Podcast appearances and mentions of joanna rutkowska

Jakie obowiązki na pracodawców nakłada ustawa work-life balance? Czy pracodawcy muszą przygotować zmiany w systemach kadrowo-płacowych? Co pracodawcy muszą zmienić w formularzach?Gościnią Szymona Glonka w podcaście "DGPtalk: Obiektywnie o Biznesie" jest Joanna Rutkowska Dyrektorka HR w agencji zatrudnienia Trenkwalder. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Gościnią Szymona Glonka w podcaście "DGPtalk: Obiektywnie o Biznesie" jest Joanna Rutkowska Dyrektorka HR w agencji zatrudnienia Trenkwalder. Kto może pracować zdalnie? Ile dni pracy zdalnej w 2023 roku przysługuje? Czy pracownik ma prawo odmówić pracy zdalnej? Kiedy pracodawca nie może odmówić pracy zdalnej? Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Wygraj iPada od Partnera odcinka - Salonów Muzycznych Riff: https://riff.net.pl/wygraj-ipadaJak pomóc dziecku w adaptacji w szkole muzycznej? Co robić, gdy chce z niej zrezygnować? I dlaczego warto kształcić się muzycznie? Gościem 77. odcinka podcastu jest Joanna Rutkowska, dyrektor Szkoły Muzycznej I i II stopnia w Gdyni, z którą rozmawiamy o tym jak pomóc uczniom rozpoczynającym naukę w szkole muzycznej, a także ich rodzicom na początku tej artystycznej drogi. A Partnerem dzisiejszego odcinka są Salony Muzyczne Riff, oferujące szeroki wybór instrumentów i akcesoriów muzycznych dla wszystkich uczących się grać, jak i dla tych, którzy są już z muzyką za pan brat. Robiąc zakupy w Salonach Muzycznych Riff do końca września 2021 roku możesz wziąć udział w akcji „Nauka nie poszła w las” i wygrać nowego iPada lub 200 zł voucher na zakupy. Wystarczy że zarejestrujesz paragon na stronie https://riff.net.pl/wygraj-ipada i odpowiesz na pytanie „Jakie były twoje najbardziej odjechane wagary?” Wersję wideo, transkrypcję i linki znajdziesz na: https://www.ojcowskastronamocy.pl/077 Dobrego dnia ;) 00:00 - Wstęp i konkurs - Wygraj iPada02:06 - Gość odcinka. Joanna Rutkowska 03:12 - Jak pomóć dzieciom rozpoczynającym szkołę muzyczną? 05:41 - Co robić, gdy rodzic nie zna się na muzyce? 12:39 - Co robić gdy dziecko chce zrezygnować ze szkoły muzycznej?20:33 - Psycholog w szkole muzycznej 22:30 - Przygotowanie do szkoły muzycznej. Ognisko. Lekcje. Koncerty 24:58 - W jakim wieku można zacząć szkołę muzyczną 28:35 - Nauka śpiewu od 15. roku życia 30:09 - Co daje szkoła muzyczna 34:55 - Nauka nie poszła w las. KonkursZobacz pozostałe odsłony Ojcowskiej Strony Mocy Podcast: http://www.ojcowskastronamocy.pl/podcast FB: https://www.facebook.com/OjcowskaStronaMocy IG: https://www.instagram.com/OjcowskaStronaMocy Blog: http://www.ojcowskastronamocy.pl Życzę Ci, byś każdego dnia stawał się lepszym ojcem i lepszym człowiekiem oraz byś zawsze powodował uśmiech na twarzach swoich dzieci Zapraszam Jarek Kania #polskipodcast #chcesięgrać

Gościem trzydziestego pierwszego odcinka podcastu Rozmowa Kontrolowana jest Joanna Rutkowska, kiedyś hakerka i twórczyni systemu QUBES, dzisiaj pracująca nad nowatorskim systemem kontenerów na dane Wildlands. Odwiedź stronę podcastu pod adresem https://live.zaufanatrzeciastrona.pl/, zapisz się do newslettera i otrzymuj powiadomienia o nowych odcinkach Rozmowy Kontrolowanej.… Czytaj dalej The post Odcinek 31 – Joanna Rutkowska first appeared on Zaufana Trzecia Strona.

"The presentation will first present how to generically (i.e. not relaying on any implementation bug) insert arbitrary code into the latest Vista Beta 2 kernel (x64 edition), thus effectively bypassing the (in)famous Vista policy for allowing only digitally singed code to be loaded into kernel. The presented attack does not requite system reboot. Next, the new technology for creating stealth malware, code-named Blue Pill, will be presented. Blue Pill utilizes the latest virtualization technology from AMD - Pacifica - to achieve unprecedented stealth. The ultimate goal is to demonstrate that is possible (or soon will be) to create an undetectable malware which is not based on a concept, but, similarly to modern cryptography, on the strength of the 'algorithm'."

"The presentation will first present how to generically (i.e. not relaying on any implementation bug) insert arbitrary code into the latest Vista Beta 2 kernel (x64 edition), thus effectively bypassing the (in)famous Vista policy for allowing only digitally singed code to be loaded into kernel. The presented attack does not requite system reboot. Next, the new technology for creating stealth malware, code-named Blue Pill, will be presented. Blue Pill utilizes the latest virtualization technology from AMD - Pacifica - to achieve unprecedented stealth. The ultimate goal is to demonstrate that is possible (or soon will be) to create an undetectable malware which is not based on a concept, but, similarly to modern cryptography, on the strength of the 'algorithm'. Joanna Rutkowska has been involved in computer security research for several years. She has been fascinated by the internals of operating systems since she was in primary school and started learning x86 assembler on MS-DOS. Soon after she switched to Linux world, gotinvolved with some system and kernel programming, focusing on exploit development for both Linux and Windows x86 systems. A couple of years ago she has gotten very interested in stealth technology as used by malware and attackers to hide their malicious actions after a successful break-in. This includes various types of rootkits, network backdoors and covert channels. She now focuses on both detecting this kind of activity and on developing and testing new offensive techniques. She currently works as a security researcher for COSEINC, a Singapore based IT security company."

The presentation will first present how to generically (i.e. not relaying on any implementation bug) insert arbitrary code into the latest Vista Beta 2 kernel (x64 edition), thus effectively bypassing the (in)famous Vista policy for allowing only digitally singed code to be loaded into kernel. The presented attack does not requite system reboot. Next, the new technology for creating stealth malware, code-named Blue Pill, will be presented. Blue Pill utilizes the latest virtualization technology from AMD - Pacifica - to achieve unprecedented stealth. The ultimate goal is to demonstrate that is possible (or soon will be) to create an undetectable malware which is not based on a concept, but, similarly to modern cryptography, on the strength of the 'algorithm'. Joanna Rutkowska has been involved in computer security research for several years. She has been fascinated by the internals of operating systems since she was in primary school and started learning x86 assembler on MS-DOS. Soon after she switched to Linux world, gotinvolved with some system and kernel programming, focusing on exploit development for both Linux and Windows x86 systems. A couple of years ago she has gotten very interested in stealth technology as used by malware and attackers to hide their malicious actions after a successful break-in. This includes various types of rootkits, network backdoors and covert channels. She now focuses on both detecting this kind of activity and on developing and testing new offensive techniques. She currently works as a security researcher for COSEINC, a Singapore based IT security company."

We will present new, practical methods for compromising Vista x64 kernel on the fly and discuss the irrelevance of TPM/Bitlocker technology in protecting against such non-persistent attacks. Then we will briefly discuss kernel infections of the type II (pure data patching), especially NDIS subversions that allow for generic bypassing of personal firewalls on Vista systems. A significant amount of time will be devoted to presenting new details about virtualization-based malware. This will include presenting various detection methods that could be used to either detect the presence of a hypervisor or find the malware itself. We will also discuss why each of these approaches cannot be used to build a practical detector, either because they could be fully defeated by virtualization based malware or because they are very impractical. This will include demonstration of how virtualization based malware can avoid timing-based detection, even if a detector uses trusted time source. We will also discuss detection approaches based on exploiting CPU bugs. The conclusion of this part is that we still do not have any good way to detect virtualization based malware... Were also going to talk about malware that fully supports nested virtualization (like e.g. our New Blue Pill does) and how this might be a challenge for OSes that would like to provide their own hypervisors in order to prevent Blue Pill-like attacks. People say that once an attacker gets into the kernel, the game is over and we should reinstall the whole system from scratch. In this presentation we show that sometimes we cannot know that the game is actually over, so we do not even know when to stop trusting our systems. In order to change this we need something more then just a bunch of patches! Joanna Rutkowska is a recognized researcher in the field of stealth malware and system compromises. Over the past several years she has introduced several breakthrough concepts and techniques on both the offensive and defensive side in this field. Her work has been quoted by the international press and she is a frequent speaker at security conferences around the world. In April 2007 she founded Invisible Things Lab, a consulting company dedicated for cutting-edge research into operating systems security. Alexander Tereshkin, aka 90210, is a seasoned reverse engineer and expert into Windows kernel, specializing in rootkit technology and kernel exploitation. He presented several sophisticated ideas for rootkit creation and personal firewall bypassing in the past few years. During the last year, when working for COSEINC Advanced Malware Labs, he has done significant work in the field of virtualization based malware and kernel protection bypassing.

We will present new, practical methods for compromising Vista x64 kernel on the fly and discuss the irrelevance of TPM/Bitlocker technology in protecting against such non-persistent attacks. Then we will briefly discuss kernel infections of the type II (pure data patching), especially NDIS subversions that allow for generic bypassing of personal firewalls on Vista systems. A significant amount of time will be devoted to presenting new details about virtualization-based malware. This will include presenting various detection methods that could be used to either detect the presence of a hypervisor or find the malware itself. We will also discuss why each of these approaches cannot be used to build a practical detector, either because they could be fully defeated by virtualization based malware or because they are very impractical. This will include demonstration of how virtualization based malware can avoid timing-based detection, even if a detector uses trusted time source. We will also discuss detection approaches based on exploiting CPU bugs. The conclusion of this part is that we still do not have any good way to detect virtualization based malware... Were also going to talk about malware that fully supports nested virtualization (like e.g. our New Blue Pill does) and how this might be a challenge for OSes that would like to provide their own hypervisors in order to prevent Blue Pill-like attacks. People say that once an attacker gets into the kernel, the game is over and we should reinstall the whole system from scratch. In this presentation we show that sometimes we cannot know that the game is actually over, so we do not even know when to stop trusting our systems. In order to change this we need something more then just a bunch of patches! Joanna Rutkowska is a recognized researcher in the field of stealth malware and system compromises. Over the past several years she has introduced several breakthrough concepts and techniques on both the offensive and defensive side in this field. Her work has been quoted by the international press and she is a frequent speaker at security conferences around the world. In April 2007 she founded Invisible Things Lab, a consulting company dedicated for cutting-edge research into operating systems security. Alexander Tereshkin, aka 90210, is a seasoned reverse engineer and expert into Windows kernel, specializing in rootkit technology and kernel exploitation. He presented several sophisticated ideas for rootkit creation and personal firewall bypassing in the past few years. During the last year, when working for COSEINC Advanced Malware Labs, he has done significant work in the field of virtualization based malware and kernel protection bypassing.