Podcasts about secretary general boutros boutros ghali

Today we're traveling back to 1990s Somalia with Black Hawk Down! Join us for a discussion of Mogadishu graffiti, hostages in the Somali conflict, Jamie's realization that the only scene she remembered from the film does not exist, the origins of the Somali Civil War, and more! **Note: This episode features the following errors that we would like to correct: 1) Top Gun was about Navy pilots, not Air Force, and 2) Karl Rove was Turd Blossom, not Scooter Libby **Content Warning**: This episode features a discussion of child abuse and sexual assault Sources: Michael Durant and POWs: US Army War College, "Mike Durant discusses the Battle of Mogadishu," YouTube (16 February 2011). https://youtu.be/p30dV6IEMO8 VAntage Point: Official Blog of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, "Black Hawk Down: Michael Durant," https://blogs.va.gov/VAntage/66864/blackhawk-michael-durant/ Zachary Cohen, "Mike Durant: More than just the 'Black Hawk Down' guy," CNN (14 March 2016). https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/14/us/mike-durant-rewind/index.html Dan Lamothe, "Why the 'Black Hawk Down' prisoner release is different than Bowe Bergdahl's," Washington Post (11 June 2014). https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/06/11/why-the-black-hawk-down-prisoner-release-is-different-than-bowe-bergdahls/ Paul Lewis, "THE SOMALIA MISSION: Prisoners; U.N., Urged by U.S., Refuses to Exchange Somalis," New York Times (8 October 1993). https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/08/world/the-somalia-mission-prisoners-un-urged-by-us-refuses-to-exchange-somalis.html Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, US Army Military History, https://history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm Frontline, "Ambush in Mogadishu," PBS. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/ Mark Bowden, "The Legacy of Black Hawk Down," Smithsonian Magazine (January/February 2019). https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/legacy-black-hawk-down-180971000/ Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Claus Kleber, Steven Livingston, and Judy Woodruff, "The CNN Effect," The Media and the War on Terrorism eds. Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb, 63-82 (Brookings Institution Press, 2003). https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt127wr6.8 Donatella Lorch, "Nigerian Soldier, Despite Ordeal, Shows No Wrath Toward Somalis," The New York Times (18 October 1993): 12. Keith B. Richburg, "Somali Ambush Kills 7 Nigerian U.N. Soldiers," Los Angeles Times (6 September 1993). https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-09-06-mn-32213-story.html Remer Tyson, "Somali Captors Treated Nigerian Soldier Much Harsher Than U.S. Pilot," Seattle Times (19 October 1993) https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19931019&slug=1726806 Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, "The U.S. Intervention in Somalia," Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics 205-241 (Harvard University Press, 2006). https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x0hfj.10 Mogadishu Graffiti: Keith B. Richburg, "Somalia's Scapegoat," The Washington Post (18 October 1993). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/10/18/somalias-scapegoat/6636e528-4c43-4770-bc68-1832e08acd67/ Eric Cabanis, Two children walk past graffiti in Mogadishu criticizing Jonathan Howe, a special envoy sent by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Photograph, 30 June 1993, AFP via Getty Images, Mogadishu, Somalia. https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/two-children-walk-30-june-1993-past-graffiti-in-mogadishu-news-photo/51432169 https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pair-of-marines-from-task-force-mogadishu-prepare-to-clear-news-photo/615292170?adppopup=true Paul Salopek, "Conflict Graffiti," Foreign Policy 189 (November 2011): 94-95. ProQuest. Associated Press, "Schoolhouse Graffiti Shows Depth of War," Los Angeles Sentinel (24 December 1992): A5. ProQuest. Diana Jean Schemo, "On Mogadishu's 'Green Line', Nothing Is Sacred," New York Times (4 February 1993): A22. ProQuest. Liz Sly, "'Help us, America. We want peace...'," Chicago Tribune (24 December 1992): 1. ProQuest. Birte Vogel, Catherine Arthur, Eric Lepp, Dylan O'Driscoll, and Billy Tusker Haworth, "Reading socio-political and spatial dynamics through graffiti in conflict-affected societies," Third World Quarterly (2020): 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1810009 International Consortium for Conflict Graffiti https://www.hcri.manchester.ac.uk/research/projects/iccg/ and https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/fea681e836974047bf0487d898601bfb Dina Kiwan, "Contesting Citizenship in the Arab Revolutions: Youth, Women, and Refugees," Democracy and Security 11:2 (April-June 2015): 129-144. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602365 Background to the Film: "As Black Hawk Down Director Ridley Scott is Nominated for an Oscar, An Actor in the Film Speaks Out Against It's Pro-War Message," Democracy Now, February 19th 2002 Black Hawk Down, IMDB: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0265086/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1 Jamie Tarabay, "Hollywood and the Pentagon: A Relationship of Mutual Exploitation," Al Jazeera, available at http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/29/hollywood-and-thepentagonarelationshipofmutualexploitation.html Adrian Brune, "Protesting Black Hawk Down," The Nation, available at https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/protesting-black-hawk-down/ Roger Ebert Review, Black Hawk Down: https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/black-hawk-down-2002 Lidwien Kapteijns, "Black Hawk Down: Recasting U.S. Military History at Somali Expense," Framing Africa: Portrayals of a Continent in Contemporary Mainstream Cinema ed. Nigel Eltringham (Bergahn Books, 2013). https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qcxp9.5 Somali Civil War: Permanent Somali Mission to the United Nations: Country Facts. Available at https://www.un.int/somalia/somalia/country-facts Ismail Einashe and Matt Kennard, "In the Valley of Death: Somaliland's Forgotten Genocide," The Nation, available at https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/in-the-valley-of-death-somalilands-forgotten-genocide/ Terry Atlas, "Cold War Rivals Sowed the Seeds of Somali Tragedy," Chicago Tribune, available at https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-12-13-9204230505-story.html

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can't we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton's new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn't we do something' through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can’t we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton’s new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn’t we do something’ through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can’t we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton’s new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn’t we do something’ through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can’t we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton’s new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn’t we do something’ through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can’t we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton’s new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn’t we do something’ through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can’t we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton’s new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn’t we do something’ through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can't we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton's new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn't we do something' through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994.