Podcasts about Communist party

Joining us today is Carlos Garrido, a Cuban-American philosophy professor, author, and Director of the Midwestern Marx Institute. He discusses the lessons the Communist Party of China can teach us in the West. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The fifth episode in a series on the history of Indonesia: a hinge in the world system where colonialism and revolution have decisively shaped the trajectory of global history. This installment traces the armed conflicts—civil wars and then confrontations with the Dutch and British—that propelled Indonesia into Sukarno's authoritarian Guided Democracy system and cascading economic crisis. Both the military and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) became increasingly powerful forces on the eve of 1965–when the armed forces would slaughter the communists and inaugurate Suharto's New Order. Featuring Rianne Subijanto, Made Supriatma, and Farabi Fakih. Support The Dig at Patreon.com/TheDig Register for the Socialism Conference by June 19th for the early bird rate! Socialismconference.org Get 50% off Backlash: The Global Rise of the Radical Right , or any first book purchase from plutobooks.com with code ‘DIG50'

The Communist Party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist) held a screening of the landmark 1948 Polish film The Last Stage (Ostatni etap). Directed by Wanda Jakubowska — a communist, resistance fighter, and survivor of Auschwitz — the film was among the first cinematic depictions of the Nazi concentration camps and the organised resistance that developed within them. Several Auschwitz survivors appear in the film, portraying roles closely connected to their own lived experiences just a few years after the liberation, adding a rare and powerful layer of direct testimony and lived experience to its reconstruction of events. Produced in postwar people's democratic Poland and filmed partly on location at Auschwitz itself, The Last Stage stands as both historical testimony and a forceful affirmation of the role played by communists in the struggle against fascism and genocide. At a time when our ruling class seeks to discredit communists and anti-imperialists as “anti-Semitic” for expressing solidarity with oppressed peoples and resisting imperialist war, occupation, sanctions, and national oppression, this screening reasserts a clear historical record: communists were at the forefront of the struggle against racism, fascism, colonialism, and war. The CPGB-ML stands firmly against all forms of racism, including anti-Semitism, while rejecting attempts to weaponise such accusations in order to silence political solidarity and internationalist struggle. George Korkovelos, Cultural Secretary of the CPGB-ML, delivered an in-depth introductory presentation. This event forms part of the party's wider cultural and political work to defend historical memory, strengthen proletarian internationalism, and uphold the struggle for liberation everywhere. ______________________________________________ Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! http://www.thecommunists.org http://www.lalkar.org http://www.redyouth.org Telegram: https://t.me/thecommunists Twitter: / cpgbml Soundcloud: / proletarianradio Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: https://odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: / cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: Each one teach one! http://www.londonworker.org/education... Join the struggle! https://www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: https://www.thecommunists.org/donate/

Listen to current week's news from and about the Church in Asia in a capsule of around 10 to 15 minutes. Catholic bishops in the Philippines appealed for donations after a powerful earthquake killed at least 41 people and left hundreds injured. In China, a Buddhist monk was detained after briefly commemorating the Tiananmen Square massacre anniversary, while in Hong Kong, a construction worker was jailed under national security laws for distributing leaflets calling for an election boycott. Tune in for the latest developments from Asia. Filed by UCA News reporters, compiled by Fabian Antony, presented by Joe Mathews, Cover photo by AFP, background score by Andre Louis, edited and produced by Binu Alex for Union of Catholic Asian News. For news in and about the Church in Asia, visit www.ucanews.comTo contribute please visit www.ucanews.com/donateOn Twitter Follow Or Connect through DM at : twitter.com/ucanewsTo view Video features please visit https://www.youtube.com/@ucanews

Last week the folks on Fox News promoted Republican candidates as if they were public relations specialists hired directly by their campaigns to create negative ads about their opponents. As we approach the midterm elections Fox News is ramping up its propaganda to aggressive and unapologetic Agitprop (Agitation and Propaganda Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party) levels.As they have done in past elections Fox tends to focus on candidates that will get the biggest emotional reaction from its viewers rather than focusing on tight races. The race for the U.S. Senate seat in Iowa could be a nail bitter but the Democratic candidate, Josh Turek, is an incredibly likable Paralympic athlete and former state representative.Fox has put its focus instead on the U.S. Senate race in Maine between popular incumbent Susan Collins and Graham Platner, a deeply flawed man with no governing experience. Although Platner has a devoted following he also has major liabilities which Fox News is happy to exploit.Susan Collins has won her seat multiple times even when polls showed she might lose it. If Fox News really wanted to make sure that the Senate stays in Republican control it would shift its focus to races like Iowa instead of Maine.The network knows segments about Platner, and his troubled past will rev up the base and keep eyes glued the screen.The network also made an abrupt pivot in California as it became more and more obvious that the former reality star and crystal connoisseur Spencer Pratt wasn't going to make it to the general election in the Los Angels mayoral race.Instead of championing Pratt or even tearing down his opponents Mayor Bass or Los Angeles City Council member Nithya Raman, the network attacked California's vote counting process.Pratt, for now, won't become the second coming of their glorious leader Donald J. Trump. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit decodingfoxnews.substack.com/subscribe

The top leaders of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed on Tuesday that the two countries should carry forward their great traditional friendship from generation to generation.Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Chinese president, and Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the DPRK, made the remarks as Xi paid homage to the China-DPRK Friendship Tower with his wife, Peng Liyuan, accompanied by Kim and his wife, Ri Sol-ju.Xi and Kim also agreed that the years when China and the DPRK fought side by side in the 1950s are an eternal historical memory shared by both countries.The two leaders pledged to jointly maintain memorial facilities dedicated to the Chinese People's Volunteers martyrs, carry out distinctive programs on revolutionary traditions and youth education, and carry forward the great spirit of the War to Resist United States Aggression and Aid Korea (1950-53).On Tuesday morning, Xi, accompanied by Kim, also visited the Central Cadres Training School of the WPK in Pyongyang.In the wooded area between teaching buildings, Xi and Kim jointly planted a fir tree. The fir tree remains evergreen throughout the year, symbolizing the enduring and ever-renewing friendship between China and the DPRK.Before departing for Beijing, Xi and Peng attended a luncheon hosted by Kim and Ri.Xi said that he reached an important consensus with Kim on developing relations between China and the DPRK in the new era.The two sides also had in-depth discussions on safeguarding peace and stability in the region and the world, Xi said.Xi thanked Kim for the warm hospitality and thoughtful arrangements for the visit, noting that through the visit, the warmth and friendship extended by the WPK and the DPRK government and people toward the CPC and the Chinese government and people are felt even more deeply.The mutual understanding between China and the DPRK has become deeper and more comprehensive, and the future development direction has become clearer and more definite, Xi said.He also said that he is ready to work with Kim to jointly lead China-DPRK relations toward greater development and inject new and strong impetus into the socialist cause of the two countries.Kim said that Xi's visit was a complete success, sending a positive message to the world that the DPRK and China are strengthening their friendly cooperation further, attracting widespread attention from various sides.Xi's visit was of great significance to bilateral relations and the future development of the region, Kim said, noting that the DPRK stands ready to earnestly implement the important consensus reached during the visit, promote new tangible outcomes in bilateral cooperation, and advance DPRK-China relations to a new and higher level.On Tuesday afternoon, Xi returned to Beijing after concluding his two-day state visit to the DPRK. Kim and his wife went to the airport to see Xi and his wife off, holding a grand farewell ceremony in their honor.carry forward /ˈkæri ˈfɔːwəd/弘扬；传承pledge /pledʒ/承诺；保证dedicate /ˈdedɪkeɪt/献给；用于martyrs /ˈmɑːtəz/烈士impetus /ˈɪmpɪtəs/动力；推动力evergreen /ˈevəɡriːn/常青的safeguard /ˈseɪfɡɑːd/维护；捍卫arrangements /əˈreɪndʒmənts/安排tangible /ˈtændʒəbl/切实的；有形的

This episode, we discuss the formation of the Communist Party of Australia. In addition, we talk about two key legal cases which significantly changed Australian federalism, R v Licensing Court of Brisbane and the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamships Co Ltd, as well as 3 major state elections (one has minor parties galore in it!)

Relations between China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea currently stand at a new historical starting point, facing new development opportunities and shouldering new missions of the times, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Chinese president, said on Monday.Xi made the remarks in a signed article published in Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the DPRK, ahead of his state visit to the country on Monday and Tuesday, his first in seven years.Xi said that he looks forward to meeting with Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the DPRK, to discuss the traditional friendship between the two countries and exchange views on the overall development of bilateral relations.Xi said that China and the DPRK are friendly socialist neighbors who stand by each other and share a common future.No matter how times change or how the international landscape evolves, the traditional friendship between China and the DPRK remains unbreakable and enduring, constantly demonstrating vigorous vitality, Xi said.Noting that top-level strategic guidance is the greatest strength of China-DPRK relations, Xi said that in recent years, he and Kim have held six meetings, maintaining close strategic communication and jointly drawing up a blueprint for the development of China-DPRK relations.Xi also said that a shared socialist ideal is a defining feature of China-DPRK relations, and that the traditional friendship between the two countries, rooted in a shared future, forms the solid foundation of bilateral ties."High-level strategic coordination gives China-DPRK relations their contemporary significance," Xi said. "Promoting long-term peace and stability in the region, as well as world peace and stability, is a common pursuit of the two parties, the two countries and their peoples."The two sides firmly support each other in safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, and work together to uphold regional peace and tranquility, international fairness and justice, and the postwar international order, Xi said.Noting that maintaining, consolidating and developing China-DPRK relations has always been an unwavering policy of the CPC and the Chinese government, Xi said that China stands ready to work with the DPRK to steer bilateral relations from a strategic perspective, keep China-DPRK relations abreast of the times and achieve greater development of the relationship.The two sides should deepen strategic communication and firmly steer China-DPRK relations in the right direction, Xi said, calling for upholding the fine tradition of high-level exchanges between the two parties and the two countries, and maintaining close contacts like relatives.The two sides should take the 65th anniversary of the China-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance as an opportunity, strengthen exchanges at all levels and across party, government and military institutions, implement the important consensus reached by the two sides, and add fresh impetus to the development of bilateral relations.Xi said the two countries should strengthen communication and mutual learning to jointly promote the steady development of the two countries' socialist cause.China and the DPRK should support each other in pursuing socialist paths suited to their own national conditions, firmly safeguard the political security of both nations, continue to expand exchanges and cooperation between the two parties, and deepen exchanges of experience and mutual learning on party and state governance, Xi said.The two countries should expand practical cooperation and continuously enhance the well-being and friendship of the two peoples, Xi said, adding that the two sides should enhance the alignment of development strategies, tap the potential for cooperation in various fields, share opportunities and promote development together, in order to better benefit the two peoples.Xi also called for close multilateral coordination and firmly safeguarding international fairness and justice.The two sides should strengthen strategic communication and coordination, and jointly uphold the international system with the United Nations at its core and the international order based on international law, Xi said, adding that the two sides should oppose hegemonism and power politics, and reject any scheme or action aimed at reviving militarism and undermining regional security and stability.The two countries should jointly promote an equal and orderly multipolarization of the world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization, implement the four major global initiatives put forward by China, and work together to build a community with a shared future for humanity, he added.sovereignty /ˈsɒvrənti/主权tranquility /træŋˈkwɪləti/安宁unwavering /ʌnˈweɪvərɪŋ/坚定不移的alignment /əˈlaɪnmənt/对接hegemonism /hɪˈdʒemənɪzəm/霸权主义multipolarization /ˌmʌltiˌpəʊləraɪˈzeɪʃən/多极化inclusive /ɪnˈkluːsɪv/包容的initiative /ɪˈnɪʃətɪv/倡议community with a shared future for humanity /kəˈmjuːnəti wɪð ə ʃeəd ˈfjuːtʃə fə hjuːˈmænəti/人类命运共同体

General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and President Xi Jinping's state visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Monday and Tuesday presents an opportunity to strengthen top-level planning and strategic guidance for China-DPRK relations in the new era.The visit has not only preserved the legacy of China-DPRK relations as good neighbors, good friends and good comrades but also helped lay out the practical priorities for the future development of relations.During his meeting with Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the DPRK, in Pyongyang on Monday, Xi put forward four proposals for advancing bilateral relations: The two sides should be guided by the high-level exchanges and consolidate the foundation of political mutual trust; stay committed to the goal of delivering benefits to the people and elevate the level of practical cooperation; uphold the inheritance of friendship as a driving force and strengthen the bonds between their peoples; and uphold fairness and justice as a guiding principle to enrich the substance of strategic coordination.This provides strategic guidelines for the healthy and stable development of China-DPRK relations.High-level exchanges have long played an important role in the development of China-DPRK relations. As the 65th anniversary of the China-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is commemorated this year, increased interaction at all levels between the two sides will help consolidate political trust and generate sustained momentum for bilateral cooperation.Both countries are pursuing their respective development goals and have broad opportunities to deepen cooperation in economic and social fields. China stands ready to work with the DPRK to strengthen the alignment of development strategies, and expand practical cooperation in such areas as economy and trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, and health care, to bring greater benefits to the two peoples.Xi called on both sides to leverage the opportunity of the full reopening of border crossings and the resumption of civil aviation flights and international passenger trains to increase people-to-people exchanges and foster mutual interaction.Equally significant is the emphasis placed on carrying forward the traditional friendship between the two peoples. The traditional friendship between China and the DPRK, forged in blood, is a valuable shared asset of the two peoples. Today, educational cooperation, youth exchanges, cultural programs and academic engagement are helping ensure the friendship continues to flourish.As regional and global dynamics become increasingly complex and volatile, it is imperative that the two sides strengthen their strategic coordination on international and regional affairs to safeguard their common interests and promote stability. In doing so, the two countries can better safeguard their respective sovereignty, security and development interests, and jointly promote regional peace and development.Xi said in a signed article published by Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the DPRK, ahead of his visit, that the two sides should uphold the international system with the United Nations at its core and the international order based on international law. In the process, they should oppose hegemonism and power politics, and reject any scheme or action aimed at reviving militarism and undermining regional security and stability.No matter how the international situation changes, the CPC and the Chinese government's firm stance on highly valuing the China-DPRK traditional friendship will not change, the firm support for Kim in leading the DPRK's socialist cause will not change, and the firm commitment to safeguarding the shared interests of the two countries and preserving a favorable strategic environment will not change, Xi said in the meeting.The two sides should make concerted efforts to translate the important consensus reached by the two leaders during the visit into concrete actions and tangible outcomes to keep bilateral relations advancing with the times and achieve greater progress.preserve the legacy /prɪˈzɜːv ðə ˈleɡəsi/传承遗产practical priorities /ˈpræktɪkl praɪˈɒrətiz/务实重点alignment of development strategies /əˈlaɪnmənt əv dɪˈveləpmənt ˈstrætədʒiz/发展战略对接economy and trade /ɪˈkɒnəmi ənd treɪd/经贸border crossings /ˈbɔːdə(r) ˈkrɒsɪŋz/边境口岸people-to-people exchanges /ˈpiːpl tə ˈpiːpl ɪksˈtʃeɪndʒɪz/人文交流

Audiobook of "The Manifesto of the Communist Party" by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, published 1848. Read online at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ (audio with no preamble as per https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/61 ) Study notes: https://workersliberty.org/cm Article on it: https://workersliberty.org/story/2026-06-09/communist-manifesto-1848 Contents and rough timestamps: 00:00 Preamble 01:40 Section 1: Bourgeois and Proletarians 39:25 Section 2: Proletarians and Communists 1:06:15 Section 3: Socialist and Communist Literature 1:31:48 Section 4: Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties #5 from Marxist points of reference: a reading list https://workersliberty.org/marxist-points-reference-reading-list (#3 will be uploaded later) Playlist of recordings from that list here https://soundcloud.com/workers-liberty/sets/marxist-points-of-reference-a Audiobook public domain from librivox; music public domain. Subscribe to the podcast "Solidarity & more" by "Workers' Liberty" wherever you listen to podcasts. More info: https://workersliberty.org/audio

Reproduced from ‪@garlandn‬ with thanks. • IMPERIALISM: DECADENT & DOOMED W/JOTI BRAR... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5RPfHV7Llpc This week I spoke with Garland Nixon about my recent visit to Moscow to take part in the Third Anti-Fascist Forum, hosted by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), under the specific theme of anti-terrorism. We discussed the connected between imperialism and fascism, and imperialism and terrorism, and the way in which both are used to create proxy forces and an element of deniability to imperialist suppression and warmongering. The imperialists are the principal terrorists in the world today. There is nothing more terroristic than the conducting of genocidal wars against people whose only crime is to live in a place where sovereignty is considered absolutely intolerable by the overlords of monopoly finance capital! We noted the painful coincidence whereby the forum convened less than 48 hours after the horrific terrorist attack by the Nato/Kiev junta on a girl's dormitory in Russia (Starobilsk, Lugansk, to be precise), and discussed the rationale behind the systematic and deliberate targeting of children by the imperialist war machine today. What do western ‘strategists' hope to achieve by perpetrating such outrages, which are certainly NOT accidental? We also talked about the doublespeak indulged in by imperialist politicians and media, whereby on the one hand they create forces of real terrorism which they CLAIM to be opposing (while actually supporting them), and on the other hand label all their opponents, whether internal antiwar activists or external freedom fighters, as 'terrorists' who must be suppressed in the harshest way possible – for the 'protection' of the wide population, naturally. ______________________________________________ Subscribe! Donate! Join us in building a bright future for humanity! http://www.thecommunists.org http://www.lalkar.org http://www.redyouth.org Telegram: https://t.me/thecommunists Twitter: / cpgbml Soundcloud: / proletarianradio Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/theCommunists Odysee: https://odysee.com/@proletariantv:2 Facebook: / cpgbml Online Shop: https://shop.thecommunists.org/ Education Program: Each one teach one! http://www.londonworker.org/education... Join the struggle! https://www.thecommunists.org/join/ Donate: https://www.thecommunists.org/donate/

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Chinese president, said on Monday he looks forward to meeting with Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), to discuss the traditional friendship between the two countries, and exchange views on the overall development of bilateral relations.Xi made the remarks in a signed article published on Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the DPRK, ahead of his state visit to the country slated for Monday and Tuesday, his first in seven years.Xi said that China and the DPRK are friendly socialist neighbors who stand by each other and share a common future.No matter how times change or how the international landscape evolves, the traditional friendship between China and the DPRK remains unbreakable and enduring, constantly demonstrating vigorous vitality, Xi said.Noting that top-level strategic guidance is the greatest strength of China-DPRK relations, Xi said in recent years, he and Kim have held six meetings, maintaining close strategic communication and jointly drawing up a blueprint for the development of China-DPRK relations.Xi also said that a shared socialist ideal is a defining feature of China-DPRK relations, and that the traditional friendship between the two countries, rooted in a shared future, forms the solid foundation of bilateral ties."High-level strategic coordination gives China-DPRK relations their contemporary significance," Xi said. "Promoting long-term peace and stability in the region, as well as world peace and stability, is a common pursuit of the two parties, the two countries and their peoples."The two sides firmly support each other in safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, and work together to uphold regional peace and tranquility, international fairness and justice, and the postwar international order, Xi said.

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Chinese president, arrived in Pyongyang on Monday for a state visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the DPRK and his wife, Ri Sol-ju, welcomed Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, at the airport. After Xi walked down the airstairs, Kim shook hands with him warmly.Kim held a grand welcoming ceremony for Xi at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang. The top leaders of the two parties and the two countries jointly ascended the review stand. Amid a 21-gun salute, the military band played the national anthems of China and the DPRK.Accompanied by Kim, Xi inspected the honor guard of the three services of the Korean People's Army. After that, Xi watched a march-past with Kim.Dressed in festive attire, people from all walks of life in Pyongyang, along with children and teenagers, holding flags, flowers and balloons, extended their sincere welcome to the distinguished Chinese guests with warm applause and cheers.En route from the airport to Kim Il-sung Square and from Kim Il-sung Square to the Kumsusan State Guesthouse, people of the DPRK lined both sides of the streets, waving to welcome Xi's arrival.In a signed article published on Monday on Rodong Sinmun prior to his arrival, Xi said he looks forward to meeting with Kim to discuss the traditional friendship between the two countries, and exchange views on the overall development of bilateral relations.

Listen to current week's news from and about the Church in Asia in a capsule of around 10 to 15 minutes. Asian bishops urged churches in the region to deepen dialogue and common witness at an ecumenical gathering in Thailand. Rights group, CIVICUS accused Hong Kong authorities of using security laws to suppress activism and free expression, and Thailand signaled it would reject colonial-era maps used by Cambodia amid worsening border tensions between the two countries. Tune in for the latest developments from Asia. Filed by UCA News reporters, compiled by Fabian Antony, presented by Joe Mathews, Cover photo by AFP, background score by Andre Louis, edited and produced by Binu Alex for Union of Catholic Asian News. For news in and about the Church in Asia, visit www.ucanews.comTo contribute please visit www.ucanews.com/donateOn Twitter Follow Or Connect through DM at : twitter.com/ucanewsTo view Video features please visit https://www.youtube.com/@ucanews

This episode examines the first round of Colombia's presidential election, which took place on May 31, 2026, and previews the June 21st runoff between two starkly different candidates. Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, WOLA's director for Colombia and the Andes, provides deep insight into the candidates, voter concerns, and the election's implications for U.S.-Colombia relations.  The first round produced some surprises. While human rights activist and senator Iván Cepeda advanced as expected with 40.9% of the vote, the first-place finisher was criminal defense lawyer and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella with 43.7%. Taken together, right-of-center candidates already exceed 50%, suggesting challenging math for Cepeda in the runoff.  Sánchez-Garzoli notes that despite fears of political violence—given the assassination of candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in the past year and Colombia's deteriorating security situation—election day proceeded peacefully.  The candidates represent fundamentally different visions for Colombia. De la Espriella, a wealthy lawyer who once advised the AUC paramilitary group during peace talks and has represented controversial figures, proposes an "iron fist" security approach. His platform includes ending peace negotiations, building ten mega-prisons, mass detentions, aggressive coca eradication, and legalizing firearms ownership. Economically, he embraces Argentina's Milei-style deregulation and reviving the fossil fuel sector. He has also proposed withdrawing Colombia from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and United Nations human rights bodies.  Cepeda, by contrast, is a philosopher and longtime human rights advocate whose father, a Communist Party senator, was assassinated during the systematic elimination of the Patriotic Union party. Known for his measured, intellectual style, Cepeda was instrumental in Colombia's 2016 Peace Accord and would continue President Gustavo Petro's approach—advancing agrarian reform, pursuing negotiations with armed groups through "total peace," and transitioning away from extractive economic models.  Voter concerns centered overwhelmingly on security and the economy. Sánchez-Garzoli explains that while Petro's ambitions of addressing centuries of inequality in just a few years proved unrealistic, the security situation has genuinely deteriorated.  U.S.-Colombia relations under either candidate promise turbulence, though of different kinds. President Trump publicly endorsed de la Espriella while labeling Cepeda a "radical leftist Marxist." De la Espriella has expressed interest in joining Trump's "Shield of the Americas" security initiative and implementing a "Plan Colombia 2.0," while Cepeda has condemned the U.S. "boat strikes" and other military interventions as violations of Latin American sovereignty and international law.  Looking toward the June 21 runoff, Sánchez-Garzoli warns that Colombia remains fragile and at risk of violence, particularly given President Petro's claims of fraud and the close expected margin. The choices of centrist voters remain uncertain, and it is hard to predict an outcome. 

On this day, 3 June 1977, police in India opened fire on a workers' demonstration, killing 12. Thousands of workers from the Bhilai Steel plant and mines had been demonstrating at the police station where strike leader Shankar Guha Niyogi was being held following his arrest the previous day. As the steel plant was a joint Soviet-Indian project, the Communist Party denounced Niyogi as a CIA agent. He was assassinated in 1991 by employers' hired guns. More information, sources and map: https://stories.workingclasshistory.com/article/10200/bhilai-steel-workers-massacreOur work is only possible because of support from you, our listeners on patreon. If you appreciate our work, please join us and access exclusive content and benefits at patreon.com/workingclasshistory.See all of our anniversaries each day, alongside sources and maps on the On This Day section of our Stories app: stories.workingclasshistory.com/date/todayBrowse all Stories by Date here on the Date index: https://stories.workingclasshistory.com/dateCheck out our Map of historical Stories: https://map.workingclasshistory.comCheck out books, posters, clothing and more in our online store, here: https://shop.workingclasshistory.comIf you enjoy this podcast, make sure to check out our flagship longform podcast, Working Class History

The Memorial Hall of the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in Shanghai received around 100,000 foreign visitors last year, a record high that reflects the growth in international interest in the CPC's history and China's development journey.中共一大纪念馆（上海）去年接待外籍访客约10万人次，创下历史新高，这一数据折射出国际社会对中国共产党历史以及中国发展历程的关注度持续攀升。Officials at the memorial hall said in an interview on Monday that foreign visitors come to find out "why China can".该纪念馆相关负责人在周一接受采访时表示，外籍访客前来参观，核心是想要探寻“中国为什么能”的答案。"These overseas visitors included delegations from international organizations and an increasing number of independent travelers, thanks to China's relaxed visa policies in recent years," said Yang Yu, director of the memorial hall's publicity and education department.纪念馆宣传教育部主任杨宇表示，得益于我国近年放宽签证政策，来访外籍人群涵盖各类国际组织代表团，自助游客数量也持续增长。"They are not merely coming for photo opportunities," she said. "Many are drawn to the birthplace of the CPC, seeking to understand why the Party has endured for over a century and continues to thrive. They are interested in discovering the secrets behind its success."她表示，这些外籍访客并非只为打卡拍照。许多人慕名来到中国共产党的诞生地，希望了解中国共产党百年赓续、蓬勃发展的原因，探寻其成功的密码。Yang also noted the growing diversity in visitors' nationalities, with many foreign tourists listing the site as a key stop in Shanghai — a city aiming to become China's top destination for inbound tourism.杨宇介绍，访客的国籍构成也愈发多元。上海正全力打造中国入境旅游首选目的地，中共一大会址已成为众多外籍游客到访上海的必游地标。Since the memorial hall launched its exhibition commemorating the 100th anniversary of the CPC's founding in June 2021, it has welcomed more than 12 million visitors in total, with the annual number rising steadily to reach 3.23 million last year.自2021年6月中共一大会址推出建党百年主题展览以来，纪念馆累计接待游客超1200万人次，年接待量稳步攀升，去年全年接待量达323万人次。The exhibition tells the story of the CPC's founding and highlights the Party's mission to seek happiness for the Chinese people and achieve the rejuvenation of the nation.该主题展览完整呈现了中国共产党的诞生历程，生动诠释了中国共产党为中国人民谋幸福、为中华民族谋复兴的初心使命。The memorial hall has developed a service system featuring full English coverage, tours in seven foreign languages, and guided tours in English and Japanese.When engaging with foreign visitors, the memorial hall's docents focus less on past hardships and more on China's achievements in the 21st century.纪念馆已搭建完善的涉外服务体系，实现英文服务全覆盖，提供七种外语讲解服务及英、日语专属导览服务。讲解员在面向外籍访客开展讲解时，会适度弱化过往艰苦历程的讲述，重点聚焦中国21世纪以来的发展成就。"This is something we learned from interacting with overseas visitors," Yang said. "They are most interested in China's rapid development over the past two decades and how the Chinese people are living better lives. The memorial hall serves as a window for them to gain an understanding of a real and endearing China, and many have expressed a sense of resonance after their visit."杨宇表示，这是场馆在与外籍访客交流过程中总结的经验。海外访客最关注中国二十年来的飞速发展以及民众生活的改善。纪念馆已然成为一扇窗口，让外籍人士看见真实、鲜活、可亲的中国，不少访客参观后都产生了强烈共鸣。The number of young foreign visitors has been growing, with some sharing their experiences on and insights into international social media platforms.Yang recalled a video uploaded by a Canadian that attracted comments from people around the world, including a Chinese university student who remarked that seeing the memorial hall through a foreign vlogger's lens was a unique experience.外籍青年访客数量持续增长，不少年轻人将自己的参观经历与感悟发布在海外社交媒体平台上。杨宇分享了一个案例：一名加拿大网友发布的参观视频，收获了全球各地网友的留言。其中一名中国大学生留言表示，透过外国博主的视角看中共一大会址，是一种全新的体验。To engage younger audiences, the memorial hall has continuously innovated its approach, offering immersive activities and virtual-reality experiences to help bring history closer to young people.为贴合年轻群体的需求，纪念馆持续创新宣教形式，推出沉浸式体验活动和虚拟现实体验项目，让历史可感可触、走近青年。"We hope that all visitors, whether from home or abroad, leave feeling inspired," Yang said. "The CPC's journey has not been without challenges, but the Party has always maintained a forward-looking spirit."杨宇说：“我们希望每一位海内外参观者都能有所感悟、有所启迪。中国共产党的百年征程并非一帆风顺，但始终坚守初心、奋勇向前、开拓进取。”Xie Yiling, a primary school student in Shanghai, has been a volunteer guide at the memorial hall for over three years, leading more than 30 tours, including for visitors from the United States and Brazil. She expressed pride in sharing the CPC's stories with foreign visitors and hoped to pass on the "red gene" to inspire more people.上海小学生谢怡灵已在纪念馆担任志愿讲解员三年多，累计完成30余场讲解服务，服务过美国、巴西等多国访客。她为能向外国友人讲述红色故事感到自豪，希望传承红色基因、传递红色力量，感召更多人。A group of high school students from Denver in the US state of Colorado visited the memorial hall on Monday during their first trip to China.周一，一批来自美国科罗拉多州丹佛市的高中生到访中共一大会址，这是他们首次来到中国。Anissa Elmrini, 17, was among them. "Many people around me — and I myself — are very interested in Shanghai and China," she said. "The streets here are beautiful, and the people are really nice and helpful. I see this trip with my teenage friends as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity."17岁的Anissa Elmrini是到访学生之一。她表示：“我身边很多同学和我一样，对上海、对中国充满好奇。这里的街道风景优美，人们友善又热心。能和同龄伙伴一起来中国参观，是一次千载难逢的宝贵经历。”

Lucille Ball might have been a natural boundary-pusher, but America's top TV comedienne had some ‘splaining to do when a damning news broadcast unveiled her former ties to the Communist Party. The hysteria of the Red Scare threatened to bury this redhead at the bottom of the Hollywood blacklist overnight. Even when America put rampant McCarthyism to rest, the United States government kept watching Lucille Ball – and we’re not talking about I Love Lucy reruns.Lucille Ball might have been a natural boundary-pusher, but America's top TV comedienne had some ‘splaining to do when a damning news broadcast unveiled her former ties to the Communist Party. The hysteria of the Red Scare threatened to bury this redhead at the bottom of the Hollywood blacklist overnight. Even when America put rampant McCarthyism to rest, the United States government kept watching Lucille Ball – and we’re not talking about I Love Lucy reruns.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

It is August 3, 1948, and a former Communist Party member named Whittaker Chambers walks into a House committee room in Washington, D.C., and says something that no one in the room ever expected to hear. Alger Hiss is a spy. Hiss was not some offhand bureaucrat. He had helped organize the United Nations and attended Yalta. He had been, for much of the 1940s, one of the most respected foreign policy figures in the American government: Harvard-educated, polished, and credentialed, exactly the kind of man that postwar Washington was built by. The question of who was telling the truth would consume the country for years and leave damage that ran in both directions.Join us every Monday for episodes and discussions and on Thursdays for pop quizzes and Sketches in History!

In today's episode David explores Doris Lessing's bold and brilliant The Golden Notebook (1962), a book about female emancipation, political disillusionment and much, much more. Why did Lessing insist that the novel's original critics misunderstood what the book was about? What makes her description of joining and then leaving the Communist Party in 1950s London different from any other account? How did a book about mental disintegration capture the essence of the age?  Out now on PPF+: a bonus episode about George Orwell's 1984. Why does a book that is out of date and out of time still haunt everyone who reads it today? To get this and all our bonus episodes plus ad-free listening sign up to PPF+ now https://www.ppfideas.com/join-ppf-plus Join us at the Cheltenham Science Festival this Wednesday 3rd June for a live recording of the podcast with David in conversation with Jimmy Wales, founder of Wikipedia, to talk about trust, democracy and knowledge in a divided world. There are a few tickets still available: book now https://www.cheltenhamfestivals.org/events/the-politics-of-trust-lessons-from-wikipedia You can find out everything you need to know about this podcast – who we are, what we do, plus merch, events and full lists of all episodes including PPF+ bonus episodes on our website https://www.ppfideas.com Next time in The Great Political Fictions: The Golden Notebook Part 2 w/Catherine Taylor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, has called for inheriting revolutionary traditions in a reply letter to student docents at the memorials of the birthplaces of the CPC in East China's Shanghai and Zhejiang province.Xi, also Chinese president and chairman of the Central Military Commission, encouraged them to build knowledge and enhance capabilities, and extended International Children's Day greetings to children nationwide.The Young Pioneers recently penned a letter to Xi, sharing what they had learned and gained while volunteering as guides at the Memorial Hall of the First National Congress of the CPC in Shanghai, and the Nanhu Revolutionary Memorial Museum in Jiaxing, Zhejiang.In the letter dated Saturday, Xi said he was pleased to learn that the students had fostered a deep affection for the Party, the country, and socialism through recounting the Party's history, revolutionary stories, and heroic deeds."This year marks the 105th anniversary of the CPC. The Party's cause calls for unremitting efforts across generations," Xi emphasized, encouraging the students to stay committed to the Party, build their characters, and carry the baton of history forward on the new journey.Back in 2021, a nationwide initiative was launched to encourage Young Pioneers to study the Party's history and share these stories at revolutionary memorial venues.The First National Congress of the CPC convened in Shanghai in July 1921. Then the founders moved to a boat on Nanhu Lake in Jiaxing to conclude the historic meeting, where they adopted the Party's first program and resolutions. The iconic boat is now referred to as the Red Boat.

Kate Adie introduces stories on Cuba's economic crisis as it feels the strain of the US fuel blockade, Lebanon's shattered ceasefire, the fevered debate over Australia's social media ban, plus dispatches from Greece and Iceland.Cuba is struggling to cope with the the US government's near-total fuel blockade and the Trump administration increased the pressure on the ruling Communist Party when it issued an indictment against Raul Castro this week. Will Grant has been gauging the mood in Havana.In southern Lebanon, Israel has stepped up its offensive on Hezbollah with daily strikes, which have killed dozens of civilians. This follows drone attacks launched by the Iran-backed group on communities in northern Israel. John Sudworth reports on the ongoing conflict.Six months on from Australia's introduction of a social media ban for under 16s, governments around the world are eagerly looking on as they consider rolling out similar policies… but is it working? Katy Watson has been following the debate in Sydney.In Greece, indignation over new labour laws introduced last October continue to simmer as the summer heat takes hold. The new law, which permits 13-hour working days was met with fierce opposition and nationwide strikes. Heidi Fuller Love heard some full-throated views on the subject in a local tavernaAnd finally, when a correspondent is on deployment, they often have to navigate sudden changes of plan. Sandra Kanthal found herself diverted by bad weather from an assignment reporting on Iceland's arctic defences… and founded herself in an unusual museum.Series Producer: Serena Tarling Production Coordinators: Sophie Hill & Katie Morrison Editor: Richard Fenton-Smith

In the 1930s, five young men at Cambridge University became members of the Communist Party. This is not too surprising, in retrospect; many others were doing so as well. But these five men were recruited by the intelligence services of the Soviet Union, and for seventeen years they betrayed the secrets of Britain and the United States.They are now often referred to as the Cambridge Five. They were Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross. While their story has been told and retold and retold in Britain, always as a parable of class and the establishment, my guest Antonia Senior observes that very few have looked at the story of the Cambridge Five from the other side of the relationship. “What did Stalin want from them?,” she asks. “How did they fit into Stalin's vision, and how did they further his cause?”Antonia Senior is a novelist, reviewer for The Times, and co-host of the podcast History Book Buffs alongside friend of this podcast Roger Moorhouse. Her latest book, Stalin's Apostles: The Cambridge Five and the Making of the Soviet Empire, was recently named a finalist for the 2026 Orwell Prize. In this conversation we discuss Cambridge in the 1930s, revolutionary violence, Soviet intelligence recruitment, Stalin's imperial ambitions, Poland, espionage, ideology, and the enduring temptation to excuse tyranny in the name of an ever-distant utopia.

On Tuesday, the third day of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic's state visit to China, he spent about five minutes inside a newly released electric vehicle at the showroom of Chinese tech company Xiaomi's auto factory in Beijing.5月26日，塞尔维亚总统亚历山大·武契奇在对华国事访问的第三天，来到北京小米汽车工厂展厅，在一辆新款电动汽车内停留了约五分钟。Sitting in the vehicle, in which commands can be voice activated, Vucic asked the in-car voice assistant: "Do you have any Serbian songs?"坐进这辆支持语音指令的汽车，武契奇向车载语音助手问道：“有塞尔维亚歌曲吗？”Serbia's national anthem, Boze pravde, then began to play.随后，塞尔维亚国歌《正义的上帝》开始播放。"I have learned a great deal here, above all about the achievements China has made. This place is amazing — I have never seen anything like it," Vucic wrote on social media. "Everything is automated. Two thousand robots operate everything, and in two shifts they produce 1,500 cars. We invited them, if they start considering investment in Europe, to choose Serbia, and we also invited them to showcase their products at EXPO 2027."武契奇在社交媒体上写道：“我在这里收获良多，尤其是中国取得的成就。这个地方令人惊叹——我从未见过如此景象。”“一切都实现了自动化。两千台机器人负责全部操作，两班倒每天可生产1500辆汽车。我们已向中方发出邀请：如果他们考虑在欧洲投资，请首选塞尔维亚；同时，我们也邀请他们参加2027年世博会，展示其产品。”The factory was Vucic's third stop on Tuesday. Earlier in the day, he delivered a speech at Tsinghua University and visited the Museum of the Communist Party of China.这座工厂是武契奇周二行程的第三站。当天早些时候，他在清华大学发表了演讲，并参观了中国共产党历史展览馆。After tracing China's journey from poverty to prosperity at the museum, Vucic wrote in the guest book that "the visit to the museum was a unique chance to deepen my knowledge of the development of China under the leadership of the CPC".在展览馆追溯了中国从贫穷走向繁荣的历程后，武契奇在留言簿上写道：“参观展览馆是一次难得的机会，让我加深了对中国共产党领导下中国发展历程的了解。”"I used to watch Back to the Future and think that flying cars, smart machines and technology that understands humans were only the stuff of movie imagination. Today, as I toured this incredible time capsule of Chinese achievements, I felt as if I had ... experienced that film myself," he wrote in a social media post.他在社交媒体上写道：“我以前看《回到未来》时，以为飞行汽车、智能机器和理解人类的技术只是电影的想象。今天，当我参观这个令人难以置信的中国成就时间胶囊时，我感觉自己仿佛亲身经历了那部电影。”He added that everything he saw seemed so advanced that, at one point, he thought his phone belonged in a technology museum.他还说，眼前的一切太过先进，有那么一刻，他甚至觉得自己的手机该被送进科技博物馆。Speaking to about 130 students and faculty members at Tsinghua University, the Serbian president said that China's progress should not be taken for granted.在对清华大学约130名师生发表演讲时，塞尔维亚总统表示，中国的进步并非理所当然。While people living in China may regard daily changes as ordinary, he said that the nation's transformation remains striking to an outside observer, even over a short period of time.他说，虽然生活在中国的人们可能觉得日常变化平平无奇，但在外界看来，中国在如此短的时间内的转变令人惊叹。He added that he has strong confidence in China's continued prosperity and bright future.他还表示对中国持续繁荣和光明未来充满信心。During the interaction with students, Vucic said that China-Serbia friendship is rooted in mutual support at difficult moments and in concrete results, rather than diplomatic rhetoric.在与学生的互动中，武契奇表示，中塞友谊植根于困难时刻的相互支持和实实在在的成果，而非简单的外交辞令。He cited Chinese participation in Serbia's infrastructure projects and the Smederevo Steel Mill, where a Chinese company's takeover helped preserve about 5,000 jobs, as examples of cooperation that have brought real benefits to local people.他举例说，中国参与了塞尔维亚的基础设施项目和斯梅代雷沃钢厂，一家中国企业接管该钢厂帮助保留了约5000个工作岗位，这些合作为当地人民带来了实实在在的利益。Vucic also linked China's development to its openness, saying that the country offers cooperation opportunities to partners from different regions. China's progress is not accidental, but is the result of knowledge, hard work, education and long-term effort, he added.武契奇还将中国的发展与其开放联系在一起，他表示中国为来自不同地区的合作伙伴提供了合作机会。他补充说，中国的进步不是偶然的，而是知识、勤奋、教育和长期努力的结果。Vucic also urged the students to remain open to the world, gain broader experience and believe in their values and principles. He said young people in China possess qualities that many countries have lost, including diligence, conviction, vision and a strong desire to succeed.武契奇还鼓励学生保持对世界的开放态度，不断丰富自身阅历，并坚定自己的价值观与原则。他指出，中国年轻人拥有许多国家已然丧失的优良品质，包括勤奋、信念、远见卓识以及强烈的成功意愿。Hard work, education and perseverance will never become outdated, he said, adding that such qualities help make a country strong and enable it to keep moving forward.他说，勤奋、教育和毅力永远不会过时，这些品质有助于国家强大并使其不断前进。EXPO /ˈekspəʊ/世博会diplomatic rhetoric /ˌdɪpləˈmætɪk ˈretərɪk/外交辞令conviction /kənˈvɪkʃən/信念perseverance /ˌpɜːsɪˈvɪərəns/毅力

Show Notes This week on MSB: monarchs hate him! This former locksmith has ten weird tricks to win a crushing landslide election. Number five will amaze you! The fourth of our Yugoslav Interlude episodes sees the Communist Party of Yugoslavia enjoying two impressive electoral achievements separated by 20 years in the political wilderness. Meanwhile, King Peter discovers the limits of royal influence, Stalin makes things easier for us, and it turns out that its a lot easier to create a new world when the old one has been reduced to ashes. Mobile Suit Breakdown is written, recorded, and produced within Lenapehoking, the ancestral and unceded homeland of the Lenape, or Delaware, people. Before European settlers forced them to move west, the Lenape lived in New York City, New Jersey, and portions of New York State, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Connecticut. Lenapehoking is still the homeland of the Lenape diaspora, which includes communities living in Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Ontario. You can learn more about Lenapehoking, the Lenape people, and ongoing efforts to honor the relationship between the land and indigenous peoples by visiting the websites of the Delaware Tribe and the Manhattan-based Lenape Center. Listeners in the Americas and Oceania can learn more about the indigenous people of your area at https://native-land.ca/. We would like to thank The Lenape Center for guiding us in creating this living land acknowledgment. You can subscribe to Mobile Suit Breakdown for free! on fine Podcast services everywhere and on YouTube, visit our website GundamPodcast.com, follow us on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook, or email your questions, comments, and complaints to gundampodcast@gmail.com. Mobile Suit Breakdown wouldn't exist without the support of our fans and Patrons! You can join our Patreon to support the podcast and enjoy bonus episodes, extra out-takes, behind-the-scenes photos and video, MSB gear, and much more! The intro music is WASP by Misha Dioxin, the recap music Window by 1000 Handz, and the outro is Long Way Home by Spinning Ratio, all licensed under Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 licenses. All music used in the podcast has been edited to fit the text. Mobile Suit Breakdown provides critical commentary and is protected by the Fair Use clause of the United States Copyright law. Gundam content is copyright and/or trademark of Sunrise Inc., Bandai, Sotsu Agency, or its original creator. Mobile Suit Breakdown is in no way affiliated with or endorsed by Sunrise, Bandai, Sotsu, or any of their subsidiaries, employees, or associates and makes no claim to own Gundam or any of the copyrights or trademarks related to it. Copyrighted content used in Mobile Suit Breakdown is used in accordance with the Fair Use clause of the United States Copyright law. Any queries should be directed to gundampodcast@gmail.comRead transcript

Nahal Toosi, Politico's senior foreign affairs correspondent and columnist, discusses her latest reporting on how President Donald Trump and his aides have grown frustrated that the U.S. pressure campaign against Cuba, which includes depriving the island of fuel, doesn't seem to be working and what sort of military action might be on the table. Photo: A person waves US and Cuban flags during a "Free Cuba" rally in Miami, Florida, on April 26, 2026, to call for the departure of the Castros and the Communist Party from power in Cuba. (Photo by CHANDAN KHANNA / AFP via Getty Images) Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

The year 1968 has become synonymous with protest and upheaval around the world. On this episode of the Transatlantic, Bakhti talks with Adrian Matus, author of the book The Long 1968 in Hungary and Romania, about what this pivotal year looked like in Hungary, Romania, and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. Bakhti and Adrian discuss how the generation of eastern Europeans born admidst World War II resisted the authoritarian systems they grew up in in uncoventional ways—through universities, literature, and even making their own instruments. Adrian then shares how the legacy of the '68ers lives on in Ukrainians under Russian occupation who are keeping their culture and identity alive using many of the same methods. --- Adrian Matus is an educator and scholar annd the Editor of the Democracy and Culture section. He defended his PhD in History at the European University Institute in 2022. Subsequently, he wrote a book entitled, "The Long 1968 in Hungary and Romania." Previously he graduated from Université Sorbonne Paris IV and Babeș-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca. From 2020 to 2022, he curated the "Communist Parties from Non-Socialist Countries" collection at the Blinken Open Society Archives, then continued researching this topic as a postdoctoral fellow at the New Europe College Bucharest. Adrian has also worked on various educational initiatives, designing history, cultural studies and social sciences syllabi for high-school students, asylum-seekers, and refugees. --- This podcast is hosted by Bakhti Nishanov and produced by Alanna Novetsky and Carly Breland, in conjunction with the Senate Recording Studio.

Last time we spoke about the New Fourth Army Incident. Across the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP entered after the setbacks of the 1930s, seeking to become a national leader in resistance while remaining cautious toward the Nationalist government. The 1936 Xi'an Incident reshaped politics, and by August 1937 KMT–CCP agreements defined a working arrangement: the CCP acknowledged KMT leadership and integrated its forces, while still pursuing political space and autonomy. As the war progressed, the CCP focused on defining its relationship with the KMT and keeping operational independence during cooperation. Mao Zedong managed this alliance by promoting a united front against Japan, yet protecting CCP revolutionary goals and internal control. The establishment of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army marked this military reorganization. Throughout, the CCP feared that KMT collaboration with Japan could enable a peace settlement that would undermine communist legitimacy and restrict the party's future authority thereafter.   #202 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase One Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Simultaneously with the friction between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were also working to take control of—and extract value from—most of the territory they had nominally conquered. Treating these two processes separately—"friction" on the one hand and "consolidation" on the other—does violence to the real difficulty of the CCP's dilemma: the Party often had to confront both problems at the same time. At certain moments, the CCP was effectively forced to wage a two-front struggle. Even so, if the worst of the KMT–CCP friction had already eased by 1941, the most serious and painful challenges posed by Japanese consolidation were still ahead. To recover anything close to reality, the two timelines have to be read together and placed on top of one another. The Japanese understood that consolidation could not be postponed, because much of the land behind the furthest reaches of their army was still only weakly under their actual control. In some places, order could be restored by relatively direct methods: rebuilding local administration and policy authority; repairing transportation and communications; enrolling Chinese personnel—usually, as it turned out, people of dubious reliability—as police or militia under puppet regimes; registering the local population; and requiring identity cards. In true old-style Chinese fashion, collective security practices were used widely. One form was the familiar bao-jia system, in one variant or another. Another was the so-called "railway-cherishing village": a village would be assigned a nearby stretch of track, and if residents failed to "cherish" it, they were held collectively responsible. Yet early Japanese weakness in northern China is vividly illustrated by an incident in the summer of 1938. Three young foreigners—vacationing from teaching in Peiping (Beijing)—were curious about events and about what people were doing. They loaded their bicycles on a southbound train, got off at Baoding, and rode west until they ran into Eighth Route Army detachments. In the early period of the war, commanders generally wanted to rely on more mobile forms of warfare. Mao, however, insisted on a strategy of de-escalation and dispersion: breaking the 8RA and New Fourth Army into small units as nuclei for combat, recruitment, political work, and base-area construction. Under this approach, few engagements could be truly dramatic in scale, and most were constrained by the need to survive. Each skirmish had to be carefully planned. The CCP would use local intelligence and the element of surprise so that a detachment could strike and withdraw before its limited ammunition ran out or before enemy reinforcements arrived. Small Japanese patrols and puppet units could be ambushed not only to seize weapons and other material, but also to inflict casualties. Active collaborators, or Japanese-sponsored administrative personnel, could be assassinated. Above all, Communist action aimed to disrupt transportation: mining roads; cutting down telegraph poles, stealing wire, and cutting rail lines; sabotaging rolling stock; and, at times, carrying off steel rails so that primitive arsenals could be supplied. Attempting derailments was also part of the effort. Destroying a bridge or a locomotive counted as a major achievement. Both the Communists and the Japanese understood that these tactics did not decisively shift the overall strategic balance. Still, they worked at other levels. For the Japanese, the result was a constant series of small wounds—painful, bleeding, and potentially infectious. Few areas in the countryside felt truly safe. Japanese field commanders documented growing frustration as they tried to eliminate resistance, restore administration, collect taxes, and prepare for more systematic and effective economic exploitation of conquered territory. Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese cannot be judged only in conventional battle terms—numbers of engagements, casualties, or territory occupied. It had to be evaluated politically and psychologically as well, exactly as Mao repeatedly emphasized. Since the CCP's wartime legitimacy depended on its patriotic claims, enough fighting had to be carried out to maintain credibility. Moreover, military success mattered for mobilizing the "basic masses," persuading wavering people to keep an open mind, and neutralizing opposition. As the logic put it, it was not that people always chose the side that was winning, but that few would ever join a side they believed was losing. One experienced cadre described the effect this way: Among the guerrilla units… there is a saying that "victory decides everything." No matter how hard it has been to recruit troops, supply the army, raise the masses' anti-Japanese fervor or win over the masses' sympathy, after a victory in battle the masses fall all over themselves to send us flour, steamed bread, meat, and vegetables. The masses' pessimistic and defeatist psychology is broken down, and many new guerrilla soldiers swarm in. But once the Japanese began to demand a heavy price for every engagement—whether the Communists won or not—this attitude began to change. In North and Central China, the Japanese earliest pacification sweeps created comparatively little trouble for the CCP. At first, the Japanese made few distinctions among Chinese forces. They simply tried to mop up or disperse them without regard to character. Over time, however, they realized that these sweeps actually made it easier for the CCP to expand. By the second half of 1939, Japanese methods became more discriminating. Chinese non-Communist forces would step aside while the Japanese hunted specifically for the 8RA, the N4A, and their local affiliates. The Japanese also made more direct appeals to non-Communist forces. According to Japanese army statistics, during the eighteen months from mid-1939 to late 1940, around 70,000 men from more or less regular Nationalist units in North China alone went over to the Japanese. The Japanese also reached informal "understandings" with several regional commanders whose forces together might have totaled as many as 300,000 men. This, of course, corresponded to what the CCP denounced as "crooked-line patriotism"—the "crooked-line" collaboration that preserved certain units so they could be used in future anti-Communist operations. When pacification efforts were intensified from late 1939 and throughout 1940, differences also appeared in the strategies Japanese armies used in North versus Central China. In North China, the approach relied heavily on military means, with political tactics limited largely to recruiting collaborators. In Central China, Japanese authorities did not hesitate to use military force, but they also attempted to supplement it with more comprehensive political and economic solutions by setting up tightly controlled "model peace zones." Although both approaches ultimately failed, they created enormous difficulties for Chinese Communists—until, in 1943, the Japanese were forced to ease off because the Pacific War against the United States became too burdensome. Careful reading of detailed intra-party documents suggests that repression also demobilized peasant support and terrorized populations into apathy, grudging acquiescence, or even active collaboration with the Japanese. In a locality already reduced from consolidated base status to guerrilla status, capacity and will were often too weak to administer complex reforms in systematic fashion. In other words, passive survival—defensive survival—was at least as important as what lay behind the heroic public images the Party projected. Systematic pacification in North China in late 1939 and 1940 radiated outward. It moved from areas held more or less firmly by the Japanese and their puppets into guerrilla and contested zones. The ultimate objective was to crush resistance or render it ineffective. The method was first to sweep the area clear of anti-Japanese elements, and then to establish a chain of interconnected strongpoints that could quickly reinforce one another. After that, puppet government would be expanded so it could take increasing responsibility for civil administration and "pacification maintenance," while Japanese forces repeated the initial steps further outward into contested territory. Violence was used selectively against individuals, groups, or villages accused of acts of resistance. This selective violence aimed to deter active participation in CCP-led programs, deprive Communist forces of a population willing to shelter them, and persuade informers to come forward. That was, at least, the theory of the strategy. In practice, the basic framework of the strategy depended on the main transport lines. Railways and roads—if properly fortified and protected—could separate resistance forces from one another and deny them one of their most effective weapons: mobility. These "cage" tactics (chiyu-lung, "jiu-lung") made it possible to enlarge pacified areas by "nibbling" outward, "as a silkworm feeds on mulberry leaves" (ts'an-shih). At the same time, the approach aimed to exploit North China's economy more effectively. To this end, the Japanese worked to improve and extend both railway and road networks. When the war began, in Shanxi the Cheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan) and Tong-Pu (Datong–Tongguan) lines were metre-gauge, incompatible with the standard-gauge lines elsewhere in China—part of Yan Xishan's design to prevent deeper penetration into his province. By the end of 1939, the Japanese used forced labor to convert both lines to standard gauge. One benefit was the easier transportation of high-quality anthracite coal from the Qingxing mines (on the Cheng-Tai line) to industrial users in North China and Manchukuo. Of the newly constructed roads and railway lines, the most important was the Te-Shih line—from Dezhou in northeastern Shandong to Shijiazhuang. Construction began in June 1940 and finished in November, connecting the Tianjin–Pukou, Beiping–Hankou, and Cheng-Tai lines. This made it easier to move troops and transport raw cotton. Once the Te–Shih link was completed, the Japanese had direct connections between the point of their furthest advance at the elbow of the Yellow River and all major cities of North China, and beyond to Manchukuo. Communist sources began to speak of a "transportation war," noting with concern the moats and ditches, the blockhouses, and the frequent patrols protecting the lines. Both militarily and economically, these measures weighed heavily on forces led by the Communists in North China and on the populations under their control—especially the plains of central and eastern Hebei. One indicator of effectiveness was the rapid decline in "acts of sabotage" against North China railways in 1939 and the first half of 1940. A cadre in Jin-Cha-Ji reported in mid-1940: "The enemy has adopted a blockhouse policy, like that of the Jiangxi Soviet. They are spread like a constellation. In central Hebei alone, there are about 500, separated by one to three miles." Normal trading patterns were disrupted as Japanese or puppet occupiers took over administrative and commercial centers, and peasants found themselves caught between regulations imposed by the Communists on one side and those enforced by the other side. Finally, landlords, moneylenders, loafers, bandits—everyone who felt damaged by the new order inside base areas—could use pacification programs to try to recover influence or simply take revenge. Some became informers. After 8RA and local units were driven away, they could kill remaining cadres or activists and settle scores with the peasants who had supported them. Until the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was defeated, local elites and other disaffected elements might also seek support from Nationalists. It was even possible for an armed band to operate for several months inside consolidated regions of the CCP base, killing cadres as it went. Peng Dehuai later recalled this period in a way that underscored how pressure translated into wavering and collapse. Under the enemy's brutal pressure, in some districts the masses even hesitated or capitulated. From March to July 1940, large areas of the North China base were reduced to guerrilla regions. Before the "Cage-bursting battle",, they controlled only two county seats: Pingxun in the Taihang mountains and Pien-kuan in northwest Shanxi. Masses who previously had one set of obligations now had two—one toward the anti-Japanese regime and one toward the puppet regime. The situation in North China had not yet become a full crisis, but it was certainly serious. Action was needed to regain initiative. On 22 July 1940, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan Deputy Chief of Staff jointly issued the Preliminary Battle Order, laying out the strategic goals for the coming operation. The order stated: "To respond to the enemy's 'prison cage policy,' obstruct its advance toward Xi'an, create favorable conditions in the North China theater, and strike at the national resistance initiative, we have decided to take advantage of the concealment provided by tall summer millet and the rainy season to carry out a large-scale sabotage operation on the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway (Zheng–Tai Line)." It required the participation of at least 22 regiments from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, the 129th Division, and the 120th Division. The main objective was to "completely destroy key points along the Zheng–Tai Line" and to "cut the railway for a prolonged period." On 8 August, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the Operational Battle Order, further clarifying how forces would be deployed. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region was assigned to attack the eastern section of the Zheng–Tai Railway (from Niangzi Pass to Shijiazhuang). The 129th Division was assigned the western section (from Niangzi Pass to Yuci). The 120th Division was tasked with targeting the northern segment of the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. The order also required all troops to begin combat operations on 20 August, and emphasized that "the success of the campaign should be assessed primarily by the extent of damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai Line." The operation was prepared under strict secrecy. Various elements of the Eighth Route Army conducted thorough preparations before the campaign. Reconnaissance teams, hidden and protected with the help of local villagers, penetrated deep into areas near the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway to carefully map Japanese strongholds, enemy troop dispositions, and local terrain. At the same time, both military and civilian communities mobilized to stockpile grain, ammunition, and tools needed for railway sabotage; blacksmiths were organized to manufacture crowbars, pickaxes, and other essential equipment. Specialized military training covered demolition methods and techniques for dismantling railways, including tactics such as heating and bending steel rails. Civilian mobilization played a crucial role: militia and support teams took on tasks such as transport, medical aid, and coordination with military units. In Central Shanxi alone, more than 10,000 militia members were mobilized. The Eighth Route Army headquarters repeatedly stressed the need for operational confidentiality, stating: "Before the battle begins, the plan must remain strictly classified; until preparations are completed, the campaign objective may be disclosed only to brigade-level commanders." With the cover of dense summer millet, troops secretly assembled within their designated operational areas. Before the battle, the Japanese North China Area Army estimated the strength of the communist regular forces at about 88,000 men in December 1939. Two years later, they revised the estimate to 140,000. On the eve of the battle, communist forces had grown to between 200,000 and 400,000 men, organized in 105 regiments. By 1940, the growth had become so significant that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regular units—46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th—against Japanese-held cities and the railway lines that connected them. According to the Communist Party's official statement, the battle began on 20 August.  On August 20, 1940, the rain didn't stop the campaign—it changed the battlefield. It slowed movement, blurred distance, and turned rivers and muddy roads into obstacles that could just as easily trap your own men as your enemy's. Along the districts bordering the Zhengtai Railway, the Eighth Route Army still moved, slipping through valleys and river crossings, bypassing Japanese posts, and positioning forces on both sides of the line as night settled in. By dark, the plan became a coordinated strike meant to hit the enemy before they could properly react. Across the entire Zhengtai Railway, attacks went out with timing designed to disorient Japanese defenders—so that their "first realization" arrived only after the railway itself was already being attacked and the window to respond effectively had slipped away.   A key portion of that strike fell to the right column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, centered on the 5th and 19th Regiments, with the mission of sabotaging the Niangziguan to Luanliu section. At 20:00 on August 20, part of the 5th Regiment infiltrated Niangziguan Village for the first time, overwhelmed the puppet troops stationed there, and seized the village by dawn. After that opening cut, the main force moved in to cover the engineers, destroy enemy fortifications, and blow up the Guandong Railway Bridge. When the sabotage was done, they withdrew from Niangziguan on their own initiative, leaving the enemy to deal with the destruction rather than being pulled into a long, grinding engagement.   That same night, at Mohe Beach along the Zhengtai line, another action unfolded. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked the station and was immediately met with a counterattack by Japanese forces. By dawn on August 21, the company withdrew—an adjustment, not defeat—and then attacked again the same night after crossing the Mian River. This time the enemy retreated into barracks to resist more stubbornly, with nearly 1,000 Japanese troops holding Mohe Beach. Heavy rain had swollen the river and made foot crossing nearly impossible, but the attackers seized the village west of the station and held it. On August 22 afternoon, more than 400 Japanese troops counterattacked; the main force of the 5th Regiment hit from the north bank of the Mian River in a fire assault, killing more than 50 before withdrawing the 1st Company out of the fighting. The 19th Regiment, meanwhile, took Jucheng and Irrang stations, tightening the pressure on the railway corridor.   On August 23, 1940, the 5th Regiment recaptured Niangziguan and blew up the stone bridge east of the village, destroying the railway segment between Chengjialongdi and Mohetan. That night the 19th Regiment stormed Yirang Station and blew up the water tower and the railway, ensuring the disruption would not be temporary. From August 24 to 27, bridges near Yanhui—stone and wooden—were destroyed again and again. Under that continuous pressure, beginning on August 25, Japanese transportation along the Niangziguan to Luanliu section of the Zhengtai Road was cut off completely. Strongholds were left to fight more or less alone, unable to coordinate or move supplies the way they normally would.   While the right column worked the railway, other forces hit the system from different angles. The Central Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region—comprised of the 2nd, 3rd, and 16th Regiments—took responsibility for sabotaging the Zhengtai Road segment from Niangziguan to Weishui and for striking the Jingxing Coal Mine area. On the night of August 20, the 3rd Regiment launched coordinated attacks on the Gangtou old mine and the Dongwangshe new mine of Jingxing, and with miners assisting, the 1st Battalion quickly stormed the new mine and annihilated part of the enemy garrison. The rest withdrew into bunkers, resisting as best they could. By the afternoon of the next day, the entire enemy force had been wiped out. Afterward, major buildings in the mining area were destroyed and most materials were removed so that the mine could not resume production for more than six months. The 3rd Regiment also captured Jiazhuang, reinforcing the idea that sabotage here meant disabling not just lines of movement, but also the flow of resources.   Elsewhere, Japanese positions were disrupted in smaller, targeted strikes that still added up. After the Japanese stronghold at Nanzheng destroyed the railway between Nanzheng and Weishui, the 2nd Regiment took the eastern end fortress of the Faluling Railway Bridge, covered the engineers as they blew up a section of the bridge, and briefly occupied Caizhuang. The 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment attacked Beiyu on the night of August 20, annihilating most defenders, and on August 21 it covered the engineers to destroy the Beiyu Stone Bridge. Other units struck Didu and annihilated most defenders in Nanyu. By August 24, the Central Column had learned that more than 1,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Jingxing County, with additional reinforcements moving toward Nanyu and Didu. Their response was practical: detachments were assigned to watch and harass along the railway while the main force gathered in mobile positions—waiting for the next opening rather than charging blindly into concentrated strength.   Meanwhile, the left column of the Jin-Cha-Ji effort—from the 2nd Regiment of the Jizhong Garrison Brigade, the Military Region Special Service Regiment, and the Pingjinghuo Detachment—focused on sabotage from Weishui to Shijiazhuang. On the night of August 20, the Pingjinghuo Detachment attacked Yanfeng and blew up the railway. The Special Service Regiment moved with massed efforts as they destroyed power lines and highways from Yanfeng to Weizhou. On the night of August 22, the Special Service Regiment attacked Shang'an Station. On August 23, the 2nd Regiment stormed Touquan Station, captured two fortresses, then withdrew from the railway line; from August 25 to 27, they destroyed the highway connecting Pingshan, Huolu, Weishui, and Yanfeng.   While the main blow was falling along the Zhengtai Railway, the 129th Division was assigned raids on the western section. That area included the Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4 headquarters, a coal mine base at Yangquan, and support from Independent Mixed Brigade No. 9 from Yuci. These raids weren't only about destruction—they were meant to disorient, to create confusion over where the main pressure truly was. After the general offensive began at 20:00 on August 20, five companies of the 16th Regiment attacked Lujiazhuang Station and captured bunkers. Two guerrilla-operating companies in Yuci worked with engineers to destroy bridges between Lujiazhuang and Duanting. The 38th Regiment surprised Shanghu and Heshangzu stations, while the 25th Regiment captured Mashou Station and pushed Japanese troops toward Shouyang. The division's right-wing sabotage unit—28th and 30th Regiments of the newly formed 10th Brigade—took on sabotage on the Yangquan–Shouyang section, splitting routes on the night of August 20 to attack stations like Langyu, Zhangjing, Qinquan, and then striking additional positions with the 30th Regiment. Across that window, stations and strongholds such as Sangzhang, Yanzigou, Langyu, and Qinquan were taken, iron bridges were destroyed, and additional stations including Potou, Xinzhuang, Saiyu, Tielugou, Xiaozhuang, and Zhangzhuang were seized or disrupted.   As the western sabotage deepened, Japanese response hardened—but the ability to coordinate weakened. With the Zhengtai line sabotaged, the western section came under the 129th Division's control except for a few places such as Shouyang. Fierce assaults forced Japanese forces to lose contact with each other within days. Strongholds were attacked, besieged, and then annihilated as communication and coordination broke down. The 129th Division mobilized local people to destroy railway facilities, stations, and installations using demolition, burning, and flooding, moving materials so the railway and related infrastructure were effectively erased rather than merely damaged.   To cover these operations, the division occupied Shinaoshan with the 14th Regiment of the general reserve. Starting the morning of August 21, Japanese forces concentrated in Yangquan and attacked Shinaoshan daily. Enemy strength reportedly rose from more than 200 to more than 600, supported by bombing and strafing and the release of poison. The 14th Regiment held out until August 25, repelling repeated attacks, and by August 26 additional pressure came again as reinforcements increased. After six days and nights—and the annihilation of more than 400 enemy soldiers—the 14th Regiment withdrew from the main peak of Shinaoshan, continuing to contain the Japanese with smaller detachments while the main force shifted to another mission.   The first phase of sabotage had succeeded, but the campaign did not allow complacency. The Japanese strengthened their presence along the railway and launched frequent counterattacks, and Japanese divisions in southern Shanxi—including the 36th, 37th, and 41st—prepared to reinforce from the north. On August 26, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued instructions for a second phase: continue breaking through the road, concentrate superior forces, and annihilate Japanese units smaller than a battalion that were attacking or reinforcing. In line with that guidance, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the Jin-You Column to keep breaking through the road on August 27 for one or two days, while the 129th Division alternated daily in breaking through. Under sustained pressure, the western section of the Zhengtai Road was basically destroyed; transportation was effectively cut off except for a few towns such as Shouyang and Yangquan.   On September 2, orders were issued to conclude the Zhengtai Campaign starting from the 3rd and shift forces according to the second-step plan. As the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region launched the Mengbei Campaign, the 129th Division shifted toward attacking invading Japanese forces, while other tasks—such as attacking the He-Liao Highway and recovering cities of He and Liao—were left for later. Beginning September 2, the Military Region deployed the 2nd, 5th, 16th, and 19th Regiments toward areas north of Meng County and Shouyang to recapture enemy strongholds. With the railway sabotaged, the Japanese main force north of Meng County shifted south to reinforce, weakening garrisons and spreading panic among the strongholds. As fierce offensives intensified, garrison troops began to waver. By the afternoon of September 5, Japanese troops at Xiashe, supported by troops from Shangshe, retreated to Shangshe and fled toward Meng County overnight. That night, the 19th Regiment arrived near Shangshe and, together with the Special Service Battalion of the 2nd Military Sub-district, pursued. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced into Shenquan and Putian to cut off the retreat route. By 9:00 AM on September 6 the enemy was surrounded in Xingdao Village, and after five hours of intense fighting most forces were annihilated. Survivors fled east to Luolizhang Mountain, only to be surrounded again by the 19th, 5th, and 16th Regiments. By the night of September 9, most Japanese forces had been wiped out, though more than 40 men broke through in dense fog and escaped into Meng County.   The siege continued through bitter episodes involving attacks and withdrawals under poison, with both sides paying heavily for every moment of progress. Eventually, on September 11, Japanese troops in Xiyan escaped back to Meng County, helped by more than 200 Japanese already present there. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to counter the pressure: on September 4 they sent more than 2,000 troops to reinforce Meng County and began a counterattack. On September 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the 19th and 5th Regiments to remain east and north of Meng County to coordinate with the 129th and 120th Divisions, while the rest prepared for new missions.   As fighting intensified around Zhengtai and Meng County, a parallel pressure campaign unfolded. To contain Eighth Route Army sabotage along Zhengtai, the Japanese assembled battalions from Independent Mixed 4th and 9th Brigades to strike the 129th Division. In response, the 120th Division began large-scale sabotage against the Tongpu Railway and major highways in northwestern Shanxi starting 20:00 on August 20. They captured enemy strongholds along rail and road lines, striking major bases such as Kangjiahui on the Xinjing Highway, where more than 50 Japanese and puppet troops were stationed, and also attacking other areas like Shishen, Lizhen, and Jingle. Ambushes were set to annihilate reinforcements arriving from different directions, and at 00:30 on August 21 the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment attacked Kangjiahui and annihilated the defenders by dawn. Reinforcements arriving in cars were destroyed, and subsequent actions continued to expand the disruption.   Over more than 180 battles in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division annihilated more than 800 Japanese and puppet troops and captured or destroyed stations and strongholds including Kangjiahui, Yangfangkou, Pingshe, and Longquan. By disrupting the Tongpu Railway and transportation along the Xinjing, Taifen, and Fenli highways, they tied down Japanese forces and made it harder to reinforce Zhengtai. In practical terms, this meant the first phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive—lasting about three weeks—ended on September 10 with major railway lines and motor roads attacked repeatedly. Roadbeds, bridges, switching yards, and installations were hit heavily; at the Qingxing coal mines, facilities were destroyed and production was halted for nearly a year.   By the end of that first phase, the campaign's logic had become clearer: once the Japanese leaned more heavily on a "cage-and-strongpoint" defense system, the same transport network that had supported their defense became less secure. When rail and road were repeatedly disrupted, strongpoints became more vulnerable—especially if Japanese units pulled out nearby detachments to respond to sabotage. So the campaign shifted from breaking transportation to attacking blockhouses and other strongpoints in contested areas, aiming to force Japanese forces back into well-defended garrisons and leave the countryside again contested by Communist forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. From 20 August 1940, under secrecy and rain, units of the 8th Route Army infiltrated stations, captured villages, destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, mines, and stations across multiple columns. By early September the Zhengtai and related Tongpu transport routes were repeatedly severed, forcing Japanese troops to fight isolated strongpoints and hindering reinforcement. 

On this day, 16 May 1967, the All Circles Struggle Committee (ACSC) was established in Hong Kong in the wake of violent police repression of a strike of plastic flower factory workers. On May 6, British colonial police violently beat picketing workers and bystanders, causing mass outrage. Protests against and clashes with police began breaking out across the city. After the ACSC was set up to coordinate a movement against colonialism, 126 struggle committees had been formed within the next two days to share experiences and plan action. A week later, wildcat strikes began to break out, with widespread rioting. In June, a general strike was called, which eventually faltered although strikes in some industries continued until late July. As the strike collapsed, many protesters began resorting to bomb attacks – both real and fake – targeting British authorities to cause chaos and disrupt business as usual. The "Hong Kong riots," as they became known, lasted until December before they were called off after secret talks between British authorities and the Communist Party of China. The CPC were nominally opposed to British colonialism, but in reality the Chinese economy benefited from having access to international markets through British Hong Kong and so they eventually decided not to push for British withdrawal. While the protests ended, in their wake British authorities implemented numerous reforms which significantly improved the lives of working class Hong Kongers. These included UK-style social benefits for the unemployed, the disabled and the elderly, construction of new hospitals and homes, abolition of some sexist laws, and rampant police corruption was largely eradicated. Learn more in our podcast episodes 30-31 about the Hong Kong riots: https://workingclasshistory.com/2019/07/15/e26-27-the-hong-kong-riots-1967/Our work is only possible because of support from you, our listeners on patreon. If you appreciate our work, please join us and access exclusive content and benefits at patreon.com/workingclasshistory.See all of our anniversaries each day, alongside sources and maps on the On This Day section of our Stories app: stories.workingclasshistory.com/date/todayBrowse all Stories by Date here on the Date index: https://stories.workingclasshistory.com/dateCheck out our Map of historical Stories: https://map.workingclasshistory.comCheck out books, posters, clothing and more in our online store, here: https://shop.workingclasshistory.comIf you enjoy this podcast, make sure to check out our flagship longform podcast, Working Class History

Savage explains how the U.S. feels like a replay of the Roaring '20s—corruption, excess, and a looming crash—citing national debt surpassing GDP and high gas prices in California. He compares HBO's "Boardwalk Empire" to today's "gangster capitalism" and then shares how Napoleon III serves as a cautionary tale about prosperity undone by war costs. Savage says he's alarmed by pressure on President Trump from pro-war talkers and the military-industrial complex to escalate the war in Iran, warning this could draw in Russia and China. He then reads from Mao's "Little Red Book" where Mao calls "democratic socialism" a road to communism. He concludes by condemning Bernie Sanders and the Communist Party while calling for divine help for America.

Former U.S. Senator and U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, Sam Brownback, wrote a book called “China’s War on Faith”, that is a “bold warning about the Chinese Communist Party’s assault on religious freedom and the global consequences of digital authoritarianism”. Brownback is urging the Trump Administration to confront China’s Communist Party about the human rights violations and religious repression going on by their hand. With President Trump’s visit to China this week, there’s no time like the present to discuss why defending religious freedom is critical to preserving democracy and the future of the free world. Sam Brownback spoke with us on this topic.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Former U.S. Senator and U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, Sam Brownback, wrote a book called “China’s War on Faith”, that is a “bold warning about the Chinese Communist Party’s assault on religious freedom and the global consequences of digital authoritarianism”. Brownback is urging the Trump Administration to confront China’s Communist Party about the human rights violations and religious repression going on by their hand. With President Trump’s visit to China this week, there’s no time like the present to discuss why defending religious freedom is critical to preserving democracy and the future of the free world. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The more than 600-year-old Temple of Heaven in Beijing provided a symbolic setting on Thursday for President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump as they posed for photos at the site after their closely watched talks earlier in the day.5月15日，在备受瞩目的中美元首会谈结束后，习近平主席与特朗普总统来到拥有六百多年历史的北京天坛合影留念，这座古建筑为两国关系增添了象征性注脚。The visit to the UNESCO World Heritage site added a cultural dimension to the summit between the leaders of the world's two largest economies.两国领导人的联合国教科文组织世界遗产地之行，为此次会晤增添了文化韵味。Built in 1420 during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), the architectural marvel welcomed the two leaders on an early summer afternoon, as ancient cypresses stood in quiet grace and a gentle breeze refreshed the air.这座建于明代（1368—1644）1420年的建筑瑰宝，在初夏午后迎接两位领导人，古柏静立，微风轻拂，空气清新宜人。Xi greeted Trump outside the Hall of Prayer for Good Harvests, the Temple of Heaven's iconic, triple-eaved, blue-tiled landmark.习近平在祈年殿外迎接特朗普。祈年殿是天坛标志性的三重檐蓝瓦建筑。The two presidents walked up the steps and entered the hall, where they viewed its architectural features, from the precise fittings of its mortise-and-tenon joints and interlocking wooden brackets to the seamless integration of astronomical calendar concepts with its structure.两国元首拾级而上，步入殿内，细细品味其建筑特色。从精密契合的榫卯结构、层层咬合的斗拱，到天文历法理念与建筑布局的巧妙融合，无不令人叹为观止。In the hall, they appreciated the concept of harmony among all things and respect for the law of nature.在殿内，两国元首共同感受“万物和谐”以及“尊重自然规律”的建筑设计理念。Xi noted that in 2017, he and Trump toured the Palace Museum along Beijing's Central Axis.习近平指出，2017年他曾与特朗普一同参观位于北京中轴线上的故宫博物院。The Temple of Heaven dates from the same period as the Palace Museum and embodies the idea that Heaven is round and Earth is square, reflecting the view of the universe and guiding philosophy of the Chinese people, he said.他说，天坛与故宫同属一个历史时期，其“天圆地方”的设计理念体现了中国人的宇宙观和思想哲学。Xi told Trump that ancient Chinese rulers would hold prayer ceremonies at the site for prosperity of the nation, happiness of the people and favorable weather for good harvests. It embodies the traditional Chinese ethos that people are the foundation of a country and only when the people lead a good life can the country thrive, he said.习近平告诉特朗普，中国古代帝王会在这里举行祭天仪式，祈求国泰民安、风调雨顺、五谷丰登。这体现了中国传统“民为邦本”的理念，只有人民生活幸福，国家才能繁荣兴盛。Xi said the Communist Party of China has inherited and carried forward the people-centered philosophy rooted in Chinese civilization, and has always adhered to its fundamental commitment of serving the people wholeheartedly, thereby gaining the firm support and heartfelt endorsement of the people.习近平表示，中国共产党继承并弘扬植根于中华文明的以人民为中心的发展思想，始终坚持全心全意为人民服务的根本宗旨，因此赢得了人民坚定支持与衷心拥护。Trump said he still has vivid memories of his 2017 visit to the Palace Museum. The Temple of Heaven, which has stood magnificently for more than six centuries, showcases the fine art of classical Chinese architecture as well as the splendid and profound traditional culture, he said.特朗普表示，他至今仍对2017年参观故宫博物院记忆犹新。他说，巍然屹立六个多世纪的天坛，展现了中国古典建筑艺术之美，也彰显了中华传统文化的辉煌与深厚。"It's great. Great place. Incredible. China is beautiful," Trump said.特朗普说：“太棒了。这是个伟大的地方，令人惊叹。中国很美。”Both the United States and China are great countries, and their peoples are both great and wise, Trump said, adding that the two countries should deepen mutual understanding and enhance friendship between their peoples.特朗普表示，美中两国都是伟大的国家，两国人民都伟大而智慧；双方应深化相互理解，增进人民友谊。The Temple of Heaven visit on Thursday continued a tradition in China-US diplomacy in which culturally significant venues are used to convey messages beyond the formal agenda. Trump's visit to the Temple of Heaven marked the first time in 51 years that a sitting US president had visited the landmark since then-US president Gerald Ford toured it during his visit to China in 1975.5月14日两国领导人到访天坛，延续了中美外交中借文化地标传递弦外之音的传统。特朗普由此成为51年来首位踏足天坛的美国现任总统。上一次美国现任总统到访此地，还要追溯到1975年杰拉尔德·福特访华期间。• UNESCO World Heritage site /juːˈneskəʊ wɜːld ˈherɪtɪdʒ saɪt/联合国教科文组织世界遗产地• summit /ˈsʌmɪt/峰会• cypresses /ˈsaɪprəsɪz/柏树• Hall of Prayer for Good Harvests /hɔːl əv preə fə ɡʊd ˈhɑːvɪsts/祈年殿• triple-eaved /ˈtrɪpl iːvd/三重檐的• blue-tiled /bluː taɪld/蓝瓦的• mortise-and-tenon joints /ˈmɔːtɪs ənd ˈtenən dʒɔɪnts/榫卯结构• interlocking /ˌɪntəˈlɒkɪŋ/相互咬合的• astronomical calendar /ˌæstrəˈnɒmɪkl ˈkælɪndə(r)/天文历法• Palace Museum /ˈpæləs mjuˈziːəm/故宫博物院• Central Axis /ˈsentrəl ˈæksɪs/中轴线

The White House will host “Rededicate 250: National Jubilee of Prayer, Praise & Thanksgiving,” on the National Mall, where senior government officials are set to lead the nation in prayer, sparking controversy on the Left over the separation of church and state. Seth dives into the complexities of American history and its relationship with Christianity. President Trump has touched-down in China for the beginning of an official state visit to the People’s Republic. Seth touches on the legacy of Richard Nixon's historic visit to China and the implications of normalizing relations with the Communist Party. We're joined by John Dombroski, founder and president of Grand Canyon Planning Associates. Seth discusses commencement speeches and the words that graduates need to hear this year.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Chinese emperor Xi Jinping's lavish welcome for President Trump cannot obscure a harsh reality: China's ruling Communist Party is at war with the United States. If we continue to ignore that natty fact, we invite a redoubling of the CCP's long-running “unrestricted warfare” against America – an unforced, and possibly terminal, error of epic proportions.  Much will depend on what comes next. If President Trump allows Xi to reduce their summit to yet-another opportunity to preside over one-sided deals with U.S. “captured elites,” 47 will be remembered as having perpetuated and greatly intensified the threat we face.  If on the other hand, like President Reagan at Rekjyavik, Mr. Trump rejects the temptation to prop up the Chinese Communist Party, he may yet put it on the “ash-heap of history,” alongside the odious Soviet one that spawned the CCP. Just do it. This is Frank Gaffney.

During the Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, joined by Winston Churchill, sat down with Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek. The purpose of the meeting, now known as the Cairo Conference, was to strategize against the Empire of Japan and make preparations for a post-war Asia.  Nearly 30 years later, President Richard Nixon, seeing an opportunity to widen the distance between China (now Communist) and the Soviet Union, paid a visit to China to meet Mao Zedong, the chair of the Communist Party. This opened diplomatic relations between the countries.  Since then, presidents have held meetings with Chinese leaders with some regularity. And President Trump is no exception. This week, he will be meeting with Xi Jinping, the President of the People's Republic of China. From AI to Iran, there is a lot on the table. To understand what to expect from this meeting, I sat down with Andrew Harding, Policy Analyst for National Securityand Indo-Pacific Affairs at The Heritage Foundation.    Email us with thoughts, questions, or suggestions: HeritageExplains@heritage.org   More on China from Heritage Experts: https://www.heritage.org/china 

A currency becomes “internationalized” when it is widely used beyond its home economy for trade, financial transactions, and as a store of value. Achieving that status can lower transaction costs and exchange rate risks, while also enhancing the issuing country's geopolitical influence. Today, the global financial system remains overwhelmingly dollar-centric, with China's renminbi playing a comparatively modest role. Yet over the past decade, Beijing has taken steps to expand its global use, expanding offshore renminbi markets, establishing bilateral swap lines, and developing alternative payment infrastructure.  To help us unpack where China's renminbi internationalization efforts stand today, we are joined by Zongyuan Zoe Liu, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Zoe's research centers on international political economy and global financial markets, with a focus on China and East Asia, as well as the Middle East. She is the author of Can BRICS De-dollarize the Global Financial System? and Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances Global Ambitions.   Timestamps:  [00:00] Introduction  [01:54] Strategic Motivations for Beijing  [04:55] Progress Report on RMB Internationalization  [08:16] Main Mechanisms Used to Promote the RMB  [11:08] RMB in the Belt and Road Initiative  [13:46] Using Clean Energy Supply Chains to Promote RMB in Key Commodities  [15:57] RMB as a Reserve Currency?  [21:23] Xi's Fourth Term Goals with the RMB  [27:26] How Global Conflicts Impact RMB Internationalization 

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

兩岸關係 liǎng àn guān xì - cross-strait relations (Taiwan–China relations)角度 jiǎo dù - perspective; angle第二次世界大戰 dì èr cì shì jiè dà zhàn - World War II世紀 shì jì - century佔據 zhàn jù - to occupy據點 jù diǎn - base; strategic point朝代 cháo dài - dynasty納入 nà rù - to incorporate; to include版圖 bǎn tú - territory; domain明末清初 míng mò qīng chū - late Ming and early Qing period明朝 Míng cháo - Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)清朝 Qīng cháo - Qing Dynasty (1644–1912)漢人的政權 Hàn rén de zhèng quán - Han Chinese regime皇帝 huáng dì - emperor女真人 Nǚ zhēn rén - Jurchen people少數民族 shǎo shù mín zú - ethnic minority服氣 fú qì - to accept; to be convinced推翻 tuī fān - to overthrow打敗 dǎ bài - to defeat反攻大陸 fǎn gōng dà lù - to retake mainland China穩固 wěn gù - to stabilize; to consolidate甲午戰爭 Jiǎ wǔ zhàn zhēng - First Sino-Japanese War (First China–Japan War, 25 July 1894 – 17 April 1895)打仗 dǎ zhàng - to wage war割讓 gē ràng - to cede (territory)統治 tǒng zhì - to rule; to govern協議 xié yì - agreement中華民國 Zhōng huá mín guó - Republic of China (Taiwan) (founded in 1912)混亂 hùn luàn - chaotic; disorderly腐敗 fǔ bài - corrupt; corruption起義 qǐ yì - uprising發動革命 fā dòng gé mìng - to launch a revolution推翻 tuī fān - to overthrow內戰 nèi zhàn - civil war共產黨 gòng chǎn dǎng - Communist Party國民黨 guó mín dǎng - Kuomintang (KMT)抗日 kàng rì - to resist Japan (Anti-Japanese resistance)中華人民共和國 Zhōng huá rén mín gòng hé guó - People's Republic of China (October 1, 1949 founded)執政 zhí zhèng - to be in power; to govern民主社會 mín zhǔ shè huì - democratic society戒嚴 jiè yán - martial law (May 20, 1949 – Jul 15, 1987 in Taiwan)撤退 chè tuì - to retreat通信 tōng xìn - to communicate (by mail/phone)間諜 jiàn dié - spy一個中國原則 yí gè Zhōng guó yuán zé - One-China principle十大建設 shí dà jiàn shè - Ten Major Construction Projects (Taiwan)反對台獨 fǎn duì tái dú - to oppose Taiwan independence派 pài - to send; to dispatch軍機軍艦 jūn jī jūn jiàn - military aircraft and warships民主自由 mín zhǔ zì yóu - democracy and freedom親近 qīn jìn - to get closer to; to be close withFollow me on Instagram: fangfang.chineselearning !

1/3: Preview for Later Today: Charles Burton examines China's exploitation of Western technology like AI and 5G to expand global power and sustain the Communist Party's control over failing systems.

Ties between China and Vietnam appear to be improving across every front. Vietnam is selling more to China, while China is investing more in its southern neighbor. Even on thorny territorial issues in the South China Sea, the two sides said they're talking through their differences. And last month, Vietnamese leader To Lam traveled to China in his capacity as both General Secretary of the Communist Party and President of the country, a model many say was inspired by the Chinese political structure. All of this has prompted discussion among some Vietnamese analysts that Hanoi is swinging in Beijing's direction. But Khang Vu, a visiting scholar in Vietnamese political science at Boston College, strongly disagrees. Khang joins Eric to discuss why Hanoi's longstanding commitment to non-alignment among the major powers remains the bedrock of Vietnamese foreign policy. Show Notes: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Why Vietnam Is Swinging in China's Direction by Nguyen Khac Giang The Diplomat: The Myth of Vietnam's Tilt Toward China by Khang Vu The Diplomat: Interpreting the Future of Vietnam-China Relations Through the 2026 Joint Statement by Hai Hong Nguyen and Vu Quy Son

Preview for Later Today: Guest Rick Fischer. Fischer attributes the slow pace of China's moon landing program to extreme risk aversion within the Communist Party culture. They prioritize avoiding technical failures over competing directly with American timelines. 3/6NOVEMBER 1955

A key meeting of the political bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee is calling for stronger confidence and effort to carry out the country's economic work. It urged efforts to stimulate consumer spending, accelerate the building of a modern industrial system, and fully implement the AI+ initiative.

  Last time we spoke about the battle of south Guangxi. In late 1939, amid the Sino-Japanese War stalemate, Japan aimed to sever China's vital supply lines from French Indochina by invading southern Guangxi. The 21st Army, including the 5th Division and Taiwan Mixed Brigade landed at Qinzhou Bay on November 15, capturing Nanning by November 24 after feinting at Beihai and overcoming scattered Chinese defenses under the 16th Army Group. Chinese forces, commanded by Bai Chongxi and reinforced by the elite 5th Army launched a counteroffensive in December. The brutal Battle of Kunlun Pass saw repeated assaults. However, Japanese counterattacks in January 1940, bolstered by the 18th Division and Konoye Brigade, recaptured Kunlun Pass and Binyang by February, inflicting over 10,000 Chinese losses and forcing retreats. A stalemate ensued until September 1940, when Japan pressured Indochina. Overextended Japanese forces withdrew south, allowing Chinese to recapture Nanning on October 30 and clear Guangxi by November 17.   #199 The battle of West Suiyuan  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Back in 1936,  the Xi'an Incident had forced a fragile alliance between the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists, forming a united front against Japan. This front extended to regional warlords like the Ma Clique, who controlled Ningxia, Gansu, and Qinghai. The Ma family, descendants of Muslim generals loyal to the Qing Dynasty, navigated complex loyalties but ultimately aligned with the Nationalist cause, driven by patriotism and self-preservation.   The stakes in West Suiyuan were high. Control of the region meant access to the Suiyuan-Xinjiang Highway, a lifeline for Soviet aid to China. Japanese occupation could threaten the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, a Communist stronghold, and open paths to Lanzhou and beyond. The battles here, though overshadowed by larger theaters like Shanghai or Wuhan, demonstrated how peripheral fronts contributed to the national resistance. Over 70 years later, the sacrifices of more than 2,000 Ningxia soldiers remain a poignant reminder of the human cost of resistance, their anti-Japanese merits etched forever in the annals of Chinese history.   The seeds of the Battle of West Suiyuan were sown in the turbulent years following the Xi'an Incident. This event in December 1936 led to the initial formation of a national united front against Japanese aggression. The Communist Party of China (CPC) mobilized masses in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, strengthening anti-Japanese forces and exerting pressure on the Ma Clique. Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government also influenced the Mas, solidifying their resolve to resist Japan.   The Ma Clique, a powerful Muslim warlord faction in Northwest China, was led by figures like Ma Hongkui (governor of Ningxia) and his cousin Ma Hongbin. They controlled a semi-autonomous region with a mix of Hui, Han, and Mongolian populations. Japan, seeking to exploit ethnic divisions, attempted to woo the Mas. Even after the July 7, 1937, outbreak of war, Japan persisted. On October 17, 1937, after occupying Baotou, the Japanese established the "Baotou Hui Muslim Branch" and appointed Jiang Wenhuan, a former Hui commander, to court Ma Hongkui. They sent envoys, including an imam from Northeast China, and even airdropped letters from "Manchukuo." In a dramatic move, Japanese commander Itagaki Seishiro flew to Alashan Banner to invite Ma Hongkui for talks. Ma sent Zhou Baihuang, who rebuffed Itagaki by invoking historical grievances: the Japanese role in the Eight-Nation Alliance's 1900 invasion, where Ma family members died at Zhengyang Gate. "The family feud remains unresolved, and the national humiliation is yet to be avenged; they are irreconcilable enemies," Zhou declared.   Japan's plot to persuade surrender failed, leading to a major offensive against Suiyuan and Ningxia. Large numbers of troops reinforced Baotou, and bombings targeted Ningxia. In response, Ma Hongkui began building fortifications in places like Shizuishan and Dengkou. Starting in the winter of 1937, he constructed defense fortifications in the Shizuishan area in four phases. In the Shizuishan Weizha area, trenches several meters wide and deep were dug, covered with branches, straw, and loose soil for camouflage, to prevent the passage of Japanese armored vehicles and heavy weapons. Within a hundred li north of Dengkou and Sanshenggong, all major roads were cut off, and deep trenches were dug to destroy the Japanese army's access to Ningxia. The banks of the Yellow River ferry crossings in northern Ningxia and the Helan Mountain passages were all cut into steep cliffs. Important passageways were fortified with blocking positions and hidden artillery to repel invading Japanese troops.   Among the various military commanders in Northwest China, Ma Hongbin possessed the strongest anti-Japanese spirit. Having joined the army at a young age, Ma Hongbin placed great emphasis on cultural learning and the cultivation of his personal character. Outside of military service, he was always seen with a book in hand, resembling a scholar. His long-term study fostered his upright character and patriotism. After the Japanese invasion of China, deeply moved by the nation's peril, he resolved to lead his troops to the battlefield to save the country from its crisis. In the spring of 1938, at the opening ceremony of an officer training course held in Wanghongbao, Yongning, Ma Hongbin addressed his subordinates from the podium: "Always remember that the nation comes first, the people come first, defend the land and country, and fulfill your duties. On the battlefield, you must be able to both attack and defend, and be prepared to live and die with the position, with the determination to fight to the end."   The Ma forces were reorganized into the Nationalist structure. Ma Hongkui's 15th Route Army and Ma Hongbin's 35th Division (later expanded to the 81st Army) formed the 17th Army Group, with Ma Hongkui as Commander-in-Chief and Ma Hongbin as Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Commander of the 81st Army. The officer training of the 81st Army improved the anti-Japanese consciousness and combat quality of the entire army, preparing for the counterattack against the Japanese invasion. In May 1938, due to the weakened defenses of Suiyuan (at that time, the troops of Fu Zuoyi, the chairman of Suiyuan Province, had retreated to Shanxi), most of the area was occupied by Japanese and puppet troops. The Kuomintang Central Committee appointed Ma Hongbin as the commander of the Suiyuan West Defense Command. Ma Hongbin led his 81st Army and two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade of Ma Hongkui's troops to Wuyuan (now Wuyuan County, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) to unify the command of the various anti-Japanese forces that had retreated into Suiyuan West. His mission was to prevent the Japanese army from advancing westward.   After arriving in Wuyuan, Ma Hongbin convened a meeting of commanders from various forces to discuss the defense against the Japanese. The various armies in western Suiyuan were of different factions and not affiliated with each other, and most adopted a policy of seeking safety and avoiding danger in their defenses. Ma Hongbin deployed the main force of his 81st Army, the 35th Division, at key passes in the Wubu Langshan area northeast of Wuyuan to serve as the first line of defense, while deploying three brigades of Ma Hongkui's troops along the line from Wuyuan to Langshan as reinforcements.   The terrain was challenging: vast deserts, mountains like Yinshan and Langshan, and the Yellow River's bends. Wubulangkou, a narrow pass between Erlang and Chashitai Mountains, was strategically vital. Defenses included anti-tank trenches and mines. These preparations reflected the Ningxia Army's blend of traditional cavalry tactics and modern training. The troops, many Hui Muslims, brought cultural cohesion and resilience, but faced equipment shortages—outdated mortars and rifles versus Japanese mechanization.   In May 1938, Ma Hongbin arrived in Linhe (now part of Bayannur, Inner Mongolia) to establish his command post. After inspecting the situation of the friendly forces in the defense zone and designating the defense zone of his subordinate 81st Army, he ordered Ma Tengjiao, commander of the 35th Division, to lead four infantry regiments, namely the 103rd and 104th Brigades, to Suiyuan Western Defense Command to fight against the Japanese. Ma Hongbin established a command post in Linhe, where he and his son, Ma Dunjing, the chief of staff of the 81st Army, deployed their troops in areas such as Wuzhen and Siyitang. Ma Dunjing directed his troops to conduct exercises in the Wuzhen and Siyitang area, and invited Soviet military advisors to provide guidance, preparing for combat with an extremely serious attitude.   To show his support for Ma Hongbin's leadership of the Suiyuan Western Defense Command, Ma Hongkui dispatched two cavalry brigades to Suiyuan Western Defense Command. The main reason why the Ma Clique army from Ningxia went to Suiyuan to fight against the Japanese was that the defense of Suiyuan was directly related to the safety of Ningxia. At the same time, after the Ma Clique army was incorporated into the anti-Japanese army, its primary task was to fight against the Japanese invaders and defend the country. In addition, the anti-Japanese enthusiasm of the people in the Northwest continued to rise. Under the impetus of the situation, it was inevitable that the Ningxia army would join the anti-Japanese war in Suiyuan.   The initial engagement came in the late summer and early autumn of 1939, as Japanese troops, driving cars, armored vehicles, and tanks, advanced from Baotou towards the defenses of the 81st Army in western Suiyuan, attempting to annihilate the main force of the 81st Army. Ma Dunjing (the third son of Ma Hongbin), Chief of Staff of the 81st Army, personally commanded the operation at the front line in Wuda Town. The Japanese advanced to the defensive positions of the 35th Division and bombarded Ma's position with heavy artillery fire. The 35th Division returned fire with 82mm mortars. Because Ma's mortars were old-fashioned, they emitted smoke upon firing, revealing their positions. The Japanese immediately unleashed over 200 shells on the 35th Division's artillery positions, silencing them and rendering them incapable of retaliating. Taking advantage of this, the Japanese, under the powerful cover of artillery and machine gun fire, swarmed in by car, tank, and armored vehicle. The 35th Division held their ground, waiting for the Japanese troops to enter effective firing range and disembark from their vehicles. Suddenly, soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the 206th Regiment jumped out of their fortifications and charged into the enemy lines, engaging the Japanese in hand-to-hand combat. The Japanese were thrown into disarray, some killed before they could even disembark. Those who did disembark suffered heavy casualties, with the remaining soldiers turning back to their vehicles and fleeing in panic. Forced to retreat after suffering a decisive blow, the 35th Division captured two Japanese vehicles, over a hundred artillery shells, dozens of boxes of ammunition, as well as firearms and officer's swords. This marked the first victory in the Suiyuan-Western Anti-Japanese War. This victory boosted morale and public spirit. When the captured vehicles entered Wuyuan County, the people cheered enthusiastically, plastering the vehicles with various celebratory slogans. An elderly local artist even composed a song to celebrate the victory and sang it on the street: "Our old Western Army (referring to Ma Hongbin's 81st Army) is really good at fighting. We drove away the Japanese soldiers, captured cars and brought them into Wuyuan City, where the whole city celebrated and welcomed them. Relying on our old Western Army, we defeated the Japanese soldiers, and the people have peace." The campaign's defining battle occurred at Wubulangkou in early 1940, following the Chinese raid on Baotou in December 1939. In the autumn of 1939, the situation in Shanxi stabilized, and Fu Zuoyi, the chairman of Suiyuan Province who had retreated to Shanxi, led his troops back to western Suiyuan, establishing the Deputy Commander's Headquarters of the Eighth War Zone to unify command of military and political affairs in western Suiyuan and actively preparing for a counter-offensive. To coordinate with the nationwide winter offensive, Fu Zuoyi decided to attack Baotou, a key Japanese stronghold, to contain the Japanese forces in North China. The Battle of Baotou was spearheaded by the newly formed 31st Division of Fu Zuoyi's 35th Army, with the 35th Division of Ma Hongbin's 81st Army providing support. Under meticulous planning, on December 20th, Sun Lanfeng's newly formed 31st Division of Fu Zuoyi's army stormed into Baotou. The Japanese army, caught off guard, panicked and suffered over a thousand casualties, scattering in all directions, losing all their supplies within the city. Fu Zuoyi then directed his troops to withdraw to the rear of western Suiyuan, luring the enemy deeper into the territory for a later battle.   The Battle of Baotou greatly angered the Japanese army. Therefore, more than 30,000 Japanese troops were mobilized from Zhangjiakou, Taiyuan, Datong, and other places, along with more than 1,500 military vehicles, armored vehicles, tanks, dozens of aircraft, and six divisions of puppet Mongolian troops, totaling more than 40,000 men. Under the command of Division Commander Kuroda, they launched a major offensive into western Suiyuan in early 1940, attempting to seize western and southern Inner Mongolia in one fell swoop. Facing the superior Japanese forces, the people and soldiers of western Suiyuan adopted a scorched-earth policy and mobile warfare to maneuver against the enemy. The specific deployment was as follows: the 7th Cavalry Division of Men Bingyue's troops blocked the Japanese troops in the Xishanzui and Maqidukou areas, and then turned to the right bank of the Yellow River to threaten the enemy's left flank; the 35th Division of Ma Hongbin's troops and the 1st Cavalry Brigade of Ma Hongkui's troops constructed positions in the Wubulangkou and Wuzhen areas, blocked the enemy, and then moved into Langshan to threaten the Japanese right flank; the 35th Army of Fu Zuoyi's troops assembled northwest of Wuyuan to launch mobile attacks on the enemy; other units chose favorable terrain to harass the exhausted enemy at any time; and the logistics personnel were transferred to the Dengkou and Shizuishan areas. Before Langshan Mountain, where the Yang family generals once fought against the Jin dynasty, a thousand-mile-long battlefield against the Japanese was set up.   Wubulangkou is located in the western part of the Yinshan Mountains. Nestled between the eastern and western ends of the rugged and precipitous Erlang Mountain and Chashitai Mountain, it forms a strategically vital location. After Fu Zuoyi returned to western Suiyuan in 1939 to serve as deputy commander of the Eighth War Zone, the Ningxia army was placed under his command. At the end of December, Fu Zuoyi's troops stormed Baotou, inflicting over a thousand casualties on the Japanese. Okabe, commander of the Japanese Mengjiang Garrison, considered the defeat at Baotou a great humiliation and declared, "We must sweep through the Hetao region and completely annihilate Fu Zuoyi's army." To eliminate future troubles, the Japanese, "determined to decisively crush the enemy's base in the Hetao region with their main force," began in January 1940, mobilizing over 30,000 Japanese and puppet troops from Zhangjiakou, Datong, and other places, along with over a thousand vehicles, aircraft, artillery, and tanks. Under the command of Division Commander Kuroda Shigetoku, they launched a three-pronged, menacing invasion of western Suiyuan.   On January 31, Kuroda led the main force of the Japanese central route, consisting of over 780 vehicles, armored vehicles, and tanks, and launched an attack at 4:30 PM on the positions of the 35th Division of the 81st Army in the area of Wubulangkou, Siyitang, and Wuzhen.    Ubulangkou, where Ma Hongbin's 35th Division was stationed, is a transliteration of the Mongolian word "Ubulak," meaning "mouth of large and small springs." Located in the southern part of present-day Urad Middle Banner, it lies at the junction of Wuliangsutai, Delingshan Township, and Wengeng Sumu, a strategically important location nestled between two mountains. When the Battle of Ubulangkou began, Ma Hongbin was in Chongqing attending a high-level military conference convened by Chiang Kai-shek, and his troops were commanded by Ma Tengjiao, commander of the 35th Division. At approximately 8:00 AM on January 31, 1940, the Japanese army amassed its forces in the Zaoshulinzi desert area, directly north of Siyitang and directly east of Ubulangkou. Their vanguard first used three aircraft to circling and bombard the positions of Ma's 205th Regiment, followed by artillery bombardment. Under the cover of aircraft and artillery, Japanese tanks, armored vehicles, and hundreds of military vehicles carrying Japanese troops launched an attack on the Siyitang and Ubulangkou positions. Following Ma Hongbin's orders, a defensive trench, 3 meters wide and 3 meters deep, had been dug in front of the 81st Army's position, stretching approximately 10 kilometers from the foot of Wubulang Pass to the north bank of the Yellow River. A 50-meter-wide pit zone preceded the trench. The two sides fought fiercely until nightfall, suffering heavy casualties and remaining evenly matched. At the Siyitang position, Ding Liangyu, the company commander of the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 205th Regiment, was wounded and died the following day; more than 30 platoon leaders, squad leaders, and soldiers were killed. Xue Wanyou, the battalion clerk, was hit by an artillery shell, his body torn apart and his head severed. Although the officers and soldiers of Ma's 35th Division suffered heavy casualties, they held their ground. Unable to break through, the Japanese used aircraft to continuously release poison gas with the wind at their backs. Although Ma's troops had prepared simple gas masks made of gauze wrapped in sawdust, the concentration of the gas was too high, causing many to experience headaches, chest tightness, and vomiting, greatly weakening their fighting capacity and making the situation increasingly critical. Around 10 PM, Division Commander Ma Tengjiao ordered Ma Jiangong, deputy battalion commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 206th Regiment, to lead two companies from Wulanaobao to reinforce the 208th Regiment via Siyitang. Ma Jiangong was killed by a grenade in the fierce fighting. The two companies fought desperately to break free from the enemy and finally joined up with the 208th Regiment. The enemy, realizing this, reinforced their forces and intensified their attack. At 11:30 PM, the 208th Regiment's position was breached, but the enemy dared not advance rashly. The battle resumed at dawn the next day, and the fighting at the Siyitang position remained extremely fierce. Ma Tengjiao ordered the 1st Battalion of the 206th Regiment to reinforce the Siyitang position. While traversing a seven- or eight-mile stretch of open land, the reinforcements were subjected to heavy artillery fire from the Japanese, suffering heavy casualties. However, the troops braved the artillery fire, bullets, and thick smoke, breaking through the enemy's fire blockade and reaching the position. The combined forces of the Wubulangkou and Siyitang positions continued to inflict powerful blows on the Japanese army. The 205th Regiment, holding the fortified Siyitang, engaged in bayonet fighting with the Japanese army. When their bayonets bent, the soldiers would grab the enemy and bite them, or detonate grenades to die alongside them. The troops had gone two days and two nights without food or water, and coupled with the bitter cold, they were exhausted and suffering heavy casualties. The battle was exceptionally fierce, tragic, and arduous. Ma Hongbin later recalled this battle, saying, "Even the world-famous battles of Taierzhuang and Changsha, where the National Revolutionary Army fought with such heroic spirit, were no more than this."   In the early morning of February 1st, the Japanese army first bombarded the defensive positions at Wubulangkou and Siyitang with heavy artillery, and then used aircraft to dive-bomb the open area in front of Wubulangkou. Under the attack of enemy artillery and tanks combined with infantry, the 208th Regiment suffered heavy casualties, and the front-line positions at Wubulangkou were breached by the enemy. The 205th and 206th Regiments sent reinforcements, using bunkers and high ground fortifications to stubbornly resist the enemy, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Seeing that they could not capture the positions defended by the Ningxia army, the Japanese army released tear gas and sneezing gas. While attacking from the front, the Japanese army sent puppet Mongolian troops to flank and attack Wubulangkou from the rear of the mountain. Although the Ma troops resisted bravely, they were ultimately outnumbered, and their positions were successively breached by the enemy, forcing the remaining defenders to withdraw. In this battle, more than 1,000 officers and soldiers of the Ningxia Ma troops shed their blood in western Suiyuan, using their lives to block the enemy's advance.   Ma's troops retreated, pursued by Japanese ground forces and strafed by aircraft, suffering over a thousand casualties and forced to retreat into the desert. They continued to fight the Japanese in the quicksand, killing another 200 enemy soldiers. After a grueling six-day, six-night march, the troops successfully returned to their Dengkou base for rest. Post-war statistics show that Ma's 35th Division originally had over 5,000 men; in the battle of Wubulangkou, over 1,000 were killed and 2,000 wounded, including 700 suffering from frostbite. This battle exemplified sacrificial defense, buying time for counteroffensives.   Upon learning of the defeat of his troops in Chongqing, Ma Hongbin immediately flew back to Ningxia and rushed to Dengkou. After regrouping the troops and investigating officers who had failed in their command, he reorganized two regiments, replenished their equipment, and after a brief rest, led by Brigade Commander Ma Peiqing, returned to western Suiyuan. To cooperate with Fu Zuoyi's troops in continuing the fight against the Japanese invaders, the Ningxia army, mainly composed of the 35th Division, entered the Dala Banner area of Yimeng to fight the enemy. After occupying Wuyuan, the Japanese army believed that the Chinese army in western Suiyuan was in disarray and would be unable to recover its fighting capacity in a short time. Furthermore, due to its overextended battle lines and supply difficulties, the Japanese army had no spare troops to expand the war. Therefore, they centered their forces on Wuyuan, leaving a Japanese regiment and four divisions of puppet Mongolian troops, totaling over 15,000 men, to garrison the Hetao region, while the rest of their forces retreated eastward. After the main Japanese force withdrew, Fu Zuoyi decided to organize a campaign to recapture Wuyuan. In March 1940, he ordered his 35th Army to lead the attack on Wuyuan, while Ma's 81st Army moved from western Suiyuan to the Dalad Banner area on the south bank of the Yellow River in the Ordos League to construct fortifications and block Japanese reinforcements from Baotou. At midnight on March 20, Fu's 35th Army simultaneously launched attacks on Japanese strongholds in Wuyuan, Meilingmiao, and Xingongzhong. After two days of fierce fighting, our army finally recaptured Linhe and Wuyuan, killing Lieutenant General Mizukawa, the division commander of the Japanese army, and several thousand of his puppet troops.    Upon hearing the news, the Japanese troops in Baotou crossed the Yellow River, attempting to outflank the 35th Army from the south. However, their westward advance was met with resistance from the positions of Ma's 81st Army. During the defensive battle, Ma's troops were bombarded by more than 30 Japanese artillery pieces. Due to outdated weaponry and lack of artillery counterattack, Ma's right flank was destroyed, allowing the enemy to encircle them from the rear. To avoid being outflanked, Ma's troops retreated north to the Shawo area to regroup. Ma Hongbin ordered each regiment to exploit the enemy's difficulty in vehicular movement in the desert, employing mobile warfare tactics, advancing when the enemy advanced and retreating when the enemy retreated, maintaining a distance of five or six li from the enemy, and choosing opportune moments to attack and exhaust them. Ma's troops also frequently formed assault teams to harass the enemy at night, keeping them constantly on edge. After maneuvering with the Japanese in the desert for several days using mobile warfare, Ma Hongbin's troops occupied a hilltop southwest of Xinminbao and laid an ambush. When the enemy approached, they unleashed a sudden barrage of fire, inflicting hundreds of casualties. This blow forced the Japanese army to abandon its southern reinforcement plan and retreat north across the Yellow River near Zhaojunfen. After the Japanese retreat, the 81st Army immediately launched an attack on the puppet Mongolian cavalry south of the Yellow River. After more than a month of battles, large and small, except for Chaidengtai, which was captured by Fu Zuoyi's troops, all other puppet strongholds were wiped out by Ma Hongbin's troops, and "the entire Damian Beach area in the northeast of the Ih Ju League was recovered."   During the Qingming Festival in 1940, the 35th Division, returning to western Suiyuan, buried the officers and soldiers who died in the battle at Wubulangkou. With tears in their eyes, people buried the remains of 148 officers and soldiers at the Cemetery for Fallen Soldiers on the west side of Wubulangkou, and erected brick monuments in front of the graves according to the names on the surviving shoulder insignia of the fallen officers and soldiers' uniforms.    Casualties on all sides were significant, reflecting the intensity of the fighting. For the Japanese, two brigades and the 72nd Cavalry Regiment took heavy hits, though official reports admitted only about 1,000 losses. Given that these units were sidelined from combat for an extended period afterward, the true figure was likely far higher. Battle reports from the 26th Division alone recorded over 3,000 casualties, nearly 20% of its strength,pushing the total Japanese toll, including other units, to between 4,000 and 5,000. Puppet forces fared even worse. The "Suiyuan-Western Autonomous Allied Army" proved utterly ineffective, collapsing almost immediately against the superior Ma Clique cavalry of the Nationalist 81st Army. While the puppet Mongolian cavalry had some combat capability, their reluctance to fight for the Japanese—often against their own kin, led to half-hearted engagements and quick retreats. Combined puppet casualties and prisoners numbered around 5,000 to 6,000, bringing the overall Japanese and puppet losses to 10,000–12,000 killed or wounded. The Chinese forces, vastly outmatched in equipment and relying on brave but undertrained local security units, endured heavy sacrifices. Domestic sources estimate their casualties at 15,000–20,000.   This campaign marked the only major anti-Japanese engagement involving people from Ningxia, where over 10,000 Hui and Han fighters, under Ma Hongbin and Ma Hongkui, battled fiercely in what is now Linhe and Wuyuan in Inner Mongolia. Thousands perished, buried far from home, embodying the unyielding spirit of the Chinese nation. It stood as Northwest China's sole battlefield in the war, a point of pride for its people. Victory was hard-won, despite the Chinese having slightly more troops but far inferior weaponry. Success stemmed from the soldiers' bravery, tactical use of cavalry mobility, and crucially, the puppet Mongolians' unwillingness to fully commit. The campaign not only repelled the Japanese westward and southward advances, securing Northwest China's northern gateway and blocking incursions into Ningxia, Shaanxi, and Gansu, but also safeguarded key supply routes like the Suiyuan-Xinjiang Highway and connections to Lanzhou. This ensured a steady influx of Soviet aid, bolstering the national resistance and indirectly supporting efforts in Southwest China.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After a Chinese raid seized Baotou, Japan launched a major 1940 offensive with tens of thousands of troops, vehicles, armor, aircraft, and puppet Mongolian forces. Chinese defenders used scorched earth, fortifications at Wubulangkou, and mobile cavalry/desert tactics, ambushes, and night harassment. Fu Zuoyi later recaptured Wuyuan/Linhe. Casualties were heavy—Chinese estimates 15,000–20,000; Japanese/puppet losses possibly 10,000–12,000.

4. The election featured threats from the Socialist and Communist parties. While Norman Thomas drew urban votes, Earl Browder's Communist Party supported Roosevelt through a "popular front" to oppose fascism. Radical agrarianism in the Midwest, led by figures like Minnesota's Floyd Olson, added further instability. 41936 FEDERAL SURPLUS

Kristalina Georgieva is not like previous heads of the International Monetary Fund. She grew up behind the Iron Curtain in Bulgaria, which was then part of the Soviet bloc. Born in Sofia in 1953, her father was a civil engineer and her mother a shopkeeper. Life was tough because her family weren't part of the Communist Party regime. Her father fell ill when Kristalina was young and she was just fifteen when she went to work at the local food market. She studied economics at the then Karl Marx Higher Economic Institute and then in the late 1980s she headed to London to spend a year at the London School of Economics. Over the last 30 years she's landed top jobs at the World Bank and the European Commission. In 2019, she was appointed managing director of the IMF, becoming the first person from an emerging economy to lead the institution. In the rare moments when she's not working, friends, colleagues and family paint a picture of a fun-loving woman who likes nothing better than dancing and singing. Becky Milligan explores Kristalina's life and career. Contributors Dessislava Kinova - daughter Iliyana Tsanova - friend and Chief Risk Officer at the European Commission Lord Nick Stern - friend and environmental economist Lord Mark Malloch Brown - friend and former World Bank Vice President Ivan Krastev - friend and political scientist Galia Mintcheva - special adviser Archive 60 Minute interview - CBS Face the Nation interview - CBS IMF news conference - UN Audiovisual Library Georgieva at Fortune MPW summit - Fortune MagazineProducer: Nathan Gower Editor: Justine Lang Sound mix: James Beard Production co-ordinator: Maria Ogundele

That's how many Chinese Communist Party United Front cells are operating inside Canada right now.This isn't a theory. It's documented. And while you were watching your grocery bills climb, Mark Carney sat down with Beijing and signed a joint security deal.In today's episode I break down: → What the CCP's United Front actually is — and why "cultural centers" is a lie → Why China's embassy in Ottawa is larger than their entire US diplomatic footprint → The January 2026 Carney-Beijing security deal and what he traded away to get it → Bill C-25 — the "integrity reform" that bans crypto donations while ignoring 575 active cells → CCP-linked electric vehicles, forced labour camps, and why our allies are losing patience with us → What happens to Canadian sovereignty when the Americans decide they've had enoughWe are being hollowed out from the inside. And our government is holding the door open.If we can't name the threat, we can't defend the country.

Subscribe now to skip the ads and get all of our episodes. Danny “Hollywood” Bessner and Derek “Bethesda” Davison are back with the news. This week: Israel bombs Lebanon and kills hundreds (2:09) as Iran halts traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in response (5:43); the U.S. and Iran prepare for peace talks in Pakistan (8:26); Trump threatens to resume the war if talks fail (13:02); the Gaza Board of Peace demands Hamas provide a disarmament response (14:56); Afghanistan and Pakistan pause talks and agree to avoid escalation (17:16); Myanmar's parliament elects junta leader Min Aung Hlaing as president (20:04); Vietnam's National Assembly elects Communist Party chief To Lam as president (21:14); KMT leader Chiang Li-wun visits China to pursue closer ties (22:59); Burkina Faso's junta leader extends military rule (27:06); Hungarian polling projects Viktor Orban to lose power to the opposition (31:51); Chadian forces deploy to Haiti under a UN-backed mission (34:54); Haiti postpones voter registration amid ongoing violence (37:15); Trump pressures NATO to secure the Strait of Hormuz (41:51). Don't forget to subscribe to the Marx Prestige miniseries. New episodes out on Tuesdays! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Danny “Hollywood” Bessner and Derek “Bethesda” Davison are back with the news. This week: Israel bombs Lebanon and kills hundreds (2:09) as Iran halts traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in response (5:43); the U.S. and Iran prepare for peace talks in Pakistan (8:26); Trump threatens to resume the war if talks fail (13:02); the Gaza Board of Peace demands Hamas provide a disarmament response (14:56); Afghanistan and Pakistan pause talks and agree to avoid escalation (17:16); Myanmar's parliament elects junta leader Min Aung Hlaing as president (20:04); Vietnam's National Assembly elects Communist Party chief To Lam as president (21:14); KMT leader Chiang Li-wun visits China to pursue closer ties (22:59); Burkina Faso's junta leader extends military rule (27:06); Hungarian polling projects Viktor Orban to lose power to the opposition (31:51); Chadian forces deploy to Haiti under a UN-backed mission (34:54); Haiti postpones voter registration amid ongoing violence (37:15); Trump pressures NATO to secure the Strait of Hormuz (41:51).Don't forget to subscribe to the Marx Prestige miniseries. New episodes out on Tuesdays!Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

4. The 1936 election involved complex dynamics with the Socialist and Communist parties, both of which Roosevelt regarded as potential electoral threats. Norman Thomas of the Socialist Party remained a factor in urban areas, while the Communist Party, led by Earl Browder, adopted a "popular front" strategy. While officially running their own ticket, the communists focused their attacks on Roosevelt's opponents to ensure his victory as a bulwark against European fascism. This period also saw radical agrarianism in the Midwest, exemplified by Minnesota's Floyd Olson, whose violent political environment underscored the era's instability. (5)1936 CENTER MARKET DC