Podcasts about russian imperial army

Episode 98:This week we're continuing Russia in Revolution An Empire in Crisis 1890 - 1928 by S. A. Smith[Part 1]Introduction[Part 2-5]1. Roots of Revolution, 1880s–1905[Part 6-8]2. From Reform to War, 1906-1917[Part 9]3. From February to October 1917Dual Power[Part 10 - This Week]Lenin and the Bolsheviks - 0:31The Aspirations of Soldiers and Workers - 13:31The Provisional Government in Crisis - 25:42[Part 11 -12?]3. From February to October 1917[Part 13 - 16?]4. Civil War and Bolshevik Power[Part 17 - 19?]5. War Communism[Part 20 - 22?]6. The New Economic Policy: Politics and the Economy[Part 23 - 26?]7. The New Economic Policy: Society and Culture[Part 27?]ConclusionFigure 3.2 - 23:54A factory meeting on May Day 1917. The banners read: ‘Long live the holiday of the world proletariat' and ‘If we repair a single steam engine it means we bring the end of hunger and poverty nearer and thereby bring an end to capitalism'.Figure 3.3 - 29:00Kerensky tours the front June 1917. He here is greeting the Czech Legion.[see figures on AbnormalMapping.com here]Footnotes:26) 0:41Christopher Read, Lenin: A Revolutionary Life (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005).27) 2:35N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917: A Personal Record, ed. Joel Carmichael (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 272–3.28) 3:05Angelica Balabanoff, Impressions of Lenin (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), 2.29) 3:36A. N. Potresov, Izbrannoe (Moscow: Mosgosarkhiv, 2002), 284.30) 5:28Robert Service, Lenin: A Political Life (3 vols), vol. 2: Worlds in Collision (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).31) 5:37Neil Harding, Lenin's Political Thought: Theory and Practice in the Democratic and Socialist Revolutions (Chicago: Haymarket, 2009), 59–70.32) 7:40V. I. Lenin, ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution', .33) 7:52Robert Service, The Bolshevik Party in Revolution: A Study in Organizational Change (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979).34) 8:27V. I. Miller, ‘K voprosu o sravnitel'noi chislennosti partii bol'shevikov i men'shevikov v 1917g.', Voprosy istorii KPSS, 12 (1988), 109–18.35) 9:10There are no biographies in English of Zinoviev and Kamenev. However, the following entries are good: ; . See, too, Catherine Merridale, ‘The Making of a Moderate Bolshevik: An Introduction to L. B. Kamenev's Political Biography', in Julian Cooper, Maureen Perrie, and E. A. Rees (eds), Soviet History, 1917–1953: Essays in Honour of R. W. Davies (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 22–41.36) 9:37Ian D. Thatcher, Trotsky (London: Routledge, 2003); Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954).37) 10:29Ian D. Thatcher, ‘The St Petersburg/Petrograd Mezhraionka, 1913–1917: The Rise and Fall of a Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party Unity Faction', Slavonic and East European Review, 87: 2 (2009), 284–321.38) 12:35Shestoi s''ezd RSDRP (bol'shevikov) avgust 1917 goda: Protokoly, 20, 23.39) 13:43Christopher Read, From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and their Revolution, 1917–21 (London: UCL Press, 1996), chs 4–6; Allan Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).40) 14:17Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Revolution and the Baltic Fleet: War and Politics, February 1917–April 1918 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978).41) 15:19.42) 16:08Pravda, 21, 30 Mar. 1917.43) 17:09Startsev, Vnutrenniaia politika.44) 18:08‘Vserossiiskaia konferentsiia frontovykh i tylovykh voennykh organizatsii RSDRP(b)', Politicheskie deiateli Rossii 1917. Biograficheskii slovar' (Moscow: Bol'shaia rossiiskaia entsiklopediia, 1993).45) 18:21K. A. Tarasov, ‘Chislennost' voennoi organizatsii bol'shevikov nakanune oktiabria 1917 goda', Trudy Karel'skoi nauchnogo tsentra RAN, 3 (2014), 146–8.46) 18:36David Mandel, The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983); David Mandel, The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet Seizure of Power (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984); Diane Koenker, Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).47) 20:23Smith, Red Petrograd.48) 25:49Figes, People's Tragedy, ch. 10.49) 29:57Izvestiia, 96, 20 June 1917.50) 30:46Wildman, End of the Russian Imperial Army.51) 31:44Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution: 1899–1919 (New York: Knopf, 1990), 770; Alexander Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968).52) 33:05Rabinowitch, Prelude, 173.53) 34:25Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 446.54) 35:51O. N. Znamenskii, Iiul'skii krizis 1917 goda (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), 124.

www.over30clan.com Intro Music 08. FxCK YOU PUNK! - Sword of Misery (03:25) V-A - Contempt Media Vol. 1 - Kinetic freemusicarchive.org/music/FxCK_YOU_PUNK Outro Music Kevin Macleod Level Up freemusicarchive.org/music/Kevin_MacLeod/ incompetech.com/music/royalty-fre…isrc=USUAN1500023 SHOW NOTES: state of the clan 24 new applications for august 10 were ps4 7 were xb1 5 pc 2 denied 7:00 sept giveaway is copy of destiny 2 for pc - be sure to check announcements on the forum and post your name in that thread to enter 10:00 pre show bullshit 12min #### nintendo coming out with another retro console (snes classic) pre orders started 8/22 they retail for $80 comes with 21 games and 2 controllers console has ability to suspend and resume gameplay from any point like a flexible save feature #### cod ww2 beta 14:00 #### destiny 2 beta 23:30 #### 36:00 gamescom announcements 50:30 #### games sony plans to bring to pax west Gran Turismo Sport Uncharted: The Lost Legacy Detroit: Become Human Marvel vs Capcom: Infinite Swords of Ditto Ni no Kuni II: Revenant Kingdom Tooth and Tail Burly Men at Sea Dragon Ball FighterZ Samurai Shodown V Special Omen of Sorrow Windjammers Hob Battle Chasers 54:00 #### Need for Speed Payback comes out Nov 10 on XB PS PC touted to be more aggressive than ever in regards to police chases #### BF1 In the Name of the Tsar launched ahead of schedule releasing 8/21 vs in September Lupkow Pass, which was the first map revealed from the expansion, is out now for anyone with the Battlefield 1 Premium Pass or In the Name of the Tsar expansion. It sees a battle between the Austro-Hungarian forces and the Russian Imperial Army in a snow-capped hillside where verticality is key. The Armored Train serves as the map's Behemoth, and all modes are available except Supply Drop and Operations. #### 56:50 what ya looking forward to playing 1:00 college football 1:17 wrap up 1:21 yellow's falling apart and more fallout / wrap up 1:28 outro

The Russian Imperial Army founded by Peter the Great has a long but mixed history.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was the most important political event of the twentieth century (no Revolution; no Nazis; no Nazis, no World War II; no World War II, no Cold War). It’s little wonder, then, that historians have expended oceans of effort and ink trying to explain why and how it happened. The answer is complex, but it boils down to this: Nicholas II’s armies had a rough time of it in World War I, his regime lost credibility, the hungry cities revolted, and the Bolsheviks usurped power in an armed coup. The key event was, then, the Russian loss to the Germans on the Eastern Front. Surprisingly, the Russian defeat –arguably the second most important political event of the twentieth century because it triggered the first–has not been widely studied. For my generation of Russian historians (and, I should add, the one that preceded it), the Revolution–the last, best hope of mankind to many–was a sexy topic indeed; the failure of the Russian Imperial Army, not so much. So we were left in the dark (or, rather, left ourselves in the dark). There were, however, historians who went against this grain. Among them are (to name only a few and those who write in English): John Bushnell, William Fuller, Peter Gatrell, Hubertus Jahn, Eric Lohr, Bruce Menning, David Rich, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Norman Stone, Allen Wildman and our guest today John Steinberg. Steinberg’s wonderful new book All the Tsar’s Men: Russia’s General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898-1914 (Johns Hopkins/Wilson Center, 2010) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the roots of the Russian defeat in World War I. His focus is the Imperial General Staff and its struggle (failed, as it turned out) to reform itself and the army that it commanded. As Steinberg points out, their task was a difficult one, made much more so by Russia’s all-encompassing (and to a considerable degree self-imposed) backwardness. The leaders of the General Staff were smart people. They knew what to do to make the Imperial Army a first-rate fighting force. Under other leadership, they might have succeeded in modernizing the army. But Nicholas did not lead, and so nothing could be done. Autocracies depend on autocrats, and Russia had none when it needed one most. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was the most important political event of the twentieth century (no Revolution; no Nazis; no Nazis, no World War II; no World War II, no Cold War). It’s little wonder, then, that historians have expended oceans of effort and ink trying to explain why and how it happened. The answer is complex, but it boils down to this: Nicholas II’s armies had a rough time of it in World War I, his regime lost credibility, the hungry cities revolted, and the Bolsheviks usurped power in an armed coup. The key event was, then, the Russian loss to the Germans on the Eastern Front. Surprisingly, the Russian defeat –arguably the second most important political event of the twentieth century because it triggered the first–has not been widely studied. For my generation of Russian historians (and, I should add, the one that preceded it), the Revolution–the last, best hope of mankind to many–was a sexy topic indeed; the failure of the Russian Imperial Army, not so much. So we were left in the dark (or, rather, left ourselves in the dark). There were, however, historians who went against this grain. Among them are (to name only a few and those who write in English): John Bushnell, William Fuller, Peter Gatrell, Hubertus Jahn, Eric Lohr, Bruce Menning, David Rich, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Norman Stone, Allen Wildman and our guest today John Steinberg. Steinberg’s wonderful new book All the Tsar’s Men: Russia’s General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898-1914 (Johns Hopkins/Wilson Center, 2010) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the roots of the Russian defeat in World War I. His focus is the Imperial General Staff and its struggle (failed, as it turned out) to reform itself and the army that it commanded. As Steinberg points out, their task was a difficult one, made much more so by Russia’s all-encompassing (and to a considerable degree self-imposed) backwardness. The leaders of the General Staff were smart people. They knew what to do to make the Imperial Army a first-rate fighting force. Under other leadership, they might have succeeded in modernizing the army. But Nicholas did not lead, and so nothing could be done. Autocracies depend on autocrats, and Russia had none when it needed one most. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was the most important political event of the twentieth century (no Revolution; no Nazis; no Nazis, no World War II; no World War II, no Cold War). It’s little wonder, then, that historians have expended oceans of effort and ink trying to explain why and how it happened. The answer is complex, but it boils down to this: Nicholas II’s armies had a rough time of it in World War I, his regime lost credibility, the hungry cities revolted, and the Bolsheviks usurped power in an armed coup. The key event was, then, the Russian loss to the Germans on the Eastern Front. Surprisingly, the Russian defeat –arguably the second most important political event of the twentieth century because it triggered the first–has not been widely studied. For my generation of Russian historians (and, I should add, the one that preceded it), the Revolution–the last, best hope of mankind to many–was a sexy topic indeed; the failure of the Russian Imperial Army, not so much. So we were left in the dark (or, rather, left ourselves in the dark). There were, however, historians who went against this grain. Among them are (to name only a few and those who write in English): John Bushnell, William Fuller, Peter Gatrell, Hubertus Jahn, Eric Lohr, Bruce Menning, David Rich, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Norman Stone, Allen Wildman and our guest today John Steinberg. Steinberg’s wonderful new book All the Tsar’s Men: Russia’s General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898-1914 (Johns Hopkins/Wilson Center, 2010) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the roots of the Russian defeat in World War I. His focus is the Imperial General Staff and its struggle (failed, as it turned out) to reform itself and the army that it commanded. As Steinberg points out, their task was a difficult one, made much more so by Russia’s all-encompassing (and to a considerable degree self-imposed) backwardness. The leaders of the General Staff were smart people. They knew what to do to make the Imperial Army a first-rate fighting force. Under other leadership, they might have succeeded in modernizing the army. But Nicholas did not lead, and so nothing could be done. Autocracies depend on autocrats, and Russia had none when it needed one most. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices