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Welcome to MOJO: The Meaning of Life and Business! In this episode, host Jennifer Glass welcomes the remarkable Olga Alexeeva—artist, author, coach, and survivor—whose powerful story is sure to move and motivate. Olga's journey is one of resilience, transformation, and courage. Originally from Russia, she arrived in America in 1991 with no English, a young son, and her mother in tow. From humble beginnings working at McDonald's and running a pizza parlor, Olga faced incredible hardship and burnout, only to rediscover herself through a chance encounter with painting—a passion she never thought possible.Olga's story is more than a tale of survival; it's about forging meaning from adversity and allowing creativity to guide the way forward. She candidly shares the trials of starting over, the heartache of betrayal, the uphill battle of learning a new language, and the fear that so often accompanies major life changes. Through her journey, Olga reveals how fear can be dissected and overcome—sometimes with just a single step of courage.Her transformation led her to open her own galleries in Nashville and to become a beacon for other women seeking purpose, launching her coaching program “Reignite Your Spark and Keep It Forever.” Olga invites listeners into her world of creative exploration—painting, poetry, public speaking, and even adventures like rope challenges and fire eating—each serving as a metaphor for the importance of stepping outside your comfort zone and saying “yes” to life's opportunities.Throughout the episode, Jennifer Glass and Olga discuss actionable advice for anyone feeling stuck or lost, from refugees adjusting to new lives to everyday people searching for meaning. Olga emphasizes playful curiosity, embracing new experiences, and the necessity of honest self-reflection, both for physical and mental wellbeing.If you're ready to reignite your passion, rekindle your creativity, and step boldly into your own authenticity, this episode is for you. Listen in for heartfelt storytelling, practical wisdom, and a manifesto for living fully, with Olga's infectious energy and optimism lighting the way. Plus, discover how you can connect with Olga for creative masterclasses and make sure no opportunity is left behind.About my guest: Olga Alexeeva is a former stage actress who spent 15 years performing in Russia's renowned repertory theater system. Growing up in the USSR, Olga witnessed the nation's tumultuous transition during the 1990s—a period that deeply shaped her understanding of history and culture. Drawing on her rich personal experiences, she recently published the book From Russia to America: A Quest for Purpose and Joy, which explores her journey from her Russian roots to finding new meaning in America. Her story is one of resilience, adaptation, and the search for joy across different worlds.Connect with Olga on LinkedIn, Facebook, and on the web at https://www.ultraverity.comKeywords: fear, overcoming fear, purpose, joy, self-discovery, creativity, painting, art gallery, burnout, coaching, women's empowerment, immigrant experience, overcoming adversity, self-love, personal growth, finding passion, resilience, transformation, inspirational story, mindset, imposter syndrome, support systems, life transitions, healing through art, purpose-driven living, breaking barriers, courage, goal achievement, personal development, authenticity

Anastasia Canonica was born in post-Soviet Russia in 1991, the year the USSR collapsed and the monetary system reset overnight, erasing everyone's savings. She was placed in an orphanage at age 4 after her parents turned to alcohol amid the poverty crisis, spending ages 4-16 in Orphanage Number 5 in Novokuznetsk, Siberia. After her father's death when she was 11, she became consumed with anger and resentment, developing a physical growth on her body. At 13, she experienced a miracle healing through Louise Hay's book "Heal Your Body," learning to release resentment and forgive. After a two-year adoption process, Anastasia came to America at 16, right as the 2008 financial crisis hit. Ana shares her awakening journey and Bitcoin adoption, seeing it as a source of hope that the parallel centralized dystopian world doesn't have to be the only option.→ Please like, comment, share & follow — to help me beat the suppressing algo's. Thank you!– SPONSORS –→ Access liquidity without selling your Bitcoin with Ledn — learn more at https://ledn.io/Efrat → Get your TREZOR wallet & accessories, with a 5% discount, using my code at checkout (get my discount code from the episode - yep, you'll have to watch it): https://affil.trezor.io/SHUn→ Have you tried mining bitcoin? Stack sats directly to your wallet while saving on taxes with Abundant Mines: https://AbundantMines.com/Efrat - Claim your free month of hosting via this link– AFFILIATES –→ Get 10% off on Augmented NAC to detox Spike protein, with the code YCXKQDK2 via this link: https://store.augmentednac.com/?via=efrat (Note, this is not medical advice, please consult your MD)→ Join me at Europe's largest bitcoin conference - BTC Prague, June 11-13, 2026. Code EFRAT for 10% off: http://btcprg.me/EFRAT→ Be good to your eyes & health, and get the Daylight tablet - a healthier, more human-friendly computer, zero blue light & flicker. Use code EFRAT for $25 off: https://bit.ly/Efrat_daylight → Get a second citizenship and a plan B to relocate to another country with Expat Money, leave your details for a follow up: https://expatmoney.com/efrat→ Watch “New Totalitarian Order” conference with Prof. Mattias Desmet & Efrat - code EFRAT for 10% off: https://efenigson.gumroad.com/l/desmet_efrat→ Join me in any of these upcoming events: https://www.efrat.blog/p/upcoming-events– LINKS –Ana on X: https://x.com/nastyhodl Ana on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/anastasia_living_life/ Efrat's X: https://twitter.com/efenigsonEfrat's Channels: https://linktr.ee/efenigsonWatch on all platforms: https://linktr.ee/yourethevoiceSupport Efrat's work: ⁠https://bit.ly/zap_efrat– CHAPTERS –00:00 - Coming Up... 01:33 - Introduction to Ana04:15 - Ana's Backstory, Soviet Collapse & Monetary Reset 09:42 - Ad-Break: Ledn & Trezor 13:00 - Orphanage at Age 4 18:35 - Grandma's Worthless Fiat Money 24:44 - Father's Death at Age 11 31:02 - The Physical Side Effects of Stuck Anger 33:59 - Ad-Break: Abundant Mines & New Totalitarian Order Conference36:20 - Louise Hay's Book: Heal Your Body 41:17 - The Miracle: Physical Healing Through Forgiveness 45:20 - Ana's Brother Adopted by American Family 51:03 - The Adoption Offer59:44 - 2008: Arriving in America During Financial Crisis 01:03:24 - Music School & Finance School 01:05:40 - Learning the Broken Monetary System & Finding Bitcoin 01:09:44 - Covid Started The Great Awakening 01:15:06 - Energy, Bitcoin & Hope

Guest: Igor Vainshtein, EO Dallas since 2022, Inventor of Entrepreneurpoly Host: Linh Podetti, EO Sydney Member since 2022 and Owner of Outsourcing Angel In this deeply honest and thought-provoking episode, Igor Vainshtein shares his extraordinary entrepreneurial journey, one shaped not by overnight success but by repeated failure, resilience, and reinvention. Having started over 20 businesses and failed 18 of them, Igor opens up about losing everything multiple times, hitting rock bottom, and the mindset shifts that ultimately changed how he defines success, in business and in life. From growing up as an immigrant with nothing, to building and exiting companies, to inventing Entrepreneurpoly, a board game that simulates the real emotional and financial rollercoaster of entrepreneurship, this conversation is packed with hard-earned wisdom. This episode is a must-listen for founders, operators, and leaders who want a more grounded, sustainable, and meaningful definition of success. ABOUT IGOR VAINSHTEIN Igor Vainshtein is a serial entrepreneur, best-selling author, TEDx speaker, and the inventor of Entrepreneurpoly, a groundbreaking board game that captures the realities of entrepreneurship. Starting his first business at 17, Igor has launched ventures across e-commerce, technology, manufacturing, and golf, including 24/7 Golf, which expanded into the US and was successfully acquired by GOLFTEC. He currently leads Golftrak.app, helping golfers improve their game using only an iPhone. Igor is the author of Practical Manifestation and Agile Manifestation, where he blends project management principles with personal growth and goal achievement. Having lived in the USSR, Australia, and the USA, he brings a rare global perspective on resilience, failure, and building businesses that support a fulfilling life. CONNECT WITH IGOR: Website: www.igorvainshtein.com LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/igorvainshtein/ Instagram: http://instagram.com/igorv--------------------ABOUT EO Entrepreneur's Organization (EO) is a global business network of 18,000 + influential business owners in over 220 chapters across 76 countries. We offer world-class events that encompass engaging entrepreneur and business stories, skills-specific workshops, and exciting social gatherings.Our mission is to drive both business and personal growth through peer-to-peer learning, providing support for the holistic entrepreneur experience covering business, family, community, and personal aspects. As a not-for-profit organization, all our funds directly contribute to member benefits.If you're a business owner with revenues ranging from US$250k to US$1m, you can join our Accelerator Program. If your revenues exceed US$1m, you can join the main EO Program in your nearest local chapter. To join or find out more about your nearest chapter, visit https://www.eonetwork.org/why-join/apply-for-membership-form.For further information, please contact:Podcast Host Linh Podetti: linh@outsourcingangel.com.au General Inquiries: support@eonetwork.org.au EO Sydney: www.eosydney.com.au EO Global: https://hub.eonetwork.org/

A Scottish ferryman refused to take travelers across the water after dark — and the ones who stayed the night were never seen again. | #WDRadio WEEK OF FEBRUARY 22, 2026==========HOUR ONE: A 178-year-old mystery comes to the surface in a Philadelphia suburb. (Grandfather's Ghost Story Leads to Mass Grave) *** Recently a wrecking crew began tearing down and old building in Rhode Island. But the big burly men on the crew got so frightened they refused to continue the work. Does reconstruction of a home or building anger the souls who once lived there? (Does Remodeling Your Home Disturb The Spirits Who Died There?) *** The way life has grown on our planet requires that all living things feed off each other and must kill others in order to survive.  That's the way of the world if you want to live for any more than a few days. But some people are now claiming they can live without food at all… indefinitely. (Life Without Food) *** Three men were in a shed selling gardening supplies when some strange powder suddenly hit the ceiling. Before they had time to react, a small jug on a shelf abruptly flew across the room. One man picked up the jug and placed it a covered box. Instantly, the jug was...somehow...back on the floor. And that was just the beginning of the strange haunting of a community's garden shed. (The Poltergeist In The Allotment Shed) *** In the movie Salt, Angelina Jolie plays a double-agent who is mind-controlled by scary remnants of the USSR secret service. And in real life, the 1940s bombshell Candy Jones was apparently brainwashed with drugs and used as a CIA covert operative.  (The Supermodel Who Was Brainwashed Into Becoming a Spy) *** No one knows exactly when she was born. Some think, maybe, she was a gypsy. Others say she was the seventh daughter of a seventh daughter. The life of Elizabeth Barnes is a mysterious one, filled with many loves, losses, and prognostications. (The Witch of Plum Hollow) *** Some travelers, arriving late at night to board Oliver's Ferry the next day, stayed at Oliver's house. But they were never seen making the ferry crossing the next morning. Is it possible that the rumors are true – that they never left the house alive? (The Frights of Oliver's Ferry)==========HOUR TWO: An eerie tombstone stands watch over one of Portland Oregon's oldest cemeteries. And the story behind that tombstone is a strange one. (The Guardians of Lone Fir Cemetery) *** Don't take a gift from Little Gracie's grave... or her life-like statue might cry tears of blood. (The Ghost of Gracie Watson) *** When it came to her daughter's Elsa doll, one mom was eager and ready to “Let It Go”. But the doll supernaturally refused to be let go! (Haunted Elsa Doll) *** An ancient stone cross is said by locals to be cursed, and the curse infects anyone who dares to disrespect it. (Curse of the Saxon Stone Cross) *** Christopher Slaughterford was seemingly a completely ordinary young Englishman – but he has earned an unenviable place in the legal books. (T
he Trials of Christopher Slaughterford) *** Two authors reported a very strange encounter with a mysterious entity they believed was not of this world. What did they see and why were they under the impression this being was not of this world? (An Author's Encounter With A Not-Of-This-World Entity)==========SUDDEN DEATH OVERTIME: For Allen Taylor, January 15, 1919 was just another day on his farm near Prescott, Iowa. That is, until his 15-year-old neighbor Irene Hoskins came stumbling down the lane with a gash in the side of her head.  (The Hoskins Family Murders) *** How did someone get the job of an executioner in medieval times? We'll find out! (To Become An Executioner) ==========SOURCES AND REFERENCES FROM TONIGHT'S SHOW:“Schoolhouse Demon Attack” from Paranormality Magazine“Grandfather's Ghost Story Leads to Mass Grave” by Meghan Rafferty for CNN: https://tinyurl.com/ravfceh“Does Remodeling Your Home Disturb The Spirits Who Died There?” by Kelly Roncace for NJ.com: https://tinyurl.com/sn7vpsg“Life Without Food” by Michael Grosso for Consciousness Abound: https://tinyurl.com/r38yxh6“The Poltergeist In The Allotment Shed” from Strange Company: https://tinyurl.com/vzlgcj9“The Supermodel Who Was Brainwashed Into Becoming a Spy” by Annalee Newitz for Gizmodo: https://tinyurl.com/sgh73da“The Witch of Plum Hollow” by James Morgan for North Country Public Radio: https://tinyurl.com/u3x3sxu“The Frights of Oliver's Ferry” by Ken Watson for Rideau-Info: https://tinyurl.com/vj96awj==========(Over time links seen above may become invalid, disappear, or have different content. I always make sure to give authors credit for material I use whenever possible. If I have overlooked doing so for a story, or if a credit is incorrect, please let me know and I will rectify it immediately. Some links may benefit me financially through qualifying purchases.)=========="I have come into the world as a light, so that no one who believes in me should stay in darkness." — John 12:46==========WeirdDarkness®, WeirdDarkness© 2026==========To become a Weird Darkness Radio Show affiliate, contact Radio America at affiliates@radioamerica.com, or call 800-807-4703 (press 2 or dial ext 250).

Martyn is joined by Gary and debutant John Mackay get stuck into a bumper couple of days. Scotland make an unfortunate start against the Danes after Uruguay set out their stall against a West German side in a state of disarray. There are a couple of heavyweight clashes with some pulled punches and much more. Paraguay v Iraq - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O8GCTxga8jw Uruguay v West Germany - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDOY6IR8u5Y Scotland v Denmark - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gfftlr9qtrQ Italy v Argentina - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHGSoYFuHow France v USSR - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uNEIWX5-z8 South Korea v Bulgaria - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VWxaRXvEB28 If you want weekly exclusive bonus shows, join our Nessun Dorma community chat, want your episodes without ads and a couple of days earlier or just want to support the podcast, then head over to ⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/NessunDormaPodcast⁠⁠⁠ where you can subscribe for only $3.99 a month (less than 75p a week!). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

This echoes of war podcast, hosted by Craig Watson and Gaurav explores the Third Carnatic War (1756–1763) as the Indian theater of the Seven Years' War. It details the decline of the Mughal Empire after Aurangzeb's death in 1707, leading to fragmented provinces like Bengal and the rise of the Maratha Empire as a dominant power. European influences are highlighted: the British East India Company with bases in Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, and the French with strongholds like Pondicherry. The narrative focuses on key events starting with the Black Hole of Calcutta in 1756, where Nawab Siraj ud-Daulah imprisoned British captives in horrific conditions, prompting retaliation. Robert Clive's victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757, aided by betrayal from Mir Jafar, secured British control over wealthy Bengal (20-25% of India's GDP). The episode covers the Siege of Madras (1758–1759), where French forces under Comte de Lally failed due to supply issues and British reinforcements. The decisive Battle of Wandiwash in 1760 saw British General Eyre Coote defeat the French, leading to the Siege of Pondicherry (1760–1761), which ended French influence. Britain's naval superiority, alliances, and strategies established dominance, marking 1759 as the "Annus Mirabilis." The podcast emphasizes colonial expansion parallels with North America, using maps and portraits for a documentary feel. It concludes with the Treaty of Paris, where France regained possessions but without fortifications, ensuring British ascendancy in India. Don't forget I have a Youtube Membership: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbp8JMZizR4zak9wpM3Fvrw/ join or my Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel where you can get exclusive content like "What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2?"

Since the era of Joseph Stalin, Moscow’s rulers have sent Russian athletes into the Summer and Winter Olympics with one command: you must win. These competitors operated under a "win-at-all-costs" doctrine most notably through the use of "shamateurism." By giving elite hockey stars nominal titles as military officers or factory workers, the USSR bypassed amateur requirements to field seasoned professionals against genuine Western students—a disparity that defined the Cold War sporting era. But the deception went deeper than employment records; it extended into the very biology of the athletes, particularly in high-strength disciplines like weightlifting and powerlifting. Athletes such as Vasily Alekseyev, the super-heavyweight lifter who set 80 world records and weighed 360 pounds, were often the face of a system later revealed to be fueled by state-mandated anabolic steroids Today’s guest is Bruce Berglund, author of “The Moscow Playbook: How Russia Used, Abused, and Transformed Sports in the Hunt for Gold.” We look at the intersection of Russian sports and geopolitical power, from the dominant Soviet teams of past Olympics to recent doping scandals and international sanctions. With new research from Olympic archives, records of the Soviet bloc and current Russian media, Berglund shows how Moscow’s leaders have defied the rules of the game for decades as the world’s governing bodies turned a blind eye.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Yes we know that's a lengthy title. By the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, New York, it had been 20 years since the U.S. won the gold. Those two decades saw a dominance unlike any other at the time by the Soviet Union and their seemingly unbeatable team. The Cold War was front and center. Expectations were pretty low for the U.S. Men's team going into the games but through a series of lucky events a man named Herb Brooks was put in the driver seat. Herb was coming off a NCAA Hockey National Championship in 1979 at the University of Minnesota and looked to create a team that could stand toe to toe with the Soviets using creativity and team chemistry. Now we should note this comes at a time when professional athletes didn't compete on olympic national teams. This team would be comprised of college athletes, many from Minnesota and many from Boston, and oh man some of these guys did not like each other, carrying over rivalries from school. They only had about 7 months to become a team capable of doing what many believed impossible. Well if you know the story, you know they did, and what follows would come to be known as The Miracle on Ice. Support the show

Send a textWhen we pursue excellence for Godly reasons, guided by love and truth, our actions will honor God and build up rather than tear down.James 3:16: For where there is envy and selfish ambition, there is disorder and every evil practice.Support the show

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war.   #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed:  (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata,  (2) comms failures,  (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently.   This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion.  2. Trust Kwantung localization.  3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks;  2) bombing risks escalation;  3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July.   Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff  By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.

by UFO History Buff & Author, Charles Lear | In the Volume 26, Number 6, March 1981 Flying Saucer Review, there is an article (page 7 of the pdf) by Russian UFO investigator Nikita A. Schnee headlined, “Contact Reported Near Pyrogovskoye Lake.” It tells the tale of an unnamed Red Army officer who said he was taken aboard a craft by “two men in dull-coloured cellophane like garments,” who told him they wanted to have a talk. In his introduction, Schnee explains that Soviet UFOlogists were of the belief that there were no Russian CE-3 cases. He cites Felix Y. Zigel, an assistant professor at the Moscow Institute of Aviation, who presented his opinion in the second issue of Observations of UFOs in the USSR that, in Schee's words, “such reports are the fruits of sick minds, or obvious hoaxes with the aim of making money or obtaining publicity.” With that said, Schnee assures the reader that in his report, “all the events described actually (emphasis in the original) took place and are not products of the contactee's imagination.” He says this “has been proved, quite convincingly” through examination of the witness and “the landing site of the UFO.” As the reader shall see, Russian UFOlogists had a unique style of landing site examination in those days. Read more →*Note: audioblogs are now a cloned AI version of Martin's voice. 

The film about the miracle on ice when the US hockey team beat the USSR! Send a textTwitter @dockingbay77podFacebook @dockingbay77podcastdockingbay77podcast@gmail.compatreon.com/dockingbay77podcast https://www.youtube.com/@DockingBay77podcast https://dockingbay77pod.buzzsprout.com

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit www.theflyingfrisby.comGood Sunday to you,In case you missed them, I put out two articles this week. Here they are.By now I am sure you will have stumbled across Matt Shumer's essay Something Big Is Happening, which has gone bananas viral. Eighty-one million views on X alone. That's even more than We're All Far Right Now.Shumer describes how AI capability is improving exponentially, meaning that most screen-based jobs face imminent and major disruption. By that he means all but disappearing. His advice is blunt: get good at using AI now; assume much of what you do will be automated, and thus your doing it will soon be redundant; and start saving up, there's economic upheaval coming.It's perhaps the best articulated essay there is describing this bleak view of what is coming.From my own little vantage point, I'm not nearly so pessimistic. I use AI a lot, and I use it more and more. Its rapid improvement over the last six months has been obvious, though it still cannot recognise humour, let alone write it - humour that's actually funny, anyway. So it's rather like the BBC comedy department in that regard.EDIT: Having written that last paragraph, I just watched this. It is a perfect Frat Pack joke. I've now watched a load of other clips made with AI movie generator Seed Dance 2.0 from Byte Dance (parent company of TikTok), and I've a mind to short Disney first thing on Monday morning. The content is breathtaking, even the comedy.I use AI as a sounding board, for legal and regulatory questions, bureaucratic procedures, personal advice, career and business advice, videos, images. I use it to proof read copy, in the case of PR which I hate writing, I use it to actually generate copy; it helps me with titles, SEO summaries and research. I am not at the point where it writes my articles for me, and I like to think I would not let that happen, but I know others are: I am increasingly reading pieces in respectable broadsheets that are clearly written by bots.That represents a lot of work I might once have given to other people.On the other hand, if I had needed to pay someone proper money to do it, I probably would not have done it at all. In that sense it is not so different from the democratisation of media that followed the turn of the 21st century, when filmmaking, podcasting and publishing suddenly became accessible to anyone with a laptop.From a personal point of view I know I have lost a shedload of voiceover work to AI, and what used to be my main source of income no longer is. More annoying, my voice, with the countless documentaries, promos, trailers and ads I've voiced over the years, has been harvested, modelled and copied like mad. Not a lot I can do. But the net result to the world is more content, better content, produced faster and at lower cost.I'm not sure quite how end-of-days it all is. But Shumer's finger is on the pulse in a way mine is not.Let's assume he is more right than I am. What then?Two things follow.First, AI is deflationary. Services get cheaper. Productivity rises. Labour loses bargaining power.Second, governments will not sit back and watch demand collapse. If employment and incomes come under pressure, the political response will be fiscal support, especially if it win s elections. This means more borrowing, therefore lower interest rates, and more money-printing. Different routes, same destination: easy money.That is essentially the conclusion reached by analyst Lyn Alden in her latest newsletter, though her reasoning is more technical. The Federal Reserve has already moved from balance sheet reduction back to ongoing expansion. Not a dramatic “QE moment”, but a structural, steady increase to keep the financial plumbing functioning. She calls it the “gradual print”.Jefferies' Chris Woods, whose Greed & Fear letter I have come to rather like, arrives at a similar place via politics. The US government is now so sensitive to interest costs that sustained tight policy is unrealistic. If markets wobble or growth weakens, intervention returns. Monetary restraint will not survive contact with fiscal reality.Hedge fund billionaire, Ray Dalio's argument, laid out in his latest offering, is similar, though simpler and colder. The United States is late in a long-term debt cycle, with borrowing rising faster than income. There are three ways out: austerity, default or money printing. The US will choose the third. If foreign buyers will not fund the deficits at acceptable rates, the central bank ultimately does. Different language, same conclusion.Which brings me to an interview I listened to this week, between Grant Williams and Rabobank's Michael Every. Every thinks stable coins will act as the funding vehicle. Every's argument is more macro than AI or the Fed. He believes we are seeing a structural shift in the global economic system, comparable to the late Soviet period. With Communism in its final throes, Gorbachev tried to transform the USSR from a military-industrial economy into a consumer one. It failed and the system collapsed.The United States, Every argues, is now attempting the reverse. After decades of financialisation and consumption, it is trying to rebuild industrial and military capacity. That means: industrial policy, trade protection, supply-chain control and capital directed toward production, rather than asset inflation. Instead of buying US treasuries, foreign dollars get recycled into US manufacturing, industry and, yes, its military.This is not the liberal globalisation model of the last thirty years. It is economic statecraft. This means growth may be slower and inflation structurally higher, while financial markets less dominant relative to the real economy.Success is by no means guaranteed, but the direction of travel is toward a more managed, more political, less free market economic system.So … large forces are converging. Different stories, maybe, but the destination is be rather similar.* AI will improve productivity, but lower labour power* Governments will be forced towards fiscal support* No longer independent, central banks will drift towards balance sheet expansion* Geopolitics will drive reindustrialisation and energy demandWhich brings us to the question that matters.What are the implications for your money?Where do you put it?

Susanna Fogel is a director, screenwriter, and novelist best known for her work in BOOKSMART and THE SPY WHO DUMPED ME. David Iserson is a filmmaker, writer, and producer best known for his work on MR. ROBOT, MAD MEN, and NEW GIRL. Iserson, alongside Fogel, served as co-creators, writers, and executive producers for the television series PONIES, a 70s-set spy thriller starring Emilia Clarke and Haley Lu Richardson. The series follows two PONIES ("persons of no interest") working anonymously as secretaries in the American Embassy until their husbands are killed under mysterious circumstances in the USSR, and the pair become CIA operatives. Together, they work to uncover a vast Cold War conspiracy and solve the mystery that made them widows in the first place. In this interview, we talk about the professional marriage between Susanna Fogel and David Iserson, the development history and production origins of their series PONIES, research and working with consultants, plus much more. Want more? Steal my first book, INK BY THE BARREL - SECRETS FROM PROLIFIC WRITERS, right now for free. Simply head over to www.brockswinson.com to get your free digital download and audiobook. If you find value in the book, please share it with a friend, as we're giving away 100,000 copies this year. It's based on over 400 interviews here at Creative Principles. Enjoy! If you enjoy the podcast, would you please consider leaving a short review on Apple Podcasts? It only takes about 60 seconds, and it really helps convince some of the hard-to-get guests to sit down and have a chat (simply scroll to the bottom of your iTunes Podcast app and click “Write Review"). Enjoy the show!

Mike and Martyn get set to devour a feast of World Cup action over these two days. We have Maradona and Passarella clashing over drugs and affairs before South Korea took turns in having a kick without any serious sanction, Hungary being smashed by the USSR, an early victory for the hosts amidst political turbulence and an arachnid taking over the Azteca, Northern Ireland and Algeria failing to live up to their previous exploits and missing the opportunity to get that much needed win and Bobby Robson arrives in Monterrey and selects a starting XI against Portugal who have never played together before. What could possibly go wrong? Argentina v South Korea - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBjRKVZb4z4 USSR v Hungary - https://youtu.be/KMtBKLEkLq0?si=PTcNz_A_lAL8SwrT Poland v Morocco - https://youtu.be/q27qUuCfMng?si=n8XXVU6kY6Esm9vP Mexico v Belgium - https://youtu.be/lwWBEG3qxtU?si=W60__dS443ngNDtx Northern Ireland v Algeria - https://youtu.be/m6Le-ZVjNho?si=HJ8dypMGjGhQzScX England v Portugal -  https://youtu.be/Q96knGZ3Of4?si=tz7OMcJ1hz4l_P8q If you want weekly exclusive bonus shows, join our Nessun Dorma community chat, want your episodes without ads and a couple of days earlier or just want to support the podcast, then head over to ⁠⁠⁠patreon.com/NessunDormaPodcast⁠⁠⁠ where you can subscribe for only $3.99 a month (less than 75p a week!). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Cold War Cinema team, Jason Christian, Anthony Ballas, and Paul T. Klein, return to discuss Mikhail Kalatozov's 1959 drama Letter Never Sent.  Synopsis of the film: Four geologists descend on the Siberian Taiga. Over the course of a backbreaking summer sifting minerals in the icy, rushing waters of boreal rivers, the group–the experienced guide, Konstantin, a young couple, Andrei and Tanya, and the brooding Sergei–search for diamond deposits to enrich themselves and their country. Throughout, Konstanin writes an extended letter home to his wife Vera. Sergei, too, writes a letter, though never meant to be read, expressing his jealousy and Andrei and love for Tanya. When a massive forest fire breaks out, however, the group must work together to survive, not only the blaze, but the ravages of the elements and the fast-approaching and deadly Siberian winter… On this episode we discuss: The unbelievable production of a film shot on location in the USSR taiga.  How the film reflects the tenents of socialist realism in complex and creative ways.  How the film shares many of the sensibilites of the western genre and pairs nicely with John Ford's The Searchers in this regard.  The basic theoretical aspects of scientific socialism and how the filmmaker uses them to shape the film's narrative and themes.  The allegorical use of a diamond in the Soviet context versus the same in the capitalist West.  _____________________ We love to give book or film recommendations on the podcast, so here are ours for this episode:  Paul: Two "Northwesterns": Bend of the River (Anthony Mann, 1952) and River of No Return (Otto Preminger, 1954) Tony: Tacky's Revolt: The Story of an Atlantic Slave War by Vincent Brown Jason: Nail in the Boot (Mikhail Kalatozov, 1931) and Socialism: Utopian and Scientific by Friedrich Engels Also, check out this fascinating interview on the Actually Existing Socialism podcast with the scholar Sardana Nikolaeva, who studies the Indigenous peoples of the northern regions of the Soviet Union (and present-day Russia) and their connection to the diamond mines that are imagined in the film.  _____________________ Like and subscribe to Cold War Cinema, and don't forget to leave us a review! Want to continue the conversation? Drop us a line at any time at coldwarcinemapod@gmail.com. To stay up to date on Cold War Cinema, follow along at coldwarcinema.com, or find us online on Bluesky @coldwarcinema.com or on X at @Cold_War_Cinema.   For more from your hosts and guest: Follow Aspen on Letterboxed at @aspenballas. Follow Jason on Bluesky at @JasonAChristian.bsky.social, on X at @JasonAChristian, or on Letterboxed at @exilemagic. Follow Anthony on Bluesky at @tonyjballas.bsky.social, on X at @tonyjballas, or on Letterboxed at @tonyjballas. Follow Paul on Bluesky at @ptklein.com, or on Letterboxed at @ptklein. Paul also writes about movies at www.howotreadmovies.com  _____________________ Logo by Jason Christian  Theme music by DYAD (Charles Ballas and Jeremy Averitt).  Happy listening!

The similarities between the EU and the USSR are striking, and they are not just a coincidence. Original article: https://mises.org/mises-wire/european-union-now-resembles-soviet-union

The similarities between the EU and the USSR are striking, and they are not just a coincidence. Original article: https://mises.org/mises-wire/european-union-now-resembles-soviet-union

 Everyone remembers the dog who died early in space exploration. Almost no one remembers the Paris alley cat who came home. This is the true story of Félicette — the forgotten cat of the Space Race.Everyone remembers Laika — the Soviet space dog who never came home.Almost no one remembers Félicette — a Paris alley cat who rode a rocket launch into space, survived the mission, and quietly disappeared into history.In 1963, at the height of the Cold War, a small, overlooked nation launched a different kind of spaceflight. No propaganda. No spectacle. Just disciplined space science and a stray cat chosen for her neurological precision.This is the forgotten story of the Space Race's most unlikely passenger — and what history chose to remember instead.If this stayed with you, you probably know someone else who might appreciate it.________________________________________Chapters (Timestamps)00:00 - Spaceflight Testing01:28 - The Animals Who Went First02:04 - A Different Animal03:43 - A Necessary Ending04:12 - An Ounce________________________________________“The Accidentally Invented World”A companion episode about how progress often comes from unnoticed, uncelebrated moments — and why history remembers the wrong things.  https://youtu.be/cx7qyVf5g3k________________________________________References (Plain-Text URLs + Context)French Space Agency (CNES) — Official history of early spaceflighthttps://cnes.frAstérix Satellite (1965) — France's first orbital launchhttps://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraft/display.action?id=1965-096AFélicette mission summary — Véronique AGI flighthttps://www.space.com/15488-french-cat-space-felicette.htmlCold War animal space programs (US & USSR)https://www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/news/FactSheets/FS-014-DFRC.html 

Comedy and radio legend Phil Proctor talks about the origin of the Firesign Theater, his love of radio, his many careers as an actor, reporter, writer, comedian, author, and how he made the New York, San Francisco, and LA scenes when there were scenes to make!  He also talks about his biography “Where's My Fortune Cookie” and how he almost died three times.  Let's see if he survives our podcast. Bio: Proctor is a founding member of the thrice-Grammy-nominated Firesign Theatre, one of Rolling Stone's “Thirty Greatest Acts of All Time” and whose archives were purchased by the Library of Congress. He's appeared on-and-off Broadway, toured the USSR with the Yale Russian Chorus and the US and Canada with Proctor & Bergman and the L.A. Guitar Quartet in Don Quixote. He has appeared in scores of commercials, audiobooks, video games, films and TV shows, receiving Theatre World, LA Weekly, LA Free Press and Drama Critics' awards, and the Norman Corwin Excellence in Audio trophy as well as a recent Emmy for the PBS-aired documentary Feast Your Ears: The Story of WHFS Radio. His voice credits include memorable characters in Academy Award-winning films for Pixar and Disney from A Bug's Life to Inside Out, the Drunken French Monkey in Dr. Dolittle, Dr. Vidic in Assassin's Creed, Simon Stagg in Batman: Arkham Knight, and Howard in the multi-Emmy-winning Rugrats, including a star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame. He has also added scores of voices to the Golden Age of Pulp Fiction series and appeared on Irish radio and live on stage with his late wife, Melinda Peterson, at the 77th Science Fiction Convention in Dublin. He was the announcer for 3 seasons of Big Brother and has a recurring role as Detective Polehaus on the long-running Adventures in Odyssey and can be seen in many old--time radio recreations at the Online Radio Theatre on YouTube. He is a 15-year member of the Antaeus Theater and to accompany his autobiography and audiobook, Where's My Fortune Cookie? co-authored by Brad Schreiber, he co-wrote What to Say to Your Crazy Right-Wing Uncle, with Samuel Joseph and God Help Us! a political comedy which toured the U.S. and Canada starring the late Ed Asner. He currently co-hosts Phil & Ted's Sexy Boomer Show, every Tuesday afternoon on KPFK with Ted Bonnitt, featuring conversations with friends like John Goodman, Penn Jillette, Weird Al,  Laraine Newman and Harry Shearer among others. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

From the American Jewish Historical Society comes a new series, The World in Front of Me, hosted by Ruth Andrew Ellenson in conversation with her lifelong friend, renowned photographer of Jewish life, Bill Aron. In this incredible episode, Bill travels to the USSR to document the lives of Refuseniks -- and encounters some KGB opposition along the way. Featuring expert commentary from The Wreckage: Open Up the Gates co-writer Shaul Kelner. Please enjoy this very special episode, and head over to The World in Front of Me, now available on all podcast platforms, to hear more incredible stories from Bill Aron. On Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-wreckage/id1743434835  On Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/7LeJU4dPEqlMuncZcuLNtJ  The World in Front of Me is presented by Jay and Gretchen Stein, with generous support from the Knapp Family Foundation, the Philip and Muriel Berman Foundation in Honor of Alan Bloch, Scott and Dianne Einhorn, The Karetsky Family, and Michael and Corie Koss.

What happens when you're tasked with reinventing an economy—and later find yourself building investment systems in countries where the rulebook doesn't exist? That's the story of Thomas Nastas, this month's guest on the Founder's Sandbox. His journey from Michigan's automotive belt to the front lines of the former USSR is a masterclass in resilience, creativity, and leadership under pressure. In this episode, host Brenda McCabe interviews Thomas Nastas, a seasoned board director with over 30 years of experience in international markets. They discuss Thomas's journey from Michigan to various emerging markets, his innovative approaches, and the differences in governance roles between the U.S. and international markets. They also touch on the importance of scaling businesses through customer revenue, the concept of resilience in entrepreneurship, and the significance of purpose-driven enterprises.

This week is all about cosmic oddities. We answer some of the biggest mysteries of the known universe such as what happens when you fart in space, life on the moon and the lost cosmonauts of the USSR.Join the current timeline on Patreon. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Last time we spoke about The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow. Following the brutal 1938 capture of Wuhan, Japanese forces aimed to solidify their hold by launching an offensive against Chinese troops in the 5th War Zone, a rugged natural fortress in northern Hubei and southern Henan. Under General Yasuji Okamura, the 11th Army deployed three divisions and cavalry in a pincer assault starting May 1, 1939, targeting Suixian and Zaoyang to crush Nationalist resistance and secure flanks. Chinese commander Li Zongren, leveraging terrain like the Dabie and Tongbai Mountains, orchestrated defenses with over 200,000 troops, including Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group. By May 23, they recaptured Suixian and Zaoyang, forcing a Japanese withdrawal with heavy losses, over 13,000 Japanese casualties versus 25,000 Chinese, restoring pre-battle lines. Shifting south, Japan targeted Shantou in Guangdong to sever supply lines from Hong Kong. In a massive June 21 amphibious assault, the 21st Army overwhelmed thin Chinese defenses, capturing the port and Chao'an despite guerrilla resistance led by Zhang Fakui. Though losses mounted, Japan tightened its blockade, straining China's war effort amid ongoing attrition.   #188 From Changkufeng to Nomonhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Well hello again, and yes you all have probably guessed we are taking another detour. Do not worry I hope to shorten this one a bit more so than what became a sort of mini series on the battle of Changkufeng or Battle of Lake Khasan. What we are about to jump into is known in the west as the battle of khalkin Gol, by the Japanese the Nomohan incident. But first I need to sort of set the table up so to say. So back on August 10th, 1938 the Litvinov-Shigemitsu agreement established a joint border commission tasked with redemarcating the disputed boundary between the Soviet Union and Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. However, this commission never achieved a mutually agreeable definition of the border in the contested area. In reality, the outcome was decided well before the group's inaugural meeting. Mere hours after the cease-fire took effect on the afternoon of August 11, General Grigory Shtern convened with a regimental commander from Japan's 19th Division to coordinate the disengagement of forces. With the conflict deemed "honorably" concluded, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters mandated the swift withdrawal of all Japanese troops to the west bank of the Tumen River. By the night of August 13, as the final Japanese soldier crossed the river, it effectively became the de facto border. Soviet forces promptly reoccupied Changkufeng Hill and the adjacent heights—a move that would carry unexpected and profound repercussions. Authoritative Japanese military analyses suggest that if negotiations in Moscow had dragged on for just one more day, the 19th Division would likely have been dislodged from Changkufeng and its surrounding elevations. Undoubtedly, General Shtern's infantry breathed a sigh of relief as the bloodshed ceased. Yet, one can't help but question why Moscow opted for a cease-fire at a juncture when Soviet troops were on the cusp of total battlefield triumph. Perhaps Kremlin leaders deemed it wiser to settle for a substantial gain, roughly three-quarters of their objectives, rather than risk everything. After all, Japan had mobilized threatening forces in eastern Manchuria, and the Imperial Army had a history of impulsive, unpredictable aggression. Moreover, amid the escalating crisis over Czechoslovakia, Moscow may have been wary of provoking a broader Asian conflict. Another theory posits that Soviet high command was misinformed about the ground situation. Reports of capturing a small segment of Changkufeng's crest might have been misinterpreted as control over the entire ridge, or an imminent full takeover before midnight on August 10. The unexpected phone call from Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to the Japanese embassy that night—proposing a one-kilometer Japanese retreat in exchange for a cease-fire along existing lines—hints at communication breakdowns between Shtern's headquarters and the Kremlin. Ironically, such lapses may have preserved Japanese military honor, allowing the 19th Division's evacuation through diplomacy rather than defeat. Both sides endured severe losses. Initial Japanese press reports claimed 158 killed and 740 wounded. However, the 19th Division's medical logs reveal a grimmer toll: 526 dead and 914 injured, totaling 1,440 casualties. The true figure may have climbed higher, possibly to 1,500–2,000. Following the armistice, the Soviet news agency TASS reported 236 Red Army fatalities and 611 wounded. Given Shtern's uphill assaults across open terrain against entrenched positions, these numbers seem understated. Attackers in such scenarios typically suffered two to three times the defenders' losses, suggesting Soviet casualties ranged from 3,000 to 5,000. This aligns with a Soviet Military Council investigation on August 31, 1938, which documented 408 killed and 2,807 wounded. Japanese estimates placed Soviet losses even higher, at 4,500–7,000. Not all victims perished in combat. Marshal Vasily Blyukher, a decorated Soviet commander, former warlord of the Far East, and Central Committee candidate, was summoned to Moscow in August 1938. Relieved of duty in September and arrested with his family in October, he faced charges of inadequate preparation against Japanese aggression and harboring "enemies of the people" within his ranks. On November 9, 1938, Blyukher died during interrogation a euphemism for torture-induced death.Other innocents suffered as well. In the wake of the fighting, Soviet authorities deported hundreds of thousands of Korean rice farmers from the Ussuri region to Kazakhstan, aiming to eradicate Korean settlements that Japanese spies had allegedly exploited. The Changkufeng clash indirectly hampered Japan's Wuhan offensive, a massive push to subdue China. The influx of troops and supplies for this campaign was briefly disrupted by the border flare-up. Notably, Kwantung Army's 2nd Air Group, slated for Wuhan, was retained due to the Soviet threat. Chiang Kai-shek's drastic measure, breaching the Yellow River dikes to flood Japanese advance routes—further delayed the assault. By October 25, 1938, when Japanese forces captured Hankow, Chiang had relocated his capital to distant Chungking. Paradoxically, Wuhan's fall cut rail links from Canton inland, heightening Chiang's reliance on Soviet aid routed overland and by air from Central Asia. Japan secured a tactical win but missed the decisive blow; Chinese resistance persisted, pinning down a million Japanese troops in occupation duties. What was the true significance of Changkufeng? For General Koiso Suetaka and the 19th Division, it evoked a mix of bitterness and pride. Those eager for combat got their share, though not on their terms. To veterans mourning fallen comrades on those desolate slopes, it might have felt like senseless tragedy. Yet, they fought valiantly under dire conditions, holding firm until a retreat that blended humiliation with imperial praise, a bittersweet inheritance. For the Red Army, it marked a crucial trial of resolve amid Stalin's purges. While Shtern's forces didn't shine brilliantly, they acquitted themselves well in adversity. The U.S. military attaché in Moscow observed that any purge-related inefficiencies had been surmounted, praising the Red Army's valor, reliability, and equipment. His counterpart in China, Colonel Joseph Stilwell, put it bluntly: the Soviets "appeared to advantage," urging skeptics to rethink notions of a weakened Red Army. Yet, by World War II's eve, many British, French, German, and Japanese leaders still dismissed it as a "paper tiger." Soviet leaders appeared content, promoting Shtern to command the Transbaikal Military District and colonel general by 1940, while honoring "Heroes of Lake Khasan" with medals. In a fiery November 7, 1938, speech, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov warned that future incursions would prompt strikes deep into enemy territory. Tokyo's views diverged sharply. Many in the military and government saw it as a stain on Imperial Army prestige, especially Kwantung Army, humiliated on Manchukuo soil it swore to protect. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji Inada, however, framed it as a successful reconnaissance, confirming Soviet border defense without broader aggression, allowing the Wuhan push to proceed safely. Critics, including Major General Gun Hashimoto and historians, questioned this. They argued IGHQ lacked contingency plans for a massive Soviet response, especially with Wuhan preparations underway since June. One expert warned Japan had "played with fire," risking Manchuria and Korea if escalation occurred. Yet, Japanese commanders gleaned few lessons, downplaying Soviet materiel superiority and maintaining disdain for Red Army prowess. The 19th Division's stand against outnumbered odds reinforced this hubris, as did tolerance for local insubordination—attitudes that would prove costly. The Kremlin, conversely, learned Japan remained unpredictable despite its China quagmire. But for Emperor Hirohito's intervention, the conflict might have ballooned. Amid purges and the Czech crisis, Stalin likely viewed it as a reminder of eastern vulnerabilities, especially with Munich advancing German threats westward. Both sides toyed with peril. Moderation won in Tokyo, but Kwantung Army seethed. On August 11, Premier Fumimaro Konoye noted the need for caution. Kwantung, however, pushed for and secured control of the disputed salient from Chosen Army by October 8, 1938. Even winter's chill couldn't quench their vengeful fire, setting the stage for future confrontations. A quick look at the regional map reveals how Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic each jut into the other's territory like protruding salients. These bulges could be seen as aggressive thrusts into enemy land, yet they also risked encirclement and absorption by the opposing empire. A northward push from western Manchuria through Mongolia could sever the MPR and Soviet Far East from the USSR's heartland. Conversely, a pincer movement from Mongolia and the Soviet Maritime Province might envelop and isolate Manchukuo. This dynamic highlights the frontier's strategic volatility in the 1930s. One particularly tense sector was the broad Mongolian salient extending about 150 miles eastward into west-central Manchukuo. There, in mid-1939, Soviet-Japanese tensions erupted into major combat. Known to the Japanese as the Nomonhan Incident and to the Soviets and Mongolians as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, this clash dwarfed the earlier Changkufeng affair in scale, duration, and impact. Spanning four months and claiming 30,000 to 50,000 casualties, it amounted to a small undeclared war, the modern era's first limited conflict between great powers. The Mongolian salient features vast, semiarid plains of sandy grassland, gently rolling terrain dotted with sparse scrub pines and low shrubs. The climate is unforgivingly continental: May brings hot days and freezing nights, while July and August see daytime highs exceeding 38°C (100°F in American units), with cool evenings. Swarms of mosquitoes and massive horseflies necessitate netting in summer. Rainfall is scarce, but dense morning fogs are common in August. Come September, temperatures plummet, with heavy snows by October and midwinter lows dipping to –34°C. This blend of North African aridity and North Dakotan winters supports only sparse populations, mainly two related but distinct Mongol tribes. The Buriat (or Barga) Mongols migrated into the Nomonhan area from the northwest in the late 17th to early 18th centuries, likely fleeing Russian expansion after the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Organized by Manchu emperors between 1732 and 1735, they settled east of the river they called Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian for "river"), in lands that would later become Manchukuo. The Khalkha Mongols, named for the word meaning "barrier" or "shield," traditionally guarded the Mongol Empire's northern frontiers. Their territories lay west of the Buriats, in what would become the MPR. For centuries, these tribes herded livestock across sands, river crossings, and desert paths, largely oblivious to any formal borders. For hundreds of years, the line dividing the Mongolian salient from western Manchuria was a hazy administrative divide within the Qing Empire. In the 20th century, Russia's detachment of Outer Mongolia and Japan's seizure of Manchuria transformed this vague boundary into a frontline between rival powers. The Nomonhan Incident ignited over this contested border. Near the salient's northeastern edge, the river, called Khalkhin Gol by Mongols and Soviets, and Halha by Manchurians and Japanese, flows northwest into Lake Buir Nor. The core dispute: Was the river, as Japan asserted, the historic boundary between Manchukuo and the MPR? Soviet and MPR officials insisted the line ran parallel to and 10–12 miles east of the river, claiming the intervening strip. Japan cited no fewer than 18 maps, from Chinese and Japanese sources, to support the river as the border, a logical choice in such barren terrain, where it served as the sole natural divider. Yet, Soviets and Mongolians countered with evidence like a 1919 Chinese postal atlas and maps from Japanese and Manchukuoan agencies (1919–1934). Unbeknownst to combatants, in July 1939, China's military attaché in Moscow shared a 1934 General Staff map with his American counterpart, showing the border east of the river. Postwar Japanese studies of 18th-century Chinese records confirm that in 1734, the Qing emperor set a boundary between Buriat and Khalkha Mongols east of the river, passing through the hamlet of Nomonhan—as the Soviets claimed. However, Kwantung Army Headquarters dismissed this as non-binding, viewing it as an internal Qing affair without Russian involvement. Two former Kwantung Army officers offer a pragmatic explanation: From 1931 to 1935, when Soviet forces in the Far East were weak, Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities imposed the river as the de facto border, with MPR acquiescence. By the mid- to late 1930s, as Soviet strength grew, Japan refused to yield, while Mongolians and Soviets rejected the river line, sparking clashes. In 1935, Kwantung Army revised its maps to align with the river claim. From late that year, the Lake Buir Nor–Halha sector saw frequent skirmishes between Manchukuoan and MPR patrols. Until mid-1938, frontier defense in northwestern Manchukuo fell to the 8th Border Garrison Unit , based near Hailar. This 7,000-man force, spread thin, lacked mobility, training, and, in Kwantung Army's eyes, combat readiness. That summer, the newly formed 23rd Division, under Kwantung Army, took station at Hailar, absorbing the 8th BGU under its command, led by Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara. At 52, Komatsubara was a premier Russian specialist in the Imperial Army, with stints as military attaché in the USSR and head of Kwantung's Special Services Agency in Harbin. Standing 5'7" with a sturdy build, glasses, and a small mustache, he was detail-oriented, keeping meticulous diaries, writing lengthy letters, and composing poetry, though he lacked combat experience. Before departing Tokyo in July 1938, Komatsubara received briefings from Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations Section chief. Amid planning for Changkufeng, Inada urged calm on the Manchukuo-MPR border given China's ongoing campaigns. Guidelines: Ignore minor incidents, prioritize intelligence on Soviet forces east of Lake Baikal, and study operations against the Soviet Far East's western sector. Familiar with the region from his Harbin days, Komatsubara adopted a low-key approach. Neither impulsive nor aggressive, he kept the green 23rd Division near Hailar, delegating patrols to the 8th BGU. An autumn incident underscores his restraint. On November 1, 1938, an 8th BGU patrol was ambushed by MPR forces. Per Japanese accounts, the three-man team, led by a lieutenant, strayed too close to the border and was attacked 50 meters inside Manchukuo. The lieutenant escaped, but his men died. Komatsubara sent an infantry company to secure the site but forbade retaliation. He pursued body recovery diplomatically, protested to MPR and Soviet officials, and disciplined his officers: garrison leaders got five days' confinement for poor troop training, the lieutenant thirty days. Despite this caution, pressures at AGS and KwAHQ were mounting, poised to thrust the 23rd Division into fierce battle. Modern militaries routinely develop contingency plans against potential adversaries, and the mere existence of such strategies doesn't inherently signal aggressive intentions. That said, shifts in Japan's operational planning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may have inadvertently fueled the Nomonhan Incident. From 1934 to 1938, Japanese war scenarios emphasized a massive surprise assault in the Ussuri River region, paired with defensive holding actions in northwestern Manchuria. However, between mid-1938 and early 1939, a clandestine joint task force from the Army General Staff  and Kwantung Army's Operations Departments crafted a bold new blueprint. This revised strategy proposed containing Soviet forces in the east and north while unleashing a full-scale offensive from Hailar, advancing west-northwest toward Chita and ultimately Lake Baikal. The goal: sever the Transbaikal Soviet Far East from the USSR's core. Dubbed Plan Eight-B, it gained Kwantung Army's endorsement in March 1939. Key architects—Colonels Takushiro Hattori and Masao Terada, along with Major Takeharu Shimanuki—were reassigned from AGS to Kwantung Army Headquarters to oversee implementation. The plan anticipated a five-year buildup before execution, with Hattori assuming the role of chief operations staff officer.  A map review exposes a glaring vulnerability in Plan Eight-B: the Japanese advance would leave its southern flank exposed to Soviet counterstrikes from the Mongolian salient. By spring 1939, KwAHQ likely began perceiving this protrusion as a strategic liability. Notably, at the outbreak of Nomonhan hostilities, no detailed operational contingencies for the area had been formalized. Concurrently, Japan initiated plans for a vital railroad linking Harlun Arshan to Hailar. While its direct tie to Plan Eight-B remains unclear, the route skirted perilously close to the Halha River, potentially heightening KwAHQ's focus on the disputed Mongolian salient. In early 1939, the 23rd Division intensified reconnaissance patrols near the river. Around this time, General Grigory Shtern, freshly appointed commander of Soviet Far Eastern forces, issued a public warning that Japan was gearing up for an assault on the Mongolian People's Republic. As Plan Eight-B took shape and railroad proposals advanced, KwAHQ issued a strikingly confrontational set of guidelines for frontier troops. These directives are often cited as a catalyst for the Nomonhan clash, forging a chain linking the 1937 Amur River incident, the 1938 Changkufeng debacle, and the 1939 conflict.Resentment had festered at KwAHQ over perceived AGS meddling during the Amur affair, which curtailed their command autonomy. This frustration intensified at Changkufeng, where General Kamezo Suetaka's 19th Division endured heavy losses, only for the contested Manchukuoan territory to be effectively ceded. Kwantung Army lobbied successfully to wrest oversight of the Changkufeng salient from Chosen Army. In November 1938, Major Masanobu Tsuji of KwAHQ's Operations Section was sent to survey the site. The audacious officer was dismayed: Soviet forces dominated the land from the disputed ridge to the Tumen River. Tsuji undertook several winter reconnaissance missions. His final outing in March 1939 involved leading 40 men to Changkufeng's base. With rifles slung non-threateningly, they ascended to within 200 yards of Soviet lines, formed a line, and urinated in unison, eliciting amused reactions from the enemy. They then picnicked with obentos and sake, sang army tunes, and left gifts of canned meat, chocolates, and whiskey. This theatrical stunt concealed Tsuji's real aim: covert photography proving Soviet fortifications encroached on Manchukuoan soil. Tsuji was a singular figure. Born of modest means, he embodied a modern samurai ethos, channeling a sharp intellect into a frail, often ailing body through feats of extraordinary daring. A creative tactician, he thrived in intelligence ops, political scheming, aerial scouting, planning, and frontline command—excelling across a tumultuous career. Yet, flaws marred his brilliance: narrow bigotry, virulent racism, and capacity for cruelty. Ever the ambitious outsider, Tsuji wielded outsized influence via gekokujo—Japan's tradition of subordinates steering policy from below. In 1939, he was a major, but his pivotal role at Nomonhan stemmed from this dynamic. Back in Hsinking after his Changkufeng escapade, Tsuji drafted a response plan: negotiate border "rectification" with the Soviets; if talks failed, launch an attack to expel intruders. Kwantung Army adopted it. Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Otozaburo Yano flew to Tokyo with Tsuji's photos, seeking AGS approval. There, he was rebuffed—Changkufeng was deemed settled, and minor violations should be overlooked amid Tokyo's aversion to Soviet conflict. Yano's plea that leniency would invite aggression was countered by notes on Europe's tensions restraining Moscow. Yano's return sparked outrage at KwAHQ, seen as AGS thwarting their imperial duty to safeguard Manchukuo. Fury peaked in the Operations Section, setting the stage for Tsuji's drafting of stringent new frontier guidelines: "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes." The core tenet: "If Soviet troops transgress the Manchukuoan frontiers, Kwantung Army will nip their ambitions in the bud by completely destroying them." Specific directives for local commanders included: "If the enemy crosses the frontiers … annihilate him without delay, employing strength carefully built up beforehand. To accomplish our mission, it is permissible to enter Soviet territory, or to trap or lure Soviet troops into Manchukuoan territory and allow them to remain there for some time… . Where boundary lines are not clearly defined, area defense commanders will, upon their own initiative, establish boundaries and indicate them to the forward elements… . In the event of an armed clash, fight until victory is won, regardless of relative strengths or of the location of the boundaries. If the enemy violates the borders, friendly units must challenge him courageously and endeavor to triumph in their zone of action without concerning themselves about the consequences, which will be the responsibility of higher headquarters." Major Tsuji Masanobu later justified the new guidelines by pointing to the "contradictory orders" that had hamstrung frontier commanders under the old rules. They were tasked with upholding Manchukuo's territorial integrity yet forbidden from actions that might spark conflict. This, Tsuji argued, bred hesitation, as officers feared repercussions for decisive responses to incursions. The updated directives aimed to alleviate this "anxiety," empowering local leaders to act boldly without personal liability. In truth, Tsuji's "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes" were more incendiary than conciliatory. They introduced provocative measures: authorizing commanders to unilaterally define unclear boundaries, enforce them with immediate force "shoot first, ask questions later", permit pursuits into enemy territory, and even encourage luring adversaries across the line. Such tactics flouted both government policy and official army doctrine, prioritizing escalation over restraint. The proposals sparked intense debate within Kwantung Army's Operations Section. Section chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and Colonel Masao Terada outranked Tsuji, as did Major Takeharu Shimanuki, all recent transfers from the Army General Staff. Tsuji, however, boasted longer tenure at Kwantung Army Headquarters since April 1936 and in Operations since November 1937, making him the de facto veteran. Hattori and Terada hesitated to challenge the assertive major, whose reputation for intellect, persuasion, and deep knowledge of Manchuria commanded respect. In a 1960 interview, Shimanuki recalled Tsuji's dominance in discussions, where his proactive ideas often swayed the group. Unified, the section forwarded Tsuji's plan to Kwantung Army Command. Commander Lieutenant General Kenkichi Ueda consulted Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai and Vice Chief General Otozaburo Yano, seasoned leaders who should have spotted the guidelines' volatility. Yet, lingering grudges from AGS "interference" in past incidents like the Amur River and Changkufeng clouded their judgment. Ueda, Isogai, and Tsuji shared history from the 1932 Shanghai Incident: Tsuji, then a captain, led a company in the 7th Regiment under Colonel Isogai, with Yano as staff officer and Ueda commanding the 9th Division. Tsuji was wounded there, forging bonds of camaraderie. This "clique," which grew to include Hattori, Terada, and Shimanuki, amplified Tsuji's influence. Despite Isogai's initial reservations as the group's moderate voice, the guidelines won approval. Ueda issued them as Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488 on April 25, 1939, during a division commanders' conference at KwAHQ. A routine copy reached AGS in Tokyo, but no formal reply came. Preoccupied with the China War and alliance talks with Germany, AGS may have overlooked border matters. Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations head, later noted basic acceptance of Order 1488, with an informal expectation—relayed to Hattori and Terada—of prior consultation on violations. KwAHQ dismissed this as another Tokyo intrusion on their autonomy. Some Japanese analysts contend a stern AGS rejection might have prevented Nomonhan's catastrophe, though quelling Kwantung's defiance could have required mass staff reassignments, a disruptive step AGS avoided. Tsuji countered that permitting forceful action at Changkufeng would have deterred Nomonhan altogether, underscoring the interconnectedness of these clashes while implicitly critiquing the 1939 battle's location. Undeniably, Order 1488's issuance on April 25 paved the way for conflict three weeks later. Japanese records confirm that Khalkha Mongols and MPR patrols routinely crossed the Halha River—viewed by them as internal territory, 10 miles from the true border. Such crossings passed uneventfully in March and April 1939. Post-Order 1488, however, 23rd Division commander General Michitaro Komatsubara responded aggressively, setting the stage for escalation. The Nomonhan Incident ignited with a border clash on May 11–12, 1939, that rapidly spiraled into a major conflict. Over a dozen "authoritative" accounts exist, varying in viewpoint, focus, and specifics. After cross-referencing these sources, a coherent timeline emerges. On the night of May 10–11, a 20-man Mongolian People's Republic border patrol crossed eastward over the Halha River (known as Khalkhin Gol to Mongols and Soviets). About 10 miles east, atop a 150-foot sandy hill, lay the tiny hamlet of Nomonhan, a cluster of crude huts housing a few Mongol families. Just south flowed the Holsten River, merging westward into the broader Halha. By morning on May 11, Manchukuoan forces spotted the MPR patrol north of the Holsten and west of Nomonhan. In the MPR/Soviet perspective, Nomonhan Hill marked the Mongolia-Manchuria border. To Manchukuoans and Japanese, it sat 10 miles inside Manchukuo, well east of the Halha. A 40-man Manchukuoan cavalry unit repelled the Mongolians back across the river, inflicting initial casualties on both sides—the Manchukuoans drawing first blood. The MPR patrol leader exaggerated the attackers as 200 strong. The next day, May 12, a 60-man MPR force under Major P. Chogdan evicted the Manchukuoans from the disputed zone, reestablishing positions between the Halha and Nomonhan. The Manchukuoans, in turn, reported facing 700 enemies. Sporadic skirmishes and maneuvering persisted through the week. On May 13, two days post-clash, the local Manchukuoan commander alerted General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division headquarters in Hailar. Simultaneously, Major Chogdan reported to Soviet military command in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital. What began as a Mongolian-Manchukuoan spat was poised to draw in Soviet and Japanese patrons. Attributing the May 10–11 violation hinges on border interpretations: both sides claimed the Halha-Nomonhan strip. Yet, most accounts concur that Manchukuoan forces initiated the fighting. Post-May 13 notifications to Moscow and Tokyo clarify the record thereafter. Midday on May 13, Komatsubara was leading a staff conference on the newly issued Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488—Major Tsuji Masanobu's aggressive border guidelines. Ironically, the first Nomonhan combat report arrived mid-discussion. Officers present recall Komatsubara deciding instantly to "destroy the invading Outer Mongolian forces" per Order 1488. That afternoon, he informed Kwantung Army Headquarters of the incident and his intent to eradicate the intruders, requesting air support and trucks. General Kenkichi Ueda, Kwantung commander, approved Komatsubara's "positive attitude," dispatching six scout planes, 40 fighters, 10 light bombers, two anti-aircraft batteries, and two motorized transport companies. Ueda added a caveat: exercise "extreme caution" to prevent escalation—a paradoxical blend of destruction and restraint, reflective of KwAHQ's fervent mood. Ueda relayed the details to Tokyo's Army General Staff, which responded that Kwantung should handle it "appropriately." Despite Kwantung's impulsive reputation, Tokyo deferred, perhaps trusting the northern strategic imbalance, eight Japanese divisions versus 30 Soviet ones from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, would enforce prudence. This faith proved misguided. On May 14, Major Tsuji flew from KwAHQ for aerial reconnaissance over Nomonhan, spotting 20 horses but no troops. Upon landing, a fresh bullet hole in his plane confirmed lingering MPR presence east of the Halha. Tsuji briefed 23rd Division staff and reported to Ueda that the incident seemed minor. Aligning with Order 1488's spirit, Komatsubara deployed a force under Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma: an armored car company, two infantry companies, and a cavalry troop. Arriving at Nomonhan on May 15, Azuma learned most MPR forces had retreated westward across the Halha the prior night, with only token elements remaining, and those withdrawing. Undeterred, he pursued. The advance met scant resistance, as foes had crossed the river. However, Japanese light bombers struck a small MPR concentration on the west bank, Outpost Number 7, killing two and wounding 15 per MPR reports; Japanese claimed 30–40 kills. All agree: the raid targeted undisputed MPR territory. Hearing of May 15's events, Komatsubara deemed the Mongolians sufficiently rebuked and recalled Azuma to Hailar on May 16. KwAHQ concurred, closing the matter. Soviet leaders, however, saw it differently. Mid-May prompted Soviet support for the MPR under their 1936 Mutual Defense Pact. The Red Army's 57th Corps, stationed in Mongolia, faced initial disarray: Commander Nikolai Feklenko was hunting, Chief of Staff A. M. Kushchev in Ulan Ude with his ill wife. Moscow learned of clashes via international press from Japanese sources, sparking Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov's furious inquiry. Feklenko and Kushchev rushed back to Ulaanbaatar, dispatching a mixed force—a battalion from the 149th Infantry Regiment (36th Division), plus light armor and artillery from the 11th Tank Brigade—to Tamsag Bulak, 80 miles west of the Halha. Led by Major A. E. Bykov, it bolstered the MPR's 6th Cavalry Division. Bykov and Cavalry Commander Colonel Shoaaiibuu inspected the site on May 15, post-Azum's departure. The cavalry arrived two days later, backed by Bykov (ordered to remain west of the river and avoid combat if possible). Some MPR troops recrossed, occupying the disputed zone. Clashes with Manchukuoan cavalry resumed and intensified. Notified of renewed hostilities, Komatsubara viewed it as defiance, a personal affront. Emboldened by Order 1488, he aimed not just to repel but to encircle and annihilate. The incident was on the verge of major expansion. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The ghosts of the Changufeng incident have come back to haunt both the USSR and Japan. Those like Tsuji Masanobu instigated yet another border clash that would erupt into a full blown battle that would set a precedent for both nations until the very end of WW2. 

Part One: Rating the Winter Olympic SportsSpunky and Wolfman bring their signature 70s vs 80s perspective to the slopes, rinks, and halfpipes as they rank every Winter Olympic sport on their patented pop culture scale. Which events score a perfect “Billie Jean video” (the ultimate 80s achievement)? And which ones crash harder than the King himself, earning the dreaded “Elvis dying on the toilet” rating?From figure skating's sequined glory to the icy chaos of curling, no sport is safe from their hot takes and nostalgic banter. Whether you're Team Downhill or Team Luge, prepare for laughs, arguments, and maybe a few controversial opinions.Part Two: Miracle - The Boys of 1980 Documentary ReviewThe hosts dive into Netflix's Miracle: The Boys of 1980, the documentary that brought back all the feelings from that legendary Lake Placid moment. Spunky and Wolfman walk you through the goosebumps-inducing moments, the unexpected tears, and the belly laughs that hit them while revisiting one of sports' greatest underdog stories.Don't have Netflix? No problem! Consider this your Reader's Digest version of the doc. The guys share the best stories, the most moving interviews, and all the behind-the-scenes details that make this film essential viewing for anyone who remembers where they were when Herb Brooks' ragtag team took down the Soviet Union.Do you believe in miracles? After this episode, you will.Send us a voicemail and hear yourself on the next episode:https://www.speakpipe.com/The70sVsThe80s

He's the Director of American Security at America First Policy Institute, and he's very serious when it comes to the implications of Iran- this could be a major shift for the world.

CLICK HERE! To send us a message! Ask us a Question or just let us know what you think!A football game on TV, Howard Cosell's voice breaking the spell, and then a silence that never really ended. We start from that shared shock and pull a larger thread: how John Lennon's voice grew into something governments measured, feared, and tried to contain.We map the Beatles' improbable journey from pop to power, banned in the USSR yet copied onto “bone records” by kids who risked their futures just to hear a chord. Former Soviet leaders later admitted what censors couldn't stop: music can humanize an enemy and loosen the gears of a rigid system. Back in the States, Lennon's moral courage showed up in concrete ways, from refusing segregated audiences to standing with activists at the Free John Sinclair concert. That stance triggered surveillance, a deportation push, and a recognition in Washington that the youth vote—and Lennon's ability to mobilize it—could reshape elections.Then we return to the Dakota and everything that doesn't sit right. Conflicting medical recollections suggest a professional hit. Eyewitness stories diverge. Mark David Chapman lingers, reading The Catcher in the Rye, echoing a pattern that later brushes the Hinckley case and fuels MKUltra speculation. We don't claim a smoking gun; we lay out the record as it exists, with care and context. Around the edges, the world was changing fast: Reagan's incoming team, the Committee on the Present Danger, Euro-missile plans, and a new media landscape—CNN, soon MTV—ready to give Lennon a live line to millions. Pair that with signs the Beatles were edging toward shared studio time in 1981, and the stakes grow larger than one man with a pistol.What remains is the why. A voice that couldn't be bought, a platform that could fill streets, and a decade that was about to hinge on narratives of fear and force. We weigh the evidence, challenge the official story where it falters, and honor the cost of losing an artist who believed songs could be tools, not souvenirs. Listen, then tell us what you think—was it a lone gunman, or did policy and power have a heavier hand?If this resonated, follow the show, share it with a friend, and leave a review. Your support helps us keep asking hard questions with open eyes.

Explore the complex origins of the French and Indian War (1754-1763), the global conflict that reshaped North America. This concise deep dive explains how competition over the Ohio River Valley between Britain and France ignited a wider struggle, drawing in Native American tribes, colonial militias, and seasoned European generals. We'll unpack the strategic minds behind the war: British commanders who favored coalition-building and aggressive offensives, alongside French leaders who emphasized fortifications and alliances with Indigenous nations. Along the way, you'll meet pivotal moments: the contested fortifications of Fort Duquesne, early skirmishes along the frontier, and the turning points that led to the dramatic Battle of Quebec. We'll analyze battlefield tactics, logistics, and how leadership decisions, including those of young George Washington, influenced the course of the war. The video also connects these events to the wider Seven Years' War and explains why outcomes in North America led to the Treaty of Paris in 1763 and far-reaching consequences for France, Britain, and Indigenous peoples. Whether you're new to the topic or brushing up for a history exam, this clear, tightly paced overview helps you remember key dates, players, and strategies. Don't forget to like, subscribe, and ring the bell for more history explainers. Share your questions about colonial conflicts in the comments, and tell us which battle you'd like us to cover next. Time-stamped chapters jump to origins, battles, and legacies. Topics like the Treaty of Paris 1763, scope of the Seven Years' War, colonial mobilization, and Native diplomacy are explored. Don't forget I have a Youtube Membership: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbp8JMZizR4zak9wpM3Fvrw/join or my Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel where you can get exclusive content like "What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2?"

https://shop.thecommunists.org/product/soviet-victory-over-fascism-2016/ The Soviet victory was a disaster for imperialism. If the first world war had ushered in the Great October Socialist Revolution and brought into existence the mighty USSR, the second world war gave birth to an entire socialist camp, which encompassed a third of the globe and a quarter of the world's population. This second edition of our popular pamphlet has been produced to meet the very real need for some fact-based history. Only by understanding our past will we be able to successfully build a bright, socialist future, free from the entirely unnecessary scourges of poverty, disease and war. Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! www.thecommunists.org www.lalkar.org www.redyouth.org Telegram: t.me/thecommunists Twitter: twitter.com/cpgbml Soundcloud: @proletarianradio Rumble: rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: www.facebook.com/cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: https://thecommunists.org/education-programme/ Each one teach one! www.londonworker.org/education-programme/ Join the struggle www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: www.thecommunists.org/donate/

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It's the 1970s. The Vietnam War, Watergate and the oil crisis are stoking turmoil in America. And in southern California two middle-class rebels are about to strike back at ‘The Man' by selling CIA spy satellite secrets to the USSR.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

2026-02-03 | UPDATES #125 | Russia's internal information front has never been more divided. You could go so far as to say it's eating itself alive. On one side: the regime's studio fanatics—smiling through war crimes, promising apocalypse, selling “victory” like they're flogging a soda brand. On the other: Z-Patriots, milbloggers, and turbo-nationalists — some angry, some exhausted, some quietly terrified that the Kremlin is steering toward yet another illusory “deal” that looks like defeat in slow motion. They can see Russia bleeding out but do nothing to stop it. As of February 3, 2026, this war has run about 1,440 days — longer than the USSR's war against Nazi Germany, commonly cited as 1,418 days. The “Great Patriotic War” myth was supposed to be the Kremlin's sacred measuring stick, the propagandist touchstone to justify every act of aggression, make sense of every horror and sacrifice. As well as being a universal vanishing point for all propaganda narratives. Now it's a timer counting down the credibility of the entire project and putting the architecture of the Russian empire in doubt. ----------SUPPORT THE CHANNEL:https://www.buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtainhttps://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtainhttps://www.gofundme.com/f/scaling-up-campaign-to-fight-authoritarian-disinformation----------A REQUEST FOR HELP!I'm heading back to Kyiv this week, to film, do research and conduct interviews. The logistics and need for equipment and clothing are a little higher than for my previous trips. It will be cold, and may be dark also. If you can, please assist to ensure I can make this trip a success. My commitment to the audience of the channel, will be to bring back compelling interviews conducted in Ukraine, and to use the experience to improve the quality of the channel, it's insights and impact. Let Ukraine and democracy prevail! https://buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtain/extrashttps://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtainhttps://www.gofundme.com/f/scaling-up-campaign-to-fight-authoritarian-disinformationNONE OF THIS CAN HAPPEN WITHOUT YOU!So what's next? We're going to Kyiv in January 2026 to film on the ground, and will record interviews with some huge guests. We'll be creating opportunities for new interviews, and to connect you with the reality of a European city under escalating winter attack, from an imperialist, genocidal power. PLEASE HELP ME ME TO GROW SILICON CURTAINWe are planning our events for 2026, and to do more and have a greater impact. After achieving more than 12 events in 2025, we will aim to double that! 24 events and interviews on the ground in Ukraine, to push back against weaponized information, toxic propaganda and corrosive disinformation. Please help us make it happen!----------SOURCES: Kyiv Post — ISW assessment summary noting milbloggers highlighting inconsistencies (published Jan 25, 2026). RussiaPost — Ivan Filippov on Z-community split over talks/ceasefire logic (Apr 1, 2025) (background framing). The Guardian — reporting including Solovyov quote about pushing Ukraine “into the stone age” (Feb 3, 2026).Reuters — Girkin sentencing context; crackdown on nationalist critic (Jan 25, 2024) (background). The Moscow Times — appeal upheld / prison status context (May 29, 2024) (background). ----------

Subscribe now to enjoy ad-free listening and bonus content. Keep the narrative flow going in 2026! It wasn't very long ago when U.S. policymakers relied on a species of grand strategist known as the Sovietologist. It was the Cold War, and the strategies for dealing with the USSR ranged from containment to rollback, to détente and peaceful bridge-building. Zbigniew Brzezinski formulated the latter. President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser was an ardent anti-communist with a pragmatic streak, whose goal was to accelerate the breakup of the Soviet Empire. He also supported Palestinian autonomy, and after the Cold War, Brzezinski backed NATO expansion in Eastern Europe while criticizing the excesses of the global war on terror. In this episode, the Financial Times' Edward Luce discusses his timely biography, Zbig: The Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski, America's Great Power Prophet. Also read: Martin Di Caro's review of Luce's book for Responsible Statecraft.  

In 1957, the beeps from Sputnik, a small Russian satellite, sent the USSR & US into a space race. Teasel Muir-Harmony of the Air & Space Museum chronicles the history of space travel and how the U.S. landed on the Moon and how we're going back in 2026. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Uncle Phil discusses the Olympics past and present with Lou A. The talk about the 1980 upset by team USA vs the USSR and the current NY Islanders

Johnny & Brent welcome Rick Monroe to The Challenge, where they craft 5-6 different conceptual ideas for a song titled "Another Garden". Rick was an indie artist for years, formerly endorsed by Jägermeister and now Monster Energy Drinks; however, Rick Monroe & The Hitmen just signed an imprint deal with Virgin Records. Monroe has performed in 17 countries, in every U.S. state (including Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico), and he's a Seven-time Jaeger Meister country brand ambassador. He's toured with Eric Church, Dierks Bentley, Lee Bryce, Aaron Lewis, Eli Young Band, Pat Green, Ted Nugent, and Randy Hauser, as well as opened for country music legends including the Charlie Daniels Band, Dwight Yoakam, Travis Tritt, Patty Loveless, and more. Finally, he's entertained the USO overseas, AFV, US troops in Vietnam, and the former President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This week we are discussing Wind of Change released in 1991 by German rock band Scoprions. A song that changed the balance of global power with nothing more than metaphors and local references. Also in this prepisode music news of the weird, listener emails and we announce next week's album. In this episode we discuss what Garrett's "freelance jobs" actually are, the fall of the USSR, using music for regime change, why Haunted Houses are not an erotic location, that Time Putin stole a Super Bowl ring, why Poison won't be touring this year, sound weapons, the Philly grave robber, David Bowie, and so much more!  Hatepod.com | TW: @AlbumHatePod | IG: @hatePod | hatePodMail@gmail.com Episode Outline: Quick update on the goings on at the world headquarters Discuss our history with the song/band Song discussion - lyrics and music Music Video How the song did worldwide Amazon reviews Listener email (just 2) Music news of the weird Announce next week's album

In this episode, we feature Michael Parenti, who passed away this week at the age of 92. A prominent political scientist and cultural critic, he delivers a powerful lecture at the University of Colorado Boulder from 1986. Parenti discusses the intricacies of US interventionism, the dynamics of capitalism, and the historical exploitation of the developing world. He challenges conventional narratives about poverty in the Global South, asserting that these nations are not poor but rather over-exploited. Join us as we unpack his insightful analysis of imperialism, capitalism, and the ongoing struggles for social justice that our oligarchs and their political class have not seemed to learn the lessons from 40 years ago, as the stature of the U.S. erodes daily on the world stage, supporting endless war in Ukraine and Palestine, disastrous trade policies, and ongoing hegemonic and regime change operations in multiple countries. Support the Podcast via PayPal https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=LBGXTRM292TFC&source=url Born to a working class Italian American family in New York City, he earned his doctorate at Yale and taught political science despite being blacklisted for his political views. We re-air this Yellow lecture - referring to the poor 1980s video quality – because after the U.S war machine goes after Venezuela, Greenland, Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, Colombia, who's next, this desire for hegemonic control from this failing empire will not stop until we all step up and make it stop. And this Imperial Boomerang, what Chalmers Johnson called Blowback, it's hitting us in Minnesota, on the streets here in Los Angeles all the way to Maine. The violent methods to control and subdue smaller weaker countries, disappearing intellectuals, activists, political leaders Like I saw in Guatemala in the 90s; where activists are unalived without any fear of accountability. Minneapolis. We did it to Vietnam, we did it in Iraq, now we're doing it in…where next? For an extended interview and other benefits, become an EcoJustice Radio patron at https://www.patreon.com/ecojusticeradio Sources: Michael Parenti speaks at the University of Colorado, Boulder: "US interventionism, the 3rd world, and the USSR" April 15, 1986 Yellow Lecture: https://youtu.be/W10QEs-TkhU?si=ZP_D5JNOWpJ_xvuC Michael Parenti Library: https://www.youtube.com/@themichaelparentilibrary/videos Michael Parenti [https://www.michael-parenti.org/] is a U.S. political scientist, academic historian and cultural critic who writes on scholarly and popular subjects. He is the award-winning author of twenty-four books, including The Face of Imperialism (2011) and Democracy for the Few originally written in 1974 with a 9th edition published in 2010: He has taught at universities and has also run for political office. Parenti is well known for his Marxist writings and lectures, and is an intellectual of the U.S. Left. Jack Eidt is an urban planner, environmental journalist, and climate organizer, as well as award-winning fiction writer. He is Co-Founder of SoCal 350 Climate Action and Executive Producer of EcoJustice Radio. He writes for an Artbound project on PBS SoCal called High & Dry [https://www.pbssocal.org/people/high-dry]. He is also Founder and Publisher of WilderUtopia [https://wilderutopia.com], a website dedicated to the question of Earth sustainability, finding society-level solutions to environmental, community, economic, transportation and energy needs. Podcast Website: http://ecojusticeradio.org/ Podcast Blog: https://www.wilderutopia.com/category/ecojustice-radio/ Support the Podcast: Patreon https://www.patreon.com/ecojusticeradio PayPal https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=LBGXTRM292TFC&source=url Executive Producer and Host: Jack Eidt Engineer and Original Music: Blake Quake Beats Episode 259 Photo credit: Michael Parenti

***RIP Michael Parenti*** Michael Parenti speaks at the University of Colorado, Boulder: "US interventionism, the 3rd world, and the USSR" April 15, 1986 Source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xP8CzlFhc14 Check out the Anti-Imperialist Archive  for more great archival mixes Join us for a live edition of Tankie Group Therapy Sunday @ 3:30 https://www.youtube.com/live/rX2hbS3eKqg    

Welcome to Impact Theory with Tom Bilyeu! In this episode, Tom Bilyeu sits down for part two of his fascinating conversation with Anatoly Yakovenko, the creator of Solana. Together, they dive deep into the future of finance, the interplay between politics and technology, and how crypto and AI are shaping our world. Anatoly Yakovenko shares his unique perspective as an immigrant from the former USSR, reflecting on the distinctly American spirit of innovation, self-reliance, and problem-solving. He offers insights into how feedback loops in democracy, technological advancements, and economic incentives drive both progress and setbacks in the United States. The duo explores the challenges of building trust in an increasingly digital world—from cryptographic signatures to the limits of human perception—and discuss how AI is rapidly transforming everything from software engineering to healthcare. Anatoly Yakovenko reveals how crypto is cutting out middlemen, democratizing financial access, and why meme coins and speculative culture are here to stay. Get ready for an episode packed with optimism, critical thinking, and a clear-eyed assessment of the innovations and hurdles ahead in tech, governance, and society. Whether you're a crypto enthusiast or just curious about the forces reshaping our world, this conversation will give you plenty to think about. Quince: Free shipping and 365-day returns at https://quince.com/impactpodHomeServe: Help protect your home systems – and your wallet – with HomeServe against covered repairs. Plans start at just $4.99 a month at https://homeserve.comShopify: Sign up for your one-dollar-per-month trial period at https://shopify.com/impact Pique: 20% off at https://piquelife.com/impactNetSuite: Right now, get our free business guide, Demystifying AI, at https://NetSuite.com/Theory Ketone IQ: Visit https://ketone.com/IMPACT for 30% OFF your subscription orderAquaTru: 20% off your purifier with code IMPACT https://aquatru.comIncogni: Take your personal data back with Incogni! Use code IMPACT at the link below and get 60% off an annual plan: https://incogni.com/impactSintra AI: 72% off with code IMPACT at https://sintra.ai/impactHuel: High-Protein Starter Kit 20% off for new customers at https://huel.com/impact code impactBevel Health: Visit https://bevel.health/impact and use code IMPACT to get your first month free. What's up, everybody? It's Tom Bilyeu here: If you want my help... STARTING a business: join me here at ZERO TO FOUNDER:  https://tombilyeu.com/zero-to-founder?utm_campaign=Podcast%20Offer&utm_source=podca[%E2%80%A6]d%20end%20of%20show&utm_content=podcast%20ad%20end%20of%20show SCALING a business: see if you qualify here.:  https://tombilyeu.com/call Get my battle-tested strategies and insights delivered weekly to your inbox: sign up here.: https://tombilyeu.com/ ********************************************************************** If you're serious about leveling up your life, I urge you to check out my new podcast, Tom Bilyeu's Mindset Playbook —a goldmine of my most impactful episodes on mindset, business, and health. Trust me, your future self will thank you. ********************************************************************** FOLLOW TOM: Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/tombilyeu/ Tik Tok: https://www.tiktok.com/@tombilyeu?lang=en Twitter: https://twitter.com/tombilyeu YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@TomBilyeu FOLLOW ANATOLY YAKOVENKO Twitter/X: https://twitter.com/aeyakovenkoSolana Foundation: https://solana.org/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode of She's All Over the Place, I had the wonderful opportunity to sit and chat with the producer, Steven Lawrence, to explore The Long Way Home: Remastered and Expanded (2026) Michael Apted's long-lost documentary about Soviet underground rock legend Boris Grebenshchikov and his extraordinary 1988 journey from Leningrad to the West during the early days of Glasnost. Filmed at a moment of rare optimism inside the USSR, the documentary follows Grebenshchikov as he records an album with Dave Stewart (Eurythmics), alongside Annie Lennox, Chrissie Hynde, Ray Cooper, and Crosby, Stills & Nash, becoming one of the first Soviet musicians to collaborate openly with Western rock stars. Remastered in 4K with new 5.1 sound and expanded with a newly created epilogue, the film now brings Boris's story up to the present: his disillusionment with post-Soviet Russia, his outspoken opposition to Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine, and his eventual exile from his homeland. We discuss the film's disappearance for more than three decades, its rediscovery through MoMA's Film Preservation Festival, and why The Long Way Home now feels less like a period piece  and more like a warning, a memory, and a testament to the enduring power of music to resist censorship and tyranny. MoMA EVENT WEBSITE: https://www.moma.org/calendar/events/11134 MoMA SOCIAL MEDIA:o Instagram: @themuseumofmodernarto Facebook: facebook.com/MuseumofModernArt (@museumofmodernart) o LinkedIn: linkedin.com/company/the-museum-of-modern-art/ (@the-museum-of-modern-art) o TikTok: @museumofmodernarto Threads: @themuseumofmodernarto Twitter: @MoMAFilm Stay Connected with ME: https://www.chonacas.com/links/

Author Izabella Tabarovsky—a scholar of Soviet antizionism and contemporary antisemitism, writer, journalist, and the author of Be a Refusenik: A Jewish Student's Survival Guide—joins host Steven Shalowitz from her home in Jerusalem to explore the Soviet origins of modern anti-Zionism and why those ideas echo so loudly on campuses today. Born in 1970 and raised in the USSR, Tabarovsky recounts what it meant to live with state-sponsored "anti-Zionism" that functioned as a sophisticated system of discrimination against Jews, from schoolyard humiliation to university and career barriers.

Send us a textMOPB- Blind Leading the BlindPodcast Summary – Ro-Mina / MOPB S1 E4 “Boobs and Knees”This episode opens with a deep dive into Ro-Mina's background. Born in Uzbekistan during the USSR era, Ro-Mina is a Bukharian (Buharian) Sephardic Jew with Persian roots—something she considers central to her identity. She immigrated to the U.S. at age five, speaks fluent Russian, and grew up in Northeast Philly before moving to Bucks County. A longtime reality-TV fan, Ro-Mina manifested her place on TV and ultimately landed on the show through Rosalyn.Professionally, Ro-Mina partnered with her brother in a senior home-care business, which they later sold. She then invested heavily in real estate with her husband Roman, taking over design and staging while he builds, leases, and manages properties himself. Roman has supported her reality-TV ambitions from day one.Ro-Mina finds herself caught in the middle of the growing rift between Rosalyn and Hillary. While she respects Hillary's talent and hustle, she believes Hillary revealed Rosalyn's past in a way that felt malicious. She encourages Rosalyn to keep finding her voice and stay authentic, while struggling with loyalty on both sides.The recap then shifts to MOPB S1 E4 – “Boobs and Knees.” Hillary plans a lavish vow renewal after her intimate Tuscany wedding, complete with yacht tastings and nonstop criticism of the food. She continues her crusade against Maria, accusing her of inappropriate behavior and declaring she doesn't belong in the group.At Maria's DJ launch party, tensions explode. Hillary and Maria face off over accusations of name-calling, attention-seeking, and physical boundaries. The argument ends with Hillary uninviting Maria from her vow renewal—and Maria gladly accepting the dismissal.The drama escalates again at Rosalyn's billionaire-level gala, featuring a $1.2M Bulgari Serpenti necklace. Fashion rules (“boobs and knees”), etiquette wars, and reputation policing dominate the night. Taja confronts Gale over name-dropping and authenticity, while Maria exposes behind-the-scenes judgment from the group. The evening reaches peak chaos when Gale literally falls off the couch, triggering a glam emergency and unfiltered confessionals.The episode closes with fractured alliances, wounded egos, and the clear realization that Palm Beach politeness is no match for unchecked honesty, couture confidence, and unresolved grudges.Support the showhttps://www.wewinewhenever.com/

On Episode 613 of Spittin' Chiclets, The boys are joined by one of the legendary Russian 5, Sergei Fedorov after he recently got his jersey retired in Detroit. An unreal interview where he talks about defecting from the USSR, Growing up skating in northern Russia, and much more. But first, The Rangers are going full Retool mode, Vegas pulls off another insane trade, and we saw a full on tilt in college hockey. Tune in. You won't want to miss it. 00:00:00 - Start 00:00:32 - Chiclets Updates 00:17:32 - Football Playoffs 00:31:47 - Rangers Retooling 00:48:13 - Andersson Trade 00:55:05 - Around the League 01:11:23 - Sergei Fedorov 02:18:34 - Quick Hits 02:22:58 - ETC. Support the Show: Pink Whitney: Take Your Shot with Pink Whitney Draft Kings: GAMBLING PROBLEM? CALL 1-800-GAMBLER, (800) 327-5050 or visit gamblinghelplinema.org (MA). Call 877-8-HOPENY/text HOPENY (467369) (NY). Please Gamble Responsibly. 888-789-7777/visit ccpg.org (CT), or visit www.mdgamblinghelp.org (MD).  21+ and present in most states. (18+ DC/KY/NH/WY). Void in ONT/OR/NH. Eligibility restrictions apply. On behalf of Boot Hill Casino & Resort (KS). Pass-thru of per wager tax may apply in IL. 1 per new customer. Must register new account to receive reward Token. Must select Token BEFORE placing min. $5 bet to receive $300 in Bonus Bets if your bet wins. Min. -500 odds req. Token and Bonus Bets are single-use and non-withdrawable. Token expires 2/1/26. Bonus Bets expire in 7 days (168 hours). Stake removed from payout. Terms: sportsbook.draftkings.com/promos. Ends 1/25/26 at 11:59 PM ET. Sponsored by DK. Rhoback: Use the code CHICLETS on https://Rhoback.com for 20% off your first purchase through the end of this week BodyArmor: Work hard and hydrate hard with BODYARMOR Flash I.V. Grab it at 7-ElevenYou can find every episode of this show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify or YouTube. Prime Members can listen ad-free on Amazon Music. For more, visit barstool.link/schiclets

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Lake Khasan. In August, the Lake Khasan region became a tense theater of combat as Soviet and Japanese forces clashed around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The Soviets pushed a multi-front offensive, bolstered by artillery, tanks, and air power, yet the Japanese defenders held firm, aided by engineers, machine guns, and heavy guns. By the ninth and tenth, a stubborn Japanese resilience kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese hands, though the price was steep and the field was littered with the costs of battle. Diplomatically, both sides aimed to confine the fighting and avoid a larger war. Negotiations trudged on, culminating in a tentative cease-fire draft for August eleventh: a halt to hostilities, positions to be held as of midnight on the tenth, and the creation of a border-demarcation commission. Moscow pressed for a neutral umpire; Tokyo resisted, accepting a Japanese participant but rejecting a neutral referee. The cease-fire was imperfect, with miscommunications and differing interpretations persisting.    #185 Operation Hainan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After what seemed like a lifetime over in the northern border between the USSR and Japan, today we are returning to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Now I thought it might be a bit jarring to dive into it, so let me do a brief summary of where we are at, in the year of 1939. As the calendar turned to 1939, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which had erupted in July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and escalated into full-scale conflict, had evolved into a protracted quagmire for the Empire of Japan. What began as a swift campaign to subjugate the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek had, by the close of 1938, transformed into a war of attrition. Japanese forces, under the command of generals like Shunroku Hata and Yasuji Okamura, had achieved stunning territorial gains: the fall of Shanghai in November 1937 after a brutal three-month battle that cost over 200,000 Chinese lives; the infamous capture of Nanjing in December 1937, marked by the Nanjing Massacre where an estimated 300,000 civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed in a six-week orgy of violence; and the sequential occupations of Xuzhou in May 1938, Wuhan in October 1938, and Guangzhou that same month.  These victories secured Japan's control over China's eastern seaboard, major riverine arteries like the Yangtze, and key industrial centers, effectively stripping the Nationalists of much of their economic base. Yet, despite these advances, China refused to capitulate. Chiang's government had retreated inland to the mountainous stronghold of Chongqing in Sichuan province, where it regrouped amid the fog-laden gorges, drawing on the vast human reserves of China's interior and the resilient spirit of its people. By late 1938, Japanese casualties had mounted to approximately 50,000 killed and 200,000 wounded annually, straining the Imperial Japanese Army's resources and exposing the vulnerabilities of overextended supply lines deep into hostile territory. In Tokyo, the corridors of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Army Ministry buzzed with urgent deliberations during the winter of 1938-1939. The initial doctrine of "quick victory" through decisive battles, epitomized by the massive offensives of 1937 and 1938, had proven illusory. Japan's military planners, influenced by the Kwantung Army's experiences in Manchuria and the ongoing stalemate, recognized that China's sheer size, with its 4 million square miles and over 400 million inhabitants, rendered total conquest unfeasible without unacceptable costs. Intelligence reports highlighted the persistence of Chinese guerrilla warfare, particularly in the north where Communist forces under Mao Zedong's Eighth Route Army conducted hit-and-run operations from bases in Shanxi and Shaanxi, sabotaging railways and ambushing convoys. The Japanese response included brutal pacification campaigns, such as the early iterations of what would later formalize as the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, burn all, loot all), aimed at devastating rural economies and isolating resistance pockets. But these measures only fueled further defiance. By early 1939, a strategic pivot was formalized: away from direct annihilation of Chinese armies toward a policy of economic strangulation. This "blockade and interdiction" approach sought to sever China's lifelines to external aid, choking off the flow of weapons, fuel, and materiel that sustained the Nationalist war effort. As one Japanese staff officer noted in internal memos, the goal was to "starve the dragon in its lair," acknowledging the limits of Japanese manpower, total forces in China numbered around 1 million by 1939, against China's inexhaustible reserves. Central to this new strategy were the three primary overland supply corridors that had emerged as China's backdoors to the world, compensating for the Japanese naval blockade that had sealed off most coastal ports since late 1937. The first and most iconic was the Burma Road, a 717-mile engineering marvel hastily constructed between 1937 and 1938 by over 200,000 Chinese and Burmese laborers under the direction of engineers like Chih-Ping Chen. Stretching from the railhead at Lashio in British Burma (modern Myanmar) through treacherous mountain passes and dense jungles to Kunming in Yunnan province, the road navigated elevations up to 7,000 feet with hundreds of hairpin turns and precarious bridges. By early 1939, it was operational, albeit plagued by monsoonal mudslides, banditry, and mechanical breakdowns of the imported trucks, many Ford and Chevrolet models supplied via British Rangoon. Despite these challenges, it funneled an increasing volume of aid: in 1939 alone, estimates suggest up to 10,000 tons per month of munitions, gasoline, and aircraft parts from Allied sources, including early Lend-Lease precursors from the United States. The road's completion in 1938 had been a direct response to the loss of southern ports, and its vulnerability to aerial interdiction made it a prime target in Japanese planning documents. The second lifeline was the Indochina route, centered on the French-built Yunnan-Vietnam Railway (also known as the Hanoi-Kunming Railway), a 465-mile narrow-gauge line completed in 1910 that linked the port of Haiphong in French Indochina to Kunming via Hanoi and Lao Cai. This colonial artery, supplemented by parallel roads and river transport along the Red River, became China's most efficient supply conduit in 1938-1939, exploiting France's uneasy neutrality. French authorities, under Governor-General Pierre Pasquier and later Georges Catroux, turned a blind eye to transshipments, allowing an average of 15,000 to 20,000 tons monthly in early 1939, far surpassing the Burma Road's initial capacity. Cargoes included Soviet arms rerouted via Vladivostok and American oil, with French complicity driven by anti-Japanese sentiment and profitable tolls. However, Japanese reconnaissance flights from bases in Guangdong noted the vulnerability of bridges and rail yards, leading to initial bombing raids by mid-1939. Diplomatic pressure mounted, with Tokyo issuing protests to Paris, foreshadowing the 1940 closure under Vichy France after the fall of France in Europe. The route's proximity to the South China Sea made it a focal point for Japanese naval strategists, who viewed it as a "leak in the blockade." The third corridor, often overlooked but critical, was the Northwest Highway through Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang province. This overland network, upgraded between 1937 and 1941 with Soviet assistance, connected the Turkestan-Siberian Railway at Almaty (then Alma-Ata) to Lanzhou in Gansu via Urumqi, utilizing a mix of trucks, camel caravans, and rudimentary roads across the Gobi Desert and Tian Shan mountains. Under the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937 and subsequent aid agreements, Moscow supplied China with over 900 aircraft, 82 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces, and vast quantities of ammunition and fuel between 1937 and 1941—much of it traversing this route. In 1938-1939, volumes peaked, with Soviet pilots and advisors even establishing air bases in Lanzhou. The highway's construction involved tens of thousands of Chinese laborers, facing harsh winters and logistical hurdles, but it delivered up to 2,000 tons monthly, including entire fighter squadrons like the Polikarpov I-16. Japanese intelligence, aware of this "Red lifeline," planned disruptions but were constrained by the ongoing Nomonhan Incident on the Manchurian-Soviet border in 1939, which diverted resources and highlighted the risks of provoking Moscow. These routes collectively sustained China's resistance, prompting Japan's high command to prioritize their severance. In March 1939, the South China Area Army was established under General Rikichi Andō (later succeeded by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi), headquartered in Guangzhou, with explicit orders to disrupt southern communications. Aerial campaigns intensified, with Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers from Wuhan and Guangzhou targeting Kunming's airfields and the Red River bridges, while diplomatic maneuvers pressured colonial powers: Britain faced demands during the June 1939 Tientsin Crisis to close the Burma Road, and France received ultimatums that culminated in the 1940 occupation of northern Indochina. Yet, direct assaults on Yunnan or Guangxi were deemed too arduous due to rugged terrain and disease risks. Instead, planners eyed peripheral objectives to encircle these arteries. This strategic calculus set the stage for the invasion of Hainan Island, a 13,000-square-mile landmass off Guangdong's southern coast, rich in iron and copper but strategically priceless for its position astride the Indochina route and proximity to Hong Kong. By February 1939, Japanese admirals like Nobutake Kondō of the 5th Fleet advocated seizure to establish air and naval bases, plugging blockade gaps and enabling raids on Haiphong and Kunming, a prelude to broader southern expansion that would echo into the Pacific War. Now after the fall campaign around Canton in autumn 1938, the Japanese 21st Army found itself embedded in a relentless effort to sever the enemy's lifelines. Its primary objective shifted from mere battlefield engagements to tightening the choke points of enemy supply, especially along the Canton–Hankou railway. Recognizing that war materiel continued to flow into the enemy's hands, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to strike at every other supply route, one by one, until the arteries of logistics were stifled. The 21st Army undertook a series of decisive occupations to disrupt transport and provisioning from multiple directions. To sustain these difficult campaigns, Imperial General Headquarters reinforced the south China command, enabling greater operational depth and endurance. The 21st Army benefited from a series of reinforcements during 1939, which allowed a reorganization of assignments and missions: In late January, the Iida Detachment was reorganized into the Formosa Mixed Brigade and took part in the invasion of Hainan Island.  Hainan, just 15 miles across the Qiongzhou Strait from the mainland, represented a critical "loophole": it lay astride the Gulf of Tonkin, enabling smuggling of arms and materiel from Haiphong to Kunming, and offered potential airfields for bombing raids deep into Yunnan. Japanese interest in Hainan dated to the 1920s, driven by the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, which eyed the island's tropical resources (rubber, iron, copper) and naval potential at ports like Sanya (Samah). Prewar surveys by Japanese firms, such as those documented in Ide Kiwata's Minami Shina no Sangyō to Keizai (1939), highlighted mineral wealth and strategic harbors. The fall of Guangzhou in October 1938 provided the perfect launchpad, but direct invasion was delayed until early 1939 amid debates between the IJA (favoring mainland advances) and IJN (prioritizing naval encirclement). The operation would also heavily align with broader "southward advance" (Nanshin-ron) doctrine foreshadowing invasions of French Indochina (1940) and the Pacific War. On the Chinese side, Hainan was lightly defended as part of Guangdong's "peace preservation" under General Yu Hanmou. Two security regiments, six guard battalions, and a self-defense corps, totaling around 7,000–10,000 poorly equipped troops guarded the island, supplemented by roughly 300 Communist guerrillas under Feng Baiju, who operated independently in the interior. The indigenous Li (Hlai) people in the mountainous south, alienated by Nationalist taxes, provided uneven support but later allied with Communists. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to occupy and hold strategic points on the island near Haikou-Shih. The 21st Army commander assigned the Formosa Mixed Brigade to carry out this mission. Planning began in late 1938 under the IJN's Fifth Fleet, with IJA support from the 21st Army. The objective: secure northern and southern landing sites to bisect the island, establish air/naval bases, and exploit resources. Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the fleet, emphasized surprise and air superiority. The invasion began under the cover of darkness on February 9, 1939, when Kondō's convoy entered Tsinghai Bay on the northern shore of Hainan and anchored at midnight. Japanese troops swiftly disembarked, encountering minimal initial resistance from the surprised Chinese defenders, and secured a beachhead in the northern zone. At 0300 hours on 10 February, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, operating in close cooperation with naval units, executed a surprise landing at the northeastern point of Tengmai Bay in north Hainan. By 04:30, the right flank reached the main road leading to Fengyingshih, while the left flank reached a position two kilometers south of Tienwei. By 07:00, the right flank unit had overcome light enemy resistance near Yehli and occupied Chiungshan. At that moment there were approximately 1,000 elements of the enemy's 5th Infantry Brigade (militia) at Chiungshan; about half of these troops were destroyed, and the remainder fled into the hills south of Tengmai in a state of disarray. Around 08:30 that same day, the left flank unit advanced to the vicinity of Shuchang and seized Hsiuying Heights. By 12:00, it occupied Haikou, the island's northern port city and administrative center, beginning around noon. Army and navy forces coordinated to mop up remaining pockets of resistance in the northern areas, overwhelming the scattered Chinese security units through superior firepower and organization. No large-scale battles are recorded in primary accounts; instead, the engagements were characterized by rapid advances and localized skirmishes, as the Chinese forces, lacking heavy artillery or air support, could not mount a sustained defense. By the end of the day, Japanese control over the north was consolidating, with Haikou falling under their occupation.Also on 10 February, the Brigade pushed forward to seize Cingang. Wenchang would be taken on the 22nd, followed by Chinglan Port on the 23rd. On February 11, the operation expanded southward when land combat units amphibiously assaulted Samah (now Sanya) at the island's southern tip. This landing allowed them to quickly seize key positions, including the port of Yulin (Yulinkang) and the town of Yai-Hsien (Yaxian, now part of Sanya). With these southern footholds secured, Japanese forces fanned out to subjugate the rest of the island, capturing inland areas and infrastructure with little organized opposition. Meanwhile, the landing party of the South China Navy Expeditionary Force, which had joined with the Army to secure Haikou, began landing on the island's southern shore at dawn on 14 February. They operated under the protection of naval and air units. By the same morning, the landing force had advanced to Sa-Riya and, by 12:00 hours, had captured Yulin Port. Chinese casualties were significant in the brief fighting; from January to May 1939, reports indicate the 11th security regiment alone suffered 8 officers and 162 soldiers killed, 3 officers and 16 wounded, and 5 officers and 68 missing, though figures for other units are unclear. Japanese losses were not publicly detailed but appear to have been light.  When crisis pressed upon them, Nationalist forces withdrew from coastal Haikou, shepherding the last civilians toward the sheltering embrace of the Wuzhi mountain range that bands the central spine of Hainan. From that high ground they sought to endure the storm, praying that the rugged hills might shield their families from the reach of war. Yet the Li country's mountains did not deliver a sanctuary free of conflict. Later in August of 1943, an uprising erupted among the Li,Wang Guoxing, a figure of local authority and stubborn resolve. His rebellion was swiftly crushed; in reprisal, the Nationalists executed a seizure of vengeance that extended far beyond the moment of defeat, claiming seven thousand members of Wang Guoxing's kin in his village. The episode was grim testimony to the brutal calculus of war, where retaliation and fear indelibly etched the landscape of family histories. Against this backdrop, the Communists under Feng Baiju and the native Li communities forged a vigorous guerrilla war against the occupiers. The struggle was not confined to partisan skirmishes alone; it unfolded as a broader contest of survival and resistance. The Japanese response was relentless and punitive, and it fell upon Li communities in western Hainan with particular ferocity, Sanya and Danzhou bore the brunt of violence, as did the many foreign laborers conscripted into service by the occupying power. The toll of these reprisals was stark: among hundreds of thousands of slave laborers pressed into service, tens of thousands perished. Of the 100,000 laborers drawn from Hong Kong, only about 20,000 survived the war's trials, a haunting reminder of the human cost embedded in the occupation. Strategically, the island of Hainan took on a new if coercive purpose. Portions of the island were designated as a naval administrative district, with the Hainan Guard District Headquarters established at Samah, signaling its role as a forward air base and as an operational flank for broader anti-Chiang Kai-shek efforts. In parallel, the island's rich iron and copper resources were exploited to sustain the war economy of the occupiers. The control of certain areas on Hainan provided a base of operations for incursions into Guangdong and French Indochina, while the airbases that dotted the island enabled long-range air raids that threaded routes from French Indochina and Burma into the heart of China. The island thus assumed a grim dual character: a frontier fortress for the occupiers and a ground for the prolonged suffering of its inhabitants. Hainan then served as a launchpad for later incursions into Guangdong and Indochina. Meanwhile after Wuhan's collapse, the Nationalist government's frontline strength remained formidable, even as attrition gnawed at its edges. By the winter of 1938–1939, the front line had swelled to 261 divisions of infantry and cavalry, complemented by 50 independent brigades. Yet the political and military fissures within the Kuomintang suggested fragility beneath the apparent depth of manpower. The most conspicuous rupture came with Wang Jingwei's defection, the vice president and chairman of the National Political Council, who fled to Hanoi on December 18, 1938, leading a procession of more than ten other KMT officials, including Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Chu Minqi, and Zeng Zhongming. In the harsh arithmetic of war, defections could not erase the country's common resolve to resist Japanese aggression, and the anti-Japanese national united front still served as a powerful instrument, rallying the Chinese populace to "face the national crisis together." Amid this political drama, Japan's strategy moved into a phase that sought to convert battlefield endurance into political consolidation. As early as January 11, 1938, Tokyo had convened an Imperial Conference and issued a framework for handling the China Incident that would shape the theater for years. The "Outline of Army Operations Guidance" and "Continental Order No. 241" designated the occupied territories as strategic assets to be held with minimal expansion beyond essential needs. The instruction mapped an operational zone that compressed action to a corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, while the broader line of occupation east of a line tracing West Sunit, Baotou, and the major river basins would be treated as pacified space. This was a doctrine of attrition, patience, and selective pressure—enough to hold ground, deny resources to the Chinese, and await a more opportune political rupture. Yet even as Japan sought political attrition, the war's tactical center of gravity drifted toward consolidation around Wuhan and the pathways that fed the Yangtze. In October 1938, after reducing Wuhan to a fortressed crescent of contested ground, the Japanese General Headquarters acknowledged the imperative to adapt to a protracted war. The new calculus prioritized political strategy alongside military operations: "We should attach importance to the offensive of political strategy, cultivate and strengthen the new regime, and make the National Government decline, which will be effective." If the National Government trembled under coercive pressure, it risked collapse, and if not immediately, then gradually through a staged series of operations. In practice, this meant reinforcing a centralized center while allowing peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing's grip on the war's moral economy. In the immediate post-Wuhan period, Japan divided its responsibilities and aimed at a standoff that would enable future offensives. The 11th Army Group, stationed in the Wuhan theater, became the spearhead of field attacks on China's interior, occupying a strategic triangle that included Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, and protecting the rear of southwest China's line of defense. The central objective was not merely to seize territory, but to deny Chinese forces the capacity to maneuver along the critical rail and river corridors that fed the Nanjing–Jiujiang line and the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway. Central to this plan was Wuhan's security and the ability to constrain Jiujiang's access to the Yangtze, preserving a corridor for air power and logistics. The pre-war arrangement in early 1939 was a tableau of layered defenses and multiple war zones, designed to anticipate and blunt Japanese maneuver. By February 1939, the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue stood in a tense standoff with the Japanese 11th Army along the Jiangxi and Hubei front south of the Yangtze. The Ninth War Zone's order of battle, Luo Zhuoying's 19th Army Group defending the northern Nanchang front, Wang Lingji's 30th Army Group near Wuning, Fan Songfu's 8th and 73rd Armies along Henglu, Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group guarding southern Hubei and northern Hunan, and Lu Han's 1st Army Group in reserve near Changsha and Liuyang, was a carefully calibrated attempt to absorb, delay, and disrupt any Xiushui major Japanese thrust toward Nanchang, a city whose strategic significance stretched beyond its own bounds. In the spring of 1939, Nanchang was the one city in southern China that Tokyo could not leave in Chinese hands. It was not simply another provincial capital; it was the beating heart of whatever remained of China's war effort south of the Yangtze, and the Japanese knew it. High above the Gan River, on the flat plains west of Poyang Lake, lay three of the finest airfields China had ever built: Qingyunpu, Daxiaochang, and Xiangtang. Constructed only a few years earlier with Soviet engineers and American loans, they were long, hard-surfaced, and ringed with hangars and fuel dumps. Here the Chinese Air Force had pulled back after the fall of Wuhan, and here the red-starred fighters and bombers of the Soviet volunteer groups still flew. From Nanchang's runways a determined pilot could reach Japanese-held Wuhan in twenty minutes, Guangzhou in less than an hour, and even strike the docks at Hong Kong if he pushed his range. Every week Japanese reconnaissance planes returned with photographs of fresh craters patched, new aircraft parked wing-to-wing, and Soviet pilots sunning themselves beside their I-16s. As long as those fields remained Chinese, Japan could never claim the sky. The city was more than airfields. It sat exactly where the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway met the line running north to Jiujiang and the Yangtze, a knot that tied together three provinces. Barges crowded Poyang Lake's western shore, unloading crates of Soviet ammunition and aviation fuel that had come up the river from the Indochina railway. Warehouses along the tracks bulged with shells and rice. To the Japanese staff officers plotting in Wuhan and Guangzhou, Nanchang looked less like a city and more like a loaded spring: if Chiang Kai-shek ever found the strength for a counteroffensive to retake the middle Yangtze, this would be the place from which it would leap. And so, in the cold March of 1939, the Imperial General Headquarters marked Nanchang in red on every map and gave General Okamura the order he had been waiting for: take it, whatever the cost. Capturing the city would do three things at once. It would blind the Chinese Air Force in the south by seizing or destroying the only bases from which it could still seriously operate. It would tear a hole in the last east–west rail line still feeding Free China. And it would shove the Nationalist armies another two hundred kilometers farther into the interior, buying Japan precious time to digest its earlier conquests and tighten the blockade. Above all, Nanchang was the final piece in a great aerial ring Japan was closing around southern China. Hainan had fallen in February, giving the navy its southern airfields. Wuhan and Guangzhou already belonged to the army. Once Nanchang was taken, Japanese aircraft would sit on a continuous arc of bases from the tropical beaches of the South China Sea to the banks of the Yangtze, and nothing (neither the Burma Road convoys nor the French railway from Hanoi) would move without their permission. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to strike first in the Nanchang region in March 1939 reflected both urgency and a desire to seize initiative before Japanese modernization of the battlefield could fully consolidate. On March 8, Chiang directed Xue Yue to prepare a preemptive attack intended to seize the offensive by March 15, focusing the Ninth War Zone's efforts on preventing a river-crossing assault and pinning Japanese forces in place. The plan called for a sequence of coordinated actions: the 19th Army Group to hold the northern front of Nanchang; the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army (the 8th and 73rd Armies) to strike the enemy's left flank from Wuning toward De'an and Ruichang; the 30th and 27th Army Groups to consolidate near Wuning; and the 1st Army Group to push toward Xiushui and Sandu, opening routes for subsequent operations. Yet even as Xue Yue pressed for action, the weather of logistics and training reminded observers that no victory could be taken for granted. By March 9–10, Xue Yue warned Chiang that troops were not adequately trained, supplies were scarce, and preparations were insufficient, requesting a postponement to March 24. Chiang's reply was resolute: the attack must commence no later than the 24th, for the aim was preemption and the desire to tether the enemy's forces before they could consolidate. When the moment of decision arrived, the Chinese army began to tense, and the Japanese, no strangers to rapid shifts in tempo—moved to exploit any hesitation or fog of mobilization. The Ninth War Zone's response crystallized into a defensive posture as the Japanese pressed forward, marking a transition from preemption to standoff as both sides tested the limits of resilience. The Japanese plan for what would become known as Operation Ren, aimed at severing the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, breaking the enemy's line of communication, and isolating Nanchang, reflected a calculated synthesis of air power, armored mobility, and canalized ground offensives. On February 6, 1939, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued a set of precise directives: capture Nanchang to cut the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway and disrupt the southern reach of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces; seize Nanchang along the Nanchang–Xunyi axis to split enemy lines and "crush" Chinese resistance south of that zone; secure rear lines immediately after the city's fall; coordinate with naval air support to threaten Chinese logistics and airfields beyond the rear lines. The plan anticipated contingencies by pre-positioning heavy artillery and tanks in formations that could strike with speed and depth, a tactical evolution from previous frontal assaults. Okamura Yasuji, commander of the 11th Army, undertook a comprehensive program of reconnaissance, refining the assault plan with a renewed emphasis on speed and surprise. Aerial reconnaissance underlined the terrain, fortifications, and the disposition of Chinese forces, informing the selection of the Xiushui River crossing and the route of the main axis of attack. Okamura's decision to reorganize artillery and armor into concentrated tank groups, flanked by air support and advanced by long-range maneuver, marked a departure from the earlier method of distributing heavy weapons along the infantry front. Sumita Laishiro commanded the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, with more than 300 artillery pieces, while Hirokichi Ishii directed a force of 135 tanks and armored vehicles. This blended arms approach promised a breakthrough that would outpace the Chinese defenders and open routes for the main force. By mid-February 1939, Japanese preparations had taken on a high tempo. The 101st and 106th Divisions, along with attached artillery, assembled south of De'an, while tank contingents gathered north of De'an. The 6th Division began moving toward Ruoxi and Wuning, the Inoue Detachment took aim at the waterways of Poyang Lake, and the 16th and 9th Divisions conducted feints on the Han River's left bank. The orchestration of these movements—feints, riverine actions, and armored flanking, was designed to reduce the Chinese capacity to concentrate forces around Nanchang and to force the defenders into a less secure posture along the Nanchang–Jiujiang axis. Japan's southward strategy reframed the war: no longer a sprint to reduce Chinese forces in open fields, but a patient siege of lifelines, railways, and airbases. Hainan's seizure, the control of Nanchang's airfields, and the disruption of the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway exemplified a shift from large-scale battles to coercive pressure that sought to cripple Nationalist mobilization and erode Chongqing's capacity to sustain resistance. For China, the spring of 1939 underscored resilience amid mounting attrition. Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on offensive means to seize the initiative demonstrated strategic audacity, even as shortages and uneven training slowed tempo. The Ninth War Zone's defense, bolstered by makeshift airpower from Soviet and Allied lendings, kept open critical corridors and delayed Japan's consolidation. The war's human cost—massive casualties, forced labor, and the Li uprising on Hainan—illuminates the brutality that fueled both sides' resolve. In retrospect, the period around Canton, Wuhan, and Nanchang crystallizes a grim truth: the Sino-Japanese war was less a single crescendo of battles than a protracted contest of endurance, logistics, and political stamina. The early 1940s would widen these fault lines, but the groundwork laid in 1939, competition over supply routes, air control, and strategic rail nodes, would shape the war's pace and, ultimately, its outcome. The conflict's memory lies not only in the clashes' flash but in the stubborn persistence of a nation fighting to outlast a formidable adversary. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese invasion of Hainan and proceeding operations to stop logistical leaks into Nationalist China, showcased the complexity and scale of the growing Second Sino-Japanese War. It would not merely be a war of territorial conquest, Japan would have to strangle the colossus using every means necessary.  

Le 11 janvier, le conflit ukrainien a atteint 1 418 jours, égalant la durée de la Seconde Guerre mondiale entre l'URSS et l'Allemagne nazie. Traduction:On January 11th, the Ukrainian conflict reached 1,418 days, matching the duration of World War II between the USSR and Nazi Germany in history. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Send us a textToday we cover the tensions between the USSR and the US as well as the start of detente. We will also briefly cover the border conflict between the USSR and China that almost led to war between the two communist behemoths.Support the show

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Changkufeng. A 7–10 August clash near Changkufeng and Hill 52 saw a brutal, multi-front Soviet push against Japanese positions in the Changkufeng–Hill 52 complex and adjacent areas. The Korea Army and Imperial forces rapidly reinforced with artillery, long-range 15 cm and other pieces, to relieve pressure. By 7–8 August, Soviet assault waves, supported by tanks and aircraft, intensified but Japanese defenses, including engineers, machine-gun fire, and concentrated artillery, prevented a decisive breakthrough at key positions like Noguchi Hill and the Changkufeng spine.  By 9–10 August, continued Japanese counterfire, improved artillery neutralization, and renewed defenses kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese control, though at heavy cost. The frontline exhaustion and looming strategic concerns prompted calls for intensified replacements and potential diplomatic considerations. It seemed like the battle was coming to an end.   #184 The Lake Khasan Truce Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The casualties were atrocious for both sides, yet they continued to mobilize more forces to the conflict area. While the Russians appeared uninterested in all-out war, they were not rushing to settle the crisis through diplomacy and, at the front, were launching "reckless" counterattacks at inconvenient locations, presumably to occupy positions useful for bargaining. The local Soviet military, having ceded the hills at the outset, must also have been anxious about its prestige. The Kwantung Army's potential threat to the flank undoubtedly made the Russians nervous. Although the leading echelon of the 104th Division did not reach Hunchun until the evening of 13 August, Japanese intelligence heard that the Red Army Headquarters staff at Khabarovsk had detected movements of Kwantung Army elements around 10 August and had been compelled to take countermeasures: they reinforced positions along the eastern and northern Manchurian frontiers, concentrated the air force, ordered move-up preparations by ground forces in the Blagoveshchensk district, and commandeered most of the motor vehicles in the Amur Province. By shifting its main strength to the eastern front, the Kwantung Army exerted, as intended, a silent pressure. The covert objective was to restrain and divert the Russians and to assist Japanese diplomacy, not to provoke war. Nevertheless, an American correspondent who visited the Changkufeng area in mid-August privately reported that the Kwantung Army was massing large numbers of troops near the border and expected further trouble.  Toward its weak neighbor in Korea the Kwantung Army rendered every support. Apart from its major demonstration in eastern Manchuria, the Kwantung Army promptly sent whatever reinforcements of artillery, engineers, and other units that Seoul had desired. Being also intimately involved in anti-Soviet military preparations, the Kwantung Army understandably wanted the latest and most authentic information on Russian Army theory and practice. The Changkufeng Incident furnished such a firsthand opportunity, and the professional observers sent from Hsinking were well received at the front. Military classmate ties contributed to the working relationships between the armies. As one division officer put it, the teams from the Kwantung Army came as "friends," not only to study the battlefield by their respective branches of service but also to assist the front-line forces; "the Kwantung Army was increasingly helpful to us in settling the incident." Foreign Minister Ugaki felt that the pressure of troop movements in Manchuria played a major part in the Russians' eventual decision to conclude a cease-fire. From Inada's viewpoint, it had been a "fine and useful demonstration against the Soviet Union." Pinned at Changkufeng, the Russians did not or could not choose to react elsewhere, too. Army General Staff officers believed that clear and consistent operational guidance furnished by Tokyo produced good results, although the fighting had been very hard for the front-line Japanese troops because of the insistence on exclusive defense, the curbs on interference by the Kwantung Army, and the prohibition on the use of aircraft. It had been close, however. Only by conscious efforts at restraint had the small war at Changkufeng been kept from spilling over into neighboring areas. Escalation of combat in early August had caused the Japanese government to try to break the diplomatic impasse while localizing the conflict. On 2 August Premier Konoe assured the Emperor that he intended to leave matters for diplomacy and to suspend military operations as soon as possible, an approach with which the government concurred. The Changkufeng dispute had been accorded priority, preceding overall settlements and the creation of joint commissions to redefine the borders. On the 3rd, after coordinating with the military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised Shigemitsu that the front-line situation had become "extremely critical" and that a quick suspension of fighting action should be proposed. Soviet and Japanese troops should be pulled back to the setup as of 30 July.  In the midst of the Changkufeng Incident, the USSR intensified harassing tactics against the last Japanese consulates located within the Soviet Union. Forty-eight hour ultimatums to quit the country were delivered to the consuls at Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk on 3 and 4 August, respectively. Although the Japanese government warned that it might retaliate, the Russians were unyielding. The foreign ambassadors, Mamoru Shigemitsu and Maxim Litvinov met on August 4th, whereupon Shigemitsu argued, the best procedure would be to suspend military operations on both sides and to restore the status quo. Litvinov in a long manner explained the stance of the USSR as Shigemitsu put it "the Soviet side had a disposition to cease fighting, provided that conditions were satisfactory."  The Russians were stalling at the very time the Red Army was bending every effort to retake Changkufeng. Coordination between the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministers produced cease-fire conditions which were rushed to the Japanese ambassador on 6 August. Two alternate lines were proposed, to which both armies would pull back. After the creation of a buffer zone, discussions could begin concerning delineation of boundaries in the region of the incident. The Hunchun pact could be the basis for deliberations, demarcation to be effected by joint investigations on the spot in consultation with documents in the possession of Manchukuo and the USSR; the Japanese would serve only as observers. Shigemitsu conferred once more with Litvinov for three and a half hours on 7 August, but no progress was made. Litvinov insisted that a clash could be averted only if Japanese forces pulled However Litvinov's positive reaction to the idea of a demarcation commission was seen as a good sign.  On August the 10th, both sides seemed to have reached a similar conclusion that a cease-fire needed to rapidly be implemented. At 11pm that night Litvinov called the embassy, asking for Shigemitus to see him as fast as possible. Shigemitsu arrived around midnight whereupon Litvinov showed him a draft of a final accord: 1. Japanese and Soviet forces shall cease all military activities on 11 August at noon local time. Instructions to that effect are to be issued immediately by the governments of the USSR and Japan.  2. Japanese as well as Soviet troops shall remain on those lines which they occupied at midnight local time on 10 August.  3. For redemarcation of the portion of frontier in dispute, there shall be created a mixed commission of two representatives from the USSR and two representatives from the Japanese-Manchurian side, with an umpire selected by agreement of both parties from among citizens of a third state.  4. The commission for redemarcation shall work on the basis of agreements and maps bearing the signatures of plenipotentiary representatives of Russia and China. Shigemitsu agreed to the inclusion of a Japanese commissioner on the Manchukuoan delegation, but he could not assent to the addition of a neutral umpire. Moscow received the news of the truce with gratification mingled with surprise. Few realized that the USSR had taken the step of appeasing or at least saving face for the Japanese even after Shigemitsu had pleaded for and won a cease-fire. The world was told by the Russians only that specific overtures for cessation of hostilities had originated with the Soviet authorities. In general, it was not difficult to guess why the Russian government, distracted by the European political scene and apprehensive about a two-front war, agreed to a cease-fire at Changkufeng.  The slowness of communication across the many miles between Moscow and Tokyo did nothing to alleviate nervousness in the Japanese capital during the night of 10–11 August. Ugaki wrote in his diary that, "after ten days of tension, the struggle between the Japanese and Soviet armies on the USSR–Manchukuo border had reached the decisive brink". Complicating the situation was the fact that, late on 10 August, the president of Domei News Agency conveyed to Konoe a message from one of his Moscow correspondents. Purporting to sum up Shigemitsu's latest outlook, the report stated that success in the negotiations seemed unlikely. The contents of the message were transmitted to Ugaki and Itagaki. Consequently, Konoe and his associates spent a fearful and depressed night. Shigemitsu's own report, sent by telegram, arrived frustratingly slowly.  After definite information had been received from Shigemitsu, Harada happily called Kazami Akira, the prime minister's chief secretary, and Konoe himself. "Until the accord was implemented," Kazami had said, "we would have to be on the alert all day today." Konoe and Kazami seemed "a little relaxed anyhow." Inada had finally retired past midnight on 10–11 August, "agreement or no agreement. I must have been dozing from fatigue when the jangle of the phone got me up. It was a message saying that a truce had been concluded the preceding midnight. Just as I had been expecting, I said to myself, but I felt empty inside, as if it were an anticlimax." The call had to have been an unofficial communication, perhaps the latest Domei news, since the records showed that definitive word from the embassy in Moscow did not reach Tokyo until after 10:00. Attache Doi's report to the Army General Staff came at about 11:00. This was extremely late in terms of getting Japanese troops to cease operations at 13:00 Tokyo time (or noon on the spot); a tardy imperial order might undo the Moscow accord. Complicating this matter of split-second timing was the fact that the first official telegram from Shigemitsu referred to unilateral Japanese withdrawal by one kilometer. At the Japanese high command level, there was agitated discussion when initial word of these arrangements arrived. Inada speculated that on 10 August the Russians had staged persistent close-quarter assaults against Changkufeng and seized the southern edge eventually, although repulsed at all other points. Moscow may have agreed to a truce at that midnight because they expected that the crest of Changkufeng would be in their hands by then and that a fait accompli would have been achieved. Some officers argued that the Russian forces were suffering "quite badly and this caused the authorities' agreeability to a cease-fire." Most exasperating, however, was the provision stipulating a one-sided military withdrawal. Admittedly, such action had been under discussion by the Army General Staff itself, particularly after Terada's sobering appeal of 10 August. It was another matter to have a Japanese withdrawal dictated by the USSR while Russian troops did not have to budge. Initial puzzlement and chagrin began to yield to rationalization. The Japanese side seemed to have made a concession in the negotiations, but there must have been significance to the phrase which said, "the line occupied by Japanese forces has been taken into due consideration." Japanese troops had presumably advanced to the edge of the frontier, while Russian soldiers had not come even close. Thus, it must have been necessary to have the Japanese units withdraw first, to fix the boundaries, since it had been the Japanese who had done the greater advancing. One Japanese office remarked "A pull-back was a pull-back, no matter how you looked at things—and we were the ones who had to do it. But the atmosphere in the command had been far from optimistic on 10 August; so we decided that it was unnecessary to complain about this issue and we approved the agreement in general. Both the senior and junior staff levels seemed to be quite relieved." The 11th of August had been an awkward day to conduct liaison between the Foreign Ministry, the Army, and the Throne, since the Emperor was leaving Hayama to visit naval installations in the Yokosuka area and the navy air unit in Chiba from morning. By the time a conclusive report on the cease-fire could be conveyed to the monarch, he was aboard the destroyer Natsugumo at Kisarazu. Naval wireless facilities in Tokyo had to be used to transmit coded messages to Admiral Yonai, the Navy Minister, for delivery to the Emperor. This was done shortly before 14:45 According to Yonai, the Emperor "was very pleased and relieved when I reported to him… about the conclusion of the truce accord." The appropriate Imperial order was approved promptly. But not until 15:00, two hours after cease-fire time at Changkufeng, did word of Imperial sanction reach the high command.  Japanese soldiers in the lines recalled nothing special on 11 August. "We didn't hear about the truce till the last minute," said one, "and we had become so inured to enemy artillery we hardly noticed any 'last salute.' From Tokyo, on 11 August, it was reported that the Japanese side had suspended operations promptly at noon, as agreed, but that sporadic bursts of fire had continued to come from the Soviet side. Colonel Grebennik, when asked after the war whether the combat did end at noon, replied petulantly: "Yes, but not quite so. The fighting actually ceased at 12:05." According to him, the tardiness was the Japanese side's fault.  The Japanese press told readers that "the cease-fire bugle has sounded—the frontier is cheerful now, 14 days after the shooting began." All was quiet in the area of Changkufeng, where the sounds of firing ceased at noon "as if erased." The most intense period of stillness lasted only a few minutes and was followed by the excited chattering of soldiers, audible on both sides. Korea Army Headquarters spoke of the "lifting of dark clouds [and] return of the rays of peace." In Hongui, a Japanese combat officer told a Japanese correspondent: "Suddenly we noticed the insects making noise; the soldiers were delighted. Once the fighting stopped, Japanese national flags were hoisted here and there along our front. … After the Russians observed what we had done, they broke out red flags also, at various points in their trenches." Some Japanese soldiers were given cookies by Soviet medical corpsmen. At Hill 52, an infantryman remembered, the Japanese and the Russians were facing each other, 50 meters apart, that afternoon. "We just lay there and stared at each other for two hours, waiting grimly. But it was well past cease-fire now, and those same Russians finally started to wave at us. Later that day, when Soviet troops came to salvage their KO'd tanks, we 'chatted' in sign language." After the cease-fire, Ichimoto, whose battalion had seen the most difficult fighting, stuck his head above the trench and waved hello to some Soviet officers. "They waved back. It gave me an odd sensation, for during the furious struggle I had considered them to be barbarians. Now I was surprised to see that they were civilized after all!" A rifleman at Changkufeng remembered swapping watches with an unarmed Russian across the peak. The Japanese front-line troops stayed in their positions confronting the Russians and conducted preparations for further combat while cleaning up the battlefield. Soviet troops also remained deployed as of the time of the cease-fire and vigorously carried out their own construction. The day after the cease-fire went into effect, Suetaka escorted an American reporter to the front. At Changkufeng:  "carpenters were making wooden receptacles for the ashes of the Japanese dead. Funeral pyres still were smoldering. . . . From our vantage point the lieutenant general pointed out long lines of Soviet trucks coming up in clouds of dust [which] apparently were made deliberately in an effort to conceal the trucks' movements, [probably designed] to haul supplies from the front. Soviet boats were pushing across [Khasan] . . . and Soviet soldiers were towing smashed tanks back from no-man'sland. On the Japanese side there was a pronounced holiday spirit. Soldiers, emerging from dugouts, were drying white undershirts on near-by brush and bathing in the Tumen River. The soldiers were laughing heartily. A few were trying to ride a Korean donkey near Changkufeng's scarred slope. The general pointed out three Soviet tanks behind the Japanese advance lines east of Changkufeng. He said the Russians had hauled back seventy others [on the night of 11 August]. . . . The writer was shown a barbed wire fence immediately behind a wrecked village on the west slope of Changkufeng which the general said the Soviet troops built at the beginning of the fighting. Possiet Bay also was pointed out, clearly visible across the swamp." Soviet losses for what became known as the battle of Lake Khasan for the Russians and the Changkufeng incident for the Japanese, totaled 792 killed or missing and 3,279 wounded or sick, according to Soviet records. The Japanese claimed to have destroyed or immobilized 96 enemy tanks and 30 guns. Soviet armored losses were significant, with dozens of tanks knocked out or destroyed and hundreds of "tank troops" becoming casualties. Japanese casualties, as revealed by secret Army General Staff statistics, were 1,439 casualties, 526 killed or missing, 913 wounded; the Soviets claimed Japanese losses of 3,100, with 600 killed and 2,500 wounded. The Soviets concluded that these losses were due in part to poor communications infrastructure and roads, as well as the loss of unit coherence caused by weak organization, headquarters, commanders, and a lack of combat-support units. The faults in the Soviet army and leadership at Khasan were blamed on the incompetence of Blyukher. In addition to leading the troops into action at Khasan, Blyukher was also supposed to oversee the trans-Baikal Military District's and the Far Eastern fronts' move to combat readiness, using an administrative apparatus that delivered army group, army, and corps-level instructions to the 40th Rifle Division by accident. On 22 October, he was arrested by the NKVD and is thought to have been tortured to death. At 15:35 on 11 August, in the Hill 52 sector, high-ranking military delegates bearing a white flag emerged from the Soviet lines and proceeded to Akahage Hill, about 100 meters from the Japanese positions. Cho, as right sector chief, was notified. He sent three lieutenants to converse with the Russians; they learned that the Soviets wanted the Japanese to designate a time and place for a conference. This word was conveyed to Suetaka, who had already dispatched Lieutenant Kozuki to the heights east of Shachaofeng to contact the Russians. Around 4:20, the commander canceled Kozuki's mission and instructed Cho to reply that the delegation ought to convene near the peak of Changkufeng at 18:00 Cho set out promptly with several subordinates; they reached the Changkufeng crest a little before 6. The Russians then said they wanted to meet the Japanese near the Crestline southeast of Changkufeng, the excuse being that the peak was too far for them to go and that they could not arrive by the designated time. Cho took his team to the location requested by the Russians. There, the Japanese found 13 Soviet soldiers and a heavy machine gun on guard, but the Russian delegates had not arrived, although it was 6:18. The irked Japanese clocked a further delay of two minutes before the Russian truce chief, Gen. Grigory M. Shtern, rode up on horseback with a party of eight. Both delegations saluted, the chiefs and team members identified themselves, and all shook hands. The Soviet team was made up of Corps General 3rd rank Shtern, 38, chief of staff, Far East area army; Brigade Commissar Semenovsky political major general, 37 or 38; Colonel Fedotev, 42; and Major Wabilev, about 30. Interpreting for the Russians was Alexei Kim. In Colonel Cho's opinion, "It was always necessary to take the initiative in dealing with the Soviets. So, even in such matters as shaking hands or conversing, he always did things first." During the exchange of greetings, Cho teased Shtern about his bandaged forehead. "A Japanese artillery shell got you, didn't it?" he asked. But Cho began formal discussions on a more dignified note: "Cho: It is very much to be regretted that the Japanese and Soviet armies had to get involved in combat around Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I laud the consummation of the Mos­cow accord on the part of both governments. And, I must say, your forces were quite brave and patriotic. Shtern: I agree with you. The Japanese Army, too, was courageous and strong." Negotiations would go on at the local level and diplomatic level for many days. In Tokyo, on the morning of 13 August, Ugaki had gone to the Meiji shrine to "report" on the cease-fire and to express his gratitude. At 10:00, when received in Imperial audience, he discussed the Changkufeng Incident. "I humbly regret to have troubled Your Majesty so unduly in connection with an unimportant affair on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier" at a time when the monarch was confronted by grave national problems. A long and winding road lay ahead before the incident as a whole was settled, but a good start had been made and "we are going to be even more careful in handling matters, although the Soviet regime  consists of devious, vicious scoundrels." Recognition of the Japanese Army's performance was accorded by the highest authorities in the homeland. As soon as the fighting ceased, Kan'in transmitted a message of appreciation. The day after the cease-fire, the command in North Korea issued a generous communique: "We pay homage to the Japanese for defending themselves against 100 planes, 200 tanks, and 60 pieces of heavy artillery. Our admiration for the bravery of both armies is of the highest." At 14:00 on the 15th, Kan'in was received in audience and reported on the settlement of the crisis. Said the Emperor: "We are gratified by the fact that, during this incident at Changkufeng, Our officers and men achieved their mission fully and manifested prudence and forbearance while confronting difficult circumstances with small forces. Our profound condolences to the casualties. Convey this message to the officers and men." A wire was dispatched promptly to Nakamura. With Imperial use of the wording "Changkufeng Incident," the nomenclature for the affair was fixed in Japan. When the cabinet met on 16 August, the decision was reached officially. After the Changkufeng affair, Japanese officers claimed that the Soviets had dispatched tactical experts "to ascertain why their elite Far Eastern forces had not been able to achieve satisfactory results. They realize the urgency of this investigation in preparation for any great war." Specifically, the AGS heard that on the day of the cease-fire, Blyukher had sent an investigative team of commissars under Romanovsky to the scene. Japanese experts on the USSR speculated that the experience at Changkufeng ought indeed to have impressed the Red Army: "Our forces did seize the hill and hold it. After comparing the strengths involved ... the Russians may well have had to modify their estimates." According to one Japanese commentator, improvements in political leadership were judged imperative by the USSR, gainsaying claims that the Soviet Army had been strengthened through the purge of alleged Japanese tools. Soviet authorities would conclude "As a test of doctrine, the fighting had confirmed the correctness of the basic principles embodied in the 1936 Field Service Regulations." The Soviet infantry had paid dearly for this, as well as for the deficiencies in tactical training. Defense Commissar Voroshilov admitted, "We were not sufficiently quick in our tactics, and particularly in joint operations in dealing the enemy a concentrated blow." In the view of historian Mackintosh: "The Soviet success at Lake Khasan was bought at the cost of heavy casualties and exposed serious defects in the mobilization machinery and the training of troops. There can be little doubt that these factors checked to some extent the Soviet Government's overoptimistic estimate of its own military strength and cast doubt on the effectiveness of its policy of expansion in all fields of military organization". Writing a year and a half after Changkufeng, an Mainichi reporter observed that the greatest harvest from the incident was tangible Japanese experience in determining the fighting strength of the Russians. Purchased with blood, this knowledge could provide valuable evidence for future combat operations. It was a question whether Changkufeng really possessed such strategic significance as was claimed for it, but the Soviet policy of bluff could be interpreted as substantiating the weakness of the defenses of Vladivostok. "The Russians used all kinds of new weapons at Changkufeng and tipped their whole hand. But although mechanization of the Red Army had attained high levels with respect to quantity, their weaknesses in technique and quality were laid bare." Imaoka observed that since the Changkufeng Incident marked the first time that the Japanese and Soviet armies engaged each other in combat involving large strategic elements, divisional and above, Russian fighting strength was studied with keen interest. The Japanese did not rate the capacity of the officers or Soviet quality, in general, as especially high. Still, the Russians did possess quantitative abundance, and Japanese losses had been heavy because the enemy had fired masses of ammunition against fixed targets. Suetaka seemed to have comprehended the scope of tangible Soviet strength in equipment and materiel, as shown by his comment: "I felt deeply that if the gap in manpower went beyond limits, it would be inevitable for our casualties to increase tremendously; this might even cause us danger in specific local areas." Few Japanese officers saw anything new in Soviet tactical methods, although considerations of mass were ever-present. Not only intelligence experts but the whole army worked on ways of coping with Soviet forces that would have the numerical advantage by 3:1. Most awesome was the "fantastic abundance" of hostile materiel, although the Russians could not deploy to surround the Japanese because of the geography. An AGS expert on the USSR summed it up: "We learned that Soviet strength was up to expectations, whereas Japanese arms and equipment had to be improved and reinforced." Worded in a multiplicity of ways, the Japanese conclusion was that patient imperial forces had won a great victory by defending the contested border with flesh vs. steel and by limiting the Changkufeng Incident, till the end, against enemy hordes supported exclusively by planes and tanks. Japanese infantrymen admit that the combat soldiers did not savor their disadvantages. "All our materiel was inferior in quality and particularly in quantity. We had the impression that whereas we relied on muscle power, the enemy used engines. This rendered our fighting particularly hard, but we had full confidence in our spiritual strength [i.e., superiority]."  Nevertheless, the Japanese mode of tactical operation, asserted Iwasaki, the Korea Army senior staff officer, was "the worst possible: fighting with hands tied." This meant that the Russians could fight "to their hearts' content," committing tanks and planes, and striking from all directions. A front-line infantry commander commented: "One's troops ought to be provided meaningful reasons for fighting and for dying happily. It is cruel to ask officers and men to meet masses of steel and to shed their blood without visible cause, and apparently because of inadequate combat preparations." The cease-fire agreement was concluded "at just the right time," General Morimoto admitted. A secret report prepared by AGS analysts sheds light on the larger question of what the army thought it had learned about itself and the Soviet enemy: "In studying Changkufeng, one ought to bear a number of cautions in mind: (1) The incident broke out when we were concentrating on the holy war against China; severe limitations on combat operations were imposed by the necessity to adhere to a policy of nonenlargement. (2) Apparently, the enemy also adopted a policy of localization while continuously attempting to recapture the high ground in the Changkufeng area. (3) Our forces employed units which were on Phase-1 alert from beginning to end; in terms of quality, the personnel were excellent—mainly active-duty types, from key men down. But our numbers were far inferior, and our organization and equipment were not of the best. In addition, we committed no planes or tanks, whereas the enemy used plenty. (4) The 19th Division was thorough, rigorous, and realistic in its combat training prior to the engagement. (5) Battlefield terrain seriously limited the enemy's attacks, especially tank action. But while the Tumen restricted assaults against our flanks and rear, it hampered our own services of supply, notably the provision of position construction materials." The Japanese learned few or erroneous lessons from the Changkufeng affair; the Kwantung Army, for example, was convinced that everything had been handled badly in 1938 by the Korea Army and the high command. When a dispute arose in 1939 at Nomonhan on another border lying between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo, the staff in Hsinking fostered escalating measures. The USSR, however, learned in 1937 and 1938 that the Japanese Army seemed to respect only force.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Changkufeng incident or battle of Lake Khasan clash saw a fierce Soviet push against Japanese positions around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The cease-fire ended the incident, but not the conflict. Despite the brutal lessons learned by both sides, a much larger conflict would explode the next year that would alter both nations throughout WW2.   

MOTIVE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NARCISSIST Colleague Paul Gregory. In the final segment, Gregoryexplores Oswald's motive, arguing that history has underestimated his intelligence and manipulativeness. Despite his dyslexia and poor education, Oswald successfully manipulated government officials in both the US and USSR. The motive was rooted in a desire to prove his greatness to the world—a belief instilled by his mother—and to prove his manhood to Marina, who viewed him with scorn. Oswald viewed the trial as a platform to broadcast his political theories and achieve historic status. Ultimately, Gregory concludes the assassination was the act of a narcissist trying to escape insignificance and domestic failure by committing a "monstrous act." NUMBER 8

LAM SON 719 AND THE FAILURE OF VIETNAMIZATION Colleague Geoffrey Wawro. The 1971 invasion of Laos (Lam Son 719) exposed the failure of Vietnamization, as South Vietnamese troops were routed without USground support, proving they lacked the leadership and logistics to fight alone. By 1972, only massive American air power, reinstated by Nixon during the Easter Offensive, saved South Vietnam from collapse, while Nixonsimultaneously pursued détente with China and the USSR to isolate Hanoi. The relentless "Linebacker" bombing campaigns eventually forced North Vietnam back to the negotiating table, though the peace deal essentially replicated terms available years earlier. NUMBER 15