Podcasts about Communist party

“We will not let Communist Party of China define who we are,” said Taiwan's Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim, who has been sanctioned by Beijing and labeled a “separatist.”Despite Beijing's ever-growing hostility toward Taiwan, she is not deterred.In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party has escalated its “gray zone” operations, naval aggression, large-scale encirclement drills and missile tests, and aircraft incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has promised to seize Taiwan—including by force if necessary.Beijing has also aggressively sought to isolate Taiwan internationally and peel away its allies. Only 11 countries and the Holy See still maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan as of 2026.“China's cognitive warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, legal warfare, and very aggressive interventions in our domestic society and politics [have] become an increasingly serious problem,” Hsiao said.Born to a Taiwanese father and an American mother, Hsiao previously served in Taiwan's legislature and as the island's top representative in Washington, where she became known for her “cat warrior diplomacy.”Although Taiwan is only about the size of Maryland, it plays a pivotal role in the global economy, producing more than 90 percent of the world's most advanced semiconductors—the chips that power artificial intelligence, smartphones, cars, and much of tomorrow's technology.It is also America's fourth-largest trading partner, and nearly half of all global container ships—dwarfing even shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz—sail through the narrow Taiwan Strait, carrying trillions in trade.“Everything we're doing today in strengthening Taiwan is to prevent an invasion, to prevent that scenario from happening,” Hsiao said.Recently, Taiwan's National Security Bureau established a secure information-reporting channel for Chinese nationals to submit intelligence tips—a unprecedented move for Taiwan.In this episode, I sat down with Hsiao in the presidential office of Taiwan to understand what's really at stake here and how Taiwan is working to strengthen its whole-of-society resilience and deter a greater conflict.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Reproduced from Deep Dive Perspectives with thanks: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W66oExlFWzw A British surgeon prosecuted, suspended & arrested — not for malpractice, but for criticising Israel. Dr Ranjeet Brar & Ryan D expose how the IHRA definition is being weaponised to criminalise dissent. The IHRA definition of antisemitism was never about protecting Jewish people. According to guests Dr Ranjeet Brar— surgeon, Communist Party of Great Britain (ML) leader, and judicial review applicant — and independent analyst Ryan Dawson, it was designed to conflate a nation-state with an ethnic group, making criticism of Israel's policies legally and professionally dangerous. Brar details being arrested three times at demonstrations, suspended from surgical duties, and facing two General Medical Council fitness-to-practice investigations — all for speaking against Israeli state violence. Dawson documents a systematic pattern of social media de-platforming, financial censorship, and academic suppression coordinated through organisations like the ADL and Canary Mission across NATO and Five Eyes countries. This is not a debate about antisemitism. It's a forensic examination of how states weaponize the language of anti-racism to protect the commission of what both guests call genocide — and what happens to those who refuse to stay silent. ______________________________________________ Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! http://www.thecommunists.org http://www.lalkar.org http://www.redyouth.org Telegram: https://t.me/thecommunists Twitter: / cpgbml Soundcloud: / proletarianradio Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: https://odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: / cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: Each one teach one! http://www.londonworker.org/education... Join the struggle! https://www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: https://www.thecommunists.org/donate/

General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee Xi Jinping has urged incessant efforts in regularizing coordinated regional development to secure solid progress in advancing common prosperity for all.Xi, also Chinese president and chairman of the Central Military Commission, made the remarks in recent instructions on steadily advancing the cooperation between China's eastern and western regions. He highlighted the east-west cooperation program's significant role in supporting poverty alleviation efforts and promoting balanced regional development over the past 30 years since its initiation, which has demonstrated the political strengths of the Party, as well as the superiority of China's socialist system.Xi highlighted this year as the opening year of China's 15th Five-Year Plan, as well as the first year of the regular assistance efforts in the country's rural revitalization drive. He also called for efforts to summarize and apply the valuable experience gained from cooperation between Fujian province and Ningxia Hui autonomous region, further improve cooperation mechanisms, optimize cooperation methods, and expand the scopes of cooperation. The endeavors are expected to promote industrial complementarity, personnel exchanges, and mutual learning of technologies, ideas, and work styles between the eastern and western regions, and to achieve mutual benefits, win-win outcomes, and common development.Party committees and governments at all levels should earnestly fulfill their responsibilities for regularized assistance for western regions, firmly secure the bottom line to prevent any large-scale relapse into poverty or new cases of poverty, steadily advance rural revitalization across the board, and continuously enhance coordinated regional development, so as to make solid progress toward common prosperity for all.The important instructions of Xi were conveyed at a national work conference on east-west regional cooperation, which opened on June 17 in Yinchuan, capital of Ningxia. Liu Guozhong, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and vice premier of the State Council, delivered a speech at the meeting. Liu emphasized that General Secretary Xi's important instructions are strategically insightful, profound and incisive, demonstrating strong political, ideological and guiding significance. They provide fundamental guidance for carrying out regularized east-west cooperation, and must be thoroughly studied, fully understood and resolutely implemented.Liu underscored the need to consistently uphold the political responsibility, firmly establish and practice a correct understanding of governance performance, and draw upon the successful experience from Fujian-Ningxia cooperation, among others. Efforts should be intensified to deepen industrial and labor-service coordination between the eastern and western regions, strengthen the exchange of officials and professionals, expand cooperation in science and technology, finance and other fields. It is essential to carry out work creatively in light of local conditions, continuously improve the quality and effectiveness of collaboration, and promote complementary strengths, mutual empowerment and common development.The meeting also briefed participants on the progress of east-west regional cooperation. Officials from Ningxia Hui autonomous region and Fujian province respectively introduced the experience and practices in Fujian-Ningxia cooperation. Officials from Beijing and Shanghai municipalities, as well as Jiangsu, Guangdong, Sichuan and Gansu provinces also addressed the meeting.Officials from relevant provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities undertaking east-west regional cooperation tasks, as well as those from some member departments of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, attended the meeting.

Silicon Bites Ep356 | 2026-06-20 | On 12 June 2026, Vyacheslav Markhayev — Communist Party of the Russian Federation, sitting State Duma deputy, former Buryat OMON riot-police commander, former colonel of the Russian Interior Ministry — published a Telegram statement that, by the standards of the Russian state in 2026, should have produced an immediate Article 280.3 dissemination-of-false-information prosecution. Cross-confirmed across Meduza (12 June 2026), The Moscow Times (12 June 2026), Kyiv Post (12 June 2026), Novaya Gazeta Europe (12 June 2026), the statement read in part — and we paraphrase to preserve the substance:----------ACTIVE CAMPAIGN:We are raising funds for 5 of 15 Vampire DronesSilicon Curtain for Kupiansk Vampires. Dzyga's Paw, together with Jonathan Fink, is joining forces to raise $40,000 to provide the Khartiia Brigade with Vampire Drones.https://dzygaspaw.com/silicon-curtain-for-kupiansk-vampiresThese heavy bombers are designed to destroy manpower and equipment, as well as for remote mining. The Vampire UAV, manufactured by Skyfall, has proven itself to be one of the most effective weapons in the Kupiansk direction. Skyfall is one of Ukraine's largest defense tech companies, producing Vampire bomber drones, various modifications of Shrike FPV drones, P1-SUN, Shahed drone interceptors, communication systems, and components.----------SUPPORT THE CHANNEL:https://www.buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtainhttps://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtainhttps://www.gofundme.com/f/scaling-up-campaign-to-fight-authoritarian-disinformation----------TRUSTED CHARITIES ON THE GROUND:Save Ukrainehttps://www.saveukraineua.org/Superhumans - Hospital for war traumashttps://superhumans.com/en/UNBROKEN - Treatment. Prosthesis. Rehabilitation for Ukrainians in Ukrainehttps://unbroken.org.ua/Come Back Alivehttps://savelife.in.ua/en/Chefs For Ukraine - World Central Kitchenhttps://wck.org/relief/activation-chefs-for-ukraineUNITED24 - An initiative of President Zelenskyyhttps://u24.gov.ua/Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundationhttps://prytulafoundation.org----------SOURCES:Michael Naki — long-form video analysis of 18 June 2026Meduza English — "Communist Party lawmaker warns Russia is 'on the brink of a social explosion' and demands a 'clear plan' to end the war" (12 June 2026) The Moscow Times — Markhayev statement coverage (12 June 2026).Kyiv Post — "Russian Lawmaker Warns of 'Social Explosion' Amid War Losses, Demands 'Public Plan' to End War" (12 June 2026).Eurasia Review — "Russia 'On Brink Of Social Explosion' Because Of Kremlin Policies Over The Last 25 Years – OpEd" (14 June 2026) Novaya Gazeta Europe — Markhayev statement and Russian-language criticism coverage (12 June 2026).The Moscow Times via Charter97 and Dagens.com — VTsIOM stopped publishing the open Putin trust rating after it fell to 29.5% in early April 2026; methodology change to door-to-door canvassing in mid-May 2026; closed-rating still at ~73% (8 June 2026).Mezha (Bukvy) — "VTsIOM halted open Putin approval rating after it fell below 30%" — methodology comparison between open recall and direct trust polling.Kyiv Independent — "Russian pollster stops publishing Putin's 'open trust' figures as ratings slide" (8 June 2026).Kyiv Independent — "Leaked Kremlin reports predict rising dissatisfaction with Putin, Zelensky claims" (14 June 2026)Kyiv Post — "Leaked Forecasts: Putin Faces Soaring Disapproval Ahead of Fall Elections" (14 June 2026)Janis Kluge via Yahoo / Daily Mail — Q1 2026 military spending analysis: 5.9 trillion rubles = 46% of federal budget = 30% YoY increase; military = two-thirds of revenues; oil/gas revenues -45% YoY; classified-spending category +40% to 40% of all expenditure; 12% of GDP per quarter on war.----------

In this episode of The President's Daily Brief: • First up—Ukraine brings the war to Moscow in dramatic fashion. A massive drone attack struck multiple targets across the Russian capital, including a key oil refinery, as new reports suggest Russia's air defenses may be burning through interceptor missiles at an unsustainable rate. • Later in the show—Xi Jinping launches a sweeping new purge inside the Communist Party, punishing nearly one million officials as he tightens his grip on power. • Plus—new reporting reveals the U.S. military prepared a plan to send ground troops into Iran to seize Tehran's enriched uranium stockpile before President Trump reportedly put the operation on hold. • In today's Back of the Brief—Toronto police say a network of hired gunmen may be behind a string of attacks targeting synagogues, Jewish institutions, and even the U.S. Consulate. To listen to the show ad-free, become a premium member of The President's Daily Brief by visiting https://PDBPremium.com. Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of The President's Daily Brief.  YouTube: youtube.com/@presidentsdailybrief Tax Relief Advocates: End your tax nightmare today by visiting us online at https://TRA.com or call 800-583-6515 DeleteMe: Get 20% off your DeleteMe plan when you go to https://joindeleteme.com/PDB and use promo code PDB at checkout. Fabletics: Get 70–80% off everything when you sign up as a new Fabletics VIP at https://Fabletics.com/pdb ! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Israel and terrorist group Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire on Friday, following an escalation of fire overnight in Lebanon, a U.S. official told The Epoch Times. The ceasefire was reached following mediation efforts by the United States and Qatar. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed the United States' support for the government of Lebanon's efforts to strengthen its sovereignty and maintain peaceful relations with all its neighbors, in a call with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, according to U.S. spokesperson Tommy Pigott.Cuba agrees to implement its largest policy reform since 1959. The Communist Party votes to approve major economic changes, opening key economic sectors such as banking, tourism, and agriculture to attract both Cuban and foreign investment. This comes amid pressure from the United States to make democratic changes.A new award-winning documentary, "Unbroken: The Untold Story of Shen Yun," premieres in Los Angeles, drawing audiences from around the globe. The investigative film unveils the perseverance of the New York-based dance company in the face of threats from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The latest screening comes as federal prosecutors continue uncovering CCP influence operations in Southern California.

For review:1. Cuban lawmakers unanimously approved sweeping reforms backed by the Communist ​Party and former leader Raul Castro that would privatize a vast swath of the country's socialist economy in a bid to survive punishing U.S. sanctions.The ‌measures, if implemented as passed, would represent the single largest change to Cuba's socialist model since former leader Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution and a major shift towards a market economy.2. President Trump on Wednesday signed the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and Iran ending the war between the two countries.3. Iran will invite the UN's nuclear watchdog agency to inspect its nuclear sites and begin work on identifying and uncovering the locations of Tehran's enriched material, US President Donald Trump's envoy Steve Witkoff tells US lawmakers in a private briefing.4. Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman warned Thursday that a continued IDF presence in southern Lebanon would mean the “annulment” of the memorandum of understanding it signed with the United States, as Israel doubled down on its plans to keep troops in the area amid its ongoing conflict with the Hezbollah terror group.5. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told NATO Thursday the Pentagon will review its force presence in Europe within six months.“This will be a real review. It will be designed to ensure that NATO is moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe leading, stepping up to take primary responsibility for the defense of Europe,” Hegseth told a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels.6. USAF CCA Update.

Listen to current week's news from and about the Church in Asia in a capsule of around 10 to 15 minutes. Indonesian Catholic students joined nationwide protests against the government's flagship free meal program amid corruption allegations, food poisoning incidents and a constitutional challenge. In India, Human Rights Watch accused authorities of forcibly expelling ethnic Bengali residents to Bangladesh without due process, leaving families stranded along the border. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities detained two leaders of a prominent Protestant house church following a police raid, as the government continues its crackdown on unregistered religious groups. Tune in for the latest developments from Asia. Filed by UCA News reporters, compiled by Fabian Antony, presented by Joe Mathews, Cover photo by AFP, background score by Andre Louis, edited and produced by Binu Alex for Union of Catholic Asian News. For news in and about the Church in Asia, visit www.ucanews.comTo contribute please visit www.ucanews.com/donateOn Twitter Follow Or Connect through DM at : twitter.com/ucanewsTo view Video features please visit https://www.youtube.com/@ucanews

Drama on a ThursdayFirst, a look at the events of the day.Then, Encore Theater, originally broadcast  June 18, 1946, 80 years ago, Yellowjack starring Ronald Coleman.   The story of how Dr. Reed discovered the cause of Yellow Fever. Followed by Boston Blackie starring Dick Kollmar, originally broadcast June 18, 1946, 80 years ago, The Hooded Gang Protection Racket.   A masked society of extortioners has been formed, which Blackie tries to break up. Then, Calling All Cars, originally broadcast June 18, 1935, 91 years ago, The Chinese Puzzle.  A Chinese merchant has been found hatchet murdered in his San Diego store.  Followed by I Was a Communist For the FBI starring Dana Andrews, originally broadcast June 18, 1952, 74 years ago, Tight Wire. The FBI assigns Cvetic the job of bugging a Communist Party meeting hall.Finally, Claudia, originally broadcast June 18, 1948, 78 years ago, The Crossroads of the World.  David's brother Hartley comes for a country visit. Kathryn Bard and Paul Crabtree star.  Thanks to Debbie B. for supporting our podcast by using the Buy Me a Coffee function at http://classicradio.streamCheck out Professor Bees Digestive Aid at profbees.com and use my promo code WYATT to save 10% when you order! If you like what we do here, visit our friend Jay at http://radio.macinmind.com for great old-time radio shows 24 hours a day

Piero Tozzi and Gordon Chang discuss KMT official Jen Wen, who visited the U.S. to bolster her credentials but faced criticism for meeting individuals linked to the Communist Party. The visit highlighted debates over drone supply chains, as the U.S. encourages "non-red" technology to counter Chinese influence. (7)1935

SCHEDULE JBS, 6-15-20262006 MOLDOVABill Roggio discusses a rumored memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran. Roggio expresses skepticism, noting that while the Strait of Hormuz may reopen, the deal fails to address Iran's nuclear program or its support for regional proxies like Hezbollah. (1)Bill Roggio highlights that the ceasefire is a return to the status quo from February. He argues that the military was restrained from finishing the job and doubts the Iranian people's willingness to overthrow the regime. Meanwhile, Hezbollah remains active in southern Lebanon. (2)Ernesto Araújo and Alejandro Peña Esclusa report that in Peru, Keiko Fujimori leads the presidential race, signaling a "blue wave" against narco-socialism. This shift reinforces regional efforts like the Shield of the Americas. Meanwhile, Bolivia faces a "slow-motion coup" by narco-terrorists, which Brazilian President Lula da Silva has largely ignored. (3)Ernesto Araújo and Alejandro Peña Esclusa describe how U.S. forces killed drug lord "El Niño Guerrero" with a drone strike inside Venezuela, signaling a transition and military cooperation against the Tren de Aragua cartel. This action pressures regional leaders and criminal gangs, potentially leading to pro-democratic elections and increased American investment. (4)Bill Roggio warns that Sunni jihadists remain a background threat while the West focuses on Iran. Groups like al-Qaedaand ISIS are gaining ground in Africa and Afghanistan, aiming to establish emirates. Pakistan also faces instability as the Taliban provides safe havens for militants. (5)Ahmad Sharawi discusses President Trump's suggestion of using the Syrian army to conduct strikes against Hezbollahin eastern Lebanon. This "creative solution" aims to disarm the proxy without using the IDF. However, experts warn this could cause a "rally around the flag" effect and increase sectarian tensions. (6)Piero Tozzi and Gordon Chang discuss KMT official Jen Wen, who visited the U.S. to bolster her credentials but faced criticism for meeting individuals linked to the Communist Party. The visit highlighted debates over drone supply chains, as the U.S. encourages "non-red" technology to counter Chinese influence. (7)Fraser Howie and Gordon Chang describe the Iran deal as a "repackaging of failure" and a humiliation for America. Markets are experiencing a relief rally due to AI and stabilizing oil prices, but fail to price in geopolitical damage. Allies now view the U.S. as an unreliable partner. (8)John Hardie reports that Russia launched a massive barrage of 70 missiles and 600 drones against Kyiv, damaging a historic monastery. Simultaneously, Ukraine is conducting a "logistics lockdown" campaign to isolate Crimea by striking fuel convoys and bridges. Despite Russian gains near Kostiantynivka, Ukraine's manpower reforms are improving battlefield stability. (9)John Hardie notes that Jared Kushner and U.S. envoys have frequently visited Moscow to negotiate an end to the Ukraine conflict. Putin uses phone calls to flatter Trump and promote the idea that Russia is dominating the battlefield. The administration pressures Ukraine to concede Donbas, despite the military defense holding. (10)David Daoud explains that reports of an upcoming memo of understanding between the U.S. and Iran are contradicted by Israel's refusal to leave Lebanon. Iran aims to save Hezbollah, its most critical asset, while the U.S. seeks a modus vivendi with the regime at almost any cost. (11)David Daoud describes a ceasefire deal requiring Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River as "magical thinking" since the fighters are locals. While the IDF faces manpower limitations, Washington continues to pressure Prime Minister Netanyahu to accept a withdrawal regardless of Israeli security concerns. (12)Bridget Toomey notes that despite the U.S.-Iran memo of understanding, the Houthis remain a threat, recently firing a drone at Eilat. The group maintains autonomy and does not feel bound by ceasefires. They continue to ban Israelimaritime navigation in the Red Sea, aiming for economic and psychological damage. (13)Samuel Ben-Ur explains that the IDF controls 64% of Gaza, but Hamas remains in control of the remaining civilian population through torture and executions. The group refuses to disarm, as their existence is predicated on destroying Israel. Despite the elimination of top leaders, the organization's decentralized structure allows survival. (14)Edmund Fitton-Brown explains that a memorandum of understanding is expected to be signed in Geneva, focusing on freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The deal includes a 60-day ceasefire but leaves critical issues like the nuclear file for later. Skeptics warn of secret annexes and deceptive Iranian propaganda. (15)Edmund Fitton-Brown notes that Russia and China view a ceasefire as beneficial for weakening U.S. influence and entrenching Iranian power. Experts argue the Islamic Republic will never negotiate away its revolutionary pillars, including its militias and nuclear shield. The deal provides a rest period for Iran to rearm for future assaults. (16)Three name corrections: John Hardy → John Hardie (9, 10) Bridget Tumi → Bridget Toomey (13) Samuel Bener → Samuel Ben-Ur (14)

Joshua Philipp, award-winning journalist and host of the show Crossroads, reacts to the peace deal with Iran and discusses why China's Communist Party is prioritizing political control and security over economic growth. https://www.theepochtimes.com/

The fifth episode in a series on the history of Indonesia: a hinge in the world system where colonialism and revolution have decisively shaped the trajectory of global history. This installment traces the armed conflicts—civil wars and then confrontations with the Dutch and British — that propelled Indonesia into Sukarno's authoritarian Guided Democracy system and cascading economic crisis. Both the military and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) became increasingly powerful forces on the eve of 1965–when the armed forces would slaughter the communists and inaugurate Suharto's New Order. Featuring Rianne Subijanto, Made Supriatma, and Farabi Fakih. Support The Dig at Patreon.com/TheDig Register for the Socialism Conference by June 19th for the early bird rate! Socialismconference.org Get 50% off Backlash: The Global Rise of the Radical Right , or any first book purchase from plutobooks.com with code ‘DIG50' The Dig goes deep into politics everywhere, from labor struggles and political economy to imperialism and immigration. Hosted by Daniel Denvir.

Joining us today is Carlos Garrido, a Cuban-American philosophy professor, author, and Director of the Midwestern Marx Institute. He discusses the lessons the Communist Party of China can teach us in the West. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The critical importance of cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation was underscored at the 18th Straits Forum in Xiamen, Fujian province, as participants from both sides of the Taiwan Strait gathered over the weekend, overcoming obstructions from island authorities.第十八届海峡论坛在福建省厦门市举行，周末期间，两岸与会人士克服台湾当局的阻挠齐聚一堂，凸显了两岸交流合作的极端重要性。The annual forum, which started in 2009, serves as a platform to promote mutual understanding and integration between the mainland and Taiwan, emphasizing the shared cultural and economic interests binding both sides.这一始于 2009 年的年度论坛是促进大陆与台湾相互了解与融合的平台，彰显了联结两岸的共同文化与经济利益。Addressing the main conference on Saturday, Wang Huning, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, China's top political advisory body, called for resolute opposition to "Taiwan independence" separatist activities and external interference, urging joint efforts to advance peaceful cross-Strait relations and national reunification.中共中央政治局常委、全国政协主席王沪宁周六在大会上发表讲话，呼吁坚决反对 "台独" 分裂活动和外部干涉，共同推动两岸关系和平发展与国家统一。He emphasized that the mainland stands ready to share development opportunities with Taiwan compatriots, noting that the country's blueprint for the ongoing 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period will open up broader space for cross-Strait integration.他强调，大陆愿与台湾同胞分享发展机遇，我国 "十五五" 规划（2026-2030 年）蓝图将为两岸融合发展开辟更广阔空间。At a meeting on Saturday on advancing the development of the demonstration zone for integrated development across the Taiwan Strait, Wang urged greater progress in advancing such integration during the 15th Five-Year Plan period.王沪宁周六在推进海峡两岸融合发展示范区建设座谈会上，要求在 "十五五" 时期推动两岸融合发展取得更大进展。He called for supporting Fujian in exploring new mechanisms, pathways and models for cross-Strait integrated development. He also urged closer people-to-people and cultural exchanges.他要求支持福建探索两岸融合发展的新机制、新路径、新模式，同时深化两岸民间和文化交流。Under the theme of expanding people-to-people exchanges, this year's Straits Forum featured 58 diverse events covering grassroots, youth, cultural and economic exchange sectors.本届海峡论坛以 "扩大民间交流" 为主题，举办了 58 场涵盖基层、青年、文化、经济等交流领域的多元化活动。Earlier, Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party authorities elevated restrictions by banning island officials from attending the event, marking the first time the island's grassroots officials were blocked from participation.此前，台湾民进党当局升级限制措施，禁止岛内官员出席本届论坛，这是首次禁止台湾基层官员参与海峡论坛。Addressing the forum despite these bans, Chang Jung-kung, vice-chairman of the Chinese Kuomintang party, said that despite twists and turns, the Straits Forum has always been committed to promoting exchanges and playing a critical role in cross-Strait relations.中国国民党副主席张荣恭出席论坛并表示，尽管历经曲折，海峡论坛始终致力于推动交流，在两岸关系中发挥着关键作用。During the forum, mainland enterprises signed agreements with various businesses and trade associations from Taiwan, buying signature agricultural goods including atemoya and pomelos, as well as tea and fishery products from counties such as Taitung, Yunlin and Nantou.论坛期间，大陆企业与台湾多家企业和行业协会签署协议，采购台东、云林、南投等县的释迦、柚子等特色农产品以及茶叶和渔产品。The contracts serve as a major step forward in implementing the 10 follow-up exchange policies introduced following the landmark cross-Strait meeting between leaders of the CPC and KMT in April, focusing on the practical livelihood needs of grassroots families and small business operators.这些协议是落实 4 月国共两党领导人历史性会晤后推出的 10 项后续交流政策的重要举措，聚焦基层家庭和小微企业经营者的实际民生需求。Yao Ching-ling, magistrate of Taitung county, said via a live video link that the purchase agreements were an immense encouragement to local farmers. "Agricultural and fishery products carry the core livelihoods of countless Taiwan families," she said.台东县县长饶庆铃通过视频连线表示，采购协议对当地农民是极大的鼓舞，她说："农渔产品承载着无数台湾家庭的核心生计。"A range of prominent figures and grassroots representatives also stepped onto the stage during the conference to share their stories of cross-Strait integration.多位知名人士和基层代表也在大会上登台，分享他们参与两岸融合发展的故事。Su Heng, a Taiwan political commentary vlogger, said grassroots perspectives and livelihood statistics best reflect the truth that artificial barriers can never block the shared enthusiasm of compatriots from both sides.台湾时政评论博主苏恒表示，基层视角和民生数据最能说明一个事实：人为障碍永远阻挡不了两岸同胞的共同热情。A massive number of Taiwan residents still crossed the Strait for markets, business cooperation and career opportunities, Su added.她补充道，仍有大量台湾同胞跨越海峡寻找市场、寻求商业合作和职业发展机遇。Lai Tsai-ta, co-founder and CEO of artificial intelligence pharmaceutical startup Metis TechBio Co, shared his journey on the mainland since 2019. Backed by over 10 million yuan ($1.48 million) in subsidies and startup services in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, his company grew into a recognized unicorn before listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in May.人工智能制药初创企业迈帝思生物科技有限公司联合创始人兼首席执行官赖财达分享了他自 2019 年以来在大陆的发展历程。在浙江省杭州市超过 1000 万元（约合 148 万美元）的补贴和创业服务支持下，他的公司成长为知名独角兽企业，并于今年 5 月在香港证券交易所上市。"The mainland offers sincere hospitality, strong policy backup, and a welcoming environment," Lai said, encouraging Taiwan youth to combine their professional skills with local industrial advantages to find their own perfect stage.赖财达表示："大陆有真诚的礼遇、有力的政策支持和友好的发展环境"，他鼓励台湾青年将专业技能与当地产业优势相结合，找到属于自己的理想舞台。underscore /ˌʌndəˈskɔː(r)/ v. 强调，凸显obstruction /əbˈstrʌkʃn/ n. 阻碍，障碍reunification /ˌriːjuːnɪfɪˈkeɪʃn/ n. 统一，重新统一integration /ˌɪntɪˈɡreɪʃn/ n. 融合，一体化

The fifth episode in a series on the history of Indonesia: a hinge in the world system where colonialism and revolution have decisively shaped the trajectory of global history. This installment traces the armed conflicts—civil wars and then confrontations with the Dutch and British—that propelled Indonesia into Sukarno's authoritarian Guided Democracy system and cascading economic crisis. Both the military and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) became increasingly powerful forces on the eve of 1965–when the armed forces would slaughter the communists and inaugurate Suharto's New Order. Featuring Rianne Subijanto, Made Supriatma, and Farabi Fakih. Support The Dig at Patreon.com/TheDig Register for the Socialism Conference by June 19th for the early bird rate! Socialismconference.org Get 50% off Backlash: The Global Rise of the Radical Right , or any first book purchase from plutobooks.com with code ‘DIG50'

The Communist Party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist) held a screening of the landmark 1948 Polish film The Last Stage (Ostatni etap). Directed by Wanda Jakubowska — a communist, resistance fighter, and survivor of Auschwitz — the film was among the first cinematic depictions of the Nazi concentration camps and the organised resistance that developed within them. Several Auschwitz survivors appear in the film, portraying roles closely connected to their own lived experiences just a few years after the liberation, adding a rare and powerful layer of direct testimony and lived experience to its reconstruction of events. Produced in postwar people's democratic Poland and filmed partly on location at Auschwitz itself, The Last Stage stands as both historical testimony and a forceful affirmation of the role played by communists in the struggle against fascism and genocide. At a time when our ruling class seeks to discredit communists and anti-imperialists as “anti-Semitic” for expressing solidarity with oppressed peoples and resisting imperialist war, occupation, sanctions, and national oppression, this screening reasserts a clear historical record: communists were at the forefront of the struggle against racism, fascism, colonialism, and war. The CPGB-ML stands firmly against all forms of racism, including anti-Semitism, while rejecting attempts to weaponise such accusations in order to silence political solidarity and internationalist struggle. George Korkovelos, Cultural Secretary of the CPGB-ML, delivered an in-depth introductory presentation. This event forms part of the party's wider cultural and political work to defend historical memory, strengthen proletarian internationalism, and uphold the struggle for liberation everywhere. ______________________________________________ Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! http://www.thecommunists.org http://www.lalkar.org http://www.redyouth.org Telegram: https://t.me/thecommunists Twitter: / cpgbml Soundcloud: / proletarianradio Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: https://odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: / cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: Each one teach one! http://www.londonworker.org/education... Join the struggle! https://www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: https://www.thecommunists.org/donate/

Last week the folks on Fox News promoted Republican candidates as if they were public relations specialists hired directly by their campaigns to create negative ads about their opponents. As we approach the midterm elections Fox News is ramping up its propaganda to aggressive and unapologetic Agitprop (Agitation and Propaganda Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party) levels.As they have done in past elections Fox tends to focus on candidates that will get the biggest emotional reaction from its viewers rather than focusing on tight races. The race for the U.S. Senate seat in Iowa could be a nail bitter but the Democratic candidate, Josh Turek, is an incredibly likable Paralympic athlete and former state representative.Fox has put its focus instead on the U.S. Senate race in Maine between popular incumbent Susan Collins and Graham Platner, a deeply flawed man with no governing experience. Although Platner has a devoted following he also has major liabilities which Fox News is happy to exploit.Susan Collins has won her seat multiple times even when polls showed she might lose it. If Fox News really wanted to make sure that the Senate stays in Republican control it would shift its focus to races like Iowa instead of Maine.The network knows segments about Platner, and his troubled past will rev up the base and keep eyes glued the screen.The network also made an abrupt pivot in California as it became more and more obvious that the former reality star and crystal connoisseur Spencer Pratt wasn't going to make it to the general election in the Los Angels mayoral race.Instead of championing Pratt or even tearing down his opponents Mayor Bass or Los Angeles City Council member Nithya Raman, the network attacked California's vote counting process.Pratt, for now, won't become the second coming of their glorious leader Donald J. Trump. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit decodingfoxnews.substack.com/subscribe

The top leaders of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed on Tuesday that the two countries should carry forward their great traditional friendship from generation to generation.Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Chinese president, and Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the DPRK, made the remarks as Xi paid homage to the China-DPRK Friendship Tower with his wife, Peng Liyuan, accompanied by Kim and his wife, Ri Sol-ju.Xi and Kim also agreed that the years when China and the DPRK fought side by side in the 1950s are an eternal historical memory shared by both countries.The two leaders pledged to jointly maintain memorial facilities dedicated to the Chinese People's Volunteers martyrs, carry out distinctive programs on revolutionary traditions and youth education, and carry forward the great spirit of the War to Resist United States Aggression and Aid Korea (1950-53).On Tuesday morning, Xi, accompanied by Kim, also visited the Central Cadres Training School of the WPK in Pyongyang.In the wooded area between teaching buildings, Xi and Kim jointly planted a fir tree. The fir tree remains evergreen throughout the year, symbolizing the enduring and ever-renewing friendship between China and the DPRK.Before departing for Beijing, Xi and Peng attended a luncheon hosted by Kim and Ri.Xi said that he reached an important consensus with Kim on developing relations between China and the DPRK in the new era.The two sides also had in-depth discussions on safeguarding peace and stability in the region and the world, Xi said.Xi thanked Kim for the warm hospitality and thoughtful arrangements for the visit, noting that through the visit, the warmth and friendship extended by the WPK and the DPRK government and people toward the CPC and the Chinese government and people are felt even more deeply.The mutual understanding between China and the DPRK has become deeper and more comprehensive, and the future development direction has become clearer and more definite, Xi said.He also said that he is ready to work with Kim to jointly lead China-DPRK relations toward greater development and inject new and strong impetus into the socialist cause of the two countries.Kim said that Xi's visit was a complete success, sending a positive message to the world that the DPRK and China are strengthening their friendly cooperation further, attracting widespread attention from various sides.Xi's visit was of great significance to bilateral relations and the future development of the region, Kim said, noting that the DPRK stands ready to earnestly implement the important consensus reached during the visit, promote new tangible outcomes in bilateral cooperation, and advance DPRK-China relations to a new and higher level.On Tuesday afternoon, Xi returned to Beijing after concluding his two-day state visit to the DPRK. Kim and his wife went to the airport to see Xi and his wife off, holding a grand farewell ceremony in their honor.carry forward /ˈkæri ˈfɔːwəd/弘扬；传承pledge /pledʒ/承诺；保证dedicate /ˈdedɪkeɪt/献给；用于martyrs /ˈmɑːtəz/烈士impetus /ˈɪmpɪtəs/动力；推动力evergreen /ˈevəɡriːn/常青的safeguard /ˈseɪfɡɑːd/维护；捍卫arrangements /əˈreɪndʒmənts/安排tangible /ˈtændʒəbl/切实的；有形的

This episode, we discuss the formation of the Communist Party of Australia. In addition, we talk about two key legal cases which significantly changed Australian federalism, R v Licensing Court of Brisbane and the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamships Co Ltd, as well as 3 major state elections (one has minor parties galore in it!)

General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and President Xi Jinping's state visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Monday and Tuesday presents an opportunity to strengthen top-level planning and strategic guidance for China-DPRK relations in the new era.The visit has not only preserved the legacy of China-DPRK relations as good neighbors, good friends and good comrades but also helped lay out the practical priorities for the future development of relations.During his meeting with Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the DPRK, in Pyongyang on Monday, Xi put forward four proposals for advancing bilateral relations: The two sides should be guided by the high-level exchanges and consolidate the foundation of political mutual trust; stay committed to the goal of delivering benefits to the people and elevate the level of practical cooperation; uphold the inheritance of friendship as a driving force and strengthen the bonds between their peoples; and uphold fairness and justice as a guiding principle to enrich the substance of strategic coordination.This provides strategic guidelines for the healthy and stable development of China-DPRK relations.High-level exchanges have long played an important role in the development of China-DPRK relations. As the 65th anniversary of the China-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is commemorated this year, increased interaction at all levels between the two sides will help consolidate political trust and generate sustained momentum for bilateral cooperation.Both countries are pursuing their respective development goals and have broad opportunities to deepen cooperation in economic and social fields. China stands ready to work with the DPRK to strengthen the alignment of development strategies, and expand practical cooperation in such areas as economy and trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, and health care, to bring greater benefits to the two peoples.Xi called on both sides to leverage the opportunity of the full reopening of border crossings and the resumption of civil aviation flights and international passenger trains to increase people-to-people exchanges and foster mutual interaction.Equally significant is the emphasis placed on carrying forward the traditional friendship between the two peoples. The traditional friendship between China and the DPRK, forged in blood, is a valuable shared asset of the two peoples. Today, educational cooperation, youth exchanges, cultural programs and academic engagement are helping ensure the friendship continues to flourish.As regional and global dynamics become increasingly complex and volatile, it is imperative that the two sides strengthen their strategic coordination on international and regional affairs to safeguard their common interests and promote stability. In doing so, the two countries can better safeguard their respective sovereignty, security and development interests, and jointly promote regional peace and development.Xi said in a signed article published by Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the DPRK, ahead of his visit, that the two sides should uphold the international system with the United Nations at its core and the international order based on international law. In the process, they should oppose hegemonism and power politics, and reject any scheme or action aimed at reviving militarism and undermining regional security and stability.No matter how the international situation changes, the CPC and the Chinese government's firm stance on highly valuing the China-DPRK traditional friendship will not change, the firm support for Kim in leading the DPRK's socialist cause will not change, and the firm commitment to safeguarding the shared interests of the two countries and preserving a favorable strategic environment will not change, Xi said in the meeting.The two sides should make concerted efforts to translate the important consensus reached by the two leaders during the visit into concrete actions and tangible outcomes to keep bilateral relations advancing with the times and achieve greater progress.preserve the legacy /prɪˈzɜːv ðə ˈleɡəsi/传承遗产practical priorities /ˈpræktɪkl praɪˈɒrətiz/务实重点alignment of development strategies /əˈlaɪnmənt əv dɪˈveləpmənt ˈstrætədʒiz/发展战略对接economy and trade /ɪˈkɒnəmi ənd treɪd/经贸border crossings /ˈbɔːdə(r) ˈkrɒsɪŋz/边境口岸people-to-people exchanges /ˈpiːpl tə ˈpiːpl ɪksˈtʃeɪndʒɪz/人文交流

Relations between China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea currently stand at a new historical starting point, facing new development opportunities and shouldering new missions of the times, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Chinese president, said on Monday.Xi made the remarks in a signed article published in Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the DPRK, ahead of his state visit to the country on Monday and Tuesday, his first in seven years.Xi said that he looks forward to meeting with Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the DPRK, to discuss the traditional friendship between the two countries and exchange views on the overall development of bilateral relations.Xi said that China and the DPRK are friendly socialist neighbors who stand by each other and share a common future.No matter how times change or how the international landscape evolves, the traditional friendship between China and the DPRK remains unbreakable and enduring, constantly demonstrating vigorous vitality, Xi said.Noting that top-level strategic guidance is the greatest strength of China-DPRK relations, Xi said that in recent years, he and Kim have held six meetings, maintaining close strategic communication and jointly drawing up a blueprint for the development of China-DPRK relations.Xi also said that a shared socialist ideal is a defining feature of China-DPRK relations, and that the traditional friendship between the two countries, rooted in a shared future, forms the solid foundation of bilateral ties."High-level strategic coordination gives China-DPRK relations their contemporary significance," Xi said. "Promoting long-term peace and stability in the region, as well as world peace and stability, is a common pursuit of the two parties, the two countries and their peoples."The two sides firmly support each other in safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, and work together to uphold regional peace and tranquility, international fairness and justice, and the postwar international order, Xi said.Noting that maintaining, consolidating and developing China-DPRK relations has always been an unwavering policy of the CPC and the Chinese government, Xi said that China stands ready to work with the DPRK to steer bilateral relations from a strategic perspective, keep China-DPRK relations abreast of the times and achieve greater development of the relationship.The two sides should deepen strategic communication and firmly steer China-DPRK relations in the right direction, Xi said, calling for upholding the fine tradition of high-level exchanges between the two parties and the two countries, and maintaining close contacts like relatives.The two sides should take the 65th anniversary of the China-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance as an opportunity, strengthen exchanges at all levels and across party, government and military institutions, implement the important consensus reached by the two sides, and add fresh impetus to the development of bilateral relations.Xi said the two countries should strengthen communication and mutual learning to jointly promote the steady development of the two countries' socialist cause.China and the DPRK should support each other in pursuing socialist paths suited to their own national conditions, firmly safeguard the political security of both nations, continue to expand exchanges and cooperation between the two parties, and deepen exchanges of experience and mutual learning on party and state governance, Xi said.The two countries should expand practical cooperation and continuously enhance the well-being and friendship of the two peoples, Xi said, adding that the two sides should enhance the alignment of development strategies, tap the potential for cooperation in various fields, share opportunities and promote development together, in order to better benefit the two peoples.Xi also called for close multilateral coordination and firmly safeguarding international fairness and justice.The two sides should strengthen strategic communication and coordination, and jointly uphold the international system with the United Nations at its core and the international order based on international law, Xi said, adding that the two sides should oppose hegemonism and power politics, and reject any scheme or action aimed at reviving militarism and undermining regional security and stability.The two countries should jointly promote an equal and orderly multipolarization of the world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization, implement the four major global initiatives put forward by China, and work together to build a community with a shared future for humanity, he added.sovereignty /ˈsɒvrənti/主权tranquility /træŋˈkwɪləti/安宁unwavering /ʌnˈweɪvərɪŋ/坚定不移的alignment /əˈlaɪnmənt/对接hegemonism /hɪˈdʒemənɪzəm/霸权主义multipolarization /ˌmʌltiˌpəʊləraɪˈzeɪʃən/多极化inclusive /ɪnˈkluːsɪv/包容的initiative /ɪˈnɪʃətɪv/倡议community with a shared future for humanity /kəˈmjuːnəti wɪð ə ʃeəd ˈfjuːtʃə fə hjuːˈmænəti/人类命运共同体

Reproduced from ‪@garlandn‬ with thanks. • IMPERIALISM: DECADENT & DOOMED W/JOTI BRAR... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5RPfHV7Llpc This week I spoke with Garland Nixon about my recent visit to Moscow to take part in the Third Anti-Fascist Forum, hosted by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), under the specific theme of anti-terrorism. We discussed the connected between imperialism and fascism, and imperialism and terrorism, and the way in which both are used to create proxy forces and an element of deniability to imperialist suppression and warmongering. The imperialists are the principal terrorists in the world today. There is nothing more terroristic than the conducting of genocidal wars against people whose only crime is to live in a place where sovereignty is considered absolutely intolerable by the overlords of monopoly finance capital! We noted the painful coincidence whereby the forum convened less than 48 hours after the horrific terrorist attack by the Nato/Kiev junta on a girl's dormitory in Russia (Starobilsk, Lugansk, to be precise), and discussed the rationale behind the systematic and deliberate targeting of children by the imperialist war machine today. What do western ‘strategists' hope to achieve by perpetrating such outrages, which are certainly NOT accidental? We also talked about the doublespeak indulged in by imperialist politicians and media, whereby on the one hand they create forces of real terrorism which they CLAIM to be opposing (while actually supporting them), and on the other hand label all their opponents, whether internal antiwar activists or external freedom fighters, as 'terrorists' who must be suppressed in the harshest way possible – for the 'protection' of the wide population, naturally. ______________________________________________ Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! http://www.thecommunists.org http://www.lalkar.org http://www.redyouth.org Telegram: https://t.me/thecommunists Twitter: / cpgbml Soundcloud: / proletarianradio Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: https://odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: / cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: Each one teach one! http://www.londonworker.org/education... Join the struggle! https://www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: https://www.thecommunists.org/donate/

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Chinese president, arrived in Pyongyang on Monday for a state visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the DPRK and his wife, Ri Sol-ju, welcomed Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, at the airport. After Xi walked down the airstairs, Kim shook hands with him warmly.Kim held a grand welcoming ceremony for Xi at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang. The top leaders of the two parties and the two countries jointly ascended the review stand. Amid a 21-gun salute, the military band played the national anthems of China and the DPRK.Accompanied by Kim, Xi inspected the honor guard of the three services of the Korean People's Army. After that, Xi watched a march-past with Kim.Dressed in festive attire, people from all walks of life in Pyongyang, along with children and teenagers, holding flags, flowers and balloons, extended their sincere welcome to the distinguished Chinese guests with warm applause and cheers.En route from the airport to Kim Il-sung Square and from Kim Il-sung Square to the Kumsusan State Guesthouse, people of the DPRK lined both sides of the streets, waving to welcome Xi's arrival.In a signed article published on Monday on Rodong Sinmun prior to his arrival, Xi said he looks forward to meeting with Kim to discuss the traditional friendship between the two countries, and exchange views on the overall development of bilateral relations.

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Chinese president, said on Monday he looks forward to meeting with Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), to discuss the traditional friendship between the two countries, and exchange views on the overall development of bilateral relations.Xi made the remarks in a signed article published on Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the DPRK, ahead of his state visit to the country slated for Monday and Tuesday, his first in seven years.Xi said that China and the DPRK are friendly socialist neighbors who stand by each other and share a common future.No matter how times change or how the international landscape evolves, the traditional friendship between China and the DPRK remains unbreakable and enduring, constantly demonstrating vigorous vitality, Xi said.Noting that top-level strategic guidance is the greatest strength of China-DPRK relations, Xi said in recent years, he and Kim have held six meetings, maintaining close strategic communication and jointly drawing up a blueprint for the development of China-DPRK relations.Xi also said that a shared socialist ideal is a defining feature of China-DPRK relations, and that the traditional friendship between the two countries, rooted in a shared future, forms the solid foundation of bilateral ties."High-level strategic coordination gives China-DPRK relations their contemporary significance," Xi said. "Promoting long-term peace and stability in the region, as well as world peace and stability, is a common pursuit of the two parties, the two countries and their peoples."The two sides firmly support each other in safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, and work together to uphold regional peace and tranquility, international fairness and justice, and the postwar international order, Xi said.

This episode examines the first round of Colombia's presidential election, which took place on May 31, 2026, and previews the June 21st runoff between two starkly different candidates. Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, WOLA's director for Colombia and the Andes, provides deep insight into the candidates, voter concerns, and the election's implications for U.S.-Colombia relations.  The first round produced some surprises. While human rights activist and senator Iván Cepeda advanced as expected with 40.9% of the vote, the first-place finisher was criminal defense lawyer and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella with 43.7%. Taken together, right-of-center candidates already exceed 50%, suggesting challenging math for Cepeda in the runoff.  Sánchez-Garzoli notes that despite fears of political violence—given the assassination of candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in the past year and Colombia's deteriorating security situation—election day proceeded peacefully.  The candidates represent fundamentally different visions for Colombia. De la Espriella, a wealthy lawyer who once advised the AUC paramilitary group during peace talks and has represented controversial figures, proposes an "iron fist" security approach. His platform includes ending peace negotiations, building ten mega-prisons, mass detentions, aggressive coca eradication, and legalizing firearms ownership. Economically, he embraces Argentina's Milei-style deregulation and reviving the fossil fuel sector. He has also proposed withdrawing Colombia from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and United Nations human rights bodies.  Cepeda, by contrast, is a philosopher and longtime human rights advocate whose father, a Communist Party senator, was assassinated during the systematic elimination of the Patriotic Union party. Known for his measured, intellectual style, Cepeda was instrumental in Colombia's 2016 Peace Accord and would continue President Gustavo Petro's approach—advancing agrarian reform, pursuing negotiations with armed groups through "total peace," and transitioning away from extractive economic models.  Voter concerns centered overwhelmingly on security and the economy. Sánchez-Garzoli explains that while Petro's ambitions of addressing centuries of inequality in just a few years proved unrealistic, the security situation has genuinely deteriorated.  U.S.-Colombia relations under either candidate promise turbulence, though of different kinds. President Trump publicly endorsed de la Espriella while labeling Cepeda a "radical leftist Marxist." De la Espriella has expressed interest in joining Trump's "Shield of the Americas" security initiative and implementing a "Plan Colombia 2.0," while Cepeda has condemned the U.S. "boat strikes" and other military interventions as violations of Latin American sovereignty and international law.  Looking toward the June 21 runoff, Sánchez-Garzoli warns that Colombia remains fragile and at risk of violence, particularly given President Petro's claims of fraud and the close expected margin. The choices of centrist voters remain uncertain, and it is hard to predict an outcome. 

On this day, 3 June 1977, police in India opened fire on a workers' demonstration, killing 12. Thousands of workers from the Bhilai Steel plant and mines had been demonstrating at the police station where strike leader Shankar Guha Niyogi was being held following his arrest the previous day. As the steel plant was a joint Soviet-Indian project, the Communist Party denounced Niyogi as a CIA agent. He was assassinated in 1991 by employers' hired guns. More information, sources and map: https://stories.workingclasshistory.com/article/10200/bhilai-steel-workers-massacreOur work is only possible because of support from you, our listeners on patreon. If you appreciate our work, please join us and access exclusive content and benefits at patreon.com/workingclasshistory.See all of our anniversaries each day, alongside sources and maps on the On This Day section of our Stories app: stories.workingclasshistory.com/date/todayBrowse all Stories by Date here on the Date index: https://stories.workingclasshistory.com/dateCheck out our Map of historical Stories: https://map.workingclasshistory.comCheck out books, posters, clothing and more in our online store, here: https://shop.workingclasshistory.comIf you enjoy this podcast, make sure to check out our flagship longform podcast, Working Class History

The Memorial Hall of the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in Shanghai received around 100,000 foreign visitors last year, a record high that reflects the growth in international interest in the CPC's history and China's development journey.中共一大纪念馆（上海）去年接待外籍访客约10万人次，创下历史新高，这一数据折射出国际社会对中国共产党历史以及中国发展历程的关注度持续攀升。Officials at the memorial hall said in an interview on Monday that foreign visitors come to find out "why China can".该纪念馆相关负责人在周一接受采访时表示，外籍访客前来参观，核心是想要探寻“中国为什么能”的答案。"These overseas visitors included delegations from international organizations and an increasing number of independent travelers, thanks to China's relaxed visa policies in recent years," said Yang Yu, director of the memorial hall's publicity and education department.纪念馆宣传教育部主任杨宇表示，得益于我国近年放宽签证政策，来访外籍人群涵盖各类国际组织代表团，自助游客数量也持续增长。"They are not merely coming for photo opportunities," she said. "Many are drawn to the birthplace of the CPC, seeking to understand why the Party has endured for over a century and continues to thrive. They are interested in discovering the secrets behind its success."她表示，这些外籍访客并非只为打卡拍照。许多人慕名来到中国共产党的诞生地，希望了解中国共产党百年赓续、蓬勃发展的原因，探寻其成功的密码。Yang also noted the growing diversity in visitors' nationalities, with many foreign tourists listing the site as a key stop in Shanghai — a city aiming to become China's top destination for inbound tourism.杨宇介绍，访客的国籍构成也愈发多元。上海正全力打造中国入境旅游首选目的地，中共一大会址已成为众多外籍游客到访上海的必游地标。Since the memorial hall launched its exhibition commemorating the 100th anniversary of the CPC's founding in June 2021, it has welcomed more than 12 million visitors in total, with the annual number rising steadily to reach 3.23 million last year.自2021年6月中共一大会址推出建党百年主题展览以来，纪念馆累计接待游客超1200万人次，年接待量稳步攀升，去年全年接待量达323万人次。The exhibition tells the story of the CPC's founding and highlights the Party's mission to seek happiness for the Chinese people and achieve the rejuvenation of the nation.该主题展览完整呈现了中国共产党的诞生历程，生动诠释了中国共产党为中国人民谋幸福、为中华民族谋复兴的初心使命。The memorial hall has developed a service system featuring full English coverage, tours in seven foreign languages, and guided tours in English and Japanese.When engaging with foreign visitors, the memorial hall's docents focus less on past hardships and more on China's achievements in the 21st century.纪念馆已搭建完善的涉外服务体系，实现英文服务全覆盖，提供七种外语讲解服务及英、日语专属导览服务。讲解员在面向外籍访客开展讲解时，会适度弱化过往艰苦历程的讲述，重点聚焦中国21世纪以来的发展成就。"This is something we learned from interacting with overseas visitors," Yang said. "They are most interested in China's rapid development over the past two decades and how the Chinese people are living better lives. The memorial hall serves as a window for them to gain an understanding of a real and endearing China, and many have expressed a sense of resonance after their visit."杨宇表示，这是场馆在与外籍访客交流过程中总结的经验。海外访客最关注中国二十年来的飞速发展以及民众生活的改善。纪念馆已然成为一扇窗口，让外籍人士看见真实、鲜活、可亲的中国，不少访客参观后都产生了强烈共鸣。The number of young foreign visitors has been growing, with some sharing their experiences on and insights into international social media platforms.Yang recalled a video uploaded by a Canadian that attracted comments from people around the world, including a Chinese university student who remarked that seeing the memorial hall through a foreign vlogger's lens was a unique experience.外籍青年访客数量持续增长，不少年轻人将自己的参观经历与感悟发布在海外社交媒体平台上。杨宇分享了一个案例：一名加拿大网友发布的参观视频，收获了全球各地网友的留言。其中一名中国大学生留言表示，透过外国博主的视角看中共一大会址，是一种全新的体验。To engage younger audiences, the memorial hall has continuously innovated its approach, offering immersive activities and virtual-reality experiences to help bring history closer to young people.为贴合年轻群体的需求，纪念馆持续创新宣教形式，推出沉浸式体验活动和虚拟现实体验项目，让历史可感可触、走近青年。"We hope that all visitors, whether from home or abroad, leave feeling inspired," Yang said. "The CPC's journey has not been without challenges, but the Party has always maintained a forward-looking spirit."杨宇说：“我们希望每一位海内外参观者都能有所感悟、有所启迪。中国共产党的百年征程并非一帆风顺，但始终坚守初心、奋勇向前、开拓进取。”Xie Yiling, a primary school student in Shanghai, has been a volunteer guide at the memorial hall for over three years, leading more than 30 tours, including for visitors from the United States and Brazil. She expressed pride in sharing the CPC's stories with foreign visitors and hoped to pass on the "red gene" to inspire more people.上海小学生谢怡灵已在纪念馆担任志愿讲解员三年多，累计完成30余场讲解服务，服务过美国、巴西等多国访客。她为能向外国友人讲述红色故事感到自豪，希望传承红色基因、传递红色力量，感召更多人。A group of high school students from Denver in the US state of Colorado visited the memorial hall on Monday during their first trip to China.周一，一批来自美国科罗拉多州丹佛市的高中生到访中共一大会址，这是他们首次来到中国。Anissa Elmrini, 17, was among them. "Many people around me — and I myself — are very interested in Shanghai and China," she said. "The streets here are beautiful, and the people are really nice and helpful. I see this trip with my teenage friends as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity."17岁的Anissa Elmrini是到访学生之一。她表示：“我身边很多同学和我一样，对上海、对中国充满好奇。这里的街道风景优美，人们友善又热心。能和同龄伙伴一起来中国参观，是一次千载难逢的宝贵经历。”

Lucille Ball might have been a natural boundary-pusher, but America's top TV comedienne had some ‘splaining to do when a damning news broadcast unveiled her former ties to the Communist Party. The hysteria of the Red Scare threatened to bury this redhead at the bottom of the Hollywood blacklist overnight. Even when America put rampant McCarthyism to rest, the United States government kept watching Lucille Ball – and we’re not talking about I Love Lucy reruns.Lucille Ball might have been a natural boundary-pusher, but America's top TV comedienne had some ‘splaining to do when a damning news broadcast unveiled her former ties to the Communist Party. The hysteria of the Red Scare threatened to bury this redhead at the bottom of the Hollywood blacklist overnight. Even when America put rampant McCarthyism to rest, the United States government kept watching Lucille Ball – and we’re not talking about I Love Lucy reruns.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

It is August 3, 1948, and a former Communist Party member named Whittaker Chambers walks into a House committee room in Washington, D.C., and says something that no one in the room ever expected to hear. Alger Hiss is a spy. Hiss was not some offhand bureaucrat. He had helped organize the United Nations and attended Yalta. He had been, for much of the 1940s, one of the most respected foreign policy figures in the American government: Harvard-educated, polished, and credentialed, exactly the kind of man that postwar Washington was built by. The question of who was telling the truth would consume the country for years and leave damage that ran in both directions.Join us every Monday for episodes and discussions and on Thursdays for pop quizzes and Sketches in History!

In today's episode David explores Doris Lessing's bold and brilliant The Golden Notebook (1962), a book about female emancipation, political disillusionment and much, much more. Why did Lessing insist that the novel's original critics misunderstood what the book was about? What makes her description of joining and then leaving the Communist Party in 1950s London different from any other account? How did a book about mental disintegration capture the essence of the age?  Out now on PPF+: a bonus episode about George Orwell's 1984. Why does a book that is out of date and out of time still haunt everyone who reads it today? To get this and all our bonus episodes plus ad-free listening sign up to PPF+ now https://www.ppfideas.com/join-ppf-plus Join us at the Cheltenham Science Festival this Wednesday 3rd June for a live recording of the podcast with David in conversation with Jimmy Wales, founder of Wikipedia, to talk about trust, democracy and knowledge in a divided world. There are a few tickets still available: book now https://www.cheltenhamfestivals.org/events/the-politics-of-trust-lessons-from-wikipedia You can find out everything you need to know about this podcast – who we are, what we do, plus merch, events and full lists of all episodes including PPF+ bonus episodes on our website https://www.ppfideas.com Next time in The Great Political Fictions: The Golden Notebook Part 2 w/Catherine Taylor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, has called for inheriting revolutionary traditions in a reply letter to student docents at the memorials of the birthplaces of the CPC in East China's Shanghai and Zhejiang province.Xi, also Chinese president and chairman of the Central Military Commission, encouraged them to build knowledge and enhance capabilities, and extended International Children's Day greetings to children nationwide.The Young Pioneers recently penned a letter to Xi, sharing what they had learned and gained while volunteering as guides at the Memorial Hall of the First National Congress of the CPC in Shanghai, and the Nanhu Revolutionary Memorial Museum in Jiaxing, Zhejiang.In the letter dated Saturday, Xi said he was pleased to learn that the students had fostered a deep affection for the Party, the country, and socialism through recounting the Party's history, revolutionary stories, and heroic deeds."This year marks the 105th anniversary of the CPC. The Party's cause calls for unremitting efforts across generations," Xi emphasized, encouraging the students to stay committed to the Party, build their characters, and carry the baton of history forward on the new journey.Back in 2021, a nationwide initiative was launched to encourage Young Pioneers to study the Party's history and share these stories at revolutionary memorial venues.The First National Congress of the CPC convened in Shanghai in July 1921. Then the founders moved to a boat on Nanhu Lake in Jiaxing to conclude the historic meeting, where they adopted the Party's first program and resolutions. The iconic boat is now referred to as the Red Boat.

Kate Adie introduces stories on Cuba's economic crisis as it feels the strain of the US fuel blockade, Lebanon's shattered ceasefire, the fevered debate over Australia's social media ban, plus dispatches from Greece and Iceland.Cuba is struggling to cope with the the US government's near-total fuel blockade and the Trump administration increased the pressure on the ruling Communist Party when it issued an indictment against Raul Castro this week. Will Grant has been gauging the mood in Havana.In southern Lebanon, Israel has stepped up its offensive on Hezbollah with daily strikes, which have killed dozens of civilians. This follows drone attacks launched by the Iran-backed group on communities in northern Israel. John Sudworth reports on the ongoing conflict.Six months on from Australia's introduction of a social media ban for under 16s, governments around the world are eagerly looking on as they consider rolling out similar policies… but is it working? Katy Watson has been following the debate in Sydney.In Greece, indignation over new labour laws introduced last October continue to simmer as the summer heat takes hold. The new law, which permits 13-hour working days was met with fierce opposition and nationwide strikes. Heidi Fuller Love heard some full-throated views on the subject in a local tavernaAnd finally, when a correspondent is on deployment, they often have to navigate sudden changes of plan. Sandra Kanthal found herself diverted by bad weather from an assignment reporting on Iceland's arctic defences… and founded herself in an unusual museum.Series Producer: Serena Tarling Production Coordinators: Sophie Hill & Katie Morrison Editor: Richard Fenton-Smith

In the 1930s, five young men at Cambridge University became members of the Communist Party. This is not too surprising, in retrospect; many others were doing so as well. But these five men were recruited by the intelligence services of the Soviet Union, and for seventeen years they betrayed the secrets of Britain and the United States.They are now often referred to as the Cambridge Five. They were Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross. While their story has been told and retold and retold in Britain, always as a parable of class and the establishment, my guest Antonia Senior observes that very few have looked at the story of the Cambridge Five from the other side of the relationship. “What did Stalin want from them?,” she asks. “How did they fit into Stalin's vision, and how did they further his cause?”Antonia Senior is a novelist, reviewer for The Times, and co-host of the podcast History Book Buffs alongside friend of this podcast Roger Moorhouse. Her latest book, Stalin's Apostles: The Cambridge Five and the Making of the Soviet Empire, was recently named a finalist for the 2026 Orwell Prize. In this conversation we discuss Cambridge in the 1930s, revolutionary violence, Soviet intelligence recruitment, Stalin's imperial ambitions, Poland, espionage, ideology, and the enduring temptation to excuse tyranny in the name of an ever-distant utopia.

Show Notes This week on MSB: monarchs hate him! This former locksmith has ten weird tricks to win a crushing landslide election. Number five will amaze you! The fourth of our Yugoslav Interlude episodes sees the Communist Party of Yugoslavia enjoying two impressive electoral achievements separated by 20 years in the political wilderness. Meanwhile, King Peter discovers the limits of royal influence, Stalin makes things easier for us, and it turns out that its a lot easier to create a new world when the old one has been reduced to ashes. Mobile Suit Breakdown is written, recorded, and produced within Lenapehoking, the ancestral and unceded homeland of the Lenape, or Delaware, people. Before European settlers forced them to move west, the Lenape lived in New York City, New Jersey, and portions of New York State, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Connecticut. Lenapehoking is still the homeland of the Lenape diaspora, which includes communities living in Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Ontario. You can learn more about Lenapehoking, the Lenape people, and ongoing efforts to honor the relationship between the land and indigenous peoples by visiting the websites of the Delaware Tribe and the Manhattan-based Lenape Center. Listeners in the Americas and Oceania can learn more about the indigenous people of your area at https://native-land.ca/. We would like to thank The Lenape Center for guiding us in creating this living land acknowledgment. You can subscribe to Mobile Suit Breakdown for free! on fine Podcast services everywhere and on YouTube, visit our website GundamPodcast.com, follow us on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook, or email your questions, comments, and complaints to gundampodcast@gmail.com. Mobile Suit Breakdown wouldn't exist without the support of our fans and Patrons! You can join our Patreon to support the podcast and enjoy bonus episodes, extra out-takes, behind-the-scenes photos and video, MSB gear, and much more! The intro music is WASP by Misha Dioxin, the recap music Window by 1000 Handz, and the outro is Long Way Home by Spinning Ratio, all licensed under Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 licenses. All music used in the podcast has been edited to fit the text. Mobile Suit Breakdown provides critical commentary and is protected by the Fair Use clause of the United States Copyright law. Gundam content is copyright and/or trademark of Sunrise Inc., Bandai, Sotsu Agency, or its original creator. Mobile Suit Breakdown is in no way affiliated with or endorsed by Sunrise, Bandai, Sotsu, or any of their subsidiaries, employees, or associates and makes no claim to own Gundam or any of the copyrights or trademarks related to it. Copyrighted content used in Mobile Suit Breakdown is used in accordance with the Fair Use clause of the United States Copyright law. Any queries should be directed to gundampodcast@gmail.comRead transcript

Nahal Toosi, Politico's senior foreign affairs correspondent and columnist, discusses her latest reporting on how President Donald Trump and his aides have grown frustrated that the U.S. pressure campaign against Cuba, which includes depriving the island of fuel, doesn't seem to be working and what sort of military action might be on the table. Photo: A person waves US and Cuban flags during a "Free Cuba" rally in Miami, Florida, on April 26, 2026, to call for the departure of the Castros and the Communist Party from power in Cuba. (Photo by CHANDAN KHANNA / AFP via Getty Images) Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

The year 1968 has become synonymous with protest and upheaval around the world. On this episode of the Transatlantic, Bakhti talks with Adrian Matus, author of the book The Long 1968 in Hungary and Romania, about what this pivotal year looked like in Hungary, Romania, and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. Bakhti and Adrian discuss how the generation of eastern Europeans born admidst World War II resisted the authoritarian systems they grew up in in uncoventional ways—through universities, literature, and even making their own instruments. Adrian then shares how the legacy of the '68ers lives on in Ukrainians under Russian occupation who are keeping their culture and identity alive using many of the same methods. --- Adrian Matus is an educator and scholar annd the Editor of the Democracy and Culture section. He defended his PhD in History at the European University Institute in 2022. Subsequently, he wrote a book entitled, "The Long 1968 in Hungary and Romania." Previously he graduated from Université Sorbonne Paris IV and Babeș-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca. From 2020 to 2022, he curated the "Communist Parties from Non-Socialist Countries" collection at the Blinken Open Society Archives, then continued researching this topic as a postdoctoral fellow at the New Europe College Bucharest. Adrian has also worked on various educational initiatives, designing history, cultural studies and social sciences syllabi for high-school students, asylum-seekers, and refugees. --- This podcast is hosted by Bakhti Nishanov and produced by Alanna Novetsky and Carly Breland, in conjunction with the Senate Recording Studio.

Last time we spoke about the New Fourth Army Incident. Across the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP entered after the setbacks of the 1930s, seeking to become a national leader in resistance while remaining cautious toward the Nationalist government. The 1936 Xi'an Incident reshaped politics, and by August 1937 KMT–CCP agreements defined a working arrangement: the CCP acknowledged KMT leadership and integrated its forces, while still pursuing political space and autonomy. As the war progressed, the CCP focused on defining its relationship with the KMT and keeping operational independence during cooperation. Mao Zedong managed this alliance by promoting a united front against Japan, yet protecting CCP revolutionary goals and internal control. The establishment of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army marked this military reorganization. Throughout, the CCP feared that KMT collaboration with Japan could enable a peace settlement that would undermine communist legitimacy and restrict the party's future authority thereafter.   #202 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase One Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Simultaneously with the friction between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were also working to take control of—and extract value from—most of the territory they had nominally conquered. Treating these two processes separately—"friction" on the one hand and "consolidation" on the other—does violence to the real difficulty of the CCP's dilemma: the Party often had to confront both problems at the same time. At certain moments, the CCP was effectively forced to wage a two-front struggle. Even so, if the worst of the KMT–CCP friction had already eased by 1941, the most serious and painful challenges posed by Japanese consolidation were still ahead. To recover anything close to reality, the two timelines have to be read together and placed on top of one another. The Japanese understood that consolidation could not be postponed, because much of the land behind the furthest reaches of their army was still only weakly under their actual control. In some places, order could be restored by relatively direct methods: rebuilding local administration and policy authority; repairing transportation and communications; enrolling Chinese personnel—usually, as it turned out, people of dubious reliability—as police or militia under puppet regimes; registering the local population; and requiring identity cards. In true old-style Chinese fashion, collective security practices were used widely. One form was the familiar bao-jia system, in one variant or another. Another was the so-called "railway-cherishing village": a village would be assigned a nearby stretch of track, and if residents failed to "cherish" it, they were held collectively responsible. Yet early Japanese weakness in northern China is vividly illustrated by an incident in the summer of 1938. Three young foreigners—vacationing from teaching in Peiping (Beijing)—were curious about events and about what people were doing. They loaded their bicycles on a southbound train, got off at Baoding, and rode west until they ran into Eighth Route Army detachments. In the early period of the war, commanders generally wanted to rely on more mobile forms of warfare. Mao, however, insisted on a strategy of de-escalation and dispersion: breaking the 8RA and New Fourth Army into small units as nuclei for combat, recruitment, political work, and base-area construction. Under this approach, few engagements could be truly dramatic in scale, and most were constrained by the need to survive. Each skirmish had to be carefully planned. The CCP would use local intelligence and the element of surprise so that a detachment could strike and withdraw before its limited ammunition ran out or before enemy reinforcements arrived. Small Japanese patrols and puppet units could be ambushed not only to seize weapons and other material, but also to inflict casualties. Active collaborators, or Japanese-sponsored administrative personnel, could be assassinated. Above all, Communist action aimed to disrupt transportation: mining roads; cutting down telegraph poles, stealing wire, and cutting rail lines; sabotaging rolling stock; and, at times, carrying off steel rails so that primitive arsenals could be supplied. Attempting derailments was also part of the effort. Destroying a bridge or a locomotive counted as a major achievement. Both the Communists and the Japanese understood that these tactics did not decisively shift the overall strategic balance. Still, they worked at other levels. For the Japanese, the result was a constant series of small wounds—painful, bleeding, and potentially infectious. Few areas in the countryside felt truly safe. Japanese field commanders documented growing frustration as they tried to eliminate resistance, restore administration, collect taxes, and prepare for more systematic and effective economic exploitation of conquered territory. Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese cannot be judged only in conventional battle terms—numbers of engagements, casualties, or territory occupied. It had to be evaluated politically and psychologically as well, exactly as Mao repeatedly emphasized. Since the CCP's wartime legitimacy depended on its patriotic claims, enough fighting had to be carried out to maintain credibility. Moreover, military success mattered for mobilizing the "basic masses," persuading wavering people to keep an open mind, and neutralizing opposition. As the logic put it, it was not that people always chose the side that was winning, but that few would ever join a side they believed was losing. One experienced cadre described the effect this way: Among the guerrilla units… there is a saying that "victory decides everything." No matter how hard it has been to recruit troops, supply the army, raise the masses' anti-Japanese fervor or win over the masses' sympathy, after a victory in battle the masses fall all over themselves to send us flour, steamed bread, meat, and vegetables. The masses' pessimistic and defeatist psychology is broken down, and many new guerrilla soldiers swarm in. But once the Japanese began to demand a heavy price for every engagement—whether the Communists won or not—this attitude began to change. In North and Central China, the Japanese earliest pacification sweeps created comparatively little trouble for the CCP. At first, the Japanese made few distinctions among Chinese forces. They simply tried to mop up or disperse them without regard to character. Over time, however, they realized that these sweeps actually made it easier for the CCP to expand. By the second half of 1939, Japanese methods became more discriminating. Chinese non-Communist forces would step aside while the Japanese hunted specifically for the 8RA, the N4A, and their local affiliates. The Japanese also made more direct appeals to non-Communist forces. According to Japanese army statistics, during the eighteen months from mid-1939 to late 1940, around 70,000 men from more or less regular Nationalist units in North China alone went over to the Japanese. The Japanese also reached informal "understandings" with several regional commanders whose forces together might have totaled as many as 300,000 men. This, of course, corresponded to what the CCP denounced as "crooked-line patriotism"—the "crooked-line" collaboration that preserved certain units so they could be used in future anti-Communist operations. When pacification efforts were intensified from late 1939 and throughout 1940, differences also appeared in the strategies Japanese armies used in North versus Central China. In North China, the approach relied heavily on military means, with political tactics limited largely to recruiting collaborators. In Central China, Japanese authorities did not hesitate to use military force, but they also attempted to supplement it with more comprehensive political and economic solutions by setting up tightly controlled "model peace zones." Although both approaches ultimately failed, they created enormous difficulties for Chinese Communists—until, in 1943, the Japanese were forced to ease off because the Pacific War against the United States became too burdensome. Careful reading of detailed intra-party documents suggests that repression also demobilized peasant support and terrorized populations into apathy, grudging acquiescence, or even active collaboration with the Japanese. In a locality already reduced from consolidated base status to guerrilla status, capacity and will were often too weak to administer complex reforms in systematic fashion. In other words, passive survival—defensive survival—was at least as important as what lay behind the heroic public images the Party projected. Systematic pacification in North China in late 1939 and 1940 radiated outward. It moved from areas held more or less firmly by the Japanese and their puppets into guerrilla and contested zones. The ultimate objective was to crush resistance or render it ineffective. The method was first to sweep the area clear of anti-Japanese elements, and then to establish a chain of interconnected strongpoints that could quickly reinforce one another. After that, puppet government would be expanded so it could take increasing responsibility for civil administration and "pacification maintenance," while Japanese forces repeated the initial steps further outward into contested territory. Violence was used selectively against individuals, groups, or villages accused of acts of resistance. This selective violence aimed to deter active participation in CCP-led programs, deprive Communist forces of a population willing to shelter them, and persuade informers to come forward. That was, at least, the theory of the strategy. In practice, the basic framework of the strategy depended on the main transport lines. Railways and roads—if properly fortified and protected—could separate resistance forces from one another and deny them one of their most effective weapons: mobility. These "cage" tactics (chiyu-lung, "jiu-lung") made it possible to enlarge pacified areas by "nibbling" outward, "as a silkworm feeds on mulberry leaves" (ts'an-shih). At the same time, the approach aimed to exploit North China's economy more effectively. To this end, the Japanese worked to improve and extend both railway and road networks. When the war began, in Shanxi the Cheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan) and Tong-Pu (Datong–Tongguan) lines were metre-gauge, incompatible with the standard-gauge lines elsewhere in China—part of Yan Xishan's design to prevent deeper penetration into his province. By the end of 1939, the Japanese used forced labor to convert both lines to standard gauge. One benefit was the easier transportation of high-quality anthracite coal from the Qingxing mines (on the Cheng-Tai line) to industrial users in North China and Manchukuo. Of the newly constructed roads and railway lines, the most important was the Te-Shih line—from Dezhou in northeastern Shandong to Shijiazhuang. Construction began in June 1940 and finished in November, connecting the Tianjin–Pukou, Beiping–Hankou, and Cheng-Tai lines. This made it easier to move troops and transport raw cotton. Once the Te–Shih link was completed, the Japanese had direct connections between the point of their furthest advance at the elbow of the Yellow River and all major cities of North China, and beyond to Manchukuo. Communist sources began to speak of a "transportation war," noting with concern the moats and ditches, the blockhouses, and the frequent patrols protecting the lines. Both militarily and economically, these measures weighed heavily on forces led by the Communists in North China and on the populations under their control—especially the plains of central and eastern Hebei. One indicator of effectiveness was the rapid decline in "acts of sabotage" against North China railways in 1939 and the first half of 1940. A cadre in Jin-Cha-Ji reported in mid-1940: "The enemy has adopted a blockhouse policy, like that of the Jiangxi Soviet. They are spread like a constellation. In central Hebei alone, there are about 500, separated by one to three miles." Normal trading patterns were disrupted as Japanese or puppet occupiers took over administrative and commercial centers, and peasants found themselves caught between regulations imposed by the Communists on one side and those enforced by the other side. Finally, landlords, moneylenders, loafers, bandits—everyone who felt damaged by the new order inside base areas—could use pacification programs to try to recover influence or simply take revenge. Some became informers. After 8RA and local units were driven away, they could kill remaining cadres or activists and settle scores with the peasants who had supported them. Until the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was defeated, local elites and other disaffected elements might also seek support from Nationalists. It was even possible for an armed band to operate for several months inside consolidated regions of the CCP base, killing cadres as it went. Peng Dehuai later recalled this period in a way that underscored how pressure translated into wavering and collapse. Under the enemy's brutal pressure, in some districts the masses even hesitated or capitulated. From March to July 1940, large areas of the North China base were reduced to guerrilla regions. Before the "Cage-bursting battle",, they controlled only two county seats: Pingxun in the Taihang mountains and Pien-kuan in northwest Shanxi. Masses who previously had one set of obligations now had two—one toward the anti-Japanese regime and one toward the puppet regime. The situation in North China had not yet become a full crisis, but it was certainly serious. Action was needed to regain initiative. On 22 July 1940, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan Deputy Chief of Staff jointly issued the Preliminary Battle Order, laying out the strategic goals for the coming operation. The order stated: "To respond to the enemy's 'prison cage policy,' obstruct its advance toward Xi'an, create favorable conditions in the North China theater, and strike at the national resistance initiative, we have decided to take advantage of the concealment provided by tall summer millet and the rainy season to carry out a large-scale sabotage operation on the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway (Zheng–Tai Line)." It required the participation of at least 22 regiments from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, the 129th Division, and the 120th Division. The main objective was to "completely destroy key points along the Zheng–Tai Line" and to "cut the railway for a prolonged period." On 8 August, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the Operational Battle Order, further clarifying how forces would be deployed. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region was assigned to attack the eastern section of the Zheng–Tai Railway (from Niangzi Pass to Shijiazhuang). The 129th Division was assigned the western section (from Niangzi Pass to Yuci). The 120th Division was tasked with targeting the northern segment of the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. The order also required all troops to begin combat operations on 20 August, and emphasized that "the success of the campaign should be assessed primarily by the extent of damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai Line." The operation was prepared under strict secrecy. Various elements of the Eighth Route Army conducted thorough preparations before the campaign. Reconnaissance teams, hidden and protected with the help of local villagers, penetrated deep into areas near the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway to carefully map Japanese strongholds, enemy troop dispositions, and local terrain. At the same time, both military and civilian communities mobilized to stockpile grain, ammunition, and tools needed for railway sabotage; blacksmiths were organized to manufacture crowbars, pickaxes, and other essential equipment. Specialized military training covered demolition methods and techniques for dismantling railways, including tactics such as heating and bending steel rails. Civilian mobilization played a crucial role: militia and support teams took on tasks such as transport, medical aid, and coordination with military units. In Central Shanxi alone, more than 10,000 militia members were mobilized. The Eighth Route Army headquarters repeatedly stressed the need for operational confidentiality, stating: "Before the battle begins, the plan must remain strictly classified; until preparations are completed, the campaign objective may be disclosed only to brigade-level commanders." With the cover of dense summer millet, troops secretly assembled within their designated operational areas. Before the battle, the Japanese North China Area Army estimated the strength of the communist regular forces at about 88,000 men in December 1939. Two years later, they revised the estimate to 140,000. On the eve of the battle, communist forces had grown to between 200,000 and 400,000 men, organized in 105 regiments. By 1940, the growth had become so significant that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regular units—46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th—against Japanese-held cities and the railway lines that connected them. According to the Communist Party's official statement, the battle began on 20 August.  On August 20, 1940, the rain didn't stop the campaign—it changed the battlefield. It slowed movement, blurred distance, and turned rivers and muddy roads into obstacles that could just as easily trap your own men as your enemy's. Along the districts bordering the Zhengtai Railway, the Eighth Route Army still moved, slipping through valleys and river crossings, bypassing Japanese posts, and positioning forces on both sides of the line as night settled in. By dark, the plan became a coordinated strike meant to hit the enemy before they could properly react. Across the entire Zhengtai Railway, attacks went out with timing designed to disorient Japanese defenders—so that their "first realization" arrived only after the railway itself was already being attacked and the window to respond effectively had slipped away.   A key portion of that strike fell to the right column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, centered on the 5th and 19th Regiments, with the mission of sabotaging the Niangziguan to Luanliu section. At 20:00 on August 20, part of the 5th Regiment infiltrated Niangziguan Village for the first time, overwhelmed the puppet troops stationed there, and seized the village by dawn. After that opening cut, the main force moved in to cover the engineers, destroy enemy fortifications, and blow up the Guandong Railway Bridge. When the sabotage was done, they withdrew from Niangziguan on their own initiative, leaving the enemy to deal with the destruction rather than being pulled into a long, grinding engagement.   That same night, at Mohe Beach along the Zhengtai line, another action unfolded. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked the station and was immediately met with a counterattack by Japanese forces. By dawn on August 21, the company withdrew—an adjustment, not defeat—and then attacked again the same night after crossing the Mian River. This time the enemy retreated into barracks to resist more stubbornly, with nearly 1,000 Japanese troops holding Mohe Beach. Heavy rain had swollen the river and made foot crossing nearly impossible, but the attackers seized the village west of the station and held it. On August 22 afternoon, more than 400 Japanese troops counterattacked; the main force of the 5th Regiment hit from the north bank of the Mian River in a fire assault, killing more than 50 before withdrawing the 1st Company out of the fighting. The 19th Regiment, meanwhile, took Jucheng and Irrang stations, tightening the pressure on the railway corridor.   On August 23, 1940, the 5th Regiment recaptured Niangziguan and blew up the stone bridge east of the village, destroying the railway segment between Chengjialongdi and Mohetan. That night the 19th Regiment stormed Yirang Station and blew up the water tower and the railway, ensuring the disruption would not be temporary. From August 24 to 27, bridges near Yanhui—stone and wooden—were destroyed again and again. Under that continuous pressure, beginning on August 25, Japanese transportation along the Niangziguan to Luanliu section of the Zhengtai Road was cut off completely. Strongholds were left to fight more or less alone, unable to coordinate or move supplies the way they normally would.   While the right column worked the railway, other forces hit the system from different angles. The Central Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region—comprised of the 2nd, 3rd, and 16th Regiments—took responsibility for sabotaging the Zhengtai Road segment from Niangziguan to Weishui and for striking the Jingxing Coal Mine area. On the night of August 20, the 3rd Regiment launched coordinated attacks on the Gangtou old mine and the Dongwangshe new mine of Jingxing, and with miners assisting, the 1st Battalion quickly stormed the new mine and annihilated part of the enemy garrison. The rest withdrew into bunkers, resisting as best they could. By the afternoon of the next day, the entire enemy force had been wiped out. Afterward, major buildings in the mining area were destroyed and most materials were removed so that the mine could not resume production for more than six months. The 3rd Regiment also captured Jiazhuang, reinforcing the idea that sabotage here meant disabling not just lines of movement, but also the flow of resources.   Elsewhere, Japanese positions were disrupted in smaller, targeted strikes that still added up. After the Japanese stronghold at Nanzheng destroyed the railway between Nanzheng and Weishui, the 2nd Regiment took the eastern end fortress of the Faluling Railway Bridge, covered the engineers as they blew up a section of the bridge, and briefly occupied Caizhuang. The 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment attacked Beiyu on the night of August 20, annihilating most defenders, and on August 21 it covered the engineers to destroy the Beiyu Stone Bridge. Other units struck Didu and annihilated most defenders in Nanyu. By August 24, the Central Column had learned that more than 1,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Jingxing County, with additional reinforcements moving toward Nanyu and Didu. Their response was practical: detachments were assigned to watch and harass along the railway while the main force gathered in mobile positions—waiting for the next opening rather than charging blindly into concentrated strength.   Meanwhile, the left column of the Jin-Cha-Ji effort—from the 2nd Regiment of the Jizhong Garrison Brigade, the Military Region Special Service Regiment, and the Pingjinghuo Detachment—focused on sabotage from Weishui to Shijiazhuang. On the night of August 20, the Pingjinghuo Detachment attacked Yanfeng and blew up the railway. The Special Service Regiment moved with massed efforts as they destroyed power lines and highways from Yanfeng to Weizhou. On the night of August 22, the Special Service Regiment attacked Shang'an Station. On August 23, the 2nd Regiment stormed Touquan Station, captured two fortresses, then withdrew from the railway line; from August 25 to 27, they destroyed the highway connecting Pingshan, Huolu, Weishui, and Yanfeng.   While the main blow was falling along the Zhengtai Railway, the 129th Division was assigned raids on the western section. That area included the Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4 headquarters, a coal mine base at Yangquan, and support from Independent Mixed Brigade No. 9 from Yuci. These raids weren't only about destruction—they were meant to disorient, to create confusion over where the main pressure truly was. After the general offensive began at 20:00 on August 20, five companies of the 16th Regiment attacked Lujiazhuang Station and captured bunkers. Two guerrilla-operating companies in Yuci worked with engineers to destroy bridges between Lujiazhuang and Duanting. The 38th Regiment surprised Shanghu and Heshangzu stations, while the 25th Regiment captured Mashou Station and pushed Japanese troops toward Shouyang. The division's right-wing sabotage unit—28th and 30th Regiments of the newly formed 10th Brigade—took on sabotage on the Yangquan–Shouyang section, splitting routes on the night of August 20 to attack stations like Langyu, Zhangjing, Qinquan, and then striking additional positions with the 30th Regiment. Across that window, stations and strongholds such as Sangzhang, Yanzigou, Langyu, and Qinquan were taken, iron bridges were destroyed, and additional stations including Potou, Xinzhuang, Saiyu, Tielugou, Xiaozhuang, and Zhangzhuang were seized or disrupted.   As the western sabotage deepened, Japanese response hardened—but the ability to coordinate weakened. With the Zhengtai line sabotaged, the western section came under the 129th Division's control except for a few places such as Shouyang. Fierce assaults forced Japanese forces to lose contact with each other within days. Strongholds were attacked, besieged, and then annihilated as communication and coordination broke down. The 129th Division mobilized local people to destroy railway facilities, stations, and installations using demolition, burning, and flooding, moving materials so the railway and related infrastructure were effectively erased rather than merely damaged.   To cover these operations, the division occupied Shinaoshan with the 14th Regiment of the general reserve. Starting the morning of August 21, Japanese forces concentrated in Yangquan and attacked Shinaoshan daily. Enemy strength reportedly rose from more than 200 to more than 600, supported by bombing and strafing and the release of poison. The 14th Regiment held out until August 25, repelling repeated attacks, and by August 26 additional pressure came again as reinforcements increased. After six days and nights—and the annihilation of more than 400 enemy soldiers—the 14th Regiment withdrew from the main peak of Shinaoshan, continuing to contain the Japanese with smaller detachments while the main force shifted to another mission.   The first phase of sabotage had succeeded, but the campaign did not allow complacency. The Japanese strengthened their presence along the railway and launched frequent counterattacks, and Japanese divisions in southern Shanxi—including the 36th, 37th, and 41st—prepared to reinforce from the north. On August 26, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued instructions for a second phase: continue breaking through the road, concentrate superior forces, and annihilate Japanese units smaller than a battalion that were attacking or reinforcing. In line with that guidance, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the Jin-You Column to keep breaking through the road on August 27 for one or two days, while the 129th Division alternated daily in breaking through. Under sustained pressure, the western section of the Zhengtai Road was basically destroyed; transportation was effectively cut off except for a few towns such as Shouyang and Yangquan.   On September 2, orders were issued to conclude the Zhengtai Campaign starting from the 3rd and shift forces according to the second-step plan. As the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region launched the Mengbei Campaign, the 129th Division shifted toward attacking invading Japanese forces, while other tasks—such as attacking the He-Liao Highway and recovering cities of He and Liao—were left for later. Beginning September 2, the Military Region deployed the 2nd, 5th, 16th, and 19th Regiments toward areas north of Meng County and Shouyang to recapture enemy strongholds. With the railway sabotaged, the Japanese main force north of Meng County shifted south to reinforce, weakening garrisons and spreading panic among the strongholds. As fierce offensives intensified, garrison troops began to waver. By the afternoon of September 5, Japanese troops at Xiashe, supported by troops from Shangshe, retreated to Shangshe and fled toward Meng County overnight. That night, the 19th Regiment arrived near Shangshe and, together with the Special Service Battalion of the 2nd Military Sub-district, pursued. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced into Shenquan and Putian to cut off the retreat route. By 9:00 AM on September 6 the enemy was surrounded in Xingdao Village, and after five hours of intense fighting most forces were annihilated. Survivors fled east to Luolizhang Mountain, only to be surrounded again by the 19th, 5th, and 16th Regiments. By the night of September 9, most Japanese forces had been wiped out, though more than 40 men broke through in dense fog and escaped into Meng County.   The siege continued through bitter episodes involving attacks and withdrawals under poison, with both sides paying heavily for every moment of progress. Eventually, on September 11, Japanese troops in Xiyan escaped back to Meng County, helped by more than 200 Japanese already present there. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to counter the pressure: on September 4 they sent more than 2,000 troops to reinforce Meng County and began a counterattack. On September 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the 19th and 5th Regiments to remain east and north of Meng County to coordinate with the 129th and 120th Divisions, while the rest prepared for new missions.   As fighting intensified around Zhengtai and Meng County, a parallel pressure campaign unfolded. To contain Eighth Route Army sabotage along Zhengtai, the Japanese assembled battalions from Independent Mixed 4th and 9th Brigades to strike the 129th Division. In response, the 120th Division began large-scale sabotage against the Tongpu Railway and major highways in northwestern Shanxi starting 20:00 on August 20. They captured enemy strongholds along rail and road lines, striking major bases such as Kangjiahui on the Xinjing Highway, where more than 50 Japanese and puppet troops were stationed, and also attacking other areas like Shishen, Lizhen, and Jingle. Ambushes were set to annihilate reinforcements arriving from different directions, and at 00:30 on August 21 the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment attacked Kangjiahui and annihilated the defenders by dawn. Reinforcements arriving in cars were destroyed, and subsequent actions continued to expand the disruption.   Over more than 180 battles in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division annihilated more than 800 Japanese and puppet troops and captured or destroyed stations and strongholds including Kangjiahui, Yangfangkou, Pingshe, and Longquan. By disrupting the Tongpu Railway and transportation along the Xinjing, Taifen, and Fenli highways, they tied down Japanese forces and made it harder to reinforce Zhengtai. In practical terms, this meant the first phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive—lasting about three weeks—ended on September 10 with major railway lines and motor roads attacked repeatedly. Roadbeds, bridges, switching yards, and installations were hit heavily; at the Qingxing coal mines, facilities were destroyed and production was halted for nearly a year.   By the end of that first phase, the campaign's logic had become clearer: once the Japanese leaned more heavily on a "cage-and-strongpoint" defense system, the same transport network that had supported their defense became less secure. When rail and road were repeatedly disrupted, strongpoints became more vulnerable—especially if Japanese units pulled out nearby detachments to respond to sabotage. So the campaign shifted from breaking transportation to attacking blockhouses and other strongpoints in contested areas, aiming to force Japanese forces back into well-defended garrisons and leave the countryside again contested by Communist forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. From 20 August 1940, under secrecy and rain, units of the 8th Route Army infiltrated stations, captured villages, destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, mines, and stations across multiple columns. By early September the Zhengtai and related Tongpu transport routes were repeatedly severed, forcing Japanese troops to fight isolated strongpoints and hindering reinforcement. 

On this day, 16 May 1967, the All Circles Struggle Committee (ACSC) was established in Hong Kong in the wake of violent police repression of a strike of plastic flower factory workers. On May 6, British colonial police violently beat picketing workers and bystanders, causing mass outrage. Protests against and clashes with police began breaking out across the city. After the ACSC was set up to coordinate a movement against colonialism, 126 struggle committees had been formed within the next two days to share experiences and plan action. A week later, wildcat strikes began to break out, with widespread rioting. In June, a general strike was called, which eventually faltered although strikes in some industries continued until late July. As the strike collapsed, many protesters began resorting to bomb attacks – both real and fake – targeting British authorities to cause chaos and disrupt business as usual. The "Hong Kong riots," as they became known, lasted until December before they were called off after secret talks between British authorities and the Communist Party of China. The CPC were nominally opposed to British colonialism, but in reality the Chinese economy benefited from having access to international markets through British Hong Kong and so they eventually decided not to push for British withdrawal. While the protests ended, in their wake British authorities implemented numerous reforms which significantly improved the lives of working class Hong Kongers. These included UK-style social benefits for the unemployed, the disabled and the elderly, construction of new hospitals and homes, abolition of some sexist laws, and rampant police corruption was largely eradicated. Learn more in our podcast episodes 30-31 about the Hong Kong riots: https://workingclasshistory.com/2019/07/15/e26-27-the-hong-kong-riots-1967/Our work is only possible because of support from you, our listeners on patreon. If you appreciate our work, please join us and access exclusive content and benefits at patreon.com/workingclasshistory.See all of our anniversaries each day, alongside sources and maps on the On This Day section of our Stories app: stories.workingclasshistory.com/date/todayBrowse all Stories by Date here on the Date index: https://stories.workingclasshistory.com/dateCheck out our Map of historical Stories: https://map.workingclasshistory.comCheck out books, posters, clothing and more in our online store, here: https://shop.workingclasshistory.comIf you enjoy this podcast, make sure to check out our flagship longform podcast, Working Class History

Savage explains how the U.S. feels like a replay of the Roaring '20s—corruption, excess, and a looming crash—citing national debt surpassing GDP and high gas prices in California. He compares HBO's "Boardwalk Empire" to today's "gangster capitalism" and then shares how Napoleon III serves as a cautionary tale about prosperity undone by war costs. Savage says he's alarmed by pressure on President Trump from pro-war talkers and the military-industrial complex to escalate the war in Iran, warning this could draw in Russia and China. He then reads from Mao's "Little Red Book" where Mao calls "democratic socialism" a road to communism. He concludes by condemning Bernie Sanders and the Communist Party while calling for divine help for America.

Former U.S. Senator and U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, Sam Brownback, wrote a book called “China’s War on Faith”, that is a “bold warning about the Chinese Communist Party’s assault on religious freedom and the global consequences of digital authoritarianism”. Brownback is urging the Trump Administration to confront China’s Communist Party about the human rights violations and religious repression going on by their hand. With President Trump’s visit to China this week, there’s no time like the present to discuss why defending religious freedom is critical to preserving democracy and the future of the free world. Sam Brownback spoke with us on this topic.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Former U.S. Senator and U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, Sam Brownback, wrote a book called “China’s War on Faith”, that is a “bold warning about the Chinese Communist Party’s assault on religious freedom and the global consequences of digital authoritarianism”. Brownback is urging the Trump Administration to confront China’s Communist Party about the human rights violations and religious repression going on by their hand. With President Trump’s visit to China this week, there’s no time like the present to discuss why defending religious freedom is critical to preserving democracy and the future of the free world. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The White House will host “Rededicate 250: National Jubilee of Prayer, Praise & Thanksgiving,” on the National Mall, where senior government officials are set to lead the nation in prayer, sparking controversy on the Left over the separation of church and state. Seth dives into the complexities of American history and its relationship with Christianity. President Trump has touched-down in China for the beginning of an official state visit to the People’s Republic. Seth touches on the legacy of Richard Nixon's historic visit to China and the implications of normalizing relations with the Communist Party. We're joined by John Dombroski, founder and president of Grand Canyon Planning Associates. Seth discusses commencement speeches and the words that graduates need to hear this year.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Chinese emperor Xi Jinping's lavish welcome for President Trump cannot obscure a harsh reality: China's ruling Communist Party is at war with the United States. If we continue to ignore that natty fact, we invite a redoubling of the CCP's long-running “unrestricted warfare” against America – an unforced, and possibly terminal, error of epic proportions.  Much will depend on what comes next. If President Trump allows Xi to reduce their summit to yet-another opportunity to preside over one-sided deals with U.S. “captured elites,” 47 will be remembered as having perpetuated and greatly intensified the threat we face.  If on the other hand, like President Reagan at Rekjyavik, Mr. Trump rejects the temptation to prop up the Chinese Communist Party, he may yet put it on the “ash-heap of history,” alongside the odious Soviet one that spawned the CCP. Just do it. This is Frank Gaffney.

During the Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, joined by Winston Churchill, sat down with Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek. The purpose of the meeting, now known as the Cairo Conference, was to strategize against the Empire of Japan and make preparations for a post-war Asia.  Nearly 30 years later, President Richard Nixon, seeing an opportunity to widen the distance between China (now Communist) and the Soviet Union, paid a visit to China to meet Mao Zedong, the chair of the Communist Party. This opened diplomatic relations between the countries.  Since then, presidents have held meetings with Chinese leaders with some regularity. And President Trump is no exception. This week, he will be meeting with Xi Jinping, the President of the People's Republic of China. From AI to Iran, there is a lot on the table. To understand what to expect from this meeting, I sat down with Andrew Harding, Policy Analyst for National Securityand Indo-Pacific Affairs at The Heritage Foundation.    Email us with thoughts, questions, or suggestions: HeritageExplains@heritage.org   More on China from Heritage Experts: https://www.heritage.org/china 

A currency becomes “internationalized” when it is widely used beyond its home economy for trade, financial transactions, and as a store of value. Achieving that status can lower transaction costs and exchange rate risks, while also enhancing the issuing country's geopolitical influence. Today, the global financial system remains overwhelmingly dollar-centric, with China's renminbi playing a comparatively modest role. Yet over the past decade, Beijing has taken steps to expand its global use, expanding offshore renminbi markets, establishing bilateral swap lines, and developing alternative payment infrastructure.  To help us unpack where China's renminbi internationalization efforts stand today, we are joined by Zongyuan Zoe Liu, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Zoe's research centers on international political economy and global financial markets, with a focus on China and East Asia, as well as the Middle East. She is the author of Can BRICS De-dollarize the Global Financial System? and Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances Global Ambitions.   Timestamps:  [00:00] Introduction  [01:54] Strategic Motivations for Beijing  [04:55] Progress Report on RMB Internationalization  [08:16] Main Mechanisms Used to Promote the RMB  [11:08] RMB in the Belt and Road Initiative  [13:46] Using Clean Energy Supply Chains to Promote RMB in Key Commodities  [15:57] RMB as a Reserve Currency?  [21:23] Xi's Fourth Term Goals with the RMB  [27:26] How Global Conflicts Impact RMB Internationalization 

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

1/3: Preview for Later Today: Charles Burton examines China's exploitation of Western technology like AI and 5G to expand global power and sustain the Communist Party's control over failing systems.

Preview for Later Today: Guest Rick Fischer. Fischer attributes the slow pace of China's moon landing program to extreme risk aversion within the Communist Party culture. They prioritize avoiding technical failures over competing directly with American timelines. 3/6NOVEMBER 1955

4. The election featured threats from the Socialist and Communist parties. While Norman Thomas drew urban votes, Earl Browder's Communist Party supported Roosevelt through a "popular front" to oppose fascism. Radical agrarianism in the Midwest, led by figures like Minnesota's Floyd Olson, added further instability. 41936 FEDERAL SURPLUS