Oxford Centre for the Study of Corruption and Transparency

Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption through Open Data

Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption through Open Data

Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption through Open Data

Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption through Open Data

Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption through Open Data

Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption through Open Data

Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption through Open Data

Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption through Open Data

Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption through Open Data

Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption through Open Data The conference took place under the aegis of the EU-funded project “TACOD” (Towards a European strategy to reduce Corruption by enhancing the use of Open Data) coordinated by RISSC (Research Centre on Security and Crime) and hosted by the University of Oxford. The conference presented results from the research pertaining to the four countries covered in the project (Austria, Italy, Spain, and United Kingdom), as well as policy recommendations for monitoring and enhancing the use of open government data for the detection and prevention of corruption.

Existing measures of corruption often suffer from bias and are too broad to guide policy or test theories. This paper proposes three new indirect indicators of high-level corruption in public procurement, using contract and organisation-level administrat The first is a composite score expressing the probability of corruption occurring in public procurement tenders based on the incidence of ‘red flags’ associated with barriers to competition and unusually high winner market share. The second is a binary variable marking companies whose public procurement market success depends on the government in power, generated by tracking companies’ market volumes from before to after the government changes. The third is a binary variable marking those public procurement winners whose owners or managers are or were public officials, building on the literature on conflict of interest and the revolving door. These new ‘objective’ indicators are used to demonstrate the utility of the approach taken for the study of other questions, such as the role of development aid (including EU Funds) in institution-building, the effect of elite composition on patterns of state capture, and the impact of civil service pay on high-level corruption.

Existing measures of corruption often suffer from bias and are too broad to guide policy or test theories. This paper proposes three new indirect indicators of high-level corruption in public procurement, using contract and organisation-level administrat The first is a composite score expressing the probability of corruption occurring in public procurement tenders based on the incidence of ‘red flags’ associated with barriers to competition and unusually high winner market share. The second is a binary variable marking companies whose public procurement market success depends on the government in power, generated by tracking companies’ market volumes from before to after the government changes. The third is a binary variable marking those public procurement winners whose owners or managers are or were public officials, building on the literature on conflict of interest and the revolving door. These new ‘objective’ indicators are used to demonstrate the utility of the approach taken for the study of other questions, such as the role of development aid (including EU Funds) in institution-building, the effect of elite composition on patterns of state capture, and the impact of civil service pay on high-level corruption.

The seminar examined the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) compliance-inducing mechanisms based on an analysis of its naming and shaming practices. The seminar further focused on the implementation of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing standards in the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy in order to contend that the Task Force’s success in getting countries to comply with its 40 Plus 9 Recommendations can be explained by looking at the conformity-inducing group pressures that the Task Force generates for states that are concerned about status markers and shame avoidance.

Angus Hawkins closes the conference.

Second of two panel discussions at the first Oxford Anti-Corruption Conference, Kellogg College, 13 January 2011. Chaired by Tricia Feeney.

Elizabeth David-Barrett, Centre for Corporate Reputation, Saïd Business School, Oxford University, speaks at the first Oxford Anti-Corruption Conference, Kellogg College, 13 January 2011.

Dominik Zaum, Reading University School of Politics and International Relations, speaks at the first Oxford Anti-Corruption Conference, Kellogg College, 13 January 2011.

Paul Collier, Oxford University Economics Department, speaks at the first Oxford Anti-Corruption Conference, Kellogg College, 13 January 2011.

First of two panel discussions at the first Oxford Anti-Corruption Conference, Kellogg College, 13 January 2011. Chaired by Jeremy Carver, Transparency International.

Ian Trumper, FTI Forensic Accounting, speaks at the first Oxford Anti-Corruption Conference, Kellogg College, 13 January 2011.

Chandrashekhar Krishnan, Transparency International UK, speaks at the first Oxford Anti-Corruption Conference, Kellogg College, 13 January 2011.

Baron Falconer of Thoroton, Opposition Spokesperson for Justice, formerly Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, speaks at the first Oxford Anti-Corruption Conference, Kellogg College, 13 January 2011.

Introduction to the first Oxford Anti-Corruption Conference, 13 January 2011, by Jonathan Michie, President of Kellogg College.