Podcasts about morales santana

This week on Blocked and Reported, a deeper dive into the recent Supreme Court decision on youth gender medicine and its aftermath. Plus, the Washington Post's unconventional plan to make a few bucks. Note: After we recorded this episode, Mark Joseph Stern sent Jesse an email laying out his views and responding to Jesse's b******g on Twitter. That email is below and we'll discuss it, plus any further correspondence those two have, at the top of the next free episode.Hi Jesse,Although I'm not on Twitter anymore, a friend flagged your tweet about my coverage of Skrmetti and your question about sex discrimination. I would like to help explain why SB1 does, indeed, discriminate on the basis of sex in a way that triggers heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause.First, I'll note that while the term "sex discrimination" is more common in media coverage, the more accurate legal standard is "sex classification." (The court's canonical cases, like Reed v. Reed and U.S. v. Virginia, favor this term.) The two can be used interchangeably, but I think "classification" is a little clearer for the purposes of addressing your arguments.You, and the Skrmetti majority, are undoubtedly correct that SB1 classifies on the basis of medical condition. But to do so, at least under many circumstances, it must also classify on the basis of sex. I see that you're suspicious of one way I've been explaining this: a cis boy can receive testosterone to develop more male features, while a trans boy cannot. I still think that example works as a legal matter, even if such treatment for a cis boy is uncommon in real life. (Although—is it? Don't doctors prescribe testosterone to cis boys with delayed puberty to jump-start secondary sex characteristics that are fundamentally cosmetic, like facial hair?) So set it aside.Consider instead an adolescent cis boy who experiences gynecomastia, unwanted but harmless growth of breast tissue. Under SB1, he may still receive testosterone therapy to reduce his breasts. Not because the excessive growth of tissue is medically harmful, but because he does not wish to appear to have breasts, as they are incongruent with his gender identity. But an adolescent trans boy may not, under SB1, receive the same treatment to achieve the same effect—reduction of breasts that are incongruent with his gender identity. Why?I take it you would say: Because the trans boy seeks the treatment for gender dysphoria, whereas the cis boy seeks it for gynecomastia. True enough, but irrelevant for the purpose of deciding whether the law classifies on the basis of sex. That's because, in addition to classifying on the basis of medical condition, the law classifies on the basis of sex to determine who may receive the same treatment to achieve the same outcome. An adolescent's access to testosterone to reduce breast growth turns on the sex they were assigned at birth. Those assigned male can get testosterone; those assigned female cannot. Thus, the law classifies patients on the basis of sex, and triggers heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Put differently, to determine the medical condition—gender dysphoria or gynecomastia—a doctor must consider the patient's sex assigned at birth. That consideration, under longstanding precedent, compels heightened scrutiny.It is not uncommon for laws that classify on the basis of sex to classify on other bases as well. For instance, in Morales-Santana, the law at issue classified on the basis of a parent's physical presence in the United States. That, all agree, was permissible. But the law also classified on the basis of the parent's sex. And that, the court held, created a "gender line" that triggered heightened scrutiny. There is a similar dynamic at play in Skrmetti. Yes, the law dictates what treatments a minor may receive based on their medical condition. But to do so, it must classify minors on the basis of sex. And that, under the court's precedents, should be enough to trigger heightened scrutiny.I will note that, as you know, the question of whether a law classifies on the basis of sex is only the first step of the analysis. If the answer is yes, the next step is to apply heightened scrutiny by asking whether the law serves important governmental interests and is substantially related to the achievement of those interests. I think your objections probably lie in this second step; to return to my example, you may think the government has a strong interest in preventing minors with gender dysphoria from altering their bodies, and you believe SB1's restrictions are sensibly drawn to encompass those cases while allowing cis minors to receive the same treatments. But even if that is correct (and I won't opine on it here), SB1 still classifies on the basis of sex, requiring the application of heightened scrutiny to survive constitutional muster. And in my view, the Skrmetti majority erred in denying that reality.Best,MarkThe Washington Post Will Ask Some Sources to Annotate Its Stories - The New York TimesUnited States v. Skrmetti‘Trans rights' has never been a civil rights issue | The SpectatorOpinion | How the Gay Rights Movement Radicalized, and Lost Its Way - The New York TimesOpinion | Author explains anonymity behind a pediatric gender medicine report - The Washington PostA Precocious Puberty Case: I Went Through Puberty at Age 2The conservative defense of Kenosha shooter Kyle Rittenhouse is nonsense.Skrmetti: John Roberts' anti-trans opinion isn't just cruel. It's incomprehensible.Massive Ordnance Penetrator - Political Gabfest - Apple Podcasts (Bazelon argument starts at 44:00) To hear more, visit www.blockedandreported.org

On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, formerly known as Lynch v. Morales-Santana. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for derivative acquisition of U.S. citizenship from birth, by a child born abroad, when one parent is a U.S. citizen and the other is not. At the relevant time here, the INA required the U.S.-citizen parent to have ten years’ physical presence in the United States prior to the child’s birth, at least five of which were after attaining age 14. Although the rule applies in full to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, there is an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother, whose citizenship can be transmitted to a child born abroad if she has lived continuously in the United States for just one year prior to the child’s birth. -- Morales-Santana, who was born in the Dominican Republic, asserted U.S. citizenship from birth based on the citizenship of his father--but his father had fallen 20 days short of satisfying the requirement of five years’ physical presence after attaining age 14. In 2000, the government sought to remove Morales-Santana as a result of several criminal convictions, classifying him as alien rather than citizen because of his father’s failure to satisfy the full physical presence requirement. The immigration judge rejected Morales-Santana’s citizenship claim and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his subsequent motion to reopen proceedings on the claim that the INA’s gender-based rule violated the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause--but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding the differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers unconstitutional and acknowledging Morales-Santana’s U.S. citizenship. -- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and by a vote of 8-0, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Second Circuit, and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that (1) the gender line Congress drew in the INA, creating an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother but not for such a father, to the physical-presence requirement, violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause as the Second Circuit had determined; but (2) the remedial course that Congress would most likely have chosen if apprised of this constitutional infirmity would have been not a broader application of the one-year exception but rather preservation of the five-year general rule; thus the Court cannot grant the relief Morales-Santana seeks. Going forward it falls to Congress to select a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender, but in the interim the five-year requirement applies prospectively to children of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers just as with such fathers. -- Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Curt Levey, who is President, Committee for Justice; Legal Affairs Fellow, Freedom Works.

On November 9, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Lynch v. Morales-Santana. Morales-Santana’s father was born in Puerto Rico but acquired U.S. citizenship in 1917 under the Jones Act of Puerto Rico. Morales-Santana was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic to his father and Dominican mother, who were unmarried at the time. In 1970, upon his parents’ marriage, he was statutorily “legitimated” and was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1976. -- The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which was in effect at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth, limits the ability of an unwed citizen father to confer citizenship on his child born abroad, where the child’s mother is not a citizen at the time of the child’s birth, more stringently than it limits the ability of a similarly situated unwed citizen mother to do the same. -- In 2000, Morales-Santana was placed in removal proceedings after having been convicted of various felonies. An immigration judge denied his application for withholding of removal on the basis of derivative citizenship obtained through his father. He filed a motion to reopen in 2010, based on a violation of equal protection and newly obtained evidence relating to his father, but the Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the Board’s decision, however, and concluded that Morales-Santana was a citizen as of birth. The Attorney General of the United States then obtained a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court. -- The two questions before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether Congress’s decision to impose a different physical-presence requirement on unwed citizen mothers of foreign-born children than on other citizen parents of foreign-born children violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in conferring U.S. citizenship on respondent, in the absence of any express statutory authority to do so. -- Featuring: Curt Levey, President, Committee for Justice; Legal Affairs Fellow, Freedom Works.

For this the Silver Anniversary Edition of The Law Is My Ass (it's our 25th episode! How crazy is that?) - we welcome back to the podcast the always brilliant and funny Jamie Lee Williams of the Electronic Frontier Foundation to talk about whether the government can track all of your movements all the time (Hint: at the moment, probably). We also talk about how to protect your text messages and your computer browser history (hint: imperfectly). Before we get to that we talk about the Ninth Circuit's landmark decision in the Hawai'i travel ban appeal - ruling against the Trump administration on STATUTORY and not constitutional grounds! We round up the week's five (count 'em - FIVE!) mostly unanimous Supreme Court decisions including Justice Ginsburg's equal protection opinion in Sessions v. Morales Santana. And as if all that weren't enough, we talk about new suits against the Trump administration, good news for DACA dreamers bad news for your Christmas plans in Havana, good news for high powered criminal defense attorneys in Washington DC; this morning's mixed news for Bill Cosby; the crime of encouraging suicide; and the Philando Castile verdict.

This week's episode takes a long detour through the Supreme Court's potential review of the Travel Ban at the highest level, with Brett and Nazim discussing each potential Justices view on the appeal and staying the lower order.  The case of Sessions v. Morales-Santana is also covered, which pairs an interesting discussion on intermediate scrutiny with a bummer ending that ruins it for everyone.  Law starts at (05:43), with a bad-ass Sam Neal/Michael Chrichton discussion around  (14:00).

On November 9, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Lynch v. Morales-Santana. Morales-Santana’s father was born in Puerto Rico but acquired U.S. citizenship in 1917 under the Jones Act of Puerto Rico. Morales-Santana was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic to his father and Dominican mother, who were unmarried at the time. In 1970, upon his parents’ marriage, he was statutorily “legitimated” and was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1976. -- The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which was in effect at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth, limits the ability of an unwed citizen father to confer citizenship on his child born abroad, where the child’s mother is not a citizen at the time of the child’s birth, more stringently than it limits the ability of a similarly situated unwed citizen mother to do the same. -- In 2000, Morales-Santana was placed in removal proceedings after having been convicted of various felonies. An immigration judge denied his application for withholding of removal on the basis of derivative citizenship obtained through his father. He filed a motion to reopen in 2010, based on a violation of equal protection and newly obtained evidence relating to his father, but the Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the Board’s decision, however, and concluded that Morales-Santana was a citizen as of birth. The Attorney General of the United States then obtained a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court. -- The two questions now before the Supreme Court are: (1) whether Congress’s decision to impose a different physical-presence requirement on unwed citizen mothers of foreign-born children than on other citizen parents of foreign-born children violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in conferring U.S. citizenship on respondent, in the absence of any express statutory authority to do so. -- To discuss the case, we have Elina Treyger, who is Assistant Professor of Law at the George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School.

Lynch v. Morales-Santana | 11/09/16 | Docket #: 15-1191

Everyone knows Ruth Bader Ginsburg the Justice, but this week takes a look at Ruth Bader Ginsburg the creative ACLU attorney who helped shape intermediate scrutiny through gender disparity cases.  These cases, including Fronterio v. Richardson, Weinberger v. Wisenfeld,and Duren v. Missouri, show how equal protection and gender was first developed, often with unexpected methods and angles.  Brett and Nazim then cover the case of Lynch v. Morales Santana, which is either a continuation of Ginsburg's jurisprudence, or a totally new path based on immigration.  Law starts at (08:55).