life in India. Though very strict in his Orthodoxy, he was flexible in externals: in India he wore a white rather than a black cassock, because black clothing had offensive connotations to the Indian people.   In 1972 Fr Lazarus was called to Greece, then in 1974 to Australia, where he served for nine years. In 1983 he moved to California in answer to call from Fr Peter Gillquist to assist members of the former 'Evangelical Orthodox Church' in their move to Orthodoxy. In 1989 he moved to Alaska, where he continued this work. He reposed in Eagle River, Alaska in 1992. Following is an excerpt from an account of his last days by members of his community in Eagle River:   "Father always signed his name with TWA, "Traveling With Angels". A few days before his death, after battling cancer many years, faithfully using the Jesus Prayer as the medicine for his affliction, the Archangel Michael appeared to help him. His final journey homeward had begun, TWA... 'the time of my departure is at hand. I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith.' (2 Timothy 4: 6-8)."

The CIA's book club, known by the codename QRHELPFUL, was a secret 35-year program born of the fear that communism would dominate the globe. About 10 million books were smuggled into the Soviet Union during the Cold War, transported by trucks and yachts, in tins and luggage, and even dropped from balloons. The agency believed that the literature could win hearts and minds, turning citizens of the Soviet Bloc into dissidents. It's all documented in author Charlie English's new book, The CIA Book Club, the first narrative account of this program. Subscribe to Sasha's Substack, HUMINT, to get more intelligence stories: https://sashaingber.substack.com/ And if you have feedback or want to hear about a particular topic, you can reach us by email at spycast@spymuseum.org,  This show is brought to you from Goat Rodeo, Airwave, and the International Spy Museum in Washington, DC. This episode was produced by Flora Warshaw and the team at Goat Rodeo. At the International Spy Museum, Mike Mincey and Memphis Vaughan III are our video editors. Emily Rens is our graphic designer. Joshua Troemel runs our SPY social media. Amanda Ohlke is our Director of Adult Education and Mira Cohen is the Vice President of Programs. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the Changkufeng Incident. In a frost-bitten dawn along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, a border notched with memory becomes the stage for a quiet duel of will. On one side, Japanese officers led by Inada Masazum study maps, mud, and the hill known as Changkufeng, weighing ground it offers and the risk of war. They glimpse a prize, high ground that could shield lines to Korea—yet they sense peril in every ridge, every scent of winter wind. Across the line, Soviet forces tighten their grip on the crest, their eyes fixed on the same hill, their tents and vehicles creeping closer to the border. The air hums with cautious diplomacy: Moscow's orders pulse through Seoul and Harbin, urging restraint, probing, deterring, but never inviting full-scale conflict. Yet every patrol, every reconnaissance, seems to tilt the balance toward escalation.   #177 The point of no return for the USSR and Japan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Days passed and the local emissaries had not been released by the Russians. Domei reported from Seoul that the authorities were growing worried; the "brazen" actions of Soviet front-line forces infuriated the Manchurians and Japanese. From Seoul, too, came ominous news that villagers were preparing to evacuate because they feared fighting would soon begin in the Changkufeng area. While diplomatic activity continued in Moscow without effect, the Tokyo press continued to report intense military activity throughout the Soviet Far East—the greatest massing of troops in months, with planes, armored cars, and motorized equipment choking the Trans-Siberian railway. The press was dominated by commentary about the danger of war. One enterprising Tokyo publisher ran advertisements under the heading: "The Manchukuo-Soviet Border Situation Is Urgent—Ours Is the Only Detailed Map of the Soviet Far East: Newspaper-size, in seven clear colors, offset printed, only 50 sen." Although the Manchukuoan foreign office issued a statement on 20 July about the dire consequences the Soviets were inviting, it is probable that the next Russian actions, of a conciliatory nature, were reached independently. Either Moscow had taken almost a week to make the decision, or the diplomatic conversations there had had an effect. Local Japanese authorities reported inactivity on the Changkufeng front from the morning of 23 July. On the next day, word was received that the USSR proposed to return the two emissaries as "trespassers." At midday on 26 July, the Russians released the blindfolded agents at a border site along the Novokievsk road. After completing the formalities, the Japanese asked the Russians for a reply concerning local settlement of the incident. According to Japanese sources, the "flustered" Colonel Grebennik answered: "My assignment today was merely to turn over the envoys. As for any request about the Changkufeng Incident, our guard commander must have asked for instructions from the central government. I think this is the type of matter which must be answered by the authorities at Moscow through diplomatic channels." Grebennik's postwar recollection does not differ appreciably from the Japanese version. Soviet sources mention a second effort by the Japanese military to deliver a message under more forceful circumstances. On 23 July a Soviet border unit drove off a four-man party. Russian cavalry, sent to investigate, discovered that the Japanese had pulled down a telegraph pole, severed lines 100–150 meters inside Soviet territory, absconded with wire, and left behind a white flag and a letter. Undated, unsigned, and written in Korean, the message struck Grebennik as being substantively the same as the communication delivered formally by the emissaries on 18 July. Japanese materials make no reference to a second, informal effort by local forces, but there is little reason to doubt that such an attempt, perhaps unauthorized, was made. Although Japanese efforts at low-level negotiations came to naught, two observations emerged from the local authorities and the press. First, on-the-spot negotiations had broken down; it had been difficult even to reclaim the emissaries, and the Russians in the Posyet region were using various pretexts to refer matters to diplomatic echelons. Second, the Russians had released the men. Some interpreted this as the first evidence of Soviet sincerity; possibly, the USSR would even return Matsushima's body as a step toward settlement. Other Japanese observers on the scene warned the public that it was imperative to stay on guard: "All depends on how diplomacy proceeds and how the front-line troops behave." Yet the excitement in the Japanese press began to abate. It is difficult to ascertain the nature of the decision-making process on the Russian side after the Japanese attempted local negotiations. The Soviets contend that nothing special had been undertaken before the Japanese provoked matters at the end of July. Grebennik, however, admits that after receiving the two Japanese communications, "we started to prepare against an attack on us in the Lake Khasan area." He and a group of officers went to Changkufeng Hill and sent as many border guards there as possible. Although he personally observed Japanese troops and instructed his officers to do the same, he denied categorically that the Russians constructed trenches and fortifications. Only the observation of Manchurian territory was intensified while instructions were awaited from higher headquarters. For its part, the Korea Army was carrying out Imperial general headquarters first instructions while pursuing a wait-and-see policy. On 16 July, Korea Army Headquarters wired an important operations order to Suetaka. With a view toward a possible attack against intruders in the Khasan area, the army planned to make preparations. The division commander was to alert stipulated units for emergency dispatch and send key personnel to the Kyonghun sector to undertake preparations for an attack. Lt. Col. Senda Sadasue, BGU commander of the 76th Infantry Regiment, was to reconnoiter, reinforce nearby districts, and be ready for emergencies. Particular care was enjoined not to irritate the Soviet side. Maj. Gen. Yokoyama Shinpei, the Hunchun garrison commander, was to maintain close contact with the BGU and take every precaution in guarding the frontiers. Like Senda, Yokoyama was warned against irritating the Russians. Korea Army Headquarters also dispatched staff to the front and had them begin preparations, envisaging an offensive. Upon receipt of the army order, Suetaka issued implementing instructions from his Nanam headquarters at 4:30 A.M. on the 17th. The following units were to prepare for immediate alert: the 38th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 75th Infantry Regiment, 27th Cavalry Regiment, 5th Antiaircraft Regiment, and 19th Engineer Regiment. The same instructions applied to the next units, except that elements organic to the division were designated: the 76th Infantry Regiment, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, and 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment. Another order enjoined utmost care not to irritate the Russians; Japanese actions were to be masked. Next came a directive to the forces of Senda and K. Sato. The former comprised mainly the 76th Infantry BGU and a cavalry platoon. The latter was built around the 75th Infantry Regiment, the Kucheng garrison unit, another cavalry platoon, two mountain artillery and one heavy field artillery battalion, and the 19th Engineers. Suetaka's idea about a solution to the border troubles had become concrete and aggressive. From the night of July 17, concentration would be accomplished gradually. The exact timing of the attack would be determined by subsequent orders; in Senda's area, there was no such restriction regarding "counteraction brought on by enemy attack." Division signal and intendant officers would conduct reconnaissance related to communications, billeting, food, and supplies. Sato and his subordinates were to reconnoiter personally. Having ordered the division to begin concentration and to stand by, Korea Army Headquarters was prepared the next morning, July 17, to direct the movement. Nevertheless, there was concern in Seoul that Suetaka's advance elements might cross the Tumen River into Manchurian territory, which could result in a clash with Soviet troops. Such an outcome might run counter to the principle established by Imperial general headquarters. Consequently, it was decided that "movement east of the river would therefore have to be forbidden in the Korea Army's implementing order." Nakamura transmitted his operational instructions to Suetaka at 6:00 on July 17: "No great change in latest situation around Lake Khasan. Soviet forces are still occupying Changkufeng area. Diplomaticlevel negotiations on part of central authorities and Manchukuoan government do not appear to have progressed. Considering various circumstances and with view to preparations, this army will concentrate elements of 19th Division between Shikai, Kyonghun, Agochi." Restrictions stipulated that the division commander would transport the units by rail and motor vehicle and concentrate them in the waiting zone in secret. Movement was to begin on the night of July 17 and to be completed the next day. Further orders, however, must govern unit advance east of the Tumen as well as use of force. The remainder of the division was to stay ready to move out. Troops were to carry rations for about two weeks.   Late that day, Suetaka received an order by phone for his subordinates in line with Seoul's instructions. Senda would handle the concentration of elements assembling at Kyonghun, and Sato would do the same for the main units arriving at Agochi. A communications net was to be set up quickly. Caution was to be exercised not to undertake provocative actions against the opposite bank of the Tumen, even for reconnaissance. The division would dispatch two trains from Hoeryong and four from Nanam. At 11:58 pm on 18 July, the first train left Hoeryong for Agochi. Concentration of units was completed by dawn. By that time, the Japanese had dispatched to the border 3,236 men and 743 horses. Past midnight on 20 July, Division Chief of Staff Nakamura wired headquarters that the division was ready to take any action required, having completed the alert process by 11 pm. Japanese scouting of the Changkufeng sector began in earnest after mid-July. Although the affair had seemed amenable to settlement, Sato took steps for an emergency from around the 14th. His thoughts centered on readiness for an attack against Changkufeng, which simultaneously required reconnaissance for the assault and preparation to pull the regiment back quickly to Hoeryong if a withdrawal was ordered. After arriving at Haigan on 18 July, Sato set out with several engineers. At Kucheng, the officers donned white Korean clothing, presumably the disguise directed by the division—and boarded native oxcarts for a leisurely journey southward along the Korean bank of the Tumen across from Changkufeng. The seemingly innocent "farmers" studied the river for crossing sites and Changkufeng Hill for the extent of enemy activity. On the hill's western slope, in Manchurian territory, three rows of Russian entanglements could be observed 300 feet below the crest. Only a handful of soldiers were visible, probably a platoon, certainly not more than a company. Infantry Captain Yamada Teizo conducted secret reconnaissance of the entire Changkufeng-Hill 52 sector for 314 hours in the afternoon of 18 July. Even after intense scanning through powerful binoculars, he could detect no more than 19 lookouts and six horsemen; camouflage work had been completed that day, and there were ten separate covered trench or base points. Barbed wire, under camouflage, extended about four meters in depth, yet even Yamada's trained eye could not determine whether there was one line of stakes or two. He jotted down what he could see and compared his information with that learned from local police. Artillery Colonel R. Tanaka shared the view that the Soviets had intruded. When he went reconnoitering along the Korean bank, he observed Russian soldiers entrenched around the hilltop, easily visible through binoculars at a range of two kilometers. Trenches had been dug 20 to 30 meters below the crest on the western slope. Eventually, there were three rows of barbed wire, the first just below the trenches and the lowest 100 meters under the summit. Tanaka estimated Soviet strength at two companies (about 200 men). Suetaka's intelligence officer, Sasai, recalls seeing barbed wire after Japanese units deployed to the front on 18–19 July; he had surmised then that the entanglements were being prepared out of fear of a Japanese assault.   To obtain first-hand information, the Gaimusho ordered a section chief, Miura Kazu'ichi, to the spot. Between 23 July and the cease-fire in August, Miura collected data at Kyonghun and transmitted reports from the consulate at Hunchun. On 28 July he visited Sozan on the Korean bank. He observed Soviet soldiers on the western slopes of Changkufeng, digging trenches and driving stakes. These actions were clearly on Manchukuoan territory even according to Soviet maps. Miura insisted that he saw no friendly troops on territory claimed by the Russians and observed no provocative actions by the Japanese. These statements are supported by a map drawn for him in early August by Division Staff Officer Saito Toshio, a sketch Miura retained as late as 1947. Miura's testimony is tempered by his assertion that he saw a red flag flying near the top of Changkufeng Hill. This contention conflicts with all evidence, as Russian lawyers at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East argued, it is improbable that a Soviet frontier post, highly interested in camouflage, would have hoisted a pennon so large that it could be seen from Sozan. Russian sources are unanimous in stating that no flag was put up until 6 August and that no trenches or entanglements were established by Soviet border guards in July, at least prior to the 29th. The two Army General staff consultants, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Seoul on 16 July, the day Korea Army Headquarters was ordering an alert for the 19th Division "with a view toward a possible attack against enemy intruders." Inada dispatched them mainly to inspect the frontline situation; but he had not fully decided on reconnaissance in force. At Shikai, Arisue and Kotani donned Korean garb and traveled by oxcart on the Korean side of the Tumen, reconnoitering opposite the Shachaofeng sector. Kotani was convinced that hostile possession of Changkufeng posed a serious threat to the Korean railway. He agreed with the division's estimate that, if the Japanese did decide to seize Changkufeng, it ought not to be too difficult. Arisue, as senior observer, dispatched messages from Kyonghun to Tokyo detailing their analysis and recommendations. Meanwhile, in Tokyo, on 17 July the central military authorities received a cable from the Japanese envoy in Moscow, Colonel Doi Akio, reporting that prospects for a diplomatic settlement were nil. The USSR was taking a hard line because Japan was deeply involved in China, though there were domestic considerations as well. The Russians, however, showed no intention of using the border incident to provoke war. It would be best for Japan to seize Changkufeng quickly and then press forward with parleys. Meanwhile, Japan should conduct an intensive domestic and external propaganda campaign. There was mounting pressure in the high command that negotiations, conducted "unaided," would miss an opportunity. Based on reports from Arisue and Kotani, that army seemed to be contemplating an unimaginative, ponderous plan: an infantry battalion would cross the Tumen west of Changkufeng and attack frontally, while two more battalions would cross south of Kyonghun to drive along the river and assault Changkufeng from the north. Inada sent a telegram on 17 July to Arisue for "reference." Prospects had diminished that Soviet troops would withdraw as a result of negotiation. As for the attack ideas Arisue mentioned, Inada believed it necessary to prepare to retake Changkufeng with a night attack using small forces. To avoid widening the crisis, the best plan was a limited, surprise attack using ground units. The notion of a surprise attack drew on the Kwantung Army's extensive combat experience in Manchuria since 1931.  The next morning, after the forward concentration of troops was completed, Suetaka went to the front. From Kucheng, he observed the Changkufeng district and decided on concrete plans for use of force. Meanwhile, Nakamura was curbing any hawkish courses at the front. As high-command sources privately conceded later, the younger officers in Tokyo sometimes seemed to think the commander was doing too good a job; there was covert sentiment that it might be preferable if someone in the chain of command acted independently before the opportunity slipped away. This is significant in light of the usual complaints by responsible central authorities about gekokujo—insubordination—by local commands. An important report influencing the high command's view arrived from Kwantung Army Intelligence on 19 July: according to agents in Khabarovsk, the USSR would not let the Changkufeng incident develop into war; Russians also believed there would be no large-scale Soviet intrusion into their territory. By 19 July, the Tokyo operations staff was considering the best method to restore control of the lost hill by force, since Seoul appeared to maintain its laissez-faire stance. On 18 July, Arisue and Kotani were instructed by Imperial General headquarters to assist the Korea Army and the 19th Division regarding the Changkufeng Incident. What the Army general staff operations officers sought was an Imperial General headquarters order, requiring Imperial sanction, that would instruct the Korea Army to evict the Russian troops from Changkufeng the way the Kwantung Army would, using units already under Nakamura's command. The sense was that the affair could be handled locally, but if the USSR sought to escalate the incident, it might be prudent for that to occur before the Hankow operation began. The IGHQ and War Ministry coordinated the drafting of an IGHQ order on 19–20 July: "We deem it advisable to eradicate Soviet challenges . . . by promptly delivering blow on this occasion against unit which crossed border at Changkufeng. That unit is in disadvantageous spot strategically and tactically; thus, probability is scant that dispute would enlarge, and we are investigating countermeasures in any case. Careless expansion of situation is definitely not desired. We would like you people also to conduct studies concerning mode of assault employing smallest strength possible for surprise attack against limited objective. Kindly learn general atmosphere here [Tokyo] from [Operations] Major Arao Okikatsu." The 20th of July proved to be a hectic day in Korea, and even more so in Tokyo. The division had informed the Korea Army that it was finally "ready to go," a message received in Seoul in the early hours. Then Arisue received a wire from Inada presenting limited-attack plans and noting that Arao was on the way. By that day, Japanese intelligence judged there were 400 Soviet troops and two or three mountain guns south of Paksikori. Russian positions at Changkufeng had been reinforced, but no aggressive intentions could be detected. Soviet ground elements, as well as materiel, appeared to be moving from Vladivostok and Slavyanka toward Posyet. Suetaka headed back to the front. Sato told him that it was absolutely necessary to occupy Chiangchunfeng Hill across the Tumen in Manchurian territory. Upon reaching the Wuchiatzu sector and inspecting the situation, Suetaka agreed to send a small unit to Chiangchunfeng on his own authority.  Colonel Sato Kotoku had ordered one company to move across the Tumen toward Chiangchunfeng on 21 July, a maneuver that did not escape the Russians' notice. On 24 July, the same day another Japanese unit occupied Shangchiaoshan Hill, Marshal Blyukher ordered the 40th Rifle Division, stationed in the Posyet area to be placed on combat readiness, with a force of regulars assigned to back the Soviet border guards; two reinforced rifle battalions were detached as a reserve. According to Japanese records, Russian border patrols began appearing around Huichungyuan, Yangkuanping, and Shachaofeng from 26 July, but no serious incidents were reported at that stage. At about 9:30 am on 29 July, Captain Kanda, the 2nd Company commander of Lieutenant Colonel Senda's 76th Border Garrison Unit, was observing the Shachaofeng area from his Kucheng cantonments. Through his glasses, Kanda observed four or five Soviet soldiers engaged in construction on high ground on the west side of Shachaofeng. Kanda notified Senda, who was at BGU Headquarters inspecting the forward areas. Senda transmitted the information to Suetaka. Deciding to cross the Tumen for a closer look, Senda set off with Kanda. A little after 11 am, they reached Chiangchunfeng Hill, where the men from Captain Noguchi's company were already located. Senda verified, to his own satisfaction, that as many as 10 enemy infantrymen had "violated the border" to a depth of 350 meters, "even by the Soviets' contention", and were starting construction 1,000 meters south of Shachaofeng. Senda decided to oust the Russian force "promptly and resolutely," in light of the basic mission assigned his unit. He telephoned Suetaka, who was in Kyonghun, and supplied the intelligence and the recommendation. Subordinates recalled Suetaka's initial reaction when the BGU reported a Soviet intrusion about a mile and a half north of Changkufeng. "The arrogant Russians were making fools of the Japanese, or were trying to. At stake was not a trifling hill and a few invaders, but the honor of the Imperial Army. In the face of this insult, the general became furious. He insisted upon smashing the enemy right away."  Kanda phoned 2nd Lieutenant Sakuma, who was still at Kucheng, and told him to bring his 25-man platoon across the river by 2 pm Sakuma crossed by boat and arrived at 1:30. Kanda set out from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20, took over Sakuma's unit, bore east, and approached within 700 meters of the enemy. He ordered the men not to fire unless fired upon, and to withdraw quickly after routing the Russians. It is said that the Japanese troops were fired upon as they advanced in deployed formation but did not respond at first. In a valley, casualties were incurred and the Japanese finally returned fire. Sakuma's 1st Squad leader took a light machine gun and pinned down the Russians facing him. Sakuma himself pressed forward with his other two squads, taking advantage of the slope to envelop the enemy from the right. At the same time, he sent a patrol to the high ground on the left to cover the platoon's flank. Thanks to the 1st Squad's frontal assault, the Russians had no chance to worry about their wings, and Sakuma moved forward to a point only 30 meters from the foe's rear. Kanda was now 50 meters from the Russians. When the enemy light machine gun let up, he ordered a charge and, in the lead, personally cut down one of the foe. Sakuma also rushed the Soviets, but when about to bring down his saber he was stabbed in the face while another Russian struck him in the shoulder. Grappling with this assailant, Sakuma felled him. Other Japanese attackers sabered two more Russians and shot the rest. By 3:10 pm the eight enemy "trespassers" had been annihilated. The covering patrol reported that five Soviet horsemen, with a light machine gun, were galloping up from Khasan. Sakuma had his platoon fire grenade dischargers, which smashed the enemy. Seventy more Russian soldiers now came, attacking from northwest of the lake and supported by fire from the east side. Using light machine guns and grenade dischargers, Sakuma checked them. Meanwhile, Miyashita's platoon, part of Noguchi's company, had departed from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20 pm and swung right until it reached the crestline between Changkufeng and Kanda's company. One squad faced 200 Russians on Changkufeng; the other faced the enemy south of Shachaofeng. Soviet forces opened intense machine-gun fire from Changkufeng and from the high ground east of the lake. After 20 minutes, Kanda's unit charged, two or three Russians fled, and Miyashita's platoon shot one down. Senda, who had gone with Miyashita, directed the platoon's movements and proceeded north, under fire, to Kanda's unit. Once the Russians had been cleared out, Senda forbade pursuit across the boundary and gradually withdrew his forces to the heights line 800 meters southwest. It was 4:30 then. By 5 pm Soviet reinforcements, apparently brought up from the Changkufeng and Paksikori sectors, advanced anew. With 80 men in the front lines, the enemy pushed across the border to a depth of at least 500 meters, according to the Japanese, and began to establish positions. Several tanks and many troops could be observed in the rear. Senda had Noguchi's company hold Chiangchunfeng. Kanda's unit, reinforced by 33 men from Kucheng, was to occupy the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, while Imagawa's company of the 76th Regiment was to occupy other high ground to the west. Senda then reported the situation to Suetaka in Kyonghun and asked for reinforcements. In Seoul, Army headquarters understood the developments reported by Suetaka as a response to the hostile border violation, and about 20 men of the Kucheng BGU under Lt. Sakuma drove the enemy out between 2:30 and 3 pm. Afterward, Sakuma pulled back to high ground two kilometers south of Yangkuanping to avoid trouble and was now observing the foe. Although Seoul had heard nothing about Japanese losses, Corp. Akaishizawa Kunihiko personally observed that Kanda had been wounded in the face by a grenade and bandaged, that Sakuma had been bayoneted twice and also bandaged, and that the dead lay on the grass, covered with raincoats. According to Suetaka "the enemy who had crossed the border south of Shachaofeng suffered losses and pulled back once as a result of our attack at about 2:30 pm". By about 4:30, Suetaka continued, the Russians had built up their strength and attacked the platoon on the heights southwest of Shachaofeng. Behind the Russian counterattack, there were now several tanks. Earlier, Suetaka noted ominously that several rounds of artillery had been fired from the Changkufeng area; "therefore, we reinforced our units too, between 5 and 6 pm., and both sides are confronting each other." Details as to the fate of Sakuma's platoon are not given, but it is now admitted that casualties were incurred on both sides. The Korea Army Headquarters consequently reported to Tokyo in the evening that, according to information from the division, 20 Japanese had driven out the Russians near Shachaofeng; 25 men from Senda's unit were occupying the heights 600 meters west of Changkufeng; and another 16 men were deployed in ambush at Yangkuanping. Such an enumeration would have tended to suggest that only a few dozen Japanese were across the Tumen on the 29th. But a review of the numbers of combat troops committed and the reinforcements sent by Senda reveals that Japanese strength across the river was in the hundreds by nightfall. In Moscow, Tass reported that on 29 July detachments of Japanese-Manchukuoan intruders had attempted to seize high ground apparently located 0.5 miles north of a Russian position. The assailants had been "completely repelled from Soviet territory, as a result of measures taken by Russian frontier guards," and instructions had been sent to the embassy in Tokyo to protest strongly. Walter Duranty, the veteran American correspondent in Moscow, heard that the Japanese press had published reports, likely intended for internal consumption, that hours of furious fighting had occurred at the points in question. Since the dispatches were unsubstantiated and "failed to gain credence anywhere outside Japan," Duranty claimed this may have forced the Japanese to translate into action their boast of "applying force" unless their demands were satisfied. "Now, it appears, they have applied force, unsuccessfully." The Soviet communiqué on the Shachaofeng affair, despite its firm tone, appeared unostentatiously in the following day's Pravda and Izvestiya under the headline, "Japanese Militarists Continue Their Provocation." The Japanese Embassy in Moscow heard nothing about the Shachaofeng affray until the morning of the 30th, when a wire was received from the Gaimusho that ten Russian soldiers had occupied a position northwest of Changkufeng and had begun trench work until ejected by frontier guards. Since the Russian communiqué spoke of afternoon fighting, American correspondents concluded that Soviet troops must have counterattacked and driven off the Japanese. No additional information was available to the public in Moscow on the 30th, perhaps because it was a holiday. Nevertheless, in the afternoon, Stalin's colleague Kaganovich addressed an immense crowd in Moscow on "Railroad Day" and at the conclusion of a long, vigorous speech said:  "The Soviet Union is prepared to meet all enemies, east or west." It certainly was not a fighting speech and there is no reason to suppose the Soviet will abandon its firm peace policy unless Japan deliberately forced the issue. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Diplomacy flickered as Moscow pressed restraint and Tokyo whispered calculated bravado. As July wore on, both sides massed troops, built trenches, and sent scouts across the river. A tense, hidden war unfolded, skirmishes, patrols, and small advances, until a fleeting moment when force collided with restraint, and the hill's future hung in the frost.

Record Store Day Black Friday 2025 is this Friday, November 28th. This week's episode is the second of two special spotlights on a few of the featured titles from the Black Friday List, which is up now at RecordStoreDay.com. This week, we welcome back Talking Heads drummer and co-founder Chris Frantz to unpack Tentative Decisions: Demos & Live a vinyl collection from Rhino Records exclusively for RSD Black Friday featuring a newly discovered demo by pre-Talking Heads group, The Artistics, plus eleven demo and live tracks recorded by the original trio lineup of the band (with Tina Weymouth, Frantz and Byrne) recorded in 1975 and 1976. Chris even teases an upcoming Talking Heads project that will re-unite the group member once again. And staying in a New York groove, Deee-Lite founding member Supa DJ Dmitry Brill is here to celebrate the release of The Very Best Of Deee-Lite, a double LP on de-groovy purple and orange splatter vinyl. Along the way, the Ukrainian born musician shares the funkadelic story of Deee-Lite's early NYC club days, complete with tales of Bootsy Collins, Maceo Parker, Fred Wesley, and Q-Tip, plus a most cherished classic rock album that Dmitry purchased at great expense back in the former Soviet Union.  Finally, we mark the passing of Reggae superstar Jimmy Cliff (1944-2025), and Stone Roses/Primal Scream bass player Gary "Mani" Mounfield (1962 -2025) the soul of "Madchester."  The Record Store Day Podcast is a weekly music chat show written, produced, engineered, and hosted by Paul Myers, who also composed the theme music and selected interstitial music.  Executive Producers (for Record Store Day) Michael Kurtz and Carrie Colliton. For the most up-to-date news about all things RSD, visit RecordStoreDay.com   Please consider subscribing to our podcast wherever you get podcasts, and tell your friends, we're here every week and we love making new friends!

Send us a textWe discuss the positions and influence of the Workers' Opposition in the Soviet Union.

In the West, World War II is commonly understood as the Allies' struggle against Nazism. Often elided, if not simply forgotten, is the Soviet Union's crucial role in that fight. With this book, acclaimed historian Jochen Hellbeck rectifies this omission by relocating the ideological core of the conflict. It was not the Western powers but Communist Russia that Nazi Germany viewed as an existential threat—in fact, “World Enemy No. 1.” Jewish revolutionaries, the Nazis believed, had seized power in 1917 and were preparing the Soviet state to destroy Germany and the world. And so, on June 22, 1941, a German army of three million attacked the Soviet Union to exterminate “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Hitler's cardinal obsession. While Europe's Jews were expelled, exiled, and persecuted by the Nazis, Soviet Jews were immediately slated for elimination. The Soviet lands thus became ground zero for systematic extermination, which was only later extended to all Jews, igniting the Holocaust.Hellbeck plumbs newly declassified archives and previously undiscovered sources—testimonies, diaries, and dispatches from soldiers and civilians, Soviet and German—to offer a unique history that takes account of both sides. He reconstructs the years leading up to the war when “Europe against Bolshevism” was the Nazis' most fervid rallying cry, and documents their annihilatory ambitions on the battlegrounds in the East. Widely disseminated accounts of German atrocities mobilized millions of Soviet citizens to join a people's war against the hated invaders. Hellbeck tracks the desire for revenge that drove the Red Army on its path of reconquest, an advance that further inflamed the belief in a murderous “Bolshevik Jew,” stirring the Germans to fight to the bitter end. Recounted here in vivid detail are the events at Babi Yar, the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the concentration camps, and the arrival of the Red Army in the Nazi capital. Finally, Hellbeck reckons with the West's persistent disregard of the Soviet Union's incalculable contribution to winning the war—and its sacrifice of twenty-six million citizens—as anti-communism and the Cold War turned erstwhile allies into mortal enemies.Hellbeck's eye-opening work is an astonishing new reading of both the Second World War and how its history has been told. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In the West, World War II is commonly understood as the Allies' struggle against Nazism. Often elided, if not simply forgotten, is the Soviet Union's crucial role in that fight. With this book, acclaimed historian Jochen Hellbeck rectifies this omission by relocating the ideological core of the conflict. It was not the Western powers but Communist Russia that Nazi Germany viewed as an existential threat—in fact, “World Enemy No. 1.” Jewish revolutionaries, the Nazis believed, had seized power in 1917 and were preparing the Soviet state to destroy Germany and the world. And so, on June 22, 1941, a German army of three million attacked the Soviet Union to exterminate “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Hitler's cardinal obsession. While Europe's Jews were expelled, exiled, and persecuted by the Nazis, Soviet Jews were immediately slated for elimination. The Soviet lands thus became ground zero for systematic extermination, which was only later extended to all Jews, igniting the Holocaust.Hellbeck plumbs newly declassified archives and previously undiscovered sources—testimonies, diaries, and dispatches from soldiers and civilians, Soviet and German—to offer a unique history that takes account of both sides. He reconstructs the years leading up to the war when “Europe against Bolshevism” was the Nazis' most fervid rallying cry, and documents their annihilatory ambitions on the battlegrounds in the East. Widely disseminated accounts of German atrocities mobilized millions of Soviet citizens to join a people's war against the hated invaders. Hellbeck tracks the desire for revenge that drove the Red Army on its path of reconquest, an advance that further inflamed the belief in a murderous “Bolshevik Jew,” stirring the Germans to fight to the bitter end. Recounted here in vivid detail are the events at Babi Yar, the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the concentration camps, and the arrival of the Red Army in the Nazi capital. Finally, Hellbeck reckons with the West's persistent disregard of the Soviet Union's incalculable contribution to winning the war—and its sacrifice of twenty-six million citizens—as anti-communism and the Cold War turned erstwhile allies into mortal enemies.Hellbeck's eye-opening work is an astonishing new reading of both the Second World War and how its history has been told. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Gene Zannetti talks with Dragon Wrestling Club founder Eleazar De Luca about why cutting weight is overrated, how confidence comes from drilling proper technique, and teaching wrestlers to shoot to positions of strength instead of uncertainty.Timestamps:2:40 - High school wrestlers focus on the wrong things3:38 - Learning from his own mistakes7:16 - Soviet Union model: one coach for life10:36 - Drilling proper technique and chain wrestling12:23 - Teaching proper vs improper wrestling positions17:00 - Confidence is brought by the drill20:10 - Competition frequency recommendations27:04 - USA Wrestling's systematic approach

The Nihilism of the Red Guards and Mao's International Maneuvers Professor Sean McMeekin This segment explores the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966) and the Red Guards, characterized by a "radical cult of youth" and a nihilistic side of communism involving the destruction of urbane, literate civilization and turning against education, books, professors, the elderly, and foreigners. During this time, there was severe tension between Moscow and Beijing in the Sino-Soviet split. Mao utilized the Soviet Union as a useful enemy to demonize and scapegoat opponents internally, while using geopolitical maneuvering—such as coziness with Romania and the eventual opening to the United States—to punch above his weight internationally.

In 1914, a young man of 16 years of age immigrated from Italy to the United States. His name was Antonio Pasin. Over the next three years he worked whatever jobs he could get, saving his money until he was able to afford to rent a one room workshop in 1917. That same year the world went mad... millions dying in WWI, Zionist Bolsheviks toppling the Romanov Dynasty in Russia to create the communist Soviet Union, America entering WWI and Europe falling into an economic spiral. Yet, Pasin started making wagons, building them at night and selling them in the day. By 1923 Pasin established the Liberty Coaster Company to manufacture and sell his wagons, and in 1927 he transformed the company by using manufacturing processes learned from Ford Motor Company, taking on the new name Radio Steel and Manufacturing Company. The Radio Flyer wagon rapidly become an American icon, becoming a part of the lives of children and adults alike.  #BardsFM_TheAmericanBrand #TheRadioFlyerWagon #DreamsAndPassions Bards Nation Health Store: www.bardsnationhealth.com EnviroKlenz Air Purification, promo code BARDS to save 10%:www.enviroklenz.com EMPShield protect your vehicles and home. Promo code BARDS: Click here MYPillow promo code: BARDS >> Go to https://www.mypillow.com/bards and use the promo code BARDS or... Call 1-800-975-2939.  White Oak Pastures Grassfed Meats, Get $20 off any order $150 or more. Promo Code BARDS: www.whiteoakpastures.com/BARDS BardsFM CAP, Celebrating 50 Million Downloads: https://ambitiousfaith.net Morning Intro Music Provided by Brian Kahanek: www.briankahanek.com Windblown Media 20% Discount with promo code BARDS: windblownmedia.com Founders Bible 20% discount code: BARDS >>> TheFoundersBible.com Mission Darkness Faraday Bags and RF Shielding. Promo code BARDS: Click here EMF Solutions to keep your home safe: https://www.emfsol.com/?aff=bards Treadlite Broadforks...best garden tool EVER. Promo code BARDS: TreadliteBroadforks.com No Knot Today Natural Skin Products: NoKnotToday.com Health, Nutrition and Detox Consulting: HealthIsLocal.com Destination Real Food Book on Amazon: click here Images In Bloom Soaps and Things: ImagesInBloom.com Angeline Design: AngelineDesign.com DONATE: Click here Mailing Address: Xpedition Cafe, LLC Attn. Scott Kesterson 591 E Central Ave, #740 Sutherlin, OR  97479

73 MinutesPG-13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.Thomas joins Pete to conclude a series examing the work of Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezin) and Joachim Hoffmann who sought to prove in their books, "Icebreaker," and "Stalin's War of Extermination," that Stalin orchestrated the beginning of World War 2.Thomas' SubstackRadio Free Chicago - T777 and J BurdenThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Buy Me a CoffeeThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

Send us a textToday, we wrap up the series on the women in Russia who helped bring about the revolutions that would bring down the Romanov dynasty.Support the show