Podcast appearances and mentions of eric lohr

Episode 95:This week we're continuing Russia in Revolution An Empire in Crisis 1890 - 1928 by S. A. Smith[Part 1]Introduction[Part 2-5]1. Roots of Revolution, 1880s–1905[Part 6]2. From Reform to War, 1906-1917Prospects for Reform[Part 7 - This Week]2. From Reform to War, 1906–1917On the Eve of War - 0:32First World War - 12:47[Part 8]2. From Reform to War, 1906–1917[Part 9 - 11?]3. From February to October 1917[Part 12 - 15?]4. Civil War and Bolshevik Power[Part 16 - 18?]5. War Communism[Part 19 - 21?]6. The New Economic Policy: Politics and the Economy[Part 22 - 25?]7. The New Economic Policy: Society and Culture[Part 26?]ConclusionFootnotes:45) 1:23Michael Melancon, The Lena Goldfields Massacre and the Crisis of the Late Tsarist State (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 116.46) 2:34Haimson and Petrusha, ‘Two Strike Waves in Imperial Russia', 107.47) 3:07Hogan, Forging Revolution, 161.48) 3:29F. A. Gaida, ‘Politicheskaia obstanovka v Rossii nakanune Pervoi mirovoi voiny v otsenke gosudarstvennykh deiatelei i liderov partii', Rossiiskaia istoriia, 6 (2011), 123–35; Jonathan W. Daly, The Watchful State: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1906–1917 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), 147.49) 4:29Victoria E. Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organizations in St Petersburg and Moscow, 1900–1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).50) 5:24Shestoi s”ezd RSDLP (bol'shevikov): Avgust 1917 goda. Protokoly (Moscow, 1958), 47.51) 5:37D. A. Loeber (ed.), Ruling Communist Parties and their Status under Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 63. Not all historians are persuaded that the Bolsheviks were taking over leadership of the labour movement: see R. B. McKean, St Petersburg Between the Revolutions: Workers and Revolutionaries, June, 1907–February 1917 (London: Yale University Press, 1990).52) 6:20Postnikov, Territorial'noe razmeshchenie, 56.53) 6:44Patricia Herlihy, The Alcoholic Empire: Vodka and Politics in Late Imperial Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 145.54) 8:34V. B. Aksenov, ‘ “Sukhoi zakon” 1914 goda: ot pridvornoi intrigi do revoliutsii', Rossiiskaia istoriia, 4 (2011), 126–39.55) 8:44For a view that individual and collective actors recoiled from taking decisive action in the political and social crisis on the eve of the war, for fear that they would be overwhelmed by an accelerating process of social polarization, see Leopold H. Haimson, ‘ “The Problem of Political and Social Stability in Urban Russia on the Eve of War” Revisited', Slavic Review, 59:4 (2000), 848–75.56) 8:58Dowler, Russia in 1913, 279.57) 9:24Gilbert, Radical Right, ch. 6.58) 9:29Rossiia 1913 god: statistiko-dokumental'nyi spravochnik (St Petersburg: BLITs, 1995), 413–14.59) 9:58William C. Fuller, Civil–Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881–1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 257.60) 10:50Mark D. Steinberg, Petersburg: Fin de Siècle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 244.61) 11:40Gatrell, Government, Industry, and Rearmament.62) 12:17.63) 13:02Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (London: Penguin, 1998).64) 15:43Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (London: Allen Lane, 1998), ix; David Stevenson, 1914–1918: The History of the First World War (London: Penguin, 2005), xix.65) 16:10G. F. Krivosheev (ed.), Rossiia i SSSR v voinakh XX veka: poteri vooruzhyennykh sil. Statisticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: OLMA, 2001).66) 17:34Boris Kolonitskii, Tragicheskaia erotika: obrazy, imperatorskoi sem'i v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: NLO, 2010), 73.67) 18:25Joshua Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 29.68) 19:26Cited in Peter Gatrell, ‘Tsarist Russia at War: The View from Above, 1914–February 1917', Journal of Modern History, 87:3 (2015), 668–700 (689).69) 19:54David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 48; Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign Against Enemy Aliens during the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 136.70) 21:17Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War One (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 3.71) 21:29Tomas Balkelis, ‘Demobilization and Remobilization of German and Lithuanian Paramilitaries after the First World War', Journal of Contemporary History, 50:1 (2015), 38–57 (38).72) 23:22Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).73) 24:04Edward J. Erickson, Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War One (London: Routledge, 2007), 1.74) 24:04A. B. Astashov, Russkii front v 1914-nachale 1917 goda: voennyi opyt i sovremennost' (Moscow: Novyi Khronograf, 2014), 19, 23.75) 25:54P. P. Shcherbinin, ‘Women's Mobilization for War (Russian Empire)', International Encyclopedia of the First World War, .76) 27:34Stone, Russian Army, 4.77) 29:05Stone, Russian Army, ch. 7.78) 30:33Edward D. Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954). Gene Huskey refers to an ‘unknown genocide', in which 100,000 to 120,000 out of 780,000 Kyrghyz were slaughtered: Gene Huskey, ‘Kyrgyzstan: The Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration', in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 400.79) 31:01Astashov, Russkii front, 116, 160.80) 31:10William G. Rosenberg, ‘Reading Soldiers' Moods: Russian Military Censorship and the Configuration of Feeling in World War I', American Historical Review, 119:3 (2014), 714–40 (716).81) 32:54A. B. Astashov and P. A. Simmons, Pis'ma s voiny 1914–1917 (Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2015), 128.82) 33:25Joshua Sanborn, ‘The Mobilization of 1914 and the Question of the Russian Nation', Slavic Review, 59:2 (2000), 267–89; S. A. Smith, ‘Citizenship and the Russian Nation during World War I: A Comment', Slavic Review, 59:2 (2000), 316–29.83) 33:38Astashov, Russkii front, 133–4, 179–87.84) 34:24Quoted in A. B. Astashov, ‘Russkii krest'ianin na frontakh Pervoi mirovoi voiny', Otechestvennaia istoriia, 2 (2003), 72–86 (75); Karen Petrone, The Great War in Russian Memory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 91.85) 34:44Mark von Hagen, ‘The Entangled Front in the First World War', in Eric Lohr et al. (eds), The Empire and Nationalism at War (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2014), 9–48 (36); Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse, 130.86) 35:28Igor V. Narskii, ‘The Frontline Experience of Russian Soldiers in 1914–16', Russian Studies in History, 51:4 (2013), 31–49.87) 36:21Astashov, Russkii front, 224, 279–300.88) 36:45Krivosheev (ed.), Rossiia, table 52.89) 37:02Dietrich Beyrau, ‘Brutalization Revisited: The Case of Russia', Journal of Contemporary History, 50:1 (2015), 15–37 (18).90) 37:29Krivosheev (ed.), Rossiia, table 56.

Russians have a reputation for xenophobia, that is, it’s said they don’t much like foreigners. According to Eric Lohr‘s new book, Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, 2012), this reputation is at once deserved and undeserved. It’s true that at various moments in Russian history, foreigners... Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Russians have a reputation for xenophobia, that is, it’s said they don’t much like foreigners. According to Eric Lohr‘s new book, Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, 2012), this reputation is at once deserved and undeserved. It’s true that at various moments in Russian history, foreigners have not been permitted to enter Russia, let alone become citizens (or, in an earlier period, “subjects”) of the state. But, intermittently, the Russian state actively recruited foreigners, and especially foreign experts and capital, to aid in economic development. In the period after the Great Reforms, for example, the Russian state actively encouraged foreign investment and immigration. Late Imperial Russia seemed to be on a kind of glide path to a modern notion of citizenship. As Eric explains, all that ended with the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 (with catastrophic economic results). Listen in. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Russians have a reputation for xenophobia, that is, it’s said they don’t much like foreigners. According to Eric Lohr‘s new book, Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, 2012), this reputation is at once deserved and undeserved. It’s true that at various moments in Russian history, foreigners have not been permitted to enter Russia, let alone become citizens (or, in an earlier period, “subjects”) of the state. But, intermittently, the Russian state actively recruited foreigners, and especially foreign experts and capital, to aid in economic development. In the period after the Great Reforms, for example, the Russian state actively encouraged foreign investment and immigration. Late Imperial Russia seemed to be on a kind of glide path to a modern notion of citizenship. As Eric explains, all that ended with the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 (with catastrophic economic results). Listen in. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Russians have a reputation for xenophobia, that is, it’s said they don’t much like foreigners. According to Eric Lohr‘s new book, Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, 2012), this reputation is at once deserved and undeserved. It’s true that at various moments in Russian history, foreigners have not been permitted to enter Russia, let alone become citizens (or, in an earlier period, “subjects”) of the state. But, intermittently, the Russian state actively recruited foreigners, and especially foreign experts and capital, to aid in economic development. In the period after the Great Reforms, for example, the Russian state actively encouraged foreign investment and immigration. Late Imperial Russia seemed to be on a kind of glide path to a modern notion of citizenship. As Eric explains, all that ended with the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 (with catastrophic economic results). Listen in. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was the most important political event of the twentieth century (no Revolution; no Nazis; no Nazis, no World War II; no World War II, no Cold War). It’s little wonder, then, that historians have expended oceans of effort and ink trying to explain why and how it happened. The answer is complex, but it boils down to this: Nicholas II’s armies had a rough time of it in World War I, his regime lost credibility, the hungry cities revolted, and the Bolsheviks usurped power in an armed coup. The key event was, then, the Russian loss to the Germans on the Eastern Front. Surprisingly, the Russian defeat –arguably the second most important political event of the twentieth century because it triggered the first–has not been widely studied. For my generation of Russian historians (and, I should add, the one that preceded it), the Revolution–the last, best hope of mankind to many–was a sexy topic indeed; the failure of the Russian Imperial Army, not so much. So we were left in the dark (or, rather, left ourselves in the dark). There were, however, historians who went against this grain. Among them are (to name only a few and those who write in English): John Bushnell, William Fuller, Peter Gatrell, Hubertus Jahn, Eric Lohr, Bruce Menning, David Rich, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Norman Stone, Allen Wildman and our guest today John Steinberg. Steinberg’s wonderful new book All the Tsar’s Men: Russia’s General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898-1914 (Johns Hopkins/Wilson Center, 2010) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the roots of the Russian defeat in World War I. His focus is the Imperial General Staff and its struggle (failed, as it turned out) to reform itself and the army that it commanded. As Steinberg points out, their task was a difficult one, made much more so by Russia’s all-encompassing (and to a considerable degree self-imposed) backwardness. The leaders of the General Staff were smart people. They knew what to do to make the Imperial Army a first-rate fighting force. Under other leadership, they might have succeeded in modernizing the army. But Nicholas did not lead, and so nothing could be done. Autocracies depend on autocrats, and Russia had none when it needed one most. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was the most important political event of the twentieth century (no Revolution; no Nazis; no Nazis, no World War II; no World War II, no Cold War). It’s little wonder, then, that historians have expended oceans of effort and ink trying to explain why and how it happened. The answer is complex, but it boils down to this: Nicholas II’s armies had a rough time of it in World War I, his regime lost credibility, the hungry cities revolted, and the Bolsheviks usurped power in an armed coup. The key event was, then, the Russian loss to the Germans on the Eastern Front. Surprisingly, the Russian defeat –arguably the second most important political event of the twentieth century because it triggered the first–has not been widely studied. For my generation of Russian historians (and, I should add, the one that preceded it), the Revolution–the last, best hope of mankind to many–was a sexy topic indeed; the failure of the Russian Imperial Army, not so much. So we were left in the dark (or, rather, left ourselves in the dark). There were, however, historians who went against this grain. Among them are (to name only a few and those who write in English): John Bushnell, William Fuller, Peter Gatrell, Hubertus Jahn, Eric Lohr, Bruce Menning, David Rich, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Norman Stone, Allen Wildman and our guest today John Steinberg. Steinberg’s wonderful new book All the Tsar’s Men: Russia’s General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898-1914 (Johns Hopkins/Wilson Center, 2010) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the roots of the Russian defeat in World War I. His focus is the Imperial General Staff and its struggle (failed, as it turned out) to reform itself and the army that it commanded. As Steinberg points out, their task was a difficult one, made much more so by Russia’s all-encompassing (and to a considerable degree self-imposed) backwardness. The leaders of the General Staff were smart people. They knew what to do to make the Imperial Army a first-rate fighting force. Under other leadership, they might have succeeded in modernizing the army. But Nicholas did not lead, and so nothing could be done. Autocracies depend on autocrats, and Russia had none when it needed one most. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was the most important political event of the twentieth century (no Revolution; no Nazis; no Nazis, no World War II; no World War II, no Cold War). It’s little wonder, then, that historians have expended oceans of effort and ink trying to explain why and how it happened. The answer is complex, but it boils down to this: Nicholas II’s armies had a rough time of it in World War I, his regime lost credibility, the hungry cities revolted, and the Bolsheviks usurped power in an armed coup. The key event was, then, the Russian loss to the Germans on the Eastern Front. Surprisingly, the Russian defeat –arguably the second most important political event of the twentieth century because it triggered the first–has not been widely studied. For my generation of Russian historians (and, I should add, the one that preceded it), the Revolution–the last, best hope of mankind to many–was a sexy topic indeed; the failure of the Russian Imperial Army, not so much. So we were left in the dark (or, rather, left ourselves in the dark). There were, however, historians who went against this grain. Among them are (to name only a few and those who write in English): John Bushnell, William Fuller, Peter Gatrell, Hubertus Jahn, Eric Lohr, Bruce Menning, David Rich, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Norman Stone, Allen Wildman and our guest today John Steinberg. Steinberg’s wonderful new book All the Tsar’s Men: Russia’s General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898-1914 (Johns Hopkins/Wilson Center, 2010) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the roots of the Russian defeat in World War I. His focus is the Imperial General Staff and its struggle (failed, as it turned out) to reform itself and the army that it commanded. As Steinberg points out, their task was a difficult one, made much more so by Russia’s all-encompassing (and to a considerable degree self-imposed) backwardness. The leaders of the General Staff were smart people. They knew what to do to make the Imperial Army a first-rate fighting force. Under other leadership, they might have succeeded in modernizing the army. But Nicholas did not lead, and so nothing could be done. Autocracies depend on autocrats, and Russia had none when it needed one most. Please become a fan of “New Books in History” on Facebook if you haven’t already. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices