Communist state in Europe and Asia that lasted from 1922 to 1991
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Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions. #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war. Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway. Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort. There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong. Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration. After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs. Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application. To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance. In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1. In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.
From the late 1970s onwards China and the USSR were on two very different historical paths and three US presidents, Carter, Reagan and Bush sought to harness the potential of the world's most populous country as it rapidly became wealthier. China, often cited as having embraced capitalism after Mao, abandoned inward looking autarchy and opened its economy up in the 1980s to foreign trade and investment. In the 1990s and 2000s there would be an explosion of offshoring that has partially created the historical crises America is experiencing now. *****STOP PRESS*****I only ever talk about history on this podcast but I also have another life, yes, that of aspirant fantasy author and if that's your thing you can get a copy of my debut novel The Blood of Tharta, right here:Help the podcast to continue bringing you history each weekIf you enjoy the Explaining History podcast and its many years of content and would like to help the show continue, please consider supporting it in the following ways:If you want to go ad-free, you can take out a membership hereOrYou can support the podcast via Patreon hereOr you can just say some nice things about it here Become a member at https://plus.acast.com/s/explaininghistory. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
My guest this episode is Patrick D. Joyce, who grew up at U.S. embassies in places like Moscow, Havana, and Managua, surrounded by secrets, spies, and surveillance. He went on to become a journalist, earn a Ph.D. in political science, and eventually found his way to writing Cold War-era young adult thrillers. We talk about how his past shaped his storytelling, how music and history inform his work, and how he's connecting with young readers today. Find more author advice, tips, and tools at our Self-publishing Author Advice Center, with a huge archive of 2,000+ blog posts, and a handy search box to find key info on the topic you need. We invite you to join our organization and become a self-publishing ally. Sponsor Inspirational Indie Authors is proudly sponsored by Bookvault. Sell high-quality, print-on-demand books directly to readers worldwide and earn maximum royalties selling directly. Automate fulfillment and create stunning special editions with BookvaultBespoke. Visit Bookvault.app today for an instant quote. About the Host Howard Lovy has been a journalist for 40 years and now amplifies the voices of independent author-publishers and works with authors as a developmental editor. Find Howard at howardlovy.com, LinkedIn, and X. About the Guest Patrick D. Joyce is the author of two thriller novels for young adults, Back in the USSR (a Publishers Weekly BookLife Prize semifinalist) and Strawberry Fields, both inspired by his experiences growing up at US embassies during the Cold War. He has been a newspaper reporter, a political science lecturer, and a medical practice manager. He lives in Massachusetts, where he can be found haunting coffee shops, taking long walks with his wife, and practicing martial arts. You can find him at patrickdjoyce.com and follow him on BlueSky, Instagram, Facebook, or TikTok.
Stalin's Final Films: Cinema, Socialist Realism, and Soviet Postwar Reality, 1945-1953 (Cornell UP, 2024) explores a neglected period in the history of Soviet cinema, breathing new life into a body of films long considered moribund as the pinnacle of Stalinism. While film censorship reached its apogee in this period and fewer films were made, film attendance also peaked as Soviet audiences voted with their seats and distinguished a clearly popular postwar cinema. Claire Knight examines the tensions between official ideology and audience engagement, and between education and entertainment, inherent in these popular films, as well as the financial considerations that shaped and constrained them. She explores how the Soviet regime used films to address the major challenges faced by the USSR after the Great Patriotic War (World War II), showing how war dramas, spy thrillers, Stalin epics, and rural comedies alike were mobilized to consolidate an official narrative of the war, reestablish Stalinist orthodoxy, and dramatize the rebuilding of socialist society. Yet, Knight also highlights how these same films were used by filmmakers more experimentally, exploring a diverse range of responses to the ideological crisis that lay at the heart of Soviet postwar culture, as a victorious people were denied the fruits of their sacrificial labor. After the war, new heroes were demanded by both the regime and Soviet audiences, and filmmakers sought to provide them, with at times surprising results. Stalin's Final Films mines Soviet cinema as an invaluable resource for understanding the unique character of postwar Stalinism and the cinema of the most repressive era in Soviet history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/film
Stalin's Final Films: Cinema, Socialist Realism, and Soviet Postwar Reality, 1945-1953 (Cornell UP, 2024) explores a neglected period in the history of Soviet cinema, breathing new life into a body of films long considered moribund as the pinnacle of Stalinism. While film censorship reached its apogee in this period and fewer films were made, film attendance also peaked as Soviet audiences voted with their seats and distinguished a clearly popular postwar cinema. Claire Knight examines the tensions between official ideology and audience engagement, and between education and entertainment, inherent in these popular films, as well as the financial considerations that shaped and constrained them. She explores how the Soviet regime used films to address the major challenges faced by the USSR after the Great Patriotic War (World War II), showing how war dramas, spy thrillers, Stalin epics, and rural comedies alike were mobilized to consolidate an official narrative of the war, reestablish Stalinist orthodoxy, and dramatize the rebuilding of socialist society. Yet, Knight also highlights how these same films were used by filmmakers more experimentally, exploring a diverse range of responses to the ideological crisis that lay at the heart of Soviet postwar culture, as a victorious people were denied the fruits of their sacrificial labor. After the war, new heroes were demanded by both the regime and Soviet audiences, and filmmakers sought to provide them, with at times surprising results. Stalin's Final Films mines Soviet cinema as an invaluable resource for understanding the unique character of postwar Stalinism and the cinema of the most repressive era in Soviet history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
Who was America's great power prophet during the Cold War? Perhaps not Henry Kissinger. In Zbig, Financial Times' U.S. editor, Edward Luce, makes the case that the Polish-American strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski was at least equal to Kissinger in his prophetic grasp of America's role in the Cold War world. Luce explores Brzezinski's role as Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, his combination of hard and soft power strategies against the Soviet Union, and his uncannily prescient predictions about Soviet collapse and the emergence of an "alliance of the aggrieved" against the United States. five key takeaways * Brzezinski was remarkably prescient - He accurately predicted Soviet collapse decades in advance, identifying the USSR's "Achilles heel" as its suppressed internal nations and calling it a "gerontocracy" destined to fail through "reverse natural selection."* The dinner that saved Europe - Brzezinski's coordination with Pope John Paul II in 1980 helped prevent Soviet invasion of Poland by persuading Solidarity to moderate their rhetoric while warning Moscow that Poland would be "indigestible."* Post-Cold War prophet of doom - Unlike triumphalist Americans in the 1990s, Brzezinski warned that U.S. hubris would create an "alliance of the aggrieved" (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) - a prediction that proved remarkably accurate.* Meritocracy believer with aristocratic standards - Despite his Polish noble background, Brzezinski championed American meritocracy but maintained old-world intellectual rigor, famously giving only one A per class regardless of size.* Study your adversaries - His key lesson for today: America must continue studying and understanding other nations' languages, cultures, and motivations rather than assuming everyone should simply follow the American model.Edward Luce is the US national editor and columnist at the Financial Times. Luce's biography of Zbigniew Brzezinski Zbig, The life of Zbig Brzezinski: America's great power prophet, came out this month. He is the author of three highly acclaimed books, The Retreat of Western Liberalism (2017), Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent (2012), and In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India (2007). He appears regularly on CNN, NPR, MSNBC's Morning Joe, and the BBC.Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe
Stalin's Final Films: Cinema, Socialist Realism, and Soviet Postwar Reality, 1945-1953 (Cornell UP, 2024) explores a neglected period in the history of Soviet cinema, breathing new life into a body of films long considered moribund as the pinnacle of Stalinism. While film censorship reached its apogee in this period and fewer films were made, film attendance also peaked as Soviet audiences voted with their seats and distinguished a clearly popular postwar cinema. Claire Knight examines the tensions between official ideology and audience engagement, and between education and entertainment, inherent in these popular films, as well as the financial considerations that shaped and constrained them. She explores how the Soviet regime used films to address the major challenges faced by the USSR after the Great Patriotic War (World War II), showing how war dramas, spy thrillers, Stalin epics, and rural comedies alike were mobilized to consolidate an official narrative of the war, reestablish Stalinist orthodoxy, and dramatize the rebuilding of socialist society. Yet, Knight also highlights how these same films were used by filmmakers more experimentally, exploring a diverse range of responses to the ideological crisis that lay at the heart of Soviet postwar culture, as a victorious people were denied the fruits of their sacrificial labor. After the war, new heroes were demanded by both the regime and Soviet audiences, and filmmakers sought to provide them, with at times surprising results. Stalin's Final Films mines Soviet cinema as an invaluable resource for understanding the unique character of postwar Stalinism and the cinema of the most repressive era in Soviet history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/performing-arts
Stalin's Final Films: Cinema, Socialist Realism, and Soviet Postwar Reality, 1945-1953 (Cornell UP, 2024) explores a neglected period in the history of Soviet cinema, breathing new life into a body of films long considered moribund as the pinnacle of Stalinism. While film censorship reached its apogee in this period and fewer films were made, film attendance also peaked as Soviet audiences voted with their seats and distinguished a clearly popular postwar cinema. Claire Knight examines the tensions between official ideology and audience engagement, and between education and entertainment, inherent in these popular films, as well as the financial considerations that shaped and constrained them. She explores how the Soviet regime used films to address the major challenges faced by the USSR after the Great Patriotic War (World War II), showing how war dramas, spy thrillers, Stalin epics, and rural comedies alike were mobilized to consolidate an official narrative of the war, reestablish Stalinist orthodoxy, and dramatize the rebuilding of socialist society. Yet, Knight also highlights how these same films were used by filmmakers more experimentally, exploring a diverse range of responses to the ideological crisis that lay at the heart of Soviet postwar culture, as a victorious people were denied the fruits of their sacrificial labor. After the war, new heroes were demanded by both the regime and Soviet audiences, and filmmakers sought to provide them, with at times surprising results. Stalin's Final Films mines Soviet cinema as an invaluable resource for understanding the unique character of postwar Stalinism and the cinema of the most repressive era in Soviet history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies
【欢迎订阅】 每天早上5:30,准时更新。 【阅读原文】 标题:How China caught up with Silicon Valley 副标题:US tech moguls used to see China as a production hub. Now some are buying slices of its technological future 正文:From Edison to Amazon, the US consistently invented the global future. The country suffered periodic anxieties about being overtaken, by the USSR in the 1960s, and by Japan in the 1980s. But America's first plausible rival — the only one with the requisite scale of manufacturing, consumer markets and scientific brainpower — was China. The country began a race with Silicon Valley to impose surveillance capitalism and unbridled AI on the rest of the world. 知识点:consistently /kənˈsɪstəntli/ maintaining technological leadership over extended periods. 持续地 e.g. The company has consistently dominated the processor market for decades. 该公司持续主导处理器市场数十年。 获取外刊的完整原文以及精讲笔记,请关注微信公众号「早安英文」,回复“外刊”即可。更多有意思的英语干货等着你! 【节目介绍】 《早安英文-每日外刊精读》,带你精读最新外刊,了解国际最热事件:分析语法结构,拆解长难句,最接地气的翻译,还有重点词汇讲解。 所有选题均来自于《经济学人》《纽约时报》《华尔街日报》《华盛顿邮报》《大西洋月刊》《科学杂志》《国家地理》等国际一线外刊。 【适合谁听】 1、关注时事热点新闻,想要学习最新最潮流英文表达的英文学习者 2、任何想通过地道英文提高听、说、读、写能力的英文学习者 3、想快速掌握表达,有出国学习和旅游计划的英语爱好者 4、参加各类英语考试的应试者(如大学英语四六级、托福雅思、考研等) 【你将获得】 1、超过1000篇外刊精读课程,拓展丰富语言表达和文化背景 2、逐词、逐句精确讲解,系统掌握英语词汇、听力、阅读和语法 3、每期内附学习笔记,包含全文注释、长难句解析、疑难语法点等,帮助扫除阅读障碍。
Marcel Dirsus is fascinated by the treadmill of tyranny: how dictators gain power, how they stay there and how they fall. This is his blueprint for bringing an end to authoritarianism.With democracies seemingly faltering worldwide, political scientist and writer Marcel Dirsus is putting tyrants under the microscope to better understand how they rise and how they fall.Years ago, Marcel took a break from his university studies and travelled to central Africa, where he took a job in a brewery.One day, while walking to work, he heard shots fired and an explosion in the distance as the military was launching a coup.The experience terrified him, and drew him into a study of tyrants — the dictators and despots who make life miserable for so many people on the planet.While they project an image of strength, guarded on all sides, and surrounded by people who do their bidding, Marcel says they live in fear.For the road to power is often flanked by the road to revolution.These men know a mass uprising, an assassination, a mutiny or a foreign invasion could end their reign at any moment, and who, or what will take their place?In investigating the long history of tyrannical leaders, however, Marcel has found a renewed optimism for Western Democracy.How Tyrants Fall: And How Nations Survive is published by Hachette Australia.Marcel is appearing at the Sydney Writers' Festival on Friday 23 May.This episode of Conversations explores Putin, Xi Jinping, China, CCP, Russia, Trump, global politics, dictatorships, democracy, voting rights, election results, the new world order, Stalin, Hitler, famous leaders, Churchill, politics, books, writing, history, war, civil war, Africa, USSR, Elon Musk, Gaddafi, golden gun, torture, Libya, Syria, control, Machiavelli, monarchs, Al-Ghazali, East Germany, Congo, academia, what to study at university, coup, the elite, power systems, Cold War, Bashar al-Assad, Ukraine, surveillance, Roman Empire.
After World War II, Germany was destroyed…the country was divided…the east was under the control of the USSR…the west was in democratic Europe…and then there was berlin, sitting in the east but cut into different zones dominated by the Russians, the Americans, the British, and the French. Most history books look at the political and military side of things…what we don't hear about nearly as much as how Germany society was rebuilt…imagine being a young person who is too young to have been in the military…what prospects did you have growing up in a divided country ruined by war. This is where art comes in…art is always downstream from whatever is happening in society…and in the case of West Germany, many artists wanted things to be different. Young German musicians had some very serious ideas of what needed to be done…many were into rock…but they were determined to create rock that was different from what was being made in the UK and America. And they certainly didn't want anything resembling traditional German music…it had been tainted by the nazi legacy…it was time for something new, different, and away from the status quo. There were experiments in the 50s that were pretty radical and, frankly, all over the place…but the results of these experiments began to coalesce into something by the end of the 60s. Within a few years, something distinctly German had emerged…it rocked (in its own way)…it had elements of psychedelic music…things could either be extremely structured or open to wild improvisation…it certainly wasn't from any blues tradition or normal rock conventions upon which British or American rock was built. The structures of some compositions weren't exactly what you could call normal—at least not in the context of rock…and occasionally, things got political, but not necessarily in a protest sense. By the middle 70s, we had a new distinctly German sound…the scene was very diverse in terms of sonics, but there was a Teutonic purpose underlying everything. The Germans just called it “German rock”…the British, however, gave it another name…it was supposed to be a joke, but the name stuck…and looking back, this sound, approach, aesthetic, and name can be found throughout many different corners of the rock. This is an explanation of thing that has become known as a “Krautrock”…and believe me, you've heard it more than you realize. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Fans of George Smiley, John le Carré's legendary spymaster, have reason to celebrate. In a rare double coup for the espionage world, Nick Harkaway—le Carré's son—has announced The Taper Man, a new Smiley novel arriving in 2026, while The Spy Who Came in From the Cold will receive its first-ever stage adaptation in the West End this autumn. The announcement marks a major return of the “Circus,” le Carré's iconic fictionalised British intelligence service, and the literary rebirth of one of spy fiction's most enduring characters. Join Spybrary - the ultimate community for spy fiction fans. The Taper Man: Smiley Heads Stateside Set in 1965, The Taper Man picks up 18 months after the events of Harkaway's bestselling Karla's Choice and places George Smiley in unfamiliar terrain—America. The novel explores Smiley's pursuit of a communist network on the US West Coast, threading together geopolitical paranoia with moral ambiguity in classic le Carré fashion. The story unfolds amid the tumultuous backdrop of the Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War, with Smiley navigating tensions with the CIA ("the Cousins") while unravelling Soviet infiltrations that stretch back to the 1950s. “It's time to meet our American Cousins,” Harkaway says. “We're following the breadcrumbs of a messy debacle in Helsinki all the way to California, uncovering the truth of Karla's 1950s network and pursuing Roy Bland into the USSR.” Publishing director Harriet Bourton of Viking describes The Taper Man as “an extraordinary new addition to the iconic literary world of John le Carré,” praising Harkaway's ability to honour the legacy while making it unmistakably his own. Smiley on Stage: The Spy Who Came in From the Cold at Soho Place Alongside the novel news, spy fans will see Smiley on stage for the first time this November, when The Spy Who Came in From the Cold—le Carré's 1963 classic—premieres at @sohoplace in London. Directed by Jeremy Herrin and adapted by acclaimed playwright David Eldridge, the production follows a successful run at Chichester Festival Theatre. Rory Keenan stars as Alec Leamas, the embittered British agent at the heart of the novel, with Agnes O'Casey playing Liz Gold. George Smiley will be portrayed by John Ramm. Clare Cornwell, director of the le Carré estate, says: “We are delighted to be celebrating the return of the Circus and George Smiley through these two new projects.” The John le Carré Legacy Continued Nick Harkaway, the fourth son of David Cornwell (John le Carré), previously completed the posthumous publication of Silverview and edited A Private Spy, a collection of his father's letters. In Karla's Choice, he took the bold step of writing new fiction within the le Carré universe—an effort praised by critics and readers alike. Watch our interview all about Karla's Choice with Nick Harkaway. With The Taper Man, Harkaway deepens his claim to the Smiley legacy while expanding the geopolitical canvas of the saga. For longtime fans of le Carré, and the next generation discovering his work through adaptations and new fiction, 2025 may just be the most thrilling year since Smiley first came in from the cold.
Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism. #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action. The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact. 2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country. 3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives. 4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people." On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator. Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base. The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince. In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses. By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia." The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi. Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control. As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm. At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple. The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple. Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan. In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust. The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared.
Officially known as the Vladimir Lenin All-Union Pioneer Organisation in honour of the recently deceased Bolshevik leader, the Young Pioneers were modelled in part on scouting organisations, but with a strong political and ideological framework aligned with the principles of the Communist ...
Max Pearson presents a collection of the week's Witness History interviews from the BBC World Service. Our guest is Dr Elizabeth Abbott, writer, historian and author of the book, "Sugar: A Bittersweet History".First, we confront the dark history of sugar. We hear how a researcher in the 1990s uncovered the unethical aspects of Sweden's Vipeholm experiments in the 1940 which led to new recommendations for children to eat sweets just once a week.And, how Mexico, a country which had one of the highest rates of fizzy drink consumption in the world, approved a tax on sugary soft drinks in 2013. Then an event which shaped the second half of the last century - On 14 May 1955, the leader of the Soviet Union and Heads of State from seven European countries met to sign the Warsaw Pact.Plus, the story of how two rival electricity pioneers, Nikola Tesla and Thomas Edison brought electricity to the world. Finally, we hear from Finnish singer Marion Rung on winning the 1980 Intervision Song Contest, the USSR's answer to Eurovision. Contributors: Dr Elin Bommenel - academic Dr Simon Barquera - director of health and nutrition research at The Institute for Public Health of Mexico Dr Elizabeth Abbott - writer and historian Otto Grotewohl - German politician Mark Seifer - biographer of Nikola Tesla William Terbo - relative of Nikola Tesla Marion Rung - Finnish winner of Intervision song contest 1980(Photo: sugar cubes and fizzy drinks, Credit: Anthony Devlin/Press Association)
"Pouehali" is an SBS Russian podcast where we talk about the waves of emigration from Russia and the Soviet Union. In the second season, we talk about the emigration of Jews from the USSR to Australia, which began in 1974 and ended in 1990. - "Поуехали" - это подкаст SBS Russian, в котором мы рассказываем о волнах эмиграции из России и Советского Союза. Во втором сезоне говорим об эмиграции евреев из СССР в Австралию, которая началась в 1974 году и продолжалась до 1990 года.
Emil Draitser — Soviet satirist turned American memoirist — joins Suzi to talk about his new book, Laughing All the Way to Freedom: The Americanization of a Russian Émigré. It's a sharp, funny, and moving account of his journey from censorship and conformity in the USSR to the chaotic freedoms of the 1970s United States. We explore how satire served as both survival and resistance in the Soviet Union, and how his identity was reshaped — culturally, politically, and personally — through the messy process of becoming American. Emil reflects on the welcome once extended to Cold War refugees like himself, and the stark contrast with today's hostile climate for immigrants. We also touch on the uneasy “friendship” between Putin and Trump, imperialists determined to redefine the character of politics. Jacobin Radio with Suzi Weissman features conversations with leading thinkers and activists, with a focus on labor, the economy, and protest movements.
Every so often we're going to bring you something we've been calling off-cuts and footnotes. These are extended scenes and deep dives that didn't make the final cut of the main episodes. This is also a place where we can talk about your questions and comments. So feel free to send your thoughts to htbdpodcast@gmail.com in a voice note or a quick message. This episode is a footnote. We're going to take a deeper dive into housing in the context of the Soviet Union. In the USSR and generally in the post-World War II city planning regimes, housing and new construction technologies played a major role in urban development booms. We're still feeling the impact of it to this day. The Soviet Union is a major contributor to this moment because it planned standardized residential developments to be deployed around its territories and spheres of influence. These designs were replicated so extensively that you can find them all over the world, from Poland to Iran from Estonia to Vietnam and of course in Odes[s]a. In this footnote, we'll hear from Kate Malaia, the author of Taking the Soviet Union Apart Room by Room, about the development of these residential blocks. We'll also hear from Odesiti who lived in the Soviet Union's first housing experiment, the communalki or communal apartments and later transitioned to different types of residential housing in Soviet Odes[s]a.
The Rise of Unmanned Warfare: Origins of the Us Autonomous Military Arsenal (Oxford UP, 2023) tells the fascinating story of the people, processes, and beliefs that led to the contemporary American unmanned arsenal. It takes an expansive look at automated and autonomous technologies, from mines and torpedoes to guided bombs and missiles, satellites, and ultimately, drones. Instead of asking the question, "Why unmanned rather than manned?" the book explains why certain types of unmanned systems became popular while others languished in research or in small pockets of the American military. To answer this question, Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald use interviews of senior decision-makers, military doctrine and writings, and historical sources to detail the proliferation of over a hundred years of unmanned weapons in the US arsenal, from mines and balloons to Reapers and Global Hawks. Their exploration reveals how multiple factors--key policy entrepreneurs, like Andy Marshall in the Office of Net Assessment; critical junctures like the fall of the USSR or the 9/11 attacks; beliefs that emerged in the wake of the Vietnam War; and US military service culture--all interacted in complex ways to form today's unmanned arsenal. The Hand Behind Unmanned uses theories of organizational innovation and process tracing of historical cases to explain recent developments, including US precision munition shortfalls and the rise of unmanned aerial platforms. It also foreshadows where the US unmanned arsenal may be headed in the future. Ultimately, the book uses a remarkable case study to illustrate how ideas diffuse across people and organizations to build the weapons of modern warfare. Our guests are Doctor Jacquelyn Schneider, who is the Hargrove Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Director of the Hoover Wargaming and Crisis Simulation Initiative, and an affiliate with Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; and Doctor Julia Macdonald, who is a Research Professor at the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and Director of Research and Engagement at the Asia New Zealand Foundation. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history
It was a time of high tension, fierce back-and-forth, and a relentless pursuit to dominate the world--and that was just between Coke and Pepsi. When you throw the Cold War into the mix, not only do you get a tumultuous time period, but the Cola Wars ramped up to another level. For Pepsi, a way to compete against Coke was to gain a foothold in the Soviet Union. And that's exactly what they did--but little did anyone know just how big they would become in the USSR. This is a look back at Pepsi's remarkable growth in the Soviet Union in the 80s, the continuous battle against Coca-Cola, and then one of the most remarkable business deals in history. Had Pepsi, for a short while, actually become a military power... War Games movie Review: Patreon.com/80s
This is our second one-hour interview in two weeks with Juliette Engel, MD, a heroic woman who has survived the worst the CIA and its torture center MKUltra could throw at her, starting at age six. For the survival of her soul, she later pushed her heart-wrenching past deep out of her consciousness and went on to put herself through medical school and into a successful career as a radiologist. That eventually led her to a second career helping reform the entire birthing system of Russia as the USSR fell in the early 1990s. As if under a Guidance much greater than herself, her Russian journey led her to become deeply involved in fighting against the trafficking of children from orphanages and institutions in Russia, with trails that led around the world and back into America itself. This helped Dr. Engel to recall her own experiences of abuse by her parents, who had close ties to the CIA and sold their own daughter to the agency to be groomed for a future career with them. Now, Dr. Engel is working with the rest of us in what she calls the Battle for Our Souls in the world today. Her focus in this spontaneous hour came to center around the survival of her soul. I was able to draw from my own experience as a therapist with adults who, as children, were exposed to ritual child abuse in America. I believe that the soul cannot be destroyed, but most people who go through very severe child abuse at the hands of their family and multiple others seem to “lose their souls.” They can no longer find and express their unique selves with the gift of reason and love for others. Many of them die mysteriously or kill themselves. Those who do survive and go on to live moral, productive lives are most unusual and are exemplars for all of us to learn from. Dr. Engel's life story, my own experience as a therapist, and Ginger's self-understanding come together in what is a truly moving and mutually enlightening hour. The two hours with Juliette, including this and her prior interview with us, can change perceptions of human evil and our ability to triumph over it. So can her books, Sparky: Surviving Sex Magic and Angels over Moscow: Life, Death, and Human Trafficking in Russia. Thank you, Dr. Juliette Engel, and thank you, our wonderful audience, for being here with us and our wonderful guests. ______ Learn more about Dr. Peter Breggin's work: https://breggin.com/ See more from Dr. Breggin's long history of being a reformer in psychiatry: https://breggin.com/Psychiatry-as-an-Instrument-of-Social-and-Political-Control Psychiatric Drug Withdrawal, the how-to manual @ https://breggin.com/a-guide-for-prescribers-therapists-patients-and-their-families/ Get a copy of Dr. Breggin's latest book: WHO ARE THE “THEY” - THESE GLOBAL PREDATORS? WHAT ARE THEIR MOTIVES AND THEIR PLANS FOR US? HOW CAN WE DEFEND AGAINST THEM? Covid-19 and the Global Predators: We are the Prey Get a copy: https://www.wearetheprey.com/ “No other book so comprehensively covers the details of COVID-19 criminal conduct as well as its origins in a network of global predators seeking wealth and power at the expense of human freedom and prosperity, under cover of false public health policies.” ~ Robert F Kennedy, Jr Author of #1 bestseller The Real Anthony Fauci and Founder, Chairman and Chief Legal Counsel for Children's Health Defense.
The Rise of Unmanned Warfare: Origins of the Us Autonomous Military Arsenal (Oxford UP, 2023) tells the fascinating story of the people, processes, and beliefs that led to the contemporary American unmanned arsenal. It takes an expansive look at automated and autonomous technologies, from mines and torpedoes to guided bombs and missiles, satellites, and ultimately, drones. Instead of asking the question, "Why unmanned rather than manned?" the book explains why certain types of unmanned systems became popular while others languished in research or in small pockets of the American military. To answer this question, Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald use interviews of senior decision-makers, military doctrine and writings, and historical sources to detail the proliferation of over a hundred years of unmanned weapons in the US arsenal, from mines and balloons to Reapers and Global Hawks. Their exploration reveals how multiple factors--key policy entrepreneurs, like Andy Marshall in the Office of Net Assessment; critical junctures like the fall of the USSR or the 9/11 attacks; beliefs that emerged in the wake of the Vietnam War; and US military service culture--all interacted in complex ways to form today's unmanned arsenal. The Hand Behind Unmanned uses theories of organizational innovation and process tracing of historical cases to explain recent developments, including US precision munition shortfalls and the rise of unmanned aerial platforms. It also foreshadows where the US unmanned arsenal may be headed in the future. Ultimately, the book uses a remarkable case study to illustrate how ideas diffuse across people and organizations to build the weapons of modern warfare. Our guests are Doctor Jacquelyn Schneider, who is the Hargrove Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Director of the Hoover Wargaming and Crisis Simulation Initiative, and an affiliate with Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; and Doctor Julia Macdonald, who is a Research Professor at the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and Director of Research and Engagement at the Asia New Zealand Foundation. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/technology
What are tariffs really used for? For economic protection? For political gain? For enforcing foreign policy? In this interview, I discuss the following with my guest scholar: ►Why James Madison foresaw tariffs as an inevitable source of conflict? ►In U.S. history, did Americans ever complain that tariffs are really a tax on the people? ►What was the first instance in which tariffs were used as a foreign policy tool? ►What is the Tariff of Abominations? ►How did tariffs backfire on Southern politicians? ►How are tariffs and secession movements related? ►Were tariffs part of Civil War's history? ►What powers did Congress grants to FDR over tariffs? ►What part of U.S. history does Pres. Trump point to as justification for his tariff policy? ►What was Pres. Reagan's tariff policy? ►How is tariff policy with the USSR different than our tariff policy toward China?
The Rise of Unmanned Warfare: Origins of the Us Autonomous Military Arsenal (Oxford UP, 2023) tells the fascinating story of the people, processes, and beliefs that led to the contemporary American unmanned arsenal. It takes an expansive look at automated and autonomous technologies, from mines and torpedoes to guided bombs and missiles, satellites, and ultimately, drones. Instead of asking the question, "Why unmanned rather than manned?" the book explains why certain types of unmanned systems became popular while others languished in research or in small pockets of the American military. To answer this question, Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald use interviews of senior decision-makers, military doctrine and writings, and historical sources to detail the proliferation of over a hundred years of unmanned weapons in the US arsenal, from mines and balloons to Reapers and Global Hawks. Their exploration reveals how multiple factors--key policy entrepreneurs, like Andy Marshall in the Office of Net Assessment; critical junctures like the fall of the USSR or the 9/11 attacks; beliefs that emerged in the wake of the Vietnam War; and US military service culture--all interacted in complex ways to form today's unmanned arsenal. The Hand Behind Unmanned uses theories of organizational innovation and process tracing of historical cases to explain recent developments, including US precision munition shortfalls and the rise of unmanned aerial platforms. It also foreshadows where the US unmanned arsenal may be headed in the future. Ultimately, the book uses a remarkable case study to illustrate how ideas diffuse across people and organizations to build the weapons of modern warfare. Our guests are Doctor Jacquelyn Schneider, who is the Hargrove Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Director of the Hoover Wargaming and Crisis Simulation Initiative, and an affiliate with Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; and Doctor Julia Macdonald, who is a Research Professor at the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and Director of Research and Engagement at the Asia New Zealand Foundation. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
The Rise of Unmanned Warfare: Origins of the Us Autonomous Military Arsenal (Oxford UP, 2023) tells the fascinating story of the people, processes, and beliefs that led to the contemporary American unmanned arsenal. It takes an expansive look at automated and autonomous technologies, from mines and torpedoes to guided bombs and missiles, satellites, and ultimately, drones. Instead of asking the question, "Why unmanned rather than manned?" the book explains why certain types of unmanned systems became popular while others languished in research or in small pockets of the American military. To answer this question, Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald use interviews of senior decision-makers, military doctrine and writings, and historical sources to detail the proliferation of over a hundred years of unmanned weapons in the US arsenal, from mines and balloons to Reapers and Global Hawks. Their exploration reveals how multiple factors--key policy entrepreneurs, like Andy Marshall in the Office of Net Assessment; critical junctures like the fall of the USSR or the 9/11 attacks; beliefs that emerged in the wake of the Vietnam War; and US military service culture--all interacted in complex ways to form today's unmanned arsenal. The Hand Behind Unmanned uses theories of organizational innovation and process tracing of historical cases to explain recent developments, including US precision munition shortfalls and the rise of unmanned aerial platforms. It also foreshadows where the US unmanned arsenal may be headed in the future. Ultimately, the book uses a remarkable case study to illustrate how ideas diffuse across people and organizations to build the weapons of modern warfare. Our guests are Doctor Jacquelyn Schneider, who is the Hargrove Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Director of the Hoover Wargaming and Crisis Simulation Initiative, and an affiliate with Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; and Doctor Julia Macdonald, who is a Research Professor at the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and Director of Research and Engagement at the Asia New Zealand Foundation. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs
The Rise of Unmanned Warfare: Origins of the Us Autonomous Military Arsenal (Oxford UP, 2023) tells the fascinating story of the people, processes, and beliefs that led to the contemporary American unmanned arsenal. It takes an expansive look at automated and autonomous technologies, from mines and torpedoes to guided bombs and missiles, satellites, and ultimately, drones. Instead of asking the question, "Why unmanned rather than manned?" the book explains why certain types of unmanned systems became popular while others languished in research or in small pockets of the American military. To answer this question, Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald use interviews of senior decision-makers, military doctrine and writings, and historical sources to detail the proliferation of over a hundred years of unmanned weapons in the US arsenal, from mines and balloons to Reapers and Global Hawks. Their exploration reveals how multiple factors--key policy entrepreneurs, like Andy Marshall in the Office of Net Assessment; critical junctures like the fall of the USSR or the 9/11 attacks; beliefs that emerged in the wake of the Vietnam War; and US military service culture--all interacted in complex ways to form today's unmanned arsenal. The Hand Behind Unmanned uses theories of organizational innovation and process tracing of historical cases to explain recent developments, including US precision munition shortfalls and the rise of unmanned aerial platforms. It also foreshadows where the US unmanned arsenal may be headed in the future. Ultimately, the book uses a remarkable case study to illustrate how ideas diffuse across people and organizations to build the weapons of modern warfare. Our guests are Doctor Jacquelyn Schneider, who is the Hargrove Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Director of the Hoover Wargaming and Crisis Simulation Initiative, and an affiliate with Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; and Doctor Julia Macdonald, who is a Research Professor at the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and Director of Research and Engagement at the Asia New Zealand Foundation. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/national-security
Last time we spoke about Operation Chahar. In the turbulent year of 1935, tensions surged in North China as the Kwantung Army defied Tokyo's orders, encroaching deeper into Chahar province. This period was marked by widespread anti-Japanese sentiments, fueled by local revolts and the assassination of pro-Japanese figures, which infuriated Japanese authorities. On May 20, the Kwantung Army launched an offensive against a bandit group led by Sun Yungqin, seeking to exert control over the demilitarized regions established by earlier agreements. Their swift victory forced the resignation of local officials opposing Japanese interests. As chaos escalated, the Chinese government, under pressure to appease Japan, dismantled anti-Japanese factions and dismissed key leaders. The climax in this saga came with the signing of the He-Umezu Agreement, stripping China of authority in Hubei and Chahar, signaling Japan's increasing dominance and setting the stage for further exploitation of the region. #150 The February 26 Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. While this podcast is supposed to be given through the Chinese perspective, I apologize but yet again I need to jump over to the Japanese side. You see, a very pivotal moment during the Showa era would occur in the year of 1936. I think it's crucial to understand it, and the underlying issues of it, to better understand what we will be stuck in for the unforeseeable future, the Second Sino-Japanese War. I've briefly mentioned the two factions within the Japanese military at this time, but now I'd really like to jump into them, and a major incident that made them collide. In the aftermath of WW1, 2 prominent factions emerged during this tumultuous period: the Kodoha, or Imperial Way Faction, and the Toseiha, or Control Faction. Each faction represented distinct visions for Japan's future, deeply influencing the nation's course leading up to World War II. The Kodoha rose to prominence in the 1920s, driven by a fervent belief in Japan's divine destiny and its right to expand its imperial reach across Asia. This faction was characterized by its adherence to traditional Japanese values, rooted in the samurai ethos. They viewed the Emperor as the embodiment of Japan's spirit and sought to return to the moral foundations they believed had been eroded by “Western influence”. The Kodoha was often critical of the West, perceiving the encroachment of Western thought and culture as a threat to Japan's unique identity. Their ideology emphasized a robust military force, advocating for aggressive campaigns in regions like Manchuria and China to assert Japan's dominance. Contrasting sharply with the Kodoha, the Toseiha began to emerge as a more dominant political force in the late 1930s. The Toseiha embraced a pragmatic approach, advocating for a disciplined military that could engage effectively with the complexities of modern warfare. They recognized the importance of retaining some traditional values while also integrating Western military techniques. Rather than rejecting Western influence entirely, the Toseiha believed in adapting to global shifts to ensure Japan's strength and security. The Toseiha's moderation extended to their governance strategies, as they prioritized political stability and control over radical ideology. They saw this approach as crucial for creating a robust state capable of managing Japan's expansionist ambitions without provoking the backlash that Kodoha tactics elicited. Their more calculated approach to military expansion included securing partnerships and pursuing diplomatic solutions alongside military action, thereby presenting a less confrontational image to the world. Now after Manchuria was seized and Manchukuo was ushered in, many in the Japanese military saw a crisis emerge, that required a “showa restoration' to solve. Both factions aimed to create military dictatorships under the emperor. The Kodoha saw the USSR as the number one threat to Japan and advocated an invasion of them, aka the Hokushin-ron doctrine, but the Toseiha faction prioritized a national defense state built on the idea they must build Japans industrial capabilities to face multiple enemies in the future. What really separated the two, was the Kodoha sought to use a violent coup d'etat to make ends meet, whereas the Toseiha were unwilling to go so far. The Kodoha faction was made up mostly of junior and youthful officers, typically country boys as we would call them. These were young men whose families were not the blue bloods, farmer types. They viewed the dramatic changes of Japan in light of their own family experiences, many were impoverished by the dramatic changes. A very specific thing these Kodoha boys hated were the Zaibatsu. The Zaibatsu were large Japanese business conglomerates, primarily active from the Meiji period until WW2. They combined various industries, including banking, manufacturing, and trading. Prominent examples included Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. The reason they hated the Zaibatsu was because they believed they were influenced by western thought and that they super succeeded the authority of the emperor. More or less you can think of it as “we hate the fat cats who are really running things”. Now the Toseiha faction were willing to work with the Zaibatsu to make Japan stronger. Basically they believed them to just be a necessary evil, you had to play ball to get things rolling. Random note, Hirohito's brother Prince Chichibu sympathized with the Kodoha faction and repeatedly counseled his brother that he should implement direct imperial rule even if it meant suspending the constitution, aka a show restoration. Hirohito believed his brother who was active in the IJA at the time was being radicalized. Now I cant go through the entire history of it, but this time period is known as the “government by assassination” period for Japan. Military leaders in the IJA, IJN and from within the Kodoha and Toseiha factions kept assassinating politicians and senior officers to push envelopes forward. Stating all of that, I now want to talk about the February 26th incident and I will add I am using a specific source, simply because it's my favorite. That is Herbert P Bix's Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. In late 1934, several officers from the Imperial Way faction at the Army Cadet School were arrested for plotting a coup. Although there were no immediate repercussions, the following year, two of the same Kodoha officers, named Isobe Asaichi and Muranaka Takaji were arrested again for distributing a document accusing Toseiha faction officers, like Major General Nagata Tetsuzan, of previously drafting coup plans against the government. This time, the army's upper echelons responded firmly, condemning Isobe and Muranaka's accusations as acts of disloyalty, resulting in both officers losing their commissions. Meanwhile, other Imperial Way officers sought retaliation against Nagata, who was rumored to be planning a major purge to eliminate factionalism within the army. Tatsukichi Minobe was a Japanese statesman and scholar of constitutional law and in the 1930s he began a movement bringing up the very real issue with the Meiji constitution in relation to the role of the emperor. In August 1935, amid a populist movement denouncing Minobe's interpretation of the constitution, Lt colonel Aizawa Saburo from Kodoha faction entered Nagata's office and fatally attacked him with his katana. This marked a significant escalation in the military struggle over state reform and the push for increased military funding, which was intertwined with the movement against Minobe. Meanwhile anti- Prime Minister Okada factions within the army, continuing to use slogans like “kokutai clarification” and “denounce the organ theory,” intensified their attacks on the emperor's advisers and hereditary peers. Senior generals from the Kodoha faction arranged a public court-martial for Aizawa, held by the 1st Division, a group heavily populated by Kodoha officers based in Tokyo. When Aizawa's trial commenced on January 12, 1936, his defense team transformed it into an emotional condemnation of the Okada cabinet, the court entourage, and Minobe's constitutional theories. This strategy garnered support across the nation, even reaching unexpected places like the imperial palace, where Dowager Empress Teimei Kogo, a staunch rightist, expressed sympathy for Aizawa. However, before the trial could progress, a military mutiny disrupted proceedings in the capital. Shockwaves rippled through the army after Army Minister Hayashi dismissed Kodoha member General Mazaki from his position overseeing military education and ordered the transfer of the 1st Division to Manchuria, which ignited the largest army uprising in modern Japanese history. The uprising was orchestrated through a series of meetings held from February 18 to 22 by key individuals including Nishida, Yasuhide Kurihara, Teruzō Andō, Hisashi Kōno, Takaji Muranaka, and Asaichi Isobe. Their plan was relatively straightforward: the officers would assassinate the most prominent adversaries of the kokutai, seize control of the administrative center of the capital and the Imperial Palace, and present their demands, which included the dismissal of certain officials and the establishment of a new cabinet led by Mazaki. They did not establish long-term goals, believing that those should be determined by the Emperor. However, it is suspected that they were prepared to replace Hirohito with Prince Chichibu if necessary. The young Kodoha officers felt they had at least implicit support from several influential Imperial Japanese Army officers after making informal inquiries. This group included figures such as Araki, Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima, Jinzaburō Mazaki, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Kanji Ishiwara, Shigeru Honjō, as well as their immediate superiors, Kōhei Kashii and Takeo Hori. Later, Kawashima's successor as Minister of War remarked that if all the officers who had endorsed the rebellion were forced to resign, there would not have been enough high-ranking officers left to replace them. To articulate their intentions and grievances, the young officers prepared a document titled "Manifesto of the Uprising" “Kekki Shuisho”, which they intended to present to the Emperor. Although the document was authored by Muranaka, it was written under the name of Shirō Nonaka, the highest-ranking officer involved in the plot. The document aligned with Kokutai Genri-ha ideals, criticizing the genrō, political leaders, military factions, zaibatsu, bureaucrats, and political parties for jeopardizing the kokutai with their selfishness and disregard for the Emperor, and emphasized the need for direct action: “Now, as we face immense foreign and domestic challenges, if we do not eliminate the disloyal and unjust who threaten the kokutai, if we do not remove the villains obstructing the Emperor's authority and hindering the Restoration, the Imperial vision for our nation will come to naught [...] Our duty is to purge the malevolent ministers and military factions surrounding the Emperor and eradicate their influence; we shall fulfill this mission.” Seven targets were selected for assassination for "threatening the kokutai". Keisuke Okada served as Prime Minister, where he notably advocated for the London Naval Treaty and supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai. His actions reflect a commitment to international agreements and specific ideological principles at the time. Saionji Kinmochi, a Genrō and former Prime Minister, also supported the London Naval Treaty. However, his influence extended further, as he played a role in prompting the Emperor to establish inappropriate cabinets, impacting political stability. Makino Nobuaki, the former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Foreign Minister, was another key figure who supported the London Naval Treaty. He notably prevented Prince Fushimi from voicing protests to the Emperor during this period, and he established a court faction in collaboration with Saitō, further entrenching political alliances. In his capacity as Grand Chamberlain, Kantarō Suzuki supported the London Naval Treaty but faced criticism for "obstructing the Imperial virtue," suggesting tensions between political decisions and traditional values. Saitō Makoto, who served as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and former Prime Minister, was involved in advocating for the London Naval Treaty and played a significant role in Mazaki's dismissal. He, too, formed a court faction with Makino, indicating the intricacies of court politics. Takahashi Korekiyo, as Finance Minister and former Prime Minister, engaged in party politics with the aim of diminishing military influence. His approach was focused on maintaining the existing economic structure amid the shifting political landscape. Finally, Jōtarō Watanabe, who replaced Mazaki as Inspector General of Military Education, supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai yet faced criticism for refusing to resign, despite being considered unsuitable for his position. On the night of February 25, Tokyo experienced a heavy snowfall, which uplifted the rebel officers as it evoked memories of the 1860 Sakuradamon Incident. During this event, political activists known as shishi assassinated Ii Naosuke, the chief advisor to the Shōgun, in the name of the Emperor. The rebel forces, organized into six groups, began mobilizing their troops and departing from their barracks between 3:30 and 4:00 AM. At 5:00 AM, they launched simultaneous attacks on key targets, including Okada, Takahashi, Suzuki, Saito, the Ministry of War, and the headquarters of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. At around five o'clock on the morning of February 26, 1936, a rebellion erupted, fueled by the long-standing tensions surrounding the kokutai issues that had plagued 1935. Twenty-two junior officers led over 1,400 armed soldiers and non-commissioned officers from three regiments of the 1st Division and an infantry unit of the Imperial Guards in a mutiny in snow-covered Tokyo. The attack on Okada involved a contingent of 280 men from the 1st Infantry Regiment, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Yasuhide Kurihara. The troops encircled the Prime Minister's Residence and compelled its guards to open the gates. Upon entering the compound, they attempted to locate Prime Minister Okada but were met with gunfire from four policemen stationed there. All four policemen were killed, wounding six rebel soldiers in the process. However, the shots served as a warning for Okada, prompting his brother-in-law, Colonel Denzō Matsuo, to help him find refuge. Matsuo, who closely resembled Okada, was eventually discovered by the soldiers and killed. After comparing Matsuo's wounded face to a photograph of the prime minister, the attackers mistakenly believed they had accomplished their mission. Okada managed to escape the following day, but this information was kept confidential, and he did not play any further role in the events. After Matsuo's death, Kurihara's men took up guard positions around the compound, reinforced by sixty soldiers from the 3rd Imperial Guard. In another key operation, Captain Kiyosada Kōda led a group of 160 men to seize control of the Minister of War's residence, the Ministry of War, and the General Staff Office. Upon entering the Minister's residence at 6:30 AM, they demanded to see Minister Kawashima. Once admitted, they read their manifesto aloud and presented a document detailing several demands, including: A prompt resolution to the situation that would further "advance the cause of the Restoration." A call to prevent the use of force against the Righteous Army. The arrest of Kazushige Ugaki (Governor-General of Korea), Jirō Minami (commander of the Kwantung Army), Kuniaki Koiso (commander of the Korean Army), and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa for their roles in undermining military command. The immediate dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Akira Mutō, Colonel Hiroshi Nemoto, and Major Tadashi Katakura from the Imperial Japanese Army for promoting "factionalism." The appointment of Araki as the new commander of the Kwantung Army. Ugaki, who served as Minister of War during two separate terms, had overseen significant reductions and modernization efforts within the army. He had also failed to support the March Incident plotters, who had hoped to install him as Prime Minister. Minami, Mutō, Nemoto, and Katakura were all influential members of the Tōsei-ha faction; Katakura had been partly responsible for reporting on the Military Academy Incident. Later that morning, Isobe encountered Katakura outside the Ministry of War and shot him non-fatally in the head. During this tumultuous period, several officers sympathetic to the rebels, including General Mazaki, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, and General Ryū Saitō, joined the uprising. Saitō praised the young officers' spirit and encouraged Kawashima to accept their demands. Shortly before 9:00 am, Kawashima indicated he needed to speak with the Emperor and left for the Imperial Palace. Meanwhile, Captain Hisashi Kōno led a team of seven, comprised mostly of civilians, to attack Makino Nobuaki, who was staying at Kōfūsō, part of the ryokan Itōya in Yugawara, Kanagawa Prefecture, with his family. Arriving at 5:45 am, they stationed two men outside while entering the inn with weapons drawn. Inside, policemen opened fire, leading to a lengthy exchange of gunfire. A policeman managed to alert Makino and his party of the danger, guiding them to a rear exit. Although the assassins fired at the escaping group, Makino successfully evaded capture. Kōno sustained a gunshot wound to the chest, and one policeman, Yoshitaka Minagawa, was killed. As Kōno was evacuated from the scene, the assailants set fire to the building. Hearing a gunshot, Kōno assumed that Makino had shot himself inside. After his recovery at a nearby military hospital, Kōno and his team were arrested by military police. Around 10:00 am, Kurihara and Nakahashi loaded a fleet of three trucks with sixty men and drove from the Prime Minister's Residence to the offices of the Asahi Shimbun, a significant liberal newspaper. They stormed the building, ordering the evacuation of employees and declaring their actions as "divine retribution for being an un-Japanese newspaper." The rebels then overturned and scattered the newspaper's type trays, containing 4,000 different characters, temporarily halting its publication. Following this attack, the men distributed copies of the uprising's manifesto to nearby newspapers before returning to the Prime Minister's Residence. On another front, 1st Lieutenant Motoaki Nakahashi of the 3rd Imperial Guard gathered 135 men and, under the pretext of paying respects at Yasukuni Shrine, marched to Takahashi Korekiyo's residence. There, he divided his forces, sending one group to attack while the other remained to guard the entrance. After breaking into the compound, Nakahashi and Lieutenant Kanji Nakajima found Takahashi in bed, where Nakahashi shot him while Nakajima delivered a fatal sword strike. Takahashi died without waking. Once his target was eliminated, Nakahashi regrouped with the soldiers and proceeded to the Imperial Palace, aiming to secure it. Entering through the western Hanzō Gate at 6:00 am, Nakahashi informed Major Kentarō Honma, the palace guard commander, that he had been dispatched to reinforce the gates due to earlier attacks. Honma, already aware of the uprisings, accepted Nakahashi's arrival. He was assigned to help secure the Sakashita Gate, the primary entrance to the Emperor's residence. Nakahashi planned to signal nearby rebel troops at police headquarters once he controlled access to the Emperor. However, he struggled to contact his allies, and by 8:00 am, Honma learned of his involvement in the uprising and ordered him, at gunpoint, to vacate the palace grounds. Nakahashi complied and returned to join Kurihara at the Prime Minister's Residence, while his soldiers remained at the gate until relieved later that day, preventing their inclusion in the government's official count of rebel forces. Elsewhere, 1st Lieutenant Naoshi Sakai led a detachment of 120 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to Saitō Makoto's home in Yotsuya. After surrounding the policemen on guard, five soldiers entered the residence and found Saitō and his wife, Haruko, in their bedroom. They shot Saitō dead, prompting Haruko to plead for her life, saying, "Please kill me instead!" While they pulled her away, she was unwittingly wounded by stray gunfire. Following Saitō's assassination, two officers directed another group to target General Watanabe, while the remaining men moved to strategically position themselves northeast of the Ministry of War. In Kōjimachi, Captain Teruzō Andō commanded 200 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to assault Suzuki's residence across from the Imperial Palace. After disarming the police on duty, they located Suzuki in his bedroom and shot him twice. When Andō moved to deliver the coup de grâce with his sword, Suzuki's wife implored to be allowed to do it herself, believing her husband to be fatally wounded. Andō obliged and, apologizing for the act, explained it was for the nation's sake. After saluting Suzuki, the soldiers left to guard the Miyakezaka junction north of the Ministry of War. Following the assault on Saitō, a party of twenty men, led by 2nd Lieutenants Tarō Takahashi and Yutaka Yasuda, headed to Watanabe's residence in Ogikubo after 7:00 AM. Despite the two-hour delay since previous attacks, no measures had been taken to alert Watanabe. As they attempted to storm the front entrance, military police inside opened fire, wounding Yasuda and another soldier. The troops then gained entry through the rear, confronting Watanabe's wife outside their bedroom. After shoving her aside, they found Watanabe using a futon as cover. He opened fire, prompting one soldier to retaliate with a light machine gun. Takahashi then rushed in and fatally stabbed Watanabe, witnessed by his nine-year-old daughter, Kazuko, who hid nearby. The soldiers departed, taking their wounded to a hospital before positioning themselves in northern Nagatachō. In a significant move, Captain Shirō Nonaka led nearly a third of the rebel forces, comprising 500 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment, to assault the Tokyo Metropolitan Police headquarters. Their objective was to secure communication equipment and prevent dispatch of the police's Emergency Service Unit. Meeting no resistance, they quickly occupied the building, possibly due to a strategic decision to leave the situation in the military's hands. After securing the police headquarters, 2nd Lieutenant Kinjirō Suzuki led a small group to attack Fumio Gotō's residence, the Home Minister's, but found that Gotō was not home, thus allowing him to escape. This attack appeared to result from Suzuki's independent decision, rather than a coordinated effort among the officers. Despite all of these actions, the Kodoha boys had failed to secure the Sakashita Gate to the palace, which allowed the palace to maintain communication with the outside world, and they neglected to address potential naval interventions. At the Yokosuka naval base, Rear Adm. Yonai Mitsumasa and his chief of staff, Inoue Shigeyoshi, positioned marines to defend the Navy Ministry and prepared warships in Tokyo Bay to suppress the rebellion. By the morning of February 28, after unsuccessful negotiations through sympathetic officers at army headquarters, the commander under martial law transmitted an imperial order to disperse. Most troops returned to their barracks, one officer committed suicide, and the remaining leaders surrendered, resulting in the uprising ending with minimal further violence. Nevertheless, martial law in Tokyo continued for nearly five months. The rebel officers had initially planned for General Kawashima, a staunch ally of the Kodoha, to relay their intentions to the emperor, who they assumed would issue a decree for a “Showa restoration.” Despite their radical objectives of overthrowing the political order, the mutineers, like other military and civilian extremists of the 1930s, sought to operate within the imperial framework and maintain the kokutai. They believed the emperor was under the control of his advisers and lacked a genuine will of his own. Once the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain were removed, they expected the emperor to appoint General Mazaki as prime minister, a leader they believed would reinforce the military and effectively address the China issue. At the onset of the insurrection, they had a real chance of success. The Tokyo military police commander, General Kashii Kohei, sympathized with their cause, and the emperor's chief aide, General Honjo, was related to rebel officer Capain Yamaguchi Ichitaro. Support for the mutineers was present at military bases nationwide. Historian Hata Ikuhiko notes that the rebels contacted General Honjo by both phone and written message before attacking the Okada cabinet. As the first in the imperial entourage to learn of the mutiny, Honjo could have warned the intended targets but chose not to do so. By the time he arrived at court at 6:00 am. on the 26th, key advisors like Chief Secretary Kido, Imperial Household Minister Yuasa Kurahei, and Vice Grand Chamberlain Hirohata Tadakata were already aware of the potential danger. Suzuki was murdered, and the emperor was deeply affected, awakening to the news at 5:40 am from the chamberlain on night duty, Kanroji Osanaga. He learned that his old ministers had been attacked and a coup was underway. Upon receiving this information, Hirohito resolved to suppress the uprising. He was outraged by the killing of his ministers and feared that the rebels might use his brother, Prince Chichibu, to force him to abdicate. He donned his army uniform and summoned Honjo, ordering him to “end it immediately and turn this misfortune into a blessing.” Hirohito adopted a strategy proposed by Kido, who had acted swiftly earlier that morning, instructing Honjo to assess the Imperial Guard Division's potential actions if the mutineers advanced on the Palace. Kido aimed to prevent the establishment of a new provisional cabinet until the mutiny was fully quelled. At 9:30 am Army Minister Kawashima, who had previously met with one of the rebel officers, arrived at court. He urged the emperor to form a cabinet that would “clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life, and fulfill national defense.” Surprised by Kawashima's tone, Hirohito reprimanded him for not prioritizing the suppression of the mutiny. He also expressed his frustration to Chief of the Navy General Staff Prince Fushimi, dismissing him when he inquired about forming a new cabinet. Later that day, Kawashima met with the Supreme Military Council, consisting mainly of army officers sympathetic to the rebels. The council decided to attempt persuasion before relaying the emperor's orders a move contrary to Hirohito's directive. According to historian Otabe Yuji, an “instruction” was issued to the rebel officers at 10:50 am, acknowledging their motives and suggesting the emperor might show them leniency. This message was communicated to the ringleaders by martial law commander General Kashii. That evening, when members of the Okada cabinet came to submit their resignations, Hirohito insisted they remain in power until the mutiny was resolved. On February 27, the second day of the uprising, Hirohito announced “administrative martial law” based on Article 8 of the Imperial Constitution. This invoked his sovereign powers to address the crisis while freeing him from needing cabinet approval for his actions. Hirohito displayed remarkable energy throughout the subsequent days, sending chamberlains to summon Honjo for updates and threatening to lead the Imperial Guard Division himself when dissatisfied with the reports. Honjo, however, resisted the emperor's demands and exhibited sympathy for the rebels. During the uprising, Hirohito met with Prince Chichibu, who had recently returned from Hirosaki. Their discussions reportedly led Chichibu to distance himself from the rebels. However, rumors of his sympathy for them persisted, leading to concerns about potential conflicts within the imperial family. On the second day, Rear Admiral Yonai and his chief of staff demonstrated their loyalty to Hirohito. By February 29, the fourth day of the uprising, Hirohito had reasserted his authority, troops were returning to their barracks, and most rebel leaders were captured. Seventeen of these leaders were court-martialed and executed in July without legal representation. Shortly after, during the obon festival, Hirohito allegedly instructed a military aide to secure seventeen obon lanterns for the palace. This action, though secret, may have provided him some personal comfort amidst the turmoil. An investigation following the mutiny revealed that the rebels' sense of crisis was amplified by the recent general elections, which had shown an anti-military sentiment among voters. Despite their populist rhetoric, most ringleaders were not motivated by the agricultural depression; their goal was to support the kokutai by advocating for increased military rearmament. During this period, military spending steadily rose from 3.47% of GNP in 1931 to 5.63% in 1936. Intriguingly, the ringleaders and their senior commanders shared a desire for state control over production to mobilize resources fully for total war. While united in this goal, their ideas about how to achieve a “Showa restoration” varied greatly, with some leaders, like Isobe, calling for complete economic consolidation and a return to strong state power. The February mutiny reinforced Hirohito's belief in the constitutional framework that underpinned his military authority. He became increasingly cautious about decisions that could compromise his command and developed closer ties to the army's Control faction, justifying military spending increases. Yet, the memory of the mutiny left him feeling uncertain about the throne's stability. Now you know me, whenever I can bring up Hirohito's involvement in the war related times I gotta do. After WW2, in an apparent effort to downplay his role as supreme commander, Hirohito provided a deliberately distorted account of the February events. “I issued an order at that time for the rebel force to be suppressed. This brings to mind Machida Chuji, the finance minister. He was very worried about the rebellion's adverse effect on the money market and warned me that a panic could occur unless I took firm measures. Therefore I issued a strong command to have [the uprising] put down. As a rule, because a suppression order also involves martial law, military circles, who cannot issue such an order on their own, need the mutual consent of the government. However, at the time, Okada's whereabouts were unknown. As the attitude of the Army Ministry seemed too lenient, I issued a strict order. Following my bitter experiences with the Tanaka cabinet, I had decided always to wait for the opinions of my advisers before making any decision, and not to go against their counsel. Only twice, on this occasion and at the time of the ending of the war, did I positively implement my own ideas. Ishiwara Kanji of the Army General Staff Office also asked me, through military aide Chojiri [Kazumoto], to issue a suppression order. I don't know what sort of a person Ishiwara is, but on this occasion he was correct, even though he had been the instigator of the Manchurian Incident. Further, my chief military aide, Honjo, brought me the plan drafted by Yamashita Hobun, in which Yamashita asked me to please send an examiner because the three leaders of the rebel army were likely to commit suicide. However, I thought that sending an examiner would imply that they had acted according to their moral convictions and were deserving of respect. . . . So I rejected Honjo's proposal, and [instead] issued the order to suppress them. I received no report that generals in charge of military affairs had gone and urged the rebels to surrender.” On February 26, when Hirohito ordered the immediate suppression of the rebels, his anger was directed not only at the insurgents who had assassinated his closest advisors but also at senior army officers who were indecisive in executing the crackdown. The following day, in addition to his role as Minister of Commerce and Industry, Machida took on the responsibilities of finance minister. Concerns over economic panic and confusion contributed to the emperor's sense of urgency, despite not being the primary motivation for his actions. Hirohito believed that every hour of delay tarnished Japan's international reputation. Since the Manchurian Incident, the emperor had frequently clashed with the military regarding encroachments on his authority, though never about fundamental policy issues. At times, he had managed to assert his political views during policy discussions, similar to his earlier influence under the Hamaguchi cabinet. The February 26 mutiny highlighted to Hirohito and Yuasa his privy seal from March 1936 to June 1940, and the first lord keeper of the privy seal to attend court regularly the necessity of fully exercising the emperor's supreme command whenever the situation demanded it. Even when faced with opposition from Honjo, Hirohito managed to gain support and assert his authority through a decisive approach. His resolution marked the end of a period during which alienated “young officers” attempted to leverage his influence as a reformist figure to challenge a power structure they could not manipulate effectively. However, Hirohito learned how to adeptly manage that establishment in most situations. The decision-making process within the government was characterized by secrecy, indirect communication, vague policy drafting, and information manipulation, creating a landscape of confusion, misunderstanding, and constant intrigue aimed at achieving consensus among elites. This was the modus operandi in Tokyo and a reflection of how the emperor operated. Once again, Hirohito reminded the tightly-knit elite that he was essential to the functioning of the system. On May 4, 1936, during his address at the opening ceremony of the Sixty-ninth Imperial Diet, while Tokyo remained under martial law, Hirohito closed the chapter on the February mutiny. Initially, he contemplated sending a strong message of censure to the military, but after considerable deliberation over three months, he ultimately chose to issue a brief, innocuous statement: “We regret the recent incident that occurred in Tokyo.” The response from his audience of Diet members and military officials was one of startled awe, with some privately expressing disappointment. Once again, at a critical juncture, Hirohito avoided an opportunity to publicly rein in the military through his constitutional role. Nonetheless, due to his behind-the-scenes actions, the drift in domestic policy that had characterized Japan since the Manchurian Incident came to an end. In the following fourteen months, the emperor and his advisors largely aligned with the army and navy's demands for increased military expansion and state-driven industrial development. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. So some very unruly young Japanese officers got the bright idea of forcing a showa restoration by killing all the culprits they believed held their emperor hostage. Little did they know, this event spelt the end of the Kodoha faction and rise of the Toseiha faction. Henceforth the military was even more in charge and would get even more insane.
The Left's focus on crude racial politics has made everyone understandably weary of identity, but identity does not magically disappear. As a response, some are now pushing for the forced elimination of identity even up to the level of the nation, singling our nationalism itself as the enemy. Under Joseph Stalin the USSR also recognize the need to abolish tribal and even national identities in the service of international community. We will discuss why projects of scale, both liberal and communist, reliably seek to destroy national identity. Follow on: Apple: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-auron-macintyre-show/id1657770114 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3S6z4LBs8Fi7COupy7YYuM?si=4d9662cb34d148af Substack: https://auronmacintyre.substack.com/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/AuronMacintyre Gab: https://gab.com/AuronMacIntyre YouTube:https://www.youtube.com/c/AuronMacIntyre Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/c-390155 Odysee: https://odysee.com/@AuronMacIntyre:f Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/auronmacintyre/ Today's sponsors: Follow https://x.com/WillHild Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
The success of the submarine-borne Polaris missile was a critical nuclear deterrent that helped President Kennedy stare down Khruschev during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Ever since, this weapon has been a key strategic tool of the U.S. Tom Ramos's book "From Berkeley to Berlin," chronicles the scientific journey leading to the development of this and other nuclear weapons and the singular man whose "buoyant optimism spread to everyone around him and accounted for the attainment of many an 'impossible' objective."Founded in 1931 on the U.C. Berkeley campus by famed physicist Ernest Lawrence, (Nobel Prize-winning inventor of the cyclotron in 1938) "The Rad Lab" attracted some of the finest talent in America, including J. Robert Oppenheimer. In 1941, Lawrence challenged his team to deter Joseph Stalin's nuclear program in the USSR. Oppenheimer and Lawrence collaborated for more than a decade, their work together culminating on the Manhattan Project. Lawrence then founded the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, whose team further developed nuclear technology, including the Polaris missile.Heroes Behind HeadlinesExecutive Producer Ralph PezzulloProduced & Engineered by Mike DawsonMusic provided by ExtremeMusic.com
Send us a textToday, we cover those scientists who served during the time of the Soviet Union.Support the show
Kerry tries to explain to Roger what's been going on with the Giants in his absence, and we both try to come to grips with the strengths and potential weaknesses of this resilient edition of the team. One thing's for sure, a strong start has put them in position to think about where the team can and should be supported and upgraded as the summer goes along.You can listen to Kerry frequently on KNBR, and follow all of his work on social media at ko-crowley. You can follow me at rog61, or simply sign up to be a There R Giants' subscriber to get all of my Giants' prospect work delivered ad-free, straight to your inbox. There R Giants is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Intro/Outro: “Back in the USSR” by The Beatles This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rogermunter.substack.com/subscribe
Donald Trump briefly tried to change "Veterans Day" to a Victory in War (both I and II) Day until rebuked by vets, but his explanation needs to also be rebuked. Trump said the U.S., more than any other country, won the world wars. Of course, that flies in the face of the actual history of World War II. On this 80th anniversary of Victory in Europe Day, we discussed the reality of the second world war . . . how the west stalled on establishing a second front while the USSR was bearing the brunt of the war, how the Soviets reversed the German offensive in 1941-42 and then liberated Europe from the Nazis, how the Red Army killed 80 percent of the Germans killed in the war, and how the Soviet Union suffered immense losses (20-25 million killed, a million farms and factories destroyed, half the economy devastated).********Outro- "Green and Red Blues" by MoodyLinks//+G&R: Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 78 Years Later (https://apple.co/3WSbppd)Follow Green and Red// +G&R Linktree: https://linktr.ee/greenandredpodcast +Our rad website: https://greenandredpodcast.org/ + Join our Discord community (https://discord.gg/hKRAGQv6)+Follow us on Substack (https://greenandredpodcast.substack.com)+Follow us on Bluesky (https://bsky.app/profile/podcastgreenred.bsky.social)Support the Green and Red Podcast// +Become a Patron at https://www.patreon.com/greenredpodcast +Or make a one time donation here: https://bit.ly/DonateGandR Our Networks// + We're part of the Labor Podcast Network: https://www.laborradionetwork.org/ +We're part of the Anti-Capitalist Podcast Network: linktr.ee/anticapitalistpodcastnetwork +Listen to us on WAMF (90.3 FM) in New Orleans (https://wamf.org/) + Check us out! We made it into the top 100 Progressive Podcasts lists (#68) (https://bit.ly/432XNJT) This is a Green and Red Podcast (@PodcastGreenRed) production. Produced by Bob (@bobbuzzanco) and Scott (@sparki1969). Edited by Scott.
Send us a textToday on The Prather Point LIVE at 2 pm ET on:https://rumble.com/v6t1eah-the-prather-point.htmlAMERICA-FIRST-LEGAL SUES CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS!TRUMP ORDERS GOLD STAR MOM TINA PETERS RELEASED!WARNING: G-STAR -TOO CLOSE TO NAZI-DAVID VERSION!RFK IGNORES SCRIPT, GETS GAIN-OF-FUNCTION BAN!HOW PROVIDENCE TURNED MY DEFEATS INTO WINS!
With the recent tensions between India and Pakistan, i figured it was a good time to talk about India's entrance to the nuclear club. We'll talk about the reasons why India would want the bomb and the world's reaction (particularly Pakistan's). We'll also discuss some issues of nuclear proliferation- if the US and USSR can have these weapons and be trusted to not end civilization as we know it, what's the problem with nations like India or Pakistan having them? Enjoy!
Host David Mauro interviews Dr. Feleks Kravetz, US citizen who migrated from the former USSR and founder of Cuber Security Easy.We discuss:
CLUMSY COMMUNISM LOSING BADLY IN BEIJING: 1/8: To the World: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Communism by Sean McMeekin (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Overthrow-World-Rise-Fall-Communism/dp/1541601963 When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the world was certain that Communism was dead. Today, three decades later, it is clear that it was not. While Russia may no longer be Communist, Communism and sympathy for Communist ideas have proliferated across the globe. In To Overthrow the World, Sean McMeekin investigates the evolution of Communism from a seductive ideal of a classless society into the ruling doctrine of tyrannical regimes. Tracing Communism's ascent from theory to practice, McMeekin ranges from Karl Marx's writings to the rise and fall of the USSR under Stalin to Mao's rise to power in China to the acceleration of Communist or Communist-inspired policies around the world in the twenty-first century. McMeekin argues, however, that despite the endurance of Communism, it remains deeply unpopular as a political form. Where it has arisen, it has always arisen by force. Blending historical narrative with cutting-edge scholarship, To Overthrow the World revolutionizes our understanding of the evolution of Communism—an idea that seemingly cannot die. 1966 MAO
CLUMSY COMMUNISM LOSING BADLY IN BEIJING: 2/8: To the World: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Communism by Sean McMeekin (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Overthrow-World-Rise-Fall-Communism/dp/1541601963 When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the world was certain that Communism was dead. Today, three decades later, it is clear that it was not. While Russia may no longer be Communist, Communism and sympathy for Communist ideas have proliferated across the globe. In To Overthrow the World, Sean McMeekin investigates the evolution of Communism from a seductive ideal of a classless society into the ruling doctrine of tyrannical regimes. Tracing Communism's ascent from theory to practice, McMeekin ranges from Karl Marx's writings to the rise and fall of the USSR under Stalin to Mao's rise to power in China to the acceleration of Communist or Communist-inspired policies around the world in the twenty-first century. McMeekin argues, however, that despite the endurance of Communism, it remains deeply unpopular as a political form. Where it has arisen, it has always arisen by force. Blending historical narrative with cutting-edge scholarship, To Overthrow the World revolutionizes our understanding of the evolution of Communism—an idea that seemingly cannot die. 1960 MAO
CLUMSY COMMUNISM LOSING BADLY IN BEIJING: 3/8: To the World: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Communism by Sean McMeekin (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Overthrow-World-Rise-Fall-Communism/dp/1541601963 When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the world was certain that Communism was dead. Today, three decades later, it is clear that it was not. While Russia may no longer be Communist, Communism and sympathy for Communist ideas have proliferated across the globe. In To Overthrow the World, Sean McMeekin investigates the evolution of Communism from a seductive ideal of a classless society into the ruling doctrine of tyrannical regimes. Tracing Communism's ascent from theory to practice, McMeekin ranges from Karl Marx's writings to the rise and fall of the USSR under Stalin to Mao's rise to power in China to the acceleration of Communist or Communist-inspired policies around the world in the twenty-first century. McMeekin argues, however, that despite the endurance of Communism, it remains deeply unpopular as a political form. Where it has arisen, it has always arisen by force. Blending historical narrative with cutting-edge scholarship, To Overthrow the World revolutionizes our understanding of the evolution of Communism—an idea that seemingly cannot die. 1959 MAO
CLUMSY COMMUNISM LOSING BADLY IN BEIJING: 4/8: To the World: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Communism by Sean McMeekin (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Overthrow-World-Rise-Fall-Communism/dp/1541601963 When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the world was certain that Communism was dead. Today, three decades later, it is clear that it was not. While Russia may no longer be Communist, Communism and sympathy for Communist ideas have proliferated across the globe. In To Overthrow the World, Sean McMeekin investigates the evolution of Communism from a seductive ideal of a classless society into the ruling doctrine of tyrannical regimes. Tracing Communism's ascent from theory to practice, McMeekin ranges from Karl Marx's writings to the rise and fall of the USSR under Stalin to Mao's rise to power in China to the acceleration of Communist or Communist-inspired policies around the world in the twenty-first century. McMeekin argues, however, that despite the endurance of Communism, it remains deeply unpopular as a political form. Where it has arisen, it has always arisen by force. Blending historical narrative with cutting-edge scholarship, To Overthrow the World revolutionizes our understanding of the evolution of Communism—an idea that seemingly cannot die. 1955 MAO
CLUMSY COMMUNISM LOSING BADLY IN BEIJING: 5/8: To the World: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Communism by Sean McMeekin (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Overthrow-World-Rise-Fall-Communism/dp/1541601963 When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the world was certain that Communism was dead. Today, three decades later, it is clear that it was not. While Russia may no longer be Communist, Communism and sympathy for Communist ideas have proliferated across the globe. In To Overthrow the World, Sean McMeekin investigates the evolution of Communism from a seductive ideal of a classless society into the ruling doctrine of tyrannical regimes. Tracing Communism's ascent from theory to practice, McMeekin ranges from Karl Marx's writings to the rise and fall of the USSR under Stalin to Mao's rise to power in China to the acceleration of Communist or Communist-inspired policies around the world in the twenty-first century. McMeekin argues, however, that despite the endurance of Communism, it remains deeply unpopular as a political form. Where it has arisen, it has always arisen by force. Blending historical narrative with cutting-edge scholarship, To Overthrow the World revolutionizes our understanding of the evolution of Communism—an idea that seemingly cannot die. 1954 MAO AT BEIDEIHE
CLUMSY COMMUNISM LOSING BADLY IN BEIJING: 6/8: To the World: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Communism by Sean McMeekin (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Overthrow-World-Rise-Fall-Communism/dp/1541601963 When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the world was certain that Communism was dead. Today, three decades later, it is clear that it was not. While Russia may no longer be Communist, Communism and sympathy for Communist ideas have proliferated across the globe. In To Overthrow the World, Sean McMeekin investigates the evolution of Communism from a seductive ideal of a classless society into the ruling doctrine of tyrannical regimes. Tracing Communism's ascent from theory to practice, McMeekin ranges from Karl Marx's writings to the rise and fall of the USSR under Stalin to Mao's rise to power in China to the acceleration of Communist or Communist-inspired policies around the world in the twenty-first century. McMeekin argues, however, that despite the endurance of Communism, it remains deeply unpopular as a political form. Where it has arisen, it has always arisen by force. Blending historical narrative with cutting-edge scholarship, To Overthrow the World revolutionizes our understanding of the evolution of Communism—an idea that seemingly cannot die. 1946 MAO AND MARSHALL
CLUMSY COMMUNISM LOSING BADLY IN BEIJING: 7/8: To the World: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Communism by Sean McMeekin (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Overthrow-World-Rise-Fall-Communism/dp/1541601963 When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the world was certain that Communism was dead. Today, three decades later, it is clear that it was not. While Russia may no longer be Communist, Communism and sympathy for Communist ideas have proliferated across the globe. In To Overthrow the World, Sean McMeekin investigates the evolution of Communism from a seductive ideal of a classless society into the ruling doctrine of tyrannical regimes. Tracing Communism's ascent from theory to practice, McMeekin ranges from Karl Marx's writings to the rise and fall of the USSR under Stalin to Mao's rise to power in China to the acceleration of Communist or Communist-inspired policies around the world in the twenty-first century. McMeekin argues, however, that despite the endurance of Communism, it remains deeply unpopular as a political form. Where it has arisen, it has always arisen by force. Blending historical narrative with cutting-edge scholarship, To Overthrow the World revolutionizes our understanding of the evolution of Communism—an idea that seemingly cannot die. 1940 MAO
CLUMSY COMMUNISM LOSING BADLY IN BEIJING: 8/8: To the World: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Communism by Sean McMeekin (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Overthrow-World-Rise-Fall-Communism/dp/1541601963 When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the world was certain that Communism was dead. Today, three decades later, it is clear that it was not. While Russia may no longer be Communist, Communism and sympathy for Communist ideas have proliferated across the globe. In To Overthrow the World, Sean McMeekin investigates the evolution of Communism from a seductive ideal of a classless society into the ruling doctrine of tyrannical regimes. Tracing Communism's ascent from theory to practice, McMeekin ranges from Karl Marx's writings to the rise and fall of the USSR under Stalin to Mao's rise to power in China to the acceleration of Communist or Communist-inspired policies around the world in the twenty-first century. McMeekin argues, however, that despite the endurance of Communism, it remains deeply unpopular as a political form. Where it has arisen, it has always arisen by force. Blending historical narrative with cutting-edge scholarship, To Overthrow the World revolutionizes our understanding of the evolution of Communism—an idea that seemingly cannot die. 1930S MAO
Last time we spoke about the Battle for the Great Wall of China. In 1933, the Kwantung Army faced logistical struggles and sought political deals with Chinese warlords to seize North China. Despite capturing key areas, chaos reigned as their unauthorized operations defied Tokyo's orders. When Emperor Hirohito demanded a withdrawal, the army reluctantly complied, derailing a coup attempt. Though peace talks followed, distrust persisted, and rogue Japanese commanders plotted fresh offensives. Amid international tensions and League of Nations' inaction, chaos loomed over China's battle-scarred plains. As tensions rose in North China, General Muto hesitated to advance without orders from Tokyo. With imperial approval, he launched a renewed offensive on May 3rd, leading the Japanese 6th and 8th Divisions to sweep through Chinese defenses. Despite Chinese concessions led by pro-Japanese Huang Fu, the Japanese pushed toward Peiping. Failed coups and desperate peace talks ensued. By May 25th, ceasefire talks began, but Japan's strengthened position left China scrambling to secure stability. #148 The Tanggu Truce Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As we last left off the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions had just taken up new positions threatening the Peiping-Tientsin area. Meanwhile the Tientsin Special service Agency had tried every scheme they could think of to establish a coup against Peiping. All of these actions were done to increase Japan's poker hand at the negotiating table. On May 17th Huang Fu arrived at a very panicked Peiping. Two days prior, the Japanese had taken an even harsher stance, demanding the Chinese forces withdraw to a line running between Shunyi, Paoti and Lutai. This demand would send the Chines further west than the line agreed upon for the ceasefire. So the Chinese ignored the demand and this inturn brought the negotiations to a standstill. On the 18th the Army General staff in Tokyo drew up a new draft titled “essentials for the Guidance of North China”. Having been chasing around the Kwantung Army like a dog chasing a car, Tokyo HQ wanted to finally draft some real legislation to reign in their unruly pet. On the 19th the General staff submited an ultimatum instructed the Kwantung Army to withdraw to Manchukuo after it reached an agreement with the Chinese, specifically to obtain the right to garrison specified locations within the Great Wall. On the 21st the Kwantung Army drew up its version of a ceasefire proposal, submitted it to the General staff who approved it. Here is a complete breakdown of it: “1) The cease-fire agreement is of a purely military nature and excludes political factors. For by returning to Manchukuo in general as quickly as possible, the imperial Japanese army will demonstrate that it acts in the cause of justice and fairness and will manifest the essence of the Japanese spirit. 2) The withdrawal line of the Chinese army and the cessation line of the Japanese army should conform generally to that referred to in the "Basic Outline" of the General Staff; that is, it should conform to the policy of the Kwantung Army and to Nagatsu's proposal. However, the return of the Japanese army to Manchukuo will be voluntary, after observance of the cease-fire terms by the Chinese army has been confirmed, and will not be specifically prescribed in the text of the agreement. 3) In order to prevent any delay in the establishment of a ceasefire, the designs of the Tientsin Special Service Agency will be terminated. 4) The site of the cease-fire agreement must be selected with consideration for the issuing of commands to military units in accord with the plans of the Japanese army command with respect to any situation which may necessitate military action at any time during the course of negotiations for cease-fire. Furthermore, a location convenient to the gathering of foreign diplomatic officials and press correspondents and to meddling intervention by third powers must be carefully avoided.” On the 22nd, the Kwantung Army ordered the Tientsin agency to discontinue their activities as the Japanese were now willing to accept a ceasefire. The Japanese and Chinese then agreed on a date and place, that being located along the Peiping-Shanhaiguan railway to sign a ceasefire agreement. For the talks, the Japanese naval attache at Peiping, Lt Commander Fujiwara Kiyoma was chosen who visited Huang Fu's residence on the 22nd. Talks began and by 2am the next day, He Yingqin received a letter officially instructing him to abide by the ceasefire terms. Thus the first step had been taken. On the 25th Chinese officials Li Zuyi and Xu Yenmu rode with Fujiwara to Miyun, then a temporary HQ for the IJA 8th Division. There they passed mounds of dead chinese placed specifically along the roadside, obviously to intimidate them. They arrived to Miyun at 4am to officially show the ceasefire proposal letter to General Nish of the 8th division. Then they got a slap in the face, a new demand was tossed at them. "As the first step, in order to verify the compliance of the Chinese army, the Japanese army may at any time use airplanes or other means to inspect the withdrawal of the Chinese army. The Chinese authorities shall afford them the necessary protection and facilities."This last minute new demand was imposed because Tokyo HQ believed it was necessary to have aerial observation to make sure both parties did not breach the agreement. The two Chinese officials did not want to devolve the talks so they signed it and returned to Peiping. The official negotiations began on May 30th at Tangu. The Kwantung delegation was led by Major General Okamura Yasuji, their vice chief of staff. He was assisted by Colonel Kita Seiichi, Lt colonel Nagatsu Sahishige, Majors Kono Etsujiro, Endo Saburo and Fujimoto Tetsukuma, Captain Okabe Eiichi and Secretary Hayashide Kenjiro of the Japanese embassy in Manchukuo. The Chinese delegation was led by Lt General Xing Pin and assisted by Chen Zungzu, Xu Yenmu, Chang Xukuang, Li Zeyu and Li Shuzheng. At the offset the Chinese Army declared Tangu under martial law as the Japanese navy dispatched the battleship Kamoi with the 14th destroyer squadron to cruise offshore. The first session of the talks began at 4pm, only lasted some 30 minutes as both sides exchanged formal credentials and such. During that night both sides proded each other trying to figure out what either would accept. Nagatsu decided to show some of the Chinese delegates a document titled “annex document concerning the Organization of Police”. This had been drafted by the Kwantung Army to try establish a demilitarized zone in northeastern Hubei, whose security would be maintained by Chinese police units. The specifics of the document said such a feat would require a force no larger than 20,000 men, with no single units exceeding 200 and they should be armed with nothing stronger than a rifle, pistol or bayont. Nagatsu personally believed this was way to much to ask of the Chinese and advised changing the wording to what the Chinese police could wield as "shall not be constituted of armed units hostile to Japanese feelings." After seeing the faces of the Chinese upon reading the document, Nagatsu would remark "This evening the Chinese appear to have gained the impression that our proposal will be excessively harsh." The second session of talks began at 9am the next day whereupon General Okamura presented their draft accord: “1) The Chinese army shall immediately withdraw to the regions west and south of the line from Yench'ing to Ch'angp'ing, Kaoliying, Shunyi, T'ungchou, Hsiangho, Paoti, Lint'ingk'ou, Ningho, and Lut'ai, and undertakes not to advance beyond that line and to avoid any provocation of hostilities. 2) The Japanese authorities may at any time use airplanes or other means to verify carrying out of the above article. The Chinese authorities shall afford them protection and facilities for such purpose. 3) The Japanese army, after ascertaining the withdrawal of the Chinese army to the line stated in Article 1, undertakes not to cross the said line and not to continue to attack the Chinese troops, and shall voluntarily withdraw, in general, to the Great Wall. 4) In the regions to the south of the Great Wall and to the north and east of the line defined in Article 1, the maintenance of peace and order shall be undertaken by the Chinese police force. The said police force shall not be constituted of armed units hostile to Japanese feelings. feelings. 5) The present agreement shall come into effect upon its signature.” To these demands Xing Pin stated that since the Chinese army had alrady withdrawn to or even beyond what was asked of them, the Japanese forces should respond promptly by withdrawing from the battle zone and to the Great Wall. Xing Pin added that he hoped his Japanese colleagues understood the Chinese Army might be required to help quell bandits that might disturb the vacuum caused by the Japanese withdrawal. To this the Japanese neither agreed nor disagreed and the meeting ended by 9:20. During the interlude the Chinese frantically sought to push further concessions. But the Japanese took a hard stance and stated they would accept nothing until their demands were signed upon. Talks officially resumed at 10:57 and within only 15 minutes both teams signed a truce agreement. Not a single change had been made in the draft the Kwantung Arym had presented. By 2 pm Xing Pin began a request that the Chinese Army be permitted to deal with bandits in the evacuated zone, as police alone most likely would not be enough. Once the Tangu truce had been signed, the Chinese began to fear rebellious warlord types, particularly Feng Yuxiang might try to exploit the demilitarized region now that the Chinese Central Army had been withdrawn. The Japanese took a solid stance opposing any exceptions to their truce and would never allow Chinese Army units within the demilitarized region. The Japanese in response to the Chinese demands stated "In case there shall be in the Demilitarized Zone armed units disturbing peace and order which the police force shall be unable to cope with, the situation will be dealt with by common accord between the two parties." The Chinese had no choice but to agree to this. The final session resumed at 3:45 pm, whereupon the Chinese tried to obtain agreement on two specific aspects of the truce: The Japanese reconnaissance aircraft would not conduct inspection flights without giving prior warning The Japanese Army would not misconstrue a move by the Chinese Army which had already withdrawn behind the line established in the truce agreement to return to the authorized line. The Japanese simply refused to even discuss these issues and a 4:05 pm the Chinese simply signed. The Japanese then submitted 4 new demands: 1) Withdraw the two cavalry divisions [formerly of the Northeastern Army] from the area southwest of Fengning in Jehol province. 2) Move the forty divisions of the Chinese Central Army presently in the Peiping-Tientsin region to some other appropriate region for the restoration of peace and order in that region. 3) Remove the entrenchments and military establishments of the Chinese army [used by Yii Hsueh-chung's army] in the area around the mouth of the Pai River. 4) Exercise strict control over anti-Japanese activities, which are the basic cause of Sino-Japanese conflict. To this the Chinese agreed with the last 3 demands and promised to “investigate” the first. At 4:10 the truce talks officially ended. As a consequence of the Tangu Truce, the Japanese Army had gained a foothold in northeastern Hubei. They would press further in the coming years, thus this truce was basically their first step in conquering north China. As you can imagine the Japanese were not done milking every drop from the Chinese. During the entire Tangu treaty talks, the Japanese had intentionally kept everything limited to military matters. The Japanese also sought to deal with what was expected to be a collosal anti-japanese movement in north china. To this end Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya was given a list of demands to press upon the Chinese: 1) The Peiping Political Affairs Council will unreservedly suppress all anti-Japanese movements and other related anti-Japanese activities of the Kuomintang in the area under its jurisdiction. 2) The said Council will unreservedly suppress all activities that disturb the peace in the area along the Great Wall by the use of militia units, or other means, from the area under its jurisdiction. 3) The said Council will unreservedly remove all obstacles to legal peaceful traffic across the Great Wall. 4) The said Council will, with the agreement of the Japanese, establish facilities for the maintenance of order in the cease-fire district. The Japanese preferred this be met by a written agreement, rather than a formal treaty that would only hurt the face of China further, thus creating even more anti-japanese movements. Real talks began at Dairen on July 3rd, where the Kwantung Army suggested that responsibility for civil administration and maintenance of order in the demilitarized region be transferred from the Hubei provincial government to the Political Affairs Council at Peiping. The reason as to why, because the Japanese believed they could easily control said body. When the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions withdrew from the demilitarized zone, they had left behind small units at Miyun, Chenchangying, Xiachangcheng, Fengtai and Yutien who went to work exerted silent pressure upon the Chinese during these future negotiations happening at Dairen. The Chinese at Dairen were represented by Li Shuzheng, the director of the Peiping-Lioaning Railway; Yin Tung and Xue Qiyen of the Political affairs council and Li Qichen the head of the Mukden-Shanhaiguan Railway Bureau. General Okamura and Colonel Kita came to the meetings, but only in capacity for observation. Included in the agenda of conversation was the disposal of pro-manchukuo militia forces in the demilitarized region and railway service between China proper and Manchukuo. Now the idea to transfer administrative responsibility over the demilitarized region to the Political affairs council in Peiping offered numerous challenges. The council was essentially an organ of the Executive Yuan of the Nanjing government. Their purpose was to overlook negotiations for Nanjing. Moreover their membership lacked prestige and they commanded no military forces, thus had little influence over Northern China. If they tried to influence the demilitarized region, a single army, such as one led by Li Qichen would easily overpower their authority. Northern China was still very much warlord dominated by this period. Li Qichen was a particularly strong warlord in the region. By December of 1932 he had begun recruiting men in the Qinxi district of Liaoning where he was receiving aid from the Japanese. His men assisted the Kwantung Army at Xumenzhai and later fought under the guidance of Captain Okada Kikusaburo at Shanhaiguan. However by Japanese standards, Li Qichengs army was nothing more than a bandit force. Thus after the Tanggu Truce, the Kwantung Army chose to distance itself from Li Qicheng and instead focus all their efforts in cooperating with the Political affairs council. Ironically one of the first things the Kwantung Army consulted with the council was a new policy to dispose of Li Qichens Army and others. Thus 4000 of Li Qichen's forces were reorganized into a peace preservation corps with the rest simply disbanded. The finer details on how this would occur were negotiated between Li Qichen and the council, meditated by Kwantung officers at Tangshan on July 16th. It was also decided the Kwantung Army would set up an office at Tangshan headed by Li Qichen who would overlook the dispersal of militia units in the demilitarized region. By August 12th, the peace preservation corps was fully established. Many pro-manchukuo militia units were reorganized via the first Dairen conference as it became known. Xu Yuan's army at Qinhuangdao was reorganized into a reserve peace preservation corps under the direct guidance of Lt Colonel Nakano Hidemitsu. They would be stationed at Yutien. Another force station near Qinhuangdao which had been recruited by the Kwantung army during Operation Nekka was ordered to transfer 2000 of its troops to Manchukuo and have the rest disbanded. Additionally there existed some 15,000 bandits operating in the demilitarized region. The largest of these bands was the East Asia Federation Combined Forces led by Guo Yazhou. He was in league with Xu Yusan and equipped like a regular Chinese Army. Once the ceasefire had been in effect, his men were conscripted in Manchukuo and would be used unofficially by the Kwantung Army. Another large bandit army was led by Lao Haozu, known colloquially as the “old rat”. Many of these bandit groups were made up of discharged troops and deserters from pro-Manchukuo militia units. After much discussion the Political affairs council took over the civil administration for the demilitarized zone, excluding the area consisting of the Great Wall. Another large item of discussion at the first Dairen conference was the restoration of train services between China Proper and Manchukuo. During the conflict the Chinese Army had ripped up a ton of railway track between Peiping and Shanhaiguan. By April 21st trains from Peiping could only operate as far as Tanggu. Meanwhile Mancukuo's Mukden to Shanhaiguan railway was operating 3 trains a day between Shanhaiguan and Tangshan after numerous repair efforts by June 1st. Service between Tanggu and Tangshan was only restored by July 3rd when the Japanese garrison at Tientsin began guarding operations between the two cities. At Dairen both sides agreed to rapidly restore the railway service between Mukden and Peiping while making Tangshan the temporary connecting point. The section between Shanhaiguan and Tangshan was to be administered by the Mukden- Shanhaiguan railway, thus by Manchukuo while from Peiping to Tangshan would be retained by the Chinese governed Peiping-Liaoning railway. The Chinese argued that once the railway lines were all restored, management over Tangshan to Shanhaiguan should be returned to the Chinese. However the Manchukuo representatives instead argued for joint control over the railway from Peiping to Shanhaiguan. Despite all the agreements met at Dairen, so much remained unresolved with the demilitarized region. The area immediately adjacent to the Great Wall had not been turned over to the political affairs coucil, the demilitarized region was still infested with bandits, many council members were not keen on any of the ongoings and relations between them and the Kwantung Army were anything but cooperative. Given all of this, in October of 1933, Huang Fu and He Yingqin came to the Japanese asking if they could form more official dialogue to deal with the problems and this led to the Peiping conference of November 1933. The Chinese were led by Huang Fu, He Yingqin, Yin Zung, Yin Juken and Cao Shangming. The Japanese were led by General Okamura, Colonels Kita ad Kikuchi Monya, Lt Colonels Nemoto Hiroshi and Shibayama Kaneshiro and Secretaries Nakayama and Hanawa Yoshitaka of the Peiping Legation. Because the talks had been opened by the Chinese, they had hoped they would control the agenda and in that they were sorely mistaken. The Japanese immediately pounced upon them and brought forth such demands. “1) The Kwantung Army hopes the Political Affairs Council will, as it solidifies its ability to maintain law and order, quickly and 5 safely assume administration in the area south and west of the Great Wall, exclusive of the Great Wall. 2) For the time being, the Political Affairs Council recognizes, in the area under its jurisdiction, the various agencies designated by the Kwantung Army as necessary for the handling of transportation, economic matters, and other affairs. The council will provide assistance in the operation of these agencies. 3) For the time being, the council agrees to lease to the Japanese army the land and buildings in the area under its jurisdiction which are needed for the purpose of stationing Japanese troops. 4) To provide facilities for trade, transportation, and communications in the area south of the Great Wall, the Political Affairs Council will appoint a delegate who will immediately begin consultations with a delegate designated by the Kwantung Army.” The Chinese agreed to the second demand allowing for the establishment by the Kwantung Army at Shanhaiguan, Gubeikou, Xifengkou, Panqiaokou, Lengkou and Qielingkou that Japanese garrisons could be stationed at Shanhaiguan, Xumenzhai, Chenchangying, Taitouying, Lengkou, Xifengkou, Malankuan and Gubeikou. The Chinese also agreed to part 4 in regards to airline connections. Thus with that the Japanese had effectively taken away China's ability to defend the Great Wall. Furthermore on the pretex of guarding said Great Wall, the Kwantung Army had forced the Chinese to recognize its right to garrison troops along the area just inside the Great Wall. Fully satisfied, the Japanese delegation departed Peiping on November 10th. The Kwantung Army still sought to extend the Peiping-Liaoing railway services to Mukden, but this inevitably raised the issue of China Proper recognizing Manchukuo. In December Yin Zung, head of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, traveled to Nanjing to discuss said issue, but would return to Peiping empty handed. Additionally Sun Fu who led a faction within the KMT, began persuading the Central Political Council to pass some legislation specifically withholding Huang Fu from holding authority in handling issues involving North China, because it was feared amongst many it would lead to a mistake that would see recognition of Manchukuo. On April 11th of 1934, Huang Fu attempted a discussion at Nanchang between himself, Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. The result of this discussion was him receiving greater authority over matters involving postal services, train services and tariffs. Despite this, the anti-Japanese part of the Nanjing government continued their efforts to hamper the efforts of Haung Fu and Yin Zung. In May, Major General Ushiroku Jun of the Kwantung Army, Attache Shibayama and Usami Kanji the chief of the Manchukuo railways Bureau, began secret talks with Yin Zung over at Shanhaiguan. They all agreed to establish a new corporation, the Eastern Travel Bureau, who would receive a million yuan provided in equal shares by the Mukden-Shanhaiguan railway bureau in Manchukuo and the Peiping-Liaoning Railway Bureau. Profits and losses would be shared equally; the general manager would be chosen from one bureau with the assistant manager chosen from the other and trains would run daily from Mukden and Peiping performing a transfer at Shanhaiguan. This idea was bitterly fought over at Nanjing, but after specific amendments would be ratified by July 1st. The first train departed Peiping on July 1st and ironically it would be interrupted midway between Tanggu and Lutai by a bomb explosion on the track. Many Chinese civilians were hurt, but no incident broke out. And we all know that little bomb had to be part of some grand false flag scheme. The establishment of air services between China Proper and Manchukuo would prove to be the most difficult one to settle. During the talks in Peiping, the Chinese agreed to provide transportation facilities that would include airline connections. But this did not materialize until February of 1935 when the Kwantung Army came up with a draft for a Sino-Japanese corporation. It would be funded equally by both sides, the Chinese would furnish the airfields and facilities, while the Kwantung Army would supply pilots and crews through the Manchukuo Aviation Corporation. The Kwantung Army also had a nefarious plot involved in this deal. By securing the civilian airline service they hoped to provide pilots and crews who at the flip of a coin could become covert military operators, providing direct flights into China Proper. At first the Chinese showed no interest in such plans, so the Kwantung Army began military transport flights to Peiping from Jinzhou to twist their arm. By June the agreement extended to airfields at Paoting, Xuzhou and Qingdao. The Chinese fought these demands as best they could, but would continuously be outplayed. Still the Kwantung Army was impatient to implement the civilian airline change and presented a new deal in June of 1935 offering to provide 55 percent of the funding from their side. To this the Chinese counter proposed the airfields be located along the border, but the Japanese would not agree to this. By August China sent conditions to ratify the idea: “1) two-thirds of the capital investment would be provided by China and one-third by Japan 2) airport facilities would be restricted to the Peiping-Tientsin region; and 3) flight operations would be entrusted to the aviation department of the Eastern Travel Bureau.” The Japanese still made demands, now seeking flights to all 5 provinces of North China. To this the Chinese officials stated they would await instructions from Nanjing. The Kwantung Army broke off the talks and stated they would do whatever action they considered necessary to resolve the issue. By early September Fu Zuoyi, the governor of Suiyuan province authorized a military flight to Paotou, then on September 28th and October 10th, Japan conducted civilian test flights between Tiantsin, Tsinan and Qingdao. Following the resolutions over the railway issues, on July 9th of 1934 Yin Zung went to Shanghai with Huang Fu and then to Dairen by July 23rd to meet with General Okumara, Colonel Kita and Attache Shibayama to make deals over other issues. One issue was Japanese control over the entrance of Korean and Japanese into the demilitarized region; the transfer to the Chinese of the Qing Dynasty's mausoleum in Malanyu; the disposition of the peace preservation units and the need for a postal service between China and Manchukuo. While this all sounds perhaps stupid to even mention, every single issue discussed was basically indanger of the Chinese accidentally recognizing Manchukuo, which was the crux of it all. In the end the Japanese made enormous inroads into North China through these negotiations. They forced the accommodation on rail and communication services between China Proper and Manchukuo, to normalize most trade between them and place their loyal proteges within the demilitarized region as so called police units. This was all accomplished through the Peiping Political Affairs Council who de facto had recognized Manchukuo. All of this severely weakened the position of Nanjing in North China and enhanced Japan. But it was not Japan proper, but the Kwantung Army really running the show. However there was absolute chaos going on in Japan during the times, known as “government by assassination”. Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated on May 15th of 1932, leading to the collapse of his cabinet. On May 26th a unity cabinet was formed under Admiral Saito Makoto. Civilian politicians were being knocked out by the military, particularly right-wing military figures. Admiral Saito Makoto selected Uchida Yasuya for foreign minister. At the time he was a retired diplomat and president of the South Manchuria Railway Company. Saito was plunged into the wild times of Kwantung insubordination. To meet the chaos he advocated 3 general principals: “(a) its separation from policy toward Manchukuo and Mongolia (b) an emphasis on economic measures; and (c) cooperation with the western powers” By reading not so between the lines, you can see the official Japanese policy was basically to let the Kwantung run amok and plan accordingly for what seemed to be an enormous annexation program targeting North China and Inner Mongolia. It was to be an extremely volatile balancing act of encroaching upon Nanjing, but not enough so to bring the wrath of the western great powers down upon Japan. Minister Uchia had served a foreign minister for 4 cabinets. In 1928 he signs the Kellogg-Briand Pact and during the Manchuria crisis he tried to fight the Kwantung Army, pushing them to stop their invasion. Yet it was also he who helped recognize Manchukuo in 1932 and he who withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933. He oversaw Operation Nekka and the resulting Tanggu Truce. All of this spat in the face of international cooperation and basically showcased Japan to be a bully. Thus he was really failing his initial goals and resigned in 1933 due to old age. He was succeeded by Hirota Koki who initially began his tenure advocating for establishing better relations with the US, USSR and China and specifically to normalize Sino-Japanese relations. Hirota was also confronted with a naval disarmament conference scheduled for 1935. There Japan would be asked to make conciliatory moves with the US. Alongside this a lot of problems were brewing with the USSR because of the establishment of Manchukuo. On the other side, Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei continued their appeasement stance, only to see Japan seize more and more from China. Yet Chiang Kai-Shek was adament, they must finish off the internal communist threat before embarking on what seemed to be an existential threat in the form of Japan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Kwantung Army was not only efficient at slicing up China with its dagger, but rather capable with the pen as well. Continuous negotiations were leading the Chinese to hand more and more over to Japan. How long could the Chinese people continue to support their seemingly incapable government during these times of crises?
Intimation of Revolution: Global Sixties and the Making of Bangladesh (Cambridge UP, 2023) analyzes the growth of Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan during the 1950s and 60s, highlighting the interplay of global politics and local socio-economic changes. The book posits that the 1969 revolution and the 1971 liberation war were influenced by the "global sixties," which reshaped Pakistan's political environment and paved the way for Bangladesh's creation. It challenges the conventional view of Bangladesh as solely a consequence of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, instead portraying it as a nation forged by Bengali nationalists resisting internal colonization by the Pakistani military-bureaucratic regime. The narrative explores how this resistance and nation-building process was inspired by concurrent decolonization movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, while also being influenced by the Cold War competition between the USA, the USSR, and China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
Margaret continues talking with Mia Wong about the communists and socialists who fought for workers’ power against the USSR.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Subscribe now for an ad-free experience and much more content. Please listen to our Sino-Soviet primer episode and part one of this discussion for some background! Danny and Derek welcome back Jeremy Friedman, assistant professor in the Business, Government, and International Economy at Harvard, to talk about the Sino-Soviet Split. The conversation picks up in the 1960s with the Soviets' push for peaceful coexistence vs the PRC and developing world's push for anti-imperialist armed struggle, how the Cultural Revolution affects the calculation, Mao's growing distrust of the USSR, the split itself, ideological vanguardism vs elitism, imperialism without capitalism, whether a split was inevitable, and more. Grab a copy of Jeremy's book Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Please listen to our Sino-Soviet primer episode and part one of this discussion for some background!On this episode of American Prestige, Danny and Derek welcome back Jeremy Friedman, assistant professor in the Business, Government, and International Economy at Harvard, to talk about the Sino-Soviet Split. The conversation picks up in the 1960s with the Soviets' push for peaceful coexistence vs the PRC and developing world's push for anti-imperialist armed struggle, how the Cultural Revolution affects the calculation, Mao's growing distrust of the USSR, the split itself, ideological vanguardism vs elitism, imperialism without capitalism, whether a split was inevitable, and more. Grab a copy of Jeremy's book Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World!Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy
Margaret talks with Mia Wong about the communists and socialists who fought for workers’ power against the USSR.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
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