Podcasts about Red Army

The Postponement of the Budapest Meeting and Negotiating with Putin. Cliff May discusses the postponement of the Trump-Putin Budapest meeting, attributing it to Marco Rubio insisting on a cessation of hostilities, which Foreign Minister Lavrov rejected, demanding "all Ukraine." May warns President Trump against being outnegotiated, referencing Stalin's success over Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta. Putin admires Stalin, who expanded the Russian Empire and engineered the Holodomor famine. May stresses that Russians negotiate only to win, not to compromise. 1921 RED ARMY

When the entire Red Army marched 10,000 kilometres and sparked the formation of modern China as we know it.

Today, Joe was joined by lifelong Munster Rugby fan Ivan O'Riordan to discuss his new book "The Brave and the Faithful: Celebrating Fifteen Years of Munster Rugby". The book captures the spirit of the game through stunning photography and unforgettable moments, taking readers pitch-side to relive the intensity, passion and pride of the Red Army. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Hey before I begin the podcast, I just want to thank all of you who joined the patreon, you guys are simply awesome. Please take the time to vote and comment on the patreon polls so I can best tackle the specific subjects you want to hear more about and hell it does not have to be about the Pacific War, I like ancient Rome, WW1, WW2, just toss some ideas and I will try to make it happen.   This Podcast is going to be a very remarkable story about a Korean man who fought for the IJA, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during the second world war.  He is also a man whom most than likely never existed.   Did that catch you off guard haha?   If you have a chance you can pull up wikipedia and search Yang Kyoungjong. The first thing you will notice is a disclaimer that states numerous historians who claim Yang Kyoungjong does not exist. Yet this man exists in some history books, there is a iconic photo of him, there is a documentary looking into him, countless Korean stories are writing loosely about him, there is a pretty decent war film and multiple youtubers have covered his so-called story. So how does this guy not exist if his story is so popular?   His story is claimed to be real by military historian Stephen Ambrose who wrote about him in his book in 1994 titled “D-day, june 6th, 1944: the Climactic battle of World War II. There is also references to him in Antony Beevor's book “the second world war” and that of defense consultant and author Steven Zaloga's book“the devil's garden: Rommel's desperate Defense of Omaha Beach on D-Day”. In 2005 a Korean SBS documentary investigated his existence and concluded there was no convincing evidence of his existence. For those of you who have ever heard of this man, I guarantee it's because of the 2011 south korean film “My Way”. That's where I found out about it by the way. Many of you probably saw the iconic photo of him, again if you pull up the wikipedia page on Yang Kyoungjong its front and center. The photo shows a asiatic man wearing a wehrmacht uniform and he has just been captured by american forces on the d-day landings.   Now I don't want to jump into the is he real or not busy just yet. So this is how the podcast will go down, very reminiscent of “Our fake History's Podcast” might I add, I am a huge fan of that guys work. I am going to tell you the story of Yang Kyoungjong, then afterwords disclose my little investigation into whether he is real or not.   So without further adieu this is the story of a man who fought for three nations during WW2.   The Story   It was June 1944, the allies had just unleashed Operation Overlord, the D-Day landings at Normandy. Lt Robert Brewer of the 506th parachute infantry regiment, 101st airborne division was overlooking the capture of Axis forces and reported to his regiment finding four Asians in Wehrmacht uniform around the Utah beach landings. Brewer nor any of his colleagues spoke the language the Asian men spoke, they assumed them to be Japanese.  The four asians were processed as POW's, listed as young Japanese and sent to a British POW camp, before he would be sent to another POW camp in the US. At some point between his capture and the POW camps, he gave his name as Yang Kyoungjong, stated he was Korean and gave an extremely incredible story. To who did he say these things, no one knows.   Yang Kyoungjong was born in 1920, in Shin Eu Joo, part of modern day North Korea. At the age of 18, Yang was forcibly conscripted into the Imperial Japanese army. Korea was one of the bread baskets of Asia and the Empire of Japan had annexed her in 1910. Japan held sovereignty over Korea, making Koreans subjects.    In 1939 the Empire of Japan faced major labor shortages and as a result began conscription of Japanese men for the military, while importing vast amounts of Korean laborers to work in mainland Japan. For the Imperial Japanese Army, Koreans were not drafted until 1944 when things were dire for Japan. Until 1944, the IJA allowed Koreans to volunteer in the army. In 1938 there was a 14% acceptance rate, by 1943 this dropped dramatically to 2%, but the number of applicants increased exponentially from 3000 per annum in 1939 to 300,000 by the end of the war. On paper it looked like Koreans were registering en masse on their on violation, but this is quite the contrary, the Japanese policy was to use force. Japanese officials began press gang efforts against Korean peasants, forcing them to sign applications, it is believed over half of the applications were done in such a manner. Other applicants registered for a variety of reasons, typically because of economic turmoil. Korea would produce 7 generals and many field grade officers. One of the most well known was Lt General Crown Prince Yi Un who would command Japanese forces in the China War.   Thus Yang Kyoungjong was forced into the IJA and would find himself stationed with the Kwantung Army. Quite unfortunately for him, he was enlisted into their service at a time where two major border skirmishes occurred with the Soviet Union. The USSR was seen as Japan's number one rival going all the way back to the Triple Intervention of 1895 when the Russians thwarted Japan's seizure of the Liaodong peninsula after they had won the first sino japanese war. This led to the Russo-Japanese war, where Japan shocked the world being victorious over the Russian Empire. When the Russian Empire fell and the Russian civil war kicked off, Japan sent the lionshare of men to fight the Red Army during the Siberian Intervention of 1918-1922.    Communism was seen as the greatest if not one of the greatest threats to the Kokutai and thus Japan as a whole. As such Japan placed the Kwantung Army along the Manchurian borderlands to thwart any possible soviet invasion. There had numerous border skirmishes, but in 1938 and 1939 two large battles occurred. In 1938 the Kwantung army intercepted a Soviet message indicating the Far East forces would be securing some unoccupied heights west of Lake Khasan that overlooked the Korean port city of Rajin. Soviet border troops did indeed move into the area and began fortifying it. The Kwantung army sent forces to dislodge them and this soon led to a full on battle. The battle was quite shocking for both sides, the Soviets lost nearly 800 men dead with 3279 wounded, the Japanese claimed they had 526 dead with 913 wounded. The Soviet lost significant armor and despite both sides agreeing to a ceasefire, the Kwantung army considered it a significant victory and proof the Soviets were not capable of thwarting them.   In theory Yang Kyoungjong would be in training and would eventually reach the Manchuria borders by 1939. Another man sent over would be Georgy Zhukov who was given the task of taking command of the 57th special corps and to eliminate Japanese provocations. What was expected of Zhukov was if the Japanese pressed again for battle, to deliver them a crushing and decisive blow. On May 11th, 1939 some Mongolian cavalry units were grazing their horses in a disputed area. On that very same day, Manchu cavalry attacked the Mongols to drive them past the river of Khalkhin Gol. Two days later the Mongols returned in greater numbers and this time the Manchu were unable to dislodge them.    What was rather funny to say, a conflict of some horses grazing on disputed land, led to a fully mechanized battle. On May 14th, Lt Colonel Yaozo Azuma led some regiments to dislodge the Mongols, but they were being supported by the Red Army. Azuma force suffered 63% casualties, devastating. June saw the battle expand enormously, Japan was tossing 30,000 men in the region, the Soviets tossed Zhukov at them alongside motorized and armored forces. The IJA lacking good armored units, tossed air forces to smash the nearby Soviet airbase at Tamsakbulak. In July the IJA engaged the Red Army with nearly 100 tanks and tankettes, too which Zhukov unleashed 450 tanks and armored cars. The Japanese had more infantry support, but the Soviet armor encircled and crushed them. The two armies spared with another for weeks, the Japanese assumed the Soviets would suffer logistical problems but Zhukoev assembled a fleet of 2600 trucks to supply his forces, simply incredible. Both sides were suffering tremendous casualties, then in August global politics shifted. It was apparent a war in Europe was going to break out, Zhukov was ordered to be decisive, the Soviets could not deal with a two front war. So Zhukov now using a fleet of 4000 trucks began transported supplies from Chita to the front next to a armada of tanks and mechanized brigades. The Soviets tossed 3 rifle divisions, two tank divisions and 2 tank brigades, nearly 500 tanks in all, with two motorized infantry divisions and 550 fighters and bombers.    The stalemate was shattered when Zhukov unleashed is armada, some 50,000 Soviets and Mongols hit the east bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese were immediately pinned down, while the Soviets were employing a double envelopment. The Japanese tried to counter attack and it failed horribly. The Japanese then scrambled to break out of the encirclement and failed. The surrounded Japanese forces refused to surrender as the Soviets smashed them with artillery and aerial bombardment. By the end of August the Japanese forces on the Mongolian side of the border were annihilated. On September 15th the USSR and Japan signed a ceasefire.    The battle of Khalkhin Gol was devastating for both sides. The Japanese claim they had 8440 deaths, 8766 wounded, lost 162 aircraft and 42 tanks. Its estimated 500-600 Japanese forces were taken prisoner. Because of IJA doctrine these men were considered killed in action. Some sources will claim the real numbers for Japanese casualties could have been as high as 30,000. The Soviets claim 9703 deaths, 15,251 wounded, the destruction of 253 tanks, 250 aircraft, 96 artillery pieces and 133 armored cars. Of those tank losses, its estimated 75-80% were destroyed by anti-tank guns, 15-20% field artillery, 5-10% infantry thrown incendiary bombs, 3% mines and another 3% for aircraft bombing.   Back to Yang Kyoungjong, he alongside the other Japanese, Manchu and Korean POW's were sent to Gulags in Siberia. As the war on the Eastern Front kicked off between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, facing annihilation the Soviets did anything possible to survive. One of these actions was to create the Shtrafbats, “Penal battalions”. Stalins order No 227 created the first penal battalions, who were supposed to be around 800 men strong. The first Shtrafbat battalion was deployed to the Stalingrad Front on August 22nd of 1942.   On order was issued on November 26, 1942 “status of Penal units of the army”, it was issued by Georgy Zhukov, now deputy commander in chief who was the man who formally standardized soviet penal units. The Shtrafbats were around 360 men per battalion commanded by mid range Red Army officers and politruks. The men forced into these were permanents or temporaries. Permanents were officers, commanders, the higher ranks guys. Temporary known as shtrafniki “punishees” were the grunts, typically prisoners and those convicted of crimes. From september 1942 to May of 1945 422,700 men would be forced into penal battalions.    Typically those forced into penal military units were one of two things: 1) those convicted of dissertation or cowardice, 2) Soviet Gulag labor camp inmates. It seems Yang Kyoungjong found himself in a very awkward situation as he would be forced into one of these penal battalions and sent to fight on the eastern front. As pertaining to Order No. 227, each Army was to have 3–5 barrier squads of up to 200 persons each, these units would be made up of penal units.    So back toYang Kyoungjong, he would find himself deployed at the third battle of Kharkov. This battle was part of a series of battles fought on the eastern front. As the German 6th army was encircling Stalingrad, the Soviets launched a series of wide counter attacks, as pertaining to “operation star”. Operation star saw massive offensives against Kharkov, Belgorod, Kursk, Voroshilovgrad and Izium. The Soviets earned great victories, but they also overextended themselves. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein seeing the opening, performed a counter-strike against Kharkov on February 19th of 1943, using fresh troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps alongside two other panzer armies. Manstein also had massive air support from field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofens Luftflotte 4, 1214 aircraft tossed 1000 sorties per day from February 20th to march 15th. The Red army had approximately 210,000 troops who fought in the Voronezh-Kharkov offensive, the Germans would have roughly 160,000 men, but their tanks outnumbered the Soviets 7-1, they had roughly 350 of them.   The Germans quickly outflanked the Soviets, managing to encircle and annihilate many units. Whenever soviets units made attempts to escape encirclements, the German air forces placed pressure upon them. The German air forces had the dual job of airlifting supplies to the front lines giving the Soviets no breathing space. Gradually the fight focused around the city of Kharkov seeing the Soviets dislodged. The Germans caused severe casualties, perhaps 45,000 dead or missing with another 41,000 wounded. The Germans suffered 4500 deaths, 7000 wounded. The Germans took a large number of prisoners, and Yang Kyoungjong was one of them.   Yet again a prisoner Yang Kyoungjong was coerced into serving another nation, this time for Die Ost-Bataillone. The Eastern Front had absolutely crippled Germany and as a result Germany began to enlist units from just about any nation possible and this included former Soviet citizens. There were countless different units, like the Russian liberation Army, die Hilfswillige, Ukrainian collaborationists, and there were also non-Russians from the USSR who formed the Ost-Bataillone. These eastern battalions would comprise a rough total of 175,000 men. Many of the Ost-Bataillone were conscripted or coerced into serving, though plenty also volunteered. Countless were recruited from POW camps, choosing to serve instead of labor in camps. The Osttruppen were to typically deployed for coastal defense, rear area activities, security stuff, all the less important roles to free up the German units to perform front line service.   There were two different groups, the Ost-Legionen “eastern legions” and Ost-Bataillone “eastern battalions”. The Ostlegionen were large foreign legion type units raised amongst members of specific ethnic or racial groups. The Ost-Bataillone were composed of numerous nationalities, usually plucked from POW camps in eastern europe. They were tossed together into battalion sized units and integrated individually into German combat formations. Obviously the Germans did not get their hands on large numbers of Koreans, so Yang Kyoungjong found himself in a Ost-Bataillone.    In 1944, due to massive losses in the Eastern Front, and in preparation for the allies about to open a second front, the Germans began deploying a lot of Ost-Bataillone along the coastal defense line at Cherbourg. Yang Kyoungjong was enlisted in the 709th static infantry division, a coastal defense unit assigned to defend the eastern and northern coasts of the Cotentin Peninsula. This would include the Utah beach landing site and numerous US airborne landing zones. The sector was roughly 250 km running northeast of Carentan, via Barfleur-Cherbourg-Cap de la Hague to the western point of Barneville. This also included the 65 km of land just in font of Cherbourg harbor. A significant portion of the 709th were Ost-bataillon, countless were from eastern europe, many were former Soviet POW'S. There were also two battalions of the 739th Grenadier regiment whom were Georgian battalions. A significant amount of the 709th had no combat experience, but had trained extensively in the area.   The 709th would be heavily engaged on D-day meeting US airborne units and the 4th infantry division who landed at Utah beach. In the early hours of June 6th, the US 82nd and 101st airborne divisions landed at the base of the Cotentin peninsula and managed to secure a general area for the US 4th infantry division to land at Utah beach, with very few casualties compared to other beach landings. After the landings the forces tried to link up with other forces further east. By June 9th they had crossed the Douve river valley and captured Carentan. House to house fighting was seen in the battle for Carentan, the Germans tossed a few counterattacks, but the Americans held on with the help of armor units of the 13th.    The Americans then advanced to cut off the Cotentin Peninsula, now supported by 3 other infantry divisions. The Germans had few armored or mobilized infantry in the area. By June 16th the German command was tossed into chaos as Erwin Rommel wanted them to pull out and man the Atlantic Wall at Cherbourg, but Hitler demanded they hold their present lines of defense. By the 17th Hitler agreed to the withdrawal, under some provisions the men still took up limited defenses spanning the entire peninsula. On the 18th the US 9th infantry division reached the west coast of the peninsula thus isolating the Cherbourg garrison. A battle was unleashed for 24 hours with the 4th, 9th and 79th US infantry divisions driving north on a broad front. They faced little opposition on the western side and the eastern, the center held much stronger resistance. The Americans would find several caches of V-1 flying bombs and V-2 rocket installations at Brix. After two days the Americans were in striking distance of Cherbourg. The garrison commander Lt General Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben had 21,000 men, but many were naval personnel and labor units. Schliebens 709th had performed a fighting withdrawal to Cherbourg and were completely exhausted. The trapped forces were low in provisions, fuel and ammunition. The luftwaffe tried dropping supplies on their positions but it was inadequate.    A general assault began on the 22nd and the German forces put up stiff resistance within their concrete pillboxes. Allied warships bombarded the city on the 25th of june and on the 26th a British elite force, No. 30 Commando launched an assault against Octeville, a suburb of southwestern Cherbourg. The commandos quickly captured 20 officers and 500 men of the Kriegmarine naval intelligence HQ at Villa Meurice. As the Germans were ground down, Schlieben was captured and with that a surrender was made on the 29th.   The Americans suffered nearly 3000 deaths with 13,500 wounded during the operation. The Germans suffered 8000 deaths with 30,000 captured. For the 709th who took a lionshare of the fighting they reported sustaining 4000 casualties.    Amongst the captured was Yang Kyoungjong. As I said in the beginning Lt Robert Brewer of the 506th parachute infantry regiment, 101st airborne division was overlooking the capture of Axis forces and reported to his regiment finding four Asians in Wehrmacht uniform around the Utah beach landings. Brewer nor any of his colleagues spoke the language the Asian men spoke, they assumed them to be Japanese.  The four asians were processed as POW's, listed as young Japanese and sent to a British POW camp, before he would be sent to another POW camp in the US. At some point between his capture and the POW camps, he gave his name as Yang Kyoungjong, stated he was Korean and gave the story. Apparently Yang Kyoungjob was granted US citizenship and would spend the rest of his life in Illinois until his death in 1992.   So that is the story of Yang Kyoungjong.    The truth Did Yang Kyoungjong exist? Where does his story originate? For those of you who have not guessed it yet, the story I told you was full of details, I simply added based on historical events, with zero evidence at all any man named Yang Kyoungjong was involved in them. I did this specifically to highlight, thats exactly what others have done over the course of many years, creating a sort of mythos. If you know the game broken telephone, thats what I would theorize makes up most of this mans story. But lets go through some actual evidence why don't we?   From the digging I have done, the story seemed to originate with historian Stephen Ambrose book in 1994 titled “D-day, june 6th, 1944: the Climactic battle of World War II”. While writing this book, Ambrose interviewed Robert Burnham Brewer, who served E Company, 2nd battalion, 506th parachute infantry regiment of the 101st airborne division. This same man was portrayed in Band of Brothers by the way. Brewer gave one rather ambiguous account where he spoke about capturing 4 asian men in Wehrmacht uniforms.    Here is patient zero as told to us by Ambrose's book (Page 34, no footnote on the page)   The so-called Ost battalions became increasingly unreliable after the German defeat at Kursk; they were, therefore, sent to france in exchange for German troops. At the beach called Utah on the day on the invasion, Lt Robert Brewer of the 506th Parachute infantry regiment, 101st airborne division, US Army, captured four asians in Wehrmacht uniforms. No one could speak their language; eventually it was learned that they were Koreans. How on earth did Koreans end up fighting for Hitler to defend france against Americans? It seems they had been conscripted into the Japanese army in 1938-Korea was then a Japanese colony-captured by the Red Army in the border battles with Japan in 1939, forced into the Red Army, captured by the Wehrmacht in December 1941 outside Moscow, forced into the German army, and sent to France”. What happened to them, Lt Brewer never found out, but presumably they were sent back to Korea. If so, they would almost certainly have been conscripted again, either into the south or north korean army. It is possible than in 1950 they ended up fighting once again, either against the US army or with it, depending on what part of Korea they came from. Such are the vagaries of politics in the 20th century. By June 1944, one in six German rifleman in France was from an Ost battalion.   Now digging further since there are no footnotes, it seems Ambrose took an oral account from Lt Brewer, but did not directly quote him and instead abstractly expanded upon his story. Ambrose was guilty of doing this often. As multiple historians have pointed out, Brewer was living in the 1940s and was by no means an ethnographer, he was not a person who could have accurately known the nationality of the four asian men he captured. It is plausible he or other US units around him, just came up with Korean for the four asians who could have been from nearly anywhere in central to east asia. For all we know the men found could have been from Turkestan. What was “asian” to westerners of the 1940's is extremely broad.    If you look up the Ost-Bataillone or Ostlegionen you will see they consisted of captured former soviet soldiers. During the d-day landings, 1/6th of the German forces defending the atlantic coast were made up of the Ost-battailones. They came from numerous places, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, India, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkestan, Mongolia and numerous parts of the USSR. Needless to say, there were a ton of people whom would be considered asian and could be mistaken to be from Korea, Japan, Burma, etc.    It seems Brewer's vague account was transformed by Amrose, but this only covers one part of all of this, the story, what about the photo?    The iconic photograph is another matter entirely. The photograph has nothing to do with Brewer's account, it is simply a random photograph taken at Utah beach of a captured asian soldier wearing a Wehrmacht uniform. The official description of the photo states “Capture Jap in Nazi uniform. France, fearful of his future, this young Jap wearing a nazi uniform, is checked off in a roundup of German prisoners on the beaches of france. An american army captain takes the Jap's name and serial number” Author Martin Morgan believes the man in the photograph is not Yang Kyoungjong, but instead an ethnic Georgian from the 795th Georgian Battalion, which was composed of Georgian Osttruppen troops or someone who was Turkistani. In 2002 word of the story became more popularized online and in 2004 the iconic photo also began to circulate heavily on the internet. The Korean media became aware of the story in 2002 and when they saw the picture the Korean news site DKBNews investigated the matter. Apparently a reader of the DKBNews submitted biographical details about the soldier in the photo, including his name, date of birth, the general story we now know, his release, life in Illinois and death. The DKBNews journalist requested sources and none were provided, typical.   So some random unknown reader of the DKBNews gave a name, place and time of birth and even where he ended up and died.  In 2005 the Seoul broadcasting system aired a documentary specifically investigating the existence of the asian soldiers who fought for Germany on d-day.   In the SBS special “The Korean in Normandy,” produced and broadcast in 2005 based on rumors of Yang kyoungjog,  they searched for records of Korean prisoners of war during the Battle of khalkhin gol and records of Korean people who participated in the German-Japanese War, and records related to the German Army's eastern unit, but could not find traces of such a person. In addition, the soldiers who served in the Soviet army, who were captured, and then transferred to the German army's eastern units were considered by the Soviet Union to be serious traitors. Accordingly, under a secret agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, they were forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union after the war and held in Gulags.. The SBS production team stated that the rumors that a 'Korean from Normandy' had gone to the United States and that he died in seclusion near Northwestern University under the name of 'Yang Kyoungjong', which they were unaware of, were false. The investigative team looked for any traces of a Yang Kyoungjong and found none, so they concluded although there were accounts of asian soldiers in the German army during WW2, there was zero evidence of the existence of Yang Kyoungjong or any Koreans fighting on D-day for that matter.    The 2005 SBS Special documentary sprang forth a bunch of stories by Korean authors, expanding the mythos of Yang Kyoungjong.   In 2007 author Jo Jeong-rae published a novel titled “human mask” which told the story of SHin Gilman, The story ends with Shin Gil-man, who was conscripted into the Japanese army at the age of 20, as a prisoner of war in Normandy, then transported back to the Soviet Union and eventually executed by firing squad. Another novel called “D-day” by author Kim Byeong-in was release in 2011, just prior to the film My War, the plot is extremely similar to the movie. The main characters are Han Dae-sik and Yoichi, who met as children as the sons of a Japanese landowner and the house's housekeeper, harboring animosity toward each other, and grew up to become marathon runners representing Joseon and Japan. As they experience the war together, they feel a strange sense of kinship and develop reconciliation and friendship.   And of course the most famous story would find its way to the big screen. In 2011 the film My Way came out, back then the most expensive south korean film ever made at around 23$ million.   Then in 2012 a unknown person created a wikipedia page piecing together the Ambrose story, the photo and the unknown DBK readers information. With all of this information becoming more viral suddenly in 2013, two history books hit the scene and would you know it, both have “Yang Kyoungjong” in them.    These are Antony Beevor's book “the second world war” and that of defense consultant and author Steven Zaloga in his book “the devil's garden: Rommel's desperate Defense of Omaha Beach on D-Day”. Both authors took the story, name and iconic photo and expanded on the mythos by adding further details as to how the Korean man would have gone from Korea to Cherbourg france.   So Ambrose's story spreads across the internet alongside this photo. Both spark interest in Korea and an investigation receives some random guys testimony, which quite honestly was groundless. Despite the korean documentary stating there was no evidence of a Yang Kyoungjong, it sparks further interest, more stories and a famous film in 2011. 2012 sees a wikipage, it becomes more viral and now seeps into other historians work.   And I would be remiss not to mention the bizarre controversy that broke out in my nation of Canada. A nation so full of controversies today, dear god. Debbie Hanlon a city councilor in St John Newfoundland was absolutely wrecked online in 2018 for an advertisement promoting her real estate business stating “Korean Yang kyoungjong fought with Japan against the USSR. He then fought with the USSR against Germany. Then with Germany against the US! Want an agent who fights for you, call me!” Really weird ad by the way. So it seems her ad was to point out how far she was willing to go for her real estate clients. It was considered extremely offensive, and not the first time she pulled this off, her husband Oral Mews had recently come under fire for another ad he made using a photo of the Puerto Rican cab driver Victor Perez Cardona, where the vehicle turned into a casket. That ad said “He can't give you a lift because he's dead. He's propped up in his cab at his wake! Need a lift to great service, call me!” Hanlon was surprised at the amount of backlash she received since the ads had been running for over 4 years online. She claimed to be the victim of cyberbullying and trolls. So yeah, that happened.    Did Yang Kyoungjong exist, more than likely not, was it possible some Koreans found themselves in a position his story pertains to, you know what it's quite possible. During War a lot of weird things happen. I hope you liked this episode, please let me know in the comments on the Patreon what you think, how I can improve things and of course what you want to hear about next!

Hey guys, what you are about to listen to is basically a “what if” Japan performed Hokushin-ron instead of Nanshin-ron, ie: What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2? Before I jump into it I just want to thank all of you that signed up for the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please leave a comment on this episode to let me know what more you want to hear about in the future. With all of that said and done lets jump right into it.   Part 1 The Geopolitical context   Ok so, one of the questions I get the most is, what if Japan invaded the USSR. I've actually already tackled this subject, albeit lightly with Cody from AlternatehistoryHub and once with my friend Eric. Its too complicated to give a real answer, a lot of this is guess work, though I really will try to provide hard numbers. I think off the bat something needs to be made clear since we are dealing with alternate history. I am not doing a “what if Japan developed completely different, or what if the IJA got their way in the early 1930's” no no, this is going to be as realistic as possible…even though this is batshit crazy.    Japan faced the decision of whether to go to war with the USSR in 1941 during Operation Barbarossa. They held meetings, made plans, and ultimately it was decided they would not engage the Soviets. Our scenario will follow exactly what they did to a T, but when the made the decision not to go to war, we will see them go to war.    Now before I jump into our this timeline, I think its very important to explain the actual situation Japan faced in 1941. There were two major strategies that emerged during the 1930's within the Japanese military. Many junior officers in the IJA favored the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” strategy against the USSR. Many officers in the IJN with some in the IJA favored the Nanshin-ron “southern strike” strategy, to seize the resource rich dutch east indies by invading Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The idea of Hokushin-ron was to perform an invasion into Southern Siberia and outer mongolia ending around Lake Baikal where they would set up defenses. They had already tried to establish this during the Russian civil war as part of the Siberian Intervention, but failed to create a buffer state. From 1935-1939 there were 108 border clashes between the USSR and Japan. In 1938 one of these border clashes turned into quite a catastrophe, it was called the battle of Lake Khasan.  The Soviets suffered nearly 800 deaths, more than 3000 wounded, perhaps nearly 50 tanks were destroyed with another 100 damaged. The Japanese suffered about 600 deaths with 2500 wounded. The result ultimately was a ceasefire, but for the Kwantung army it seemed to them like a victory. In May of 1939 they had a much larger and more famous battle known as the battle of Khalkhin Gol.  During the early part of the battle the IJA sent 80 tanks crossing over Khalkhin Gol, driving the Soviets back towards Baintsagan Hill. Zhukov was waiting for the attack and sent 450 tanks and armored cars unsupported by infantry to attack the IJA from three sides. The IJA were practically encircled and lost half their armored units as they struggled to fight back as it withdrew. The two armies spared for the next 2 weeks along the east bank of the Khalkhin Gol. Problem was the Japanese were having issues getting their supplies to the area as they lacked motor transport while Zhukov whose army was over 460 miles away from its base of supply had 2600 trucks supplying them. On july 23rd the Japanese launched attacks supported by artillery and within two days they had consumed half their ammunition stores. The situation was terrible, they suffered 5000 casualties and made little progress breaking the Soviet lines. Zhukov then unleashed an offensive on august 20th using over 4000 trucks to transport supplies from Chita base. He assembled around 500 tanks, 550 fighters and bombers and his 50,000 infantry supported by armored cars. This mechanized force attacked the Japanese first using artillery and the aircraft as his armor and infantry crossed the river. The IJA were quickly flanked by the fast moving Soviet armor and encircled by August 25th. The IJA made attempts to break out of the encirclement but failed. They refused to surrender despite overwhelming artillery and aerial bombardment; by the 31st the Japanese forces on the Mongolian side of the border were destroyed. The Japanese suffered nearly 20,000 casualties, the lost 162 aircraft, 29 tanks, 7 tankettes, 72 artillery pieces a large number of vehicles. The Soviets took a heavy hit also suffering almost 25,000 casualties, 250 aircraft, 250 tanks, 133 armored cars, almost 100 artillery pieces, hundreds of vehicles. While these numbers make it seem the Japanese did a great job, you need to consider what each party was bringing to this fight. The Japanese brought roughly 30,000 men, 80 tanks and tankettes, 400 aircraft, 300 artillery pieces, 1000 trucks. The Soviets brought nearly 75,000 men, 550 tanks, 900 aircraft, 634 artillery pieces, 4000 trucks. There are some sources that indicate the IJA brought as many artillery rounds as they could muster from Japan, Manchuria and Korea, roughly 100,000 rounds for the operation. The Soviets fired 100,000 rounds per day. A quick look at wikipedia numbers, yes I know its a no no, but sometimes its good for quick perspectives show: USSR: Bomber sorties 2,015, fighter sorties 18,509; 7.62 mm machine gun rounds fired 1,065,323; 20 mm (0.80 in) cannon rounds expended 57,979; bombs dropped 78,360 (1,200 tons). Japan: Fighter/bomber sorties 10,000 (estimated); 7.7 mm (0.30 in) machine gun rounds fired 1.6 million; bombs dropped 970 tons. What I am trying to say is there was an enormous disparity in military production. And this is not just limited to numbers but quality. After the battle the Japanese made significant reforms. They increased tank production from 500 annually to 1200. The Japanese funded research into new anti-tank guns, such as the Type 1 47 mm. They mounted this gun to their Type 97 Chi-Ha tanks, the new standard medium tank of the IJA. Because of the tremendous defeat to Soviet armor they send General Yamashita to Germany to learn everything he could about tank tactics. But they simply could not produce enough tanks to ever hope to match 10% of the USSR. The Soviets had mostly been using T-26's, BT-5's and BT-7's who were crudely made, but made en masse. The Japanese would find most of their tank models with less effective range, less armor and some with less penetration power. It took the Japanese a hell of a lot more time to produce tanks, they were simply not on par with the Soviets in quantity or quality. Their tank tactics, albeit improved via Yamashita after 1939, were still nothing compared to the Soviets.  The major outcome of the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol was the abandonment of the hokushin-ron strategy and adoption of the nanshin-ron strategy. But, that didnt mean Japan did not have a plan in case they had to go to war with the USSR. Part 2 Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū or the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers was an operational plan created by the General Staff of the IJA for an invasion of the Russian Far East to capitalize on Operation Barbarossa. Here our story truly begin. Between 1938-1939 the IJA General Staff and Kwantung Army formed two “Hachi-Go” plans. Variants A and B examined the possibility of an all out war with the USSR beginning in 1943. In both plans they expected to be facing 60 Soviet divisions, while they could deliver 50 divisions, delivered incrementally from China and Japan. Plan A called for attacks across the eastern and northern borders of Manchuria while maintaining a defensive stance in the west. Plan B, much more ambitious, called for striking into the vast steppe between the Great Khingan Mountains and Lake Baikal, hoping to cut off the trans-siberian railway. If this was done successfully it was believed the whole of European Russia would be doomed to be defeated in detail. Defeated in detail means to divide and conquer. This battle would take place over 5000 kilometers with Japan's final objective being to advance 1200 km into the USSR. That dwarves Operation Barbarossa in distance, let that sink in. Both plans faced impossible odds. First of all the railway networks in Manchuria were not sufficiently expanded for such far reaching offensives, especially for plan B. Furthermore the 50 divisions required for them would be impossible to come by, since 1937 Japan was bogged down in a war with China. When Japan went to war with the west in 1941 she had 51 divisions. She left the base minimum in China, 35 divisions and tossed nearly 20 into southeast asia and the pacific. On top of not having the men, the IJA estimated a fleet of 200,000 vehicles would be necessary to sustain an offensive to Lake Baikal. That was twice the number of military vehicles Japan had at any given time. After the battle of Khalkhin Gol, plan B was completely abandoned. Planning henceforth focused solely on the northern and eastern fronts with any western advance being limited in scope. Now Japan formed a neutrality pact with the USSR because of her defeat at Khalkhin Gol and Molotov Ribbentrop pact between Germany and the USSR. The Molotov Ribbentrop Pact came as a bitter and complete surprise to Japan. It pushed Japan to fully adopt the Nanshin-ron strategy and this began with her invasion of French IndoChina, which led the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and United States to embargo her. The Netherlands Dutch East Indies refused to sell oil to Japan, the UK refused to sell oil from Burma and the US gradually cut off selling oil to Japan, with her oil exports alone being 80% of Japans supply, the rest from the Dutch east indies. The United States also placed an embargo on scrap-metal shipments to Japan and closed the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. 74.1% of Japan's scrap iron came from the United States in 1938, and 93% of Japan's copper in 1939. Other things like Rubber and tin were also off the table, as this was mostly acquired from British held Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.    Now the crux of everything is the China War. Japan was stuck, she needed to win, in order to win she needed the resources she was being denied. The only logical decision was to attack the places with these resources. Thus until 1941, Japan prepared to do just that, investing in the Navy primarily. Then in June of 1941, Hitler suddenly informs the Japanese that he is going to invade the USSR. The Japanese were shocked and extremely angry, they nearly left the Tripartite Pact over the issue. This unprecedented situation that ushered in the question, what should Japan do? There were those like Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka who argued they must abandon the neutrality pact and launch a simultaneous offensive with the Germans against the USSR. The IJA favored this idea….because obviously it would see them receiving more funding as the IJN was currently taking more and more of it for the Nanshin-ron plans. But this is not a game of hearts of Iron IV, the Japanese government had to discuss and plan if they would invade the USSR….and boy it took awhile. I think a lot of you will be very disappointed going forward, but there is no grand unleashing of a million Japanese across the borders into the Soviet Far East, in the real world there is something called logistics and politics.    The Japanese military abided by a flexible response policy, like many nations do today. Theres was specifically called the Junbi Jin Taisei or “preparatory formation setup”. Japan would only go to war with the USSR if favorable conditions were met. So in our timeline the Junbi Jin encountered its first test on June 24th when the IJA/IJN helped a conference in the wake of operation barbarossa. A compromise was made allowing the IJA to prepare an invasion plan if it did not impede on the nanshin-ron plans. There was those in the IJA who argued they should invade the USSR whether conditions were favorable or not, there were those who only wanted to invade if it looked like the USSR was on the verge of collapse. One thing agreed upon was if Japan unleashed a war with the USSR, the hostilities needed to be over by mid-October because the Siberian climate would hit winter and it would simply be impossible to continue. The IJA needed 60-7 days to complete operational preparations and 6-8 weeks to defeat the Soviets within the first phase of the offensive. Here is a breakdown of what they were thinking: 28 June: Decide on mobilization 5 July: Issue mobilization orders 20 July: Begin troop concentration 10 August: Decide on hostilities 24 August: Complete readiness stance 29 August: Concentrate two divisions from North China in Manchuria, bringing the total to 16 5 September: Concentrate four further divisions from the homeland, bringing the total to 22; complete combat stance 10 September (at latest): Commence combat operations 15 October: Complete first phase of war   The plan called for 22 divisions (might I add my own calculations of 20 divisions were pretty spot on), with roughly 850,000 men, including Manchukuo allies, supported by 800,000 tons of shipping. The Japanese hoped the Soviets would toss at least half their forces in the Far East, perhaps 2/3rd of their armor and aircraft against the Germans giving them a 2-1 superiority. Even the 22 divisions was questionable, many in the war ministry thought only 16 divisions could be spared for such a venture, something only suitable for mop up operations in the aftermath of a German victory along the eastern front. It was clear to all, Japan needed perfect conditions to even think about performing such a thing.    The War hawks who still sought to perform Hokushin-ron tried to persaude Hideki Tojo on july 5th to go through with a new plan using a total of 25 divisions. This plan designated “Kantogun Tokushu Enshu or Kantokuen” would involve 2 phases, a buildup and readiness phase and an offensive phase. On July 7th they went to Hirohito for his official sanction for the build up. Hirohito questioned everything, but gradually relented to it. The plan was nearly identical to the former plans, banking on the Soviets being unable to reinforce the Far East because of Germany's progress. The level of commitment was scaled down somewhat, but still enormous. Again a major looming issue was the Manchurian railways that would need to be expanded to accomodate the movement of men and supplies. This meant the construction of port facilities, military barracks, hospitals and such. Kantokuen would begin with a initial blow against the Ussuri front, targeting Primorye and would be followed up by a northern attack against Blagoveshchensk and Kuibyshevka. The 1st area army, 3rd and 20 armies with the 19th division of the Korean army would penetrade the border south of Lake Khanka to breach the main soviet defensive lines, thus threatening Vladivostok. The 5th army would strike south of Dalnerechensk to complete the isolation of the maritime province, sever the trans-sierian railway and block Soviet reinforcements. The 4th army would attack along the Amur river before helping out against Blagoveshchensk. Two reinofrced divisions would invade Sakhalin from land and sea. The second phase would see the capture of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Nikolayevsk. Additionally, amphibious operations against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula were contemplated.   It was agreed the operation could only afford 24 divisions, with 1,200,000 men, 35,000 vehicles, 500 tanks, 400,000 horses and 300,000 coolies. The deployment of thse forces would mean the western front facing Mongolia and the Trans-baikal region would be pretty much open, so delaying actions would have to be fought if the soviets performed a counter offensive there. Air forces were critical to the plan. They sought to dispatch up to roughly 2000 aircraft cooperating with 350 naval aircraft to launch a sudden strike against the Soviet Far East Air Force to knock them out early.    The Soviet Far East had two prominent weaknesses to be exploited. Number 1 was Mongolia's 4500 km long horeshoe shaped border. Number 2 was its 100% dependency on European Russia to deliver men, food and war materials via the trans-siberian railway. Any disruption of the trans-siberian railway would prove fatal to the Soviet Far East.    Now as for the Soviets. The 1930's and early 1940's saw the USSR take up a defensive policy, but retained offensive elecments as well. Even with the German invasion and well into 1942, the Soviets held a strategy of tossing back the IJA into Manchuria if attacked. The primary forces defending the Far east in 1941 were the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts, under the command of Generals Iosif Apanasenko and Mikhail Kovalyov. The Trans-Baikal front held 9 divisions, including 2 armored, a mechanized brigade and a heavily fortified region west of the Oldoy River near Skovorodino had a garrison. The Far Eastern Front had 23 divisions including 3 armored, 4 brigades and 11 heavily fortified regions with garrisons including Vladivostok. Altogether they had 650,000 men, 5400 tanks, 3000 aircraft, 57,000 vehicles, 15,000 artillery pieces and nearly 100,000 horses. By 1942 the Vladivostok sector had 150 artillery pieces with 75 -356 mm calibers organized into 50 batteries. As you can imagine after Operation Barbarrosa was unleashed, things changed. From June to December, roughly 160,000 men, 3000 tanks, 2670 artillery pieces, 12,000 vehicles and perhaps 1800 aircraft were sent to deal with the Germans. Despite this, the Soviets also greatly expanded a buildup to match the apparent Japanese buildup in Manchuria. By July 22nd 1941 the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts were to be raised by 1 million men for august. By December it was nearly 1.2 million. Even the Soviet Far East Navy saw an increase from 100,000 men to 170,000 led by Admiral Yumashev. The Soviet Mongolian allies were capable of manning about 80,000, though they lacked heavy equipment.    Thus if this war broke out in September the Soviets and Mongolians would have just over a million men, with 2/3rds of them manning the Amur-Ussuri-Sakhalin front, the rest would defend Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region. Even though the war against the Germans was dire, the Soviets never really gave up their prewar planning for how to deal with the Japanese. There would be an all-out defense over the border to prevent any breach of Soviet territory. The main effort would see the 1st and 25th armies holding a north-south axis between the Pacific ocean and Lake Khanka; the 35th army would defend Iman; the 15th and 2nd Red Banner armies would repel the Japanese over the Amur River; and other forces would try to hold out on Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Pacific coast. The Soviets had constructed hundreds of fortified positions known as Tochkas along the border. Most of these were hexagonal concrete bunkers contained machine gun nests and 76 mm guns. The fortified regions I mentioned were strategically placed forcing the Japanese to overcome them via frontal attacks. This would require heavy artillery to overcome. Despite the great defensive lines, the Soviets did not intend to be passive and would launch counteroffensives. The Soviet air force and Navy would play an active role in defeating a Japanese invasion as well. The air force's objetice would be to destroy the Japanese air force in the air and on the ground, requiring tactical ground attack mission. They would also destroy key railways, bridges and airfields within Manchuria and Korea alongside intercepting IJN shipping. Strategic bombing against the home islands would be limited to under 30 DB-3's who could attack Tokyo, Yokosuka, Maizuru and Ominato. The Soviet Navy would help around the mouth of the Amur River, mine the Tatar Strait and try to hit any IJN ships landing men or materials across the Pacific Coasts.    Japan would not be able to continue a land war with the USSR for very long. According to Japanese military records, in 1942 while at war they were required to produce 50 Kaisenbun. A Kaisenbun is a unit of measurement for ammunition needed for a single division to operate for 4 months. Annual production never surpassed 25 kaisenbun with 100 in reserve. General Shinichi Tanaka estimated for an operation against the USSR 3 Kaisenbun would be needed per divisions, thus a total of 72 would be assigned to 24 divisions. This effectively meant 2/3rds of Japans ammunition stockpile would be used on the initial strike against the USSR. Japan would have been extremely hard pressed to survive such a war cost for 2 years.    Now in terms of equipment Japan had a lot of problems. During the border battles, Japanese artillery often found itself outranged and grossly under supplied compared to the Soviet heavier guns. Despite moving a lot of men and equipment to face the Germans, the Red Army maintained a gross superiority in armor. The best tank the Kwantung Army had in late 1941 was the Type 97 Chi-Ha, holding 33mm armor with a low velocity 57 mm gun. There was also Ha-Go and Te-Ke's with 37 mm guns but they had an effective range less than 1 km.   The Soviet T-26, BT-5 and BT-7's had 45 mm guns more than capable of taking out the Japanese armor and the insult to injury was they were crudely made and very expendable. Every Japanese tank knocked out was far greater a loss, as Japan's production simply could not remotely match the USSR. For aircraft the Japanese were a lot better off. The Polikarpov I-16 was the best Soviet fighter in the Far East and performed alright against the Nakajima Ki-27 at Khalkhin Gol. The rest of the Soviet air arsenal were much older and would struggle. The Soviets would have no answer to the IJN's Zero fighter or the IJA's high speed KI-21 bomber that outraced the Soviet SB-2. Japanese pilots were battle hardened by China and vastly experienced.   Another thing the Japanese would have going for them was quality of troops. The Soviets drained their best men to fight the Germans, so the combat effectiveness in the far east would be less. Without the Pacific War breaking out, some of Japan's best Generals would be brought into this war, of course the first one that comes to mind for me is General Yamashita, probably the most armor competent Japanese general of ww2.    Come August of 1941 those who still sought the invasion of the USSR were facing major crunch time. The IJA planners had assumed the Soviets would transfer 50% or more of their power west to face the Germans, but this was not the case. By August 9th of 1941, facing impossible odds and with the western embargos in full motion, in our timeline the Japanese Hokushin-Ron backers gave up. But for the sake of our story, for some batshit insane reason, the Japanese military leadership and Hirohito give the greenlight for an invasion on August 10th.   Part 3 the catastrophe   So to reiterate the actual world plan had    10 August: Decide on hostilities 24 August: Complete readiness stance 29 August: Concentrate two divisions from North China in Manchuria, bringing the total to 16 5 September: Concentrate four further divisions from the homeland, bringing the total to 22; complete combat stance 10 September (at latest): Commence combat operations 15 October: Complete first phase of war   So what is key to think about here is the events of September. The Battle for Moscow is at the forefront, how does a Japanese invasion in the first week or two of September change things? This is going to probably piss off some of you, but Operation Typhoon would still fail for Germany.  In our time line the legendary spy Richard Sorge sent back information on Japan's decision to invade the USSR between August 25th to September 14th. On the 25th he informed Stalin the Japanese high command were still discussing whether to go to war or not with the USSR. On September 6th Stalin was informed the Japanese were beginning preparations for a war against the west. Then on September 14th, the most important message was relayed to Stalin "In the careful judgment of all of us here... the possibility of [Japan] launching an attack, which existed until recently, has disappeared...."[15]    With this information on hand from 23 June to 31 December 1941, Stalin transferred a total of 28 divisions west. This included 18 rifle divisions, 1 mountain rifle division, 3 tank divisions, 3 mechanized divisions and 3 mountain cavalry divisions. The transfers occurred mainly in June (11 divisions) and October (9 divisions).    Here we come to a crossroads and I am going to have to do some blunt predictions. Let's go from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic. Scenario 1) for some insane reason, Stalin abandons Moscow and moves his industry further east, something the Soviets were actively preparing during Operation Typhoon. This is not a defeat of the USSR, it certainly would prolong the war, but not a defeat. Now that seems rather silly. Scenario 2) Stalin attempts transferring half of what he did in our time line back to Moscow and the Germans fail to take it. The repercussions of course is a limited counteroffensive, it wont be as grand as in our timeline, but Moscow is saved. Scenario 3) and the most likely in my opinion, why would Stalin risk moscow for the Far East? Stalin might not transfer as many troops, but certainly he would have rather placed his chips in Moscow rather than an enemy literally 6000 km's away who have to cross a frozen desert to get to anything he cares about.  Even stating these scenarios, the idea the German army would have taken Moscow if some of the very first units from the far east arrived, because remember a lot of these units did not make it in time to defend moscow, rather they contributed to the grand counteroffensive after the Germans stalled. The German armies in front of Moscow were depleted, exhausted, unsupplied and freezing. Yes many of the Soviet armies at Moscow were hastily thrown together, inexperienced, poorly led and still struggling to regain their balance from the German onslaught. Yet from most sources, and by sources I mean armchair historian types argue, the Germans taking Moscow is pretty unlikely. And moscow was not even that important. What a real impact might have been was the loss of the Caucasus oil fields in early 1942, now that could have brought the USSR down, Moscow, not so much, again the Soviets had already pulled their industry further east, they could do it again.   So within the context of this Second Russo-Japanese War, figure the German's still grind to a halt, they don't take Moscow, perhaps Soviets dont push them back as hard, but the USSR is not collapsing by any means. Ok now before we talk about Japans invasion we actually need to look at some external players. The UK/US/Netherlands already began massive embargoes against Japan for oil, iron, rubber, tin, everything she needed to continue her war, not just against the USSR, but with over 35 divisions fighting in China. President Roosevelt was looking for any excuse to enter WW2 and was gradually increasing ways to aid Britain and the Soviets.  Now American's lend-lease program seriously aided the USSR during WW2, particularly the initial stages of the war. The delivery of lend-lease to the USSR came through three major routes: the Arctic Convoys, the Persian Corridor, and the Pacific Route. The Arctic route was the shortest and most direct route for lend-lease aid to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous as it involved sailing past German-occupied Norway. Some 3,964,000 tons of goods were shipped by the Arctic route; 7% was lost, while 93% arrived safely. The Persian Corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid-1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27% of the total. The most important was the Pacific Route which opened up in August of 1941, but became affected when Japan went to war with America. The major port was Vladivostok, where only Soviet ships could transport non-military goods some 8,244,000 tons of goods went by this route, 50% of the total. Vladivostok would almost certainly be captured by the Japanese in our scenario so it won't be viable after its capture. Here is the sticky part, Japan is not at war with the US, so the US is pretty much free to find different Pacific paths to get lend-lease to the Soviets, and to be honest there's always the Arctic or Persian corridors. Hell in this scenario America will be able to get supplies easily into China as there will be no war in Burma, hong kong, Malaya and such. America alone is going to really ruin Japans day by increasing lend-lease to the UK, China and the USSR. America wont be joining the war in 1941, but I would strongly wager by hook or by crook, FDR would pull them into a war against Germany, probably using the same tactic Woodrow Wilson did with WW1. This would only worsen things for Japan. Another player of course is China. Late 1941, China was absolutely battered by Japan. With Japan pulling perhaps even more troops than she did for the Pacific war to fight the USSR, Chiang Kai-Shek would do everything possible to aid his new found close ally Stalin. How this would work out is anyone's guess, but it would be significant as I believe America would be providing a lot more goodies.    Ok you've all been patient, what happens with the war? Japan has to deliver a decisive knock out blow in under 4-6 months, anything after this is simply comical as Japan's production has no resources. The oil in siberia is not even remotely on the table. The Japanese can't find it, would not be able to exploit it, let alone quick enough to use it for the war. Hell the Italians were sitting on oil in Libya and they never figured that out during WW2.   So Kantokuen is unleashed with an initial blow against the Primorye in the Ussuri Front followed by an assault against Blagoveshchensk and Kiubyshevka. The main soviet lines south of Lake Khanka are attacked by the Japanese 1st area army, 3rd and 20th armies and the 19th Korean division. This inturn threatens Vladivostok who is also being bombarded by IJA/IJN aircraft. The 5th Ija army attacks south of Dalnerechensk in an attempt to sever the trans-siberian railway, to block Soviet reinforcements and supplies. The 4th IJA army fords the Amur river to help with the assault of Blagoveshchensk. Meanwhile Sakhalin is being attacked from land and sea by two IJA divisions.  Despite the Soviets being undermanned the western front facing Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region is wide up to an attack as its only defended by the 23rd IJA division, so a limited counteroffensive begins there. The Japanese quickly win air superiority, however the heavily fortified Tochkas are not being swept aside as the Japanese might have hoped. A major problem the Japanese are facing is Soviet artillery. The Japanese artillery already placed along the borders, initially performed well, crushing Tochkas in range, but when the Japanese begin advancing and deploying their artillery units they are outgunned perhaps 3-1, much of the Soviet artillery outranges them and the Soviets have a much larger stockpile of shells. Airpower is failing to knock out soviet artillery which is placed within Tochkas and other fortified positions with anti-aircraft guns. Without achieving proper neutralization or counter battery fire, the Japanese advance against the fortified Soviet positions. The Soviets respond shockingly with counterattacks. The 15th and 35th Soviet armies with the Amur Red Banner Military Flotilla toss limited counterattacks against both sides of the Sungari River, harassing the Japanese. While much of the soviet armor had been sent west, their light tanks which would be useless against the Germans have been retained in the far east and prove capable of countering the IJA tanks. The Soviets inflict tremendous casualties, however General Yamashita, obsessed with blitzkrieg style warfare he saw first hand in the west, eventually exploits a weak area in the line.Gradually a blitzkrieg punches through and begins to circle around hitting Soviet fortified positions from the rear. The Soviets knew this would be the outcome and had prepared to fight a defense in depth, somewhat managing the onslaught.  The trans-siberian railway has been severed in multiple locations close to the border area, however this is not as effective as it could be, the Japanese need to hook deeper to cut the line further away. In the course of weeks the Soviets are gradually dislodged from their fortified positions, fighting a defense in depth over great stretches of land. Vladivostok holds out surprisingly long until the IJN/IJA seize the city. Alongside this Sakhalin is taken with relative ease. The Soviet surface fleet is annihilated, but their large submarine force takes a heavy toll of the IJN who are attempting Pacific landings. Kantokuen phase 1 is meeting its objectives, but far later than expected with much more casualties than expected. The Japanese are shocked by the fuel consumption as they advance further inland. Each truck bearing fuel is using 50% of said fuel to get to the troops, something reminiscent of the north african campaign situation for Rommel. The terrain is terrible for their vehicles full of valleys, hills, forests and mountains. Infrastructure in the region is extremely underdeveloped and the Soviets are burning and destroying everything before the Japanese arrive. All key roads and cities are defended until the Japanese can encircle the Soviets, upon which they depart, similar to situations the Japanese face in China. It is tremendously slow progress. The IJA are finding it difficult to encircle and capture Soviet forces who have prepared a series of rear lines to keep falling back to while performing counterattacks against Japanese columns. As the Japanese advance further into the interior, the IJN are unable to continue supporting them with aircraft and much of the IJA aircraft are limited in operations because of the range. The second phase of Kantokuen calls for the capture of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Nikolayevsk. Additionally, amphibious operations against Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula are on standby as the IJN fears risking shipping as a result of Soviet submarine operations. The sheer scope of the operation was seeing the tide sides stretching their forces over a front nearly 5000 km in length. At some points the Japanese were attempting to advance more than 1000 km's inland, wasting ungodly amounts of fuel and losing vehicles from wear and tear.  So what does Japan gain? Within the span of 4 months, max 6 months Japan could perhaps seized: Sakhalin, the Primorsye krai including Vladivostok, segments of the trans siberian railway, Blagoveshchensk, Kuibyshevka. If they are really lucky Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan, Nikolayevsk. Additionally, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula. What does this mean? Really nothing. Pull out a map of manchuria during WW2, take a pencil and expand the manchurian border perhaps 1000 km if you really want to be generous, that's the new extent of the empire of the rising sun. The real purpose of attacking the USSR is not to perform some ludicrous dash across 6000 km's of frozen wasteland to whittle down and defeat the Soviets alongside the rest of the Axis. It was only to break them, in late 1941 at Moscow there was perhaps a fools chance, but it was a fool's chance for Japan.  Japan has run out of its stockpiles of Kaisenbun, oil, iron, rubber, tin, all types of resources necessary for making war. Unlike in our timeline where Japan began exporting resources from its conquests in southeast asia and the pacific, here Japan spent everything and now is relying on the trickles it has within its empire. The China war will be much more difficult to manage. The lend-lease will increase every day to China. The US/UK/Netherlands will only increase pressure upon Japan to stop being a nuisance, Japan can't do anything about this as the US Pacific Fleet is operating around the Philippines always a looming threat. The Japanese are holding for a lack of better words, useless ground in the far east. They will build a buffer area to defend against what can only be described as a Soviet Invasion of Manchuria x1000. The Allies will be directing all of their effort against Germany and Italy, providing a interesting alternate history concept in its own right. After Germany has been dealt with, Japan would face a existential threat against a very angry Stalin. Cody from Alternate History Hub actually made an episode on this scenario, he believed the Soviets would conquer most of Japan occupied Asia and even invade the home islands. It would certainly be something on the table, taking many years, but the US/UK would most likely interfere in some way. The outcome would be so much worse for Japan. Perhaps she is occupied and a communist government is installed. Perhaps like in our timeline the Americans come in to bolster Japan up for the looming coldwar.  But the question I sought to answer here was, Japan invading the USSR was a dumb idea. The few Japanese commanders who pushed it all the way until August 9th of 1941 simply had to give up because of how illogical it was. I honestly should not have even talked about military matters, this all came down to logistics and resources. You want to know how Japan could have secured itself a better deal in WW2? 1941, the China War is the number one problem Japan can't solve so they look north or south to acquire the means to solve the China problem? Negotiate a peace with China. That is the lackluster best deal right there.    Sorry if this episode did not match your wildest dreams. But if you want me to do some batshit crazy alternate history stuff, I am more than happy to jump into it and have fun. Again thank all of you guys who joined the patreon, you guys are awesome. Until next time this is the Pacific War channel over and out. 

In 1945, weeks before the Western Allies arrived in Hitler's capital the Red Army controlled the city and began to quietly impose a new generation of German communists. Amid the ruins and devastation, ordinary Berliners, aware of their country's crimes, began to rebuild. This episode draws on Berlin by Sinclair McKay.Go Deeper: Visit our website at www.explaininghistory.org for articles and detailed explorations of the topics discussed.▸ Join the Conversation: Our community of history enthusiasts discusses episodes, shares ideas, and continues the conversation. Find us on:Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcast/Substack: https://theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com/▸ Support the Podcast: Explaining History is a listener-supported production. Your contribution helps us cover the costs of research and keep these conversations going. You can support the show and get access to exclusive content by becoming a patron.Support on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/explaininghistoryExplaining History helps you understand the 20th Century through critical conversations and expert interviews. We connect the past to the present. If you enjoy the show, please subscribe and share.▸ Support the Show & Get Exclusive ContentBecome a Patron: patreon.com/explaininghistory▸ Join the Community & Continue the ConversationFacebook Group: facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcastSubstack: theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com▸ Read Articles & Go DeeperWebsite: explaininghistory.org Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

David Silver and Raghu Markus explore the life and teachings of George Gurdjieff, the Russian-born mystic and philosopher of consciousness.This time on Mindrolling, Raghu and David have a discussion about:How a teenage David Silver was first introduced to Gurdjieff's teachingsGurdjieff's influence on the 1960s counterculture and the evolution of consciousness movementsThe call to “do only what is new and fresh” and live in search of the miraculousDoing the work literally and figuratively; supporting oneself and moving towards clear mentation Gurdjieff's view of humans as incomplete sleepwalkers, mechanically reacting to lifeGradual awakening through self-observation, inner struggle, and conscious effort Shedding false pretenses to discover a unified, authentic selfHow Gurdjieff's philosophy inspired Ram Dass's spiritual visionThe Seekers of Truth and The Sarmoung Brotherhood The transformative and ongoing practice of self-remembering Pre-order your copy of There Is No Other: The Way to Harmony and Wholeness a profound collection of newly gathered writings from Ram Dass and edited by Parvati Markus. Ram Dass shows us how a house divided against itself—whether that “house” is our individual self or the society in which we live—can come together in wholeness. Learn more: There Is No Other Way Pre-OrderAbout George Ivanovich GurdjieffGurdjieff, who was born in the late 1800's, was a philosopher, mystic, spiritual teacher, composer, and movements teacher. Born in the Russian Empire, he briefly became a citizen of the First Republic of Armenia after its formation in 1918, but fled the impending Red Army invasion of Armenia in 1920, which rendered him stateless. Gurdjieff taught that people are not conscious of themselves and thus live their lives in a state of hypnotic "waking sleep", but that it is possible to awaken to a higher state of consciousness and serve our purpose as human beings. Learn more about Gurdjieff HERE and pick up some of Gurdjieff's most famous work, Meetings with Remarkable Men.About David Silver:David Silver is the former co-host of the Mindrolling podcast. He is a filmmaker and director, most recently coming out with Brilliant Disguise. Brilliant Disguise tells the unique story of a group of inspired Western spiritual seekers from the 60s, who in meeting the great American teacher, Ram Dass, followed him to India to meet his Guru, Neem Karoli Baba, familiarly known as Maharaj-ji. Two days before he left his body, Maharaj-ji instructed K.C. Tewari to take care of the Westerners, which he did resolutely until the day he died in 1997. Silver's #1 charting MGM/UA/Warners film, “The Compleat Beatles” is the critically acclaimed biopic movie about history's most famous band. The term ‘rockumentary' was first applied to this two-hour movie. Rolling Stone recently described the film as a “masterwork.” Silver's Warner Brothers' feature film, “No Nukes” also started the whole trend of music/activism feature documentaries.“His father basically said to him, you must not do anything old, you must always try and do something new and fresh, you must already be honest, you must always support yourself, These were all important in Gurdjieff's life. You must be in search of the miraculous, because what else is there?” —David SilverSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

By January 1945, the war in Europe neared its final phase. In the west, the Allies had repelled the Ardennes offensive. In the east, the Red Army prepared the Vistula–Oder offensive, a huge strike that pushed German forces out of Poland. The Soviet advance carried them to the very gates of Berlin. The Vistula–Oder offensive in 1945 liberated vast areas, including Auschwitz. It also created the springboard for the final assault on Germany. Stalin wanted more than battlefield victory. He pushed Soviet borders west, reclaimed imperial lands, and shaped Poland's fate before the war ended. The Wehrmacht resisted fiercely. German forces launched a desperate counterattack, their last major armoured offensive on the Eastern Front. In this episode of the WW2 Podcast, I talk with Prit Buttar, author of Into the Reich: The Red Army's Advance to the Oder in 1945.   patreon.com/ww2podcast    

It's not exactly news that the Nazis didn't like the Jews. But according to the Rutgers historian Jochen Hellbeck, author of World Enemy Number One, the Nazi obsession went so far as to believe that the Soviet Union was owned and operated by a global cabal of Jews. And so, Hellbeck argues, it was not the Western powers but Communist Russia that Nazi Germany viewed as an existential threat—in fact, “World Enemy No. 1.” Jewish revolutionaries, the Nazis believed, had seized power in 1917 and were preparing the Soviet state to destroy Germany and the world. This paranoid delusion drove Nazi Germany's most catastrophic decision: launching Operation Barbarossa in 1941. While Hitler made tactical alliances and fought on multiple fronts, Hellbeck demonstrates through his meticulous archival research that the destruction of “Judeo-Bolshevism” remained the Nazis' primary ideological mission. Drawing on overlooked Soviet sources, including war correspondent Ilya Ehrenburg's writings, Hellbeck shows how this twisted worldview shaped not just propaganda but military strategy, ultimately leading to both the Holocaust and Germany's catastrophic defeat on the Eastern Front.1. The Nazis saw “Judeo-Bolshevism” as one unified threat The Nazis genuinely believed Soviet communism was a Jewish conspiracy for world domination. They conflated Russians, Bolsheviks, and Jews into a single enemy - viewing Karl Marx's Jewish heritage as proof that communism itself was a Jewish plot to destroy Germany.2. This obsession drove Nazi military strategy, not just propaganda Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union wasn't merely opportunistic. German military planning for attacking the USSR, including detailed preparations for different rail gauges and propaganda leaflets, began in the mid-1930s - showing this was a long-term ideological priority, not a tactical decision.3. Soviet sources deserve serious historical consideration Western historiography has often dismissed Soviet wartime accounts as propaganda. But Hellbeck's research, particularly examining war correspondent Ilya Ehrenburg's work against German documents, shows these Soviet sources accurately documented Nazi atrocities and mindsets without fabrication.4. Ordinary Germans, not just the SS, committed atrocities The Wehrmacht's brutality on the Eastern Front wasn't limited to special units. Hellbeck found that whenever German soldiers felt threatened, they defaulted to extreme racial violence - a pattern that intensified as the Red Army approached Germany in 1944-45.5. The war's memory continues shaping current conflicts The different ways Eastern and Western Ukraine remembered WWII (Soviet liberation vs. Soviet occupation) contributed to the country's political divisions. Putin's Russia still invokes the “Great Patriotic War” to justify current actions, showing how WWII's contested legacy remains politically explosive.Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe

About the Lecture: In the summer and fall of 1919 not only the fate of Russia, but also that of Europe and the world, was hanging in the balance as the White anti-Bolshevik forces approached Moscow from the south. Lenin's Bolshevik regime was teetering on the edge and appeared increasingly close to total collapse. However, the Red Army eventually counter-attacked and, turning a fighting retreat into a full-scale rout, pushed the White armies into the Crimea, thereby taking the decisive upper hand in the Russian Civil War. The sudden White defeat, and the survival and strengthening of Soviet communism, is generally attributed to White inflexibility, imperialistic rhetoric, failure to build a viable state apparatus and make national or economic concessions where necessary, and general lack of political sophistication and realism. However, the staunch hostility of Polish head of state Jόzef Piłsudski to the Whites, and his refusal to help the Whites, was an equally important factor. About the Speaker: Paweł Styrna was born in Poland and earned a PhD in history from American University in Washington, DC, writing a dissertation on the attitudes of the Russian Whites towards Poland and Poles in 1918 – 1921. He is also a graduate of the Institute of World Politics and the University of Illinois Chicago, holding MA degrees from both institutions. Dr. Styrna works in immigration policy and has written numerous articles on history, current affairs, and mass migration.

The Allied Intervention into the Russian Civil War remains one of the most ambitious yet least talked about military ventures of the 20th century. Coinciding with the end of the first World War, some 180,000 troops from several countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Greece, Poland, and Romania, among others, were sent to fight alongside Russian “Whites” against the Red Army. Despite one victory for the Allied troops – independence for the Latvians and the Estonians – the two-year long attempt at reversing the 1917 Russian Revolution ended in humiliating defeat. To explore this crucial event of the early 20th century is today’s guest, Anna Reid, author of “A Nasty Little War: The Western Intervention into the Russian Civil War.” What was originally aimed to prevent Germany from exploiting the power vacuum in Eastern Europe left by the Russian Revolution ultimately morphed into the Allies’ gamble to destroy Communist ideology. It was a mixture of good intentions and self-delusion, flag-waving and empty promises, cover-ups, exaggerations, and downright lies from politicians.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

While some of your flowers might've lost the colour that gave you joy throughout the summer, their charm in your home is far from over.Drying seedheads is one of Sarah and Arthur's great delights, and with summer rolling into autumn it's the perfect time to start drying seedheads and grasses ready to create stunning, sustainable Christmas decorations.In this episode, discover:How to perfectly time your harvest for the most vibrant and long-lasting dried flowers and seed headsSimple, tried-and-tested techniques for drying and storing your blooms for lasting colour and structure right through the winterInspiring ideas for using dried flowers in festive decorations, creative arrangements, and sustainable home décorPersonal favourites and new discoveries from Sarah and Arthur, including must-try varieties like strawflowers, xeranthemums, and the wonderfully quirky “fish bone grass”Products mentioned:Helichrysum bracteatum 'White' (Sunflower)https://www.sarahraven.com/products/helichrysum-bracteatum-whiteXeranthemum annuumhttps://www.sarahraven.com/products/xeranthemum-annuumAmaranthus tricolor 'Red Army'https://www.sarahraven.com/products/amaranthus-tricolor-red-armyAmaranthus cruentus 'Hot Biscuits'https://www.sarahraven.com/products/amaranthus-hot-biscuitsChasmanthium latifoliumhttps://www.sarahraven.com/products/chasmanthium-latifoliumFollow Sarah: https://www.instagram.com/sarahravenperchhill/Get in touch: info@sarahraven.comShop on the Sarah Raven Website: http://bit.ly/3jvbaeuFollow us on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/sarahravensgarden/Order Sarah's latest books: https://www.sarahraven.com/gifts/gardening-books?sort=newest

Last time we spoke about the surrender of Japan. Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender on August 15, prompting mixed public reactions: grief, shock, and sympathy for the Emperor, tempered by fear of hardship and occupation. The government's response included resignations and suicide as new leadership was brought in under Prime Minister Higashikuni, with Mamoru Shigemitsu as Foreign Minister and Kawabe Torashiro heading a delegation to Manila. General MacArthur directed the occupation plan, “Blacklist,” prioritizing rapid, phased entry into key Japanese areas and Korea, while demobilizing enemy forces. The surrender ceremony occurred aboard the Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, with Wainwright, Percival, Nimitz, and UN representatives in attendance. Civilians and soldiers across Asia began surrendering, and postwar rehabilitation, Indochina and Vietnam's independence movements, and Southeast Asian transitions rapidly unfolded as Allied forces established control. This episode is the Aftermath of the Pacific War Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Pacific War has ended. Peace has been restored by the Allies and most of the places conquered by the Japanese Empire have been liberated. In this post-war period, new challenges would be faced for those who won the war; and from the ashes of an empire, a defeated nation was also seeking to rebuild. As the Japanese demobilized their armed forces, many young boys were set to return to their homeland, even if they had previously thought that they wouldn't survive the ordeal. And yet, there were some cases of isolated men that would continue to fight for decades even, unaware that the war had already ended.  As we last saw, after the Japanese surrender, General MacArthur's forces began the occupation of the Japanese home islands, while their overseas empire was being dismantled by the Allies. To handle civil administration, MacArthur established the Military Government Section, commanded by Brigadier-General William Crist, staffed by hundreds of US experts trained in civil governance who were reassigned from Okinawa and the Philippines. As the occupation began, Americans dispatched tactical units and Military Government Teams to each prefecture to ensure that policies were faithfully carried out. By mid-September, General Eichelberger's 8th Army had taken over the Tokyo Bay region and began deploying to occupy Hokkaido and the northern half of Honshu. Then General Krueger's 6th Army arrived in late September, taking southern Honshu and Shikoku, with its base in Kyoto. In December, 6th Army was relieved of its occupation duties; in January 1946, it was deactivated, leaving the 8th Army as the main garrison force. By late 1945, about 430,000 American soldiers were garrisoned across Japan. President Truman approved inviting Allied involvement on American terms, with occupation armies integrated into a US command structure. Yet with the Chinese civil war and Russia's reluctance to place its forces under MacArthur's control, only Australia, Britain, India, and New Zealand sent brigades, more than 40,000 troops in southwestern Japan. Japanese troops were gradually disarmed by order of their own commanders, so the stigma of surrender would be less keenly felt by the individual soldier. In the homeland, about 1.5 million men were discharged and returned home by the end of August. Demobilization overseas, however, proceeded, not quickly, but as a long, difficult process of repatriation. In compliance with General Order No. 1, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters disbanded on September 13 and was superseded by the Japanese War Department to manage demobilization. By November 1, the homeland had demobilized 2,228,761 personnel, roughly 97% of the Homeland Army. Yet some 6,413,215 men remained to be repatriated from overseas. On December 1, the Japanese War Ministry dissolved, and the First Demobilization Ministry took its place. The Second Demobilization Ministry was established to handle IJN demobilization, with 1,299,868 sailors, 81% of the Navy, demobilized by December 17. Japanese warships and merchant ships had their weapons rendered inoperative, and suicide craft were destroyed. Forty percent of naval vessels were allocated to evacuations in the Philippines, and 60% to evacuations of other Pacific islands. This effort eventually repatriated about 823,984 men to Japan by February 15, 1946. As repatriation accelerated, by October 15 only 1,909,401 men remained to be repatriated, most of them in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Higashikuni Cabinet and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru managed to persuade MacArthur not to impose direct military rule or martial law over all of Japan. Instead, the occupation would be indirect, guided by the Japanese government under the Emperor's direction. An early decision to feed occupation forces from American supplies, and to allow the Japanese to use their own limited food stores, helped ease a core fear: that Imperial forces would impose forced deliveries on the people they conquered. On September 17, MacArthur transferred his headquarters from Yokohama to Tokyo, setting up primary offices on the sixth floor of the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building, an imposing edifice overlooking the moat and the Imperial palace grounds in Hibiya, a symbolic heart of the nation.  While the average soldier did not fit the rapacious image of wartime Japanese propagandists, occupation personnel often behaved like neo-colonial overlords. The conquerors claimed privileges unimaginable to most Japanese. Entire trains and train compartments, fitted with dining cars, were set aside for the exclusive use of occupation forces. These silenced, half-empty trains sped past crowded platforms, provoking ire as Japanese passengers were forced to enter and exit packed cars through punched-out windows, or perch on carriage roofs, couplings, and running boards, often with tragic consequences. The luxury express coaches became irresistible targets for anonymous stone-throwers. During the war, retrenchment measures had closed restaurants, cabarets, beer halls, geisha houses, and theatres in Tokyo and other large cities. Now, a vast leisure industry sprang up to cater to the needs of the foreign occupants. Reopened restaurants and theatres, along with train stations, buses, and streetcars, were sometimes kept off limits to Allied personnel, partly for security, partly to avoid burdening Japanese resources, but a costly service infrastructure was built to the occupiers' specifications. Facilities reserved for occupation troops bore large signs reading “Japanese Keep Out” or “For Allied Personnel Only.” In downtown Tokyo, important public buildings requisitioned for occupation use had separate entrances for Americans and Japanese. The effect? A subtle but clear colour bar between the predominantly white conquerors and the conquered “Asiatic” Japanese. Although MacArthur was ready to work through the Japanese government, he lacked the organizational infrastructure to administer a nation of 74 million. Consequently, on October 2, MacArthur dissolved the Military Government Section and inaugurated General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, a separate headquarters focused on civil affairs and operating in tandem with the Army high command. SCAP immediately assumed responsibility for administering the Japanese home islands. It commandeered every large building not burned down to house thousands of civilians and requisitioned vast tracts of prime real estate to quarter several hundred thousand troops in the Tokyo–Yokohama area alone. Amidst the rise of American privilege, entire buildings were refurbished as officers' clubs, replete with slot machines and gambling parlours installed at occupation expense. The Stars and Stripes were hoisted over Tokyo, while the display of the Rising Sun was banned; and the downtown area, known as “Little America,” was transformed into a US enclave. The enclave mentality of this cocooned existence was reinforced by the arrival within the first six months of roughly 700 American families. At the peak of the occupation, about 14,800 families employed some 25,000 Japanese servants to ease the “rigours” of overseas duty. Even enlisted men in the sparse quonset-hut towns around the city lived like kings compared with ordinary Japanese. Japanese workers cleaned barracks, did kitchen chores, and handled other base duties. The lowest private earned a 25% hardship bonus until these special allotments were discontinued in 1949. Most military families quickly adjusted to a pampered lifestyle that went beyond maids and “boys,” including cooks, laundresses, babysitters, gardeners, and masseuses. Perks included spacious quarters with swimming pools, central heating, hot running water, and modern plumbing. Two observers compared GHQ to the British Raj at its height. George F. Kennan, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, warned during his 1948 mission to Japan that Americans had monopolized “everything that smacks of comfort or elegance or luxury,” criticizing what he called the “American brand of philistinism” and the “monumental imperviousness” of MacArthur's staff to the Japanese suffering. This conqueror's mentality also showed in the bullying attitudes many top occupation officials displayed toward the Japanese with whom they dealt. Major Faubion Bowers, MacArthur's military secretary, later said, “I and nearly all the occupation people I knew were extremely conceited and extremely arrogant and used our power every inch of the way.” Initially, there were spasms of defiance against the occupation forces, such as anonymous stone-throwing, while armed robbery and minor assaults against occupation personnel were rife in the weeks and months after capitulation. Yet active resistance was neither widespread nor organized. The Americans successfully completed their initial deployment without violence, an astonishing feat given a heavily armed and vastly superior enemy operating on home terrain. The average citizen regarded the occupation as akin to force majeure, the unfortunate but inevitable aftermath of a natural calamity. Japan lay prostrate. Industrial output had fallen to about 10% of pre-war levels, and as late as 1946, more than 13 million remained unemployed. Nearly 40% of Japan's urban areas had been turned to rubble, and some 9 million people were homeless. The war-displaced, many of them orphans, slept in doorways and hallways, in bombed-out ruins, dugouts and packing crates, under bridges or on pavements, and crowded the hallways of train and subway stations. As winter 1945 descended, with food, fuel, and clothing scarce, people froze to death. Bonfires lit the streets to ward off the chill. "The only warm hands I have shaken thus far in Japan belonged to Americans," Mark Gayn noted in December 1945. "The Japanese do not have much of a chance to thaw out, and their hands are cold and red." Unable to afford shoes, many wore straw sandals; those with geta felt themselves privileged. The sight of a man wearing a woman's high-buttoned shoes in winter epitomized the daily struggle to stay dry and warm. Shantytowns built of scrap wood, rusted metal, and scavenged odds and ends sprang up everywhere, resembling vast junk yards. The poorest searched smouldering refuse heaps for castoffs that might be bartered for a scrap to eat or wear. Black markets (yami'ichi) run by Japanese, Koreans, and For-mosans mushroomed to replace collapsed distribution channels and cash in on inflated prices. Tokyo became "a world of scarcity in which every nail, every rag, and even a tangerine peel [had a] market value." Psychologically numbed, disoriented, and disillusioned with their leaders, demobilized veterans and civilians alike struggled to get their bearings, shed militaristic ideologies, and begin to embrace new values. In the vacuum of defeat, the Japanese people appeared ready to reject the past and grasp at the straw held out by the former enemy. Relations between occupier and occupied were not smooth, however. American troops comported themselves like conquerors, especially in the early weeks and months of occupation. Much of the violence was directed against women, with the first attacks beginning within hours after the landing of advance units. When US paratroopers landed in Sapporo, an orgy of looting, sexual violence, and drunken brawling ensued. Newspaper accounts reported 931 serious offences by GIs in the Yokohama area during the first week of occupation, including 487 armed robberies, 411 thefts of currency or goods, 9 rapes, 5 break-ins, 3 cases of assault and battery, and 16 other acts of lawlessness. In the first 10 days of occupation, there were 1,336 reported rapes by US soldiers in Kanagawa Prefecture alone. Americans were not the only perpetrators. A former prostitute recalled that when Australian troops arrived in Kure in early 1946, they “dragged young women into their jeeps, took them to the mountain, and then raped them. I heard them screaming for help nearly every night.” Such behaviour was commonplace, but news of criminal activity by occupation forces was quickly suppressed. On September 10, 1945, SCAP issued press and pre-censorship codes outlawing the publication of reports and statistics "inimical to the objectives of the occupation." In the sole instance of self-help General Eichelberger records in his memoirs, when locals formed a vigilante group and retaliated against off-duty GIs, 8th Army ordered armored vehicles into the streets and arrested the ringleaders, who received lengthy prison terms. Misbehavior ranged from black-market activity, petty theft, reckless driving, and disorderly conduct to vandalism, arson, murder, and rape. Soldiers and sailors often broke the law with impunity, and incidents of robbery, rape, and even murder were widely reported. Gang rapes and other sex atrocities were not infrequent; victims, shunned as outcasts, sometimes turned to prostitution in desperation, while others took their own lives to avoid bringing shame to their families. Military courts arrested relatively few soldiers for these offenses and convicted even fewer; Japanese attempts at self-defense were punished severely, and restitution for victims was rare. Fearing the worst, Japanese authorities had already prepared countermeasures against the supposed rapacity of foreign soldiers. Imperial troops in East Asia and the Pacific had behaved brutally toward women, so the government established “sexual comfort-stations” manned by geisha, bar hostesses, and prostitutes to “satisfy the lust of the Occupation forces,” as the Higashikuni Cabinet put it. A budget of 100 million yen was set aside for these Recreation and Amusement Associations, financed initially with public funds but run as private enterprises under police supervision. Through these, the government hoped to protect the daughters of the well-born and middle class by turning to lower-class women to satisfy the soldiers' sexual appetites. By the end of 1945, brothel operators had rounded up an estimated 20,000 young women and herded them into RAA establishments nationwide. Eventually, as many as 70,000 are said to have ended up in the state-run sex industry. Thankfully, as military discipline took hold and fresh troops replaced the Allied veterans responsible for the early crime wave, violence subsided and the occupier's patronising behavior and the ugly misdeeds of a lawless few were gradually overlooked. However, fraternisation was frowned upon by both sides, and segregation was practiced in principle, with the Japanese excluded from areas reserved for Allied personnel until September 1949, when MacArthur lifted virtually all restrictions on friendly association, stating that he was “establishing the same relations between occupation personnel and the Japanese population as exists between troops stationed in the United States and the American people.” In principle, the Occupation's administrative structure was highly complex. The Far Eastern Commission, based in Washington, included representatives from all 13 countries that had fought against Japan and was established in 1946 to formulate basic principles. The Allied Council for Japan was created in the same year to assist in developing and implementing surrender terms and in administering the country. It consisted of representatives from the USA, the USSR, Nationalist China, and the British Commonwealth. Although both bodies were active at first, they were largely ineffectual due to unwieldy decision-making, disagreements between the national delegations (especially the USA and USSR), and the obstructionism of General Douglas MacArthur. In practice, SCAP, the executive authority of the occupation, effectively ruled Japan from 1945 to 1952. And since it took orders only from the US government, the Occupation became primarily an American affair. The US occupation program, effectively carried out by SCAP, was revolutionary and rested on a two-pronged approach. To ensure Japan would never again become a menace to the United States or to world peace, SCAP pursued disarmament and demilitarization, with continuing control over Japan's capacity to make war. This involved destroying military supplies and installations, demobilizing more than five million Japanese soldiers, and thoroughly discrediting the military establishment. Accordingly, SCAP ordered the purge of tens of thousands of designated persons from public service positions, including accused war criminals, military officers, leaders of ultranationalist societies, leaders in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, business leaders tied to overseas expansion, governors of former Japanese colonies, and national leaders who had steered Japan into war. In addition, MacArthur's International Military Tribunal for the Far East established a military court in Tokyo. It had jurisdiction over those charged with Class A crimes, top leaders who had planned and directed the war. Also considered were Class B charges, covering conventional war crimes, and Class C charges, covering crimes against humanity. Yet the military court in Tokyo wouldn't be the only one. More than 5,700 lower-ranking personnel were charged with conventional war crimes in separate trials convened by Australia, China, France, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Of the 5,700 Japanese individuals indicted for Class B war crimes, 984 were sentenced to death; 475 received life sentences; 2,944 were given more limited prison terms; 1,018 were acquitted; and 279 were never brought to trial or not sentenced. Among these, many, like General Ando Rikichi and Lieutenant-General Nomi Toshio, chose to commit suicide before facing prosecution. Notable cases include Lieutenant-General Tani Hisao, who was sentenced to death by the Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal for his role in the Nanjing Massacre; Lieutenant-General Sakai Takashi, who was executed in Nanjing for the murder of British and Chinese civilians during the occupation of Hong Kong. General Okamura Yasuji was convicted of war crimes by the Tribunal, yet he was immediately protected by the personal order of Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek, who kept him as a military adviser for the Kuomintang. In the Manila trials, General Yamashita Tomoyuki was sentenced to death as he was in overall command during the Sook Ching massacre, the Rape of Manila, and other atrocities. Lieutenant-General Homma Masaharu was likewise executed in Manila for atrocities committed by troops under his command during the Bataan Death March. General Imamura Hitoshi was sentenced to ten years in prison, but he considered the punishment too light and even had a replica of the prison built in his garden, remaining there until his death in 1968. Lieutenant-General Kanda Masatane received a 14-year sentence for war crimes on Bougainville, though he served only four years. Lieutenant-General Adachi Hatazo was sentenced to life imprisonment for war crimes in New Guinea and subsequently committed suicide on September 10, 1947. Lieutenant-General Teshima Fusataro received three years of forced labour for using a hospital ship to transport troops. Lieutenant-General Baba Masao was sentenced to death for ordering the Sandakan Death Marches, during which over 2,200 Australian and British prisoners of war perished. Lieutenant-General Tanabe Moritake was sentenced to death by a Dutch military tribunal for unspecified war crimes. Rear-Admiral Sakaibara Shigematsu was executed in Guam for ordering the Wake Island massacre, in which 98 American civilians were murdered. Lieutenant-General Inoue Sadae was condemned to death in Guam for permitting subordinates to execute three downed American airmen captured in Palau, though his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 1951 and he was released in 1953. Lieutenant-General Tachibana Yoshio was sentenced to death in Guam for his role in the Chichijima Incident, in which eight American airmen were cannibalized. By mid-1945, due to the Allied naval blockade, the 25,000 Japanese troops on Chichijima had run low on supplies. However, although the daily rice ration had been reduced from 400 grams per person per day to 240 grams, the troops were not at risk of starvation. In February and March 1945, in what would later be called the Chichijima incident, Tachibana Yoshio's senior staff turned to cannibalism. Nine American airmen had escaped from their planes after being shot down during bombing raids on Chichijima, eight of whom were captured. The ninth, the only one to evade capture, was future US President George H. W. Bush, then a 20-year-old pilot. Over several months, the prisoners were executed, and reportedly by the order of Major Matoba Sueyo, their bodies were butchered by the division's medical orderlies, with the livers and other organs consumed by the senior staff, including Matoba's superior Tachibana. In the Yokohama War Crimes Trials, Lieutenant-Generals Inada Masazumi and Yokoyama Isamu were convicted for their complicity in vivisection and other human medical experiments performed at Kyushu Imperial University on downed Allied airmen. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, which began in May 1946 and lasted two and a half years, resulted in the execution by hanging of Generals Doihara Kenji and Itagaki Seishiro, and former Prime Ministers Hirota Koki and Tojo Hideki, for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, specifically for the escalation of the Pacific War and for permitting the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war. Also sentenced to death were Lieutenant-General Muto Akira for his role in the Nanjing and Manila massacres; General Kimura Heitaro for planning the war strategy in China and Southeast Asia and for laxity in preventing atrocities against prisoners of war in Burma; and General Matsui Iwane for his involvement in the Rape of Nanjing. The seven defendants who were sentenced to death were executed at Sugamo Prison in Ikebukuro on December 23, 1948. Sixteen others were sentenced to life imprisonment, including the last Field Marshal Hata Shunroku, Generals Araki Sadao, Minami Hiro, and Umezu Shojiro, Admiral Shimada Shigetaro, former Prime Ministers Hiranuma Kiichiro and Koiso Kuniaki, Marquis Kido Koichi, and Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro, a major instigator of the second Sino-Japanese War. Additionally, former Foreign Ministers Togo Shigenori and Shigemitsu Mamoru received seven- and twenty-year sentences, respectively. The Soviet Union and Chinese Communist forces also held trials of Japanese war criminals, including the Khabarovsk War Crime Trials, which tried and found guilty some members of Japan's bacteriological and chemical warfare unit known as Unit 731. However, those who surrendered to the Americans were never brought to trial, as MacArthur granted immunity to Lieutenant-General Ishii Shiro and all members of the bacteriological research units in exchange for germ-w warfare data derived from human experimentation. If you would like to learn more about what I like to call Japan's Operation Paper clip, whereupon the US grabbed many scientists from Unit 731, check out my exclusive podcast. The SCAP-turn to democratization began with the drafting of a new constitution in 1947, addressing Japan's enduring feudal social structure. In the charter, sovereignty was vested in the people, and the emperor was designated a “symbol of the state and the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people in whom resides sovereign power.” Because the emperor now possessed fewer powers than European constitutional monarchs, some have gone so far as to say that Japan became “a republic in fact if not in name.” Yet the retention of the emperor was, in fact, a compromise that suited both those who wanted to preserve the essence of the nation for stability and those who demanded that the emperor system, though not necessarily the emperor, should be expunged. In line with the democratic spirit of the new constitution, the peerage was abolished and the two-chamber Diet, to which the cabinet was now responsible, became the highest organ of state. The judiciary was made independent and local autonomy was granted in vital areas of jurisdiction such as education and the police. Moreover, the constitution stipulated that “the people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights,” that they “shall be respected as individuals,” and that “their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall … be the supreme consideration in legislation.” Its 29 articles guaranteed basic human rights: equality, freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin, freedom of thought and freedom of religion. Finally, in its most controversial section, Article 9, the “peace clause,” Japan “renounce[d] war as a sovereign right of the nation” and vowed not to maintain any military forces and “other war potential.” To instill a thoroughly democratic ethos, reforms touched every facet of society. The dissolution of the zaibatsu decentralised economic power; the 1945 Labour Union Law and the 1946 Labour Relations Act guaranteed workers the right to collective action; the 1947 Labour Standards Law established basic working standards for men and women; and the revised Civil Code of 1948 abolished the patriarchal household and enshrined sexual equality. Reflecting core American principles, SCAP introduced a 6-3-3 schooling system, six years of compulsory elementary education, three years of junior high, and an optional three years of senior high, along with the aim of secular, locally controlled education. More crucially, ideological reform followed: censorship of feudal material in media, revision of textbooks, and prohibition of ideas glorifying war, dying for the emperor, or venerating war heroes. With women enfranchised and young people shaped to counter militarism and ultranationalism, rural Japan was transformed to undermine lingering class divisions. The land reform program provided for the purchase of all land held by absentee landlords, allowed resident landlords and owner-farmers to retain a set amount of land, and required that the remaining land be sold to the government so it could be offered to existing tenants. In 1948, amid the intensifying tensions of the Cold War that would soon culminate in the Korean War, the occupation's focus shifted from demilitarization and democratization toward economic rehabilitation and, ultimately, the remilitarization of Japan, an shift now known as the “Reverse Course.” The country was thus rebuilt as the Pacific region's primary bulwark against the spread of Communism. An Economic Stabilisation Programme was introduced, including a five-year plan to coordinate production and target capital through the Reconstruction Finance Bank. In 1949, the anti-inflationary Dodge Plan was adopted, advocating balanced budgets, fixing the exchange rate at 360 yen to the dollar, and ending broad government intervention. Additionally, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was formed and supported the formation of conglomerates centered around banks, which encouraged the reemergence of a somewhat weakened set of zaibatsu, including Mitsui and Mitsubishi. By the end of the Occupation era, Japan was on the verge of surpassing its 1934–1936 levels of economic growth. Equally important was Japan's rearmament in alignment with American foreign policy: a National Police Reserve of about 75,000 was created with the outbreak of the Korean War; by 1952 it had expanded to 110,000 and was renamed the Self-Defense Force after the inclusion of an air force. However, the Reverse Course also facilitated the reestablishment of conservative politics and the rollback of gains made by women and the reforms of local autonomy and education. As the Occupation progressed, the Americans permitted greater Japanese initiative, and power gradually shifted from the reformers to the moderates. By 1949, the purge of the right came under review, and many who had been condemned began returning to influence, if not to the Diet, then to behind-the-scenes power. At the same time, Japanese authorities, with MacArthur's support, began purging left-wing activists. In June 1950, for example, the central office of the Japan Communist Party and the editorial board of The Red Flag were purged. The gains made by women also seemed to be reversed. Women were elected to 8% of available seats in the first lower-house election in 1946, but to only 2% in 1952, a trend not reversed until the so-called Madonna Boom of the 1980s. Although the number of women voting continued to rise, female politicisation remained more superficial than might be imagined. Women's employment also appeared little affected by labour legislation: though women formed nearly 40% of the labor force in 1952, they earned only 45% as much as men. Indeed, women's attitudes toward labor were influenced less by the new ethos of fulfilling individual potential than by traditional views of family and workplace responsibilities. In the areas of local autonomy and education, substantial modifications were made to the reforms. Because local authorities lacked sufficient power to tax, they were unable to realise their extensive powers, and, as a result, key responsibilities were transferred back to national jurisdiction. In 1951, for example, 90% of villages and towns placed their police forces under the control of the newly formed National Police Agency. Central control over education was also gradually reasserted; in 1951, the Yoshida government attempted to reintroduce ethics classes, proposed tighter central oversight of textbooks, and recommended abolishing local school board elections. By the end of the decade, all these changes had been implemented. The Soviet occupation of the Kurile Islands and the Habomai Islets was completed with Russian troops fully deployed by September 5. Immediately after the onset of the occupation, amid a climate of insecurity and fear marked by reports of sporadic rape and physical assault and widespread looting by occupying troops, an estimated 4,000 islanders fled to Hokkaido rather than face an uncertain repatriation. As Soviet forces moved in, they seized or destroyed telephone and telegraph installations and halted ship movements into and out of the islands, leaving residents without adequate food and other winter provisions. Yet, unlike Manchuria, where Japanese civilians faced widespread sexual violence and pillage, systematic violence against the civilian population on the Kuriles appears to have been exceptional. A series of military government proclamations assured islanders of safety so long as they did not resist Soviet rule and carried on normally; however, these orders also prohibited activities not explicitly authorized by the Red Army, which imposed many hardships on civilians. Residents endured harsh conditions under Soviet rule until late 1948, when Japanese repatriation out of the Kurils was completed. The Kuriles posed a special diplomatic problem, as the occupation of the southernmost islands—the Northern Territories—ignited a long-standing dispute between Tokyo and Moscow that continues to impede the normalisation of relations today. Although the Kuriles were promised to the Soviet Union in the Yalta agreement, Japan and the United States argued that this did not apply to the Northern Territories, since they were not part of the Kurile Islands. A substantial dispute regarding the status of the Kurile Islands arose between the United States and the Soviet Union during the preparation of the Treaty of San Francisco, which was intended as a permanent peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers of World War II. The treaty was ultimately signed by 49 nations in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and came into force on April 28, 1952. It ended Japan's role as an imperial power, allocated compensation to Allied nations and former prisoners of war who had suffered Japanese war crimes, ended the Allied post-war occupation of Japan, and returned full sovereignty to Japan. Effectively, the document officially renounced Japan's treaty rights derived from the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and its rights to Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Kurile Islands, the Spratly Islands, Antarctica, and South Sakhalin. Japan's South Seas Mandate, namely the Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, and Caroline Islands, had already been formally revoked by the United Nations on July 18, 1947, making the United States responsible for administration of those islands under a UN trusteeship agreement that established the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In turn, the Bonin, Volcano, and Ryukyu Islands were progressively restored to Japan between 1953 and 1972, along with the Senkaku Islands, which were disputed by both Communist and Nationalist China. In addition, alongside the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan and the United States signed a Security Treaty that established a long-lasting military alliance between them. Although Japan renounced its rights to the Kuriles, the U.S. State Department later clarified that “the Habomai Islands and Shikotan ... are properly part of Hokkaido and that Japan is entitled to sovereignty over them,” hence why the Soviets refused to sign the treaty. Britain and the United States agreed that territorial rights would not be granted to nations that did not sign the Treaty of San Francisco, and as a result the Kurile Islands were not formally recognized as Soviet territory. A separate peace treaty, the Treaty of Taipei (formally the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty), was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952 between Japan and the Kuomintang, and on June 9 of that year the Treaty of Peace Between Japan and India followed. Finally, Japan and the Soviet Union ended their formal state of war with the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, though this did not settle the Kurile Islands dispute. Even after these formal steps, Japan as a nation was not in a formal state of war, and many Japanese continued to believe the war was ongoing; those who held out after the surrender came to be known as Japanese holdouts.  Captain Oba Sakae and his medical company participated in the Saipan campaign beginning on July 7, 1944, and took part in what would become the largest banzai charge of the Pacific War. After 15 hours of intense hand-to-hand combat, almost 4,300 Japanese soldiers were dead, and Oba and his men were presumed among them. In reality, however, he survived the battle and gradually assumed command of over a hundred additional soldiers. Only five men from his original unit survived the battle, two of whom died in the following months. Oba then led over 200 Japanese civilians deeper into the jungles to evade capture, organizing them into mountain caves and hidden jungle villages. When the soldiers were not assisting the civilians with survival tasks, Oba and his men continued their battle against the garrison of US Marines. He used the 1,552‑ft Mount Tapochau as their primary base, which offered an unobstructed 360-degree view of the island. From their base camp on the western slope of the mountain, Oba and his men occasionally conducted guerrilla-style raids on American positions. Due to the speed and stealth of these operations, and the Marines' frustrated attempts to find him, the Saipan Marines eventually referred to Oba as “The Fox.” Oba and his men held out on the island for 512 days, or about 16 months. On November 27, 1945, former Major-General Amo Umahachi was able to draw out some of the Japanese in hiding by singing the anthem of the Japanese infantry branch. Amo was then able to present documents from the defunct IGHQ to Oba ordering him and his 46 remaining men to surrender themselves to the Americans. On December 1, the Japanese soldiers gathered on Tapochau and sang a song of departure to the spirits of the war dead; Oba led his people out of the jungle and they presented themselves to the Marines of the 18th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Company. With great formality and commensurate dignity, Oba surrendered his sword to Lieutenant Colonel Howard G. Kirgis, and his men surrendered their arms and colors. On January 2, 1946, 20 Japanese soldiers hiding in a tunnel at Corregidor Island surrendered after learning the war had ended from a newspaper found while collecting water. In that same month, 120 Japanese were routed after a battle in the mountains 150 miles south of Manila. In April, during a seven-week campaign to clear Lubang Island, 41 more Japanese emerged from the jungle, unaware that the war had ended; however, a group of four Japanese continued to resist. In early 1947, Lieutenant Yamaguchi Ei and his band of 33 soldiers renewed fighting with the small Marine garrison on Peleliu, prompting reinforcements under Rear-Admiral Charles Pownall to be brought to the island to hunt down the guerrilla group. Along with them came former Rear-Admiral Sumikawa Michio, who ultimately convinced Yamaguchi to surrender in April after almost three years of guerrilla warfare. Also in April, seven Japanese emerged from Palawan Island and fifteen armed stragglers emerged from Luzon. In January 1948, 200 troops surrendered on Mindanao; and on May 12, the Associated Press reported that two unnamed Japanese soldiers had surrendered to civilian policemen in Guam the day before. On January 6, 1949, two former IJN soldiers, machine gunners Matsudo Rikio and Yamakage Kufuku, were discovered on Iwo Jima and surrendered peacefully. In March 1950, Private Akatsu Yūichi surrendered in the village of Looc, leaving only three Japanese still resisting on Lubang. By 1951 a group of Japanese on Anatahan Island refused to believe that the war was over and resisted every attempt by the Navy to remove them. This group was first discovered in February 1945, when several Chamorros from Saipan were sent to the island to recover the bodies of a Saipan-based B-29. The Chamorros reported that there were about thirty Japanese survivors from three ships sunk in June 1944, one of which was an Okinawan woman. Personal aggravations developed from the close confines of a small group on a small island and from tuba drinking; among the holdouts, 6 of 11 deaths were the result of violence, and one man displayed 13 knife wounds. The presence of only one woman, Higa Kazuko, caused considerable difficulty as she would transfer her affections among at least four men after each of them mysteriously disappeared, purportedly “swallowed by the waves while fishing.” According to the more sensational versions of the Anatahan tale, 11 of the 30 navy sailors stranded on the island died due to violent struggles over her affections. In July 1950, Higa went to the beach when an American vessel appeared offshore and finally asked to be removed from the island. She was taken to Saipan aboard the Miss Susie and, upon arrival, told authorities that the men on the island did not believe the war was over. As the Japanese government showed interest in the situation on Anatahan, the families of the holdouts were contacted in Japan and urged by the Navy to write letters stating that the war was over and that the holdouts should surrender. The letters were dropped by air on June 26 and ultimately convinced the holdouts to give themselves up. Thus, six years after the end of World War II, “Operation Removal” commenced from Saipan under the command of Lt. Commander James B. Johnson, USNR, aboard the Navy Tug USS Cocopa. Johnson and an interpreter went ashore by rubber boat and formally accepted the surrender on the morning of June 30, 1951. The Anatahan femme fatale story later inspired the 1953 Japanese film Anatahan and the 1998 novel Cage on the Sea. In 1953, Murata Susumu, the last holdout on Tinian, was finally captured. The next year, on May 7, Corporal Sumada Shoichi was killed in a clash with Filipino soldiers, leaving only two Japanese still resisting on Lubang. In November 1955, Seaman Kinoshita Noboru was captured in the Luzon jungle but soon after committed suicide rather than “return to Japan in defeat.” That same year, four Japanese airmen surrendered at Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea; and in 1956, nine soldiers were located and sent home from Morotai, while four men surrendered on Mindoro. In May 1960, Sergeant Ito Masashi became one of the last Japanese to surrender at Guam after the capture of his comrade Private Minagawa Bunzo, but the final surrender at Guam would come later with Sergeant Yokoi Shoichi. Sergeant Yokoi Shoichi survived in the jungles of Guam by living for years in an elaborately dug hole, subsisting on snails and lizards, a fate that, while undignified, showcased his ingenuity and resilience and earned him a warm welcome on his return to Japan. His capture was not heroic in the traditional sense: he was found half-starving by a group of villagers while foraging for shrimp in a stream, and the broader context included his awareness as early as 1952 that the war had ended. He explained that the wartime bushido code, emphasizing self-sacrifice or suicide rather than self-preservation, had left him fearing that repatriation would label him a deserter and likely lead to execution. Emerging from the jungle, Yokoi also became a vocal critic of Japan's wartime leadership, including Emperor Hirohito, which fits a view of him as a product of, and a prisoner within, his own education, military training, and the censorship and propaganda of the era. When asked by a young nephew how he survived so long on an island just a short distance from a major American airbase, he replied simply, “I was really good at hide and seek.”  That same year, Private Kozuka Kinshichi was killed in a shootout with Philippine police in October, leaving Lieutenant Onoda Hiroo still resisting on Lubang. Lieutenant Onoda Hiroo had been on Lubang since 1944, a few months before the Americans retook the Philippines. The last instructions he had received from his immediate superior ordered him to retreat to the interior of the island and harass the Allied occupying forces until the IJA eventually returned. Despite efforts by the Philippine Army, letters and newspapers left for him, radio broadcasts, and even a plea from Onoda's brother, he did not believe the war was over. On February 20, 1974, Onoda encountered a young Japanese university dropout named Suzuki Norio, who was traveling the world and had told friends that he planned to “look for Lieutenant Onoda, a panda, and the abominable snowman, in that order.” The two became friends, but Onoda stated that he was waiting for orders from one of his commanders. On March 9, 1974, Onoda went to an agreed-upon place and found a note left by Suzuki. Suzuki had brought along Onoda's former commander, Major Taniguchi, who delivered the oral orders for Onoda to surrender. Intelligence Officer 2nd Lt. Onoda Hiroo thus emerged from Lubang's jungle with his .25 caliber rifle, 500 rounds of ammunition, and several hand grenades. He surrendered 29 years after Japan's formal surrender, and 15 years after being declared legally dead in Japan. When he accepted that the war was over, he wept openly. He received a hero's welcome upon his return to Japan in 1974. The Japanese government offered him a large sum of money in back pay, which he refused. When money was pressed on him by well-wishers, he donated it to Yasukuni Shrine. Onoda was reportedly unhappy with the attention and what he saw as the withering of traditional Japanese values. He wrote No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War, a best-selling autobiography published in 1974. Yet the last Japanese to surrender would be Private Nakamura Teruo, an Amis aborigine from Formosa and a member of the Takasago Volunteers. Private Nakamura Teruo spent the tail end of World War II with a dwindling band on Morotai, repeatedly dispersing and reassembling in the jungle as they hunted for food. The group suffered continuous losses to starvation and disease, and survivors described Nakamura as highly self-sufficient. He left to live alone somewhere in the Morotai highlands between 1946 and 1947, rejoined the main group in 1950, and then disappeared again a few years later. Nakamura hinted in print that he fled into the jungle because he feared the other holdouts might murder him. He survives for decades beyond the war, eventually being found by 11 Indonesian soldiers. The emergence of an indigenous Taiwanese soldier among the search party embarrassed Japan as it sought to move past its imperial past. Many Japanese felt Nakamura deserved compensation for decades of loyalty, only to learn that his back pay for three decades of service amounted to 68,000 yen.   Nakamura's experience of peace was complex. When a journalist asked how he felt about “wasting” three decades of his life on Morotai, he replied that the years had not been wasted; he had been serving his country. Yet the country he returned to was Taiwan, and upon disembarking in Taipei in early January 1975, he learned that his wife had a son he had never met and that she had remarried a decade after his official death. Nakamura eventually lived with a daughter, and his story concluded with a bittersweet note when his wife reconsidered and reconciled with him. Several Japanese soldiers joined local Communist and insurgent groups after the war to avoid surrender. Notably, in 1956 and 1958, two soldiers returned to Japan after service in China's People's Liberation Army. Two others who defected with a larger group to the Malayan Communist Party around 1945 laid down their arms in 1989 and repatriated the next year, becoming among the last to return home. That is all for today, but fear not I will provide a few more goodies over the next few weeks. I will be releasing some of my exclusive podcast episodes from my youtube membership and patreon that are about pacific war subjects. Like I promised the first one will be on why Emperor Hirohito surrendered. Until then if you need your fix you know where to find me: eastern front week by week, fall and rise of china, echoes of war or on my Youtube membership of patreon at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a key architect of the Soviet Union's demise, which ended the Cold War. A child of Warsaw—the heart of central Europe's bloodlands—Brzezinski turned his fierce resentment at his homeland's razing by Nazi Germany and the Red Army into a lifelong quest for liberty. Born the year that Joseph Stalin consolidated power, and dying a few months into Donald Trump's first presidency, Brzezinski was shaped by and in turn shaped the global power struggles of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As counsel to US presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and chief foreign policy figure of the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski converted his acclaim as a Sovietologist into Washington power. With Henry Kissinger, his lifelong rival with whom he had a fraught on-off relationship, he personified the new breed of foreign-born scholar who thrived in America's “Cold War University”—and who ousted Washington's gentlemanly class of WASPs who had run US foreign policy for so long.Brzezinski's impact, aided by his unusual friendship with the Polish-born John Paul II, sprang from his knowledge of Moscow's “Achilles heel”—the fact that its nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, and satellite states, including Poland, yearned to shake off Moscow's grip. Neither a hawk nor a dove, Brzezinski was a biting critic of George W. Bush's Iraq War and an early endorser of Obama. Because he went against the DC grain of joining factions, and was on occasion willing to drop Democrats for Republicans, Brzezinski is something of history's orphan. His historic role has been greatly underweighted. In the almost cinematic arc of his life can be found the grand narrative of the American century and great power struggle that followed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

The German Army continued to retreat westward over the winter of 1943-44, abandoning most of Ukraine. Red Army pressure was relentless, not giving the Germans any opportunity to establish a strong defensive line.

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, the surprise invasion of the Soviet Union that opened the Eastern Front in World War II. With lightning speed and devastating success, the German army tore through Soviet territory and rolled over the Red Army, scoring some of the most dramatic victories in military history--until the blitzkrieg bogged down during the approach on Moscow. At the spearhead of the attack was General Heinz Guderian, one of the most celebrated and controversial commanders of the war, who commanded a tank group in the center of the German front that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Guderian's Panzers reconstructs Barbarossa from the perspective of Generaloberst Guderian and his 2nd Panzer Group. With the German war machine at the height of its martial prowess in June 1941, Guderian's group of 250,000 men and 900 tanks rapidly broke through the Soviet frontier defenses and thrust some 600 kilometers into Soviet Russia in a matter of weeks--in doing so playing an integral part in the successful encirclement (cauldron) battles of Belostok-Minsk (June/July 1941) and Smolensk (July/August 1941); each of these battles resulting in the loss of several Soviet armies and hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Despite having sustained alarming losses of personal and equipment in these opening battles, Guderian pushed his men, and himself, to even greater achievements, culminating in the triumphant cauldron Battle of Kiev in the Ukraine (September 1941) that obliterated Soviet Southwestern Front and resulted in the capture of over 600,000 Red Army POWs. It was, perhaps, Germany's greatest victory in WWII, and Guderian had made it happen. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a key architect of the Soviet Union's demise, which ended the Cold War. A child of Warsaw—the heart of central Europe's bloodlands—Brzezinski turned his fierce resentment at his homeland's razing by Nazi Germany and the Red Army into a lifelong quest for liberty. Born the year that Joseph Stalin consolidated power, and dying a few months into Donald Trump's first presidency, Brzezinski was shaped by and in turn shaped the global power struggles of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As counsel to US presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and chief foreign policy figure of the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski converted his acclaim as a Sovietologist into Washington power. With Henry Kissinger, his lifelong rival with whom he had a fraught on-off relationship, he personified the new breed of foreign-born scholar who thrived in America's “Cold War University”—and who ousted Washington's gentlemanly class of WASPs who had run US foreign policy for so long.Brzezinski's impact, aided by his unusual friendship with the Polish-born John Paul II, sprang from his knowledge of Moscow's “Achilles heel”—the fact that its nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, and satellite states, including Poland, yearned to shake off Moscow's grip. Neither a hawk nor a dove, Brzezinski was a biting critic of George W. Bush's Iraq War and an early endorser of Obama. Because he went against the DC grain of joining factions, and was on occasion willing to drop Democrats for Republicans, Brzezinski is something of history's orphan. His historic role has been greatly underweighted. In the almost cinematic arc of his life can be found the grand narrative of the American century and great power struggle that followed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies

We recap the Kickers' 0-0 road draw against Portland Hearts of Pine, highlighting a gritty defensive effort and the Red Army's strong away-day presence. With just 10 games left, we discuss how Coach Darren can build on this point to spark a late-season push.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a key architect of the Soviet Union's demise, which ended the Cold War. A child of Warsaw—the heart of central Europe's bloodlands—Brzezinski turned his fierce resentment at his homeland's razing by Nazi Germany and the Red Army into a lifelong quest for liberty. Born the year that Joseph Stalin consolidated power, and dying a few months into Donald Trump's first presidency, Brzezinski was shaped by and in turn shaped the global power struggles of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As counsel to US presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and chief foreign policy figure of the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski converted his acclaim as a Sovietologist into Washington power. With Henry Kissinger, his lifelong rival with whom he had a fraught on-off relationship, he personified the new breed of foreign-born scholar who thrived in America's “Cold War University”—and who ousted Washington's gentlemanly class of WASPs who had run US foreign policy for so long.Brzezinski's impact, aided by his unusual friendship with the Polish-born John Paul II, sprang from his knowledge of Moscow's “Achilles heel”—the fact that its nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, and satellite states, including Poland, yearned to shake off Moscow's grip. Neither a hawk nor a dove, Brzezinski was a biting critic of George W. Bush's Iraq War and an early endorser of Obama. Because he went against the DC grain of joining factions, and was on occasion willing to drop Democrats for Republicans, Brzezinski is something of history's orphan. His historic role has been greatly underweighted. In the almost cinematic arc of his life can be found the grand narrative of the American century and great power struggle that followed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a key architect of the Soviet Union's demise, which ended the Cold War. A child of Warsaw—the heart of central Europe's bloodlands—Brzezinski turned his fierce resentment at his homeland's razing by Nazi Germany and the Red Army into a lifelong quest for liberty. Born the year that Joseph Stalin consolidated power, and dying a few months into Donald Trump's first presidency, Brzezinski was shaped by and in turn shaped the global power struggles of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As counsel to US presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and chief foreign policy figure of the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski converted his acclaim as a Sovietologist into Washington power. With Henry Kissinger, his lifelong rival with whom he had a fraught on-off relationship, he personified the new breed of foreign-born scholar who thrived in America's “Cold War University”—and who ousted Washington's gentlemanly class of WASPs who had run US foreign policy for so long.Brzezinski's impact, aided by his unusual friendship with the Polish-born John Paul II, sprang from his knowledge of Moscow's “Achilles heel”—the fact that its nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, and satellite states, including Poland, yearned to shake off Moscow's grip. Neither a hawk nor a dove, Brzezinski was a biting critic of George W. Bush's Iraq War and an early endorser of Obama. Because he went against the DC grain of joining factions, and was on occasion willing to drop Democrats for Republicans, Brzezinski is something of history's orphan. His historic role has been greatly underweighted. In the almost cinematic arc of his life can be found the grand narrative of the American century and great power struggle that followed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a key architect of the Soviet Union's demise, which ended the Cold War. A child of Warsaw—the heart of central Europe's bloodlands—Brzezinski turned his fierce resentment at his homeland's razing by Nazi Germany and the Red Army into a lifelong quest for liberty. Born the year that Joseph Stalin consolidated power, and dying a few months into Donald Trump's first presidency, Brzezinski was shaped by and in turn shaped the global power struggles of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As counsel to US presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and chief foreign policy figure of the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski converted his acclaim as a Sovietologist into Washington power. With Henry Kissinger, his lifelong rival with whom he had a fraught on-off relationship, he personified the new breed of foreign-born scholar who thrived in America's “Cold War University”—and who ousted Washington's gentlemanly class of WASPs who had run US foreign policy for so long.Brzezinski's impact, aided by his unusual friendship with the Polish-born John Paul II, sprang from his knowledge of Moscow's “Achilles heel”—the fact that its nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, and satellite states, including Poland, yearned to shake off Moscow's grip. Neither a hawk nor a dove, Brzezinski was a biting critic of George W. Bush's Iraq War and an early endorser of Obama. Because he went against the DC grain of joining factions, and was on occasion willing to drop Democrats for Republicans, Brzezinski is something of history's orphan. His historic role has been greatly underweighted. In the almost cinematic arc of his life can be found the grand narrative of the American century and great power struggle that followed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a key architect of the Soviet Union's demise, which ended the Cold War. A child of Warsaw—the heart of central Europe's bloodlands—Brzezinski turned his fierce resentment at his homeland's razing by Nazi Germany and the Red Army into a lifelong quest for liberty. Born the year that Joseph Stalin consolidated power, and dying a few months into Donald Trump's first presidency, Brzezinski was shaped by and in turn shaped the global power struggles of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As counsel to US presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and chief foreign policy figure of the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski converted his acclaim as a Sovietologist into Washington power. With Henry Kissinger, his lifelong rival with whom he had a fraught on-off relationship, he personified the new breed of foreign-born scholar who thrived in America's “Cold War University”—and who ousted Washington's gentlemanly class of WASPs who had run US foreign policy for so long.Brzezinski's impact, aided by his unusual friendship with the Polish-born John Paul II, sprang from his knowledge of Moscow's “Achilles heel”—the fact that its nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, and satellite states, including Poland, yearned to shake off Moscow's grip. Neither a hawk nor a dove, Brzezinski was a biting critic of George W. Bush's Iraq War and an early endorser of Obama. Because he went against the DC grain of joining factions, and was on occasion willing to drop Democrats for Republicans, Brzezinski is something of history's orphan. His historic role has been greatly underweighted. In the almost cinematic arc of his life can be found the grand narrative of the American century and great power struggle that followed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/national-security

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a key architect of the Soviet Union's demise, which ended the Cold War. A child of Warsaw—the heart of central Europe's bloodlands—Brzezinski turned his fierce resentment at his homeland's razing by Nazi Germany and the Red Army into a lifelong quest for liberty. Born the year that Joseph Stalin consolidated power, and dying a few months into Donald Trump's first presidency, Brzezinski was shaped by and in turn shaped the global power struggles of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As counsel to US presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and chief foreign policy figure of the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski converted his acclaim as a Sovietologist into Washington power. With Henry Kissinger, his lifelong rival with whom he had a fraught on-off relationship, he personified the new breed of foreign-born scholar who thrived in America's “Cold War University”—and who ousted Washington's gentlemanly class of WASPs who had run US foreign policy for so long.Brzezinski's impact, aided by his unusual friendship with the Polish-born John Paul II, sprang from his knowledge of Moscow's “Achilles heel”—the fact that its nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, and satellite states, including Poland, yearned to shake off Moscow's grip. Neither a hawk nor a dove, Brzezinski was a biting critic of George W. Bush's Iraq War and an early endorser of Obama. Because he went against the DC grain of joining factions, and was on occasion willing to drop Democrats for Republicans, Brzezinski is something of history's orphan. His historic role has been greatly underweighted. In the almost cinematic arc of his life can be found the grand narrative of the American century and great power struggle that followed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a key architect of the Soviet Union's demise, which ended the Cold War. A child of Warsaw—the heart of central Europe's bloodlands—Brzezinski turned his fierce resentment at his homeland's razing by Nazi Germany and the Red Army into a lifelong quest for liberty. Born the year that Joseph Stalin consolidated power, and dying a few months into Donald Trump's first presidency, Brzezinski was shaped by and in turn shaped the global power struggles of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As counsel to US presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and chief foreign policy figure of the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski converted his acclaim as a Sovietologist into Washington power. With Henry Kissinger, his lifelong rival with whom he had a fraught on-off relationship, he personified the new breed of foreign-born scholar who thrived in America's “Cold War University”—and who ousted Washington's gentlemanly class of WASPs who had run US foreign policy for so long.Brzezinski's impact, aided by his unusual friendship with the Polish-born John Paul II, sprang from his knowledge of Moscow's “Achilles heel”—the fact that its nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, and satellite states, including Poland, yearned to shake off Moscow's grip. Neither a hawk nor a dove, Brzezinski was a biting critic of George W. Bush's Iraq War and an early endorser of Obama. Because he went against the DC grain of joining factions, and was on occasion willing to drop Democrats for Republicans, Brzezinski is something of history's orphan. His historic role has been greatly underweighted. In the almost cinematic arc of his life can be found the grand narrative of the American century and great power struggle that followed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a key architect of the Soviet Union's demise, which ended the Cold War. A child of Warsaw—the heart of central Europe's bloodlands—Brzezinski turned his fierce resentment at his homeland's razing by Nazi Germany and the Red Army into a lifelong quest for liberty. Born the year that Joseph Stalin consolidated power, and dying a few months into Donald Trump's first presidency, Brzezinski was shaped by and in turn shaped the global power struggles of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As counsel to US presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and chief foreign policy figure of the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski converted his acclaim as a Sovietologist into Washington power. With Henry Kissinger, his lifelong rival with whom he had a fraught on-off relationship, he personified the new breed of foreign-born scholar who thrived in America's “Cold War University”—and who ousted Washington's gentlemanly class of WASPs who had run US foreign policy for so long.Brzezinski's impact, aided by his unusual friendship with the Polish-born John Paul II, sprang from his knowledge of Moscow's “Achilles heel”—the fact that its nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, and satellite states, including Poland, yearned to shake off Moscow's grip. Neither a hawk nor a dove, Brzezinski was a biting critic of George W. Bush's Iraq War and an early endorser of Obama. Because he went against the DC grain of joining factions, and was on occasion willing to drop Democrats for Republicans, Brzezinski is something of history's orphan. His historic role has been greatly underweighted. In the almost cinematic arc of his life can be found the grand narrative of the American century and great power struggle that followed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, the surprise invasion of the Soviet Union that opened the Eastern Front in World War II. With lightning speed and devastating success, the German army tore through Soviet territory and rolled over the Red Army, scoring some of the most dramatic victories in military history--until the blitzkrieg bogged down during the approach on Moscow. At the spearhead of the attack was General Heinz Guderian, one of the most celebrated and controversial commanders of the war, who commanded a tank group in the center of the German front that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Guderian's Panzers reconstructs Barbarossa from the perspective of Generaloberst Guderian and his 2nd Panzer Group. With the German war machine at the height of its martial prowess in June 1941, Guderian's group of 250,000 men and 900 tanks rapidly broke through the Soviet frontier defenses and thrust some 600 kilometers into Soviet Russia in a matter of weeks--in doing so playing an integral part in the successful encirclement (cauldron) battles of Belostok-Minsk (June/July 1941) and Smolensk (July/August 1941); each of these battles resulting in the loss of several Soviet armies and hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Despite having sustained alarming losses of personal and equipment in these opening battles, Guderian pushed his men, and himself, to even greater achievements, culminating in the triumphant cauldron Battle of Kiev in the Ukraine (September 1941) that obliterated Soviet Southwestern Front and resulted in the capture of over 600,000 Red Army POWs. It was, perhaps, Germany's greatest victory in WWII, and Guderian had made it happen. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, the surprise invasion of the Soviet Union that opened the Eastern Front in World War II. With lightning speed and devastating success, the German army tore through Soviet territory and rolled over the Red Army, scoring some of the most dramatic victories in military history--until the blitzkrieg bogged down during the approach on Moscow. At the spearhead of the attack was General Heinz Guderian, one of the most celebrated and controversial commanders of the war, who commanded a tank group in the center of the German front that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Guderian's Panzers reconstructs Barbarossa from the perspective of Generaloberst Guderian and his 2nd Panzer Group. With the German war machine at the height of its martial prowess in June 1941, Guderian's group of 250,000 men and 900 tanks rapidly broke through the Soviet frontier defenses and thrust some 600 kilometers into Soviet Russia in a matter of weeks--in doing so playing an integral part in the successful encirclement (cauldron) battles of Belostok-Minsk (June/July 1941) and Smolensk (July/August 1941); each of these battles resulting in the loss of several Soviet armies and hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Despite having sustained alarming losses of personal and equipment in these opening battles, Guderian pushed his men, and himself, to even greater achievements, culminating in the triumphant cauldron Battle of Kiev in the Ukraine (September 1941) that obliterated Soviet Southwestern Front and resulted in the capture of over 600,000 Red Army POWs. It was, perhaps, Germany's greatest victory in WWII, and Guderian had made it happen. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, the surprise invasion of the Soviet Union that opened the Eastern Front in World War II. With lightning speed and devastating success, the German army tore through Soviet territory and rolled over the Red Army, scoring some of the most dramatic victories in military history--until the blitzkrieg bogged down during the approach on Moscow. At the spearhead of the attack was General Heinz Guderian, one of the most celebrated and controversial commanders of the war, who commanded a tank group in the center of the German front that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Guderian's Panzers reconstructs Barbarossa from the perspective of Generaloberst Guderian and his 2nd Panzer Group. With the German war machine at the height of its martial prowess in June 1941, Guderian's group of 250,000 men and 900 tanks rapidly broke through the Soviet frontier defenses and thrust some 600 kilometers into Soviet Russia in a matter of weeks--in doing so playing an integral part in the successful encirclement (cauldron) battles of Belostok-Minsk (June/July 1941) and Smolensk (July/August 1941); each of these battles resulting in the loss of several Soviet armies and hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Despite having sustained alarming losses of personal and equipment in these opening battles, Guderian pushed his men, and himself, to even greater achievements, culminating in the triumphant cauldron Battle of Kiev in the Ukraine (September 1941) that obliterated Soviet Southwestern Front and resulted in the capture of over 600,000 Red Army POWs. It was, perhaps, Germany's greatest victory in WWII, and Guderian had made it happen. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/german-studies

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, the surprise invasion of the Soviet Union that opened the Eastern Front in World War II. With lightning speed and devastating success, the German army tore through Soviet territory and rolled over the Red Army, scoring some of the most dramatic victories in military history--until the blitzkrieg bogged down during the approach on Moscow. At the spearhead of the attack was General Heinz Guderian, one of the most celebrated and controversial commanders of the war, who commanded a tank group in the center of the German front that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Guderian's Panzers reconstructs Barbarossa from the perspective of Generaloberst Guderian and his 2nd Panzer Group. With the German war machine at the height of its martial prowess in June 1941, Guderian's group of 250,000 men and 900 tanks rapidly broke through the Soviet frontier defenses and thrust some 600 kilometers into Soviet Russia in a matter of weeks--in doing so playing an integral part in the successful encirclement (cauldron) battles of Belostok-Minsk (June/July 1941) and Smolensk (July/August 1941); each of these battles resulting in the loss of several Soviet armies and hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Despite having sustained alarming losses of personal and equipment in these opening battles, Guderian pushed his men, and himself, to even greater achievements, culminating in the triumphant cauldron Battle of Kiev in the Ukraine (September 1941) that obliterated Soviet Southwestern Front and resulted in the capture of over 600,000 Red Army POWs. It was, perhaps, Germany's greatest victory in WWII, and Guderian had made it happen. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, the surprise invasion of the Soviet Union that opened the Eastern Front in World War II. With lightning speed and devastating success, the German army tore through Soviet territory and rolled over the Red Army, scoring some of the most dramatic victories in military history--until the blitzkrieg bogged down during the approach on Moscow. At the spearhead of the attack was General Heinz Guderian, one of the most celebrated and controversial commanders of the war, who commanded a tank group in the center of the German front that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Guderian's Panzers reconstructs Barbarossa from the perspective of Generaloberst Guderian and his 2nd Panzer Group. With the German war machine at the height of its martial prowess in June 1941, Guderian's group of 250,000 men and 900 tanks rapidly broke through the Soviet frontier defenses and thrust some 600 kilometers into Soviet Russia in a matter of weeks--in doing so playing an integral part in the successful encirclement (cauldron) battles of Belostok-Minsk (June/July 1941) and Smolensk (July/August 1941); each of these battles resulting in the loss of several Soviet armies and hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Despite having sustained alarming losses of personal and equipment in these opening battles, Guderian pushed his men, and himself, to even greater achievements, culminating in the triumphant cauldron Battle of Kiev in the Ukraine (September 1941) that obliterated Soviet Southwestern Front and resulted in the capture of over 600,000 Red Army POWs. It was, perhaps, Germany's greatest victory in WWII, and Guderian had made it happen. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/eastern-european-studies

Richard W. Harrison's The Soviet Army's High Commands in War and Peace, 1941-1992 (Casemate Academic, 2022) is the first full treatment of the unique phenomenon of High Commands in the Soviet Army during World War II and the Cold War. The war on the Eastern Front during 1941–45 was an immense struggle, running from the Barents Sea to the Caucasus Mountains. The vast distances involved forced the Soviet political-military leadership to resort to new organizational expedients in order to control operations along the extended front. These were the high commands of the directions, which were responsible for two or more fronts (army groups) and, along maritime axes, one or more fleets. In all, five high commands were created along the northwestern, western, southwestern, and North Caucasus strategic directions during 1941–42. However, the highly unfavorable strategic situation during the first year of the war, as well as interference in day-to-day operations by Stalin, severely limited the high commands' effectiveness. As a consequence, the high commands were abolished in mid-1942 and replaced by the more flexible system of supreme command representatives at the front. A High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East was established in 1945 and oversaw the Red Army's highly effective campaign against Japanese forces in Manchuria. The Far Eastern High Command was briefly resurrected in 1947 as a response to the tense situation along the Korean peninsula and the ongoing civil war in China, but was abolished in 1953, soon after Stalin's death. Growing tensions with China brought about the recreation of the Far Eastern High Command in 1979, followed a few years later by the appearance of new high commands in Europe and South Asia. However, these new high commands did not long survive the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and were abolished a year later. The book relies almost exclusively on Soviet and post-communist archival and other sources and is the first unclassified treatment of this subject in any country, East or West.Richard W. Harrison earned his Undergraduate and Master's degrees from Georgetown University, where he specialized in Russian Area Studies. He later earned his doctorate in War Studies from King's College London. He also was an exchange student in the former Soviet Union and spent several years living and working in post-communist Russia. He has taught Russian History and Military History at the US Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Harrison lives with his family near Carlisle, Pennsylvania.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

One way to examine the thinking and ruling style of Chinese President Xi Jinping: his father's role in the rise and evolution of Chinese-brand communism. Hoover research fellow Joseph Torigian, author of the recently released The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping, discusses how the elder Xi's involvement in the Red Army, economic political reform, working alongside Zhou Enlai and dealing with ethnic minorities and organized religion – plus years of political exile after running afoul of Maoist sensibilities – all play into how his son runs the modern-day Chinese Communist Party.

Richard W. Harrison's The Soviet Army's High Commands in War and Peace, 1941-1992 (Casemate Academic, 2022) is the first full treatment of the unique phenomenon of High Commands in the Soviet Army during World War II and the Cold War. The war on the Eastern Front during 1941–45 was an immense struggle, running from the Barents Sea to the Caucasus Mountains. The vast distances involved forced the Soviet political-military leadership to resort to new organizational expedients in order to control operations along the extended front. These were the high commands of the directions, which were responsible for two or more fronts (army groups) and, along maritime axes, one or more fleets. In all, five high commands were created along the northwestern, western, southwestern, and North Caucasus strategic directions during 1941–42. However, the highly unfavorable strategic situation during the first year of the war, as well as interference in day-to-day operations by Stalin, severely limited the high commands' effectiveness. As a consequence, the high commands were abolished in mid-1942 and replaced by the more flexible system of supreme command representatives at the front. A High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East was established in 1945 and oversaw the Red Army's highly effective campaign against Japanese forces in Manchuria. The Far Eastern High Command was briefly resurrected in 1947 as a response to the tense situation along the Korean peninsula and the ongoing civil war in China, but was abolished in 1953, soon after Stalin's death. Growing tensions with China brought about the recreation of the Far Eastern High Command in 1979, followed a few years later by the appearance of new high commands in Europe and South Asia. However, these new high commands did not long survive the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and were abolished a year later. The book relies almost exclusively on Soviet and post-communist archival and other sources and is the first unclassified treatment of this subject in any country, East or West.Richard W. Harrison earned his Undergraduate and Master's degrees from Georgetown University, where he specialized in Russian Area Studies. He later earned his doctorate in War Studies from King's College London. He also was an exchange student in the former Soviet Union and spent several years living and working in post-communist Russia. He has taught Russian History and Military History at the US Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Harrison lives with his family near Carlisle, Pennsylvania.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Richard W. Harrison's The Soviet Army's High Commands in War and Peace, 1941-1992 (Casemate Academic, 2022) is the first full treatment of the unique phenomenon of High Commands in the Soviet Army during World War II and the Cold War. The war on the Eastern Front during 1941–45 was an immense struggle, running from the Barents Sea to the Caucasus Mountains. The vast distances involved forced the Soviet political-military leadership to resort to new organizational expedients in order to control operations along the extended front. These were the high commands of the directions, which were responsible for two or more fronts (army groups) and, along maritime axes, one or more fleets. In all, five high commands were created along the northwestern, western, southwestern, and North Caucasus strategic directions during 1941–42. However, the highly unfavorable strategic situation during the first year of the war, as well as interference in day-to-day operations by Stalin, severely limited the high commands' effectiveness. As a consequence, the high commands were abolished in mid-1942 and replaced by the more flexible system of supreme command representatives at the front. A High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East was established in 1945 and oversaw the Red Army's highly effective campaign against Japanese forces in Manchuria. The Far Eastern High Command was briefly resurrected in 1947 as a response to the tense situation along the Korean peninsula and the ongoing civil war in China, but was abolished in 1953, soon after Stalin's death. Growing tensions with China brought about the recreation of the Far Eastern High Command in 1979, followed a few years later by the appearance of new high commands in Europe and South Asia. However, these new high commands did not long survive the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and were abolished a year later. The book relies almost exclusively on Soviet and post-communist archival and other sources and is the first unclassified treatment of this subject in any country, East or West.Richard W. Harrison earned his Undergraduate and Master's degrees from Georgetown University, where he specialized in Russian Area Studies. He later earned his doctorate in War Studies from King's College London. He also was an exchange student in the former Soviet Union and spent several years living and working in post-communist Russia. He has taught Russian History and Military History at the US Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Harrison lives with his family near Carlisle, Pennsylvania.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

Richard W. Harrison's The Soviet Army's High Commands in War and Peace, 1941-1992 (Casemate Academic, 2022) is the first full treatment of the unique phenomenon of High Commands in the Soviet Army during World War II and the Cold War. The war on the Eastern Front during 1941–45 was an immense struggle, running from the Barents Sea to the Caucasus Mountains. The vast distances involved forced the Soviet political-military leadership to resort to new organizational expedients in order to control operations along the extended front. These were the high commands of the directions, which were responsible for two or more fronts (army groups) and, along maritime axes, one or more fleets. In all, five high commands were created along the northwestern, western, southwestern, and North Caucasus strategic directions during 1941–42. However, the highly unfavorable strategic situation during the first year of the war, as well as interference in day-to-day operations by Stalin, severely limited the high commands' effectiveness. As a consequence, the high commands were abolished in mid-1942 and replaced by the more flexible system of supreme command representatives at the front. A High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East was established in 1945 and oversaw the Red Army's highly effective campaign against Japanese forces in Manchuria. The Far Eastern High Command was briefly resurrected in 1947 as a response to the tense situation along the Korean peninsula and the ongoing civil war in China, but was abolished in 1953, soon after Stalin's death. Growing tensions with China brought about the recreation of the Far Eastern High Command in 1979, followed a few years later by the appearance of new high commands in Europe and South Asia. However, these new high commands did not long survive the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and were abolished a year later. The book relies almost exclusively on Soviet and post-communist archival and other sources and is the first unclassified treatment of this subject in any country, East or West.Richard W. Harrison earned his Undergraduate and Master's degrees from Georgetown University, where he specialized in Russian Area Studies. He later earned his doctorate in War Studies from King's College London. He also was an exchange student in the former Soviet Union and spent several years living and working in post-communist Russia. He has taught Russian History and Military History at the US Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Harrison lives with his family near Carlisle, Pennsylvania.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/eastern-european-studies

The National Security Hour with Al Johnson – Today, we have many oligarch groups that are doing similar with the CCP. From selling NVIDIA chips to the Red Army, to the very land of our nation, to SCO axis members like Iran, Russia, and the CCP.  Land that is connected to OR WITHIN DRONE DISTANCE of critical infrastructure of almost every state in the US has been sold...

World War II endures in the popular imagination as a heroic struggle between good and evil, with villainous Hitler driving its events. But Hitler was not in power when the conflict erupted in Asia—and he was certainly dead before it ended. His armies did not fight in multiple theaters, his empire did not span the Eurasian continent, and he did not inherit any of the spoils of war. That central role belonged to Joseph Stalin. The Second World War was not Hitler's war; it was Stalin's war. Drawing on ambitious new research in Soviet, European, and US archives, Stalin's War: A New History of World War II (Basic Books, 2021) by award winning historian, Sean McMeekin, Professor of History at Bard College, revolutionizes our understanding of this global conflict by moving its epicenter to the east. Hitler's genocidal ambition may have helped unleash Armageddon, but as McMeekin shows, the war which emerged in Europe in September 1939 was the one Stalin wanted, not Hitler. So, too, did the Pacific war of 1941–1945 fulfill Stalin's goal of unleashing a devastating war of attrition between Japan and the “Anglo-Saxon” capitalist powers he viewed as his ultimate adversary. McMeekin also reveals the extent to which Soviet Communism was rescued by the US and Britain's self-defeating strategic moves, beginning with Lend-Lease aid, as American and British supply boards agreed almost blindly to every Soviet demand. Stalin's war machine, McMeekin shows, was substantially reliant on American materiél from warplanes, tanks, trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, fuel, ammunition, and explosives, to industrial inputs and technology transfer, to the foodstuffs which fed the Red Army. This unreciprocated American generosity gave Stalin's armies the mobile striking power to conquer most of Eurasia, from Berlin to Beijing, for Communism. A groundbreaking reassessment of the Second World War, Stalin's War is revisionist history at its very best: breaking down old paradigms and narratives and bringing to the fore new understandings of the historical process. All from a historian who has the best claim to be the closest, modern-day American equivalent of A. J. P. Taylor. Charles Coutinho Ph. D. of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

World War II endures in the popular imagination as a heroic struggle between good and evil, with villainous Hitler driving its events. But Hitler was not in power when the conflict erupted in Asia—and he was certainly dead before it ended. His armies did not fight in multiple theaters, his empire did not span the Eurasian continent, and he did not inherit any of the spoils of war. That central role belonged to Joseph Stalin. The Second World War was not Hitler's war; it was Stalin's war. Drawing on ambitious new research in Soviet, European, and US archives, Stalin's War: A New History of World War II (Basic Books, 2021) by award winning historian, Sean McMeekin, Professor of History at Bard College, revolutionizes our understanding of this global conflict by moving its epicenter to the east. Hitler's genocidal ambition may have helped unleash Armageddon, but as McMeekin shows, the war which emerged in Europe in September 1939 was the one Stalin wanted, not Hitler. So, too, did the Pacific war of 1941–1945 fulfill Stalin's goal of unleashing a devastating war of attrition between Japan and the “Anglo-Saxon” capitalist powers he viewed as his ultimate adversary. McMeekin also reveals the extent to which Soviet Communism was rescued by the US and Britain's self-defeating strategic moves, beginning with Lend-Lease aid, as American and British supply boards agreed almost blindly to every Soviet demand. Stalin's war machine, McMeekin shows, was substantially reliant on American materiél from warplanes, tanks, trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, fuel, ammunition, and explosives, to industrial inputs and technology transfer, to the foodstuffs which fed the Red Army. This unreciprocated American generosity gave Stalin's armies the mobile striking power to conquer most of Eurasia, from Berlin to Beijing, for Communism. A groundbreaking reassessment of the Second World War, Stalin's War is revisionist history at its very best: breaking down old paradigms and narratives and bringing to the fore new understandings of the historical process. All from a historian who has the best claim to be the closest, modern-day American equivalent of A. J. P. Taylor. Charles Coutinho Ph. D. of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

World War II endures in the popular imagination as a heroic struggle between good and evil, with villainous Hitler driving its events. But Hitler was not in power when the conflict erupted in Asia—and he was certainly dead before it ended. His armies did not fight in multiple theaters, his empire did not span the Eurasian continent, and he did not inherit any of the spoils of war. That central role belonged to Joseph Stalin. The Second World War was not Hitler's war; it was Stalin's war. Drawing on ambitious new research in Soviet, European, and US archives, Stalin's War: A New History of World War II (Basic Books, 2021) by award winning historian, Sean McMeekin, Professor of History at Bard College, revolutionizes our understanding of this global conflict by moving its epicenter to the east. Hitler's genocidal ambition may have helped unleash Armageddon, but as McMeekin shows, the war which emerged in Europe in September 1939 was the one Stalin wanted, not Hitler. So, too, did the Pacific war of 1941–1945 fulfill Stalin's goal of unleashing a devastating war of attrition between Japan and the “Anglo-Saxon” capitalist powers he viewed as his ultimate adversary. McMeekin also reveals the extent to which Soviet Communism was rescued by the US and Britain's self-defeating strategic moves, beginning with Lend-Lease aid, as American and British supply boards agreed almost blindly to every Soviet demand. Stalin's war machine, McMeekin shows, was substantially reliant on American materiél from warplanes, tanks, trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, fuel, ammunition, and explosives, to industrial inputs and technology transfer, to the foodstuffs which fed the Red Army. This unreciprocated American generosity gave Stalin's armies the mobile striking power to conquer most of Eurasia, from Berlin to Beijing, for Communism. A groundbreaking reassessment of the Second World War, Stalin's War is revisionist history at its very best: breaking down old paradigms and narratives and bringing to the fore new understandings of the historical process. All from a historian who has the best claim to be the closest, modern-day American equivalent of A. J. P. Taylor. Charles Coutinho Ph. D. of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/german-studies

The National Security Hour with Al Johnson – Today, we have many oligarch groups that are doing similar with the CCP. From selling NVIDIA chips to the Red Army, to the very land of our nation, to SCO axis members like Iran, Russia, and the CCP.  Land that is connected to OR WITHIN DRONE DISTANCE of critical infrastructure of almost every state in the US has been sold...

World War II endures in the popular imagination as a heroic struggle between good and evil, with villainous Hitler driving its events. But Hitler was not in power when the conflict erupted in Asia—and he was certainly dead before it ended. His armies did not fight in multiple theaters, his empire did not span the Eurasian continent, and he did not inherit any of the spoils of war. That central role belonged to Joseph Stalin. The Second World War was not Hitler's war; it was Stalin's war. Drawing on ambitious new research in Soviet, European, and US archives, Stalin's War: A New History of World War II (Basic Books, 2021) by award winning historian, Sean McMeekin, Professor of History at Bard College, revolutionizes our understanding of this global conflict by moving its epicenter to the east. Hitler's genocidal ambition may have helped unleash Armageddon, but as McMeekin shows, the war which emerged in Europe in September 1939 was the one Stalin wanted, not Hitler. So, too, did the Pacific war of 1941–1945 fulfill Stalin's goal of unleashing a devastating war of attrition between Japan and the “Anglo-Saxon” capitalist powers he viewed as his ultimate adversary. McMeekin also reveals the extent to which Soviet Communism was rescued by the US and Britain's self-defeating strategic moves, beginning with Lend-Lease aid, as American and British supply boards agreed almost blindly to every Soviet demand. Stalin's war machine, McMeekin shows, was substantially reliant on American materiél from warplanes, tanks, trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, fuel, ammunition, and explosives, to industrial inputs and technology transfer, to the foodstuffs which fed the Red Army. This unreciprocated American generosity gave Stalin's armies the mobile striking power to conquer most of Eurasia, from Berlin to Beijing, for Communism. A groundbreaking reassessment of the Second World War, Stalin's War is revisionist history at its very best: breaking down old paradigms and narratives and bringing to the fore new understandings of the historical process. All from a historian who has the best claim to be the closest, modern-day American equivalent of A. J. P. Taylor. Charles Coutinho Ph. D. of the Royal Historical Society, received his doctorate from New York University. His area of specialization is 19th and 20th-century European, American diplomatic and political history. He has written for Chatham House's International Affairs, the Institute of Historical Research's Reviews in History and the University of Rouen's online periodical Cercles. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

Here are the 3 Big things you need to know this hour—   Number One— In Russia – Bad news as the Red Army unleashed it's biggest attacks on Ukraine yet—bombarding the nation with missiles, rockets and drones—the war there is dragging on—   Number Two— Good News—While you were looking the other way—President Trump delivered another peace deal—this one ending a 30 year war between Rwanda and the Congo—that's right a peace deal with benefits for America too—   Number Three— We must take a deep dive into the rise of a Ugandan Communist to be on track to become Mayor of New York City—

The end of the Battle of Kursk did not mean the end of the Red Army advance. The Germans withdrew, but the Red Army just kept coming.

Last time we spoke about Japan's preparations for War. In late 1936, tensions soared in China as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was detained by dissenting commanders who were frustrated with his focus on communism instead of the growing Japanese threat. Faced with escalating Japanese aggression, these leaders forced Chiang into a reluctant alliance with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a pivotal shift in China's strategy. Despite this union, China remained unprepared, lacking sufficient military supplies and modern equipment. Conversely, Japan, wary of Chinese modernization efforts, pushed for a preemptive strike to dismantle Chiang's regime before it could pose a serious threat. As aggressive military exercises intensified, Japan underestimated Chinese resilience. By spring 1937, both nations found themselves on the brink of war, with Japan's divided military leadership struggling to formulate a coherent strategy. Ultimately, these miscalculations would lead to the full-scale Sino-Japanese War, altering the course of history in East Asia.   #154 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Here we are at last, the beginning of the absolute cataclysm between China and Japan. Now as many of you know I run the Pacific War week by week podcast, which technically covers the second sino-japanese war, nearly to a T. So for this podcast I want to try and portray the event from the Chinese and Japanese point of view, but not in the rather dry manner of the other podcast. In the other podcast I am hampered by the week by week format and can never dig deep into the nitty gritty as they say. On the same hand I don't want to simply regurgitate every single battle of this conflict, it would be absolutely nuts. So bear with me friends as we fall down in the rabbit hole of madness together, who knows how long it will take to get out. On the night of July 7, 1937, at approximately 19:30, the 8th Squadron of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment of the Hebian Brigade of the Japanese Army, stationed in Fengtai and led by Squadron Leader Shimizu Seiro, conducted a military exercise, heading toward Lungwangmiao, approximately just under a mile northwest of the Marco Polo Bridge The exercise simulated an operation to capture the bridge. As you may have guessed it was named after the Italian explorer Marco Polo, who described it in his travels, the bridge is renowned for its intricate carvings of lions and other sculptures. However after 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge would be far less known for its history dealing with the venetian explorer and more so with an event that many would contend to be the start of WW2. At that time, troops from Japan, Britain, France, and Italy were stationed near Peiping in accordance with the Boxer Protocol of 1901. The Japanese China Garrison Army, comprising around 4,000 soldiers and commanded by Lieutenant-General Tashiro Kan'ichirō, was based in Tientsin. Its mission was to "maintain communication lines between Peiping and the seaports in the Gulf of Chihli and to protect Japanese citizens living in key areas of North China." The protocol also permitted the garrison forces of the signatory nations to conduct field drills and rifle practice without notifying the Chinese authorities, with the exception of cases involving live fire. During this period, Japanese troops were conducting nightly exercises in anticipation of a scheduled review on July 9. The night maneuver was within the army's rights under the Boxer Protocol and was not an illegal act, as later claimed by the Chinese. However, the Japanese army had courteously informed the Chinese authorities about its training plans in advance. Despite this, the atmosphere was charged with tension, and the Japanese decision to use blank ammunition during their night exercise further escalated the already volatile situation. Earlier that evening, Captain Shimizu Setsurö, a company commander, arrived at the banks of the Yungting River, where the maneuver was to take place. He noticed that the site looked different since the last exercise had occurred; Chinese troops had recently constructed new trenches and parapets from the embankment to the Lungwangmiao shelter. While eating his dinner and surveying the area, Shimizu felt a sense of unease, harboring a premonition that “something might happen that night.” After completing the first stage of the maneuver around 10:30 PM, several live rounds were fired into the assembled company from the direction of the riverbank. Shimizu immediately conducted a roll call and found one soldier missing. He promptly sent a messenger to inform the battalion commander. The exercise was then called off, and the company moved eastward to await further orders at Hsiwulitien. Battalion Commander Itsuki Kiyonaho, upon receiving the report, deemed the situation serious. Aside from the gunfire heard in the darkness from an unknown source, he expressed concern over the soldier's disappearance and sought permission from Regiment Commander Mutaguchi Renya, an absolute moron, if you listen to the pacific war podcast, well you know. Anyways to relocate the battalion to the area where the shots had been fired and to establish surveillance. As dawn approached, the troops heard several more gunshots. Within twenty minutes of the soldier's disappearance, he returned to his ranks, but Shimizu did not report this update until four hours later. Meanwhile, midnight negotiations included a Japanese request for permission to search the city of Wanping, leading both sides to believe the incident was significant. Around 11:00 PM, the Japanese forces falsely reported that one of their soldiers had gone missing during the drill and demanded permission to enter the city for a search. This request was firmly denied by Ji Xingwen, the commander of the 219th Regiment of the 37th Division of the Chinese Army. In response, Japanese troops swiftly surrounded Wanping County. To prevent further escalation, at 2:00 AM the following morning, Qin Dechun, deputy commander of the 29th Army and mayor of Beiping, agreed with the Japanese to allow both sides to send personnel for an investigation. While Matsui, the head of the Japanese secret service in Peiping, was negotiating with North Chinese authorities based on unverified reports from Japanese troops in Fengtai, Ikki Kiyonao, the battalion commander of the Japanese garrison in Fengtai, had already reported to his regiment commander, Mutaguchi Lianya. The latter approved orders for the Japanese troops in Fengtai to “immediately move out” to the Marco Polo Bridge.  On July 8, a large contingent of Japanese troops appeared at Lugou Bridge. Shen Zhongming, the platoon leader of the 10th Company of the Reserve Force of the 3rd Battalion of the 219th Regiment of the 37th Division of the 29th Army, was assisting in guarding the bridgehead. He jumped out of the trench, stood in front of the bunker, and raised his right hand to halt the advancing Japanese troops. However, the Japanese military threatened to search for their missing soldiers, pushed forward, and opened fire. Shen Zhongming was shot and died on the spot. At 4:50 AM, the Japanese army launched a fierce assault on Wanping County, capturing Shagang in the northeast of Wanping and firing the first shot of the siege. Unable to withstand the aggression, the Chinese defenders mounted a counterattack. That day, the Japanese army assaulted Wanping City three times, targeting the Pinghan Railway Bridge and the Chinese defenders at the Huilong Temple position on the left. He Jifeng, the commander of the 110th Brigade of the Chinese defenders, issued a resolute order to “live and die with the bridge” and personally commanded the front-line battle. The Chinese defenders engaged in fierce combat, fighting valiantly despite exhausting their ammunition and resorting to hand-to-hand combat with swords against the Japanese soldiers. Tragically, over 80 Chinese defenders from two platoons were killed at the bridgehead. On the same day, the Beijing authorities instructed the garrison to hold firm at the Marco Polo Bridge. Song Queyuan sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek to report the true events of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The National Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a verbal protest with the Japanese ambassador regarding the incident. Additionally, the CPC Central Committee issued a telegram urging all Chinese soldiers and civilians to unite and resist Japanese aggression. The Japanese cabinet, in a bid to mislead global public opinion, proposed a so-called policy of “resolving the incident locally without escalating it,” aiming to paralyze the KMT authorities and buy time to mobilize additional forces. In the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, generals of the 29th Army, including Qin Dechun, Feng Zhian, and Zhang Zizhong, convened an emergency meeting. Following their discussions, they issued a statement demanding that their troops withdraw from the Marco Polo Bridge to de-escalate tensions. However, they expressed deep concerns about national sovereignty, stating, “We cannot simply back down. If they continue to oppress us, we will do our utmost to defend ourselves.” Concurrently, the 29th Army commanded the troops defending the Marco Polo Bridge: “The Marco Polo Bridge is your grave. You must live and die with the bridge and must not retreat.” Brigade Commander He Jifeng reinforced three directives for the defenders:  1. Do not allow the Japanese army to enter the city;  2. Firmly counterattack if the Japanese invade;  3. You are responsible for defending the territory and will never yield. If you abandon your position, you will face military law. On July 9, the 29th Army successfully eliminated a Japanese squadron and reclaimed control of the railway bridge and Longwang Temple. A temporary lull settled over the Marco Polo Bridge battlefield, during which the Japanese military made false claims that "missing Japanese soldiers had returned to their units" and described the situation as a misunderstanding that could be resolved peacefully. Subsequently, Chinese and Japanese representatives in Beijing and Tianjin engaged in negotiations. The Beijing authorities reached an agreement with the Japanese forces, which included:  (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities by both parties;  (2) the Japanese army withdrawing to the left bank of the Yongding River while the Chinese army retreated to the right bank; and  (3) the defense of Lugou Bridge being assigned to Shi Yousan's unit of the Hebei Security Team. However, the following day, while the Chinese army withdrew as agreed, the Japanese army not only failed to uphold its commitments but also dispatched a significant number of troops to launch an offensive against the Chinese forces. Reports on July 10 indicated that the Japanese army had arrived from Tianjin, Gubeikou, Yuguan, and other locations, advancing toward the Lugou Bridge with artillery and tanks, and had occupied Dajing Village and Wulidian, signaling that another outbreak of conflict was imminent. On July 11, the Japanese Cabinet decided to deploy seven divisions from the Kwantung Army, the Korean Army, and Japan to North China. On the same day, the Beiping-Tianjin authorities reached a localized agreement with the Japanese army, which entailed:  (1) a formal apology from a representative of the 29th Army to the Japanese forces, along with assurances that those responsible for the initial conflict would be held accountable;  (2) a ban on anti-Japanese activities conducted by the Communist Party, the Blue Shirts Society, and other resistance groups; and  (3) an agreement ensuring that no Chinese troops would be stationed east of the Yongding River. Concurrently, the Japanese army positioned their forces at strategic points in Wuqing, Fengtai, Wanping, and Changping, effectively encircling the city of Beijing and continuing to advance troops into its surrounding suburbs. Starting on July 11, the Japanese army began bombarding Wanping City and its surrounding areas with artillery, resulting in numerous casualties among the local population. Following the injury of regiment commander Ji Xingwen, residents were evacuated to safer locations outside the city. The conflict then spread to Babaoshan, Changxindian, Langfang, Yangcun, and other areas, with the 29th Army being deployed to various locations to confront the enemy. The Japanese military also dispatched aircraft for reconnaissance and strafing missions, leading to intermittent fighting. On July 13, Mao Zedong urged "every Communist Party member and anti-Japanese revolutionary to be prepared to mobilize to the frontline of the anti-Japanese war at any time" from Yan'an. By July 15, a CPC representative presented the "Communist Party Declaration on Cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party" to Chiang Kai-shek, proposing that this declaration serve as the political foundation for cooperation between the two parties and be publicly issued by the Kuomintang. Zhou Enlai, Qin Bangxian, and Lin Boqu continued negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, Shao Lizi, and Zhang Chong in Lushan. Although Chiang Kai-shek recognized the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, disagreements remained regarding the reorganization of the Red Army. On July 16, the Five Ministers Conference in Tokyo resolved to mobilize 400,000 Japanese troops to invade China and to enforce a policy aimed at rapidly destroying the entire country. The following day, more than 100 Japanese soldiers arrived in Shunyi and Changping, where they reinforced fortifications on the city wall of Changping. On July 18, the Japanese army invaded Changping, Tongzhou, and other counties in the pseudo-border areas by maneuvering through various passes of the Great Wall. Japanese plainclothes teams were reported to be active in the Xiaotangshan area of Changping, raising alert levels within the Chinese army. On July 20, the Kuomintang Military and Political Department became aware that the Japanese army intended to first occupy strategic locations such as the Indigo Factory, Wanshou Mountain, and Balizhuang in the Pingxi area, before cutting off the Pingsui Road and controlling the route from Beiping to Changping. On July 21, the Japanese army violated the agreement by bombarding Wanping County and the garrison at Changxindian.  On the night of July 25, a confrontation took place at the railway station in Langfang, located between Peiping and Tientsin. The clash involved Chinese troops and a Japanese company dispatched to repair telegraph lines. General Kazuki promptly sought Tokyo's permission to respond with military force, believing that the situation required immediate action. Without waiting for authorization, he ordered a regiment from Tientsin to engage the Chinese forces and issued an ultimatum to Sung Che-yuan, stating that if the 37th Division did not completely withdraw from Peiping by noon on July 28, the Garrison Army would take unilateral action. The 77th Infantry Regiment of the 20th Division was dispatched with the Gonoi Squadron to escort a repair team to Langfang Station. Stationed near Langfang were the headquarters of the 113th Brigade of the 38th Division, along with the main force of the 226th Regiment, led by Brigade Commander Liu Zhensan and Regiment Commander Cui Zhenlun. Although the leadership of the 29th Army adopted a passive stance in the war of resistance, the forces in Langfang prepared for conflict in an organized manner. They not only evacuated the families of servicemen and relocated the regiment headquarters, but also built fortifications and deployed plainclothes teams at Wanzhuang Station, Luofa Station, and Langfang Station to swiftly destroy the railway if necessary. Despite their preparations, the commanders of the 38th Division adhered to Song Queyuan's directives. When the 5th Company, stationed at Yangcun, observed Japanese supply units continually moving toward Lugou Bridge, they sought permission to engage the enemy. However, the 38th Division later reassigned this company. The Bac Ninh Line, established after the Boxer Protocol, had granted the Japanese the right to station troops, placing the 38th Division in a vulnerable position and preventing them from stopping the Japanese before they reached Langfang. Upon the arrival of Japanese forces at Langfang Station, Chinese guards initiated negotiations, requesting the Japanese to withdraw quickly after completing their mission. The Japanese, however, insisted on establishing camps outside the station, leading to repeated arguments. As tensions mounted, the Japanese began constructing positions near the station, ultimately forcing Chinese troops to retreat and escalating the conflict. The situation reached a boiling point around 11:10 pm, when fierce gunfire and explosions erupted near Langfang Station. The Japanese army claimed they were defending the station from an attack by Chinese forces armed with rifles, machine guns, and mortars throughout the night. According to Cui Zhenlun, the head of the 226th Regiment, it was the 9th and 10th companies that could no longer tolerate the Japanese provocation and fired first, catching the enemy off guard. As the battle intensified, reinforcements from the main force of the 77th Infantry Regiment “Li Deng Unit” arrived at the scene after receiving reports of the skirmish and gradually joined the fight after 6:30 am on July 26. When dawn broke, Japanese troops stationed at Langfang began to rush out to counterattack, seeing their reinforcements arrive. Recognizing they could not eliminate the Japanese presence at the station quickly, the 226th Regiment faced heavy bombardment from the Japanese Air Force later that morning. Consequently, the headquarters of the 113th Brigade and the primary forces of the 226th Regiment hastily retreated to Tongbai Town, suffering significant losses in equipment during their withdrawal. That night, Kazuki made the unilateral decision to abandon the policy of restraint and decided to use force on July 28 "to punish the Chinese troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area." On the morning of July 27, the army high command endorsed his decision and submitted a plan to the cabinet for mobilizing divisions in Japan. The cabinet agreed, and imperial approval was sought. At that time, the Chinese army was gathering in significant numbers in Baoding and Shijiazhuang in southern Hebei, as well as in Datong, Shanxi. They had effectively surrounded the Japanese army on all sides in the Fengtai District. Meanwhile, newly mobilized units of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Korean Army were en route to the Tianjin and Beiping areas. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd China Garrison Infantry Regiment, commanded by Major Hirobe, was dispatched with 26 trucks to the Japanese barracks within the walls of Beiping to ensure the protection of Japanese residents. Prior discussions had taken place between Takuro Matsui, head of the Special Service Agency, and officials from the Hebei–Chahar Political Council regarding the passage of troops through the Guang'anmen gate just outside Beiping. The mayor, Qin Dechun, had granted approval for this movement. However, when Major Tokutaro Sakurai, a military and political advisor to the Council, arrived at Guang'anmen, a famous gate to Beiping, around 6:00 pm to establish contact, he found that the Chinese troops on guard had closed the gate. After further negotiations, the gates were opened at approximately 7:30 pm, allowing the Japanese units to begin passing through. Unfortunately, as the first three trucks crossed, the Chinese opened fire on them. Two-thirds of the units managed to get through before the gate was abruptly shut, leaving a portion of Hirobe's troops trapped both inside and outside. As they faced unexpectedly heavy fire from machine guns and grenades, efforts by Japanese and Chinese advisors to pacify the Chinese troops proved futile. By 8:00 pm, the Japanese launched a counterattack from both sides of the gate. The Chinese received reinforcements and encircled the Japanese forces. Despite a relief column being dispatched by Brigadier Masakazu Kawabe, commander of the brigade in the Fengtai District, by 9:30 pm, negotiations with the Chinese yielded a proposal for de-escalation: the Chinese army would maintain a distance while the Japanese inside the gate would relocate to the grounds of their legation, and those outside would return to Fengtai. Fighting ceased shortly after 10:00 pm, and at approximately 2:00 am the following day, Hirobe's unit successfully entered the barracks in the legation. The total casualties reported for the Japanese army during these confrontations were 2 dead and 17 wounded. Both fatalities were superior privates. The wounded included one major, one captain, one sergeant, two superior privates, one private first class, seven privates second class, two attached civilians, and one news reporter. Additionally, the interpreter accompanying Tokutaro Sakurai was also killed in action. On July 27, the Japanese army launched attacks on the 29th Army garrisons in Tongxian, Tuanhe, Xiaotangshan, and other locations, forcing the defenders to retreat to Nanyuan and Beiyuan. At 8:00 am on July 28, under the command of Army Commander Kiyoshi Kozuki, the Japanese army initiated a general assault on the 29th Army in the Beiping area. The primary attacking force, the 20th Division, supported by aircraft and artillery, targeted the 29th Army Special Brigade, the 114th Brigade of the 38th Division, and the 9th Cavalry Division stationed in Nanyuan. Overwhelmed by the Japanese assault, Nanyuan's defenders struggled to maintain command, leading to chaotic individual combat. Meanwhile, the main Japanese garrison brigade in Fengtai advanced to Dahongmen, effectively cutting off the Nanyuan troops' route to the city and blocking their retreat. The battle for Nanyuan concluded at 1:00 pm, resulting in the deaths of Tong Lingge, deputy commander of the 29th Army, and Zhao Dengyu, commander of the 132nd Division. As this unfolded, elements of the 37th Division of the 29th Army launched an attack on the Japanese forces in Fengtai but were repulsed by Japanese reinforcements. On that day, the Japanese Army's 1st Independent Mixed Brigade captured Qinghe Town, prompting the 2nd Brigade of the Hebei-Northern Security Force, stationed there, to retreat to Huangsi. The Japanese also occupied Shahe. In the afternoon of July 28, Song Qeyuan appointed Zhang Zizhong as the acting chairman of the Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs Committee and director of the Hebei-Chahar Pacification Office, as well as the mayor of Beiping, before leaving the city for Baoding that evening. The 37th Division was ordered to retreat to Baoding. On July 29th, a significant mutiny broke out at Tongzhou. If you remember our episode covering the Tanggu truce, Tongzhou had become the capital of the East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government headed by Yin Jukeng. In response Chiang Kai-Shek had established the East Hebei Administrative Affairs Committee, chaired by Song Queyuan. In Tongzhou, Japanese troops were stationed under the pretext of protecting Japanese residents, as stipulated by the Boxer Protocol. Initially, a unit was intended to be stationed in Tongzhou; however, Vice Minister of the Army Umezu Yoshijiro strongly opposed this plan, arguing that placing forces in Tongzhou, far from the Beiping-Tianjin Line was inconsistent with the spirit of the Boxer Protocol. Consequently, this unit was stationed in Fengtai, located southwest of Beiping. At the time of the Tongzhou Incident, the main force of the Japanese Second Regiment, which was responsible for defending Tongzhou, had been deployed to Nanyuan, south of Beijing. Consequently, only non-combat personnel remained in Tongzhou. Japan regarded the Jidong Anti-Communist Autonomous Government Security Force as a friendly ally. Back on July 27, the primary forces of the Japanese Army stationed in Tongzhou, comprising the Kayashima Unit and the Koyama Artillery Unit, received orders to advance toward Nanyuan, Beiping, leaving Tongzhou significantly under-defended. The following day, the Japanese launched a substantial attack on Nanyuan, employing aircraft to bomb Beiping. Sensing a critical opportunity, Zhang Qingyu conferred with Zhang Yantian and Shen Weigan to initiate an uprising that very night. The insurgent force included elements from the first and second corps and the teaching corps, totaling approximately 4,000 personnel. Zhang Qingyu orchestrated the uprising with a focused strategy: the first corps was divided into three groups targeting Japanese forces in Xicang, the puppet government, and various establishments such as opium dens, casinos, and brothels operated by Japanese ronin. Meanwhile, the second corps secured key intersections and facilities in Chengguan, and the teaching corps managed defenses against potential reinforcements at vital stations. At dawn on July 29, the gunfire signaling the uprising erupted. The second unit of the first corps launched an assault on the Xicang Barracks, which housed 120 troops and non-combat personnel, including the Tongzhou Guard, Yamada Motor Vehicle Unit, a Military Police Detachment, and a host of military and police units, totaling about 500 individuals. At around 3 a.m. on July 29, the sound of gunfire filled the air as the insurgents engaged the Japanese forces. Although equipped with only four field guns, several mortars, and a few heavy machine guns, the uprising's numerical superiority enabled simultaneous attacks from the east, south, and northwest. Despite their well-fortified positions and rigorous defense, the Japanese troops struggled against the relentless onslaught. For over six hours, fierce fighting ensued. The uprising troops escalated their firepower but failed to breach the Xicang Barracks initially. More than 200 members of the Japanese security forces lost their lives in the conflict. Concerned that reinforcements might arrive and flank the uprising, Zhang Qingyu ordered artillery assaults around 11 a.m., prompting a shift in the battle's dynamics. The artillery targeted a Japanese motor vehicle convoy transporting supplies and munitions, leading to the destruction of all 17 vehicles, triggering explosions that scattered bullets and shrapnel across the area. Subsequently, nearby fuel depots ignited, engulfing the surroundings in flames and creating chaos among Japanese ranks. The insurgent infantry capitalized on this confusion, wiping out most of the remaining Japanese forces, with only a handful managing to escape. As the uprising signal rang out, another faction of insurgents swiftly blocked access to Tongzhou, disrupting traffic and occupying the telecommunications bureau and radio station. They encircled the offices of the Jidong puppet government, capturing traitor Yin Rugeng, who was taken to the Beiguan Lu Zu Temple. Despite being urged to resist the Japanese, Yin hesitated and was subsequently imprisoned. The third group then targeted the Japanese secret service agency in Nishicang. Hosoki Shigeru, residing a mere lane away from the pseudo-office, responded to the gunfire by mobilizing a contingent of secret agents to confront the uprising. However, the insurgents swiftly overtook the secret service agency, resulting in Shigeru's death and the annihilation of all secret personnel. At 4:00 p.m. on July 29, the Japanese command dispatched reinforcements, compelling the insurgents to retreat from Tongzhou. The Japanese Chinese Garrison ordered air attacks on the uprising forces, with over ten bombers targeting Tongzhou. Concurrently, the Japanese Fengtai Infantry Brigade and the Second Regiment were mobilized for a rescue operation, arriving on the morning of July 30. The Japanese headquarters issued a night defense order requiring all units to be on high alert. By 5:30 p.m., commanding officers assembled to devise a strategy. With the uprising forces still positioned around the eastern, southern, and northern walls of the barracks, Tsujimura's troops implemented strict measures: all units were instructed to fortify defenses throughout the night, with the Tongzhou Guard directly protecting the barracks and the Yamada unit securing the warehouse and supply areas. They enforced silence, prohibiting any lights at night, coordinating operations under the code name "plum cherry." As the Japanese planes repeatedly bombed the area, the insurgents, lacking anti-aircraft defenses, could only mount futile counterattacks with machine guns, leading to disorder among their ranks. Many insurgents abandoned their uniforms and weapons and fled, prompting Zhang Qingyu to make the difficult decision to evacuate Tongzhou before Japanese reinforcements arrived, regrouping in Beiping with the remnants of the 29th Army. In the late hours of July 29, the security team retreated to Beiping in two groups. Upon arrival, they discovered the 29th Army had already evacuated, forcing them to retreat to Changxindian and Baoding. En route, they encountered part of the Suzuki Brigade of the Japanese Kwantung Army near Beiyuan and Xizhimen, where they faced concentrated attacks. Officers Shen Weigan and Zhang Hanming were both killed in the subsequent battles as they led their teams in desperate fights for survival. Amid the confusion, Yin Rugeng managed to escape when the convoy escorting him was broken up by Japanese forces. In a last-ditch effort, Zhang Qingyu ordered the army to split into small groups of 50 to 60, navigating through Mentougou to regroup with the 29th Army. By the time they reached Baoding, only about 4,000 personnel remained. On the morning of July 30, over a thousand troops from the Sakai Army entered Tongzhou City. They rounded up all men they encountered, searching residences for insurgents, and exhibited intentions of massacring the local population. By 4 p.m., the Kayashima Army arrived and sealed all city gates, deploying surveillance units to oversee the city and "restore public order." The Tsujimura Army removed perimeter defenses and concentrated their forces in barracks and storage facilities. Japanese troops combed through residences based on household registries, detaining those they deemed suspicious, with many later executed. As reported by the puppet county magistrate Wang Jizhang, roughly 700 to 800 individuals were executed within a few days. This brutal retaliation instilled terror throughout Tongzhou City, leading many to flee and seek refuge, often in American churches. The pervasive atmosphere of fear lasted for two to three months. The Japanese authorities framed their violent suppression as "restoring stability to East Asia" and derided the legitimate resistance of Chinese citizens as "communist harassment" and "treason." In response to the uprising, the Japanese embassy, concerned that it could trigger a repeat of the Temple Street Incident and instigate political upheaval at home, acted without government instructions. They appointed Morishima Morito to oversee negotiations with Chi Zongmo, who had replaced Yin Rugeng as the head of the "Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government." On December 24, 1937, Chi submitted a formal apology to the Japanese embassy, committing to pay a total of 1.2 million yuan in reparations, with an immediate payment of 400,000 yuan, while the remaining 800,000 yuan would be disbursed by the "Provisional Government of the Republic of China." Furthermore, the Japanese demanded that the "Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government" relinquish the territories where Japanese nationals had been killed and take responsibility for constructing "comfort towers." They compelled Chinese laborers to build these structures at the former site of the Governor's Office of Canal Transport in Shuiyueyuan Hutong, Nanmenli, and the northeastern corner of Xicang Square to commemorate Japanese casualties from the uprising. Additionally, they forcibly uprooted ancient trees from the Temple of Heaven, transplanting them around the "comfort towers." The Japanese military also demolished white marble guardrails at the Confucian Temple to erect a monument honoring their soldiers, resulting in the destruction of centuries-old cultural artifacts. On the morning of July 29, the Japanese Army's 11th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked Beiyuan and Huangsi. The Hebei-Northern Security Force, stationed in Huangsi, engaged the Japanese forces until 6:00 PM before retreating. Meanwhile, the 39th Independent Brigade, garrisoned in Beiyuan, fought the Japanese before withdrawing to Gucheng, eventually returning to Beiyuan. On July 31, this brigade was disarmed by the Japanese army, while the Independent 27th Brigade in the city was reorganized into a security team to maintain public order, later breaking through to Chahar Province a few days later and being assigned to the 143rd Division. Meanwhile, the 38th Division of the 29th Army, stationed in Tianjin, proactively attacked Japanese troops in Tianjin early on July 29, capturing the Japanese garrison at Tianjin General Station and launching an assault on the Japanese headquarters at Haiguang Temple and the Dongjuzi Airport. Initially, the battle progressed favorably; however, due to counterattacks from Japanese aircraft and artillery, the Chinese forces began to retreat around 3:00 PM, leading to the fall of Tianjin. Later that afternoon, the rebel forces evacuated Tong County and advanced toward Beiping. En route, they were attacked by the Japanese army north of the city and subsequently retreated to Baoding. As the 37th Division of the 29th Army received orders to retreat southward, the 110th Brigade covered the army headquarters and the Beiping troops from Wanping to Babaoshan, eventually retreating southward through Mentougou. After completing their task, they withdrew to Baoding on July 30. By the end of the 30th, the Japanese army had occupied both Beiping and Tianjin. The Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 1 and the garrison brigade occupied high ground west of Changxindian and the area near Dahuichang on the evenings of the 30th and 31st, respectively. With this, the battles in Beiping and Tianjin effectively came to a close. China and Japan were at war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. It has finally happened, China and Japan are officially at war. From 1931 until now, it had been an unofficial war between the two, yet another incident had finally broke the camel's back. There was no turning back as Japan would unleash horror upon the Chinese people. The fight for China's survival had begun. China was completely alone against a fierce enemy, how would she manage? 

What was life like in Berlin in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War? Why did the Red Army steal taps from Berlin houses when they reached the city? Was the famous photo of the red flag on the Reichstag staged or authentic? Anita and William are joined by Giles Milton, author of Checkmate in Berlin: The Cold War Showdown That Shaped the Modern World, to discuss the division and destitution of the capital city after the Second World War.  ----------------- Empire Club: Become a member of the Empire Club to receive early access to miniseries, ad-free listening, early access to live show tickets, bonus episodes, book discounts, our exclusive newsletter, and access to our members' chatroom on Discord! Head to empirepoduk.com to sign up. For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com.  ----------------- Email: empire@goalhanger.com Instagram: @empirepoduk  Blue Sky: @empirepoduk  X: @empirepoduk Assistant Producer: Becki Hills Producer: Anouska Lewis Senior Producer: Callum Hill Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Today, we are exploring a topic that doesn't get talked about much — the British tanks that ended up serving with the Red Army during the Second World War. We often think about the Soviet Union producing huge numbers of its own tanks like the T-34, but in the early years of the war—and even before it—the Soviets were looking abroad for armoured vehicles to strengthen their forces. Britain, with its long history of tank development stretching back to the First World War, was one of the countries they turned to. Joining me is Peter Samsonov, who's spent a lot of time researching Soviet armoured warfare and is the author of 'British Tanks of the Red Army'.   patreon.com/ww2podcast  

SAME 1939 GAME PLAN TODAY: SET ALL AGAINST ALL AND GRAB WHAT WE CAN   6/8: Stalin's War: A New History of World War II, Sean McMeekin, with Kevin Stillwell as narrator. Published by Basic Books.  Audible Audiobook – Unabridged https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/392db86e-7d65-4c5d-b2a9-b781d5ee7250?shareToken=99d9180db57c2304848bc11f23ff97dc World War II:  Hitler was not in power when the conflict erupted in Asia—and he was certainly dead before it ended. His armies did not fight in multiple theaters, his empire did not span the Eurasian continent, and he did not inherit any of the spoils of war. That central role belonged to Joseph Stalin. The Second World War was not Hitler's war; it was Stalin's war: Drawing on ambitious new research in Soviet, European, and US archives, Stalin's War revolutionizes our understanding of this global conflict by moving its epicenter to the east. Hitler's genocidal ambition may have helped unleash Armageddon, but as McMeekin shows, the war which emerged in Europe in September 1939 was the one Stalin wanted, not Hitler. So, too, did the Pacific war of 1941–1945 fulfill Stalin's goal of unleashing a devastating war of attrition between Japan and the “Anglo-Saxon” capitalist powers he viewed as his ultimate adversary.   McMeekin also reveals the extent to which Soviet Communism was rescued by the US and Britain's self-defeating strategic moves, beginning with Lend-Lease aid, as American and British supply boards agreed almost blindly to every Soviet demand. Stalin's war machine, McMeekin shows, was substantially reliant on American materiél from warplanes, tanks, trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, fuel, ammunition, and explosives, to industrial inputs and technology transfer, to the foodstuffs which fed the Red Army. 1944 WC AND ALEXANDER

SAME 1939 GAME PLAN TODAY: SET ALL AGAINST ALL AND GRAB WHAT WE CAN.  7/8: Stalin's War: A New History of World War II, Sean McMeekin, with Kevin Stillwell as narrator. Published by Basic Books.  Audible Audiobook – Unabridged https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/392db86e-7d65-4c5d-b2a9-b781d5ee7250?shareToken=99d9180db57c2304848bc11f23ff97dc World War II:  Hitler was not in power when the conflict erupted in Asia—and he was certainly dead before it ended. His armies did not fight in multiple theaters, his empire did not span the Eurasian continent, and he did not inherit any of the spoils of war. That central role belonged to Joseph Stalin. The Second World War was not Hitler's war; it was Stalin's war: Drawing on ambitious new research in Soviet, European, and US archives, Stalin's War revolutionizes our understanding of this global conflict by moving its epicenter to the east. Hitler's genocidal ambition may have helped unleash Armageddon, but as McMeekin shows, the war which emerged in Europe in September 1939 was the one Stalin wanted, not Hitler. So, too, did the Pacific war of 1941–1945 fulfill Stalin's goal of unleashing a devastating war of attrition between Japan and the “Anglo-Saxon” capitalist powers he viewed as his ultimate adversary.   McMeekin also reveals the extent to which Soviet Communism was rescued by the US and Britain's self-defeating strategic moves, beginning with Lend-Lease aid, as American and British supply boards agreed almost blindly to every Soviet demand. Stalin's war machine, McMeekin shows, was substantially reliant on American materiél from warplanes, tanks, trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, fuel, ammunition, and explosives, to industrial inputs and technology transfer, to the foodstuffs which fed the Red Army. 1944 QQEBEC

SAME 1939 GAME PLAN TODAY: SET ALL AGAINST ALL AND GRAB WHAT WE CAN.   1/8: Stalin's War: A New History of World War II, Sean McMeekin, with Kevin Stillwell as narrator. Published by Basic Books.  Audible Audiobook – Unabridged https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/392db86e-7d65-4c5d-b2a9-b781d5ee7250?shareToken=99d9180db57c2304848bc11f23ff97dc World War II:  Hitler was not in power when the conflict erupted in Asia—and he was certainly dead before it ended. His armies did not fight in multiple theaters, his empire did not span the Eurasian continent, and he did not inherit any of the spoils of war. That central role belonged to Joseph Stalin. The Second World War was not Hitler's war; it was Stalin's war: Drawing on ambitious new research in Soviet, European, and US archives, Stalin's War revolutionizes our understanding of this global conflict by moving its epicenter to the east. Hitler's genocidal ambition may have helped unleash Armageddon, but as McMeekin shows, the war which emerged in Europe in September 1939 was the one Stalin wanted, not Hitler. So, too, did the Pacific war of 1941–1945 fulfill Stalin's goal of unleashing a devastating war of attrition between Japan and the “Anglo-Saxon” capitalist powers he viewed as his ultimate adversary.   McMeekin also reveals the extent to which Soviet Communism was rescued by the US and Britain's self-defeating strategic moves, beginning with Lend-Lease aid, as American and British supply boards agreed almost blindly to every Soviet demand. Stalin's war machine, McMeekin shows, was substantially reliant on American materiél from warplanes, tanks, trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, fuel, ammunition, and explosives, to industrial inputs and technology transfer, to the foodstuffs which fed the Red Army. 1941 CANADA, ATKANTIC CHARTER

SAME 1939 GAME PLAN TODAY: SET ALL AGAINST ALL AND GRAB WHAT WE CAN.   8/8: Stalin's War: A New History of World War II, Sean McMeekin, with Kevin Stillwell as narrator. Published by Basic Books.  Audible Audiobook – Unabridged https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/392db86e-7d65-4c5d-b2a9-b781d5ee7250?shareToken=99d9180db57c2304848bc11f23ff97dc World War II:  Hitler was not in power when the conflict erupted in Asia—and he was certainly dead before it ended. His armies did not fight in multiple theaters, his empire did not span the Eurasian continent, and he did not inherit any of the spoils of war. That central role belonged to Joseph Stalin. The Second World War was not Hitler's war; it was Stalin's war: Drawing on ambitious new research in Soviet, European, and US archives, Stalin's War revolutionizes our understanding of this global conflict by moving its epicenter to the east. Hitler's genocidal ambition may have helped unleash Armageddon, but as McMeekin shows, the war which emerged in Europe in September 1939 was the one Stalin wanted, not Hitler. So, too, did the Pacific war of 1941–1945 fulfill Stalin's goal of unleashing a devastating war of attrition between Japan and the “Anglo-Saxon” capitalist powers he viewed as his ultimate adversary.   McMeekin also reveals the extent to which Soviet Communism was rescued by the US and Britain's self-defeating strategic moves, beginning with Lend-Lease aid, as American and British supply boards agreed almost blindly to every Soviet demand. Stalin's war machine, McMeekin shows, was substantially reliant on American materiél from warplanes, tanks, trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, fuel, ammunition, and explosives, to industrial inputs and technology transfer, to the foodstuffs which fed the Red Army. 1963 HARRIMAN & ACHESON