Podcast appearances and mentions of jonathan masur

What Good is Happiness? A Dialogue Between Economics & Philosophy. University of South Carolina Philosopher Jennifer Frey and University of Chicago Professor of Law Jonathan Masur Discuss. • Please like, share, subscribe to, and review this podcast. Thank you!

Jonathan Masur, law professor of The University of Chicago, joins us to discuss an article he wrote along with two colleagues on how implementing a diversity policy and having a multi-diverse membership is good for the quality of the articles selected for publishing in law reviews.   Episode Resources https://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/masur   Episode Highlights Jonathan explains to us his article's subject - 1:57 The article's inspiration - 2:04 The use of diversity policies - 2:13 Different types of law reviews - 2:50 The quality of a law review article - 4:02 Law schools and law reviews - 4:27 Which law reviews have diversity policies - 4:48 Reactions against his law reviews article - 7:40 The pre-policy period before 2006, and the post-policy period after 2006 - 10:23 The benefits of diversity on law reviews - 12:18 Liberal articles reviews and conservative articles reviews - 13:07 The impact of law reviews articles - 14:09 Increasing diversity on law reviews - 15:37 Trying to collect information about more law reviews - 16:14 Jonathan gives a piece of advice for increasing the diversity on law reviews - 17:04   Subscribe, Share and Review To get the next episode subscribe with your favorite podcast player. Subscribe with Apple Podcasts Follow on Spotify Leave a review on Apple Podcasts

With commentary by Professor Jonathan Masur John G. Malcolm oversees The Heritage Foundation's work to increase understanding of the Constitution and the rule of law as director of the think tank's Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies. In addition to his duties at Heritage, Malcolm is chairman of the Criminal Law Practice Group of the Federalist Society. Malcolm has previously served in both the public and private sectors. Among other positions, he has worked as general counsel at the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, as executive vice president and director of worldwide anti-piracy operations for the Motion Picture Association of America, as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Department of Justice's Criminal Division, as a partner in the Atlanta law firm of Malcolm & Schroeder, and as an assistant U.S. attorney in the Atlanta fraud and public corruption section. Malcolm began his law career clerking for Judge James C. Hill on the Eleventh Circuit and for Chief Judge Charles A. Moye, Jr. on the Northern District of Georgia. Malcolm is a graduate of Harvard Law School and holds a bachelor's degree in economics from Columbia College. Jonathan Masur received a BS in physics and an AB in political science from Stanford University in 1999 and his JD from Harvard Law School in 2003. After graduating from law school, he clerked for Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and for Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He joined the Law School faculty in 2007 and received tenure in 2012. He served as Deputy Dean from 2012 to 2014 and was named the John P. Wilson Professor of Law in 2014. He won the Graduating Students Award for Teaching Excellence in 2014 and 2017 and the Class of 2016 Award. He has served as director of the Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Program in Behavioral Law, Finance and Economics since its founding.

With commentary by Professor Jonathan Masur John G. Malcolm oversees The Heritage Foundation's work to increase understanding of the Constitution and the rule of law as director of the think tank's Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies. In addition to his duties at Heritage, Malcolm is chairman of the Criminal Law Practice Group of the Federalist Society. Malcolm has previously served in both the public and private sectors. Among other positions, he has worked as general counsel at the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, as executive vice president and director of worldwide anti-piracy operations for the Motion Picture Association of America, as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Department of Justice's Criminal Division, as a partner in the Atlanta law firm of Malcolm & Schroeder, and as an assistant U.S. attorney in the Atlanta fraud and public corruption section. Malcolm began his law career clerking for Judge James C. Hill on the Eleventh Circuit and for Chief Judge Charles A. Moye, Jr. on the Northern District of Georgia. Malcolm is a graduate of Harvard Law School and holds a bachelor's degree in economics from Columbia College. Jonathan Masur received a BS in physics and an AB in political science from Stanford University in 1999 and his JD from Harvard Law School in 2003. After graduating from law school, he clerked for Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and for Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He joined the Law School faculty in 2007 and received tenure in 2012. He served as Deputy Dean from 2012 to 2014 and was named the John P. Wilson Professor of Law in 2014. He won the Graduating Students Award for Teaching Excellence in 2014 and 2017 and the Class of 2016 Award. He has served as director of the Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Program in Behavioral Law, Finance and Economics since its founding.

A special live-to-tape dig through the mailbag. This show’s links: Christian’s Modern American Legal Theory audio downloads (paste this into your podcast app: http://www.hydratext.com/malt2016?format=rss) Episodes relevant to driverless cars: No Drones in the Park (guest Frank Pasquale and Sense-Think-Act (guest Ryan Calo) Jonathan Masur’s episode: All over the Gander SustainAtlanta Oral Argument 74: Minimum Curiosity (guest Amanda Frost) More Perfect (a side project of Radiolab) Oral Argument 77: Jackasses Are People Too (guest Adama Kolber) Oral Argument 44: Serial Sarah Koenig, Judge Orderns New Trial for Adnan Syed (containing a link and embedded version of the opinion and order granting Syed a new trial) Oral Argument 69: Contaminated Evidence (guest Brandon Garrett); Oral Argument 48: Legal Truth (guest Lisa Kern Griffin); Oral Argument 45: Sacrifice Kathryn Rubino, Did Georgia Just Poison Bar Exam Test Takers?; Oral Argument 61: Minimum Competence (guest Derek Muller) Oral Argument 21: Kind of a Hellscape (guest Brigham Daniels); Oral Argument 63: A Struggle with Every Single One (guest Jessica Owley)

We’re joined by a scholar of patent law, administrative law, and many other things, Jonathan Masur. Jonathan does not think the patent office has done a very good job of conducting cost-benefit analyses of various rules and procedures for issuing, maintaining, and challenging patents. Supposing patents should exist at all - can you tell who writes these show notes? - how should we account for the effects of the way we administer the system? These questions lead us to some basic conversation about cost-benefit analysis and and the value of patents. And we wind up asking simple questions, like what a cost is. This show’s links: Jonathan Masur’s faculty profile and writing Jonathan Masur, CBA at the PTO Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee Patent and Trademark Office, Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings (at 48720-48722) Patent and Trademark Office, Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees in accordance with Section 10 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Paul Heald, A Transaction Cost Theory of Patent Law Special Guest: Jonathan Masur.

Suppose a court holds in the context of a habeas petition that a constitutional right is not yet “clearly established.” Can we conclude from this that the right does not exist? The answer, of course, is “no”—it would be error to treat this case as having held that there is no such right. Yet in case after case, across multiple areas of law, judges (and their clerks) make precisely these types of “deference mistakes”: they rely on precedent without understanding the standard of review or burden of proof that governed that precedent. That includes the particular mistake described here: courts regularly rely on precedents holding that a constitutional right was not “clearly established” to conclude that the right does not exist. Nor is the problem confined to individual cases. Deference mistakes can propagate over time, leading to systematic shifts in legal doctrine. Jonathan Masur is the John P. Wilson Professor of Law, David and Celia Hilliard Research Scholar, and Director of the Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Program in Behavioral Law, Finance and Economics. Presented on January 12, 2016, as part of the Chicago's Best Ideas lecture series.

Suppose a court holds in the context of a habeas petition that a constitutional right is not yet “clearly established.” Can we conclude from this that the right does not exist? The answer, of course, is “no”—it would be error to treat this case as having held that there is no such right. Yet in case after case, across multiple areas of law, judges (and their clerks) make precisely these types of “deference mistakes”: they rely on precedent without understanding the standard of review or burden of proof that governed that precedent. That includes the particular mistake described here: courts regularly rely on precedents holding that a constitutional right was not “clearly established” to conclude that the right does not exist. Nor is the problem confined to individual cases. Deference mistakes can propagate over time, leading to systematic shifts in legal doctrine. Jonathan Masur is the John P. Wilson Professor of Law, David and Celia Hilliard Research Scholar, and Director of the Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Program in Behavioral Law, Finance and Economics. Presented on January 12, 2016, as part of the Chicago's Best Ideas lecture series.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. Drawing on new research in psychology, neuroscience, and economics, Jonathan Masur talks about how the law affects people’s quality of life—and how it can do so in a better way.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. Drawing on new research in psychology, neuroscience, and economics, Jonathan Masur talks about how the law affects people’s quality of life—and how it can do so in a better way.

Libertarians often assert that regulation is unnecessary because the market will meet any existing consumer demand. The issue of smoking in bars is a paradigmatic context in which this argument arises. Libertarians argue that bar patrons (and employees) are free to patronize or work in whichever bars they choose. Accordingly, if workers or patrons want smoke-free bars, the market will provide smoke-free bars. For the libertarian, the fact that nearly every bar in every city allowed smoking prior to the enactment of smoking bans is proof that this is what employees and patrons really want. The market equilibrium is the efficient equilibrium. Our work calls this conclusion into question. We suggest that in many contexts there are many possible equilibria, not just one equilibrium. The fact that we live in one equilibrium rather than another might be merely a product of path dependence. For instance, the vast majority of bars might allow smoking (absent smoking bans) simply because behavior has evolved from a time when smoking was always allowed and not even viewed as harmful. If smoking had been banned until recently, and then the ban were repealed, a very different equilibrium might have emerged. If this is the case, then what follows? The recent wave of behavioral economics has led some theorists to advocate the possibility of "libertarian paternalism," where regulators designing institutions permit significant individual choice but nonetheless use default rules to "nudge" individuals toward informed or salutary choices. Here, we propose a type of libertarian paternalist intervention aimed directly at the question of multiple equilibria: temporary law. If an equilibrium exists only because of path dependence, there is no need for a permanent restriction on liberty. A state or city could simply pass a temporary law, allow the law to expire, and then examine the state of affairs that emerges. We thus propose imagining regulations that include an expiration date, and we will describe the many advantages of that approach. This talk was recorded on February 25, 2014. Tom Ginsburg is Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Research Scholar and Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago Law School. Jonathan Masur is Deputy Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Richard McAdams is Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar at the University of Chicago Law School.

Libertarians often assert that regulation is unnecessary because the market will meet any existing consumer demand. The issue of smoking in bars is a paradigmatic context in which this argument arises. Libertarians argue that bar patrons (and employees) are free to patronize or work in whichever bars they choose. Accordingly, if workers or patrons want smoke-free bars, the market will provide smoke-free bars. For the libertarian, the fact that nearly every bar in every city allowed smoking prior to the enactment of smoking bans is proof that this is what employees and patrons really want. The market equilibrium is the efficient equilibrium. Our work calls this conclusion into question. We suggest that in many contexts there are many possible equilibria, not just one equilibrium. The fact that we live in one equilibrium rather than another might be merely a product of path dependence. For instance, the vast majority of bars might allow smoking (absent smoking bans) simply because behavior has evolved from a time when smoking was always allowed and not even viewed as harmful. If smoking had been banned until recently, and then the ban were repealed, a very different equilibrium might have emerged. If this is the case, then what follows? The recent wave of behavioral economics has led some theorists to advocate the possibility of "libertarian paternalism," where regulators designing institutions permit significant individual choice but nonetheless use default rules to "nudge" individuals toward informed or salutary choices. Here, we propose a type of libertarian paternalist intervention aimed directly at the question of multiple equilibria: temporary law. If an equilibrium exists only because of path dependence, there is no need for a permanent restriction on liberty. A state or city could simply pass a temporary law, allow the law to expire, and then examine the state of affairs that emerges. We thus propose imagining regulations that include an expiration date, and we will describe the many advantages of that approach. This talk was recorded on February 25, 2014. Tom Ginsburg is Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Research Scholar and Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago Law School. Jonathan Masur is Deputy Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Richard McAdams is Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar at the University of Chicago Law School.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. Preventing global warming requires lowering carbon production, and China produces a high level of carbon emissions. China gains a significant advantage to its economic growth from its continued use of fossil fuels, but the harms from global warming will fall disproportionately on other countries. Thus, some writers advocate giving side payments to China as part of an international agreement to reduce global warming. Their analysis treats China as a "black box"; the input is money, the output is reduced carbon emissions. But when we open the box, the situation is not so simple. The box really has two Chinas inside.In this edition of Chicago's Best Ideas on January 14, Professors Daniel Abebe and Jonathan Masur presented "The Two Chinas and the Problem of Global Warming," based on their paper "Climate Change and Internal Heterogeneity." The first China is Eastern China. Eastern China is prosperous, having experienced a blistering growth rate around 10 percent annually over the past couple decades. Most of China's major cities dot the Eastern coast, and the cities are hubs for finance and manufacturing. The second China is Western China. Western China resembles a developing country and is still mostly agrarian. Per capita GDP is half what it is in the East (9,967 yuan versus 19,813 yuan). The interplay between the two gives the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) incentives to not accept a climate-change treaty.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. Preventing global warming requires lowering carbon production, and China produces a high level of carbon emissions. China gains a significant advantage to its economic growth from its continued use of fossil fuels, but the harms from global warming will fall disproportionately on other countries. Thus, some writers advocate giving side payments to China as part of an international agreement to reduce global warming. Their analysis treats China as a "black box"; the input is money, the output is reduced carbon emissions. But when we open the box, the situation is not so simple. The box really has two Chinas inside.In this edition of Chicago's Best Ideas on January 14, Professors Daniel Abebe and Jonathan Masur presented "The Two Chinas and the Problem of Global Warming," based on their paper "Climate Change and Internal Heterogeneity." The first China is Eastern China. Eastern China is prosperous, having experienced a blistering growth rate around 10 percent annually over the past couple decades. Most of China's major cities dot the Eastern coast, and the cities are hubs for finance and manufacturing. The second China is Western China. Western China resembles a developing country and is still mostly agrarian. Per capita GDP is half what it is in the East (9,967 yuan versus 19,813 yuan). The interplay between the two gives the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) incentives to not accept a climate-change treaty.