Podcasts about chinese communist party ccp

Could communist Chinese infiltration of Canada become an existential threat to American security—or is it already one?Scott McGregor has spent decades in the Canadian military and Canadian intelligence studying the threat that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) poses to Canada and North America more broadly. He has known about the CCP's infiltration of Canada for many years and briefed major intelligence agencies in both Canada and the United States about it.According to McGregor, the strategic partnership between Canada and China is extremely detrimental to Canada's interests—and also poses a major security threat to America.McGregor, who is the co-author of the book “The Mosaic Effect,” told me the partnership “came as quite a shock. ... This strategic alliance ... cuts the legs out of the people that have been trying to bring awareness to the threat of China to Canada and North America.”U.S. President Donald Trump's comments last year about Canada becoming America's 51st state alienated many Canadians to such a degree that they are eager to distance themselves from America. But McGregor says the reality is that Canada very much depends on the United States. It's by far Canada's most important trading partner and an indispensable military partner.“Canada relies on the United States as a partner in logistics support, especially militarily. When I deployed, we had Canadians that were saved because Americans had helicopters that could operate in regions that we just couldn't. We didn't have the capability. The same goes for weaponry,” he says.Without American military support, McGregor warns, “We are left on our own. ... Canada needs the United States.”But do Canadians want to hear such warnings? Do Canadians perhaps tend to overestimate their country's military strength? Do they understand the depth of the threat from a China under CCP rule? Are they aware of the extent to which Canadian society has already been undermined over the last half century?And are Canadians perhaps too trusting to realize that the CCP has a plan for Canada and is executing it?He tells me: “China has a goal, an objective. It's not destruction at this point. It's disruption, and the disruption is working. They've outflanked us. We're fighting amongst ourselves—exactly what they want.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Last time we spoke about the New Fourth Army Incident. Across the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP entered after the setbacks of the 1930s, seeking to become a national leader in resistance while remaining cautious toward the Nationalist government. The 1936 Xi'an Incident reshaped politics, and by August 1937 KMT–CCP agreements defined a working arrangement: the CCP acknowledged KMT leadership and integrated its forces, while still pursuing political space and autonomy. As the war progressed, the CCP focused on defining its relationship with the KMT and keeping operational independence during cooperation. Mao Zedong managed this alliance by promoting a united front against Japan, yet protecting CCP revolutionary goals and internal control. The establishment of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army marked this military reorganization. Throughout, the CCP feared that KMT collaboration with Japan could enable a peace settlement that would undermine communist legitimacy and restrict the party's future authority thereafter.   #202 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase One Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Simultaneously with the friction between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were also working to take control of—and extract value from—most of the territory they had nominally conquered. Treating these two processes separately—"friction" on the one hand and "consolidation" on the other—does violence to the real difficulty of the CCP's dilemma: the Party often had to confront both problems at the same time. At certain moments, the CCP was effectively forced to wage a two-front struggle. Even so, if the worst of the KMT–CCP friction had already eased by 1941, the most serious and painful challenges posed by Japanese consolidation were still ahead. To recover anything close to reality, the two timelines have to be read together and placed on top of one another. The Japanese understood that consolidation could not be postponed, because much of the land behind the furthest reaches of their army was still only weakly under their actual control. In some places, order could be restored by relatively direct methods: rebuilding local administration and policy authority; repairing transportation and communications; enrolling Chinese personnel—usually, as it turned out, people of dubious reliability—as police or militia under puppet regimes; registering the local population; and requiring identity cards. In true old-style Chinese fashion, collective security practices were used widely. One form was the familiar bao-jia system, in one variant or another. Another was the so-called "railway-cherishing village": a village would be assigned a nearby stretch of track, and if residents failed to "cherish" it, they were held collectively responsible. Yet early Japanese weakness in northern China is vividly illustrated by an incident in the summer of 1938. Three young foreigners—vacationing from teaching in Peiping (Beijing)—were curious about events and about what people were doing. They loaded their bicycles on a southbound train, got off at Baoding, and rode west until they ran into Eighth Route Army detachments. In the early period of the war, commanders generally wanted to rely on more mobile forms of warfare. Mao, however, insisted on a strategy of de-escalation and dispersion: breaking the 8RA and New Fourth Army into small units as nuclei for combat, recruitment, political work, and base-area construction. Under this approach, few engagements could be truly dramatic in scale, and most were constrained by the need to survive. Each skirmish had to be carefully planned. The CCP would use local intelligence and the element of surprise so that a detachment could strike and withdraw before its limited ammunition ran out or before enemy reinforcements arrived. Small Japanese patrols and puppet units could be ambushed not only to seize weapons and other material, but also to inflict casualties. Active collaborators, or Japanese-sponsored administrative personnel, could be assassinated. Above all, Communist action aimed to disrupt transportation: mining roads; cutting down telegraph poles, stealing wire, and cutting rail lines; sabotaging rolling stock; and, at times, carrying off steel rails so that primitive arsenals could be supplied. Attempting derailments was also part of the effort. Destroying a bridge or a locomotive counted as a major achievement. Both the Communists and the Japanese understood that these tactics did not decisively shift the overall strategic balance. Still, they worked at other levels. For the Japanese, the result was a constant series of small wounds—painful, bleeding, and potentially infectious. Few areas in the countryside felt truly safe. Japanese field commanders documented growing frustration as they tried to eliminate resistance, restore administration, collect taxes, and prepare for more systematic and effective economic exploitation of conquered territory. Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese cannot be judged only in conventional battle terms—numbers of engagements, casualties, or territory occupied. It had to be evaluated politically and psychologically as well, exactly as Mao repeatedly emphasized. Since the CCP's wartime legitimacy depended on its patriotic claims, enough fighting had to be carried out to maintain credibility. Moreover, military success mattered for mobilizing the "basic masses," persuading wavering people to keep an open mind, and neutralizing opposition. As the logic put it, it was not that people always chose the side that was winning, but that few would ever join a side they believed was losing. One experienced cadre described the effect this way: Among the guerrilla units… there is a saying that "victory decides everything." No matter how hard it has been to recruit troops, supply the army, raise the masses' anti-Japanese fervor or win over the masses' sympathy, after a victory in battle the masses fall all over themselves to send us flour, steamed bread, meat, and vegetables. The masses' pessimistic and defeatist psychology is broken down, and many new guerrilla soldiers swarm in. But once the Japanese began to demand a heavy price for every engagement—whether the Communists won or not—this attitude began to change. In North and Central China, the Japanese earliest pacification sweeps created comparatively little trouble for the CCP. At first, the Japanese made few distinctions among Chinese forces. They simply tried to mop up or disperse them without regard to character. Over time, however, they realized that these sweeps actually made it easier for the CCP to expand. By the second half of 1939, Japanese methods became more discriminating. Chinese non-Communist forces would step aside while the Japanese hunted specifically for the 8RA, the N4A, and their local affiliates. The Japanese also made more direct appeals to non-Communist forces. According to Japanese army statistics, during the eighteen months from mid-1939 to late 1940, around 70,000 men from more or less regular Nationalist units in North China alone went over to the Japanese. The Japanese also reached informal "understandings" with several regional commanders whose forces together might have totaled as many as 300,000 men. This, of course, corresponded to what the CCP denounced as "crooked-line patriotism"—the "crooked-line" collaboration that preserved certain units so they could be used in future anti-Communist operations. When pacification efforts were intensified from late 1939 and throughout 1940, differences also appeared in the strategies Japanese armies used in North versus Central China. In North China, the approach relied heavily on military means, with political tactics limited largely to recruiting collaborators. In Central China, Japanese authorities did not hesitate to use military force, but they also attempted to supplement it with more comprehensive political and economic solutions by setting up tightly controlled "model peace zones." Although both approaches ultimately failed, they created enormous difficulties for Chinese Communists—until, in 1943, the Japanese were forced to ease off because the Pacific War against the United States became too burdensome. Careful reading of detailed intra-party documents suggests that repression also demobilized peasant support and terrorized populations into apathy, grudging acquiescence, or even active collaboration with the Japanese. In a locality already reduced from consolidated base status to guerrilla status, capacity and will were often too weak to administer complex reforms in systematic fashion. In other words, passive survival—defensive survival—was at least as important as what lay behind the heroic public images the Party projected. Systematic pacification in North China in late 1939 and 1940 radiated outward. It moved from areas held more or less firmly by the Japanese and their puppets into guerrilla and contested zones. The ultimate objective was to crush resistance or render it ineffective. The method was first to sweep the area clear of anti-Japanese elements, and then to establish a chain of interconnected strongpoints that could quickly reinforce one another. After that, puppet government would be expanded so it could take increasing responsibility for civil administration and "pacification maintenance," while Japanese forces repeated the initial steps further outward into contested territory. Violence was used selectively against individuals, groups, or villages accused of acts of resistance. This selective violence aimed to deter active participation in CCP-led programs, deprive Communist forces of a population willing to shelter them, and persuade informers to come forward. That was, at least, the theory of the strategy. In practice, the basic framework of the strategy depended on the main transport lines. Railways and roads—if properly fortified and protected—could separate resistance forces from one another and deny them one of their most effective weapons: mobility. These "cage" tactics (chiyu-lung, "jiu-lung") made it possible to enlarge pacified areas by "nibbling" outward, "as a silkworm feeds on mulberry leaves" (ts'an-shih). At the same time, the approach aimed to exploit North China's economy more effectively. To this end, the Japanese worked to improve and extend both railway and road networks. When the war began, in Shanxi the Cheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan) and Tong-Pu (Datong–Tongguan) lines were metre-gauge, incompatible with the standard-gauge lines elsewhere in China—part of Yan Xishan's design to prevent deeper penetration into his province. By the end of 1939, the Japanese used forced labor to convert both lines to standard gauge. One benefit was the easier transportation of high-quality anthracite coal from the Qingxing mines (on the Cheng-Tai line) to industrial users in North China and Manchukuo. Of the newly constructed roads and railway lines, the most important was the Te-Shih line—from Dezhou in northeastern Shandong to Shijiazhuang. Construction began in June 1940 and finished in November, connecting the Tianjin–Pukou, Beiping–Hankou, and Cheng-Tai lines. This made it easier to move troops and transport raw cotton. Once the Te–Shih link was completed, the Japanese had direct connections between the point of their furthest advance at the elbow of the Yellow River and all major cities of North China, and beyond to Manchukuo. Communist sources began to speak of a "transportation war," noting with concern the moats and ditches, the blockhouses, and the frequent patrols protecting the lines. Both militarily and economically, these measures weighed heavily on forces led by the Communists in North China and on the populations under their control—especially the plains of central and eastern Hebei. One indicator of effectiveness was the rapid decline in "acts of sabotage" against North China railways in 1939 and the first half of 1940. A cadre in Jin-Cha-Ji reported in mid-1940: "The enemy has adopted a blockhouse policy, like that of the Jiangxi Soviet. They are spread like a constellation. In central Hebei alone, there are about 500, separated by one to three miles." Normal trading patterns were disrupted as Japanese or puppet occupiers took over administrative and commercial centers, and peasants found themselves caught between regulations imposed by the Communists on one side and those enforced by the other side. Finally, landlords, moneylenders, loafers, bandits—everyone who felt damaged by the new order inside base areas—could use pacification programs to try to recover influence or simply take revenge. Some became informers. After 8RA and local units were driven away, they could kill remaining cadres or activists and settle scores with the peasants who had supported them. Until the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was defeated, local elites and other disaffected elements might also seek support from Nationalists. It was even possible for an armed band to operate for several months inside consolidated regions of the CCP base, killing cadres as it went. Peng Dehuai later recalled this period in a way that underscored how pressure translated into wavering and collapse. Under the enemy's brutal pressure, in some districts the masses even hesitated or capitulated. From March to July 1940, large areas of the North China base were reduced to guerrilla regions. Before the "Cage-bursting battle",, they controlled only two county seats: Pingxun in the Taihang mountains and Pien-kuan in northwest Shanxi. Masses who previously had one set of obligations now had two—one toward the anti-Japanese regime and one toward the puppet regime. The situation in North China had not yet become a full crisis, but it was certainly serious. Action was needed to regain initiative. On 22 July 1940, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan Deputy Chief of Staff jointly issued the Preliminary Battle Order, laying out the strategic goals for the coming operation. The order stated: "To respond to the enemy's 'prison cage policy,' obstruct its advance toward Xi'an, create favorable conditions in the North China theater, and strike at the national resistance initiative, we have decided to take advantage of the concealment provided by tall summer millet and the rainy season to carry out a large-scale sabotage operation on the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway (Zheng–Tai Line)." It required the participation of at least 22 regiments from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, the 129th Division, and the 120th Division. The main objective was to "completely destroy key points along the Zheng–Tai Line" and to "cut the railway for a prolonged period." On 8 August, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the Operational Battle Order, further clarifying how forces would be deployed. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region was assigned to attack the eastern section of the Zheng–Tai Railway (from Niangzi Pass to Shijiazhuang). The 129th Division was assigned the western section (from Niangzi Pass to Yuci). The 120th Division was tasked with targeting the northern segment of the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. The order also required all troops to begin combat operations on 20 August, and emphasized that "the success of the campaign should be assessed primarily by the extent of damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai Line." The operation was prepared under strict secrecy. Various elements of the Eighth Route Army conducted thorough preparations before the campaign. Reconnaissance teams, hidden and protected with the help of local villagers, penetrated deep into areas near the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway to carefully map Japanese strongholds, enemy troop dispositions, and local terrain. At the same time, both military and civilian communities mobilized to stockpile grain, ammunition, and tools needed for railway sabotage; blacksmiths were organized to manufacture crowbars, pickaxes, and other essential equipment. Specialized military training covered demolition methods and techniques for dismantling railways, including tactics such as heating and bending steel rails. Civilian mobilization played a crucial role: militia and support teams took on tasks such as transport, medical aid, and coordination with military units. In Central Shanxi alone, more than 10,000 militia members were mobilized. The Eighth Route Army headquarters repeatedly stressed the need for operational confidentiality, stating: "Before the battle begins, the plan must remain strictly classified; until preparations are completed, the campaign objective may be disclosed only to brigade-level commanders." With the cover of dense summer millet, troops secretly assembled within their designated operational areas. Before the battle, the Japanese North China Area Army estimated the strength of the communist regular forces at about 88,000 men in December 1939. Two years later, they revised the estimate to 140,000. On the eve of the battle, communist forces had grown to between 200,000 and 400,000 men, organized in 105 regiments. By 1940, the growth had become so significant that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regular units—46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th—against Japanese-held cities and the railway lines that connected them. According to the Communist Party's official statement, the battle began on 20 August.  On August 20, 1940, the rain didn't stop the campaign—it changed the battlefield. It slowed movement, blurred distance, and turned rivers and muddy roads into obstacles that could just as easily trap your own men as your enemy's. Along the districts bordering the Zhengtai Railway, the Eighth Route Army still moved, slipping through valleys and river crossings, bypassing Japanese posts, and positioning forces on both sides of the line as night settled in. By dark, the plan became a coordinated strike meant to hit the enemy before they could properly react. Across the entire Zhengtai Railway, attacks went out with timing designed to disorient Japanese defenders—so that their "first realization" arrived only after the railway itself was already being attacked and the window to respond effectively had slipped away.   A key portion of that strike fell to the right column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, centered on the 5th and 19th Regiments, with the mission of sabotaging the Niangziguan to Luanliu section. At 20:00 on August 20, part of the 5th Regiment infiltrated Niangziguan Village for the first time, overwhelmed the puppet troops stationed there, and seized the village by dawn. After that opening cut, the main force moved in to cover the engineers, destroy enemy fortifications, and blow up the Guandong Railway Bridge. When the sabotage was done, they withdrew from Niangziguan on their own initiative, leaving the enemy to deal with the destruction rather than being pulled into a long, grinding engagement.   That same night, at Mohe Beach along the Zhengtai line, another action unfolded. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked the station and was immediately met with a counterattack by Japanese forces. By dawn on August 21, the company withdrew—an adjustment, not defeat—and then attacked again the same night after crossing the Mian River. This time the enemy retreated into barracks to resist more stubbornly, with nearly 1,000 Japanese troops holding Mohe Beach. Heavy rain had swollen the river and made foot crossing nearly impossible, but the attackers seized the village west of the station and held it. On August 22 afternoon, more than 400 Japanese troops counterattacked; the main force of the 5th Regiment hit from the north bank of the Mian River in a fire assault, killing more than 50 before withdrawing the 1st Company out of the fighting. The 19th Regiment, meanwhile, took Jucheng and Irrang stations, tightening the pressure on the railway corridor.   On August 23, 1940, the 5th Regiment recaptured Niangziguan and blew up the stone bridge east of the village, destroying the railway segment between Chengjialongdi and Mohetan. That night the 19th Regiment stormed Yirang Station and blew up the water tower and the railway, ensuring the disruption would not be temporary. From August 24 to 27, bridges near Yanhui—stone and wooden—were destroyed again and again. Under that continuous pressure, beginning on August 25, Japanese transportation along the Niangziguan to Luanliu section of the Zhengtai Road was cut off completely. Strongholds were left to fight more or less alone, unable to coordinate or move supplies the way they normally would.   While the right column worked the railway, other forces hit the system from different angles. The Central Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region—comprised of the 2nd, 3rd, and 16th Regiments—took responsibility for sabotaging the Zhengtai Road segment from Niangziguan to Weishui and for striking the Jingxing Coal Mine area. On the night of August 20, the 3rd Regiment launched coordinated attacks on the Gangtou old mine and the Dongwangshe new mine of Jingxing, and with miners assisting, the 1st Battalion quickly stormed the new mine and annihilated part of the enemy garrison. The rest withdrew into bunkers, resisting as best they could. By the afternoon of the next day, the entire enemy force had been wiped out. Afterward, major buildings in the mining area were destroyed and most materials were removed so that the mine could not resume production for more than six months. The 3rd Regiment also captured Jiazhuang, reinforcing the idea that sabotage here meant disabling not just lines of movement, but also the flow of resources.   Elsewhere, Japanese positions were disrupted in smaller, targeted strikes that still added up. After the Japanese stronghold at Nanzheng destroyed the railway between Nanzheng and Weishui, the 2nd Regiment took the eastern end fortress of the Faluling Railway Bridge, covered the engineers as they blew up a section of the bridge, and briefly occupied Caizhuang. The 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment attacked Beiyu on the night of August 20, annihilating most defenders, and on August 21 it covered the engineers to destroy the Beiyu Stone Bridge. Other units struck Didu and annihilated most defenders in Nanyu. By August 24, the Central Column had learned that more than 1,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Jingxing County, with additional reinforcements moving toward Nanyu and Didu. Their response was practical: detachments were assigned to watch and harass along the railway while the main force gathered in mobile positions—waiting for the next opening rather than charging blindly into concentrated strength.   Meanwhile, the left column of the Jin-Cha-Ji effort—from the 2nd Regiment of the Jizhong Garrison Brigade, the Military Region Special Service Regiment, and the Pingjinghuo Detachment—focused on sabotage from Weishui to Shijiazhuang. On the night of August 20, the Pingjinghuo Detachment attacked Yanfeng and blew up the railway. The Special Service Regiment moved with massed efforts as they destroyed power lines and highways from Yanfeng to Weizhou. On the night of August 22, the Special Service Regiment attacked Shang'an Station. On August 23, the 2nd Regiment stormed Touquan Station, captured two fortresses, then withdrew from the railway line; from August 25 to 27, they destroyed the highway connecting Pingshan, Huolu, Weishui, and Yanfeng.   While the main blow was falling along the Zhengtai Railway, the 129th Division was assigned raids on the western section. That area included the Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4 headquarters, a coal mine base at Yangquan, and support from Independent Mixed Brigade No. 9 from Yuci. These raids weren't only about destruction—they were meant to disorient, to create confusion over where the main pressure truly was. After the general offensive began at 20:00 on August 20, five companies of the 16th Regiment attacked Lujiazhuang Station and captured bunkers. Two guerrilla-operating companies in Yuci worked with engineers to destroy bridges between Lujiazhuang and Duanting. The 38th Regiment surprised Shanghu and Heshangzu stations, while the 25th Regiment captured Mashou Station and pushed Japanese troops toward Shouyang. The division's right-wing sabotage unit—28th and 30th Regiments of the newly formed 10th Brigade—took on sabotage on the Yangquan–Shouyang section, splitting routes on the night of August 20 to attack stations like Langyu, Zhangjing, Qinquan, and then striking additional positions with the 30th Regiment. Across that window, stations and strongholds such as Sangzhang, Yanzigou, Langyu, and Qinquan were taken, iron bridges were destroyed, and additional stations including Potou, Xinzhuang, Saiyu, Tielugou, Xiaozhuang, and Zhangzhuang were seized or disrupted.   As the western sabotage deepened, Japanese response hardened—but the ability to coordinate weakened. With the Zhengtai line sabotaged, the western section came under the 129th Division's control except for a few places such as Shouyang. Fierce assaults forced Japanese forces to lose contact with each other within days. Strongholds were attacked, besieged, and then annihilated as communication and coordination broke down. The 129th Division mobilized local people to destroy railway facilities, stations, and installations using demolition, burning, and flooding, moving materials so the railway and related infrastructure were effectively erased rather than merely damaged.   To cover these operations, the division occupied Shinaoshan with the 14th Regiment of the general reserve. Starting the morning of August 21, Japanese forces concentrated in Yangquan and attacked Shinaoshan daily. Enemy strength reportedly rose from more than 200 to more than 600, supported by bombing and strafing and the release of poison. The 14th Regiment held out until August 25, repelling repeated attacks, and by August 26 additional pressure came again as reinforcements increased. After six days and nights—and the annihilation of more than 400 enemy soldiers—the 14th Regiment withdrew from the main peak of Shinaoshan, continuing to contain the Japanese with smaller detachments while the main force shifted to another mission.   The first phase of sabotage had succeeded, but the campaign did not allow complacency. The Japanese strengthened their presence along the railway and launched frequent counterattacks, and Japanese divisions in southern Shanxi—including the 36th, 37th, and 41st—prepared to reinforce from the north. On August 26, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued instructions for a second phase: continue breaking through the road, concentrate superior forces, and annihilate Japanese units smaller than a battalion that were attacking or reinforcing. In line with that guidance, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the Jin-You Column to keep breaking through the road on August 27 for one or two days, while the 129th Division alternated daily in breaking through. Under sustained pressure, the western section of the Zhengtai Road was basically destroyed; transportation was effectively cut off except for a few towns such as Shouyang and Yangquan.   On September 2, orders were issued to conclude the Zhengtai Campaign starting from the 3rd and shift forces according to the second-step plan. As the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region launched the Mengbei Campaign, the 129th Division shifted toward attacking invading Japanese forces, while other tasks—such as attacking the He-Liao Highway and recovering cities of He and Liao—were left for later. Beginning September 2, the Military Region deployed the 2nd, 5th, 16th, and 19th Regiments toward areas north of Meng County and Shouyang to recapture enemy strongholds. With the railway sabotaged, the Japanese main force north of Meng County shifted south to reinforce, weakening garrisons and spreading panic among the strongholds. As fierce offensives intensified, garrison troops began to waver. By the afternoon of September 5, Japanese troops at Xiashe, supported by troops from Shangshe, retreated to Shangshe and fled toward Meng County overnight. That night, the 19th Regiment arrived near Shangshe and, together with the Special Service Battalion of the 2nd Military Sub-district, pursued. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced into Shenquan and Putian to cut off the retreat route. By 9:00 AM on September 6 the enemy was surrounded in Xingdao Village, and after five hours of intense fighting most forces were annihilated. Survivors fled east to Luolizhang Mountain, only to be surrounded again by the 19th, 5th, and 16th Regiments. By the night of September 9, most Japanese forces had been wiped out, though more than 40 men broke through in dense fog and escaped into Meng County.   The siege continued through bitter episodes involving attacks and withdrawals under poison, with both sides paying heavily for every moment of progress. Eventually, on September 11, Japanese troops in Xiyan escaped back to Meng County, helped by more than 200 Japanese already present there. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to counter the pressure: on September 4 they sent more than 2,000 troops to reinforce Meng County and began a counterattack. On September 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the 19th and 5th Regiments to remain east and north of Meng County to coordinate with the 129th and 120th Divisions, while the rest prepared for new missions.   As fighting intensified around Zhengtai and Meng County, a parallel pressure campaign unfolded. To contain Eighth Route Army sabotage along Zhengtai, the Japanese assembled battalions from Independent Mixed 4th and 9th Brigades to strike the 129th Division. In response, the 120th Division began large-scale sabotage against the Tongpu Railway and major highways in northwestern Shanxi starting 20:00 on August 20. They captured enemy strongholds along rail and road lines, striking major bases such as Kangjiahui on the Xinjing Highway, where more than 50 Japanese and puppet troops were stationed, and also attacking other areas like Shishen, Lizhen, and Jingle. Ambushes were set to annihilate reinforcements arriving from different directions, and at 00:30 on August 21 the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment attacked Kangjiahui and annihilated the defenders by dawn. Reinforcements arriving in cars were destroyed, and subsequent actions continued to expand the disruption.   Over more than 180 battles in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division annihilated more than 800 Japanese and puppet troops and captured or destroyed stations and strongholds including Kangjiahui, Yangfangkou, Pingshe, and Longquan. By disrupting the Tongpu Railway and transportation along the Xinjing, Taifen, and Fenli highways, they tied down Japanese forces and made it harder to reinforce Zhengtai. In practical terms, this meant the first phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive—lasting about three weeks—ended on September 10 with major railway lines and motor roads attacked repeatedly. Roadbeds, bridges, switching yards, and installations were hit heavily; at the Qingxing coal mines, facilities were destroyed and production was halted for nearly a year.   By the end of that first phase, the campaign's logic had become clearer: once the Japanese leaned more heavily on a "cage-and-strongpoint" defense system, the same transport network that had supported their defense became less secure. When rail and road were repeatedly disrupted, strongpoints became more vulnerable—especially if Japanese units pulled out nearby detachments to respond to sabotage. So the campaign shifted from breaking transportation to attacking blockhouses and other strongpoints in contested areas, aiming to force Japanese forces back into well-defended garrisons and leave the countryside again contested by Communist forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. From 20 August 1940, under secrecy and rain, units of the 8th Route Army infiltrated stations, captured villages, destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, mines, and stations across multiple columns. By early September the Zhengtai and related Tongpu transport routes were repeatedly severed, forcing Japanese troops to fight isolated strongpoints and hindering reinforcement. 

“Very successful” is how President Trump is describing his historic state visit to China. He says China not only offered to help broker an end to the Iran conflict, but could also invest hundreds of billions of dollars into U.S. companies. From soybeans to jets, Trump says China's President Xi Jinping promised to buy more American goods, with Xi reportedly saying China would, quote, “open wider” to U.S. companies. Some of that money could flow into U.S. tech giants, with CEOs including Tim Cook, Elon Musk, and Jensen Huang joining the president in Beijing. But should corporate America be careful? For years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been accused of stealing American technology, intellectual property, and data—using U.S. innovation to fuel China's own rise. David Shedd, the former Acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and co-author of The Great Heist: China's Epic Campaign to Steal America's Secrets, joins FOX Business Network's Lydia Hu to discuss the risks U.S. companies take when doing business with China, the CCP's decades-long history of stealing America's advancements, and what businesses can do to protect their most precious secrets. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

“Very successful” is how President Trump is describing his historic state visit to China. He says China not only offered to help broker an end to the Iran conflict, but could also invest hundreds of billions of dollars into U.S. companies. From soybeans to jets, Trump says China's President Xi Jinping promised to buy more American goods, with Xi reportedly saying China would, quote, “open wider” to U.S. companies. Some of that money could flow into U.S. tech giants, with CEOs including Tim Cook, Elon Musk, and Jensen Huang joining the president in Beijing. But should corporate America be careful? For years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been accused of stealing American technology, intellectual property, and data—using U.S. innovation to fuel China's own rise. David Shedd, the former Acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and co-author of The Great Heist: China's Epic Campaign to Steal America's Secrets, joins FOX Business Network's Lydia Hu to discuss the risks U.S. companies take when doing business with China, the CCP's decades-long history of stealing America's advancements, and what businesses can do to protect their most precious secrets. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

“Very successful” is how President Trump is describing his historic state visit to China. He says China not only offered to help broker an end to the Iran conflict, but could also invest hundreds of billions of dollars into U.S. companies. From soybeans to jets, Trump says China's President Xi Jinping promised to buy more American goods, with Xi reportedly saying China would, quote, “open wider” to U.S. companies. Some of that money could flow into U.S. tech giants, with CEOs including Tim Cook, Elon Musk, and Jensen Huang joining the president in Beijing. But should corporate America be careful? For years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been accused of stealing American technology, intellectual property, and data—using U.S. innovation to fuel China's own rise. David Shedd, the former Acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and co-author of The Great Heist: China's Epic Campaign to Steal America's Secrets, joins FOX Business Network's Lydia Hu to discuss the risks U.S. companies take when doing business with China, the CCP's decades-long history of stealing America's advancements, and what businesses can do to protect their most precious secrets. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

It's time to fundamentally rethink America's approach to the Chinese Communist Party, argues Sam Brownback, former U.S. senator, Kansas governor, U.S. ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, and author of the new book “China's War on Faith.”Ahead of President Donald Trump's high-stakes summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, I'm sitting down with Brownback to understand what's really at stake and why he believes America is wasting the greatest leverage it has had.“I think we've just got to recognize: ... This is an evil regime. They've killed more of their own people than any other regime in the history of mankind, and we've been treating them like a normal country,” Brownback says.Brownback lays out the case that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently conducting three genocides—against the Uyghur Muslims, Falun Gong practitioners, and Tibetan Buddhists—through mass detention, torture, cultural eradication, and forced organ harvesting. At the same time, the regime is escalating its war on Christianity, arresting pastors, and crushing underground churches, Brownback says.Now, the CCP is also exporting the technologies it uses to surveil and persecute dissidents to at least 80 other countries, he says.For decades, human rights and religious freedom has been a “red line” for the Chinese regime that American leaders and diplomats have tiptoed around.But the reality is that human rights and religious freedom are the CCP's deepest vulnerability and insecurity—and America's most potent weapon and leverage against this regime, Brownback argues.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

Is America's food supply safe?

On this episode of the podcast, Amanda Head sits down with Levi Browde, executive director of the Falun Dafa Information Center, to uncover the story behind Shen Yun as it marks its 20th anniversary.Founded in 2006, Shen Yun was created to revive and preserve 5,000 years of traditional Chinese culture—heritage that Browde says has been systematically suppressed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Through a powerful series of 20 vignettes, the production brings ancient legends, spiritual traditions, and modern-day stories to life on stage.But behind the beauty is a darker reality. Browde details how Shen Yun and its performers have faced ongoing threats, including alleged sabotage efforts and intimidation tied to the CCP's broader crackdown, particularly against practitioners of Falun Gong.This conversation is about cultural survival, political pressure, and why Shen Yun has become a global symbol of resistance and awareness against authoritarian control.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Election integrity warrior, Army veteran, and Republican U.S. Senate candidate for Florida Chris Gleason (@immutablechrist) is sounding the alarm on a full-scale Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence operation infiltrating Sunshine State politics at every level. In explosive recent posts, Gleason exposes how CCP-linked shell corporations — including money funneled through iGas USA and tied to Chinese state-owned entities like Zhejiang Juhua — have laundered millions into Florida campaigns and committees via sophisticated "smurfing" networks using ActBlue, WinRed, Democracy Engine, and more.His forensic analysis shows both leading 2026 Florida Senate contenders compromised: Attorney General Ashley Moody receiving criminally laundered CCP and corporate cash, and Alex Vindman taking CCP and Soros-linked funds. Gleason doesn't mince words — he calls it straight-up treason, declaring neither is fit for public office. From voting machines with CCP-compromised components to full infiltration of the Republican Party of Florida (RPOF), Gleason lays out the evidence that has already prompted FEC complaints, sworn statements to FDLE investigators, and national attention.As the data expert who built the “Smurf Hunter” tools exposing massive money laundering operations — triggering responses from Sen. Marco Rubio, Texas AG Ken Paxton, and even a Presidential Memorandum — Gleason is now running for U.S. Senate to take the fight from the outside straight into the Capitol and finish the job of cleaning house. This isn't politics as usual. This is foreign ownership of American government.Tune in as we break down the charts, the money trail, the bipartisan betrayal, and why Chris Gleason believes common sense demands we stop treating CCP-controlled donations as “American values.”This is Steel News where truth survives pressure.Guest / Focus: Chris Gleason, Candidate for U.S. Senate, Florida 2026 https://x.com/immutablechristFollow: ANN VANDERSTEEL https://AnnVandersteel.comOn Pickax - https://pickax.com/annvandersteel

New evidence is emerging on how a China-based billionaire is funding unrest on the streets in the United States. Key organizations behind major protests could be puppets of a broader strategy, and a new investigation from Fox News Digital has shown that around 2,000 organizations directly work on propaganda across the United States, with messages that align with what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants.We'll discuss this topic and others in this episode of “Crossroads.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Pastor Bob Fu was a student leader during the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement and later led an underground Chinese house church. In 1996, he was imprisoned for “illegal evangelism.”He later fled China and came to the United States, where he founded ChinaAid, a Christian human‑rights organization that documents cases of persecution, provides legal aid, and advocates for religious freedom in China.In this episode, we dive into the escalation of religious persecution in recent years in China, including the growing dehumanization of Christians.Echoing Mao Zedong's targeting of “five black classes” during the Cultural Revolution, in 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders labelled Christian underground churches as one of five new “black classes” or black categories.Fu says that the CCP's leadership is determined to destroy the positive image that Chinese people have of Christian believers.“Xi Jinping wants to play God,” Fu says. “The Communist Party treats these people as a threat to the regime's existence. The goal is to eradicate Christian faith from the map of China.”We also discuss a case now at the Supreme Court, Cisco v. Doe, which could have important repercussions for American companies that enable China's human rights atrocities.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

“The U.S. went to war in Iran because Iran made itself a Chinese weapon,” argues policy analyst Zineb Riboua, a research fellow at Hudson Institute's Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East.Riboua is the founder of the “China in MENA Project,” which tracks communist Chinese expansion and influence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).Is there a bigger dimension to the Iran war that people are missing?“We have this tendency to just look at the countries involved ... but there's a big player, and the big player here is China,” she says. “China has been investing immensely in the region in the last two decades, in courting, in coordinating, in cooperating with Gulf countries, with Iran itself, and also with its proxies.”And why, I ask her, has China been so keen on gaining strategic influence over the Middle East?It's because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) understands that “China cannot rise without having the United States weakened in one of the most important regions in the world,” she said.“Iran has been that tool. China has built Iran's military arsenal. It has collaborated extensively with Iran's proxies, especially the Houthis.“And reversing that calculus is what Operation Epic Fury is doing.”In our interview, we delve deep into the symbiotic relationship between the two countries—why China needs Iran and why Iran needs China:Which role does Iran play on China's geopolitical chessboard?Why did China turn Iran into one of its strategic allies, and how did the Islamic Republic benefit?How dependent is the Iranian regime on China's military support and surveillance infrastructure?How dependent is China on Iran's oil?The goal of America's military operation, Riboua believes, is to dismantle the whole structure of the Islamic Republic. “The United States is destroying ... every single launcher, every single missile facility. Their whole Navy has been absolutely crushed. ... It's 2,000 targets so far, and they're hitting even more.”We also discuss what the Chinese regime will do if the Islamic Republic disappears.How will its geopolitical strategy be impacted? What will happen to the CCP's Belt and Road initiative, in which Iran played a central role? And how will China's economy and its relationships with its Middle Eastern and North African proxies be affected?Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Within just a few days, the United States working with Israel has destroyed Iran's military force. Defense systems provided to the regime by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were destroyed, Iran's fleet of warships was sunk, and its leadership was killed in targeted strikes. The show of force has reasserted the fighting prowess of the United States, and also put a serious dent in the global plans of the CCP.We'll discuss this topic and others in this episode of Crossroads.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

The war with Iran is closing multiple fronts for Israel, but the strategic aftershocks — from a resurgent Sunni Islamist movement to a fracturing Jordan — may reshape the Middle East for decades. The current conflict is not an isolated campaign against Tehran but the catalyst for a broader regional realignment, with “the haunting black cloud over the West” finally lifting, Dr. David Wurmser told a Jewish Policy Center webinar on March 5, 2026. Wurmser, a senior analyst for Middle East Affairs at the Center for Security Policy and a former senior advisor at the White House and State Department, began with Lebanon, where Hezbollah had provoked Israel by launching missiles — what he called submitting “the winning entry for this year's Darwin Awards.” Hezbollah is not its own front, he argued, but an extension of the broader Iranian war, and Israel intends to see the fight through to the end. Northern Israeli towns remain largely depopulated, and every Israeli knows the war was unfinished. The Sunni Threat After Iran While the Iranian regime is being brought down, a dangerous Sunni Islamist bloc is taking shape. The new government in Damascus represents the first time Arab Islamic forces have controlled that city in a thousand years — evoking the Umayyad Caliphate of 1,300 years ago and “creating a civilizational confidence that the Turks are buying into.” Wurmser identified a strategic triad of Turkey under Erdogan, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood as the animating force, one that also maintains ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through the Belt and Road initiative. Qatar is trying to reposition itself after refusing US airspace and attempting to sabotage wartime diplomacy. Having chosen the losing side, the Qataris now want to claim credit for an American victory. Meanwhile, Tehran is deliberately stoking Sunni-Shiite tensions to frighten its own population into rallying behind the regime — a desperate strategy Wurmser said would likely fail. Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq Egypt is navigating between rival camps, and the long-term trajectory is troubling. President al-Sisi recognizes that the military rank and file are sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, and Cairo has been drifting toward Turkey on issues from the Horn of Africa to North Africa. Egypt's peace with Israel, Wurmser argued, has always been anchored to its desire to be part of the American alliance — a commitment that eroded under Presidents Obama and Biden but that President Trump has helped shore up by reasserting American leadership. Jordan faces an even more immediate danger. Forces aligned with the Damascus government and the Muslim Brotherhood are fracturing the tribal structure that forms the regime's core, pulling Iraqi tribes away from their traditional Hashemite alignment. Iraq, by contrast, may benefit from Iran's fall: traditional Shiism could reemerge, Iranian-backed militias are being targeted by US and Israeli operations, and the 20-year Iraqi conundrum — which Wurmser characterized as an Iranian-sponsored insurgency rather than an Iraqi one — may finally see resolution. Israel's Post-War Horizon Drawing a historical parallel to the United States between 1865 and 1890, Wurmser argued that Israel is entering a transformative era. The external wars that defined its first 80 years are winding down, and the country is poised for significant immigration, demographic growth, and “civilizational solidity.” He pointed to an emerging alignment of Israel, India, and Japan — “the League of Rising Ancients” — three ancient, democratic nations that have reconciled tradition with modernity, forming a strategic arc that boxes in Chinese and Turkish ambitions from the south. The 47-year Iranian threat is nearing its end, he concluded, calling the coming resolution “almost as big as the Berlin Wall” and a major blow to China. Israel and the United States are being handed a circumstance of immense positive potential — if they are prepared to seize it. Written with AI assistance and may contain errors. 

America's national debt has reached a breaking point, and interest rates could cause a spiral that becomes even harder to break from.In other news, internet routers from TP-Link are being accused of giving a backdoor to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). And now, Texas is suing them.We'll discuss these topics and others in this episode of Crossroads.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

A 59-year-old Falun Dafa practitioner from Hebei Province, China, recounts her experiences of persecution since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) banned the practice in 1999. Despite facing arrest, detention, and harassment, she remained steadfast in her belief and continued to practice. Her unwavering faith and determination to validate the goodness of Dafa inspired her family and community. This and other experience-sharing from the Minghui website.Original Articles:1. China Fahui | Nothing Can Stop Me from Practicing Falun Dafa2. China Fahui | A Cultivator Shall Let Go of Every Human Attachment To provide feedback on this podcast, please email us at feedback@minghuiradio.org

The Chinese government under Xi Jinping placed an estimated one million Uyghurs in concentration camps, subjecting them to forced labor and other horrific abuses. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also destroyed or modified mosques all as part of a “sinicization” policy to assimilate by force or to eliminate perceived non-CCP influences and ethnic minority communities. U.S. government responses have included sanctions; legislation, such as the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act; and the determination that the CCP is committing “genocide against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.”On this episode of the USCIRF Spotlight Podcast, Chair Vicky Hartzler speaks with Jewher Ilham, a Uyghur advocate, author, and filmmaker, and Adrian Zenz, Senior Fellow and Director in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation.

Some good news to share on Feb. 12, 2026. One of the major hopes for OUR European future comes from a whole lot of non-Europeans who are fighting like hell to free their own country from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These are the millions of very courageous Chinese adherents to an organization they formed called “Falun Gong”. One evidence of their dedication to ending the biggest threat to their survival, and to OUR survival, the CCP, is manifest in the best paper newspaper in the world, The Epoch Times, which they publish out of Washington, D.C. and New York. You can read much of this best paper in the world for free at https://theepochtimes.com. For a modest price you can read the whole paper online. Or, you can go for the magnificent whole deal as I have, and subscribe to the 44-page full newspaper for $3 a week. Mine arrives every Friday in my mailbox like clockwork. The newspaper is SO good, and SO chock=full of everything one would want to know, that I have yet to read an entire The Epoch Times in about ten years!https://x.com/i/status/1976326059500109846

Was there a FAILED attempted coup in Beijing?When purges happen at the top in China, it's rarely about loyalty failing overnight.It's about perceptions shifting—and Guānxì (关系) no longer being enough.Recent earth-shattering removals of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli aren't just political headlines. They're reminders of a rule foreigners often miss:In China, relationships open doors—but they don't shield you when power dynamics realign.My experiences are a microcosm and can be an invaluable lesson for those venturing inside the Chinese arena, "Is Guānxì Enough? Unveiling the Hidden Dynamics of Chinese Relationships & Power." What feels like trust can coexist with quiet threat. What looks stable can become untenable the moment incentives, narratives, or perceived risks change.At senior levels, Guānxì is structural, conditional, and constantly reassessed. The question is never who you know—it's who you are perceived to be now.The same logic plays out in business, leadership, and politics.What scales up is the psychology.Once you understand why Guānxì alone doesn't protect anyone—on the ground or at the top—you'll be one step closer to understanding "How China Works."#ChinaCrisis #ChinaPolitics #CCP #ChineseCulture #Guanxi #ChinaBusinessWatch on YouTube: https://youtu.be/abWot5Ori0A

Newt talks with Xi Van Fleet about her new book, “Made in America: The Hidden History of How the U.S. Enabled Communist China and Created Our Greatest Threat” co-authored with Yu Jie. Her book explores the historical connections between the United States and the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), emphasizing the role of the U.S. in enabling China's current global ambitions. Xi is a prominent anti-communist voice and gained national attention with a speech to the Loudoun County, Virginia school board comparing critical race theory to Mao's cultural revolution, highlighting the dangers of Marxist ideologies in America. They discuss the parallels between identity politics in the U.S, and class divisions in Maoist China, warning of the potential loss of freedom if these ideologies continue to spread. They also discuss the indoctrination occurring within American educational institutions. They conclude with concerns about the CCP's influence, and the internal threats posed by communist ideologies within the United States.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

State Senate President and Republican candidate for Attorney General, Warren Petersen (LD14) opens the show live and in person for discussion with Seth on Attorney General Kris Mayes’ recent comments implying it was lawful to shoot masked U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers due to Arizona’s Stand Your Ground laws. Get involved in his campaign for Attorney General today at www.petersenforag.com! We're joined by John Dombroski, founder and president of Grand Canyon Planning Associates. The Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) have cozied up to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this episode of the Kelsi Sheren Perspective, Kelsi passionately discusses the dangers of Canada potentially partnering with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). She expresses her concerns about the implications of such a partnership, drawing parallels to historical authoritarian regimes and emphasizing the need for Canadians to recognize the reality of the CCP's oppressive nature. Kelsi argues that the Canadian government is ignoring the lessons of history and the stark differences between democratic freedoms and the authoritarian practices of China. She urges listeners to educate themselves about the realities of life under the CCP and to take action against the growing influence of communism in Canada.00:00 Introduction and Show Growth02:57 The Dangers of Partnering with China09:00 China's Environmental Hypocrisy12:08 Chinese Interference in Canadian Affairs15:15 The Reality of Trade with Authoritarian Regimes19:36 The Consequences of Complacency - - - - - - - - - - - -One Time Donation! - Paypal - https://paypal.me/brassandunityBuy me a coffee! - https://buymeacoffee.com/kelsisherenLet's connect!Youtube - https://www.youtube.com/@thekelsisherenperspectiveInstagram -  https://www.instagram.com/thekelsisherenperspective?utm_source=ig_web_button_share_sheet&igsh=ZDNlZDc0MzIxNw%3D%3DX: https://x.com/KelsiBurnsInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/kelsie_sheren/Substack:  https://substack.com/@kelsisherenTikTok -   https://x.com/KelsiBurnsListen on Spotify - https://open.spotify.com/show/1O3yiobOjThKHtqyjviy1a?si=6c78bdc2325a43aeSUPPORT OUR SPONSORS - - - - - - - - - - - -MasterPeace - 10% off with code KELSI - MasterPeace.Health/KelsiKetone IQ- 30% off with code KELSI - https://ketone.com/KELSIGood Livin - 20% off with code KELSI - https://www.itsgoodlivin.com/?ref=KELSIBrass & Unity - 20% off with code UNITY  - http://brassandunity.com- - - - - - - - - - - - -CHARITYHeroic Hearts Project - https://www.heroicheartsproject.orgDefenders of Freedom - https://www.defendersoffreedom.usBoot Campaign - https://bootcampaign.org

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has now surrounded Taiwan with warships and is holding live-fire exercises. The move is directed at U.S. support for Taiwan and is taking place as the CCP pushes its agenda to take the island by force.In other news, the FBI is focusing on the Somali scam rings in Minnesota, and in a new update announced that fraudsters of Somali origin who have become American citizens may be denaturalized and deported.We'll discuss these topics, and others, in this episode of Crossroads.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and guests, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

The Dean's List with Host Dean Bowen – “Under President Biden, CCP influence in our country—including our schools—grew unchecked. Republicans are reversing that damage.” The GOP recently put its spine on display with an announcement regarding the passage of several bills this week aimed at blocking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence in K–12 schools...

PREVIEW — Bruce Bechtol — China's Role in Supplying Dual-Use Technology to North Korea and the Axis. Bechtolexamines China's critical role in sustaining North Korea's military-industrial complex, particularly since 2019 when international sanctions enforcement effectively ceased. China supplies dual-use technologies and component parts, frequently procured through illicit channels, directly to North Korea, thereby reinforcing the axis of revisionist states comprising Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Chinese companies involved in these transfers maintain direct linkages to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), operating as instruments of state policy. 1951

CrowdStrike research into AI coding assistants reveals a new, subtle vulnerability surface: When DeepSeek-R1 receives prompts the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) likely considers politically sensitive, the likelihood of it producing code with severe security flaws increases by up to 50%. Stefan Stein, manager of the CrowdStrike Counter Adversary Operations Data Science team, joined Adam and Cristian for a live recording at Fal.Con 2025 to discuss how this project got started, the methodology behind the team's research, and the significance of their findings. The research began with a simple question: What are the security risks of using DeepSeek-R1 as a coding assistant? AI coding assistants are commonly used and often have access to sensitive information. Any systemic issue can have a major and far-reaching impact.  It concluded with the discovery that the presence of certain trigger words — such as mentions of Falun Gong, Uyghurs, or Tibet — in DeepSeek-R1 prompts can have severe effects on the quality and security of the code it produces. Unlike most large language model (LLM) security research focused on jailbreaks or prompt injections, this work exposes subtle biases that can lead to real-world vulnerabilities in production systems. Tune in for a fascinating deep dive into how Stefan and his team explored the biases in DeepSeek-R1, the implications of this research, and what this means for organizations adopting AI. 

The United States is moving toward a larger break from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This emerging reality came to the forefront during a key meeting between President Donald Trump and CCP leader Xi Jinping. While they were able to make a deal, the broader picture suggests the countries will move further apart.We'll discuss this topic, and others, in this episode of Crossroads.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and guests, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

What if the most potent weapon that America has against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) isn't nukes or tariffs?“This isn't a competition between the largest economy and the second largest economy. This is a competition of ideals—and we've got the better ones,” says former Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback.“If you want to hit them where it hurts, hit them on human rights issues, genocides in their own country, religious freedom that they don't grant any of their people—whether they be Buddhist, Muslim, Falun Gong, Christians. That's where they're the weakest. It's where they're the most vulnerable.”Ahead of President Donald Trump's expected meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, I sat down with Brownback to understand what he sees as the Chinese regime's greatest vulnerabilities, its deepest fears, and how those can be strategically leveraged by the United States.Brownback is co-chair of the International Religious Freedom Summit. He previously served as governor of Kansas from 2011 to 2018 and as a U.S. senator from Kansas, 1996 to 2011. His upcoming book is titled, “China's War on Faith.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Rep. John Moolenaar (R-Mich.) has been spearheading efforts in Congress to combat the threat posed by the Chinese regime to American interests—from economic warfare to espionage and infiltration—as chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party.“With rare earths, China is basically firing a loaded gun ... on our economy,” he says.He's pushing a bill that would phase in a 100 percent tariff on all strategic goods from China. The tariff would not just penalize China but also incentivize “other countries, as well as the United States, to invest in this almost as if it's a Defense Production Act activity.”Beyond rare earth minerals, what leverage does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have exactly in trade talks with the United States? What will the CCP's strategy be? How should President Donald Trump respond to the CCP's coercive tactics and its recent attempts to gain additional leverage?And what can America do to extricate itself from its dependence on China for some of its most critical manufacturing technologies?Moolenaar points out that the CCP is using its leverage not only over trade but also over Chinese nationals studying or working in America via its extensive United Front operations.“Under their recent national security laws, any Chinese national who doesn't carry out the will of the Chinese Communist Party, no matter where they are in the world, on U.S. soil or somewhere else in the world, [is] in violation of national security laws,” Moolenaar says.On the other hand, is the position of the CCP really secure? And what about Chinese leader Xi Jinping's position in particular? What signs of dissatisfaction and unrest are there among the Chinese population?Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Fentanyl Cash Laundering and the Role of Chinese Nationals. Josh Birenbaum (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) discusses with John Batchelor the challenge of laundering the enormous amounts of cash generated by fentanyl drug smugglers and drug lords. This multibillion-dollar process often utilizes Chinese nationals residing in the United States. Because of capital controls imposed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), diaspora populations use internet chat rooms and WeChat to find opportunities to access dollars. Drug cartels capitalize on this by giving the Chinese nationals money to spend lavishly, thus laundering the drug cash. While these individuals may know they are circumventing CCP controls, they usually do not know the illegal origin of the funds which ultimately finance the cartels.

Xi Jinping may no longer be in charge of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). A series of top level purges within the Chinese military has removed key loyalists of Xi, in what looks like a power grab against the communist leader.In other news, the United States has signed a deal with Australia on the production of rare earth elements. And alongside this, details are being exposed on how the CCP manufactured a global monopoly on the key materials.We'll discuss these topics and others, in this episode of “Crossroads.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and guests, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Chinese Communist Party Turmoil Following Removal of Seven Top Generals. Charles Burton comments on turmoil in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership following the simultaneous removal of seven top generals for corruption, reported after the gathering of the Fourth Plenum in Beijing. Burton suggests that these senior communists, potentially acting patriotically, may be representing the interests of China and the Chinese people in the face of Xi Jinping's "disastrous leadership." Xi is criticized for his handling of domestic economics and the terrible downturn in relations with the United States, which negatively impacts China. Regardless of whether this signals a successful crackdown on dissent, it indicates serious problems between Mr. Xi—who is reportedly very corrupt himself—and the military.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recently imposed unprecedented export controls on rare earths, escalating the U.S.–China trade war.How is it that the Chinese regime managed to gain control of many of the most essential supply chains, from critical minerals to pharmaceuticals? How should the Trump administration approach this threat to national security?In this episode, we sit down with Lee Smith, author of “The Plot Against the President,” and the soon-to-be-released book, “The China Matrix: The Epic Story of How Donald Trump Shattered a Deadly Pact.”“It was simply American corruption that has allowed all of this to happen. And that's certainly the point that [U.S. President] Donald Trump makes in the book,” Smith says.What is Trump's strategy when it comes to China? How does he actually view Chinese leader Xi Jinping?Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.Editor's Note: Lee Smith previously hosted the EpochTV program “Words That Matter.”

On this episode of Rich Valdes America at Night, Rep. Jimmy Patronis (R-FL) joins Rich to discuss the looming government shutdown, the latest peace deal developments, and the biggest stories from the weekend. Gordon Chang, author of Plan Red: China's Project to Destroy America, breaks down the escalating Trump-China trade war over rare earth minerals and what it means for global markets., and to discuss how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) weaponized narco-terrorists to engage in drug-warfare to destabilize the United States through addiction and overdose.Then, Ammon Blair, Senior Fellow at the Texas Public Policy Foundation and former U.S. Border Patrol agent, examines new data showing National Guard readiness concerns and explains why cartels should be considered unlawful combatants in America's border security strategy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

In a moment that stunned the world, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping were recently caught on a hot mic talking about increasing longevity and even achieving immortality through repeated organ transplants.For the last two decades, we've been reporting how the CCP kills prisoners of conscience, the main body of them being Falun Gong practitioners, for their organs.Joining me today to unpack the significance of this moment and what it teaches us about the inner workings of the CCP is Epoch Times senior investigative journalist Joshua Philipp, host of EpochTV's “Crossroads.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Political economist Chenggang Xu grew up amid the upheaval of China's Cultural Revolution and in the 1970s was beaten, imprisoned, and subjected to years of forced labor by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).Today, he is a senior research scholar at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions, a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and author of the new book, “Institutional Genes: Origins of China's Institutions and Totalitarianism.”For decades, Beijing has repeatedly deceived the world about its true intentions, Xu says. So why do we keep falling for it?In this episode, we dive into the origins of the Chinese Communist Party and why Xu believes its model of totalitarianism is distinct from any other regime today.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

RUMOURS OF XI JINPING'S UPCOMING REBUKE JUST LIKE HIS FATHER: 1/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of XI Zhongxun, Father of XI Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by  Joseph Torigian  (Author) https://www.amazon.com.au/Partys-Interests-Come-First-Zhongxun/dp/1503634752/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0 1949 XI ZHONGXUN China's leader, Xi Jinping, is one Cf the most powerful individuals inCtheCworld--and one of the least understood. Much can be learned, however, about both Xi Jinping and the nature of the party he leads from the memory and legacy of his father, the revolutionary Xi Zhongxun (1913-2002). The elder Xi served the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more than seven decades. He worked at the right hand of prominent leaders Zhou Enlai and Hu Yaobang. He helped build the Communist base area that saved Mao Zedong in 1935, and he initiated the Special Economic Zones that launched China into the reform era after Mao's death. He led the Party's United Front efforts toward Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Taiwanese. And though in 1989 he initially sought to avoid violence, he ultimately supported the Party's crackdown on the Tiananmen protesters. The Party's Interests Come First is the first biography of Xi Zhongxun written in English. This biography is at once a sweeping story of the Chinese revolution and the first several decades of the People's Republic of China and a deeply personal story about making sense of one's own identity within a larger political context. Drawing on an array of new documents, interviews, diaries, and periodicals, Joseph Torigian vividly tells the life story of Xi Zhongxun, a man who spent his entire life struggling to balance his own feelings with the Party's demands. Through the eyes of Xi Jinping's father, Torigian reveals the extraordinary organizational, ideological, and coercive power of the CCP--and the terrible cost in human suffering that comes with it.

Bryan Kohberger—the man who killed four University of Idaho students in 2022—is expected to be sentenced to four consecutive life terms. He was arrested six weeks after the killings and charged with four counts of first-degree murder. Kohberger pleaded guilty earlier this month and faces the victims' families at his sentencing hearing on Wednesday.The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is holding a hearing on Wednesday to discuss strategies for countering the CCP's economic coercion against democracies around the world. Former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel are set to testify.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is deploying a robust campaign to manipulate American society, media, and government, trying to turn U.S. institutions against CCP critics and even fellow Americans. For decades, the CCP has systematically infiltrated our political systems, businesses, and institutions to subvert America from within. The CCP's alarming new tactics focus on the manipulation of American media and legal systems, and constitute a test run for how Beijing can influence, or even dictate, what we can do and what we believe.

For decades, we've been reporting on the ways the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) crushes the religious freedom of its citizens. But in recent years, the CCP has been escalating its tactics against a religious group here—on American soil.In this episode, I sit down with religious freedom lawyers Justin Butterfield and Lea Patterson to understand what's going on and discuss their response to a recent lawsuit against Shen Yun, the performing arts company founded by Falun Gong practitioners in New York. The case touches on vital questions about what it means to be able to practice your faith—and guide the education of your children in America.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guests and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

SHOW SCHEDULE TUESDAY 17 JUNE, 2025. Good evening: The show begins IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM at the Federal Reserve, waiting for the Fed board to see data that move it to reduce the high rate of borrowing -- the cost of money... 1917 EDERAL RESERVE BOARD https://substack.com/profile/222380536-john-batchelor?utm_source=global-search CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR FIRST HOUR 9:00-9:15 #Markets: What is the Fed waiting to see? Liz Peek The Hill. Fox News and Fox Business 9:15-9:30 #Markets: What was "No Kings?" Liz Peek The Hill. Fox News and Fox Business 9:30-9:45 1/2: Iran: The nuclear weapons makers. Andrea Stricker FDD 9:45-10:00 2/2: Iran: The nuclear weapons makers. Andrea Stricker FDD SECOND HOUR 10:00-10:15 #Berlin: Chancellor Merz success so far. Judy Dempsey, Senior Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Berlin. 10:15-10:30 #EU: Global Euro and its possibility. Judy Dempsey, Senior Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Berlin. 10:30-10:45 Harvard: The fail of 2020. Peter Berkowitz, Hoover Institution 10:45-11:00 PRC: Quiet remarks about its Iran oil supplier and weapons customer. Jack Burnham, FDD THIRD HOUR 11:00-11:15 #AUKUS at the G-7: Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs 11:15-11:30 #ECOWAS: In failure. Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs 11:30-11:45 Iran: After the fall down. Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs 11:45-12:00 Charles III: Modern kingship works. Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs FOURTH HOUR 12:00-12:15 5/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by Joseph Torigian (Author) https://www.amazon.com.au/Partys-Interests-Come-First-Zhongxun/dp/1503634752/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0 China's leader, Xi Jinping, is one of the most powerful individuals in the world—and one of the least understood. Much can be learned, however, about both Xi Jinping and the nature of the party he leads from the memory and legacy of his father, the revolutionary Xi Zhongxun (1913-2002). The elder Xi served the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more than seven decades. He worked at the right hand of prominent leaders Zhou Enlai and Hu Yaobang. He helped build the Communist base area that saved Mao Zedong in 1935, and he initiated the Special Economic Zones that launched China into the reform era after Mao's death. He led the Party's United Front efforts toward Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Taiwanese. And though in 1989 he initially sought to avoid violence, he ultimately supported the Party's crackdown on the Tiananmen protesters. The Party's Interests Come First is the first biography of Xi Zhongxun written in English. This biography is at once a sweeping story of the Chinese revolution and the first several decades of the People's Republic of China and a deeply personal story about making sense of one's own identity within a larger political context. Drawing on an array of new documents, interviews, diaries, and periodicals, Joseph Torigian vividly tells the life story of Xi Zhongxun, a man who spent his entire life struggling to balance his own feelings with the Party's demands. Through the eyes of Xi Jinping's father, Torigian reveals the extraordinary organizational, ideological, and coercive power of the CCP—and the terrible cost in human suffering that comes with it. 12:15-12:30 6/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by Joseph Torigian (Author) 12:30-12:45 7/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by Joseph Torigian (Author) 12:45-1:00 8/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by Joseph Torigian (Author)

5/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of XI Zhongxun, Father of XI Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by  Joseph Torigian  (Author) https://www.amazon.com.au/Partys-Interests-Come-First-Zhongxun/dp/1503634752/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0 1949 XI ZHONGXUN China's leader, Xi Jinping, is one Cf the most powerful individuals inCtheCworld--and one of the least understood. Much can be learned, however, about both Xi Jinping and the nature of the party he leads from the memory and legacy of his father, the revolutionary Xi Zhongxun (1913-2002). The elder Xi served the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more than seven decades. He worked at the right hand of prominent leaders Zhou Enlai and Hu Yaobang. He helped build the Communist base area that saved Mao Zedong in 1935, and he initiated the Special Economic Zones that launched China into the reform era after Mao's death. He led the Party's United Front efforts toward Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Taiwanese. And though in 1989 he initially sought to avoid violence, he ultimately supported the Party's crackdown on the Tiananmen protesters. The Party's Interests Come First is the first biography of Xi Zhongxun written in English. This biography is at once a sweeping story of the Chinese revolution and the first several decades of the People's Republic of China and a deeply personal story about making sense of one's own identity within a larger political context. Drawing on an array of new documents, interviews, diaries, and periodicals, Joseph Torigian vividly tells the life story of Xi Zhongxun, a man who spent his entire life struggling to balance his own feelings with the Party's demands. Through the eyes of Xi Jinping's father, Torigian reveals the extraordinary organizational, ideological, and coercive power of the CCP--and the terrible cost in human suffering that comes with it.

The National Security Hour with Al Johnson – This week, three major events shook the world: riots gripping U.S. cities, escalating global conflicts, and a shocking move by President Trump that some claim hands the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a dangerous advantage. What a week! Each of these events demands deeper discussion on this week's National Security Hour with Al Johnson...

1/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of XI Zhongxun, Father of XI Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by  Joseph Torigian  (Author) https://www.amazon.com.au/Partys-Interests-Come-First-Zhongxun/dp/1503634752/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0 China's leader, Xi Jinping, is one Cf the most powerful individuals inCtheCworld--and one of the least understood. Much can be learned, however, about both Xi Jinping and the nature of the party he leads from the memory and legacy of his father, the revolutionary Xi Zhongxun (1913-2002). The elder Xi served the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more than seven decades. He worked at the right hand of prominent leaders Zhou Enlai and Hu Yaobang. He helped build the Communist base area that saved Mao Zedong in 1935, and he initiated the Special Economic Zones that launched China into the reform era after Mao's death. He led the Party's United Front efforts toward Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Taiwanese. And though in 1989 he initially sought to avoid violence, he ultimately supported the Party's crackdown on the Tiananmen protesters. The Party's Interests Come First is the first biography of Xi Zhongxun written in English. This biography is at once a sweeping story of the Chinese revolution and the first several decades of the People's Republic of China and a deeply personal story about making sense of one's own identity within a larger political context. Drawing on an array of new documents, interviews, diaries, and periodicals, Joseph Torigian vividly tells the life story of Xi Zhongxun, a man who spent his entire life struggling to balance his own feelings with the Party's demands. Through the eyes of Xi Jinping's father, Torigian reveals the extraordinary organizational, ideological, and coercive power of the CCP--and the terrible cost in human suffering that comes with it. 1910 MAO

Good evening: The show begins in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania with POTUS leading the steelworks in celebration of renovated mills. CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR 1904 PITTSBURGH FIRST HOUR 9:00-9:15 #KeystoneReport: Air Force One to West Mifflin PA. Salena Zito, Middle of Somewhere, @dcexaminer, salenazito.com 9:15-9:30 #PacificWatch: #VegasReport: Hollywood turned back. @jcbliss 9:30-9:45 #SmallBusinessAmerica: Slowing. @genemarks @guardian @phillyinquirer 9:45-10:00 #SmallBusinessAmerica: Optimism. @genemarks @guardian @phillyinquirer SECOND HOUR 10:00-10:15 #Ukraine: 101st Airborne D-Day veteran speaks. Colonel Jeff McCausland, USA (Retired) @mccauslj @cbsnews @dickinsoncol 10:15-10:30 #Ukraine: Is the IDF overstretched overtasked? Colonel Jeff McCausland, USA (Retired) @mccauslj @cbsnews @dickinsoncol 10:30-10:45 1/2: SCOTUS; Guns and hiring and worship, 9-0. Richard Epstein, Civitas 10:45-11:00 2/2: SCOTUS; Guns and hiring and worship, 9-0. Richard Epstein, Civitas Institute THIRD HOUR 11:00-11:15 1/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by Joseph Torigian (Author) https://www.amazon.com.au/Partys-Interests-Come-First-Zhongxun/dp/1503634752/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0 China's leader, Xi Jinping, is one of the most powerful individuals in the world--and one of the least understood. Much can be learned, however, about both Xi Jinping and the nature of the party he leads from the memory and legacy of his father, the revolutionary Xi Zhongxun (1913-2002). The elder Xi served the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more than seven decades. He worked at the right hand of prominent leaders Zhou Enlai and Hu Yaobang. He helped build the Communist base area that saved Mao Zedong in 1935, and he initiated the Special Economic Zones that launched China into the reform era after Mao's death. He led the Party's United Front efforts toward Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Taiwanese. And though in 1989 he initially sought to avoid violence, he ultimately supported the Party's crackdown on the Tiananmen protesters. The Party's Interests Come First is the first biography of Xi Zhongxun written in English. This biography is at once a sweeping story of the Chinese revolution and the first several decades of the People's Republic of China and a deeply personal story about making sense of one's own identity within a larger political context. Drawing on an array of new documents, interviews, diaries, and periodicals, Joseph Torigian vividly tells the life story of Xi Zhongxun, a man who spent his entire life struggling to balance his own feelings with the Party's demands. Through the eyes of Xi Jinping's father, Torigian reveals the extraordinary organizational, ideological, and coercive power of the CCP--and the terrible cost in human suffering that comes with it. 11:15-11:30 2/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by Joseph Torigian (Author) 11:30-11:45 3/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by Joseph Torigian (Author) 11:45-12:00 4/8 The Party's Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping Hardcover – 3 June 2025 by Joseph Torigian (Author) FOURTH HOUR 12:00-12:15 Lancaster Report: Slower shopping. Jim McTague, former Washington editor, Barron's. @mctaguej. Author of the "Martin and Twyla Boundary Series." #FriendsOfHistoryDebatingSociety 12:15-12:30 Italy: Mt. Etna spectacularly. Lorenzo Fiori. 12:30-12:45 NASA: The cutbacks. Bob Zimmerman behindtheblack.com 12:45-1:00 AM Sunspots: Plunge count. Bob Zimmerman behindtheblack.com

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has established a broad network inside American universities. This allows them to monitor and use Chinese students, and also ties them in with a broader system of CCP subversion that includes the consulates, front organizations, and sources of funding.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and guests and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

PREVIEW: Colleague Rick Fisher presents the PRC's phased asteroid missions and also reports on the PRC ambition to dominate the solar system with men and machines. More on. august 1953. CLAUSE 4.0: Let me search for more information about China's broader solar system exploration strategy and Rick Fisher's analysis. China's Phased Asteroid Mission Strategy Bottom Line Up Front: China has developed an ambitious multi-phase approach to asteroid exploration and planetary defense, positioning itself as a major space power with systematic missions targeting asteroids, Mars, Jupiter, and potentially the outer solar system through 2050. Current Asteroid Missions (2025-2030) Tianwen-2 (2025): China will launch the Tianwen-2 mission to sample a near-Earth asteroid next year. The mission will first focus on sampling near-Earth asteroid Kamoʻoalewa (2016 HO3). After delivering samples to Earth, the spacecraft will use our planet for a gravitational slingshot maneuver and set it on a course for main-belt comet 311P/PANSTARRS. SpaceNewsSpace Planetary Defense Test (2025-2030): China is planning its first mission to impact an asteroid in the name of planetary defense. The mission will serve a dual purpose: One craft will impact the asteroid while its partner observes the space rock to learn more about the solar system and its formation. SpaceSpace China wants to test changing the orbit of a potentially hazardous asteroid with an impactor spacecraft and also accurately measure how much its orbit is altered. China will launch 2-in-1 asteroid deflection mission in 2025 | Space Expanding Solar System Dominance Strategy Deep Space Exploration Roadmap: China's plans for exploring the outer Solar System are taking shape, with Jupiter's moon Callisto and one of the ice giants the main targets. PlanetarySpaceNews China has unveiled a long-term planetary exploration roadmap for planetary habitability and the search for extraterrestrial life. China to seek out life in the solar system as NASA faces cuts, commercial players expand ambitions - SpaceNews Tianwen-4 Jupiter Mission (2029): Zhu's outline of the mission sees a Tianwen-4 launch in September 2029. The spacecraft will use a flyby of Venus in 2030 plus further gravity assists from Earth in 2031 and 2033, to arrive at Jupiter in December 2035. China's plans for outer Solar System exploration Ice Giant Missions (2035-2050): Zhu provides a potential launch date of 2035 for a Uranus mission, arriving in orbit in 2050. If a Neptune mission is chosen instead, it would launch in 2040 and arrive in 2058. China's plans for outer Solar System exploration Infrastructure and Capabilities Development Planetary Defense Force: China is recruiting for a planetary defense force to combat the threat of asteroids colliding with Earth. The successful candidates will be required to research tasks related to near-Earth asteroid monitoring and early warning systems. Wanted: 3 asteroid watchers for China's 'planetary defense force' Advanced Detection Systems: The "compound eye," a 25-antennae network of radars, is under construction to bounce signals off deep space objects to determine their potential threat to Earth. The project is set to be completed in 2025. China targets its first planetary defense test mission Strategic Implications Rick Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, has been analyzing China's space ambitions extensively. Rick Fisher talks about China's growing space ambitions—from the Moon, to Mars, to asteroids. Throughout the program, Rick talked about Chinese space policy, goals, objectives, hardware, all of it, as tools of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and as an implement of the PLA (People's Liberation Army). NTDThespaceshow China's systematic approach includes not just exploration but potential dual-use capabilities, advanced manufacturing in space (including plans for a lunar base by the 2030s Space-Based Solar Power and 21st-Century Geopolitical Competition | RealClearDefense and space-based solar power), and the development of comprehensive planetary defense systems that could have both protective and offensive applications. This represents a coordinated strategy to establish Chinese leadership across the solar system through the combination of scientific exploration, resource utilization, and strategic positioning—what some analysts view as China's bid to become the dominant space power of the 21st century.

A recent discovery is raising concerns over whether America's electricity could be shut off by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at a moment's notice. The United States is now investigating solar panels from China, after rogue communication devices were recently found. The issue raises something bigger as well, going back more than a decade, of suspicious Chinese parts and components in everything from U.S. military airplanes to our missile defense system.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and guests and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

In this eye-opening episode of The Daily Signal podcast, Rob Bluey interviews Chris Iacovella, CEO of the American Securities Association. Iacovella recently testified before Congress about a disturbing financial reality many Americans are unaware of. Iacovella explains how Wall Street exploits multiple loopholes that allow companies controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to access American capital markets, despite laws prohibiting foreign ownership of Chinese companies. Key points discussed: How American investments are unknowingly funding CCP activities, including the internment of Uyghurs, PLA weapons systems, cyber attacks against the U.S., and what the State Department has classified as genocide The "Variable Interest Entity" loophole: Americans who think they're buying shares in Chinese companies like Alibaba are actually only purchasing rights to a contract with a Cayman Islands company that contracts with the mainland Chinese company The "Passive Index" loophole: Asset managers include mainland Chinese companies in index funds sold to U.S. investors, allowing these companies to access American capital without complying with U.S. laws and regulations Bipartisan legislation from Rep. Andy Barr and Sen. John Cornyn aimed at identifying Chinese companies with ties to the military or specific technology infrastructure Why China's economic competition is fundamentally unfair: "When you have slave labor, no environmental laws, no OSHA laws, and no labor laws, of course it's going to be cheaper" Iacovella also explains the mission of the American Securities Association as a non-Wall Street trade association representing approximately 100 member firms across the country. Its mission is to "promote investor trust and confidence and to facilitate the flow of capital to small businesses across America." Listen now to understand how your investments might be inadvertently supporting a foreign adversary and what you can do about it. Keep Up With The Daily Signal Sign up for our email newsletters: https://www.dailysignal.com/email⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠   Subscribe to our other shows:  Problematic Women: https://www.dailysignal.com/problematic-women⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  The Signal Sitdown: https://www.dailysignal.com/the-signal-sitdown⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  The Tony Kinnett Cast: https://www.dailysignal.com/the-tony-kinnett-cast Follow The Daily Signal:  X: ⁠⁠https://x.com/DailySignal⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thedailysignal/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/TheDailySignalNews/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  Truth Social: https://truthsocial.com/@DailySignal⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/user/DailySignal⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  Rumble: ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://rumble.com/c/TheDailySignal⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  Thanks for making The Daily Signal your trusted source for the day's top news. Subscribe on your favorite podcast platform and never miss an episode. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices