Podcast appearances and mentions of carissa hessick

“Innocent until proven guilty” has been the rule of the American justice system since its inception. It still is today. Unless, that is, you happen to be accused of wrongdoing on a college campus. In that case, you might as well be dragged before the modern-day equivalent of the Star Chamber, where campus administrators hardly even pay lip service to your due process rights.As we explored last week with Carissa Hessick, it is a far graver injustice to deprive an innocent person of the liberty than to let a guilty person go free. That is why the founders gave the accused so many protections in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) was created to uphold these protections against rules passed under the Title IX legislation that require colleges to effectively prosecute students outside of the criminal justice system. In these campus tribunals, those accused of serious misconduct like sexual assault have been denied basic protections like the right to a live hearing, to cross examine witnesses, and even to hear the full charges being levied against them.Joe Cohn, director of FIRE's Legislative and Policy department, joins me this Sunday to discuss a proposed rule change from the same administrative office behind the infamous 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter. The new language would turn certain kinds of constitutionally-protected free speech into a punishable offense under the broad umbrella of “sexual harassment.” Under the new rule, the “trial” that results from alleged misconduct would be conducted by a single college administrator acting as judge, jury, and prosecutor.Anyone connected with an American university that receives federal funding (aka, virtually all colleges) should tune in to this important broadcast. The first step to protecting your rights is to know what they are. Be sure to share this with any college students who may not know their rights, and check out FIRE's free Guide to Due Process and Campus Justice.

“How do you plea?”It's the first question the judge asks you in a criminal trial. But before the accused even has a chance to answer “guilty” or “not guilty,” there is another, prior legal proceeding that rarely gets talked about – even though it pre-empts the need for a trial in 97% of convictions. Jury trials were one of the founders' critical safeguards against the tyranny of overzealous government prosecutors. Thomas Jefferson viewed the institution as the most vital form of democracy – above the ability to vote for legislators. And yet the American legal system has largely abandoned this bedrock principle in favor of the “efficiency” of the plea bargain.Carissa Hessick is the director of the Prosecutors and Politics Project, Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law, and author of an important new book, Punishment Without Trial: Why Plea Bargaining Is a Bad Deal.Professor Hessick joins me to explain how this practice persists as the norm, while jury trials have been turned into a rare exception. What would the Founders say about this state of affairs? And why hasn't the Supreme Court done something about it?

Carissa Hessick, Professor at the University of North Carolina School of Law, joins me to discuss her new book "Punishment Without Trial." There are a few things I heard that surprised me. Enjoy!

The right to a trial by jury is enshrined into the constitution, yet increasingly over the last few decades, trials have become a vanishing feature of the criminal justice system. University of North Carolina law professor Carissa Hessick recently wrote the book, Punishment Without Trial: Why Plea Bargaining Is a Bad Deal. While there are positive aspects of the plea bargain – efficiency in the system and reduced punishment, overall 97 to 98 percent of all cases end not with a jury verdict but with an agreement between prosecutor and defense – an agreement that is often negotiated under unfavorable and unequal terms. As Hessick points out, “Instead of protecting defendants' right to have their guilt or innocence decided by their peers, judges routinely punish defendants for exercising that right.” Specifically, “judges regularly impose longer sentences on those defendants who insist on going to trial than on those defendants who plead guilty.” A 2018 report shows that, “on average, defendants who insist on a trial receive sentences three times longer than those of defendants who plead guilty.” This practice is so common that it even has a name: the “trial penalty.” Listen as Everyday Injustice talks with Professor Hessick about why this arrangement is detrimental to the system including the incentive for innocent people to plead guilty to crimes that they did not commit rather than risk the longer trial penalty.

Around a hundred people have already pleaded guilty to crimes in connection with the Jan. 6 attempted insurrection on the Capitol. What should we make of the plea deals thus far? Are they overly lenient? Are they what we might expect? To talk through the Jan. 6 plea deals, Jacob Schulz sat down on Lawfare Live with Carissa Byrne Hessick, the Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland "Buck" Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law. They talked through her reaction to the deals, her recent Lawfare article on the deals and about plea bargaining in general, which is the subject of her new book, “Punishment Without Trial: Why Plea Bargaining Is a Bad Deal.”Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

The second in a series on electing prosecutors - an interview with Carissa Hessick about elections for prosecuting attorneys and what to know and what to ask candidates for that office. North Carolina's Prosecutors and Politics Project can be found here: https://law.unc.edu/academics/centers-and-programs/prosecutors-and-politics-project/    For more of her bio: https://law.unc.edu/people/carissa-byrne-hessick/   Music by Evan Schaeffer

Last month, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in City of Boise v. Martin, a case out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The case involved a challenge to Boise’s enforcement of its criminal law prohibiting public camping against the homeless. The Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the enforcement of the law against the homeless when there are insufficient beds available in shelters. Although the Court denied review, the Ninth Circuit’s decision raises many important questions about many issues, including the effect on the homeless and surrounding communities, ways that law enforcement might react to their inability to enforce this law, and the potential constraints placed on the approximately 1600 municipalities in the Ninth Circuit—in particular San Francisco and Los Angeles, which have significant homeless populations—in their efforts to combat homelessness and the ills associated with it. Learn about this case's history, facts, unresolved questions, and legal implications moving forward.Featuring:-- Prof. Andrew Hessick, Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Strategy, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law-- Prof. Carissa Hessick, Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland "Buck" Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Development, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law-- Moderator: Hon. Eileen J. O'Connor, Law Office of Eileen J. O'Connor, PLLC

Last month, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in City of Boise v. Martin, a case out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The case involved a challenge to Boise’s enforcement of its criminal law prohibiting public camping against the homeless. The Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the enforcement of the law against the homeless when there are insufficient beds available in shelters. Although the Court denied review, the Ninth Circuit’s decision raises many important questions about many issues, including the effect on the homeless and surrounding communities, ways that law enforcement might react to their inability to enforce this law, and the potential constraints placed on the approximately 1600 municipalities in the Ninth Circuit—in particular San Francisco and Los Angeles, which have significant homeless populations—in their efforts to combat homelessness and the ills associated with it. Learn about this case's history, facts, unresolved questions, and legal implications moving forward.Featuring:-- Prof. Andrew Hessick, Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Strategy, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law-- Prof. Carissa Hessick, Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland "Buck" Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Development, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law-- Moderator: Hon. Eileen J. O'Connor, Law Office of Eileen J. O'Connor, PLLC

In this episode, Cynthia Godsoe, Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, discusses her 2017 article "Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes," which was published in the Washington and Lee Law Review. Prof. Godsoe begins by orienting the listener to the concept of “vaguenets,” broadly written laws punishing common and largely harmless conduct. She then discusses the history and structure of juvenile courts in the United States and how they establish a system parallel to the adult criminal justice system that is, arguably, even more punitive. Professor Godsoe then discusses how employment of the vagueness doctrine can not only limit “vaguenets” such as teen sex statutes, but also be used to institute wider criminal justice reform. She concludes by giving a preview of her next related project, examining vagueness in the context of the child welfare and dependency system, to be co-authored with Carissa Hessick. Professor Godsoe is on Twitter at @cynthia_godsoe.This episode was hosted by Maybell Romero, Assistant Professor of Law at Northern Illinois University College of Law. Professor Romero is on Twitter at @maybellromero. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Fast on the heels of her last appearance, Carissa Hessick joins us to talk about corpus linguistics, which means... well, we debate this, but, generally, the use of computer-based methods to draw inferences from large databases of texts. What is this enterprise? How can and should it be used to answer legal questions? What does it mean to mean something? These questions, thunder, sense, nonsense, and a continued delving into Joe's pscyhe all feature in this episode. Carissa Hessick’s faculty profile (http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/hessickcarissabyrne/) and writing (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=445060) Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3031987) Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Corpus Linguistics (https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2017/10/legal-theory-lexicon-corpus-linguistics.html) James Phillips, Daniel Ortner, and Thomas Lee, Corpus Linguistics and Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical (https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/corpus-linguistics-original-public-meaning) Special Guest: Carissa Hessick.

If you were charged with a crime, would you rather it be one written down by a legislature and codified in the tomes of a state's laws or one marked out by the decisions of judges over time? You're hardly alone if you chose the first option, and it is in fact the conventional wisdom that we have rightfully abandoned and prohibited "common law crimes." Not so fast, says our guest, Carissa Hessick. Our system of criminal law is still host to a good deal of common law, in the interstices of statutory text, through explicit incorporation, and sometimes from thin air. More importantly, if what you care about is the rule of law, then our system of code, in which prosecutors exercise less visible and less precedent-governed authority than any common law judge, hardly fits the bill. Carissa Hessick’s faculty profile (http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/hessickcarissabyrne/) and writing (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=445060) Carissa Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3139831) United States v. Hudson and Goodwin (https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10808232938953194239) Bordenkircher v. Hayes (https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3433599856216279138) Yates v. United States (https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4276838743116849486) Bond v. United States (https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14369486041709640908) Carissa Hessick, Vagueness Principles (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2837743) Bob Ratterman, Judicial Candidate Expresses Frustration with the Plea Bargain Process (https://www.journal-news.com/news/local/judicial-candidate-expresses-frustration-with-the-plea-bargain-process/DEn1cDLn83Hz2m5GLIiJjJ/) James Burnham, Why Don’t Courts Dismiss Indictments? A Simple Suggestion For Making Federal Criminal Law A Little Less Lawless (http://www.greenbag.org/v18n4/v18n4_articles_burnham.pdf) Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten History (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3070478) Special Guest: Carissa Hessick.

The Black’s Law Dictionary defines Plea Bargaining as: “[t]he process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that possible for the graver charge.” Plea Bargaining as a concept dates farther back than the American justice system itself. However, over the past few decades it has occurred with more and more frequency to reach its’ current unprecedented level in our criminal justice system. Today, over 95 percent of criminal convictions are a result of Plea Bargaining, which has contributed to an evolving and controversial national debate over whether Plea Bargaining has gone too far. The positives of Plea Bargaining are apparent. It is a much more efficient process than juries, and a much more inexpensive process than trials. However, some opponents of plea bargaining point to the dangerous potential for coercion, insisting that the imbalance of power between prosecutor and defendant can often lead to a miscarriage of justice. Additionally, some criticize Plea Bargaining because it infringes upon the right of the American citizen to participate in the jury process. The debates over the correct response to the frequency of Plea Bargaining will continue to grow as the effects are felt by the entirety of the American Criminal Justice System.Hon. Stephanos Bibas, United States Court of Appeals, Third CircuitMr. Greg Brower, Shareholder, Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, ShreckProf. Carissa Hessick, Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland "Buck" Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of LawMr. Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice, Cato InstituteModerator: Hon. Lisa Branch, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

The Black’s Law Dictionary defines Plea Bargaining as: “[t]he process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that possible for the graver charge.” Plea Bargaining as a concept dates farther back than the American justice system itself. However, over the past few decades it has occurred with more and more frequency to reach its’ current unprecedented level in our criminal justice system. Today, over 95 percent of criminal convictions are a result of Plea Bargaining, which has contributed to an evolving and controversial national debate over whether Plea Bargaining has gone too far. The positives of Plea Bargaining are apparent. It is a much more efficient process than juries, and a much more inexpensive process than trials. However, some opponents of plea bargaining point to the dangerous potential for coercion, insisting that the imbalance of power between prosecutor and defendant can often lead to a miscarriage of justice. Additionally, some criticize Plea Bargaining because it infringes upon the right of the American citizen to participate in the jury process. The debates over the correct response to the frequency of Plea Bargaining will continue to grow as the effects are felt by the entirety of the American Criminal Justice System.Hon. Stephanos Bibas, United States Court of Appeals, Third CircuitMr. Greg Brower, Shareholder, Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, ShreckProf. Carissa Hessick, Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland "Buck" Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of LawMr. Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice, Cato InstituteModerator: Hon. Lisa Branch, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States. Travis Beckles, who had various felony convictions, was subsequently found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. As a result he was subject to an enhanced sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which deemed him a “career offender” whose firearm possession offense constituted a “crime of violence.” Applying the enhancement, the district court sentenced Beckles to 360 months’ imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Beckles then sought habeas relief from his enhanced sentence, arguing that his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was not a “crime of violence,” and that therefore he did not qualify as a “career offender” under the Guidelines. The district court denied his petition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed. -- Beckles then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and while his petition was pending the Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the residual clause part of the “crime of violence” definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act--the very same language that was applied to Beckles via the Sentencing Guidelines--was unconstitutionally vague. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment in Beckles’ case and remanded to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of the Johnson decision. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed Beckles’ enhanced sentence, reasoning that Johnson simply did not address the Sentencing Guidelines or related commentary. The Supreme Court then again granted certiorari, to “resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether Johnson’s vagueness holding applies to the residual clause in [the Guidelines.]” -- By a vote of 7-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that “the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause and that [the Guidelines’] residual clause is not void for vagueness.” Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- To discuss the case, we have Carissa Hessick, who is the Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland "Buck" Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law.