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When World War II ended 80 years ago, the fighting ended but global stability and peace did not emerge. Instead, a "Cold War" between the forces of capitalism and communism, represented by the U.S. and Soviet Union, dominated global politics and led to instability, interventions, wars, a militarized economy, a mass-surveillance National Security State, and so much more---and its legacy continued to this day as we look at Venezuela, Palestine, Iran, and other places across the globe.The U.S. posed the Cold War as a battle between "freedom" and Soviet domination, but that was always a ruse as the Americans held overwhelming dominance in all major military and economic matters. The U.S. had emerged from the war with global hegemony while the USSR had lose about 25 million people, a million farms and factories, and half its economy.So, 80 years later, it's important to examine and understand the role of the U.S. in using its power to create global dominance, disrupt 3rd World development, and destabilize countries across the globe. ----------------------------------

Prof John Lennox joins Justin to talk about his life and legacy - finding faith during 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland, his academic life at Cambridge and Oxford University, speaking in the USSR and debating the 'new atheists' such as Richard Dawkins & Christopher Hitchens. John also shares candidly about being sustained by his faith in the midst of health challenges for his wife Sally. More info, book & newsletter: https://justinbrierley.com/surprisingrebirth/ Support via Patreon for early access to new episodes and bonus content: https://www.patreon.com/justinbrierley/membership Support via Tax-deductible (USA) and get the same perks: https://defendersmedia.com/portfolio/justin-brierley/ Give a one-off gift via PayPal: https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/brierleyjustin Buy the book or get a signed copy: https://justinbrierley.com/the-surprising-rebirth-of-belief-in-god/ Got feedback? Share it with us by emailing: feedback@think.faith Ep 27 show notes: https://justinbrierley.com/surprisingrebirth/season-2-episode-27-lennox The Surprising Rebirth of Belief in God is a production of Think Faith in partnership with Genexis, and support from The Jerusalem Trust. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Hello again Pacific War Week by Week listeners, it is I your dutiful host Craig Watson with more goodies from my exclusive patreon podcast series. This is actually going to be a two parter specifically looking at the failure and responsibility of Emperor Hirohito during the 15 year war Japan unleashed in 1931. Again a big thanks to all of you for listening all these years, you are all awesome.   Hello everyone, a big thanks to all of you who joined the patreon and voted for this to be the next episode, you all are awesome.    Now I realize very well when I jumped into my former patreon episode on Ishiwara Kanji, I fell into a rabbit hole and it became a rather long series. I wanted to get this one done in a single episode but its also kind of a behemoth subject, so I will do this in two parts: this episode will be on Hirohito's failure and responsibility in regards to the China War from 1931-1941. The next one will cover Hirohito's failure and responsibility in the world war from 1941-1945.   I am not going to cover the entire life of Hirohito, no what I want is to specifically cover his actions from 1931-1945. Nw I want you to understand the purpose of this episode is to destroy a narrative, a narrative that carried on from 1945-1989. That narrative has always been that Emperor Hirohito was nothing more than a hostage during the war years of 1931-1945. This narrative was largely built by himself and the United States as a means of keeping the peace after 1945. However upon his death in 1989 many meeting notes and diaries from those who worked close to him began emerging and much work was done by historians like Herbert P Bix and Francis Pike. The narrative had it that Hirohito was powerless to stop things, did not know or was being misled by those around him, but this is far from the truth. Hirohito was very active in matters that led to the horrors of the 15 year war and he had his own reasons for why or when he acted and when he did not.   For this episode to be able to contain it into a single one, I am going to focus on Hirohito's involvement in the undeclared war with China, that's 1931-1941. For those of you who don't know, China and Japan were very much at war in 1931-1937 and certainly 1937 onwards, but it was undeclared for various reasons. If you guys really like this one, let me know and I can hit Hirohito 1941-1945 which is honestly a different beast of its own.   For those of you who don't know, Hirohito was born on April 29th of 1901, the grandson of Emperor Meiji. Hirohito entered the world right at the dawn of a new era of imperial rivalry in Asia and the Pacific. According to custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. In 1908 he entered elementary education at the age of 7 and would be taught first be General Nogi Maresuke who notoriously did not pamper the prince. Nogi rigorously had Hirohito train in physical education and specifically implanted virtues and traits he thought appropriate for the future sovereign: frugality, diligence, patience, manliness, and the ability to exercise self-control under difficult conditions. Hirohito learnt what hard work was from Nogi and that education could overcome all shortcomings. Emperor Meiji made sure his grandson received military training.   When Emperor Meiji died in 1912, Hirohito's father, Yoshihito took the throne as emperor Taisho. Taisho for a lack of better words, suffered from cerebral meningitis at an early age and this led to cognitive deficiency's and in reality the Genro would really be running the show so to say. When Taisho took the throne it was understood immediately, Hirohito needed to be prepared quickly to take the throne. After Meiji's funeral General Nogi politely told the family he could no longer be a teacher and committed seppuku with his wife. He wrote a suicide letter explained he wanted to expiate his disgrace during the russo japanese war for all the casualties that occurred at Port Arthur, hardcore as fuck. Hirohito would view Nogi nearly as much of an iconic hero as his grandfather Meiji, the most important figure in his life.   Hirohito's next teacher was the absolute legendary Fleet Admiral Togo Heihachiro who would instill national defense policy into him. Hirohito would be taught Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahans theories as all the great minds were taught at the time. Now I know it sucks but I cant delve deep into all this. What I want you to envision is a growing Man, instilled with the belief above all else, the Kokutai was most important. The Kokutai was the national essence of Japan. It was all aspects of Japanese polity, derived from history, tradition and customs all focused around the cult of the Emperor. The government run by politicians was secondary, at any given time the kokutai was the belief the Emperor could come in and directly rule.   If you are confused, dont worry, I am too haha. Its confusing. The Meiji constitution was extremely ambiguous. It dictated a form of constitutional monarchy with the kokutai sovereign emperor and the “seitai” that being the actual government. Basically on paper the government runs things, but the feeling of the Japanese people was that the wishes of the emperor should be followed. Thus the kokutai was like an extra-judicial structure built into the constitution without real legal framework, its a nightmare I know.    Let me make an example, most of you are American I imagine. Your congress and senate actually run the country, wink wink lets forget about lobbyists from raytheon. The president does not have actual executive powers to override any and all things, but what if all Americans simply felt he did. Thus everyone acted in accordance to his wishes as they assumed them to be, thats my best way of explaining Japan under Hirohito.    Emperor Taisho dies in 1926, and Hirohito takes the throne ushering in the Showa Era. He inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. Hirohito sought to restore the image of a strong charismatic leader on par with his grandfather Meiji, which was sorely lacking in his father Taishos reign. He was pressured immediately by the Navy that the national sphere of defense needed to be expanded upon, they felt threatened by the west, specifically by the US and Britain who had enacted the Washington Naval Treaty. Hirohito agreed a large navy was necessary for Japan's future, he was a proponent of the decisive naval battle doctrine, remember his teacher was Togo.    From the very beginning Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. In 1928 the Japanese covertly assassinated the warlord of Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin. The current prime minister Tanaka Giichi had performed a thorough investigation of the incident and presented his report to Hirohito on December 24th of 1928. He told Hirohito he intended to court martial the criminals, purge the army and re-establish discipline. However the rest of Tanaka's cabinet wished to allow the army to deal with the matter and quiet the entire thing down. Hirohito responded by stating he had lost confidence in Tanaka and admonished his report. Hirohito allowed the army to cover up the incident, he sought to have it hushed up as well. Thus Hirohito had indulged the army in its insubordination and the kwantung army officers now felt they could take matters into their own hands.   Also in 1928 the Tanaka cabinet failed to endorse the international protocol banning chemical and biological warfare. The next year the privy council, pressured by the military, failed to ratify the full geneva convention of prisoners of war. Hirohito in response began doing something Emperor Meiji never had done, he began to scold officials to force them to retire from positions. Tanaka Giichi was bullied out. Hirohito then stated his endorsement of Hamaguchi Osachi as Tanaka's successors.   Just a few months after Hamaguchi cabinet formed, Hirohito overrode the advice of his naval chief of staff and vice chief of staff, Admiral Kato and Vice Admiral Suetsugu. The Americans and British were hinting they might form a naval alliance against Japan if she did not abide by the Washington Conference mandates on naval tonnage. Kato and Suetsugu refused to accept the terms, but prime minister Hamaguchi stood firm against them. The navy leaders were outraged and accused Hamaguchi of signing the treaty without the support of the Navy General Staff thereby infringing upon the “emperor's right of supreme command”. Two months after signing the treaty, Hamaguchi was assassinated and upon learning of this Hirohito's first concern apparently was “that constitutional politics not be interrupted”. The military felt greatly emboldened, and thus began the age of the military feeling “its right of supreme command”. Generals and Admirals fought back against arms reduction talks, discipline within the officer corps loosened, things spiraled out of control. Alongside this came the increasing cult of the emperor, that they were all doing this in his name.   When rumors emerged of the emerging Mukden Incident in 1931, Hirohito  demanded the army be reigned in. Attempts were made, but on September 18th of 1931, Kwantung army officer detonated an explosion at Liut'iaokou north of Mukden as a false flag operation. The next day the imperial palace were given a report and Hirohito was advised by chief aide de camp Nara Takeji “this incident would not spread and if the Emperor was to convene an imperial conference to take control of the situation, the virtue of his majesty might be soiled if the decisions of such a conference should prove impossible to implement”. This will be a key theme in Hirohito's decision making, protect the kokutai from any threats.   As the Mukden incident was getting worse, the Kwantung officers began to demand reinforcement be sent from the Korea army. The current Wakatsuki cabinet met on the issue and decided the Mukden incident had to remain an incident, they needed to avoid a declaration of war. The official orders were for no reinforcements of the Korea army to mobilize, however the field commander took it upon his own authority and mobilized them. The army chief of staff Kanaya reported to Hirohito the Korea army was marching into Manchuria against orders. At 31 years of age Hirohito now had an excellent opportunity to back the current cabinet, to control the military and stop the incident from getting worse. At this time the military was greatly divided on the issue, politically still weak compared to what they would become in a few years, if Hirohito wanted to rule as a constitutional monarch instead of an autocratic monarch, well this was his chance. Hirohito said to Kanaya at 4:20pm on September 22nd “although this time it couldn't be helped, [the army] had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito accepted the situation as fait accompli, he was not seriously opposed to seeing his army expand his empire. If it involved a brief usurpation of his authority so bit, as long as the operation was successful. Within two weeks of the incident, most of Japan had rallied being the kwantung army's cause. Hirohito knew it was a false flag, all of what they had done. Hirohito planned the lightests punishments for those responsible. Hirohito then officially sanctioned the aerial strike against Chinchou, the first air attack since ww1.   A message had gone out to the young officers in the Japanese military that the emperors main concern was success; obedience to central command was secondary. After the Mukden incident Prime Minister Wakatsuki resigned in december after failing to control the army and failing to contain the financial depression. The new Priminister Inukai took to action requesting permission from Hirohito to dispatch battalions to Tientsin and a brigade to Manchuria to help the Kwantung army take Chinchou. Hirohito responded by advising caution when attacking Chinchou and to keep a close eye on international public perception. Nevertheless Chinchou was taken and Hirohito issued an imperial rescript praising the insubordinate Kwantung army for fighting a courageous self defense against Chinese bandits. In a few more years Hirohito would grant awards and promotions to 3000 military and civil officials involved in the Manchurian war. When incidents broke out in Shanghai in 1932 involved the IJN, Tokyo high command organized a full fledged Shanghai expeditionary force under General Shirakawa with 2 full divisions. But within Shanghai were western powers, like Britain and America, whom Hirohito knew full well could place economic sanctions upon Japan if things got out of hand. Hirohito went out of his way to demand Shirakawa settle the Shanghai matter quickly and return to Japan.   And thus here is a major problem with Hirohito during the war years. On one end with Manchuria he let pretty much everything slide, but with Shanghai he suddenly cracks the whip. Hirohito had a real tendency of choosing when he wanted to act and this influenced the military heavily. On May 15th of 1932, young naval officers assassinated prime minister Inukai at his office. In the political chaos, Hirohito and his advisors agreed to abandon the experiment in party cabinets that had been the custom since the Taisho era. Now Hirohito endorsed a fully bureaucratic system of policy making, cabinet parties would no longer depend on the two main conservative parties existing in the diet. When the diet looked to the genro as to who should be the next prime minister, Hirohito wrote up “his wishes regarding the choice of the next prime minister”. Loyal officials backed Hirohito's wishes, the cult of the emperor grew in power. To the military it looked like Hirohito was blaming the party based cabinets rather than insubordinate officers for the erosion of his own authority as commander in chief. The young military officers who already were distrustful of the politicians were now being emboldened further.    After Manchuria was seized and Manchukuo was ushered in many in the Japanese military saw a crisis emerge, that required a “showa restoration' to solve. There were two emerging political factions within the military, the Kodoha and Toseiha factions. Both aimed to create military dictatorships under the emperor. The Kodoha saw the USSR as the number one threat to Japan and advocated an invasion of them, aka the Hokushin-ron doctrine, but the Toseiha faction prioritized a national defense state built on the idea they must build Japans industrial capabilities to face multiple enemies in the future. What separated the two, was the Kodoha sought to use a violent coup d'etat to do so, the Toseiha were unwilling to go so far. The Kodoha faction was made up of junior and youthful officers who greatly distrusted the capitalists and industrialists of Japan, like the Zaibatsu and believed they were undermining the Emperor. The Toseiha faction were willing to work with the Zaibatsu to make Japan stronger. Hirohito's brother Prince Chichibu sympathized with the Kodoha faction and repeatedly counseled his brother that he should implement direct imperial rule even if it meant suspending the constitution, aka a show restoration. Hirohito believed his brother who was active in the IJA at the time was being radicalized. Chichibu might I add was in the 3rd infantry regiment under the leadership of Colonel Tomoyuki Yamashita.   This time period has been deemed the government by assassination period. Military leaders in both the IJA and IJN and from both the Kodoha and Toseiha began performing violence against politicians and senior officers to get things done.    A enormous event took place in 1936 known as the february 26 incident. Kodoha faction officers of the IJA attempted a coup d'etat to usher in a showa restoration. They assassinated several leading officials, such as two former prime ministers and occupied the government center of Tokyo. They failed to assassinate the current prime minister Keisuke Okada or take control over the Imperial palace. These men believed Japan was straying from the Kokutai and that the capitalist/industrialists were exploiting the people of the nation by deceiving the emperor and usurping his power. The only solution to them was to purge such people and place Hirohito as an absolute leader over a military dictatorship.    Now the insurrectionists failed horribly, within just a few hours they failed to kill the current prime minister, and failed to seize the Sakashita Gate to the imperial palace, thus allowing the palace to continue communicating with the outside, and they never thought about what the IJN might do about all of this. The IJN sent marines immediately to suppress them. The insurrectionists had planned to have the army minister General Kwashima who was a Kodoha backer, report their intentions to Hirohito who they presumed would declare a showa restoration. They falsely assumed the emperor was a puppet being taken hostage by his advisers and devoid of his own will.   At 5:40am on February the 26th Hirohito was awakened and informed of the assassinations and coup attempt. From the moment he learnt of this, he was outraged and demanded the coup be suppressed and something I would love to highlight is he also immediately demanded his brother Prince Chichibu be brought over to him. Why would this be important? Hirohito believed the insurrectionists might enlist his brother to force him to abdicate. Hirohito put on his army uniform and ordered the military to “end it immediately and turn this misfortune into a blessing”. Hirohito then met with Kwashima who presented him with the insurrectionists demands to “clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life and fulfill national defense, aka showa restoration”. Hirohito scolded Kwashima and ordered him to suppress the mutiny. On the morning of the 27th Hirohito declared administrative martial law on the basis of Article 8 of the Imperial Constitution, pertaining to emergency imperial ordinances. Formally he was invoking his sovereign power to handle a crisis. Hirohito displayed an incredible amount of energy to crush the mutiny as noted by those around him at the time. Every few hours he demanded reports to be given to him by top officials and at one point he was so angry he threatened to lead the Imperial Guard division himself to go out and quell it. Hirohito met with Chichibu and its alleged he told his brother to end any relationships he had with the Kodoha members. By february 29th, Hirohito had firmly crushed the mutiny, most of the ringleaders were arrested. In april they were court martialed secretly without even given a chance to defend themselves in court and 17 were executed by firing squad in July. As a result of it all, the Kodoha faction dissolved and the Toseiha faction reigned supreme.    On the morning of July 8th of 1937 came the Marco Polo Bridge incident, a nearly identical false flag operation to what occurred at Mukden in 1931. Hirohito's reaction was first to consider the possible threat of the USSR. He wondered if the communists would seize the opportunity to attack Manchukuo. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied.    Hirohito demanded to know what contingency plans existed. After this he approved the decision of the Konoe cabinet to move troops into Northern China and fixed his seal to the orders of dispatch. The emperor had tacitly agreed to it all from the start. With each action taken for the following months, Hirohito would explicitly sanction them after the fact. In his mind he kept thinking about a fight with the USSR, he believed he had no choice in the China matter. All of his top ranking officials like Sugiyama would tell him “even if war with China came… it could be finished up within two or three months”. Hirohito was not convinced, he went to Konoe, to imperial conferences, to other military officials to get their views. None convinced him but as Hirohito put it  “they agreed with each other on the time factor, and that made a big difference; so all right, we'll go ahead.”     Two weeks into the conflict, the kwangtung army and Korean army were reinforced by 3 divisions from Japan and on July 25th were reaching Beijing. What did the man who was not responsible in such decision making say? On July 27 Hirohito sanctioned an imperial order directing the commander of the China Garrison Force to “chastise the Chinese army in the Peking-Tientsin area and bring stability to the main strategic places in that region.” Hirohito wanted a killing blow to end the war, and thus he escalated the incident. Historian Fujiwara Akira noted “it was the [Konoe] government itself that had resolved on war, dispatched an army, and expanded the conflict,” and Hirohito had fully supported it”   Chiang Kai-shek abandoned northern China pulling into the Interior and unleashed a campaign in Shanghai to draw the Japanese into a battle showcased in front of western audiences. Chiang Kai-shek tossed the creme of his military all into Shanghai to make it as long and explosive as possible to try and win support from other great powers. On August 18 Hirohito summoned his army and navy chiefs for a pointed recommendation. The war, he told them, “is gradually spreading; our situation in Shanghai is critical; Tsingtao is also at risk. If under these circumstances we try to deploy troops everywhere, the war will merely drag on and on. Wouldn't it be better to concentrate a large force at the most critical point and deliver one overwhelming blow? Based on our attitude of fairness, Do you, have in hand plans for such action? In other words, do we have any way worked out to force the Chinese to reflect on their actions?”   The chiefs of staff returned 3 days later with an aerial campaign to break China's will to fight and strategic cities needed to be seized. Hirohito gave his sanction and on August 31st gave the order “for the Dispatch of the North China Area Army. [D]estroy the enemy's will to fight and wipe out resistance in the central part of Hepei Province,” Over the course of weeks Hirohito sanctioned 6 troop mobilizations to the Shanghai area where the fighting had bogged down. Then he sanctioned 3 divisions from Taiwan to Shanghai, but for units in northern Manchuria to stand guard firmly in case the USSR attacked. The entire time this was happening both China and Japan referred to it as an incident and not a real war lest either of them lose the backing of their great power allies. Japan needed oil, iron and rubber from America, China was likewise received materials from the USSR/America/Britain and even Germany.    By november the war was not going well and Hirohito had the Imperial Headquarters established within his palace as a means to exercise his constitutional role as supreme commander, the army and navy would act in concert. For a few hours in the morning a few days every week, the chiefs of staff, army and navy ministers and chiefs of operations would meet with Hirohito. At these imperial conferences Hirohito presided over and approved decisions impacting the war. This was Hirohito's device for legally transforming the will of the emperor into the will of the state. Hirohito not only involved himself, sometimes on a daily basis he would shape strategy and decide the planning, timing and so on of military campaigns. He even intervened in ongoing field operations. He monitored and occasionally issued orders through commanders to subordinate units. Now I can't go through the entire 1937-1945 war and showcase all the things he did but I will highlight things I think we're important.    On November 9th, the Shanghai battle was finally falling apart for the Chinese as they began a withdrawal to the Nanking area some 180 miles away. The Japanese forces chased them and for the first time were really coming into direct contact with Chinese civilians, when it came to Shanghai most had evacuated the areas. The Japanese burned, plundered and raped villages and towns as they marched towards Nanking. On december 1st, Hirohito's imperial HQ ordered the 10th army and Shanghai expeditionary force to close in on Nanking from different directions, a pincer maneuver. Prince Asaka took command of the Shanghai expeditionary force and General Matsui commanded the Central China Area Army consisted of the Shanghai force and 10th army. Asaka led the forces to assault the walled city of Nanking with a population estimated to be 4-5 hundred thousand and it would fall on December 13th. Was there an order to “rape Nanking”, no. The Imperial HQ did not order the total extermination of the Chinese in Nanking, they had ordered an encirclement campaign. However, the standing orders at this time were to take no prisoners. Once Nanking fell, the Japanese began to execute en massage military prisoners and unarmed troops who surrendered willingly. There was a orgy of rape, arson, pillage and murder. The horror was seen in Nanking and the 6 adjacent villages over the course of 3 months far exceeding any atrocities seen during the battle for Shanghai or even the march to Nanking. General Nakajima's 16th division on its first day in Nanking was estimated to have murdered 30,000 POWs. Estimate range insanely, but perhaps 200,000 POW's and civilians were butchered over the course of 6 weeks.   Prince Asaka the 54 year old grand uncle to Hirohito and other members of the Imperial Family commanded the attack on Nanking and supervised the horrors. 49 year old General Prince Higashikuni chief of the army air force alongside Prince Kan'in knew of the atrocities occurring. Army minister Sugiyama knew, many middle echelon officers of the Imperial HQ knew. Hirohito was at the top of the chain of command, there is no way he was not informed. Hirohito followed the war extensively, reading daily reports, questioned his aides. It was under his orders that his army “chastise China”, but did he show any concern for the breakdown of his army's discipline? There is no documented evidence he ordered an investigation, all we are met with as historians is a bizarre period of silence. Hirohito goes from supervising the war with OCD precision, to silence, then back to normal precision. Did Hirohito show anything publicly to show angry, displeasure or remorse, at the time he energetically began spurring his generals and admirals on their great victories and the national project to induce “Chinese self-reflection”.    On November 24th Hirohito gave an after the fact sanction to the decision of General Matsui to attack and occupy Nanking. Hirohito was informed the city was going to be bombarded by aircraft and artillery and he sanctioned that as well. That was basically him removing any restrictions on the army's conduct. On December 14th the day after Nankings fall, he made an imperial message to his chiefs of staff expressing his pleasure at the news of the city's capture and occupation. Hirohito granted General Matsui an imperial rescript for his great military accomplishments in 1938 and gave the order of the golden early to Prince Asaka in 1940. Perhaps Hirohito privately agonized over what happened, but publicly did nothing about the conduct of his armed forces, especially in regards to the treatment of POW's.   Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Naking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. Chiang Kai-shek had hoped to end the fighting by enticing the other great powers to intervene. At the 9 power treaty conference in Brussel in november of 1937, Britain and the US proposed boycotting Japan. However the conference ended without any sanctions being enacted upon Japan. The Konoe government and Imperial HQ immediately expanded the combat zone. Chiang Kai-shek in desperation accepted a previous offer by Germany to mediate. Oscar Trautmann, the German ambassador to China attempted to negotiate with Japan, but it failed. China was offered harsh terms; to formally recognize Manchukuo, cooperate with it and Japan to fight communism, permit the indefinite stationg of Japanese forces and pay war reparations.    On January 9th of 1938, Imperial HQ formed a policy for handling the China incident which was reported to Hirohito. Konoe asked Hirohito to convene an imperial conference for it, but not to speak out at it  “For we just want to formally decide the matter in your majesty's presence.” Konoe and Hirohito were concerned with anti expansionists within the army general staff and wanted to prevent German interference in Japanese affairs. On January 11th, the policy was showcased and adopted, there would be no peace until Chiang kai-shek's regime was dissolved and a more compliant regime followed. Hirohito presided over the conference in full army dress uniform and gave his approval. He sat there for 27 minutes without uttering a word, appearing to be neutral in the matter, though in fact he was firmly backing a stronger military policy towards China.    The Konoe cabinet inaugurated a second phase to the China incident, greatly escalating the war. By this point in time Japanese had seen combat casualties at 62,007 killed, 160,000 wounded. In 1939 it would be 30,081 killed, 55,970 wounded, then 15,827 killed and 72,653 wounded in 1940. Major cities were under Japanese control ranging from the north east and south. Chiang Kai-shek fled to Chongqing, the war was deadlocked without any prospect of victory in sight.    On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer. Konoe resigned in disgrace in 1939 having failed to bring the China war to an end and being outed by his colleagues who sought an alliance with Germany, which he did not agree with. His successor was Hiranuma a man Hirohito considered a outright fascist. Hiranuma only received the job because he promised Hirohito he would not make enemies of Britain or the US by entering in a hasty alliance with Nazi Germany. However his enter prime ministership would be engulfed by the alliance question.   In May of 1939 there was another border clash with the USSR, the battle of Khalkhin Gol. This one was much larger in scale, involving armored warfare, aircraft and though it seems it was not used, the Japanese brought biological warfare weapons as well. The Japanese had nearly 20,000 casualties, it was an unbelievable defeat that shocked everyone. Hirohito refrained from punishing anyone because they technically followed orders based on a document “outline for dealing with disputes along the manchurian soviet border” that Hirohito had sanctioned shortly before the conflict arose.   In July of 1939, the US told Hiranuma's government they intended not to renew the US-Japan treaty of commerce and navigation. Until this point Roosevelt had been very lenient towards Japan, but now it looked to him war would break out in europe and he wanted Japan to know they could expect serious economic sanctions if they escalated things. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Then suddenly as Japan was engaging in a truce with the USSR to stop the border conflict, Germany shocked the world and signed a nonaggression pact with them. This completely contravened the 1936 Japan-German anti-comintern pact. Hiranuma resigned in disgrace on august 28th.    Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”. Then Germany invaded Poland and began a new European War. Abe's cabinet collapsed from the unbelievable amount of international actions by January 14th 1940. Hirohito appointed Admiral Yonai as prime minister  and General Tojo to vice army minister. As we have seen Hirohito played a active role appointing high level personnel and imposed conditions upon their appointments.    Hirohito dictated what Yonai was to do, who he was to appoint to certain positions so on and so forth. When a large part of the military were calling for an alliance with Germany, Hirohito resisted, arguing Japan should focus on the China war and not ally itself to Germany unless it was to counter the USSR. Three months passed by and Germany began invading western europe. Norway fell, Denmark fell, Luxembourg, Belgium, the netherlands and then France, it was simply stunning. While Japan had been locked in a deadlock against China, Germany was crushing multiple nations with ease, and this had a large effect on asia. Britain, France and the Netherlands could not hope to protect their holdings in asia. But Hirohito kept pressuring Yonai not to begin any talks of an alliance, and the military leaders forced Yonai's cabinet to collapse.    So Hirohito stood by while Hiranuma, Abe and Yonai met each crisis and collapses. He watched as the China war went nowhere and the military was gradually pushing for the Nanshin-ron doctrine to open a southern war up with the west. Not once did he make a public effort on his lonesome to end the war in China. Japan's demands of China were unchanged, relations with the west were getting worse each day. The China war was undeclared, hell it was from the Japanese viewpoint “chastising China”. Japan was no respecting any rules of war in China, atrocities were performed regularly and for that Hirohito shared responsibility. For he alone was free to act in this area, he needed to act, but he did not. He could have intervened and insisted on respecting the rules of war, especially in regards to POW's and the results could have been dramatically different. Hirohito bore direct responsibility for the use of poison gas upon Chinese and Mongolian combatants and non combatants even before the undeclared war of 1937.    Then on July 28th of 1937 Hirohito made his first directive authorizing the use of chemical weapons which was transmitted by the chief of the army general staff prince Kan'in. It stated that in mopping up the Beijing-Tientsin area, “[Y]ou may use tear gas at suitable times.” Then on September 11th of 1937 he transmitted again through Kan'in the authorization to deploy special chemical warfare units in Shanghai. Gas weapons were one weapon the imperial HQ, aka Hirohito held effective control over throughout the China war. Front line units were never free to employ it at their own discretion, it required explicit authorization from the imperial HQ. During the Wuhan offensive of August to October 1938, imperial HQ authorized the use of poison gas 375 separate times. Hirohito authorized on May 15th of 1939 the carrying out of field studies of chemical warfare along the Manchukuo-soviet border.  In 1940 Hirohito sanctioned the first experimental use of bacteriological weapons in China, though there is no documented evidence of this, given the nature of how he micro managed everything it goes without saying he would have treated it the same as the poison gas. He was a man of science, a person who questioned everything and refused to put his seal on orders without first examining them. Imperial HQ directives went to unit 731 and as a rule Hirohito overlooked them. There again is no documents directly linking him to it, but Hirohito should be held responsibility for strategic bombing campaigns performing on cities like Chongqing. Alongside such horror Hirohito sanctioned annihilation campaigns in China. Such military campaigns were on the scale of what occurred at Nanking. Take for example the Hebei offensive which saw the infamous “three alls policy, burn all, kill all, steal all”.    Before Pearl Harbor and the ushering in of the war against the west, look at the scene that had unfolded. China and Japan were not officially at war until December of 1941. Not to say it would have been easy by any means, but look at the countless opportunities the man, emperor, so called god if you will, held in his hands to stop it all or at the very least stop escalating it. Why did he not do so? To protect the Kokutai. Above all else, the role and survival of the emperor's divinity over the people of Japan was always at the forefront of his mind. He did what he thought was always necessary to thwart threats internal and external. He allowed his military to do horrible things, because they did so in his name, and likewise they were a threat to him. I know its abrupt to end it like this, but for those of you who perhaps say to yourself “well he really was powerless to stop it, they would have killed him or something”, who chose suddenly to intervene in 1945 and made the decision to surrender?

Last time we spoke about the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict. The border between Soviet Manchuria and Japanese-occupied territories emerges not as a single line but as a mosaic of contested spaces, marks, and memories. A sequence of incidents, skirmishes along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, reconnaissance sorties, and the complex diplomacy of Moscow, Tokyo, and peripheral actors to trace how risk escalated from routine patrols to calibrated leverage. On the ground, terrain functioned as both obstacle and argument: ridges like Changkufeng Hill shaping sightlines, river valleys shaping decisions, and markers weathered by snow, wind, and drift. In command tents, officers translated terrain into doctrine: contingency plans, supply routes, and the precarious calculus of restraint versus escalation. Both nations sought to establish firmer defensive barriers against the other. Inevitably they were destined to clash, but how large that clash would become, nobody knew.   #176 The Changkufeng Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we broke down a general history of the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict and how it escalated significantly by 1938. Colonel Inada Masazum serving as chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March of 1938 would play a significant role in this story. When the Japanese command's attention was drawn to the area of Changkufeng, consideration was given to the ownership and importance of the disputed high ground. Inada and his operations section turned to an appraisal of the geography. The officers had been impressed by the strategic importance of the Tumen, which served to cut off the hill country from North Korea. In the Changkufeng area, the river was a muddy 600 to 800 meters wide and three to five meters deep. Japanese engineers had described rowing across the stream as "rather difficult."  Russian roads on the left bank were very good, according to Japanese intelligence. Heavy vehicles moved easily; the Maanshan section comprised the Russians' main line of communications in the rear. To haul up troops and materiel, the Russians were obliged to use trucks and ships, for there were no railways apart from a four-kilometer line between the harbor and town of Novokievsk. Near Changkufeng, hardly any roadways were suitable for vehicular traffic. On the right, or Korean, bank of the Tumen, there were only three roads suitable for vehicular traffic, but even these routes became impassable after a day or two of rain. In the sector between Hill 52 to the south and Shachaofeng to the north, the most pronounced eminences were Chiangchunfeng and the humps of Changkufeng. Rocky peaks were characteristically shaped like inverted T's, which meant many dead angles against the crests. The gentle slopes would allow tanks to move but would restrict their speed, as would the ponds and marshes. In general, the terrain was treeless and afforded little cover against aircraft. Against ground observation or fire, corn fields and tall miscanthus grass could provide some shielding. Between Chiangchunfeng and the Tumen, which would have to serve as the main route of Japanese supply, the terrain was particularly sandy and hilly. This rendered foot movement difficult but would reduce the effectiveness of enemy bombs and shells. The high ground east of Khasan afforded bases for fire support directed against the Changkufeng region. Plains characterized the rest of the area on the Soviet side, but occasional streams and swamps could interfere with movement of tanks and trucks. The only towns or villages were Novokievsk, Posyet, Yangomudy, and Khansi. At Kozando there were a dozen houses; at Paksikori, a few. The right bank was farmed mainly by Koreans, whose scattered cottages might have some value for billeting but offered none for cover. On the left bank, the largest hamlets were Fangchuanting, with a population of 480 dwelling in 73 huts, and Yangkuanping, where there were 39 cottages. Shachaofeng was uninhabited. Japanese occupation of Changkufeng would enable observation of the plain stretching east from Posyet Bay, although intelligence made no mention of Soviet naval bases, submarine pens, or airstrips in the immediate area of Posyet, either in existence or being built in 1938. As Inada knew, the Japanese Navy judged that Posyet Bay might have another use, as a site for Japanese landing operations in the event of war. In Russian hands, the high ground would endanger the Korean railway. This line, which started from Najin in northeastern Korea, linked up with the vital system in Manchuria at the town of Tumen and provided a short cut, if not a lifeline, between Japan and the Kwantung Army and Manchuria from across the Sea of Japan. Even from relatively low Changkufeng, six or seven miles of track were exposed to Soviet observation between Hongui and Shikai stations. The port of Najin, with its fortress zone, lay 11 miles southwest; Unggi lay even nearer. It was not the danger of Japanese shelling of Vladivostok, at an incredible range of 80 miles that was at stake but the more realistic hypothesis of Russian shelling of the rail line, and Russian screening of the Soviet side of the border. Hills and questions were thought to have two sides. It was the consensus of Japanese that Changkufeng Hill's potential value to the Russians far outweighed its possible benefits to them, or at least that the Japanese had more to lose if the Russians took the high ground by the Tumen. Inada nurtured few illusions concerning the intrinsic value of the heights. Despite the fact that the high command always had good reasons for quiescence in the north, Inada believed that the latest border difficulty could not be overlooked. By mid-July 1938 Inada's thoughts crystallized. The Japanese would conduct a limited reconnaissance in force known as iryoku teisatsu in the strategic sense. Whereas, at the tactical schoolbook level, this might mean the dispatch of small forces into enemy territory to seek local combat intelligence, at the Imperial General Headquarters level the concept was far more sweeping. There would also be useful evidence of mobilization and other buildup procedures. The affair at Changkufeng was merely a welcome coincidence, something started by the Russians but liable to Japanese exploration. Inada had no intention of seizing territory, of becoming involved in a war of attrition at a remote and minor spot, or of provoking hostilities against the USSR. The Russians would comprehend the nature of the problem, too. If they were interested in interfering seriously with the Japanese, there were numberless better locations to cause trouble along the Manchurian front; those were the places to watch. The cramped Changkufeng sector, described as "narrow like a cat's brow," could too readily be pinched off from Hunchun to render it of strategic value to either side. The bog land to the north interfered with the use of armored forces, while artillery sited on the heights along the Tumen in Korea could as easily control the area as batteries emplaced east of the lake. It was Inada's professional opinion that the Russians could commit three or four infantry divisions there at most, with no mechanized corps—no heavy tanks, in particular. No decisive battle could be waged, although, once the Russians became involved, they might have to cling to the hill out of a sense of honor. The military action would be meaningless even if the Japanese let the Russians have the heights. For their part, the Japanese would ostensibly be fighting to secure the boundary and to hold Changkufeng peak, beyond which they would not move a step onto Soviet soil. There would be no pursuit operations. Troop commitment would be limited to about one division without tank support. Japanese Air Force intervention would be forbidden. Matters would be directed entirely by Imperial General Headquarters working through the Korea Army chain of command and carried out by the local forces. Calm, clear, and dispassionate overall estimates and instructions would be based on materials available only in Tokyo. The command would not allow the Kwantung Army to touch the affair. Inada foresaw that the Japanese government might also seek a settlement through diplomacy. Although border demarcation was desirable and should be sought, the command would not insist on it, nor would it demand permanent occupation of Changkufeng summit. As soon as reconnaissance objectives had been achieved, the local forces would be withdrawn. As Inada described it "In the process, we would have taught the Russians some respect and given them a lesson concerning their repeated, high-handed provocations and intrusions. If a show of force sufficed to facilitate the negotiations and cause the Russians to back down, so much the better; the affair would be over and my point proved." The instrument for carrying out Inada's strategic design appeared to be ideal, the 19th Division, strenuously trained and high-spirited. It could be expected to perform very well if unleashed within defined limits. Colonel Suetaka was just the commander to direct local operations. Since he had been pleading to fight in China, an operation at Changkufeng might prove to be an excellent "safety valve." His staff was full of experienced, fierce warriors eager for battle. Until recently, the Korea Army commanding general had wisely kept the aggressive division away from Changkufeng Hill, but now Imperial general headquarters had its own overriding ideas and needs. How could the Japanese ensure that any military action would remain limited if the Russians chose to respond with vigor? Naturally, one infantry division, without armor or air support, could not withstand all of the Soviet forces in the maritime province. Inada answered that the mission to be assigned the 19th Division was merely the recapture of Changkufeng crest. If the Japanese side had to break off the operation, evacuation would be effected voluntarily and resolutely on Imperial general headquarters responsibility, without considerations of "face." At worst, the Japanese might lose one division, but the affair would be terminated at the Tumen River without fail. "Even so, we ought to be able to prove our theory as well as demonstrate our true strength to the Russians." In case the Soviets opted for more than limited war, the Japanese were still not so overextended in China that they could not alter their strategic disposition of troops. Although the Kwantung Army's six divisions were outnumbered four to one and the Japanese were not desirous of a war at that moment, the first-class forces in Manchuria could make an excellent showing. In addition, the high command possessed armor, heavy artillery, fighters, and bombers, held in check in Manchuria and Korea, as well as reserves in the homeland. There was also the 104th Division, under tight Imperial general headquarters control, in strategic reserve in southern Manchuria. Inada recalled "How would the Russians react? That was the answer I sought. Victory in China depended on it." By mid-July, the high command, at Inada's urging, had worked out a plan titled, "Imperial General headqaurters Essentials for Dealing with the Changkufeng Incident." Tada's telegram of 14 July to Koiso described succinctly the just-decided policy: the central authorities concurred with the Korea Army's opinion regarding the Changkufeng affair, then in embryo. Considering that Changkufeng Hill posed a direct threat to the frontier of Korea, Imperial General headqaurters would immediately urge the foreign ministry to lodge a stern protest. Next day, Tojo sent a telegram stating the Japanese policy of employing diplomacy; whether the Russians should be evicted by force required cautious deliberation in case the USSR did not withdraw voluntarily. On the basis of the guidance received from Imperial General headqaurters, the Korea Army drew up its own plan, "Essentials for Local Direction of the Changkufeng Incident," on 15 July. Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Sakae was sent promptly to the front from Seoul. At the same time, military authorities allowed the press to release news that Soviet troops were constructing positions inside Manchurian territory in an "obvious provocation." The government of Manchukuo was demanding an immediate withdrawal. Even then, those Japanese most closely connected with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident were not in agreement that everybody at command level was as ardent a proponent of reconnaissance in force as Inada claimed to be. Some thought that most, if not all, of his subordinates, youthful and vigorous, were in favor of the notion; others denied the existence of such an idea. Inada remained clear-cut in his own assertions. Everything done by the local Soviet forces, he insisted, must have been effected with the permission of Moscow; it was customary for the USSR not to abandon what it had once started. The Japanese Army never really thought that the Soviet Union would withdraw just as the result of diplomatic approaches. Therefore, from the outset, preparations were made to deal the Russians one decisive blow. Inada had recommended his plan, with its clear restrictions, to his colleagues and superiors; the scheme, he says, was approved 14 July "all the way up the chain of command, through the Army general staff and the ministry of war, with unexpected ease." The only real opposition, Inada recalled, came from the navy, whose staff advised the army operations staff, in all sincerity, to give up the idea of strategic reconnaissance. Inada adhered to his opinion stubbornly. He never forgot the grave look on the face of Captain Kusaka, the UN operations section chief, as the latter gave in reluctantly. The navy view was that the Changkufeng affair typified the army's aggressive policies as opposed to relative passivity on the part of the navy. Like Kusaka, Japanese Navy interviewees shared the fear that Changkufeng might prove to be the most dangerous military confrontation ever to occur between the USSR and Japan. In view of navy objections, one wonders where Inada could have drawn support for his concept of reconnaissance in force. If one accepts the comments contained in a letter from a navy ministry captain, Takagi Sokichi, to Baron Harada Kumao at the beginning of August, in the army and in a portion of the navy there existed "shallow-minded fellows who are apt to take a firm stand in the blind belief that the USSR would not really rise against us, neglecting the fact that the Russians had foreseen our weak points." Takagi also had violent things to say about "white-livered" Gaimusho elements that were playing up to the army. Although Takagi's remarks, expressed in confidence, were sharp, cautious injunctions were being delivered by the high command to the new Korea Army commander, General Nakamura Kotaro, who was about to leave for Seoul to replace Koiso. Nakamura's attitude was crucial for the course and outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. More of a desk soldier than a warrior, he characteristic ally displayed a wariness that was reinforced by the guidance provided him. This personal quality assumes even greater significance if one believes that the Russians may have initiated the Changkufeng Incident by exploiting the special opportunities afforded them by the routine replacement of the Korea Army commander, the temporary absence from Moscow of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the geographical as well as subjective gap between the Kwantung and Korea armies that was exposed during the Lyushkov affair. At 10:00 on 15 July Nakamura was designated army commander by the Emperor at the palace. Soon afterward, he was briefed by Imperial General headquarters officers. Hashimoto, the operations bureau chief, recalled that when he saw Nakamura off on 17 July, Hashimoto stressed prudence, limitation of any military action, and diplomatic solution of the problem. The new commanding general, Inada asserted, promised full cooperation. There was no mention, at this level, of Inada's concept of reconnaissance in force. When Nakamura reached Seoul, he found an Imperial order from Tokyo dated 16 July awaiting him. This important document stipulated that he could concentrate units under his command in Korea near the border against the trespassing Soviet forces in the Changkufeng area. Resort to force, however, was dependent upon further orders. This message was followed by a wire from Kan'in, the Army general staff chief. The Imperial order, it was explained, had been designed to support diplomatic negotiations. Simultaneous approval was granted for concentrating forces to respond swiftly in case the situation deteriorated. As for implementation of the Imperial order, discretion should be exercised in line with the opinion expressed earlier by Korea Army Headquarters. Negotiations were to be conducted in Moscow and Harbin, the location of a Soviet consulate in Manchukuo. Meanwhile, the command was dispatching two officers for purposes of liaison: Lt. Colonel Arisue Yadoru in Operations and Major Kotani Etsuo a specialist in Soviet intelligence. Inada advised Arisue that, apart from liaison flights inside the frontiers, particular care should be exercised with regard to actions that might lead to air combat. Nevertheless, although Inada stated that the Imperial order called for "a sort of military demonstration," he admitted that it meant preparatory action for an attack. The Korea Army senior staff officer, Iwasaki, recalled hearing nothing about secret intentions. Nakamura briefed his staff about the need for restraint, especially during this key period of the Wuhan operation. Koiso had disposed of speculation that he had issued an order to concentrate the 19th Division before Nakamura arrived, although he and Nakamura did have the opportunity to confer in Seoul before he departed for Japan. The Imperial order of 16 July, in response to Koiso's inquiry received in Tokyo on 14 July, had arrived in Seoul addressed to Nakamura; thereupon, the Korea Army chief of staff, Kitano, had the message conveyed to the division. By 21 July Koiso was back in Tokyo where, the day afterward, he advised the war minister, Itagaki, "to act prudently with respect to the Changkufeng problem." Why did the high command dispatch two field-grade liaison officers to Korea from the outset of the Changkufeng Incident? The Korea Army lacked operations staff. Its commander had been allotted prime responsibility, within the chain of command, for defense of northeastern Korea. At the beginning, the highest-ranking staff officer at the front was a major. Since there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the command and the forces in Korea, it was proper to send experts from Tokyo to assist. Imperial General headqaurters would observe the situation carefully, devise measures on the basis of the overall view, and issue orders which the Korea Army would implement through ordinary channels. It had not been the type of incident which required the army commander to go to the front to direct. This was the Korea Army's first test, and political as well as diplomatic problems were involved that the army in the field should not or could not handle. If Tokyo had left decisions to the division and its regiments, the latter would have been held to account, which was not proper. Imperial General headquarters had to assume responsibility and reassure local commanders of its full support. Imaoka Yutaka explained that operational guidance by Imperial General headquarters and line operations conducted by the 19th Division formed the core of the affair; the Korea Army, placed between, was "shadowy." Koiso had not been enthusiastic; this set the mood among the staff. Nakamura, who arrived with a thorough comprehension of AGS thinking, was basically passive. The Korea Army staff, in general, included no "wild boars."    There was an urgent need to monitor developments. Not only was the Korea Army unfamiliar with handling this type of incident, but many hitches occurred. There had been no practice in emergency transmission of coded wires between the Korea Army and Tokyo. Now telegram after telegram had to be sent; most were deciphered incorrectly and many were not decoded at all. Another problem centered on the lack of knowledge in Tokyo about the situation on the spot, which only visual observation could rectify. As a result, the two Army general staff experts, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Korea on 16 July. Kotani recalled that he was to collect intelligence and assist the local authorities. One of the first duties that he and Arisue performed was to disseminate the principle that use of force required a prior Imperial order. Also on 16 July, Japanese newspapers reported that the USSR was still concentrating troops, that the Manchukuoan government was watching intently, "decisive punitive measures" were being contemplated by the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities, and there were signs of a worsening of the crisis. Despite good reasons for this gloomy appraisal, the Japanese press had not yet given the incident page-one treatment. More alarming news was being disseminated abroad. Domei, the official Japanese news agency, reported that the situation would probably become worse unless Soviet troops were withdrawn. The position of the Japanese government impressed foreign correspondents as unusually firm. Informants characterized the Changkufeng Incident as the most serious affair since the clash on the Amur River in 1937. Irked by the Korea Army's timidity and eager for first-hand information, the Kwantung Army dispatched two observers to the front: from Intelligence, Ogoshi Kenji, and from Operations, Tsuji Masanobu. If you listen to my pacific war week by week podcast or echoes of war, you know I highlight Tsuji Masanobu as one of the most evil Japanese officers of WW2. No other way to describe this guy, he was a shithead. In his memoirs, Tsuji asserted that he and Ogoshi climbed Changkufeng Hill, discerned Soviet soldiers digging across the peak in Manchurian territory, and concluded that "probably even Tokyo could not overlook such a clear-cut case of invasion." Although his account aligned with the general thrust, Ogoshi contended that Tsuji could not have accompanied him. According to sources with the 19th Division, when Koiso learned that Tsuji and Ogoshi were disparaging the Korea Army's ability to defend Changkufeng, he ordered "those spies" ousted. Ogoshi replied that the army staff was not angry, but Koiso did become furious and ordered Ogoshi "arrested for trespassing." Ogoshi surmised that Koiso's concern was that emotional outsiders such as Tsuji could provoke trouble, perhaps even war, if they visited Changkufeng. This view was widely shared. Inada stated that he made a practice of keeping away to maintain the degree of detachment and impartiality required of high command authorities. One sidelight to the "fraternal" visit to the Changkufeng area by observers from Hsinking was provided by Lt. Colonel Katakura Tadashi, chief of the Kwantung Army's 4th Section, which handled Manchukuo affairs, primarily political direction. When Katakura visited the Operations Section, Tsuji and Ogoshi told him that an intrusion had been confirmed and that the Kwantung Army staff was studying ways to evict the Soviets. Katakura consulted Maj. General Ishiwara Kanji, acting chief of staff, who was already in possession of the draft of an operations order calling for offensive preparations by the Kwantung Army against the Russians at Changkufeng. Katakura asked for reconsideration of the order. This was not a matter to be handled solely by the operations staff. Borders and international affairs were involved; hence the 4th Section, along with the Manchukuoan government, the Gaimusho, and other agencies, were concerned. Field observers were expressing exaggerated personal opinions based on having seen Soviet sentries on a hilltop. If the matter fell within the Korea Army's defensive prerogative, that army ought to handle it. Apparently the Kwantung Army commander and Ishiwara agreed with Katakura, for the draft order was not approved. The so-called private message dispatched by a Kwantung Army staff officer just before Koiso's departure may have been provoked by this rejection of direct participation by forces under Kwantung Army command. Staff officers in Tokyo believed that Hsinking could not see the forest for the trees. In the high command's view, the Kwantung Army's deliberate escalation of a negligible frontier incident undoubtedly stemmed from a failure to grasp the strategic requirements of national defense—pursuit of the campaign in China, the nurturance of Manchukuo, and the buildup of operational readiness for the ultimate solution of the Soviet problem. The high command felt obliged to remind the Kwantung Army that, in dealing with the Changkufeng Incident, the central authorities pressed for a Russian pullback through diplomacy. Consequently, the Korea Army had been instructed to be ready to concentrate troops near Changkufeng as a "background." Meanwhile, it remained the Imperial will that utmost prudence be exercised. The Kwantung Army commander accordingly issued cautious instructions to subordinate units, especially those on the eastern border. The high command's injunctions did not end the discontent and recrimination at the lower levels of Kwantung Army Headquarters, nor did they quiet the concern felt in Tokyo. A former war minister told Baron Harada repeatedly in late July that the Kwantung Army was "no good," while the superintendent of police added that the Kwantung Army was embarrassing Foreign Minister Ugaki. Nevertheless, the Kwantung Army did exert self-restraint. For its part, the Korea Army naïvely sought to achieve entente with an antagonist who considered the case nonnegotiable. First, the government of Manchukuo was asked to lodge a formal protest with the USSR. The commissioner for foreign affairs at Harbin phoned V. V. Kuznetzov, the acting consul, on the night of 14 July and saw him on the 18th. Basing its contentions on maps, the Haensing regime demanded Soviet withdrawal from Changkufeng. The Japanese government was lodging similar protests within the framework of Japanese-Manchukuoan joint defense agreements. On the spot, the situation inflamed. During the afternoon of 15 July, a Japanese military police patrol from Korea reconnoitered at the foot of Hill 52, southeast of Changkufeng. The party came under Soviet gunfire and was driven back, abandoning the body of Corp. Matsushima Shakuni. Japanese sources claimed that a Russian ambush had been set inside Manchuria. The Russian side insisted that it was the Soviet frontier that had been violated by thirty meters. Kuzma Grebennik, the colonel commanding the 59th BGU, which covered the Posyet sector, asserted that Matsushima's effects included a notebook containing reconnaissance results and a camera with film of Soviet-claimed terrain, particularly Changkufeng Hill. According to Maj. Gilfan Batarshin, a subordinate of Grebennik, two Russian border guards from Podgornaya opened fire when the Japanese fled after being challenged. Japanese protests to the USSR about the death of Matsushima and the taking of his body were added to the negotiations concerning the disputed border and the alleged trespassing. Charge Nishi Haruhiko lodged a vigorous complaint in Moscow on 15 July but was answered by a counterprotest. Ambassador Shigemitsu underwent an identical experience during a conversation with Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov on 20 July. Shigemitsu retorted that the murder tended to exacerbate the negotiations. In his memoirs, he stated that the killing of Matsushima provoked the local Japanese border garrison unit. The shooting occurred as the Soviet military buildup continued, according to Japanese sources. Mechanized units were reported moving in the direction of Kyonghun from Barabash and Posyet Bay. Biplanes were reconnoitering the Hunchun Valley, within Manchurian territory, from the afternoon of 16 July. To the local Japanese authorities, it seemed that the Russians were adopting a challenging attitude. Although the Japanese-Manchukuoan side remained willing to negotiate—that is, to take no forceful actions if the Russians would withdraw, the latter appeared not to share such an intention. The Soviets were not only misinterpreting the Hunchun treaty to their advantage but were encroaching beyond what they claimed to be the line; they "lacked sincerity." Decisive use of force might have been imperative to secure the Manchurian border, which was Japan's legal responsibility. As far north as Tungning on the eastern Manchurian frontier, two Soviet ground divisions and considerable numbers of tanks and aircraft were reported massed in full view. At Changkufeng, Russian soldiers fortified the crest. Mountain guns were now seen with muzzles pointed toward Manchuria, and Japanese intelligence estimated that Soviet troop strength near Changkufeng had grown to 120 or 130 by the evening of 18 July. As Sawamoto Rikichiro, an Imperial aide, noted in his diary, "It would seem that settlement of the affair had become increasingly difficult." Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya sent two emissaries bearing the notice to the Soviet border. The pair, "blazing with patriotic ardor,"set out on 18 July, carrying a message in one hand and a white flag in the other. From Kyonghun came the report the next day that there had been an urgent, well-attended Soviet staff meeting at BGU Headquarters in Novokievsk all night, and that the Russian side had been discomfited by the Japanese request, which had been transmitted to higher authorities. Still, the emissaries did not return, while a stream of reports indicated a Soviet buildup along a dozen frontier sectors. Russian authorities had reportedly forced the natives to evacuate an area twenty miles behind their borders. From Japanese observation posts, Soviet convoys of men, guns, and horses could be sighted moving toward Novokievsk after being unloaded from transports originating at Vladivostok. Japanese Army Intelligence reported that on 18 July a regimental-size force had arrived at Novokievsk; artillery displacements forward were particularly visible by night east of Khasan. A confidential Gaimusho message indicated that Soviet truck movements between Posyet, Novokievsk, and the front had increased since the 20th. Russian intrusions, kidnappings, and sniping incidents were reported along the Manchurian borders, from Manchouli on the west to Suifenho on the east, between 18 and 25 July. Aircraft on daytime reconnaissance were detected as far as three miles inside Manchurian territory in the Hunchun area. Although the Japanese asserted that their forbearance was being tested, Izvestiya charged "Japanese militarists" with manufacturing an affair at Ussuri as well as at Changkufeng. The Japanese themselves received reports from the Changkufeng front that by 20 July the Soviets had 250 soldiers, armed with field pieces, trench mortars, howitzers, and light and heavy machine guns, on the southern slopes. The Russians were putting up tents capable of holding 40 men each; officers could be observed for the first time. On the evening of the 20th, the Soviets lobbed illuminating shells toward Manchurian territory. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Inada Masazum, studying maps and mud, saw Changkufeng Hill as a prize with peril, a test of nerve rather than a conquest. Tokyo's orders pulsed through Seoul and Harbin: guard, probe, and deter, but avoid full-scale war. Across the border, Soviet units pressed closer, lights and tents flickering on the hillside. The sea within sight whispered of strategy, diplomacy, and a warning: a single misstep could redraw Asia. And so the standoff waited, patient as winter.

The author of the world's best-selling book on negotiation draws on his nearly fifty years of experience and knowledge grappling with the world's toughest conflicts to offer a way out of the seemingly impossible problems of our time. Conflict is increasing everywhere, threatening everything we hold dear—from our families to our democracy, from our workplaces to our world. In nearly every area of society, we are fighting more and collaborating less, especially over crucial problems that demand solutions. With this groundbreaking book, bestselling author and international negotiator William Ury shares a new “path to possible”—time-tested practices that will help listeners unlock their power to constructively engage and transform conflict. Part memoir, part manual, part manifesto, Possible: How We Survive (and Thrive) in an Age of Conflict (Harper Business, 2024) offers stories and sage advice from Ury's nearly 50 years of experience on the front lines of some of the world's toughest conflicts. One of the world's top experts in the field, Ury has worked on conflicts ranging from boardroom battles to labor strikes, from the US partisan divide to family feuds, from wars in the Middle East, Colombia and Ukraine to helping the US and USSR avoid nuclear disaster. Now, in Possible, he helps us tackle the seemingly intransigent problems facing us. In Possible, Ury argues conflict is natural. In fact, we need more conflict, not less—if we are to grow, change, evolve and solve our problems creatively. While we may not be able to end conflict, we can transform it—unleashing new, unexpected possibilities. Successfully tested at Harvard University with almost a thousand participants from business, government, academia, and the nonprofit sector, Ury's “Path to Possible” proved so valuable that Harvard's Program on Negotiation selected it as its inaugural online daylong in April 2022. Possible introduces Ury's methods and makes them available for everyone. Combining accessible frameworks and powerful storytelling and offering dozens of examples, it is an essential guide for anyone looking to break through the toughest conflicts—in their workplace, family, community or the world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

EPISODE 626 - Suzanne Parry - The Soviet Experience Through Historical Fiction, Pentagon Tour, Iron Maiden of StockholmRaised in a quiet rural corner of western New York State, I didn't always want to be a writer. I was, however, always surrounded by books. Bookcases in every room. Entire walls of them. My mother was an avid reader and regular trips to the library were part of my childhood. My stepfather was a creative writing professor and words floated through the rooms and into the nooks and crannies of that pre-Civil War era farmhouse. Books weren't my escape so much as they were part of my daily diet. At twenty I made a list of things I wanted to accomplish and “write a book” was on it. That list included both measurable things like “learn five foreign languages” and “complete a significant athletic achievement” and less quantifiable items like “make the world a better place.” During the Cold War of my high school and college years, I very much wanted to help reduce the possibility of conflict between the US and the USSR.I earned a bachelor's degree at Purdue University, and then continued my Russian studies at the Pushkin Russian Language Institute in Moscow. I studied Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, received a Master's in 1982 and started a career in public service with the US Department of Defense. My work in the Office of the Secretary of Defense focused on European security issues between NATO, Warsaw Pact, and neutral nations. While at the Pentagon I helped negotiate the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, the first security agreement of the Gorbachev era. At the Stockholm talks as we often called the CDE, a number of my European colleagues jokingly called me the “Iron Maiden of Stockholm” in a not altogether flattering reference to British PM Margaret Thatcher, the original tough-as-nails female negotiator. The many months I spent crafting an agreement with diplomats from thirty-five nations, sitting at a table alongside NATO colleagues and opposite Soviet and Warsaw Pact counterparts, was my great honor.After this heady time, I put most of my energy into raising a large family (requiring its own negotiating skills). Funny enough, having a family was not on that list and yet today I would say without hesitation that the most impactful (and most difficult) thing I've ever done is raise four children. I lived in several countries, including the former Soviet Union, Belgium, Sweden, Singapore, and Germany. Throughout adulthood I've been a committed runner. I've completed dozens of marathons in more than twenty countries, including the fifty-six-mile Comrades Marathon in South Africa. I eventually landed in the wonderful and welcoming city of Portland, Oregon as a single parent. There, I coached high school cross country and track at a large public high school before deciding it wasn't too late to dust off that forty-year-old list and write a book.I now divide my time between Portland and Washington, DC, but also travel for fun, for research, and best of all, to visit my children and grandchildren.https://suzanneparrywrites.com/Support the show___https://livingthenextchapter.com/podcast produced by: https://truemediasolutions.ca/Coffee Refills are always appreciated, refill Dave's cup here, and thanks!https://buymeacoffee.com/truemediaca

The author of the world's best-selling book on negotiation draws on his nearly fifty years of experience and knowledge grappling with the world's toughest conflicts to offer a way out of the seemingly impossible problems of our time. Conflict is increasing everywhere, threatening everything we hold dear—from our families to our democracy, from our workplaces to our world. In nearly every area of society, we are fighting more and collaborating less, especially over crucial problems that demand solutions. With this groundbreaking book, bestselling author and international negotiator William Ury shares a new “path to possible”—time-tested practices that will help listeners unlock their power to constructively engage and transform conflict. Part memoir, part manual, part manifesto, Possible: How We Survive (and Thrive) in an Age of Conflict (Harper Business, 2024) offers stories and sage advice from Ury's nearly 50 years of experience on the front lines of some of the world's toughest conflicts. One of the world's top experts in the field, Ury has worked on conflicts ranging from boardroom battles to labor strikes, from the US partisan divide to family feuds, from wars in the Middle East, Colombia and Ukraine to helping the US and USSR avoid nuclear disaster. Now, in Possible, he helps us tackle the seemingly intransigent problems facing us. In Possible, Ury argues conflict is natural. In fact, we need more conflict, not less—if we are to grow, change, evolve and solve our problems creatively. While we may not be able to end conflict, we can transform it—unleashing new, unexpected possibilities. Successfully tested at Harvard University with almost a thousand participants from business, government, academia, and the nonprofit sector, Ury's “Path to Possible” proved so valuable that Harvard's Program on Negotiation selected it as its inaugural online daylong in April 2022. Possible introduces Ury's methods and makes them available for everyone. Combining accessible frameworks and powerful storytelling and offering dozens of examples, it is an essential guide for anyone looking to break through the toughest conflicts—in their workplace, family, community or the world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/van-leer-institute

SPONSORS: 1) MIZZEN & MAIN: Right now, Mizzen & Main is offering our listeners 20% off your first purchase at http://mizzenandmain.com , promo code JULIAN20 2) GHOSTBED: Right now, GhostBed's Black Friday Sale, you can get 25% off already-reduced prices, PLUS a free Massaging Neck Pillow with your mattress purchase. Just go to http://GhostBed.com/julian and use promo code JULIAN at checkout PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/JulianDorey (***TIMESTAMPS in description below) ~ Elizabeth Lane is an investigative journalist and Chief Operating Officer at UNIFYD TV. ELIZABETH's LINKS: X: https://x.com/imelizabethlane IG: https://www.instagram.com/elizabethlaneofficial/?hl=en FOLLOW JULIAN DOREY INSTAGRAM (Podcast): https://www.instagram.com/juliandoreypodcast/ INSTAGRAM (Personal): https://www.instagram.com/julianddorey/ X: https://twitter.com/julianddorey JULIAN YT CHANNELS - SUBSCRIBE to Julian Dorey Clips YT: https://www.youtube.com/@juliandoreyclips - SUBSCRIBE to Julian Dorey Daily YT: https://www.youtube.com/@JulianDoreyDaily - SUBSCRIBE to Best of JDP: https://www.youtube.com/@bestofJDP ****TIMESTAMPS**** 0:00 - John Kiriakou, Georgian Roots & Elizabeth's Story, JFK 11:15 - USSR & Gorbachev, Fascism vs Communism, Elites 22:49 - Brainwashing, Lobbying, CIA & Corporations 33:52 - Why Julian Thinks America is Still the Best, Economic Hitman 43:38 - JFK's Vision, NASA Moon Landing, Conspiracy Overload Problem 55:29 - Delusional Power, Soviet History, Joseph Stalin 1:07:36 - Types of Communism in USSR, Stalin vs. Leninists 1:26:02 - Generalizing Problems, Elites & Hitler during WW2 1:38:45 - Shadow Government, Relationship w/ Russia 1:48:08 - Vladimir Putin 2:03:00 - Putin Dictator Actions, Putin k1lling Nemtsov 2:13:15 - Julian's Hang Up With What is Happening Today 2:21:39 - Elizabeth's Coverage of Charlie Kirk Shooter's Trial 2:31:57 - Who is lying about Charlie Kirk Assassination, “Miracle” Tweet 2:42:06 - Stupid Conspiracies Around Charlie's D3ath, Investigating what happened 2:56:05 - Understanding counterarguments CREDITS: - Host, Editor & Producer: Julian Dorey - COO, Producer & Editor: Alessi Allaman - https://www.youtube.com/@UCyLKzv5fKxGmVQg3cMJJzyQ - In-Studio Producer: Joey Deef - https://www.instagram.com/joeydeef/ Julian Dorey Podcast Episode 355 - Elizabeth Lane Music by Artlist.io Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

“She said, ‘This isn't the koan you wanted.' And I thought about that. What do you do with a koan you don't want? Usually, if it's a koan, you didn't want it.” - Resa Alboher   Long time sangha stalwart and dear friend Resa Alboher brings us the epic adventure of what brought her to ACZC across continents, decades of earth shaking world events, and moments of life altering personal ones as well. What do we with the koan we didn't want? How do we sit still when lying down is all we can actually manage? And just what was the Buddhist scene in Moscow like at the fall of the USSR?? Find out here!

More mailbag! 00:00 – Biggest mailbag load EVER. Too much random vintage USSR stuff to list… 26:24 – Logicgat Digital Logic training board. https://logicgat.es/ 31:22 – SLogic16U3 $69 USB3 800MHz Logic Analyser https://wiki.sipeed.com/hardware/en/logic_analyzer/slogic16u3/Introduction.html Forum: https://www.eevblog.com/forum/blog/eevblog-1720-mailbag-ussr-bonanza-logic-training-$69-logic-analyzer/

In 1991, as the USSR broke apart and its population became open to the reforming discourse of Mikhail Gorbachev's reform program of perestroika, Soviet dissident historian Roy Medvedev set the tone for subsequent writing on Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, concluding that he was “a personality so mediocre and a politician so ordinary” that he “quickly disappeared from the political scene and also in the literal and metaphorical sense.” But not for long. When it became clear by the end of the decade that market capitalism and democracy had not improved people's lives, nostalgia for the Brezhnev era rightly raised the question of whether he had been given his just due and unfairly blamed for the shortcomings of the Soviet system. This reversal of fortune also makes clear that no Soviet leader has been as neglected or as misunderstood as Brezhnev and therefore no Soviet party boss is in such need of a fresh historical reassessment. Divided into two parts, my presentation will first make a case for Brezhnev, emphasizing his vision of guaranteeing stability, assuring peace, and letting people live well. Earlier I coined the term “Soviet man of peace,” to characterize Brezhnev. I emphasize this point here, arguing that his dream of wanting to be remembered as an asset for world peace made him a leader who changed the world. In part 2 of my presentation, I zoom in on the Leonid Brezhnev that, as his biographer, I might never know and propose what these unresolved questions might mean. Donald J. Raleigh is the Jay Richard Judson Distinguished Professor of Russian History Emeritus at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He has authored, translated, and edited numerous books on modern Russian history including Revolution on the Volga (1986), Experiencing Russia's Civil War (2002), Russia's Sputnik Generation (2006) and Soviet Baby Boomers (2012). He currently is writing a biography of Soviet leader Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, research for which has taken him to archives in Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the UK, and the US. This lecture is sponsored by the Alice D. Mortenson/Petrovich Distinguished Chair of Russian History and University Lectures.

In 1989, Boris Yeltsin walked into a Houston supermarket — and walked out ready to end an empire. What he saw in Texas that day would shake the foundations of the Soviet Union. * On the Very Special Episodes podcast, we tell one incredible story each week. Follow us down a different rabbit hole every Wednesday. Hosted by Dana Schwartz, Zaron Burnett, and Jason EnglishWritten by Dave RoosSenior Producer is Josh FisherEditing and Sound Design by Jonathan WashingtonAdditional Editing by Mary DooeMixing and Mastering by Josh FisherResearch and Fact-Checking by Dave Roos and Austin ThompsonVoice Actor is Tom AntonellisOriginal Music by Elise McCoyShow Logo by Lucy QuintanillaSocial Clips by Yarberry MediaExecutive Producer is Jason English Special thanks to composer Evan Mack for letting us play a clip of “Make Your Move,” from his original opera Yeltsin in Texas. Learn more at evanmack.com. And thanks to Yelena Biberman for sharing her story. Check out her excellent podcast How to Kill a Superpower. We've got a mailbag episode coming later this month. Got a question for Dana, Zaron, or Jason? Email us at veryspecialepisodes@gmail.com. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

She knows tyranny when she sees it. Award-winning journalist Stella Escobedo, who escaped Soviet oppression as a child, now warns that the same toxic mix of antisemitism, propaganda, and communist ideology her family fled in the USSR is taking root in America. She's on a mission to use her media presence to fight back. For the weekend, post my talk in Denver. Make sure to edit out the dead time at the end of the video.Join Our Whatsapp Channel: https://chat.whatsapp.com/GkavRznXy731nxxRyptCMvFollow us on Twitter: https://x.com/AviAbelowJoin our Telegram Channel: https://t.me/aviabelowpulseFollow us on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/pulse_of_israel/?hl=enPulse of Israel on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/IsraelVideoNetworkVisit Our Website - https://pulseofisrael.com/Donate to Pulse of Israel: https://pulseofisrael.com/boost-this-video/

In 1989, Boris Yeltsin walked into a Houston supermarket — and walked out ready to end an empire. What he saw in Texas that day would shake the foundations of the Soviet Union. * On the Very Special Episodes podcast, we tell one incredible story each week. Follow us down a different rabbit hole every Wednesday. Hosted by Dana Schwartz, Zaron Burnett, and Jason EnglishWritten by Dave RoosSenior Producer is Josh FisherEditing and Sound Design by Jonathan WashingtonAdditional Editing by Mary DooeMixing and Mastering by Josh FisherResearch and Fact-Checking by Dave Roos and Austin ThompsonVoice Actor is Tom AntonellisOriginal Music by Elise McCoyShow Logo by Lucy QuintanillaSocial Clips by Yarberry MediaExecutive Producer is Jason English Special thanks to composer Evan Mack for letting us play a clip of “Make Your Move,” from his original opera Yeltsin in Texas. Learn more at evanmack.com. We've got a mailbag episode coming later this month. Got a question for Dana, Zaron, or Jason? Email us at veryspecialepisodes@gmail.com. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In 1989, Boris Yeltsin walked into a Houston supermarket — and walked out ready to end an empire. What he saw in Texas that day would shake the foundations of the Soviet Union. * On the Very Special Episodes podcast, we tell one incredible story each week. Follow us down a different rabbit hole every Wednesday. Hosted by Dana Schwartz, Zaron Burnett, and Jason EnglishWritten by Dave RoosSenior Producer is Josh FisherEditing and Sound Design by Jonathan WashingtonAdditional Editing by Mary DooeMixing and Mastering by Josh FisherResearch and Fact-Checking by Dave Roos and Austin ThompsonVoice Actor is Tom AntonellisOriginal Music by Elise McCoyShow Logo by Lucy QuintanillaSocial Clips by Yarberry MediaExecutive Producer is Jason English Special thanks to composer Evan Mack for letting us play a clip of “Make Your Move,” from his original opera Yeltsin in Texas. Learn more at evanmack.com. And thanks to Yelena Biberman for sharing her story. Check out her excellent podcast How to Kill a Superpower. We've got a mailbag episode coming later this month. Got a question for Dana, Zaron, or Jason? Email us at veryspecialepisodes@gmail.com. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In addition to advocacy at home, including through efforts like the twinning program, a number of activists working on behalf of Soviet Jewry traveled to the USSR, arranging meetings with Jews living behind the Iron Curtain in an effort to provide support and gain access to information to bring back to the United States. The journey was dangerous, and entailed a great deal of risk as the KGB enacted tighter and tighter restrictions on foreign visitors, and looked at each traveler with intense suspicion. Narrated by Rebecca Naomi Jones and featuring Dr. Shaul Kelner, author of A Cold War Exodus: How American Activists Mobilized to Free Soviet Jews. Image: In October of 1985, American travelers Cheryl Pollman and Mark Werbner meet with the Pevzner family in Odessa, from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry Records, I-181. The Wreckage is made possible by funding from the Ford Foundation. Additional funding is provided through the American Jewish Education Program, generously supported by Sid and Ruth Lapidus.

A bold, revisionist study of modern warfare, showing that military victory is rooted not in large armies and decisive battles, but in the full spectrum of economic, political, and social power. For nearly two centuries, international relations have been premised on the idea of the "Great Powers." As the thinking went, these mighty states--the European empires of the nineteenth century, the United States and the USSR during the Cold War--were uniquely able to exert their influence on the world stage because of their overwhelming military capabilities. But as military historian Phillips Payson O'Brien argues in War and Power: Who Wins Wars--And Why (PublicAffairs, 2025), this conception of power fails to capture the more complicated truth about how wars are fought and won. Our focus on the importance of large, well-equipped armies and conclusive battles has obscured the foundational forces that underlie military victories and the actual mechanics of successful warfare. O'Brien suggests a new framework of "full-spectrum powers," taking into account all of the diverse factors that make a state strong--from economic and technological might, to political stability, to the complex logistics needed to maintain forces in the field. Drawing on examples ranging from Napoleon's France to today's ascendant China, War and Power offers a critical new understanding of what makes a power truly great. It is vital reading in today's perilous world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Hey guys before you listen to this one, do realize this is part 4 on a series about General Kanji Ishiwara, so if you have not already done so I would recommend listening to Part 1-2-3.    This episode is General Kanji Ishiwara part 4: Ishiwara vs Hideki Tojo So I promised this would be the last one and it is, rest assured. Sheesh what started as a suggested episode turned into an entire series, but then again Ishiwara Kanji was quite a figure. I recently did a podcast with Cody from AlternateHistoryHub, and at the end of the podcast he poked at me for some alternate history ideas related to the Pacific War. My first thought was what if the Triple Intervention after the Russo-Japanese War never occurred, but then I thought….hell what if Ishiwara Kanji never existed or I dunno got hit by a car. Imagine how different things would have been if not for this one, I am just gonna say it, instigator haha. Now I think when one looks at this mans life, we attribute much of the story towards the Mukden Incident and the eventual full scale China war, but thats not where it ends of course. Ishiwara did a lot during the war and after, so to close it all up lets jump back into it.   Ishiwara is now a Major General , chief of the most powerful office on the general staff. He was fighting tooth and nail to limit operations in what was the new China War. A month before everything hit the fan he declared in front of the General staff “I shall never send a single soldier to China as long as I live”. But in mid-June of 1937 rumors emerged that the China garrison was planning another incident in the Beijing area, similar to Ishiwara's famous Mukden incident of September 1931. Two weeks later the Marco Polo Bridge incident occurred on July 7th. The Japanese army were divided on the issue. There was the expansionists who sought to smash China in a single blow and the non-expansionists who sought to settle everything between their nations before the conflict became too large. Ishiwara was on the side of the non-expansionists and from the earliest hours of the war he directed a losing fight to try and localize the conflict. Fight as he must to stop mobilization of further forces, he was forced to relent multiple times and to his horror the conflict grew and grew. Ishiwara's efforts or some would say meddling, ironically made things worse for the non-expansionists. Some of the expansionists would go on the record to state Ishiwara bungled the situation, years after the China incident, Colonel Shibayama would say with bitterness “The idea that Ishiawara Kanji opposed the expansion of the China incident is nonsense. If he really had opposed it he wouldn't have agreed to the mobilization. There were certainly other ways of solving the problem” Ishiwara was stuck between a rock and a hard place. While he wanted to stop the mobilization of more forces to China, the men at the front kept sending reports that Japanese citizens were underthreat in areas like Beijing, his wrists were turned as they say. Ishiwara did not cave in without a fight however, as I said in the last episode he turned to Prime Minister Konoe to strike a deal with Chiang Kai-shek, and Konoe nearly did, but at the last minute he canceled his flight to Nanking.   When the North China incident saw action spring up in Shanghai, it then became officially the China incident and Ishiwara attempted once more to push for a peace settlement in September. However by that point Ishiwara's influence had dropped considerably, few in the Operations division were still following his lead. Many of the expansionists began to bemoan Ishiwara as nothing more than a nuisance. Prince Sainji would go on the record telling Konoe “Ishiwara is like a candly in the wind ready to be snuffed out at any moment”. By late september Ishiwara was removed from the General staff by General Tada. The expansionists had won the day. There were other non-expansionists like Horiba Kazuo and Imai Takeo who carried on fighting the non-expansionist cause, but in january of 1938 Konoe decalred the Japanese government would not treat with Chiang Kai-shek. It was the nail in the coffin.   The war escalted, by 1938 24 divisions were tossed into China, in 1939 it would be 34 bogged down. The IJA was without mobilization divisions and less than half the ammunition necessary for the 15 divisions assigned to the borders with the USSR and that critical weakness became only to apparent with two border clashes in 1938 and 1939. To Ishiwara it was all too predicatable, he had continuously argued the folly of a China War. He lectured about how it was impossible to conquer China “China is like an earthworm. Cut it in two and it will still keep on wriggling”. Ishiwara believed China's territory and self-sufficiency built upon its masses would always make up for Japanese military might. Ishiwara unlike his colleagues believed Japan was not capable of dealing a knock out blow against China. He would criticize many for promoting the idea stating “those who excite the public by claims of victory, just because the army has captured some out of the way little area, do so only to coneal their own incompetence as they squander the nation's power in an unjustified war”.   In the fall of 1937 Ishiwara found himself back in mainland Asia with an appointed as the vice chief of staff of the Kwantung army. But he came back with a scarred reputation now, for his non-expansionist fight earned him a lot of scorn. All of his ideas of a political independent and racially equal Manchukuo in 1932 had all but disappeared. The Japanese military and civilians occupied all important positions in the puppet state. The Kwantung army authorities, particularly that of Hideki Tojo wgo was at the time a provost marshal in Manchuria had taken a stern line against any efforts to revive East Asian League or their ideals. So when Ishiwara arrived, he quickly realized his influence had deminished significantly. None the less he took up his old cause trying to work with the barely relavent Concordia association, but they were fighting against Tojo who received a promotion to chief of staff in Manchuria in March. Tojo was now Ishiwara's superior, it was a hopeless cause, but Ishiwara persisted.    Ishiwara began insisting the Kwantung army must step asie to allow for self-government to reing over Manchuria. He argued Japan's special holdings in Manchuria should be turned over to the Manchukuo government and that the Concordia association should act as a guiding source. He also pointed out how dangerous the USSR was too Manchuria and that Japan must increase its forces in the border areas of Manchuria. For all of this he recommended a solution would be a Asian union, that if Manchukuo flourished under racial equality and harmony, perhaps it would show the rest of China Sino-Japanese cooperation was possible and maybe China would join an East Asian league. Ishiwara would continously hammer the idea, that the solution to the China war was to create an effective east asian league. With China in the fold, they would have unrivaled airpower, a prime element in his preparation for the Final War. Not a single one of his arguments were given any consideration.   Ontop of his radical ideas, Ishiwara also advised reducing salaries for Japanese officials in Manchuria and was as you can imagine denounced quickly by his colleagues for this. Then Ishiwara found out Tojo was embezzling Kwantung army funds to the officers wives club, a pet project of Mrs Tojo. So Ishiwara went ahead by pointing out Tojo's corruption and added a large insult by suggesting Tojo had the mentality of a mere sergeant. In a public speech at the Concordia association infront of a mixed Japanese/manchurian audience he tore into many of his colleagues like General Hashimoto Toranosuke who was an honorary president of said association and Ishiwara said “he did nothing but sit around and draw a high salary, setting a disgraceful example to junior officers”. So yeah Ishiwara soon found himself very very isolated in the Kwantung army staff. Tojo received a promotion to vice minister of war in May of 1938, with the support of notable expansionist types. As for Ishiwara he had became quite a headache to his colleagues. Depressed and disgusted with the situation, Ishiwara decided to quit the army before he was tossed out. He first tried to apply at the war ministry to be placed on the reserve list but was told the matter required approval of the minister of war. At that time, it was actually his old buddy Itagaki Seishiro as minister of war. While the decision was being made, Ishiwara was authorized to return to Japan, but when he did the Kwantung army inisted he had departed without authorization to do so, basically arguing he just walked away from his desk one day.   Itagaki made no move to summon Ishiwara once he was back in Tokyo, but Tojo as vice minister got wind of the situation and was all too eager to pounce. It turned out Tojo had Kenpeitai waching Ishiwara and some of his closest colleagues for awhile and he chose this moment to haul Ishiwara up for military indiscipline. The case against Ishiwara was quite a controversy and in the end all Itagaki could do for his old friend was get him an command over the Maizuru fortress area on Japan's seacost of Kyoto prefecture. The day before the orders were posted, Tojo managed to toss one last punch at Ishiwara. He order his Kenpeitai friend, special service commander Colonel Otani Keijiro to carry out a lightning raid on the Tokyo offices of the Concordia Association which saw the arrests of some of Ishiwara's close colleagues.   1939-1941 marked a terrible time for Ishiwara's military career, but he did take the time to build more so upon his Final War theory, the national defense state, the Showa restoration and the East Asian league. Ishiwara's lackluster Maizuru assignment was a quite backwater, not demanding much attention. During his leisure time he came to the conclussion based on his analysis of military history with some fresh readings of Buddhist texts that the Final War was destined to break out within the next 40 years or so. On March 10th of 1939 he made an address to the Concordia association in Toyko “a concept of world war “sekai sensokan”. He stated based on his analysis that Japan had to prepare for the final war because “world conflict is now in the semifinal round and it is for this reason that the necessity has arrived for an east asian league”. In August of 1939 Itagaki resigned as war minister to take up a position on on the chief of staff in the China expeditionary army which was then grinding to a halt. But before he did so, he made one of his final acts as war minister to give Ishiwara command of the 16th reserve division in Kyoto.   It was not a frontline position, but it was an important one, as the Kyoto command was notable for developing infantry tactics. Japan had just received some major defeats to the USSR at the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol so Ishiwara went to work developing some anti soviet tactics. This led to some infiltration techniques that would see application with the IJA during the early battles of the Pacific War. But despite his work on tactics, what really consumed his mind was pressing for the East Asian League. He argued a Showa restoration needed to happen, like the Meiji restoration, but this new one would be pan-asian, to face the west. In May of 1940 he put all of his arguments together in a public address that gained fame under the title “on the final war”. It was here he unleashed two decades of his thoughts into the Japanese public. He added some new features to his theories such as a “the world had entered a second industrial revolution”. He pointed out German had pioneered in the field of electrochemistry, producing energy for both industrial production and weapons of war. Such discoveries he argued would permit Asian nations to catch up and eventually overtake the west in productive and destructive power. But above all else he kept hammering the necessity for an east asian league, which required a Showa restoration to finally bring pan-asianism.   In November of 1939, as a successor to the Concordia Association, the association for an east asian league was established with its HQ in tokyo. Ishiwara was unable to officially become a member because he was part of the military, but he was an unofficial advisor and more importantly in the eyes of the public it was his association. By 1941 the association blew up to 100,000 members, mostly ex-soldiers, businessmen, journalists, farmers and such. They had a monthly magazine, training courses, meetings, lectures, the works. They extensively studied Ishiwara's writings on the history of war, the Showa restoration and his Final War theory. They spent extensive resources securing bases on the asian mainland trying to recruit supporters amongst other asian peoples to create a federation. Within Japanese controlled portions of China, they propagated the concept of the East Asian league. For the small group of collaborationists in China, many were attracted to it. In February of 1941 the General China assembly for the east asian league, was established in Nanjing with Wang Jingwei as chairman. Oh Wang Jingwei…having spent so much time learning about the Warlord Era and Northern Expedition, it never surprises me this guy would cling to anything for power. The influence of the league even found its way to Chongqing, and Chiang Kai-shek allegedly declared that peace negotiations could be pursued based on some aspects of the movement. But come spring of 1941, all of the leagues efforts would be dashed by Tojo. In early 1941, Tojo as war minister began plotting against the league and its architect Ishiwara. Tojo believed the east asian league was very defeatists and antithetical to his own hard line stance on Sino-Japanese relations. It also provided his nemesis Ishiwara with a political base to generate public opposition to his government's policies. Tojo obviously thought Ishiwara would use such a thing to overthrow him, so he went to war. His first move was to put Ishiwara on the retired list in december of 1940. However Ishiwara was still a influential figure and held some considerably powerful friends like Prince Higashikuni, so he was unable to safely pull this off. Instead he chose to harass the league.    Initially Premier Konoe was backing the league, but Tojo began to pressure Konoe to take a position against it. On January 14th, the konoe cabinet stated “as it appears that they violate respect for the nation and cast a shadow on the imperial authority, theories advocating leagues of states are hereby not permitted”. Thus the east asian league became illegal. Taking the cue on the cabinets decision, the Japanese media began a running hit pieces on the league, kind of like how America works today, ompf. By february of 1941 the criticism towards the league was smashing them. All of Ishiwara's allies within the league were hit hard, some even tortured, it was a purge. For Ishiwara nothing really happened, except for the continual surveillance by the Kenpeitai. Ishiwara proceeded to vent his wrath in public speeches, pretty bold ass move if you ask me and he delivered one fiery one at Kyoto university on east asia problems where he told his audience “the enemy is not the chinese people, but rather certain Japanese. It is particularly Tojo Hideki and Umezu Yoshijiro, who, armed and pursuing their own ambition, are the enemy of Japan. As disturbers of the peace they are the enemies of the world. They should be arrested and executed”. Excuse my french, but the fucking balls on this guy haha. Ishiwara made this statement in public and at the time he was still in military service, its simply incredible he did not suffer horrible punishment after slandering the minister of war and commander of the kwantung army. Why was he not punished, well again it was awkward as he still had a cult following and going after him might see violence. Ishiwara would later state the reason he was not persecuted was because “Tojo was a coward who never had the courage to arrest me. The fact that a man like Tojo and his henchmen came to power was one reason for Japan's downfall”.    Regardless Ishiwara's public statements finally led to him being placed on the retirement list on March 1st of 1941 and yes it was 100% Tojo who pushed this. Tojo ordered the Kenpeitai to watch Ishiwara closely for weeks after his forced retirement. Ishiwara enthusiastically went into retirement as he now was fully dedicated to his four great concerns: the east asian league, the showa restoration, the national defense state and of course the final war theory.   In the meantime another league had opened up, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere and you would be forgiven to believe it was the same as the east asian league if not its successor. Both perpetuated common ideology, like racial harmony, stemming from the Concordia association. Ishiwara's concepts of national defense also found their way in the Greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. It advocated for most of the basic principals of the league, common defense, political independence and integration of economic systems. How did they differ you might ask? Well Ishiwara's east asian league did not share the formers racial superiority of the Japanese as its cornerstone. The east asian league was not built upon the premise that China was incompetent as a modern state and needed to be led. For you american listeners, its actually pretty easy to summarize the co-prosperity sphere idea, its was Japan's monroe doctrine. The east asian league had been undone by the China War and then Pacific War, leaving the co-prosperity sphere to monopolize the asian continent and it did so through brute force and undermined any chance of pan-asianism. Ishiwara sought the east asian league solely because he truly believed pan-asianism would be required to build up enough forces to fight the final war.    During his retirement Ishiwara went on lecturing in major universities, but Tojo unleashed the Kenpeitai upon him, whom often demanded he cancel a lecture or not talk about certain subjects. I guess its like Youtube today, haha. Though ever the more isolated, when the Pacific War kicked off, Ishiwara could not be fully muzzled. He did not opposed the surprise attack on pearl harbor publically, but privately he predicted Japan had begun a war it would lose, based solely on material terms. A famous thing he once said to Satomi Kishio which appears in an cooky anime called Zipang where some member of the SDF accidentally go back in time to june 4th of 1942 if you were curious, really funny premise, but anyways, Ishiwara said this “inevitably, we shall lose this war. It will be a struggle in which Japan, even though it has only a thousand yen in its pocket, plans to spend ten thousand, while the United States has a hundred thousand yen, but only needs to spend ten thousand…we simply cannot last. Japan started this war without considering its resources beforehand”. I love this passage. It's an excellent way to speak to a general public, very effective I find.   Ishiwara criticized the military for spreading themselves out too thinly in the early months of the war, dispersing countless men on small islands in the pacific. But above all else, he kept hammering the fact the China war needed to end. China was sucking up the vast majority of Japan's military resources and men, how could Japan hope to wage a war against a nation like the US when it was stuck in China? When Saipan fell in 1944, Ishiwara said all hope was lost. He believed the only possible way Japan could avoid disaster was if the USSR broke its pact with its allies and offered a settlement to Japan, but he knew that was a long shot given how anti-communist Japan was. I have to make a point here to say a LOT of Ishiwara's talk, comes postwar and feels like a “i told you so”. Ishiwara gave testimony at the Tokyo war crime trials and declared “despite its material inferiority, Japan did not need to suffer a defeat, if its strategy had been well planned and carried out”. He even made a remark to an American correspondent named Mark Gayn in 1946 stating if he held command of the forces he would have ended the war with China, consolidated Japanese defensive lines and made a proper stand.   Throughout the war, Ishiwara battled Tojo, often referring to him as a simpleton. In fact in late 1942 he arranged an audience with Tojo and told him to his face that he was too incompetent to run the nation or wage a war and that he should step down. There was a rumor Ishiwara was part of a plot to assassinate Tojo in the summer of 1944. This was a scheme hatched by some junior officers in the central HQ, and one of their members was a east asian league associate. Ishiwara was called upon to Tokyo during an investigation of the plot and as much as Tojo and his team tried to find evidence of his involvement, they were unable to nail him. The Kenpeitai chased after Ishiwara until Tojo's regime collapsed.    By the end of the war, Ishiwara was asked by Prince Higashikuni if he could join the “surrender cabinet' as an advisor. Ishiwara declined on the grounds he wanted to be unsullied by Japans defeat.    It should be noted again, Ishiwara was a man of countless contradictions. While he was one of the first to be outspoken against the Pacific War and predicted Japan's defeat, during the end half of the way he got really caught up in the war fever. For example in 1944 he began stating Japan needed to prepare to “shed the blood of a million lives in the south seas in a do or die battle”. He also had this blind faith that a German victory in Europe would turn the tide of the war in the east. He said of Hitler in 1944 “he is the greatest hero in Europe since Napoleon”. Some argue his later public stances were the result of him not being in the military and thus he had to conform to the wartime propaganda to get his message across to the general public. He also began linking concepts of the east asian league to the greater east asian co-prosperity sphere, which is quite the contradiction. Again personally I see him as a fence sitter, he loved to always have a backdoor in his arguments.   One major thing that he faced during the Pacific War, was trying to explain to his followers, the current war was not the Final War. As he stated publicly in February of 1942 “Many people think that the greater east asian war is the final war. Nothing could be further from the truth… the greater east asian war is the grand rehearsal for the final war. In other words, it will lead to the liberation of east asia and the establishment of an east asian league and will provide to the league the necessary material and strategic base for the final war”. Well the failure of the China War, Pacific War, the complete military collapse of Japan, the take over of communism in mainland asia, the emerging cold war….I guess that all kind of ruined his final war theory.    With Japan's defeat looming in 1944, Ishiwara began to shift his focus towards a reconstruction effort. He began as early as 1944 to talk about what would happen to Japan. He predicted she would lose much overseas territory, her cities would be in ruins, her people would be starving. He turned his attention to agriculture, how could food production be increased, he became particularly interested in fertilizers. By the end of the war he gathered a farming community to discuss how things could be improved. When the surrender proclamation was made, he began to ponder the meaning of his life's work. After the emperor made his speech, Ishiwara gathered his followers to speak to them about how Japan could regain world power and thus keep his theory intact. Ishiwara had many ideas going forward about how Japan could take a positive footing. He advocated Japan dismantle the remnants of its bureaucratic despotism, abolition the special police force, apologize to the global community for war crimes, but he also argued America needed to answer for her war crimes as well. He especially pointed fingers at President Truman for two atomic bombs and that efforts needed to be made to use bombings to lessen Japan's punishment. Ishiwara also argued Japan should gain sympathy from asia so their former enemies could come together to form an east asian league.   Emperor Hirohito proclaimed the surrender and abolition of all stocks of war materials, and Ishiwara said that was fine because he believed the final war would require new armaments that would be completely different from what existed. He predicted the future wars would be more scientific, fought with decisive weapons developed in laboratories that did not require large organized military forces. He thought perhaps a small body of underground scientists could create terrible new weapons to prepare for the Final War, thats a terrifying idea. In autumn of 1945, Ishiwara found himself in the limelight again. His lectures had made him a viable alternative to the Tojo regime during the last year of the war and his reputation as an opponent and victim of said regime made him special. Many journalists, both Japanese and American came flooding to him followed by a legion of followers who were unable to publicly come forward during the Tojo years.   Ishiwara took advantage of this new situation to make some very large speeches. He spoke about how the Tojo clique was the reason for Japan's defeat, how they all needed to establish a new Japan. He brought out the usual theories he had spoke about for years, and argued the necessity for national reconstruction to prepare for the final war. However he changed his argument a bit, stating while Japan had military been crushed, it now must prepare for the final war by building the highest culture. In this new age, Japan needed to obtain supremacy in fields of science, because he now believed that was the new power. “A single laboratory, a single factory, or perhaps a single man working alone will make the most fantastic discovery that will make war decisive”. He would continue to make speeches throughout 1945, but come 1946 the high authority, one Emperor Douglas MacArthur, haha sorry I had to say it, General MacArthur stamped down on any Japanese leader, especially former military leaders. So Ishiwara had a few months of fame, but then he found himself yet again purged, though not arrested. Alongside this came a ban on the East Asian League association.    Ishiwara was then incapacitated by illness, something that plagued his life. His condition became so bad he required surgery in Tokyo. In April of 1946 he was interviewed by American correspondent Mark Gayn who left with a very memorable impression of the man, he had this to say “ Ishiwara received us in his small room, whose window frames were still buckled from bomb explosions. He is a lean man with a deeply tanned face, close shaven head and hard, unblinking eyes. He was sitting Japanese style on his cot, his hands in his lap. Even in a shapeless gown of yellow silk, his body looked straight as a steel rod… We asked Ishiwara just two questions: what of Japan in defeat and what of himself? He answered readily and at length, in a sharp firm voice. He talked like a man who believed every word he said”. Ishiwara told his life story, the Mukden incident, the China war escalation, his feud with Tojo all of his failed attempts with the East Asian League.    In 1947 Ishiwara was put on a list of those Japanese who were purged from public life. He was extremely bitter about this and at the same time he was called as a defense witness in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. Ishiwara was too sick to travel to Tokyo, so a special military court was convened in Sakata city. He made his deposition in front of 50 people, talking about his role in the Mukden incident and China War. He stated President Truman should be indicted for the atomic bombs and firebombing campaigns and turned upon his American audience about the denunciation for Japanese expansionism. “Havent you ever heard of Perry? Don't you know anything about your country's history? Tokugawa Japan believed in isolation; it didnt want to have anything to do with other countries, and had its doors locked tightly. Then along came Perry from your country in his black ships to open those doors; he aimed his big guns at Japan and warned that ‘if you don't deal with us, look out for these; open your doors, and negotiate with other countries too'. And then when Japan did open its doors and tried dealing with other countries, it learned that all those countries were a fearfully aggressive lot. And so for its own defense it took your country as its teacher and set about learning how to be aggressive. You might saw we became your disciples. Why dont you subpoena Perry from the other world and try him as a war criminal?”    In November of 1948 Ishiwara declared on a home recorded video “we must utterly cast war aside. We must firmly avoid questions of interest and advantage and judge our national policy purely on a spirit of righteousness…Japan may be devastated, but we must live by a complete rejection of war. The nation must compose itself like Nichiren at Takenoguchi or Christ on his war to the crucifixion”. It seems Ishiwara at the very end gave up on his theories, and supported Japan attaining a permanent peace. That last years of his life were spent in constant pain due to his illness. In 1949 he contracted a fatal case of pneumonia and realizing he was going to die, dictated a message that summed up all his speculation in the recent years on Japan and its future. The document was originally done in English and directed at General Douglas MacArthur. A month after Ishiwara's death, a Japanese version came out titled “the course for a new Japan / Shin Nihon no Shinro”. The primary purpose of the document was to get MacArthur to lift the ban on the east asia league, but it was also a last apologia. He talked about how Germany, the USSR, Italy and Japan had started on the path of state control, and they all fell prey to group despotism, because all decisions were being made by a few men in the center. He argued Britain's socialist government, the United States New Deal and Marshall plan were great example of a good control system. He argued pure liberalism no longer existed anywhere, not even in the US, yet the US was trying to make Japan a liberal nation. He argued all nations should be allowed to move ahead freely. To end it all of he said this as well “I realize now in my predictions concerning a final war between the east and west I was supremely overconfident and that the facts have proven my wrong. I fear that the real final conflict may be the United States and USSR”   At the age of 61 Ishiwara died in August of 1949, in a small house with some of his followers gathered around him. He said to them before dying he was glad to die at the same age as Nichiren

A bold, revisionist study of modern warfare, showing that military victory is rooted not in large armies and decisive battles, but in the full spectrum of economic, political, and social power. For nearly two centuries, international relations have been premised on the idea of the "Great Powers." As the thinking went, these mighty states--the European empires of the nineteenth century, the United States and the USSR during the Cold War--were uniquely able to exert their influence on the world stage because of their overwhelming military capabilities. But as military historian Phillips Payson O'Brien argues in War and Power: Who Wins Wars--And Why (PublicAffairs, 2025), this conception of power fails to capture the more complicated truth about how wars are fought and won. Our focus on the importance of large, well-equipped armies and conclusive battles has obscured the foundational forces that underlie military victories and the actual mechanics of successful warfare. O'Brien suggests a new framework of "full-spectrum powers," taking into account all of the diverse factors that make a state strong--from economic and technological might, to political stability, to the complex logistics needed to maintain forces in the field. Drawing on examples ranging from Napoleon's France to today's ascendant China, War and Power offers a critical new understanding of what makes a power truly great. It is vital reading in today's perilous world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

We're continuing from 15 Nov 2024, discussing the next subsection of Chapter 4 (The Pragmatism and Idolatry of the Ideologies), called "Ideologies as Idolatry" based on the insights from a master observer of both types of totalitarian socialisms on the Left, national socialism -- sometimes called fascism -- and the kind of socialism that the Communists in East Germany and Russia had during the 1900s, during the life of Dr. Thielicke. (USSR meant Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). We go from pp. 46 thru 52, finishing that chapter from last year (see 15 Nov 2024, "Law and Ideology" for the last episode in this series). Our return guest today on The Republican Professor Podcast is the former professor of Theology at the University of Hamburg in West Germany, Dr. Helmut Thielicke, Ph.D., D.Theol. (Philosophy and Theology). Professor Thielicke once again joins us through his teaching in his Theological Ethics, Vol. 2: Politics. My copy was purchased at Old Capitol Books (new location) in Monterey, California, across from Nick the Greek restaurant on Alvarado Street (their old location was 559 Tyler, Monterey, CA, across from the Peet's Coffee and was formerly Book Haven for many years), and is a hard copy published in 1969 by Fortress Press and edited by William H. Lazareth. Thielicke died before he was able to come on to The Republican Professor Podcast. We thank Fortress Press for making the book available. Check out their catalogue for a full listing of their very interesting titles, and buy one. Get a copy of this for yourself and following along in our transformative, performative reading of it as we make fair use on his insights, with fresh scholarly commentary from me, and allow it to shape our understanding of American Politics. This is part 9 in a series on The Republican Professor Podcast, an introduction to theological reflection on American government. Here, we continue the topic of the nature and power of "ideology" in Communist Socialist and National Socialist (sometimes called by others fascistic socialism/fascism). Our very special guest today is, once again, the esteemed and long-time Professor of Theology at the University of Hamburg, Helmut Thielicke. And I've invited Professor Thielicke to join us today through my transformative, performative reading (with my scholarly commentary upon) and fair use of his teaching on this topic in his magisterial "Theological Ethics, Volume 2: Politics." My copy of the book was published in 1969 by Fortress Press. Please buy a copy of the book and follow along with our study of this material. Here's a link to the book: https://www.amazon.com/Theological-Ethics-Politics-Helmut-Thielicke/dp/0802817920 Please, please support your brick and mortar used book dealers as well. Professor Thielicke died before we were able to invite him in person as a guest on the podcast. Thanks to Fortress Press, the book is still in print and would be a valuable addition, indeed, to your personal library. Please support the work of Fortress Press and buy the book, and check out the other selections that they carry, as well. The Republican Professor Podcast is a pro-deeply-conversing-on-the-theological-aspects-of-the-nature-of-government podcast. Therefore, welcome Professor Helmut Thielicke ! The Republican Professor is produced and hosted by Dr. Lucas J. Mather, Ph.D. To financially support this podcast, comment on today's episode, or to make a suggestion for a topic or guest for the podcast or Substack newsletter, send an email to therepublicanprofessor@substack.com . We'd love to hear from you. Warmly, Lucas J. Mather, Ph.D. The Republican Professor Podcast The Republican Professor Newsletter on Substack https://therepublicanprofessor.substack.com/ https://www.therepublicanprofessor.com/podcast/ https://www.therepublicanprofessor.com/articles/

A bold, revisionist study of modern warfare, showing that military victory is rooted not in large armies and decisive battles, but in the full spectrum of economic, political, and social power. For nearly two centuries, international relations have been premised on the idea of the "Great Powers." As the thinking went, these mighty states--the European empires of the nineteenth century, the United States and the USSR during the Cold War--were uniquely able to exert their influence on the world stage because of their overwhelming military capabilities. But as military historian Phillips Payson O'Brien argues in War and Power: Who Wins Wars--And Why (PublicAffairs, 2025), this conception of power fails to capture the more complicated truth about how wars are fought and won. Our focus on the importance of large, well-equipped armies and conclusive battles has obscured the foundational forces that underlie military victories and the actual mechanics of successful warfare. O'Brien suggests a new framework of "full-spectrum powers," taking into account all of the diverse factors that make a state strong--from economic and technological might, to political stability, to the complex logistics needed to maintain forces in the field. Drawing on examples ranging from Napoleon's France to today's ascendant China, War and Power offers a critical new understanding of what makes a power truly great. It is vital reading in today's perilous world. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

Last time we spoke about the Changsha fire. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man or flood the land to slow the invaders. He chose both, pushing rivers and rallying a fractured army as Japanese forces pressed along the Yangtze. Fortresses at Madang held long, but the cost was high—troops lost, civilians displaced, a city's heart burning in the night. Wuhan fell after months of brutal fighting, yet the battle did not break China's will. Mao Zedong urged strategy over martyrdom, preferring to drain the enemy and buy time for a broader struggle. The Japanese, though victorious tactically, found their strength ebbing, resource strains, supply gaps, and a war that felt endless. In the wake of Wuhan, Changsha stood next in the Japanese crosshairs, its evacuation and a devastating fire leaving ash and memory in its wake. Behind these prices, political currents swirled. Wang Jingwei defected again, seeking power beyond Chiang's grasp, while Chongqing rose as a western bastion of resistance. The war hardened into a protracted stalemate, turning Japan from an aggressive assailant into a wary occupier, and leaving China to endure, persist, and fight on.   #175  The Soviet-Japanese Border Conflicts Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So based on the title of this one, you probably can see we are taking a bit of a detour. For quite some time we have focused on the Japanese campaigns into China proper 1937-1938. Now the way the second sino-japanese war is traditionally broken down is in phases. 1937-1938, 1939-1942 and 1942-1945. However there is actually even more going on in China aside from the war with Japan. In Xinjiang province a large full blown Islamic revolution breaks out in 1937. We will be covering that story at a later date, but another significant event is escalating border skirmishes in Manchukuo. Now these border skirmishes had been raging ever since the USSR consolidated its hold over the far east. We talked about some of those skirmishes prior to the Sino-Soviet war in 1929. However when Japan created the puppet government of Manchukuo, this was a significant escalation in tensions with the reds. Today we are going to talk about the escalating border conflicts between the Soviets and Japan. A tongue of poorly demarcated land extends southeast from Hunchun, hugging the east bank of the Tumen River between Lake Khasan to the east and Korea to the west. Within this tongue stands Changkufeng Hill, one of a long chain of highlands sweeping from upstream along the rivers and moors toward the sea. The twin-peaked hill sits at the confluence area several miles northwest of the point where Manchuria, Korea, and the Russian Far East meet. The hill's shape reminded Koreans of their changgo, which is a long snare drum constricted at the center and tapped with the hands at each end. When the Manchus came to the Tumen, they rendered the phonetic sounds into three ideographic characters meaning "taut drum peaks" or Chang-ku-feng. The Japanese admired the imagery and preserved the Chinese readings, which they pronounce Cho-ko-ho. From their eastern vantage, the Russians called it Zaozernaya, "hill behind the lake." Soviet troops referred to it as a sugar-loaf hill. For many years, natives and a handful of officials in the region cultivated a relaxed attitude toward borders and sovereignty. Even after the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, the issue did not immediately come to a head. With the expansion of Manchukuo and the Soviet Far East under Stalin's Five-Year plans, both sides began to attend more closely to frontier delimitation. Whenever either party acted aggressively, force majeure was invoked to justify the unexpected and disruptive events recognized in international law. Most often, these incidents erupted along the eastern Manchurian borders with the USSR or along the 350-mile frontier south of Lake Khanka, each skirmish carrying the seeds of all-out warfare. Now we need to talk a little bit about border history. The borders in question essentially dated to pacts concluded by the Qing dynasty and the Tsardom. Between the first Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and the Mukden Agreement of 1924, there were over a dozen accords governing the borders. Relevant to Changkufeng were the basic 15-article Convention of Peking, supplementing the Tientsin Treaties of November 1860, some maps made in 1861, and the eight-article Hunchun Border Protocol of 1886. By the 1860 treaty, the Qing ceded to Tsarist Russia the entire maritime province of Siberia, but the meaning of "lands south of Lake Khanka" remained rather vague. Consequently, a further border agreement was negotiated in June 1861 known as "the Lake Khanka Border Pact", by which demarcations were drawn on maps and eight wooden markers erected. The border was to run from Khanka along ridgelines between the Hunchun River and the sea, past Suifenho and Tungning, terminating about 6 miles from the mouth of the Tumen. Then a Russo-Chinese commission established in 1886 drew up the Hunchun Border Pact, proposing new or modified markers along the 1860–1861 lines and arranging a Russian resurvey. However, for the Japanese, in 1938, the Chinese or Manchu texts of the 1886 Hunchun agreement were considered controlling. The Soviets argued the border ran along every summit west of Khasan, thereby granting them jurisdiction over at least the eastern slopes of all elevations, including Changkufeng and Shachaofeng.  Since the Qing dynasty and the house of Romanov were already defunct, the new sovereignties publicly appealed to opposing texts, and the Soviet side would not concede that the Russian-language version had never been deemed binding by the Qing commissioners. Yet, even in 1938, the Japanese knew that only the Chinese text had survived or could be located.    Now both the Chinese and Russian military maps generally drew the frontier along the watershed east of Khasan; this aligned with the 1861 readings based on the Khanka agreement. The Chinese Republican Army conducted new surveys sometime between 1915 and 1920. The latest Chinese military map of the Changkufeng area drew the border considerably closer to the old "red line" of 1886, running west of Khasan but near the shore rather than traversing the highland crests. None of the military delimitations of the border was sanctified by an official agreement. Hence, the Hunchun Protocol, whether well known or not, invaluable or worthless, remained the only government-to-government pact dealing with the frontiers.  Before we jump into it, how about a little summary of what became known as the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts. The first major conflict would obviously be the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Following years of conflict between the Russian Empire and Japan culminating in the costly Battle of Tsushima, Tsar Nicholas II's government sought peace, recognizing Japan's claims to Korea and agreeing to evacuate Manchuria.  From 1918 to 1920, the Imperial Japanese Army, under Emperor Taishō after the death of Meiji, assisted the White Army and Alexander Kerensky against the Bolshevik Red Army. They also aided the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia to facilitate its return to Europe after an Austrian-Hungarian armoured train purportedly went astray. By 1920, with Austria-Hungary dissolved and Czechoslovakia established two years earlier, the Czechoslovak Legion reached Europe. Japan withdrew from the Russian Revolution and the Civil War in 1922. Following Japan's 1919-1920 occupations and the Soviet intervention in Mongolia in 1921, the Republic of China also withdrew from Outer Mongolia in 1921. In 1922, after capturing Vladivostok in 1918 to halt Bolshevik advances, Japanese forces retreated to Japan as Bolshevik power grew and the postwar fatigue among combatants increased. After Hirohito's invasion of Manchuria in 1931–1932, following Taishō's death in 1926, border disputes between Manchukuo, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Soviet Union increased. Many clashes stemmed from poorly defined borders, though some involved espionage. Between 1932 and 1934, the Imperial Japanese Army reported 152 border disputes, largely tied to Soviet intelligence activity in Manchuria, while the Soviets accused Japan of 15 border violations, six air intrusions, and 20 cases of "spy smuggling" in 1933 alone. Numerous additional violations followed in the ensuing years. By the mid-1930s, Soviet-Japanese diplomacy and trust had deteriorated further, with the Japanese being openly labeled "fascist enemies" at the Seventh Comintern Congress in July 1935. Beginning in 1935, conflicts significantly escalated. On 8 January 1935, the first armed clash, known as the Halhamiao incident, took place on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. Several dozen cavalrymen of the Mongolian People's Army crossed into Manchuria near disputed fishing grounds and engaged an 11‑man Manchukuo Imperial Army patrol near the Buddhist temple at Halhamiao, led by a Japanese military advisor. The Manchukuo Army sustained 6 wounded and 2 dead, including the Japanese officer; the Mongols suffered no casualties and withdrew after the Japanese sent a punitive expedition to reclaim the area. Two motorized cavalry companies, a machine‑gun company, and a tankette platoon occupied the position for three weeks without resistance. In June 1935, the first direct exchange of fire between the Japanese and Soviets occurred when an 11‑man Japanese patrol west of Lake Khanka was attacked by six Soviet horsemen, reportedly inside Manchukuo territory. In the firefight, one Soviet soldier was killed and two horses were captured. The Japanese requested a joint investigation, but the Soviets rejected the proposal. In October 1935, nine Japanese and 32 Manchukuoan border guards were establishing a post about 20 kilometers north of Suifenho when they were attacked by 50 Soviet soldiers. The Soviets opened fire with rifles and five heavy machine guns. Two Japanese and four Manchukuoan soldiers were killed, and another five were wounded. The Manchukuoan foreign affairs representative lodged a verbal protest with the Soviet consul at Suifenho. The Kwantung Army of Japan also sent an intelligence officer to investigate the clash. On 19 December 1935, a Manchukuoan unit reconnoitering southwest of Buir Lake clashed with a Mongolian party, reportedly capturing 10 soldiers. Five days later, 60 truck‑borne Mongolian troops assaulted the Manchukuoans and were repulsed, at the cost of three Manchukuoan dead. On the same day, at Brunders, Mongolian forces attempted three times to drive out Manchukuoan outposts, and again at night, but all attempts failed. Further small attempts occurred in January, with Mongolians using airplanes for reconnaissance. The arrival of a small Japanese force in three trucks helped foil these attempts; casualties occurred on both sides, though Mongolian casualties are unknown aside from 10 prisoners taken. In February 1936, Lieutenant-Colonel Sugimoto Yasuo was ordered to form a detachment from the 14th Cavalry Regiment to "drive the Outer Mongol intruders from the Olankhuduk region," a directive attributed to Lieutenant-General Kasai Heijuro. Sugimoto's detachment included cavalry guns, heavy machine guns, and tankettes. They faced a force of about 140 Mongolians equipped with heavy machine guns and light artillery. On February 12, Sugimoto's men drove the Mongolians south, at the cost of eight Japanese killed, four wounded, and one tankette destroyed. The Japanese began to withdraw, but were attacked by 5–6 Mongolian armored cars and two bombers, which briefly disrupted the column. The situation was stabilized when the Japanese unit received artillery support, allowing them to destroy or repel the armored cars. In March 1936, the Tauran incident occurred. In this clash, both the Japanese Army and the Mongolian Army deployed a small number of armored fighting vehicles and aircraft. The incident began when 100 Mongolian and six Soviet troops attacked and occupied the disputed village of Tauran, Mongolia, driving off the small Manchurian garrison. They were supported by light bombers and armored cars, though the bombing sorties failed to inflict damage on the Japanese, and three bombers were shot down by Japanese heavy machine guns. Local Japanese forces counter-attacked, conducting dozens of bombing sorties and finally assaulting Tauran with 400 men and 10 tankettes. The result was a Mongolian rout, with 56 Mongolian soldiers killed, including three Soviet advisors, and an unknown number wounded. Japanese losses were 27 killed and 9 wounded. Later in March 1936, another border clash occurred between Japanese and Soviet forces. Reports of border violations prompted the Japanese Korean Army to send ten men by truck to investigate, but the patrol was ambushed by 20 Soviet NKVD soldiers deployed about 300 meters inside territory claimed by Japan. After suffering several casualties, the Japanese patrol withdrew and was reinforced with 100 men, who then drove off the Soviets. Fighting resumed later that day when the NKVD brought reinforcements. By nightfall, the fighting had ceased and both sides had pulled back. The Soviets agreed to return the bodies of two Japanese soldiers who had died in the fighting, a development viewed by the Japanese government as encouraging. In early April 1936, three Japanese soldiers were killed near Suifenho in another minor affray. This incident was notable because the Soviets again returned the bodies of the fallen servicemen. In June 1937, the Kanchazu Island incident occurred on the Amur River along the Soviet–Manchukuo border. Three Soviet gunboats crossed the river's center line, disembarked troops, and occupied Kanchazu Island. Japanese forces from the IJA 1st Division, equipped with two horse-drawn 37 mm artillery pieces, quickly established improvised firing positions and loaded their guns with both high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. They shelled the Soviet vessels, sinking the lead gunboat, crippling the second, and driving off the third. Japanese troops subsequently fired on the swimming crewmen from the sunken ships using machine guns. Thirty-seven Soviet soldiers were killed, while Japanese casualties were zero. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested and demanded the Soviet forces withdraw from the island. The Soviet leadership, apparently shocked by the incident and reluctant to escalate, agreed to evacuate their troops. By 1938 the border situation had deteriorated. The tangled terrain features, mountain, bog, stream, forest, and valley, would have complicated even careful observers' discernment of the old red line drawn in 1886. Fifty years later, the markers themselves had undergone a metamorphosis. Japanese investigators could find, at most, only 14 to 17 markers standing fairly intact between the Tumen estuary and Khanka—roughly one every 25 miles at best. The remainder were missing or ruined; five were found in new locations. Marker "K," for example, was 40 meters deeper inside Manchuria, away from Khanka. Japanese military experts noted that of the 20 markers originally set along the boundaries of Hunchun Prefecture alone, only four could be found by the summer of 1938. The rest had either been wrecked or arbitrarily moved and discarded by Russian or Chinese officials and inhabitants. It is even said that one missing marker could be seen on display in Khabarovsk. The Chinese had generally interpreted the boundary as the road line just west of Khasan, at least in practice. Free road movement, however, had become a problem even 20 years before the Japanese overran Manchuria in 1931–1932 during the so-called Manchurian Incident. The Japanese adopted, or inherited, the Chinese interpretation, which was based on the 1886 agreement on border roads; the key clause held that the frontier west of Khasan would be the road along the lake. Japanese sources emphasize that local residents' anger toward gradual Soviet oppression and penetrations westward into Manchurian territory fueled the conflict. Many natives believed the original boundaries lay east of the lake, but the Soviets adjusted the situation to suit their own convenience. In practice, the Russians were restricting road use just west of Khasan by Manchurian and Korean residents. There was speculation that this was a prelude to taking over the ridgelines, depending on the reaction of the Manchukuoan–Japanese side. Villagers who went to streams or the lake to launder clothing found themselves subjected to sniper fire. Along a 25-mile stretch of road near Shachaofeng, farmers reported coming under fire from new Soviet positions as early as November 1935. Nevertheless, Japanese and Koreans familiar with the Tumen area noted agrarian, seasonal Korean religious rites atop Changkufeng Hill, including fattened pigs sacrificed and changgo drums beaten. Village elders told Japanese visitors in 1938 that, until early the preceding year, no Russians had come as far as Changkufeng Hill. Looking only at the border sector around Changkufeng, the easy days were clearly behind us. In the summer of 1938, Gaimusho "Foreign Ministry" observers described the explosive situation along the Korea–Manchuria–USSR borders as a matter of de facto frontiers. Both sides pressed against each other, and their trigger-happy posture was summed up in the colloquial refrain: "Take another step and we'll let you have it." Near dawn on 13 June 1938, a Manchurian patrol detected a suspicious figure in the fog swirling over Changlingtzu Hill on the Siberian–Manchurian frontier. Challenged at 15 feet, the suspect hurled two pistols to the ground and raised his hands in surrender. At headquarters, the police soon realized this was no routine border-trespassing case. The man was a defector and he was a Russian general, in fact he was the director of all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Beneath a mufti of spring coat and hunting cap, he wore a full uniform with medals. His identification card No. 83 designated him as G. S. Lyushkov, Commissar 3rd Class, countersigned by Nikolai Yezhov, NKVD head in Moscow. Lyushkov was promptly turned over to the Japanese military authorities, who transferred him to Seoul and then to Tokyo under close escort. On 1 July, the Japanese press was permitted to disclose that Lyushkov had sought refuge in Japan. Ten days later, to capitalize on the commissar's notoriety and to confound skeptics, the Japanese produced Lyushkov at a press conference in Tokyo. For the Japanese and foreign correspondents, who met separately with him, Lyushkov described Soviet Far East strength and the turmoil wracking the USSR, because for those of you unfamiliar this was during the Stalinist purges. Clearly, the Japanese had gained a unique reservoir of high-level intelligence and a wealth of materials, including notes scratched in blood by suspects incarcerated at Khabarovsk. A general tightening of Russian frontier security had recently been reported. Natives of Fangchuanting asserted that a Soviet cavalry patrol appeared in June, seemingly for the first time. Contact with Yangkuanping, northwest of Khasan, was severed. More importantly, Japanese Army Signal Corps intelligence detected a surge of Soviet message traffic from the Posyet Bay district. After Lyushkov's defection, a drastic reshuffle in the local Russian command apparently occurred, and responsibility for border surveillance seems to have been reallocated. Japanese records indicate that the Novokievsk security force commander was relieved and the sector garrison replaced by troops from Vladivostok. Gaimusho intelligence also received reports that a border garrison unit had been transferred from Khabarovsk or Chita to the Tumen sector. The Kwantung Army signal monitors also intercepted two significant frontline messages on 6 July from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region, addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Khabarovsk. Decoded, the messages suggested (1) that ammunition for infantry mortars amounted to less than half the required supply; and  (2) a recommendation that higher headquarters authorize Russian elements to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of Khasan.  The commander noted terrain advantages and the contemplated construction of emplacements that would command Najin and the Korean railway. As a start, at least one Russian platoon should be authorized to dig in on the highest ground (presumably Changkufeng) and deploy four tons of entanglements to stake out the Soviet claim. Korea Army Headquarters received a telegram from the Kwantung Army on 7 July conveying the deciphered messages. On the same day, the 19th Division in North Korea telephoned Seoul that, on 6 July, three or four Soviet horsemen had been observed reconnoitering Manchurian territory from atop a hill called Changkufeng. The alarming intelligence from the Kwantung Army and the front warranted immediate attention by the Korea Army. Some Kwantung Army officers doubted the significance of the developments, with one intelligence official even suggesting the Russian messages might be a deliberate ploy designed to entrap the Japanese at Changkufeng. On 7–8 July, all staff officers in Seoul convened at army headquarters. The name of Changkufeng Hill was not well known, but maps and other data suggested that neither the Japanese nor the Russians had previously stationed border units in the ridge complex west of Khasan. As early as March 1936, Army Commander Koiso Kuniaki had distributed maps to subordinate units, indicating which sectors were in dispute. No patrol was to enter zones lacking definitive demarcation. Until then, the only Japanese element east of the Tumen was a Manchurian policeman at Fangchuanting. Ownership of the high ground emerged as an early issue. A number of other points were raised by  the Kwantung Army: At present, Soviet elements in the area were negligible. The intrusion must not be overlooked. The Russians could be expected to exploit any weakness, and half-measures would not suffice, especially regarding the Japanese defense mission along a 125-mile frontier. In Japanese hands, Changkufeng Hill would be useful, but two excellent observation posts already existed in the neighboring sector of the Manchurian tongue. With dissidence and purges underway, the Russians may have judged it necessary to seal border gaps, particularly after Lyushkov's defection. They may also have sought to control Changkufeng to offset Japanese dominance of the high ground to the north. Soviet seizure of Changkufeng would upset the delicate status quo and could provoke a contest for equivalent observation posts. In broader terms, it mattered little whether the Russians sought a permanent observation post on Changkufeng Hill, which was of relatively minor strategic value. Japan's primary concern lay in the China theater; Changkufeng was peripheral. The Japanese should not expend limited resources or become distracted. The matter required consultation with the high command in Tokyo. In the absence of more comprehensive intelligence, the assembled staff officers concluded that the Korea Army should, at a minimum, ignore or disregard Soviet actions for the time being, while maintaining vigilant observation of the area. The consensus was communicated to Major General Kitano Kenzo, the Korea Army chief of staff, who concurred, and to Koiso. Upon learning that the recommendation advocated a low posture, Koiso inquired only whether the opinion reflected the unanimous view of the staff. Having been assured that it did, he approved the policy. Koiso, then 58, was at the threshold of the routine personnel changes occurring around 15 July. He had just been informed that he would retire and that General Nakamura Kotaro would succeed him. Those acquainted with Koiso perceived him as treating the border difficulties as a minor anticlimax in the course of his command tour. He appeared unemphatic or relaxed as he prepared to depart from a post he had held for twenty-one years. Although neither Koiso nor his staff welcomed the Soviet activities that appeared under way, his reaction likely reflected a reluctance to make decisions that could constrain his soon-to-arrive successor. On 8 July Koiso authorized the dispatch of warnings to the 19th Division at Nanam, to the Hunchun garrison, and to the intelligence branch at Hunchun. These units were instructed to exercise maximum precautions and to tighten frontier security north of Shuiliufeng. In response to the initial appearance of Soviet horsemen at Changkufeng, the Kucheng Border Garrison Unit of the 76th Infantry Regiment maintained close surveillance across the Tumen. By about noon on 9 July, patrols detected approximately a dozen Russian troops commencing construction atop Changkufeng. Between 11 and 13 July, the number of soldiers on the slopes increased to forty; there were also thirty horses and eleven camouflaged tents. Operating in shifts on the western side, thirty meters from the crest, the Russians erected barbed wire and firing trenches; fifty meters forward, they excavated observation trenches. In addition to existing telephone lines between Changkufeng, Lake Khasan, and Kozando, the Russians installed a portable telephone net. Logistical support was provided by three boats on the lake. Approximately twenty kilometers to the east, well within Soviet territory, large forces were being mobilized, and steamship traffic into Posyet Bay intensified. Upon learning of the "intrusion" at Changkufeng on 9 July, Lt. General Suetaka Kamezo, the commander of the 19th Division, dispatched staff officers to the front and prepared to send elements to reinforce border units.  The special significance of Suetaka and his division stemmed from a series of unusual circumstances. Chientao Province, the same zone into which Lyushkov had fled and the sector where Soviet horsemen had appeared, fell within Manchukuo geographically and administratively. Yet, in terms of defense, the configuration of the frontier, the terrain, and the transportation network more closely connected the region with North Korea than with southeastern Manchuria. Approximately 80% of the population was of Korean origin, which implied Japanese rather than Manchukuoan allegiance. Consequently, the Korea Army had been made operationally responsible for the defense of Chientao and controlled not only the three-battalion garrison at Hunchun but also the intelligence detachment located there. In the event of war, the Korea Army's mission was defined as mobilization and execution of subsidiary operational tasks against the USSR, under the control and in support of the Kwantung Army.  The Korea Army ordinarily possessed two infantry divisions, the 19th in North Korea and the 20th stationed at Seoul, but the 20th Division had already departed for China, leaving only the 20th Depot Division in the capital. Beyond sparse ground units, devoid of armor and with weak heavy artillery, there were only two air regiments in Korea, the nearest being the unit at Hoeryong. The Korea Army was designed to maintain public security within Korea as well as fulfill minimal defensive responsibilities. Such an army did not require a full-time operations officer, and none was maintained. When needed, as in mid-1938, the task fell to the senior staff officer, in this case Colonel Iwasaki Tamio. In peacetime, training constituted the primary focus.  Thus, the 19th Division was entrusted with defending northeastern Korea. Its commander, Suetaka, a seasoned infantryman, resented the fact that his elite force had never engaged in combat in China. He intensified training with zeal, emphasizing strict discipline, bravery, aggressiveness, and thorough preparation. Japanese veterans characterized him as severe, bullish, short-tempered, hot-blooded, highly strung, unbending, and stubborn. Nonetheless, there was widespread respect for his realistic training program, maintained under firm, even violent, personal supervision. His men regarded Suetaka as a professional, a modern samurai who forged the division into superb condition. Privately, he was reputed for sensitivity and warmth; a Japanese phrase "yakamashii oyaji" captures the dual sense of stern father and martinet in his character. At the outset, however, Suetaka displayed little aggression. Although not widely known, he did not welcome the orders from army headquarters to deploy to the Tumen. Until late July, he remained somewhat opposed to the notion of dislodging the Soviets from the crest, a proposition arising from neither the division staff nor, initially, Suetaka himself. Colonel Sato noted that, for a week after reports of Soviet excavation at Changkufeng, the division's response was limited to preparations for a possible emergency, as they perceived the matter as a local issue best settled through diplomacy. Korea Army officers acknowledged that, around the time the Soviets consolidated their outpost strength at Changkufeng, an informal and personal telegram arrived in Seoul from a Kwantung Army Intelligence field-grade officer who specialized in Soviet affairs. If the Korea Army hesitated, the Kwantung Army would be obliged to eject the Russians; the matter could not be ignored. While the telegram did not demand a reply and struck several officers as presumptuous and implausible, the message was promptly shown to Koiso. Koiso was driven to immediate action, he wired Tokyo asserting that only the Korea Army could and would handle the incident. One staff officer recalled "We felt we had to act, out of a sense of responsibility. But we resented the Kwantung Army's interference." The Korea Army staff convened shortly after receipt of the unofficial telegram from Hsinking. Based on the latest intelligence from the division dated 13 July, the officers prepared an assessment for submission to the army commander. The hypotheses were distilled into three scenarios: The USSR, or the Far East authorities, desires hostilities. Conclusion: Slightly possible. The USSR seeks to restrain Japan on the eve of the pivotal operations in China: the major Japanese offensive to seize Hankow. Conclusion: Highly probable. The Posyet district commander is new in his post; by occupying the Changkufeng ridges, he would demonstrate loyalty, impress superiors, and seek glory. Conclusion: Possible. Late on 13 July or early on 14 July, Koiso approved the dispatch of a message to the vice minister of war, and the Kwantung Army chief of staff:  "Lake Khasan area lies in troublesome sector USSR has been claiming . . . in accordance with treaties [said Secret Message No. 913], but we interpret it to be Manchukuoan territory, evident even from maps published by Soviet side. Russian actions are patently illegal, but, considering that area does not exert major or immediate influence on operations [Japan] is intending and that China Incident is in full swing, we are not going to conduct counterattack measures immediately. This army is thinking of reasoning with Soviets and requesting pullback, directly on spot. . . . In case Russians do not accede in long run, we have intention to drive Soviet soldiers out of area east of Khasan firmly by use of force."  The message concluded with a request that the Tokyo authorities lodge a formal protest with the USSR, on behalf of Manchukuo and Japan, and guide matters so that the Russians would withdraw quickly. Dominant in Japanese high command thinking in 1938 was the China theater; the Changkufeng episode constituted a mere digression. A sequence of Japanese tactical victories had preceded the summer: Tsingtao fell in January; the Yellow River was reached in March; a "reformed government of the Republic of China" was installed at Nanking several weeks later; Amoy fell in early May; Suchow fell on the 20th. With these gains, northern and central fronts could be linked by the Japanese. Yet Chinese resistance persisted, and while public statements anticipated imminent Chinese dissension, private admissions acknowledged that the partial effects of Suchow's fall were ominous: control might pass from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists, Chinese defiance might intensify, and Soviet involvement could ensue. A Hankow drive appeared desirable to symbolize the conclusion of the military phase of hostilities. The Japanese and their adversaries were in accord regarding the importance of the summer and autumn campaigns. Even after Suchow's fall, the government discouraged public insinuations that enemy resistance was collapsing; when Chiang addressed the nation on the first anniversary of hostilities, Premier Konoe prophetically proclaimed, "The war has just begun." Colonel Inada Masazum served as the Army General Staff's principal figure for the Changkufeng affair, occupying the position of chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March 1938. A distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, Inada completed the War College program and held a combination of line, instructional, and staff assignments at the War College, the Army General Staff, and the War Ministry. He was recognized as a sharp, highly capable, and driveful personality, though some regarded him as enigmatic. Following the capture of Suchow, Imperial General Headquarters on 18 June ordered field forces to undertake operational preparations for a drive to seize the Wuhan complex. Inada favored a decisive move aimed at achieving a rapid political settlement. He acknowledged that Soviet intervention in 1938, during Japan's involvement in China, would have been critical. Although Japanese forces could still defeat the Chinese, an overextended Japanese Army might be fatally compromised against the Russians. Soviet assistance to China was already pronouncedly unwelcome. The Soviets were reported to possess roughly 20 rifle divisions, four to five cavalry divisions, 1,500 tanks, and 1,560 aircraft, including 300 bombers with a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers, enabling reach from Vladivostok to Tokyo. Soviet manpower in Siberia was likely near 370,000. In response, Japanese central authorities stressed a no-trouble policy toward the USSR while seeking to "wall off" the border and bolster the Kwantung Army as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the envisaged correction of the strategic imbalance could not occur before 1943, given shortages in ammunition, manpower, and materiel across existing theaters in China. By the end of 1937 Japan had committed 16 of its 24 divisions to China, bringing the standing force to roughly 700,000. Army General Staff planners reallocated three ground divisions, intended for a northern contingency, from north to central China, even as the Kwantung Army operated from a less favorable posture. Attitudes toward the northern problem varied within senior military circles. While concern persisted, it was not universal. As campaigns in China widened, planning at the high command level deteriorated, propagating confusion and anxiety to field armies in China. The Japanese Navy suspected that the Army general staff was invoking the USSR as a pretext for broader strategic aims—namely, to provoke a more consequential confrontation with the USSR while the Navy contended with its own strategic rivalries with the Army, centered on the United States and Britain. Army leaders, however, denied aggressive intent against the USSR at that time. The Hankow plan encountered substantial internal opposition at high levels. Private assessments among army planners suggested that a two-front war would be premature given operational readiness and troop strength. Not only were new War Ministry officials cautious, but many high-ranking Army general staff officers and court circles shared doubts.  Aggressive tendencies, influenced by subordinates and the Kwantung Army, were evident in Inada, who repeatedly pressed Tada Shun, the deputy army chief of staff, to endorse the Wuhan drive as both necessary and feasible, arguing that the USSR would gain from Japan's weakening without incurring substantial losses. Inada contended that Stalin was rational and that time favored the USSR in the Far East, where industrial buildup and military modernization were ongoing. He argued that the Soviet purges impeded opportunistic ventures with Japan. He posited that Nazi Germany posed a growing threat on the western front, and thus the USSR should be avoided by both Japan, due to China and Russia, due to Germany. While most of the army remained engaged in China, Tada did not initially share Inada's views; only after inspecting the Manchurian borders in April 1938 did he finally align with Inada's broader vision, which encompassed both northern and Chinese considerations. During this period, Inada studied daily intelligence from the Kwantung Army, and after Lyushkov's defection in June, reports suggested the Soviets were following their sector commander's recommendations. Russian troops appeared at Changkufeng, seemingly prepared to dig in. Inada recollects his reaction: "That's nice, my chance has come." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The simmering Soviet–Japanese border clashes centered on Changkufeng Hill near Lake Khanka, set within a broader history of contested frontiers dating to Qing and Tsarist treaties. Japan, prioritizing China, considered Changkufeng peripheral but ready to confront Soviet encroachment; Moscow aimed to consolidate border gains, with high-level war planning overlaying regional skirmishes. Conflict loomed over Manchuria.

TV Guide October 31 - November 6, 1987 This week Ken welcomes writer, comedian and artist Mary Houlihan to the show. Ken and Mary discuss new ways to greet people, how awful the world is, growing up in New Jersey, how New Jersey is actually nice, checking out the woods, Paramis, going into Manhattan, not getting the issue you wanted, Dolly Parton, the tattoos, variety shows, Mary, product placement, growing up without country music in the Northeast, how famous rich people should try to be good people, work life balance, wanting to be left alone, Family Ties, Courtney Cox, At This Moment, Billy Vera, Kool Milds, when political campaigns became reality TV, Grand Ole Opry, Halloween, Women in Prison, Joe Piscapo, the most famous person from your state, how it's incomprehensible that anyone in the 21st Century ever puts on black face, Nickelodeon, Nick News, Cartoon Network, Dexter's Lab, The Flying Karamatzoff Brothers, non-comedic Rhea Pearlman roles, murder, The Simpsons, the awful early days of the Fox network, Get a Life, kicking Seinfeld's ass, Jason Mamoa, Giants vs Cowboys, ambiance, Harry and the Hendersons, Scorch, What a Dummy!, the TV Guide movie section, Bad New Bears go to Japan, Fluppy Dogs, The Huga-Bunch, Discover, World of Science, Bigfoot, Crime Story, Miami Vice, David Chase, Dads, Romania, Ukraine Youtubers, Billy Joel Back in the USSR, how Joel Hodgson could have been Woody on Cheers, Freaks and Geeks, Wise Guy, I Married Dora finale, Ken's Rags to Riches beef with Baby Jessica, Billy Madison being interrupted by Clinton Lewinski coverage, and the art of saying it without saying it. 

Patrick Bet-David examines the United States' relationship with China and Russia. Which country is a better strategic partner for the United States? Did Nixon and Kissinger accidentally create the rise of China? And is Trump reviving their Cold War strategy to rebalance global power?This video breaks down the strategy behind triangular diplomacy and the geopolitical chess game between the United States, China, and Russia that has shaped world power for more than 50 years.

November 7, 1944. A spy who predicted the Nazi invasion of the USSR and Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is executed. This episode originally aired in 2024.Support the show! Join Into History for ad-free listening and more.History Daily is a co-production of Airship and Noiser.Go to HistoryDaily.com for more history, daily.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Donate (no account necessary) | Subscribe (account required) Join Bryan Dean Wright, former CIA Operations Officer, as he dives into today's top stories shaping America and the world. In this episode of The Wright Report, Bryan breaks down what fueled Democrats' big election wins, the White House response to those losses, and why the GOP is now divided over whether to end the Senate filibuster. We'll also cover a plane crash in Kentucky, Europe's migrant gang crisis, China's backtracking on trade promises, and good news from the world of medicine. Election Aftermath and the GOP Divide: Republicans are blaming blue states for this week's Democratic sweep, but Vice President JD Vance says the problem is deeper — working-class voters are frustrated with slow economic progress. Bryan agrees, warning that without action on wages, housing, and immigration, low-propensity MAGA voters will stay home in 2026. White House Strategy and Filibuster Fight: Trump is pushing GOP senators to scrap the filibuster so his economic agenda can pass with a simple majority. Some Republicans refuse, but others warn that Democrats will eventually do it anyway. Bryan says, "If the GOP waits too long, America could wake up with Marxist mayors becoming its presidents." Migrant Crime Spreads in Europe: Norway is facing bombings and assassinations linked to North African and Middle Eastern migrant gangs spreading from Sweden. Police say children as young as ten are being recruited for contract killings — some even hired by Iran. Bryan warns, "This is what happens when immigration policy abandons common sense." Gaza's Tunnel Stalemate: Dozens of Hamas fighters are trapped in their own tunnels and begging Israel for mercy. Trump and Arab partners are urging Israel to show compassion, while Jerusalem insists the militants must surrender or face the consequences. China Backtracks on Soybean Deal: Beijing is quietly reinstating tariffs that make U.S. soybeans less competitive, undermining its trade pledges with Trump. Farmers are waiting to see if Xi Jinping will keep his word or walk away from the agreement entirely. Medical Breakthroughs — Schizophrenia and Wound Healing: British researchers discovered that the common antibiotic doxycycline may reduce schizophrenia risk by up to 35 percent. Meanwhile, University of Pennsylvania scientists found that rosemary compounds help wounds heal faster with less scarring.   "And you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." - John 8:32     Keywords: 2025 election results Democrats sweep, JD Vance working-class voters economy, Trump filibuster repeal GOP divide, Norway migrant gangs Foxtrot Rumba Iran, Hamas Gaza tunnel standoff, China soybean tariffs trade deal, doxycycline schizophrenia study UK, rosemary wound healing University of Pennsylvania

Michael Berry tackles socialism, stadium subsidies, and holiday madness.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

"The Future Is Not a Grave" is a three-day workshop happening next week at NYUAD which explores futurisms and futurescapes across the MENA, Gulf, and Indian Ocean regions. In this collaborative episode with NYU Abu Dhabi Institute, conveners Tishani Doshi and Masha Kirasirova delve into challenging despair, fostering collective imagination, and integrating diverse perspectives from artists, scholars, and performers. Discover how this initiative seeks to redefine conversations about the future, moving beyond conventional narratives and embracing a more open-ended, tolerant, and inclusive approach.November 10-12, 2025 in Abu Dhabi

Hey guys before you listen to this one, do realize this is part 3 on a series about General Kanji Ishiwara, so if you have not already done so I would recommend listening to Part 1 & 2.    This episode is General Kanji Ishiwara part 3: The gradual fall into War with China   I tried so hard this time to finish this up neatly in part 3 and utterly failed. I wrote pages and even deleted them to keep squeezing, but theres simply too much to the story. Part 3 will be focusing on the insane politics of the 1930's and how Ishiwara tried to prevent war with China.   Its rather ironic that the man who was the chief instigator that ushering in the conquest of Manchuria was unable to impose his will when it came to molding Manchukuo. Now while Ishiwara Kanji was the operations officer given official responsibility over the planning and conduct of military operations to seize Manchuria, the arrangements for that new state, being political in nature, were not in his sphere of influence. Regardless, Ishiwara was extremely vocal about his opinions on how Manchukuo should develop and he heavily emphasized racial harmony. He continuously hammered his colleagues that the economic development of Manchukuo should reflect the spirit of racial cooperation. Ishiwara assumed the economic interests of Manchukuo would simply coincide with that of the Kwantung army, by definition both's ultimate goals would be unity of Asia against the west. He was very wrong. Ishiwara was consumed by his theory of final war, everything he did was to prepare for it, thus his obsession of racial harmony was another part of the plan.    In 1932 the self government guidance board was abolished in march, leaving its functions and regional organizations to be tossed into brand new bureaus of the new government of Manchukuo. An organization emerged in April called the (Kyowakai / Concordia Association). It was brought together by Yamaguchi Juji and Ozawa Kaisaku, and its purpose was to promote racial harmony and it was backed by members of the Kwantung army, notably Ishiwara, Itagaki and Katakura. The Kwantung army flooded money into the organization and it grew rapidly…well amongst the Japanese anyways. General Honjo was a bit weary about how much the organization might have in the political sphere of Manchukuo, he did not want to see it become an official political party, he preferred it remain in a educative role. By educative role, I of course mean, to be a propaganda arm of the Kwantung army to exert influence over Manchukuo without having real skin in the game.    But to Ishiwara the Concordia Association was the logical means to unify the new nation, guiding its political destiny, to be blunt Ishiwara really saw it should have much more authority than his colleagues believed it should. Ishiwara complained in August of 1932, that Manchuria was a conglomerate of conflicting power centers such as the Kwantung army, the new Manchukuo government, the Kwantung government, the Mantetsu, consular office and so on. Under so many hats he believed Manchukuo would never become a truly unified modern state, and of course he was one of the few people that actually wanted it to be so. He began arguing the Kwantung army should turn over its political authority as soon as possible so “Japanese of high resolve should hasten to the great work of the Manchurian Concordia Association, for I am sure that we Japanese will be its leaders. In this way Manchukuo will not depend on political control from Japan, but will be an independent state, based on Japanese Manchurian cooperation. Guided by Japanese, it will be a mode of Sino-Japanese friendship, an indicator of the present trends of world civilization” Needless to say the Concordia Association made little headway with the Chinese and it began to annoy Japanese leaders. The association gradually was bent into a spiritless propaganda and intelligence arm of the IJA, staffed largely by elite Japanese working in the Manchukuo government.    Ishiwara began using the Concordia Association to promote things such as: returning leased territories like the Railway zone, abolition of extraterritoriality, equalizing payment between the races working in Manchukuo, the kind of stuff that would promote racial harmony. Such advocacy as you can imagine deviated heavily with the Japanese military, and Ishiwara's reputation would be hurt by this. The Kwantung Army staff began shifting dramatically, seeing Ishiwara isolated, aside from Itagaki and a few other followers being around. The upper brass as they say had had enough of the nuisance Concordia Association's and gradually took control of it and made sure to stop the talk of concessions. In August of 1932 Ishiwara received a new assignment and it seems he was only too happy to leave Manchuria.   Ishiwara returned to Japan, disgusted with the turn of direction Manchuria was going, and believing he would be blamed for its future failures he submitted his resignation. But the IJA knew how popular Ishiwara was and how dangerous he could become so they rejected his resignation. Instead they gave him a military decoration. He was in a very strange spot now, for the youthful officers of the Kodoha faction loved Ishiwara, but the senior top brass of the IJA were extremely suspicious of him and lets just say he was kept under close watch.   Now with Ishiwara back in Japan he would get himself involved in a bit of a war between two factions. As many of you probably already know, the Japanese military of the late 1920s and early 1930's saw the emergence of two factions: the Kodoha “imperial way” and Tosei “control” factions. The Kodoha sought what they called a “showa restoration” to give the emperor absolute power like the good olds days as they say. They were willing to even form a coup if necessary to make this happen. Another thing they believed was in the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” war plan. The idea behind this was that the USSR and communism as a whole was Japans largest threat and the IJA needed to invade the USSR. Now the Tosei faction believed in most of what the Kodoha did, but they differed on some issues. Number 1) they were not willing to perform a coup to usher in a showa restoration, no they thought they could work with the existing Zaibatsu elites and politicians to get things done. THe Kodoha hated the politicians and Zaibatsu to the point they wanted to murder them, so differing opinions. The Tosei also believed the next world war would require a total war strategy, to build up Japan to fight the USSR, but probably the US as well. They favored Nanshin-ron “the southern strike” policy, to target the resources of south east asia necessary to give Japan what it needed to be self sufficient. Another thing that separated these two factions, the Kodoha typically were younger officers.   Despite their differences, everyone in the Japanese military understood forceful expansion into Asia was going to happen and this meant collison with the USSR, America and Britain. Ishiwara's first assignment back in Japan was a temporary duty with the foreign ministry, he was a member of the Japanese legation to the league of nations under Matsuoka Yosuke. The league of nations at this time was performing the Lytton Commission which was investigating the Macnhurian problem, ie: Japan invading Manchuria. Upon returning to Japan in summer of 1933, Ishiwara sought a regimental command, but found it difficult to acquire because of his troublemaker like history. Then General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko who commanded the 2nd sendai division gave him command over the 4th infantry regiment. Ishiwara went to work training the men under him to counter the latest soviet infantry tactics and of course he lectured extensively about his final war theories. During this time rumors emerged that Ishiwara supported the Nanshin-ron strategy. Many of his old colleagues who supported Hokushin-ron demanded he explain himself and Ishiwara did. These rumors were actually false, it was not that Ishiwara favored the Nanshin-ron strategy, it was simply that he did not back all aspects of the Hokushin-ron strategy.   Ishiwara believed to challenge the USSR, first Japan needed an Asian union, which he thought would take probably 30 years to create. But to usher such an Asian union, first Manchukuo needed to be hammered out properly, something Ishiwara thought Japan was failing to do. Also Japan's military strength was insufficient to overwhelm the multiple enemies before her, the war she would enter would be a protracted one. To win such a war she needed resources and allies, notably Manchukuo and China. To confront the USSR, Japan would need to subvert outer mongolia, but to confront the USA and Britain she would have to seize the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong and Guam. It was going to be a global clash.   Ishiwara was gravely concerned with how powerful the USSR was becoming in the early 1930s. In the 3 years since he had left Manchuria, the Soviet divisions in east asia had jumped from 8 to 14 by the end of 1935, while Japanese divisions in Manchuria were only 3. For aircraft the Soviets had 950 vs 220 for Japan. On top of that the Soviets had TB-5 long range bombers, capable of hitting Japan, but the Japanese had no comparable aircraft. A large reason for such build up's were literally because Kodoha leaders were publicly threatening the Soviets such as Generals Sadao Araki. The Kodoha faction faced a lot of challenges as to how they could hope to face off against the USSR. They figured out three main principles needed to be overcome: 1) Japan had to prevent the USSR from being able to defeat its enemies to the west and east one at a time, Japan should seek diplomatic aims in this like allying with Germany. 2) A devastating blow was necessary to the USSR far east, perhaps against the Trans-siberian railway and air bases in the maritime provinces. 3) If Japan was able to demolish Soviet resistance in the far east, Japan would need to take forward positions on the Manchurian border for a protracted war. Ishiwara tried to figure out ways to get by these principles. First he advocated for Japanese troops strength in Manchuria and Korea to be 80% equivalent to that of the Soviets east of Lake Baikal at the offset of hostilities. He also urged cooperation with Germany and to preserve friendly neutral relations with Britain and the US, that is until the soviets were dealt with of course. Ishiwara vigorously felt the Nanshin ron strategy to push into southeast asia and the pacific was far too ambitious for the time being and that all efforts should be made to consolidate Manchuria for resources. Ishiwara tried to win over some Naval support for his plans, but none would be found. When Ishiwara showed his formal plans for Asia to the war ministry, they told him his projections in Manchuria would cost at least 1 billion 300 million yen. They also notified Ishiwara the navy were asking for about the same amount for their programs. Now while Ishiwara spent years trying to produce a 6 year plan to build up Manchuria, other significant things were going on in Japan.   The Kodoha faction as I said had a lot of younger officer support and a lot of these were men who came from rural parts of Japan. A lot of these men came from poor families suffering, and it looked to them that Japan was a nation full of social injustice and spiritual disintegration. These young officers were becoming more and more vocal in the early 1930's about wanting a showa restoration. They thought Japan would be better off as a military state with the emperor on top. Ishiwara empathized with the desire for a showa restoration, and many of the young officers calling for it claimed he was one of their champions. He made some fiery speeches in 1935 linking the evils of capitalism to the destitution of rural japan. He argued farmers were bearing crushing burdens because of economic privation. In his words “if the clash between the exploiters (landlords and capitalists) and the exploited continues much longer the exploited will be ground to bits. The present system of free economic competition has produced a situation where there is a small number of fabulously rich and limitless number of desperately poor. The national has indeed reached a national crisis. Liberal capitalism must inevitably give way to a newer system". What that “newer system was” however differed from what the youthful officers saw as their Showa restoration. Ishiwara wanted the Japanese government to create plans and policy, the Kodoha hardliners wanted to form a violent coup.    Kodoha officers began to push Ishiwara to champion their cause more and more. However by late 1935 Ishiwara's name would actually begin to be connected to the Tosei faction. While Ishiwara supported much of the Kodoha ideology, he simply did not share their beliefs in the same Showa restoration, he was more akin to the Tosei in that regard. Now after the manchurian incident the two factions kind of went to war with another to dominate the military. The Kodoha faction was early on the most powerful, but in 1934 their leader Araki resigned from the army due to failing health and he was replaced by General Senjuro Hayashi who favored the Tosei. In November of 1934, a plot was discovered that involved Kodoha officers seeking to murder some top ranking politicians. The result of this saw the Tosei faction force the resignation of the Kodoha leader General Jinzaburo Masaki, who was serving as the inspector general of military education. In retaliation to this, the Kodoha officer Saburo Aizawa murdered the Toseiha leader General Tetsuzen Nagata. This caused a frenzy, things began to really escalate, and many looked at Ishiwara Kanji to prove which side he favored. While in prison awaiting trial, Aizawa asked Ishiwara to be his defense counsel, to which he promised he would consider it. At the same time other Kodoha officers began pressing Ishiwara to support their cause openly. It is really hard to see where exactly Ishiwara was in all of this as all of his speeches prior were purposely ambiguous. He looked like a fence sitter and after what will be the February coup of 1936, there was testimony that Ishiwara was a middle-echelon member involved in the coup, other testimony literally had him on the list of people to be assassinated. A few weeks before Aizawa's trial, Ishiwara refused his request.   On February 26th, Ishiwara was awakened at his Tokyo home by a telephone call from Colonel Suzuki Teiichi informing him a rebellion was underway. Ishiwara, though ill at the time rushed over to the Military police HQ in Kudan. There he was informed of what was going on and how the officers were now taking the side of the showa restorationists or to quell the rebellion. From there he rushed to meet War Minister Kawashima Yoshiyuki where he demanded a proclamation of martial law to cope with the rebellion. He then urged Vice Chief of staff Sugiyama to order units from garrisons around Tokyo to overwhelm the rebels. Within 24 hours of the event, Ishiwara was then named operations officer of the Martial Law headquarters and he began coordinating plans to deal with the crisis. Thus Ishiwara occupied a crucial position in quelling the coup. On the night of the 27th a bunch of officers who sympathized with the rebels came to the HQ to argue for delaying actions against them. To this Ishiwara rose up and announced “we shall immediately carry forward plans for an assault. All units will assemble for that purpose. The army will wait until noon of the 28th; then it will begin its assault and crush the rebellion”. The next day,  Ishiwara went to the main entrance of the War Ministers office, where a large number of the rebels occupied and he demanded to talk to their leaders face to face. He hoped the youthful officers who looked up to him would see reason. They let him in, after they had shot Captain Katakura Tadashi for trying to do the same thing. Ishiwara then told them he shared many of their goals, but condemned their use of force. With a pistol pointed at him Ishiwara declared this “If you don't listen to reason you will be crushed by the severest measures”. He delivered his ultimatum and just walked out the door.    By the 28th the tides turned on the rebels. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down, demanding an end to the mutiny, many of the top Kodoha leaders walked away because of this. The Navy brought all of its power to Tokyo bay including its SNLF marines, all guns were on the rebels. Some of the rebels held out, still hoping the Emperor would change his mind and order a showa restoration, but by the 29th it fell apart. The rebels surrendered, aided by Colonel Tomoyuki Yamashita (one of my favorite generals of WW2, fascinating character). In the words of Matsumura Shuitsu a member of the Martial law HQ “In the midst of all the confusion and commotion, Ishiwara never lost sight of his objective and dealt with the criss with cool efficiency. If ever there was a case of the right man in the right place it was Ishiwara at that time. No doubt, what brought about the ultimate surrender of the rebel forces, was, of course, the Imperial command. But I believe that in a large part the collapse of the rebellion was due to the decisiveness of Ishwara, who never swerved, never hesitated. In short, Tokyo was saved by Ishiwara's courage”. It is rather ironic, many would point out it was Ishiwara who instigated the insurrection, but when it came time for it, he was the largest one to stamp down upon it. One could argue, by suppressing the rebellion, Ishawara had exploited the crisis in order to earn the political power necessary to bring about his version of a Showa Restoration.   During the mutiny, after meeting the rebels, Ishiwara actually had a secret meeting with two Kodoha officers at the Imperial Hotel. They were Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro and Colonel Mitsui Sakichi. He spoke to them about the possibility of forming a new government. The 3 of them came to these conclusions to actually perform a real Showa restoration. The rebels needed to go back to their barracks; the emperor needed to endorse the showa restoration; and members of the cabinet and top military leaders had to support it. Ishiwara then went to the Martial Law HQ and demanded Army vice chief of staff Sugiyama that he submit to the emperor a petition “to establish a restoration which would make clear the spirit of the nation, realize the national defense, and stabilize the peoples livelihood”. Sugiyama wanted nothing to do with this and told him “its simply impossible to relay such a request from the army” Ishiwara knew Sugiyama's position was too strong to challenge directly so he backed off, this was his last attempt to alter the nation's course through confrontation. Because of his actions during the quelling of the rebellion, this little scene was forgotten, his reputation was not tarnished…well it was amongst the Kodoha hardliners who saw him as a traitor, but other than that. Yet again he seems to be a man of many contradictions.  After the February coup the Kodoha faction ceased to exist and the Toseiha's ideology grabbed most of the military, though they also faded heavily.     Ishiwara went back to planning and lecturing taking a heavy notice of how Germany and Italy's totalitarian models were looking like the most efficient ones that Japan should emulate. He pushed heavily for a national defense state. He kept advocating for a 5 year plan he had to push Japan into a total war economy, but the industrialists and economists kept telling him it was far too much. I could write pages on all the ideas he had, he covered every aspect of Japanese society. He wanted the whole of Japan to devote itself to becoming the hegemonic power in Asia and this required self-sufficiency, more territory, alliances, an overhaul of Japan's politics, economy, etc etc he worked on this for years. One thing I find amusing to note, Ishiwara's plans had the national defense state not run directly by the military. No instead the military would only focus on military affairs to maximize their efficiency, thus civilians would lead the government. In his words “the tactics and strategy of national defense in the narrow sense are unquestionably the responsibility of the military. But national defense in the widest sense, industry, economy, transportation, communications are clearly related to the field of politics. Of course, the military can naturally express their opinion on these matters in order to counsel some minister whose duties are political, but to go before the general public and discuss the detailed industrial and economic is an arrogation of authority”. So ye, Ishiwara actually sought to remove military officers from political positions.    In 1937 Ishiwara was promoted to the rank of major general and his duties were of the operations division of the general staff. Because of his popularity and now his rank, some began to see him almost as that of a rising dictator. In January of 1937, the government of Hirota Koki who had come to power largely because of the february coup were having problems. Politicians were unable to deal with the rising military budgets. Ishiwara was eager to press forward his national defense state idea. Alongside this Captain Fukutome Shigeru, his naval counterpart was angry at the cabinet for hindering funding and called for their dissolution. In one meeting Ishiwara blurted out “if there's any disturbance the military should proclaim martial law throughout the country until things were straightened out”. Well within days the cabinet fell on its own and now everyone looked to a successor.    The Army and Navy fought for their candidate. The Nazi favored Ugaki Kazushige, but the Army held grudges against him. Ishiwara also did not like his appointment stating he had a bad political past, by bad that meant he had advocated for military budget cuts. Ugaki refused the job because of the pressure and made a note about Ishiwara's remarks towards him. Seeing Ugaki pushed aside, Ishiwara and his followers pushed for 3 other candidates; Hayashi Senjuro, House President Konoe Fumumaro and President of the privy council Hiranuma Kiichiro. Ishiwara sent to each man his 5 year plan to test their enthusiasm for it. Hiranuma didn't like it, Konoe was neutral and Hayashi liked it. So Ishiwara backed Hayashi go figure. All of his Manchurian oriented followers pushed to get him into office. When Hayashi was given Imperial command to head a new government, Ishiwara met with his Manchurian faction friends to draw a list of people to put in the cabinet. Itagaki Seishiro was chosen as war minister; Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa known to have radical reformist leanings for navy minister; Matsuoka Yosuke or SHiratori Toshio for foreign minister, industrialist Ikeda Seihin for finance, Tsuda Shingo for commerce and industry, Sogo Shinji as chief cabinet secretary and Miyazaki as chairman. Ishiwara himself stayed carefully in the background to make it seem like he was only attending military duties.    But rivals to Ishiwara began working against him, especially some of those Kodoha hardliners who felt he betrayed them. They pressed Hayashi to not accept many of Ishiwara's cabinet candidates such as Itagaki and Hayashi backed off the majority of them as a result. The effort to form a Macnhurian cabal failed and this further led to a lack of enthusiasm for Ishiwara's national defense plans. Hayashi's government which Ishiwara had placed his hopes upon became antagonistic towards him and his followers.    Now over in Manchuria, the Kwantung army was looking to seize territory in northern China and inner mongolia. This was something Ishiwara was flip floppy about. At first he began speaking about the need to simply develop Manchukuo so that China and Inner mongolia would follow suite, but gradually he began to warm up to schemes to invade. Though when he heard his former Kwantun colleagues were basically going to perform the exact same plan he had done with the Mukden incident he traveled back to Manchuria to dissuade them. Ishiwara landed at Dairen and within days of his arrival he learned that 15,000 troops under Prince Demchugdongrub, known also as Prince Teh of Mongolia, backed by Kwantung arms and aircraft were launching a full scale invasion of Suiyuan province. Ishiwara was furious and he screamed at the General staff “the next time I visit the Kwantung Army I'm going to piss on the floor of the commanders office!”    Within a month, the Warlord Yan Xishan, now fighting for the NRA turned back Prince Teh's forces. This angered the Kwantung army, fueling what Ishiwara always feared, a war between China and Japan. Ishiwara began lecturing left right and center about how Japan needed to curb her imperialist aggression against China. He advocated as always racial harmonization, about the East Asian League idea, cooperation between China and Japan. He thought perhaps China could be induced by joined a federation with Japan and to do all of this Japan should help develop Manchukuo as a positive model. Ishiwara warned any aggressive actions against China would waste valuable resources needed dearly to be directed against the USSR. In his words “China was an endless bog that would swallow men and materiel without prospect of victory and it would cripple the possibility of East Asian Union” Prophetic words to be sure.   Ishiwara was still influential and many in Hayashi's cabinet headed him, trying to push for more diplomacy with China. But by spring of 1937 Tokyo HQ had split over the issue. On one side were Ishiwara and those seeking to obtain a sort of treaty with China to form an alliance against the USSR. On the other hand the Nationalists and Communists were on the verge of forming a united front allied to the USSR, thus the invading China faction was gaining steam. This faction simply sought to get China out of the way, then focus on the USSR. As much as Ishiwara fought it, the China War would come nonetheless.   In June of 1937, a report from a Japanese civilian visiting China reached Colonel Kawabe Torashiro. The report stated that the China Garrison Army in the Peking area were planning an incident similar to what had occurred in Mukden in 1931. Kawabe took the report to Ishiwara who said he would investigate the matter. Ishiwara pressed the war ministry to send Colonel Okamoto Kiyotomi to the military administration section to north china to warn Generals Hashimoto Gun of the China Garrison Army and Kwabe Msakazu commander the brigade station in the Peking area that Tokyo would not tolerate provocation actions. Okamoto came back and stated they reassured him it was just rumors and nothing was occurring.   Two weeks later on July 7th, the infamous Marco Polo Bridge incident began WW2. When it began, Tokyo took it as a minor incident, just some skirmishes between minor forces, but the fighting grew and grew. The two factions in Tokyo who we can call the “expansionists and non expansionists” began arguing on what to do. The expansionists argued this was the time to deliver a quick and decisive blow, which meant mobilizing and dispatching divisions into northern China to overwhelm them. The non expansionists argued they needed to terminate hostilities immediately and seek diplomacy before the conflict got out of hand. From the offset of the conflict, Ishiwara led the doomed non expansionists. Ishiwara tried to localize the conflict to prevent more Japanese from getting involved. To do this he urged Prince Kan'in to send a cable on July 8th to the local Japanese forces to settle the issue locally. But they reported back that the Nanjing government was tossing 4 divisions of reinforcements to the area, prompting the Japanese to mobilize 3 divisions in response. For 3 days Ishiwara tried to halt the reinforcements, but the Nanjing report came true, the Chinese reinforcements arrived to the scene, pushing the Japanese to do the same. General Kawabe Masakazu argued 12,000 Japanese civilians were in the area and now under threat, thus Ishiwara had to stand down.   The conflict at the Marco Polo Bridge quickly got out of hand. Ishiwara was very indecisive, he tried to thwart the spread of the conflict, but he was continuously forced to stand down when reports false or true poured in about Chinese offensives. In fact, Ishiwara's efforts were getting him in a ton of trouble as his colleagues began to point out they were hindering the military operations which at the time were trying to end the conflict quickly. Ishiwara did not go down without a fight tossing one last attempt to stop the conflict. He urged Prime Minister Konoe to fly to Nanjing to speak directly with Chiang Kai Shek, it was a last ditch effort before the Japanese reinforcements arrived. When Konoe received requests to do this from multiple Japanese military leaders on urged on by Ishiwara, he was initially favorable to the idea and had a plane prepared for the trip. But within hours of the idea leaked out raising a storm of protests from the expansionists. Sugiyama then told Konoe it was Ishiwara pushing the idea and that his views represented a small minority in the military. Konoe ultimately back down and chose not to do it. Ishiwara was outraged when he found out screaming “tell the Prime minister that in 2000 years of our history no man will have done more to destroy Japan than he has by his indecisiveness in this crisis”.   Ishiwara began fighting with his colleagues as the situation worsened. He tabled a motion to press Nanjing to support Manchukuo in order for the Japanese to withdraw, but his colleagues blocked it. By August the conflict had spread as far as Shanghai and now even the IJN were getting involved. To this Ishiwara argued they should just evacuate Japanese civilians in Shanghai and pay them several hundred million yen in compensation as it would be cheaper than a war. He was quickly overruled. Thus the North China Incident simply became the China incident. In early september Ishiwara tried one last attempt to negotiate a settlement, trying to get Germany to mediate, but by mid september Ishiwara's influence had dropped considerably. By late september Ishiwara was removed from the General staff by General Tada. The remnants of Ishiwara's followers in the central army were defeated, particularly when Konoe declared in January of 1938 that Japan would not treat with Chiang Kai-shek. Ironically Konoe would quickly come around to believe Japan had made a grave mistake. By 1938 24 IJA divisions were tossed into China, the next year this became 34. 

Edward Luce discusses how Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter, sought to bring down the USSR and end the Cold War by magnifying the Politburo' dilemmas. During the Cold War, two dominant émigré figures emerged in United States national security strategy making: Henry Kissinger (Republican) and Zbigniew Brzezinski (Democrat). Zbigniew Brzezinski played a pivotal behind-the-scenes role in Jimmy Carter's presidential campaign, later serving as Carter's National Security Advisor. Often described as the realist 'Yin' to Carter's idealistic 'Yang,' Brzezinski was a trusted confidant of the President. However, his often-hawkish foreign policy stance created tensions within the Democratic Party and led to challenging relationships with colleagues in the State Department and Department of Defence. His efforts to bring down the Soviet Union earned the admiration of Ronald Reagan, whose Republican administration continued many of Brzezinski's policies. The consequences of some of these policies, though, caused problems later. Edward Luce is the North America Editor of the Financial Times. He published a recent biography of Zbigniew Brzezinski that sought to reclaim Brzezinski's reputation as a leading architect of the strategy that brought the Cold War to an end without it becoming hot.   Further Reading Edward Luce, Zbig. The life of Zbig Brzezinski: America's great power prophet (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2025). Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision; American and the Crisis of Global Power, Basic Books, 2012, available at: https://archive.org/details/strategicvisiona0000brze Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, 1997, available at: https://archive.org/details/grandchessboarda00brze_0/mode/2up Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century, Collier Books, 1993, available at: https://archive.org/details/outofcontrolglob00brze/mode/2up Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983). Justin Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski: America's Grand Strategist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018)

Last time we spoke about the fall of Wuhan. In a country frayed by war, the Yangtze became a pulsing artery, carrying both hunger and hope. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man, or flood the rivers to buy time. He chose both, setting sullen floodwaters loose along the Yellow River to slow the invaders, a temporary mercy that spared some lives while ripping many from their homes. On the river's banks, a plethora of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, fractured into rival zones, clung to lines with stubborn grit as Japanese forces poured through Anqing, Jiujiang, and beyond, turning the Yangtze into a deadly corridor. Madang's fortifications withstood bombardment and gas, yet the price was paid in troops and civilians drowned or displaced. Commanders like Xue Yue wrestled stubbornly for every foothold, every bend in the river. The Battle of Wanjialing became a symbol: a desperate, months-long pincer where Chinese divisions finally tightened their cordon and halted the enemy's flow. By autumn, the Japanese pressed onward to seize Tianjiazhen and cut supply lines, while Guangzhou fell to a ruthless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan loomed inevitable, yet the story remained one of fierce endurance against overwhelming odds.   #174 The Changsha Fire Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the summer of 1938, amid the upheaval surrounding Chiang Kai-shek, one of his most important alliances came to an end. On June 22, all German advisers to the Nationalist government were summoned back; any who refused would be deemed guilty of high treason. Since World War I, a peculiar bond had tied the German Weimar Republic and China: two fledgling states, both weak and only partially sovereign. Under the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany had lost extraterritorial rights on Chinese soil, which paradoxically allowed Berlin to engage with China as an equal partner rather than a traditional colonizer. This made German interests more welcome in business and politics than those of other Western powers. Chiang's military reorganization depended on German officers such as von Seeckt and von Falkenhausen, and Hitler's rise in 1933 had not immediately severed the connection between the two countries. Chiang did not share Nazi ideology with Germany, but he viewed Berlin as a potential ally and pressed to persuade it to side with China rather than Japan as China's principal East Asian, anti-Communist partner. In June 1937, H. H. Kung led a delegation to Berlin, met Hitler, and argued for an alliance with China. Yet the outbreak of war and the Nationalists' retreat to Wuhan convinced Hitler's government to align with Japan, resulting in the recall of all German advisers. Chiang responded with a speech praising von Falkenhausen, insisting that "our friend's enemy is our enemy too," and lauding the German Army's loyalty and ethics as a model for the Chinese forces. He added, "After we have won the War of Resistance, I believe you'll want to come back to the Far East and advise our country again." Von Falkenhausen would later become the governor of Nazi-occupied Belgium, then be lauded after the war for secretly saving many Jewish lives. As the Germans departed, the roof of the train transporting them bore a prominent German flag with a swastika, a prudent precaution given Wuhan's vulnerability to air bombardment. The Japanese were tightening their grip on the city, even as Chinese forces, numbering around 800,000, made a stubborn stand. The Yellow River floods blocked northern access, so the Japanese chose to advance via the Yangtze, aided by roughly nine divisions and the might of the Imperial Navy. The Chinese fought bravely, but their defenses could not withstand the superior technology of the Japanese fleet. The only substantial external aid came from Soviet pilots flying aircraft bought from the USSR as part of Stalin's effort to keep China in the war; between 1938 and 1940, some 2,000 pilots offered their services. From June 24 to 27, Japanese bombers relentlessly pounded the Madang fortress along the Yangtze until it fell. A month later, on July 26, Chinese defenders abandoned Jiujiang, southeast of Wuhan, and its civilian population endured a wave of atrocities at the hands of the invaders. News of Jiujiang's fate stiffened resolve. Chiang delivered a pointed address to his troops on July 31, arguing that Wuhan's defense was essential and that losing the city would split the country into hostile halves, complicating logistics and movement. He warned that Wuhan's defense would also be a spiritual test: "the place has deep revolutionary ties," and public sympathy for China's plight was growing as Japanese atrocities became known. Yet Chiang worried about the behavior of Chinese soldiers. He condemned looting as a suicidal act that would destroy the citizens' trust in the military. Commanders, he warned, must stay at their posts; the memory of the Madang debacle underscored the consequences of cowardice. Unlike Shanghai, Wuhan had shelters, but he cautioned against retreating into them and leaving soldiers exposed. Officers who failed in loyalty could expect no support in return. This pep talk, combined with the belief that the army was making a last stand, may have slowed the Japanese advance along the Yangtze in August. Under General Xue Yue, about 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back the invaders at Huangmei. At Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with poison gas finally forcing Japanese victory. Yet even then, Chinese generals struggled to coordinate. In Xinyang, Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted; they expected relief from Hu Zongnan's forces, but Hu instead withdrew, allowing Japan to capture the city without a fight. The fall of Xinyang enabled Japanese control of the Ping-Han railway, signaling Wuhan's doom. Chiang again spoke to Wuhan's defenders, balancing encouragement with a grim realism about possible loss. Although Wuhan's international connections were substantial, foreign aid would be unlikely. If evacuation became necessary, the army should have a clear plan, including designated routes. He recalled the disastrous December retreat from Nanjing, where "foreigners and Chinese alike turned it into an empty city." Troops had been tired and outnumbered; Chiang defended the decision to defend Nanjing, insisting the army had sacrificed itself for the capital and Sun Yat-sen's tomb. Were the army to retreat again, he warned, it would be the greatest shame in five thousand years of Chinese history. The loss of Madang was another humiliation. By defending Wuhan, he argued, China could avenge its fallen comrades and cleanse its conscience; otherwise, it could not honor its martyrs. Mao Zedong, observing the situation from his far-off base at Yan'an, agreed strongly that Chiang should not defend Wuhan to the death. He warned in mid-October that if Wuhan could not be defended, the war's trajectory would shift, potentially strengthening the Nationalists–Communists cooperation, deepening popular mobilization, and expanding guerrilla warfare. The defense of Wuhan, Mao argued, should drain the enemy and buy time to advance the broader struggle, not become a doomed stalemate. In a protracted war, some strongholds might be abandoned temporarily to sustain the longer fight. The Japanese Army captured Wuchang and Hankou on 26 October and captured Hanyang on the 27th, which concluded the campaign in Wuhan. The battle had lasted four and a half months and ended with the Nationalist army's voluntary withdrawal. In the battle itself, the Japanese army captured Wuhan's three towns and held the heartland of China, achieving a tactical victory. Yet strategically, Japan failed to meet its objectives. Imperial Headquarters believed that "capturing Hankou and Guangzhou would allow them to dominate China." Consequently, the Imperial Conference planned the Battle of Wuhan to seize Wuhan quickly and compel the Chinese government to surrender. It also decreed that "national forces should be concentrated to achieve the war objectives within a year and end the war against China." According to Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Hirohito authorized the use of chemical weapons against China by specific orders known as rinsanmei. During the Battle of Wuhan, Prince Kan'in Kotohito transmitted the emperor's orders to deploy toxic gas 375 times between August and October 1938. Another memorandum uncovered by Yoshimi indicates that Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni authorized the use of poison gas against the Chinese on 16 August 1938. A League of Nations resolution adopted on 14 May condemned the Imperial Japanese Army's use of toxic gas. Japan's heavy use of chemical weapons against China was driven by manpower shortages and China's lack of poison gas stockpiles to retaliate. Poison gas was employed at Hankou in the Battle of Wuhan to break Chinese resistance after conventional assaults had failed. Rana Mitter notes that, under General Xue Yue, approximately 100,000 Chinese troops halted Japanese advances at Huangmei, and at the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory secured only through the use of poison gas. Chinese generals also struggled with coordination at Xinyang; Li Zongren's Guangxi troops were exhausted, and Hu Zongnan's forces, believed to be coming to relieve them, instead withdrew. Japan subsequently used poison gas against Chinese Muslim forces at the Battle of Wuyuan and the Battle of West Suiyuan. However, the Chinese government did not surrender with the loss of Wuhan and Guangzhou, nor did Japan's invasion end with Wuhan and Guangzhou's capture. After Wuhan fell, the government issued a reaffirmation: "Temporary changes of advance and retreat will not shake our resolve to resist the Japanese invasion," and "the gain or loss of any city will not affect the overall situation of the war." It pledged to "fight with even greater sorrow, greater perseverance, greater steadfastness, greater diligence, and greater courage," dedicating itself to a long, comprehensive war of resistance. In the Japanese-occupied rear areas, large armed anti-Japanese forces grew, and substantial tracts of territory were recovered. As the Japanese army themselves acknowledged, "the restoration of public security in the occupied areas was actually limited to a few kilometers on both sides of the main transportation lines." Thus, the Battle of Wuhan did not merely inflict a further strategic defeat on Japan; it also marked a turning point in Japan's strategic posture, from offense to defense. Due to the Nationalist Army's resolute resistance, Japan mobilized its largest force to date for the attack, about 250,000 personnel, who were replenished four to five times over the battle, for a total of roughly 300,000. The invaders held clear advantages in land, sea, and air power and fought for four and a half months. Yet they failed to annihilate the Nationalist main force, nor did they break the will to resist or the army's combat effectiveness. Instead, the campaign dealt a severe blow to the Japanese Army's vitality. Japanese-cited casualties totaled 4,506 dead and 17,380 wounded for the 11th Army; the 2nd Army suffered 2,300 killed in action, 7,600 wounded, and 900 died of disease. Including casualties across the navy and the air force, the overall toll was about 35,500. By contrast, the Nationalist Government Military Commission's General Staff Department, drawing on unit-level reports, calculated Japanese casualties at 256,000. The discrepancy between Japanese and Nationalist tallies illustrates the inflationary tendencies of each side's reporting. Following Wuhan, a weakened Japanese force confronted an extended front. Unable to mount large-scale strategic offensives, unlike Shanghai, Xuzhou, or Wuhan itself, the Japanese to a greater extent adopted a defensive posture. This transition shifted China's War of Resistance from a strategic defensive phase into a strategic stalemate, while the invaders found themselves caught in a protracted war—a development they most disliked. Consequently, Japan's invasion strategy pivoted: away from primary frontal offensives toward a greater reliance on political inducements with secondary military action, and toward diverting forces to "security" operations behind enemy lines rather than pushing decisive frontal campaigns. Japan, an island nation with limited strategic resources, depended heavily on imports. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan's gold reserves,including reserves for issuing banknotes, amounted to only about 1.35 billion yen. In effect, Japan's currency reserves constrained the scale of the war from the outset. The country launched its aggression while seeking an early solution to the conflict. To sustain its war of aggression against China, the total value of military supplies imported from overseas in 1937 reached approximately 960 million yen. By June of the following year, for the Battle of Wuhan, even rifles used in training were recalled to outfit the expanding army. The sustained increase in troops also strained domestic labor, food, and energy supplies. By 1939, after Wuhan, Japan's military expenditure had climbed to about 6.156 billion yen, far exceeding national reserves. This stark reality exposed Japan's economic fragility and its inability to guarantee a steady supply of military materiel, increasing pressure on the leadership at the Central Command. The Chief of Staff and the Minister of War lamented the mismatch between outward strength and underlying weakness: "Outwardly strong but weak is a reflection of our country today, and this will not last long." In sum, the Wuhan campaign coincided with a decline in the organization, equipment, and combat effectiveness of the Japanese army compared with before the battle. This erosion of capability helped drive Japan to alter its political and military strategy, shifting toward a method of inflicting pressure on China and attempting to "use China to control China", that is, fighting in ways designed to sustain the broader war effort. Tragically a major element of Chiang Kai-shek's retreat strategy was the age-old "scorched earth" policy. In fact, China originated the phrase and the practice. Shanghai escaped the last-minute torching because of foreigners whose property rights were protected. But in Nanjing, the burning and destruction began with increasing zeal. What could not be moved inland, such as remaining rice stocks, oil in tanks, and other facilities, was to be blown up or devastated. Civilians were told to follow the army inland, to rebuild later behind the natural barrier of Sichuan terrain. Many urban residents complied, but the peasantry did not embrace the plan. The scorched-earth policy served as powerful propaganda for the occupying Japanese army and, even more so, for the Reds. Yet they could hardly have foreseen the propaganda that Changsha would soon supply them. In June, the Changsha Evacuation Guidance Office was established to coordinate land and water evacuation routes. By the end of October, Wuhan's three towns had fallen, and on November 10 the Japanese army captured Yueyang, turning Changsha into the next primary invasion target. Beginning on October 9, Japanese aircraft intensified from sporadic raids on Changsha to large-scale bombing. On October 27, the Changsha Municipal Government urgently evacuated all residents, exempting only able-bodied men, the elderly, the weak, women, and children. The baojia system was mobilized to go door-to-door, enforcing compliance. On November 7, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military meeting at Rongyuan Garden to review the war plan and finalize a "scorched earth war of resistance." Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, drafted the detailed implementation plan. On November 10, Shi Guoji, Chief of Staff of the Security Command, presided over a joint meeting of Changsha's party, government, military, police, and civilian organizations to devise a strategy. The Changsha Destruction Command was immediately established, bringing together district commanders and several arson squads. The command actively prepared arson equipment and stacked flammable materials along major traffic arteries. Chiang decided that the city of Changsha was vulnerable and either gave the impression or the direct order, honestly really depends on the source your reading, to burn the city to the ground to prevent it falling to the enemy. At 9:00 AM on November 12, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Zhang Zhizhong: "One hour to arrive, Chairman Zhang, Changsha, confidential. If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned. Please make thorough preparations in advance and do not delay." And here it seems a game of broken telephone sort of resulted in one of the worst fire disasters of all time. If your asking pro Chiang sources, the message was clearly, put up a defense, once thats fallen, burn the city down before the Japanese enter. Obviously this was to account for getting civilians out safely and so forth. If you read lets call it more modern CPP aligned sources, its the opposite. Chiang intentionally ordering the city to burn down as fast as possible, but in through my research, I think it was a colossal miscommunication. Regardless Zhongzheng Wen, Minister of the Interior, echoed the message. Simultaneously, Lin Wei, Deputy Director of Chiang Kai-shek's Secretariat, instructed Zhang Zhizhong by long-distance telephone: "If Changsha falls, the entire city must be burned." Zhang summoned Feng Ti, Commander of the Provincial Capital Garrison, and Xu Quan, Director of the Provincial Security Bureau, to outline arson procedures. He designated the Garrison Command to shoulder the preparations, with the Security Bureau assisting. At 4:00 PM, Zhang appointed Xu Kun, Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment, as chief commander of the arson operation, with Wang Weining, Captain of the Social Training Corps, and Xu Quan, Chief of Staff of the Garrison Command, as deputies. At 6:00 PM, the Garrison Command held an emergency meeting ordering all government agencies and organizations in the city to be ready for evacuation at any moment. By around 10:15 PM, all urban police posts had withdrawn. Around 2:00 AM (November 13), a false report circulated that "Japanese troops have reached Xinhe" . Firefighters stationed at various locations rushed out with kerosene-fueled devices, burning everything in sight, shops and houses alike. In an instant, Changsha became a sea of flames. The blaze raged for 72 hours. The Hunan Province Anti-Japanese War Loss Statistics, compiled by the Hunan Provincial Government Statistics Office of the Kuomintang, report that the fire inflicted economic losses of more than 1 billion yuan, a sum equivalent to about 1.7 trillion yuan after the victory in the war. This figure represented roughly 43% of Changsha's total economic value at the time. Regarding casualties, contemporary sources provide varying figures. A Xinhua Daily report from November 20, 1938 noted that authorities mobilized manpower to bury more than 600 bodies, though the total number of burned remains could not be precisely counted. A Central News Agency reporter on November 19 stated that in the Xiangyuan fire, more than 2,000 residents could not escape, and most of the bodies had already been buried. There are further claims that in the Changsha Fire, more than 20,000 residents were burned to death. In terms of displacement, Changsha's population before the fire was about 300,000, and by November 12, 90% had been evacuated. After the fire, authorities registered 124,000 victims, including 815 orphans sheltered in Lito and Maosgang.  Building damage constituted the other major dimension of the catastrophe, with the greatest losses occurring to residential houses, shops, schools, factories, government offices, banks, hospitals, newspaper offices, warehouses, and cultural and entertainment venues, as well as numerous historic buildings such as palaces, temples, private gardens, and the former residences of notable figures; among these, residential and commercial structures suffered the most, followed by factories and schools. Inspector Gao Yihan, who conducted a post-fire investigation, observed that the prosperous areas within Changsha's ring road, including Nanzheng Street and Bajiaoting, were almost completely destroyed, and in other major markets only a handful of shops remained, leading to an overall estimate that surviving or stalemated houses were likely less than 20%. Housing and street data from the early post-liberation period reveal that Changsha had more than 1,100 streets and alleys; of these, more than 690 were completely burned and more than 330 had fewer than five surviving houses, accounting for about 29%, with nearly 90% of the city's streets severely damaged. More than 440 streets were not completely destroyed, but among these, over 190 had only one or two houses remaining and over 130 had only three or four houses remaining; about 60 streets, roughly 6% had 30 to 40 surviving houses, around 30 streets, 3% had 11 to 20 houses, 10 streets, 1% had 21 to 30 houses, and three streets ) had more than 30 houses remaining. Housing statistics from 1952 show that 2,538 houses survived the fire, about 6.57% of the city's total housing stock, with private houses totaling 305,800 square meters and public houses 537,900 square meters. By 1956, the surviving area of both private and public housing totaled 843,700 square meters, roughly 12.3% of the city's total housing area at that time. Alongside these losses, all equipment, materials, funds, goods, books, archives, antiques, and cultural relics that had not been moved were also destroyed.  At the time of the Changsha Fire, Zhou Enlai, then Deputy Minister of the Political Department of the Nationalist Government's Military Commission, was in Changsha alongside Ye Jianying, Guo Moruo, and others. On November 12, 1938, Zhou Enlai attended a meeting held by Changsha cultural groups at Changsha Normal School to commemorate Sun Yat-sen's 72nd birthday. Guo Moruo later recalled that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were awakened by the blaze that night; they each carried a suitcase and evacuated to Xiangtan, with Zhou reportedly displaying considerable indignation at the sudden, unprovoked fire. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai rushed back to Changsha and, together with Chen Cheng, Zhang Zhizhong, and others, inspected the disaster. He mobilized personnel from three departments, with Tian Han and Guo Moruo at the forefront, to form the Changsha Fire Aftermath Task Force, which began debris clearance, care for the injured, and the establishment of soup kitchens. A few days later, on the 22nd, the Hunan Provincial Government established the Changsha Fire Temporary Relief Committee to coordinate relief efforts.  On the night of November 16, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Changsha and, the next day, ascended Tianxin Pavilion. Sha Wei, head of the Cultural Relics Section of the Changsha Tianxin Pavilion Park Management Office, and a long-time researcher of the pavilion, explained that documentation indicates Chiang Kai-shek, upon seeing the city largely reduced to scorched earth with little left intact, grew visibly angry. After descending from Tianxin Pavilion, Chiang immediately ordered the arrest of Changsha Garrison Commander Feng Ti, Changsha Police Chief Wen Chongfu, and Commander of the Second Garrison Regiment Xu Kun, and arranged a military trial with a two-day deadline. The interrogation began at 7:00 a.m. on November 18. Liang Xiaojin records that Xu Kun and Wen Chongfu insisted their actions followed orders from the Security Command, while Feng Ti admitted negligence and violations of procedure, calling his acts unforgivable. The trial found Feng Ti to be the principal offender, with Wen Chongfu and Xu Kun as accomplices, and sentenced all three to prison terms of varying lengths. The verdict was sent to Chiang Kai-shek for approval, who was deeply dissatisfied and personally annotated the drafts: he asserted that Feng Ti, as the city's security head, was negligent and must be shot immediately; Wen Chongfu, as police chief, disobeyed orders and fled, and must be shot immediately; Xu Kun, for neglect of duty, must be shot immediately. The court then altered the arson charge in the verdict to "insulting his duty and harming the people" in line with Chiang's instructions. Chiang Kai-shek, citing "failure to supervise personnel and precautions," dismissed Zhang from his post, though he remained in office to oversee aftermath operations. Zhang Zhizhong later recalled Chiang Kai-shek's response after addressing the Changsha fire: a pointed admission that the fundamental cause lay not with a single individual but with the collective leadership's mistakes, and that the error must be acknowledged as a collective failure. All eyes now shifted to the new center of resistance, Chongqing, the temporary capital. Chiang's "Free China" no longer meant the whole country; it now encompassed Sichuan, Hunan, and Henan, but not Jiangsu or Zhejiang. The eastern provinces were effectively lost, along with China's major customs revenues, the country's most fertile regions, and its most advanced infrastructure. The center of political gravity moved far to the west, into a country the Nationalists had never controlled, where everything was unfamiliar and unpredictable, from topography and dialects to diets. On the map, it might have seemed that Chiang still ruled much of China, but vast swaths of the north and northwest were sparsely populated; most of China's population lay in the east and south, where Nationalist control was either gone or held only precariously. The combined pressures of events and returning travelers were gradually shifting American attitudes toward the Japanese incident. Europe remained largely indifferent, with Hitler absorbing most attention, but the United States began to worry about developments in the Pacific. Roosevelt initiated a January 1939 appeal to raise a million dollars for Chinese civilians in distress, and the response quickly materialized. While the Chinese did not expect direct intervention, they hoped to deter further American economic cooperation with Japan and to halt Japan's purchases of scrap iron, oil, gasoline, shipping, and, above all, weapons from the United States. Public opinion in America was sufficiently stirred to sustain a campaign against silk stockings, a symbolic gesture of boycott that achieved limited effect; Japan nonetheless continued to procure strategic materials. Within this chorus, the left remained a persistent but often discordant ally to the Nationalists. The Institute of Pacific Relations, sympathetic to communist aims, urged America to act, pressuring policymakers and sounding alarms about China. Yet the party line remained firmly pro-Chiang Kai-shek: the Japanese advance seemed too rapid and threatening to the Reds' interests. Most oil and iron debates stalled; American businessmen resented British trade ties with Japan, and Britain refused to join any mutual cutoff, arguing that the Western powers were not at war with Japan. What occurred in China was still commonly referred to in Western diplomatic circles as "the Incident." Wang Jingwei's would make his final defection, yes in a long ass history of defections. Mr Wang Jingwei had been very busy traveling to Guangzhou, then Northwest to speak with Feng Yuxiang, many telegrams went back and forth. He returned to the Nationalist government showing his face to foreign presses and so forth. While other prominent rivals of Chiang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and others, rallied when they perceived Japan as a real threat; all did so except Wang Jingwei. Wang, who had long believed himself the natural heir to Sun Yat-sen and who had repeatedly sought to ascend to power, seemed willing to cooperate with Japan if it served his own aims. I will just say it, Wang Jingwei was a rat. He had always been a rat, never changed. Opinions on Chiang Kai-Shek vary, but I think almost everyone can agree Wang Jingwei was one of the worst characters of this time period. Now Wang Jingwei could not distinguish between allies and enemies and was prepared to accept help from whomever offered it, believing he could outmaneuver Tokyo when necessary. Friends in Shanghai and abroad whispered that it was not too late to influence events, arguing that the broader struggle was not merely China versus Japan but a clash between principled leaders and a tyrannical, self-serving clique, Western imperialism's apologists who needed Chiang removed. For a time Wang drifted within the Kuomintang, moving between Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, and Chongqing, maintaining discreet lines of communication with his confidants. The Japanese faced a governance problem typical of conquerors who possess conquered territory: how to rule effectively while continuing the war. They imagined Asia under Japanese-led leadership, an East Asia united by a shared Co-Prosperity Sphere but divided by traditional borders. To sustain this vision, they sought local leaders who could cooperate. The search yielded few viable options; would-be collaborators were soon assassinated, proved incompetent, or proved corrupt. The Japanese concluded it would require more time and education. In the end, Wang Jingwei emerged as a preferred figure. Chongqing, meanwhile, seemed surprised by Wang's ascent. He had moved west to Chengde, then to Kunming, attempted, and failed to win over Yunnan's warlords, and eventually proceeded to Hanoi in Indochina, arriving in Hong Kong by year's end. He sent Chiang Kai-shek a telegram suggesting acceptance of Konoe's terms for peace, which Chungking rejected. In time, Wang would establish his own Kuomintang faction in Shanghai, combining rigorous administration with pervasive secret-police activity characteristic of occupied regimes. By 1940, he would be formally installed as "Chairman of China." But that is a story for another episode.  In the north, the Japanese and the CCP were locked in an uneasy stalemate. Mao's army could make it impossible for the Japanese to hold deep countryside far from the railway lines that enabled mass troop movement into China's interior. Yet the Communists could not defeat the occupiers. In the dark days of October 1938—fifteen months after the war began—one constant remained. Observers (Chinese businessmen, British diplomats, Japanese generals) repeatedly predicted that each new disaster would signal the end of Chinese resistance and force a swift surrender, or at least a negotiated settlement in which the government would accept harsher terms from Tokyo. But even after defenders were expelled from Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan, despite the terrifying might Japan had brought to bear on Chinese resistance, and despite the invader's manpower, technology, and resources, China continued to fight. Yet it fought alone. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a land shredded by war, Wuhan burned under brutal sieges, then Changsha followed, a cruel blaze born of orders and miscommunications. Leaders wrestled with retreat, scorched-earth vows, and moral debts as Japanese force and Chinese resilience clashed for months. Mao urged strategy over martyrdom, Wang Jingwei's scheming shadow loomed, and Chongqing rose as the westward beacon. Yet China endured, a stubborn flame refusing to surrender to the coming storm. The war stretched on, unfinished and unyielding.

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama, then a very young political scientist, declared that history was over. He wrote a book with the same title just a couple of years later. The Cold War had finished, the USSR had collapsed, liberal democracy and market capitalism reigned supreme, and it wasn't going to change. And yet in the […]

Send us a textToday, we cover the enormous role that women played in the two Russian Revolutions of the early 20th century. Support the show

Winner of The 74th National Jewish Book Award: Amer­i­can Jew­ish Studies Cel­e­brate 350 Award Reveals the mass mobilization tactics that helped free Soviet Jews and reshaped the Jewish American experience from the Johnson era through the Reagan–Bush yearsWhat do these things have in common? Ingrid Bergman, Passover matzoh, Banana Republic®, the fitness craze, the Philadelphia Flyers, B-grade spy movies, and ten thousand Bar and Bat Mitzvah sermons? Nothing, except that social movement activists enlisted them all into the most effective human rights campaign of the Cold War.The plight of Jews in the USSR was marked by systemic antisemitism, a problem largely ignored by Western policymakers trying to improve relations with the Soviets. In the face of governmental apathy, activists in the United States hatched a bold plan: unite Jewish Americans to demand that Washington exert pressure on Moscow for change.A Cold War Exodus: How American Activists Mobilized To Free Soviet Jews (NYU Press, 2025) delves into the gripping narrative of how these men and women, through ingenuity and determination, devised mass mobilization tactics during a three-decade-long campaign to liberate Soviet Jews—an endeavor that would ultimately lead to one of the most significant mass emigrations in Jewish history.Drawing from a wealth of archival sources including the travelogues of thousands of American tourists who smuggled aid to Russian Jews, Shaul Kelner offers a compelling tale of activism and its profound impact, revealing how a seemingly disparate array of elements could be woven together to forge a movement and achieve the seemingly impossible. It is a testament to the power of unity, creativity, and the unwavering dedication of those who believe in the cause of human rights. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Chabad, Zionism & the Sixth Rebbe: Rabbi David Eliezrie with Rabbi Daniel LevineWelcome back! I share a quick update on the podcast's fast growth and my Los Angeles Jewish Journal feature, then dive into a wide-ranging conversation with Rabbi David Eliezrie Chabad/Lubavitch about his new book Undaunted—the gripping story of the Sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn, the “Frierdiker Rebbe” who defied Czarist Russia, Soviet communism, and Nazism, built clandestine yeshivot across the USSR, and helped reimagine American Judaism.We unpack Chabad history and philosophy, women's learning, the “Rebbe-as-Moshiach” debate, Chabad's nuanced stance on Zionism/State of Israel & IDF, and how outreach reshaped the American Jewish landscape.Next week's guest: Rep. Don Bacon—on bipartisan support for Jews and Israel.⏱️ Chapters00:00 Intro & Jewish Journal shout-out00:33 Next week: Congressman Don Bacon00:59 Guest intro: Rabbi David Eliezrie & Undaunted02:45 What is Chabad? Origins, Baal Shem Tov → Alter Rebbe (Chabad = Chochmah-Binah-Da'at)07:50 Russia 1880s–1930s: pogroms, revolution, Soviet crackdown on religion14:10 Underground yeshiva network & the “covenant of mesirut nefesh”21:00 America 1940: “America is nisht andersh”—changing U.S. Judaism25:10 Outreach vs. “fortress Judaism”29:20 Women's Torah/Talmud learning in Chabad35:10 Zionism then & now: Religious Zionists, Haredi separation, Chabad's middle path46:05 Army/service, apolitical posture, security red lines53:40 Moshiach question—myth vs. mainstream Chabad belief57:20 Why no successor after the 7th Rebbe? Ideas - personality cult1:04:50 Modern challenges, engagement without assimilation1:10:40 Key legacy of the Sixth Rebbe & today's relevance

Winner of The 74th National Jewish Book Award: Amer­i­can Jew­ish Studies Cel­e­brate 350 Award Reveals the mass mobilization tactics that helped free Soviet Jews and reshaped the Jewish American experience from the Johnson era through the Reagan–Bush yearsWhat do these things have in common? Ingrid Bergman, Passover matzoh, Banana Republic®, the fitness craze, the Philadelphia Flyers, B-grade spy movies, and ten thousand Bar and Bat Mitzvah sermons? Nothing, except that social movement activists enlisted them all into the most effective human rights campaign of the Cold War.The plight of Jews in the USSR was marked by systemic antisemitism, a problem largely ignored by Western policymakers trying to improve relations with the Soviets. In the face of governmental apathy, activists in the United States hatched a bold plan: unite Jewish Americans to demand that Washington exert pressure on Moscow for change.A Cold War Exodus: How American Activists Mobilized To Free Soviet Jews (NYU Press, 2025) delves into the gripping narrative of how these men and women, through ingenuity and determination, devised mass mobilization tactics during a three-decade-long campaign to liberate Soviet Jews—an endeavor that would ultimately lead to one of the most significant mass emigrations in Jewish history.Drawing from a wealth of archival sources including the travelogues of thousands of American tourists who smuggled aid to Russian Jews, Shaul Kelner offers a compelling tale of activism and its profound impact, revealing how a seemingly disparate array of elements could be woven together to forge a movement and achieve the seemingly impossible. It is a testament to the power of unity, creativity, and the unwavering dedication of those who believe in the cause of human rights. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/jewish-studies

Winner of The 74th National Jewish Book Award: Amer­i­can Jew­ish Studies Cel­e­brate 350 Award Reveals the mass mobilization tactics that helped free Soviet Jews and reshaped the Jewish American experience from the Johnson era through the Reagan–Bush yearsWhat do these things have in common? Ingrid Bergman, Passover matzoh, Banana Republic®, the fitness craze, the Philadelphia Flyers, B-grade spy movies, and ten thousand Bar and Bat Mitzvah sermons? Nothing, except that social movement activists enlisted them all into the most effective human rights campaign of the Cold War.The plight of Jews in the USSR was marked by systemic antisemitism, a problem largely ignored by Western policymakers trying to improve relations with the Soviets. In the face of governmental apathy, activists in the United States hatched a bold plan: unite Jewish Americans to demand that Washington exert pressure on Moscow for change.A Cold War Exodus: How American Activists Mobilized To Free Soviet Jews (NYU Press, 2025) delves into the gripping narrative of how these men and women, through ingenuity and determination, devised mass mobilization tactics during a three-decade-long campaign to liberate Soviet Jews—an endeavor that would ultimately lead to one of the most significant mass emigrations in Jewish history.Drawing from a wealth of archival sources including the travelogues of thousands of American tourists who smuggled aid to Russian Jews, Shaul Kelner offers a compelling tale of activism and its profound impact, revealing how a seemingly disparate array of elements could be woven together to forge a movement and achieve the seemingly impossible. It is a testament to the power of unity, creativity, and the unwavering dedication of those who believe in the cause of human rights. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies

Winner of The 74th National Jewish Book Award: Amer­i­can Jew­ish Studies Cel­e­brate 350 Award Reveals the mass mobilization tactics that helped free Soviet Jews and reshaped the Jewish American experience from the Johnson era through the Reagan–Bush yearsWhat do these things have in common? Ingrid Bergman, Passover matzoh, Banana Republic®, the fitness craze, the Philadelphia Flyers, B-grade spy movies, and ten thousand Bar and Bat Mitzvah sermons? Nothing, except that social movement activists enlisted them all into the most effective human rights campaign of the Cold War.The plight of Jews in the USSR was marked by systemic antisemitism, a problem largely ignored by Western policymakers trying to improve relations with the Soviets. In the face of governmental apathy, activists in the United States hatched a bold plan: unite Jewish Americans to demand that Washington exert pressure on Moscow for change.A Cold War Exodus: How American Activists Mobilized To Free Soviet Jews (NYU Press, 2025) delves into the gripping narrative of how these men and women, through ingenuity and determination, devised mass mobilization tactics during a three-decade-long campaign to liberate Soviet Jews—an endeavor that would ultimately lead to one of the most significant mass emigrations in Jewish history.Drawing from a wealth of archival sources including the travelogues of thousands of American tourists who smuggled aid to Russian Jews, Shaul Kelner offers a compelling tale of activism and its profound impact, revealing how a seemingly disparate array of elements could be woven together to forge a movement and achieve the seemingly impossible. It is a testament to the power of unity, creativity, and the unwavering dedication of those who believe in the cause of human rights. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/eastern-european-studies

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union began a new era of political engagement with the global south. One feature was development assistance. The Soviet Union embodied, offered and inspired an alternative approach to development, industrialization and modernization across the global south. Countries such as Ghana, Guinea and Mali in the 1950s-60s were governed by nationalists, not Marxists or Communists, and were newly independent from European imperial-colonial control.Soviet specialists assessed the difficult conditions of these post-colonial countries as opening a path for “non-capitalist” development: state led modernization. As opposed to a Western promoted primacy of markets and individuals, “non-capitalist” development would ensure sovereignty and economic growth by shielding against French or British neo-colonial exploitation, improving living standards, empowering the state and strengthening political ties with the socialist world.To discuss all this and more, we welcome historian Alessandro Iandolo, author of the book Arrested Development: The Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea and Mali 1955-1968Book description:In Arrested Development, Alessandro Iandolo examines the USSR's role in West Africa during the 1950s and 1960s as an aid donor, trade partner, and political model for newly independent Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.With a strong economy in the 1950s, the USSR expanded its global outreach, supporting economic development in post-colonial Africa and Asia. Many nations saw the Soviet model as a path to political and economic independence. Drawing on extensive Russian and West African archival research, Iandolo explores Soviet ideas, sponsored projects, and their lasting impact.Soviet specialists worked alongside West African colleagues to design ambitious development plans, build infrastructure, establish collective farms, survey mineral resources, and manage banking and trade. These collaborations—and the tensions they created—shed light on how Soviet and West African visions of development intersected. Arrested Development positions the USSR as a key player in twentieth-century economic history, reshaping global approaches to modernization.Alessandro Iandolo is Lecturer in Soviet and Post-Soviet History at University College London.The episode art is a 1960 poster from the Georgian SSR by Giorgi Pirtskhalava that reads: კოლონიზატორებო გაეთრიეთ! - Colonizers, get out!

Chronicles the encounter of one of the largest Jewish communities in the world with war, revolution, and Soviet power from 1917 through 1930 At the beginning of the twentieth century, more Jews lived in the Russian Empire than anywhere else in the world. After the Holocaust, the USSR remained one of the world's three key centers of Jewish population, along with the United States and Israel. Yet while a great deal is known about the history and experiences of the Jewish people in the US and in Israel in the twentieth century, much less is known about the experiences of Soviet Jews. Jews in the Soviet Union, a new multi-volume history, is an unprecedented undertaking. This groundbreaking work draws on rare access to documents from the Soviet archives, allowing for the presentation of a sweeping history of Jewish life in the Soviet Union from 1917 through the early 1990s. Jews in the Soviet Union: A History: Revolution, Civil War, and New Ways of Life, 1917–1930, Vol. 1, (NYU Press, 2025) Guest: Elissa Bemporad (she/her) is the Ungar Chair in East European Jewish History and the Holocaust, and is a Professor of History at Queens College and the CUNY Graduate Center. She is a two-time winner of the National Jewish Book Award. She is the author of Becoming Soviet Jews: The Bolshevik Experiment in Minsk (2013), and Legacy of Blood: Jews, Pogroms, and Ritual Murder in the Lands of the Soviets (2019). Elissa is also the co-editor of two volumes: Women and Genocide: Survivors, Victims, Perpetrators (2018); and Pogroms: A Documentary History (Oxford University Press, 2021). Host: Jenna Pittman (she/her), a Ph.D. student in the Department of History at Duke University. She studies modern European history, political economy, and Germany from 1945-1990. Scholars@Duke: here Linktree: here tells the story of the ways in which Jews endured, adjusted to, and participated in the Soviet system both as individuals and as part of a Jewish collectivity during the first decade of its existence. The volume explores Jewish cultural, political, and social life in the different regions of the Soviet Union, integrating gender and women's issues, narratives of historical elites and ordinary folk. It focuses on everyday life and discusses the fate of Jews in the Soviet Union both as Soviet citizens and as Jews. Chronicling the ways in which different Jews became Soviet in the 1920s, the volume reveals how the lines of contact between Jews in the Soviet Union and the outside world fluctuated between open antagonism and impassioned support. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In this episode of The Open Door, panelists Thomas Storck, Andrew Sorokowski, and Christopher Zehnder interview Felix Corley on his book Catholicos and Commissar: The Armenian Church under the Soviet Regime (October29, 2025)Part of a two-volume set, this volume explores the history of the Armenian Apostolic Church under Soviet rule. Initially flourishing across the Russian Empire, the Church briefly enjoyed greater religious freedom after the February 1917 revolution. However, the Bolshevik regime imposed severe restrictions after October 1917: churches were seized, clergy were taxed and jailed, religious education was banned, and international ties were severed. By 1938, Stalin's purges had devastated the Church, culminating in the murder of Catholicos Khoren and the closure of almost all churches.Despite this, a partial revival occurred after World War II. In 1945, Stalin permitted the election of a new Church leader, Catholicos Gevorg, who supported Soviet territorial claims and repatriation efforts. Although minimal, the Church's presence in the South Caucasus and southern Russia was gradually restored.The book is based on extensive archival research, memoirs, and interviews, offering a vivid account of how the Church and its followers struggled to maintain faith under an oppressive regime.Volume 2 continues the history of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the Soviet Union, focusing on the leadership of Catholicos Vazgen I, who served from 1955 until 1994-the longest tenure of any religious leader in the USSR. Chosen by the KGB after a lack of suitable Soviet-based candidates, Vazgen publicly supported the Soviet regime but worked quietly to strengthen the Church's presence at home and abroad. The Church's seminary at Echmiadzin grew, and diaspora ties were cautiously encouraged, though most parishes remained isolated.Despite the appearance of normalcy, the Church operated under heavy restrictions. Major decisions were often made by the state, and KGB agents were placed among the clergy. The harsh anti-religious campaigns of the Khrushchev era forced the closure of many churches. After Khrushchev's fall, restrictions eased somewhat, but the Church remained passive, neither resisting nor expanding.Major change came under Gorbachev's reforms in the late 1980s. Long-suppressed Armenian national aspirations, especially around Nagorno-Karabakh, erupted, followed by the 1988 earthquake. The Church responded with new community efforts. Though initially cautious about independence, Catholicos Vazgen eventually played a key role in legitimising the new Armenian state and reaffirming the Church's place as its official religion.Like Volume One, this book draws from extensive archival research, memoirs, and interviews to tell the story of how the Armenian Church and its followers navigated Soviet repression and shifting political landscapes.

Chronicles the encounter of one of the largest Jewish communities in the world with war, revolution, and Soviet power from 1917 through 1930 At the beginning of the twentieth century, more Jews lived in the Russian Empire than anywhere else in the world. After the Holocaust, the USSR remained one of the world's three key centers of Jewish population, along with the United States and Israel. Yet while a great deal is known about the history and experiences of the Jewish people in the US and in Israel in the twentieth century, much less is known about the experiences of Soviet Jews. Jews in the Soviet Union, a new multi-volume history, is an unprecedented undertaking. This groundbreaking work draws on rare access to documents from the Soviet archives, allowing for the presentation of a sweeping history of Jewish life in the Soviet Union from 1917 through the early 1990s. Jews in the Soviet Union: A History: Revolution, Civil War, and New Ways of Life, 1917–1930, Vol. 1, (NYU Press, 2025) Guest: Elissa Bemporad (she/her) is the Ungar Chair in East European Jewish History and the Holocaust, and is a Professor of History at Queens College and the CUNY Graduate Center. She is a two-time winner of the National Jewish Book Award. She is the author of Becoming Soviet Jews: The Bolshevik Experiment in Minsk (2013), and Legacy of Blood: Jews, Pogroms, and Ritual Murder in the Lands of the Soviets (2019). Elissa is also the co-editor of two volumes: Women and Genocide: Survivors, Victims, Perpetrators (2018); and Pogroms: A Documentary History (Oxford University Press, 2021). Host: Jenna Pittman (she/her), a Ph.D. student in the Department of History at Duke University. She studies modern European history, political economy, and Germany from 1945-1990. Scholars@Duke: here Linktree: here tells the story of the ways in which Jews endured, adjusted to, and participated in the Soviet system both as individuals and as part of a Jewish collectivity during the first decade of its existence. The volume explores Jewish cultural, political, and social life in the different regions of the Soviet Union, integrating gender and women's issues, narratives of historical elites and ordinary folk. It focuses on everyday life and discusses the fate of Jews in the Soviet Union both as Soviet citizens and as Jews. Chronicling the ways in which different Jews became Soviet in the 1920s, the volume reveals how the lines of contact between Jews in the Soviet Union and the outside world fluctuated between open antagonism and impassioned support. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Chronicles the encounter of one of the largest Jewish communities in the world with war, revolution, and Soviet power from 1917 through 1930 At the beginning of the twentieth century, more Jews lived in the Russian Empire than anywhere else in the world. After the Holocaust, the USSR remained one of the world's three key centers of Jewish population, along with the United States and Israel. Yet while a great deal is known about the history and experiences of the Jewish people in the US and in Israel in the twentieth century, much less is known about the experiences of Soviet Jews. Jews in the Soviet Union, a new multi-volume history, is an unprecedented undertaking. This groundbreaking work draws on rare access to documents from the Soviet archives, allowing for the presentation of a sweeping history of Jewish life in the Soviet Union from 1917 through the early 1990s. Jews in the Soviet Union: A History: Revolution, Civil War, and New Ways of Life, 1917–1930, Vol. 1, (NYU Press, 2025) Guest: Elissa Bemporad (she/her) is the Ungar Chair in East European Jewish History and the Holocaust, and is a Professor of History at Queens College and the CUNY Graduate Center. She is a two-time winner of the National Jewish Book Award. She is the author of Becoming Soviet Jews: The Bolshevik Experiment in Minsk (2013), and Legacy of Blood: Jews, Pogroms, and Ritual Murder in the Lands of the Soviets (2019). Elissa is also the co-editor of two volumes: Women and Genocide: Survivors, Victims, Perpetrators (2018); and Pogroms: A Documentary History (Oxford University Press, 2021). Host: Jenna Pittman (she/her), a Ph.D. student in the Department of History at Duke University. She studies modern European history, political economy, and Germany from 1945-1990. Scholars@Duke: here Linktree: here tells the story of the ways in which Jews endured, adjusted to, and participated in the Soviet system both as individuals and as part of a Jewish collectivity during the first decade of its existence. The volume explores Jewish cultural, political, and social life in the different regions of the Soviet Union, integrating gender and women's issues, narratives of historical elites and ordinary folk. It focuses on everyday life and discusses the fate of Jews in the Soviet Union both as Soviet citizens and as Jews. Chronicling the ways in which different Jews became Soviet in the 1920s, the volume reveals how the lines of contact between Jews in the Soviet Union and the outside world fluctuated between open antagonism and impassioned support. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/jewish-studies

Nicolas Flamel, the alchemist from Harry Potter, was a real 14th-century Parisian bookseller who became legendary for supposedly discovering the secret to immortality—and some believe he faked his death in 1418 and is still alive today.Support our Halloween “Overcoming the Darkness” campaign to help people with depression: https://weirddarkness.com/HOPEIN THIS EPISODE: It's what every non-muggle dreams of… to be able to turn any metal into gold and to create a magic potion to give one eternal life! So is the life of wizarding at Hogwarts in the Harry Potter books. But was there a real Philosopher's Stone? Was there a Real Nicolas Flamel who created it? (The Real Nicolas Flamel and the Philosopher's Stone) *** In 1929 the Soviet Union decided seven days a week just too many to keep track of, and it's easier to count by five – so in the USSR they suddenly began to live life with only five days per week. No more weekends. How do you think the citizens took that news? (What is Life in a Five Day Week?) *** While not nearly as well-known as its larger Bermudan brother, the Bridgewater Triangle in southeastern Massachusetts in the United States is home to strange tales itself, with the paranormal, unexplained, and even home to its very own cryptid. (The Eerie Inhabitants of the Mysterious Bridgewater Triangle) *** Author Margaret Helen James wrote, “There is an uncomfortable sort of ghostly terror, in beast form, that haunts the villages on the borders of the two counties, which is commonly called the ‘Hateful Thing'. I allude to the churchyard or hell-beast.” Something was terrifying people in the marshlands of a small county in England and tales of it can still bring nightmares to those who live there today. (The Hateful Thing of Geldeston) CHAPTERS & TIME STAMPS (All Times Approximate)…00:00:00.000 = Show Open00:02:30.429 = The Real Nicolas Flamel and the Philosopher's Stone00:09:15.670 = The Hateful Thing of Geldeston00:16:11.858 = ***Eerie Inhabitants of Bridgewater Triangle00:36:50.673 = ***What Is Life In a Five Day Week?00:47:00.746 = Show Close & Bloopers*** = Begins immediately after inserted ad breakSOURCES and RESOURCES – and/or --- PRINT VERSION to READ or SHARE:“The Real Nicolas Flamel and the Philosopher's Stone” from Wizarding World: https://tinyurl.com/yycxmws5“The Eerie Inhabitants of the Mysterious Bridgewater Triangle” by Susannah Sudborough for South Coast Todayhttps://tinyurl.com/y5n3rjcb, and Wicked Local https://tinyurl.com/yxh7g6k2“The Hateful Thing of Geldeston” by Stacia Briggs and Siofra Connor for Eastern Daily Press: https://tinyurl.com/y4z2bdc8“What is Life in a Five Day Week?” by Genevieve Carlton for Weird History: https://tinyurl.com/y2u97jxy“Bogie Tales of East Anglia” by Margaret Helen James: https://amzn.to/3bWfAcP"Mysterious America: The Ultimate Guide To The Nation's Weirdest Wonders, Strangest Spots, and Creepiest Creatures" by Loren Coleman: https://amzn.to/3spR8X3=====(Over time links may become invalid, disappear, or have different content. I always make sure to give authors credit for the material I use whenever possible. If I somehow overlooked doing so for a story, or if a credit is incorrect, please let me know and I will rectify it in these show notes immediately. Some links included above may benefit me financially through qualifying purchases.)= = = = ="I have come into the world as a light, so that no one who believes in me should stay in darkness." — John 12:46= = = = =WeirdDarkness® is a registered trademark. Copyright ©2025, Weird Darkness.=====Originally aired: January 16, 2021EPISODE PAGE (includes sources): https://weirddarkness.com/NicolasFlamelABOUT WEIRD DARKNESS: Weird Darkness is a true crime and paranormal podcast narrated by professional award-winning voice actor, Darren Marlar. Seven days per week, Weird Darkness focuses on all thing strange and macabre such as haunted locations, unsolved mysteries, true ghost stories, supernatural manifestations, urban legends, unsolved or cold case murders, conspiracy theories, and more. On Thursdays, this scary stories podcast features horror fiction along with the occasional creepypasta. Weird Darkness has been named one of the “Best 20 Storytellers in Podcasting” by Podcast Business Journal. Listeners have described the show as a cross between “Coast to Coast” with Art Bell, “The Twilight Zone” with Rod Serling, “Unsolved Mysteries” with Robert Stack, and “In Search Of” with Leonard Nimoy.DISCLAIMER: Ads heard during the podcast that are not in my voice are placed by third party agencies outside of my control and should not imply an endorsement by Weird Darkness or myself. *** Stories and content in Weird Darkness can be disturbing for some listeners and intended for mature audiences only. Parental discretion is strongly advised.#NicolasFlamel #HarryPotter #PhilosophersStone #Alchemy #Immortality #MedievalHistory #HistoricalMysteries #OccultHistory #DarkHistory #WeirdDarkness

In this bonus interview, I sit down with Phillips Payson O'Brien and we discuss his latest book: War and Power: Who Wins Wars—and Why. For nearly two centuries, international relations have been premised on the idea of the “Great Powers.” As the thinking went, these mighty states—the European empires of the nineteenth century, the United States and the USSR during the Cold War—were uniquely able to exert their influence on the world stage because of their overwhelming military capabilities. But as military historian Phillips Payson O'Brien argues in War and Power, this conception of power fails to capture the more complicated truth about how wars are fought and won.Our focus on the importance of large, well-equipped armies and conclusive battles has obscured the foundational forces that underlie military victories and the actual mechanics of successful warfare. O'Brien suggests a new framework of “full-spectrum powers,” taking into account all of the diverse factors that make a state strong—from economic and technological might, to political stability, to the complex logistics needed to maintain forces in the field.Drawing on examples ranging from Napoleon's France to today's ascendant China, War and Power offers a critical new understanding of what makes a power truly great. It is vital reading in today's perilous world.Buy The Book HereSupport Western Civ

The last time we spoke, Ishiwara had been spending considerable amounts of time with the Kwantung Army staff trying to figure out a way to push the envelope on seizing Manchuria. Ishiwara and his like minded colleagues had tried everything to persuade the Imperial Japanese army high command to initiate a course of action, but everytime the message was the same “wait, wait until next year, we can't do this at this time”. In 1931 Ishiwara and Itagaki organized the last major expedition into Northern Manchuria to get the newest recruited Kwantung officers up to speed and ready for plans they had been cooking up. Captain Nakamura Shintaro disappeared on the way back to Port Arthur. The Kwantung officers took the initiative, one could call it “Gekokujo / ruling from below” because without approval, in fact basically against the orders of high command they mobilized their forces outside their designated railway zone and headed for Mukden to quote “get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance”. When Tokyo HQ got a whiff of this they dispatched a telegram immediately demanding the Kwantung officers get their men back and not use the Nakamura incident as a way of “solving the Manchurian problem”   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. He doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . During the last hectic weeks, General Honjo Shigeru arrived to take command of the Kwantung Army and there is no solid evidence Ishiwara and his radical group had disclosed their plans to him. However when everything began to move into motion, Honjo agreed to Ishiwara's military solution for the Manchurian problem.   On september 18th of 1931, a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army upon the south manchurian railway tracks at Liutiaokou. There was an explosion and the Kwantung army immediately claimed it to be a Chinese plot and moved with skill and precision to overrun the Peitaying Barracks. General Honjo's first reaction was hesitation, but then he committed additional units to aid the radicals and upon seeing the chaos unfold, ordered the seizure of all of Mukden in the process. Investigators would find the actions of Honjo over the course of the next few days to be quite indecisive. At first he seemed to be attempting to localize the incident, but then, likely as a result of Ishiwara and Itagaki pressuring him, relented to ordering a general assault on all Chinese positions in the area. Thus what was a isolated incident, transformed into a major offensive, and that major offensive was largely directed by two of Honjo's subordinates, as you may guess Ishiwara and Itagaki.   Now after the bomb explosion, the next 10 days saw southern and central Manchuria suddenly under the control of the Kwantung army. Itagaki as a senior staff officer and full colonel, was technically Ishiwara's superior, but for the next 4 months it appears Ishiwara was the main driver behind the military actions. Itagaki was quote to say to a friend during the offensive “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's War”. And indeed, being so far from Tokyo HQ's control, it really was Ishiwara's war. Tokyo dispatched official orders on September the 19th opposing the offensive, despite a lot of sympathy for the cause amongst the high commanders. Ishiwara and Inagaki had been planning this for months, they were willing to risk it all, so they disobeyed and carried on. Ishiwara began by first coercing Honjo for reinforcements and freedom to take initiative, as he was quoted asking ‘to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”.   Now obviously Ishiwara and Itagaki wanted to expand the offensive through the officials means firstmost, but they definitely went around the officials channels as well. One devious method they employed was to create chaos for civilians in Manchurian cities, thus increasing the need for better security for Japanese residents. This would allow the Kwantung army troops to deploy past their set perimeters. Immediately after what is now called “the Mukden incident”, military agents were dispatched to Kirin to create some chaos within the city. Reports of incidents from Kirin began to poor into the Kwantung Army HQ alongside Ishiwara demanding Honjo dispatch forces to Kirin to protect Japanese residents there. He also advocated for demanding reinforcements from the Korea Army, but Honjo was unwilling to go that far. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.    The operation against Kirin was carried out in lightning fast speed. Ishiwara directed the bulk of the 2nd division led by General Tamon Jiro to rush over to Kirin by rail. They entered the city without firing a single shot and forced the local Chinese commander to proclaim the independence of the province from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours after this, the Korea army responded to a aid request sent out by the Kwantung Army staff on september 21st and began moving into Manchuria. Within only 48 hours the Japanese military had seized Kirin which lay outside the Kwantung operational zone and the Korea army was invading Manchuria without any approval from Tokyo, military discipline thus had been shattered.    Chief of staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to limit the scope of the Kwantung army's operations and entrusted discretionary authority to the field commanders for certain emergency situations, usually of a local nature. The Kirin expedition did not exactly fall within any of these boundaries. Bolstered by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki followed up the Kirin operation by pressing for an advance upon Harbin. As you might recall from the previous episode, the entire idea of taking Manchuria was built upon speed and precision. The Kwantung army had tiny forces compared to the immediate Chinese forces in Manchuria. However here they were blocked by directives sent from Tokyo HQ which forbade the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the south manchuria railway, up to this point they had limited their actions along those margins. Ishiwara attempted arguing something on more political lines. He argued Japan should aid Manchurian independence and sent the idea straight to Tokyo central HQ. In a sharp rebuff on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ affirmed its opposition to expanding the hostilities and rejected the political idea.   With the hard no from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals thought the only course of action was to cause even more chaos to force the issue. Ishiwara took the lead again, trying to toss Tokyo HQ off balance. Ishiwara personally went out on October the 8th, dressed in military pilot gear and slipped into one of five Chinese aircraft that had been seized at Mukdens airfield. He then personally led a raid, though later in life, such as at the Tokyo War crimes trials he would argue the flight was supposed to be just a reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. As he asserted, it was only at the last minute, some intelligence sprang up that anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou and thus the Kwantung army Commander had given permission to neutralize them if fired upon. Ishiwara stated that he and the 4 other aircraft accompanying him were fired upon and thus they dropped around 75 bombs on Chinchou, yes quite the course of events. As you might guess, more contemporary accounts would indicate this was a premeditated effort designed to freak out Tokyo.    The raid against Chinchou did indeed freak out Tokyo, the staff there began to fear the west would begin tossing condemnation upon them. Tokyo high command was in a bad spot. They felt obliged to back up the Kwantung army publically, by issuing post-facto approval of the many chaotic attacks, but internally they were livid. Major Endo Saburo of the intelligence division was sent to Manchuria to investigate the Chinchou situation. Saburo said upon asking Ishiwara what occurred, he responded that he had acted under the principle of field initiative and that was the reason why he never informed Tokyo in advance. Saburo also noted the manner in which he spoke to him indicated that Saburo alongside the intelligence division should mind their own business. Saburo also found out there were murmurs in Manchuria that if Tokyo high command did not get onboard, the Kwantung army was prepared to go it alone. It seemed the radical Kwantung officers would even go against the imperial japanese army command to get what they wanted. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire”.If you thought this was pretty nuts, a rumor also emerged that Ishiwara and Itagaki were going to use an independent Manchuria as a base to perform a coup d'etat against the Japanese government, to overthrow the capitalists strangling the people and to establish a national socialist regime built around the emperor. For those of you who know your 1930's Japanese government by assassination history, you know exactly what this rumor is about, a little something that will occur in 1936. Whether Ishiwara and Itagaki actually intended to do this is unknown, but they certainly put out the word.   On october 18th, war minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram over to the Kwantung army ordering them to cease any and all talk of making Manchuria independent or trying to take control of it. Alongside that, they sent operations section, Colonel Imamura Hitoshi to Manchuria to talk some sense into Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”.   And so despite the chaos and mania, the Kwantung Army had been restrained from pursuing any sustained military action through october. Ishiwara as you would imagine kept arguing they had to advance into northern manchuria. In early november Ishiwara got lucky again, finding a pretext in more destroyed railways. The rail bridges over the Nonni river south of Tsitsihar had allegedly been blown up by hostile Chinese forces. When Japanese engineer units showed up to repair the damaged tracks they were fired upon by Chinese forces. To the high officials in Tokyo it looked like a justifiable reason to take defensive measures. This was also being meet with Kwantung intelligence information being sent to Tokyo that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had provided some rather exaggerated reports to the Japanese public to manipulate their opinion through the press which in turn put pressure on Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern manchuria.   Tokyo authorized a defensive operation, limited to time and distance aimed at defending the Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung army forces began moving north and soon were engaged in heavy fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led men during this, it would actually be the only time in his military career to do so. General Honjo, rightfully feared the Kwantung forces were getting out of hand sent a cabled on November 5th announcing under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate”, the general staff was assuming direct command authority in Manchuria. As you can imagine Ishiwara and his like minded Kwantung officer colleagues were livid. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.    Facing yet another terrible situation publicly, the IJA high command allowed the Kwantung to advance upon Tsitsihar, but then uproar started abroad, forcing them to order the city evacuated. Ishiwara then began a huge argument amongst the staff stating the evacuation was unacceptable because of the sacrifices the forces had already made. But Honjo was standing firm. Then a few days later, Chinese forces began to assemble at Chinchou  and there had been some conflicts emerging between Japanese and chinese forces at Tientsin. Well Ishiwara immediately went to work demanding Honjo launch an offensive on Chinchou as a first step of linking their forces closer to Tientsin incase they were overwhelmed. To secure the advance, they also asked the Korea army to help out. Yet again Tokyo was tossed the hot potato. Tokyo high command ordered an immediate cease to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao river. The Kwantung army paused, not so much before of the order, but because the Korea army refused to participate in the offensive against Chinchou, and they were most definitely needed.    Ishiwara faced a dilemma, without the reinforcements the entire offensive might be doomed. And then fatefully, Premier Wakatsuki was outed on December 11th.War Minister Minami and Chief of staff Kanaya, both who tried to moderate the Kwantung army's offensives were replaced by Araki Sadao an aggressive leader of the Kodoha Faction, known in english as “the imperial way faction”. To explain a bit, within the Japanese military there were cliques, kind of like the warlords cliques in many ways. They fought to direct the future operations of the IJA and even IJN to an extent. There were two main ones that influenced the 1930's heavily, the Kodoha and Toseiha (control faction). The Kodoha were not an organized political party, nor did they have an official standing within the IJA, but they were certainly influential. Kodoha members tended to be younger officers in the IJA, particularly those in the Kwantung army. General Sadao Araki was a founder of the faction and they were heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism and the Kokutai. They sought a return to “the good old days” as one says. They say liberal democracy as a poison hurting Japan. They viewed the capitalists, industrialists and elites of Japan, ie the politicians, bureaucrats and Zaibatsu leaders to be responsible for ruining the once great nation. They wanted to see the Emperor take back full power, in what they would call a “showa restoration”. Their number one enemy, as was viewed by most of the Japanese military at this time, was the USSR and communism as a whole. Thus they were also by proxy in favor of the Hokushin-ron “northern strike policy” which was the Japanese theoretical war plan to invade the USSR. Now I don't want to go to far down the rabbit whole, but due note they were counter balanced by another faction known as the Toseiha faction, who were I guess to put it lightly, more moderate. The Toseiha were headed by Hideki Tojo famously and they opposed the Kodoha faction on a few grounds, one important one being, they did not want to cause a violent revolution to usher in the Emperor dominance. The Toseiha shared a lot of principles with the Kodoha, but they did not favor the Hokushin-ron strategy and instead adopted the Nanshin-ron strategy “southern strike” into southeast asia and the resource rich dutch east indies. It goes without saying the Toseiha faction enjoyed better relations with the IJN. So just to place this story within the political realm we are speaking, these two factions began to compete heavily for dominance 1931 onwards.   With Araki Sadao and some help from Prince Kan'in who was a Kodoha sympathizer things dramatically changed in Tokyo command. All of a sudden, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria became “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung army with Tokyo's full backing soon pursued all their military objectives, set out by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were seized in early January of 1932; Tsitsihar by February and by spring of 1932 Ishiwara argued to the staff they should complete the full seizure of Manchuria both north and south. In April that year he laid out “Manshu haiti heiryaku / the program for pacification of manchuria”. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol.   It goes without saying Ishiwara was central to the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and IJA overall had numerous options laid bare to them to solve the Manchurian problem, but Ishiwara's primary concern was total control over Manchuria for its resources, strategic position and to obtain a continental base for a war against America. To Ishiwara, taking all of Manchuria was necessary to prepare for the Final War. Without Ishiwara it is certain there would have been conflict in Manchuria between Japan and China, but would Japan have outright seized the province? Ishiwara spent years planning and pushing the envelope. When the plan was unleashed, it would turn out Ishiwara and his colleagues did not have a concrete timetable for conquest and lacked quite a few contingency plans. Despite the chaotic nature of it all, the conquest of Manchuria was a stunning success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”.   Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria affair started Japan on an inevitable course to fight the China War, which inturn led her to fight the west. It was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The entire affair also brings into question the subject of military discipline. Many look at the Gekokujo variable as an explanation as to how people like Ishiwara and Itagaki got away with all they did. You know, these militarist hardtype junior officers just ran amok, performed some rebellious acts defying their superiors, forcing their hands to become accomplices. Now don't get me wrong Gekokujo definitely played a hand, particularly when you look at Ishiwara. But it does not take away from the fact there simply was a high level of indiscipline within the Japanese army.   Ishiwara would have been 100% fully aware what his actions might result in, hell the guy before him, Colonel Komoto Daisaku is a great example. Ishiwara spent a long time with Komoto and saw the man's career broken as he was exiled for the Huanggutun incident. But Ishiwara was not only focus on Manchuria, he had a close eye on the political situation in Tokyo. Ishiwara knew the 1931 cabinet was crumbling, he knew certain high officials like Araki Sadao were in fast track position for promotions and their sympathies were with his cause. Ishiwara was betting, certain sympathizers such as Kodoha faction aligned ones would take seats of power necessary to help push his cause. His gamble more than paid off. All the main actors in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their accomplishments. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite 3rd class. More importantly he returned to Japan as a rockstar hero, the younger IJA officers were enthralled by him. Ironically Ishiwara had fostered indiscipline within the army more so, that when he went up the ladder becoming a member of the Tokyo staff it would bite him in the ass.   Manchukuo and racial harmony   Now Ishiwara's dream of taking control over Manchuria was almost purely a means to end end: ie to obtain resources and a strategic position to face America. Once Manchuria was under their control, Ishiwara directed his attention towards another goal aside from this, that of racial cooperation among the asian peoples. Manchukuo or rather Ishiwara's view of what it could be was a springboard of his vision for a East-Asian league, something that had a firm basis in his Final War theory. During Ishiwara's tour of duty in Manchuria in 1932, this Pan-Asian idea of what Manchukuo could be is what set him apart from many of his Kwantung Army colleagues, it also marked him to be very unorthodox within the IJA.    Manchukuo as many of you probably know, was a sham puppet state created to legitimize Japan's seizure of Manchuria. The Japanese high command simply sought to use the guise of an indigenous movement for independence to hide the fact the simply invaded a part of China and stole it. To do this they went as far as grabbing the last Qing emperor, Puyi and tossing him upon the throne of the new state of Manchukuo while they tossed up principles of racial harmony. For obvious reasons this was all done. You can't control a region full of a population that rightfully hates you without trying to win them over. Now what the Japanese did have going for them, was there did exist elements in Manchuria who sought independence. This was Manchuria, the heart of Nurhaci's Manchu people, don't get me started on what a Manchu exactly is by the way, listen to the fall and rise of China podcast for that. The Japanese had a lot to work with, it could be seen as a righteous Qing revival, or simply giving power back to the Manchu. There was also a large presence of Mongolians, and yes Inner Mongolia would come into all of this. Manchuria came into the nationalist fold late and not exactly willingly. Also the fear of the USSR was not something Japan had alone, Manchuria had struggled against the USSR for a very long time. There was also of course a large Japanese settler population in Manchuria who obviously welcomed the seizure. The Zhang Xueliang regime was not exactly too too friendly to the Japanese within the borders and a lot of discriminatory measure had been exacted upon them. When Zhang Xueliang had joined the Nationalists this had basically spelt doom upon them, at some point they knew they would be kicked out.   While the offensives were in full swing, Ishiwara and Itagaki met with other influential Kwantung Officers to figure out how they could exert control over Manchuria. Officer Katakura, chief of staff Miyake, Dohihara Kenji of the Mukden special service organ all met, looking over a previous plan created by Colonel Dohihara, for a multi racial autonomous nation of Manchuria. It was to be headed by the last Qing emperor, Puyi and needed to possess complete autonomy in internal matters, but its defense and foreign relations would be entrusted to Japan. Ishiwara drafted the plans by September 22nd and they were telegrammed to Tokyo on October 2nd. Tokyo high command disproved of the objectives, but nonetheless worked with the Kwantung army for 5 months on the creation of a new state based on two major principles: the so-called indigenous movement for Manchurian independence and the administrative planning for the Kwantung army to control it.    The Kwantung army went to work using the traditional structure of Manchuria, local self governing bodies. They bribed, persuaded and threatened as many as they could throughout 1931 carefully cultivating a local autonomy movement against the Kuomintang hardliners. One of the first things they created was “Jichi Shidobu self-government guidance board”, whose organ was responsible for coordinating various regional movements for independence to work with the Kwantung army to, in the words of Miyake “guide Manchuria to self-government”. The head of this board was appointed to the Mukden elder statesmen Yu Ch'ung-han, a man educated in Japan and previous advisor to Zhang Zuolin. His board would consist of 20 Japanese and 10 Manchurian members. Such organs were opened Japanese civilians in Manchuria and they flocked to them to support the so called multiracial political structure, because they could bend it to their own benefit.   The Kwantung army began tossing the slogans “racial harmony, racial equality and the righteous way” around heavily. The Kwantung army control over Manchuria was hashed out easily by establishing Japanese advisors over all organs who held ultimate veto authority, they would be appointed at all levels of government, thus everything was in reality Japanese controlled. Everything was going according to Ishiwara's vision….or was it? You would think so, and Ishiwara was definitely pushing all of this forward, but by 1933 he suddenly became a ferocious critic of the very beast he had helped create.