Podcasts about tenth circuits

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Becerra v San Carlos Apache Tribe.      In this case, the court considered this issue: Must the Indian Health Service pay “contract support costs” not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe's expenditure of income collected from third parties? The case was decided on June 6, 2024. The Supreme Court held that the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) requires the Indian Health Service (IHS) to pay contract support costs for activities tribes carry out under self-determination contracts, including costs incurred when spending program income from third-party payers. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court, affirming the decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. ISDA Sections 5325(a)(2) and (a)(3)(A) require the Indian Health Service (IHS) to pay “contract support costs” to tribes that take over healthcare programs the IHS previously operated. These costs cover reasonable expenses tribes incur to ensure they comply with their contracts with IHS. The tribes' contracts require them to collect and spend “program income” (like insurance payments) to carry out the healthcare programs they took over. When tribes use this program income as required and incur administrative and overhead costs as a result, those costs fit squarely within what the law defines as reimbursable “contract support costs.” The Court rejected IHS's arguments that Section 5326 prohibits paying these costs. That provision was meant to prevent IHS from paying costs related to separate contracts tribes have with other parties, which isn't the situation here. Rather, here, the contract support costs are directly attributable to and associated with the tribes' contracts with IHS, because those contracts themselves require the tribes to collect and spend the program income that generates the costs. Therefore, ISDA requires IHS to pay the contract support costs the tribes incur from spending program income as their IHS contracts demand. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Amy Coney Barrett. The dissent argued that ISDA's contract support cost provisions do not extend to the costs associated with spending third-party income, emphasizing that the majority's interpretation could lead to significant financial implications and potentially disrupt the allocation of federal funds. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Garland v. Cargill concerned whether bump stocks are considered "machineguns" as defined by Title 26 of the United States Code. Impacting the realms of both Second Amendment and administrative law, the case raised questions concerning the role of lenity, the applicability of the (then standing) Chevron Doctrine, and the nature of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)’s authority.The issue came to the Court following a significant circuit split on the validity of the ATF's 2019 reclassification of bump stocks as machineguns, with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits having held that bump stocks are not machineguns, while the D.C. and Tenth Circuits had held that they were. Oral argument was heard in Cargill on February 28, 2024, and a 6-3 Court issued its decision on June 14, 2024.Join us as a panel of experts break down and analyze the decision and its potential impacts for both Second Amendment and administrative law jurisprudence.Featuring:Dr. Stephen Halbrook, Senior Fellow, Independent InstituteProf. Zachary Price, Professor of Law, The College of the Law, University of California San Francisco(Moderator) Dr. Robert Leider, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University, Antonin Scalia Law School

Garland v. Cargill concerns whether bump stocks are considered "machineguns" as defined by Title 26 of the United States Code. Impacting the realms of both Second Amendment and Administrative Law, the case raises questions concerning the role of lenity, the applicability of the Chevron Doctrine, and the nature of the ATF’s authority. Bump stocks are devices attached to semi-automatic firearms to increase the rate of fire. In 2019, the ATF issued a rule that bumpstocks themselves were machineguns, and thus subject to the rules of Title 26, which marked a significant shift in federal policy. Michael Cargill, the owner of Central Texas Gun Works, challenged this reclassification, arguing it was an unconstitutional overreach by the ATF and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Fifth Circuit of Appeals ruled in his favor. A significant circuit split on this issue now exists, with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits holding that bump stocks are not machineguns, while the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have held that they are. The oral argument in Cargill is set to be heard before the Supreme Court on February 28, 2024.Join us the next day as we break down and analyze how oral argument went before the Court. Featuring:Stephen Halbrook, Senior Fellow, Independent Institute(Moderator) Robert Leider, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University, Antonin Scalia Law School

The Armed Career Criminal Act provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum. The question presented is: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach? The Armed Career Criminal Act mandates fifteen years in prison for federal firearm offenses where the defendant has three prior "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses." The ACCA defines a "serious drug offense" as "an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment often years or more is prescribed by law." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Four circuits have unanimously held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) incorporates the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense to which the ACCA applies. In the decision below, however, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the government's express invitation to reject those circuit decisions. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) instead incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the defendant's prior state drug offense. The question presented is: Whether the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense (as the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held), or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense (as the Eleventh Circuit held below).1 1 A related question is presented in Altman, et al. v. United States (No. 22-5877) (response requested Nov. 16, 2022) and Brown v. United States (No. 22-6389) (docketed Dec. 23, 2022).

On this week's show, your host, Justin Mog, introduces you to Ashley Wilmes, the new Executive Director of Kentucky Resources Council, which combines smart policy and legal advocacy to protect the Commonwealth's natural resources and ensure environmental justice for Kentucky's most vulnerable people and communities (https://www.kyrc.org/). Ashley was appointed director in fall of 2021, replacing Tom “Fitz” Fitzgerald, who served as director throughout the history of KRC and is transitioning into a senior staff role. Ashley attended Centre College and the University of Oregon School of Law, where she earned a specialty certificate in Environmental and Natural Resources Law. Before joining KRC, she practiced environmental law as a solo practitioner, served as a visiting lecturer at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, and worked as in-house counsel for environmental advocacy organization WildEarth Guardians. Ashley has represented organizations across the country on environmental matters and has argued cases before the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. She recently stepped down as Chair of the Environmental Law Section of the Kentucky Bar Association. For 35 years, the Kentucky Resources Council has been a trusted source of legal representation, advice, and assistance to individuals, communities, and local governments on a wide range of environmental and energy issues. KRC provides consistent, aggressive advocacy on environmental and public health issues by monitoring and educating the public on permits, regulations, and legislation; facilitating networking among environmental and citizen groups; and providing direct and indirect legal representation without charge to individuals, community groups, and local governments. You can donate to support KRC at https://www.kyrc.org/get-involved/donate Read Joe Childer's Op-Ed “In EKy, people can't live on high ground because it's all owned by corporate interests”: https://www.kentucky.com/opinion/op-ed/article264568066.html The KELI Podcast is available at:·         https://anchor.fm/kyresources https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/kentucky-resources-council/id1509478015?uo=4 https://open.spotify.com/show/7djs7cxyFrv36Fc6NmeXzT Donate to ACLC's Flood Recovery: https://appalachianlawcenter.networkforgood.com/projects/165958-urgent-donate-to-aclc-s-flood-recovery-fund?fbclid=IwAR22NdMMjiItf7eLWXG2Ebork1-kkJDQnIBA43rB7LxUGPkPiRbE8vcwg_o More great resources for how to support flood recovery in Eastern Kentucky is at https://appalshop.org/news/appalachian-flood-support-resources As always, our feature is followed by your community action calendar for the week, so get your calendars out and get ready to take action for sustainability NOW! Sustainability Now! is hosted by Dr. Justin Mog and airs on Forward Radio, 106.5fm, WFMP-LP Louisville, every Monday at 6pm and repeats Tuesdays at 12am and 10am. Find us at http://forwardradio.org The music in this podcast is courtesy of the local band Appalatin and is used by permission. Explore their delightful music at http://appalatin.com

In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the test for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless on habeas review is whether the defendant suffered "actual prejudice." Congress later enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), which prohibits habeas relief on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, orinvolved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Although the Court has held that the Brecht test "subsumes" § 2254(d)(1)'s requirements, the Court declared in Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 267 (2015), that those requirements are still a "precondition" for relief and that a state-court harmlessness determination under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), still retains "significance" under the Brecht test. The question presented is:May a federal habeas court grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the. Brecht test is satisfied, as the Sixth Circuit held, or must the court also find that the state court's Chapman application was unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1), as the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held?★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

In AEP v. Connecticut (2011), the Supreme Court unanimously rejected federal common law nuisance claims brought by states and cities against companies alleged to have contributed to global warming by emitting greenhouse gases. The Court held that Congress, by enacting the Clean Air Act, had displaced the federal common law of nuisance and gave jurisdiction over these issues to the EPA. The Court declined to open up a “parallel track” to enforcing carbon emissions standards in the federal system via the federal courts. Since that time, states and municipalities in California and elsewhere have brought similar suits under state nuisance law, but judges have indicated this problem needs a national solution that “must be fixed by our [other] political branches.” At present, the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are hearing arguments about whether these issues belong in the federal courts, state courts, or elsewhere. Featuring: -- Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

In AEP v. Connecticut (2011), the Supreme Court unanimously rejected federal common law nuisance claims brought by states and cities against companies alleged to have contributed to global warming by emitting greenhouse gases. The Court held that Congress, by enacting the Clean Air Act, had displaced the federal common law of nuisance and gave jurisdiction over these issues to the EPA. The Court declined to open up a “parallel track” to enforcing carbon emissions standards in the federal system via the federal courts. Since that time, states and municipalities in California and elsewhere have brought similar suits under state nuisance law, but judges have indicated this problem needs a national solution that “must be fixed by our [other] political branches.” At present, the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are hearing arguments about whether these issues belong in the federal courts, state courts, or elsewhere. Featuring: -- Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

As the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is defanged and the Department of Labor rolls back rules that would require retirement professionals to put the best interests or customers first, it’s easy to feel like nobody has our backs. The good news is that individual states are coming to the rescue when it comes to financial regulation and protecting consumers. In my conversation with Maria Vullo, the Superintendent of Financial Services for the State of New York (DFS), you will learn how Vullo and her department attempt to regulate a wide swath of industries. DFS has a lofty mission: “To reform the regulation of financial services in New York to keep pace with the rapid and dynamic evolution of these industries, to guard against financial crises and to protect consumers and markets from fraud.” Here’s what Vullo and her team are attempting to do on a daily basis:Eliminate financial fraud, other criminal abuse and unethical conduct in the industryEducate and protect users of financial products and services and ensure that users are provided with timely and understandable information to make responsible decisions about financial products and servicesEnsure the continued solvency, safety, soundness and prudent conduct of the providers of financial products and servicesProtect users of financial products and services from financially impaired or insolvent providers of such servicesEncourage high standards of honesty, transparency, fair business practices and public responsibilityOver the course of her distinguished career, Vullo’s specific legal experience has included litigations and investigations involving the financial services sectors and fraud, real estate, health care, insurance, tax, consumer protection, bankruptcy, antitrust, and constitutional law. She has argued before the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, and the New York State Appellate Division. Ms. Vullo is a recognized leader in protecting women’s rights, including representing women raped by soldiers during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, a case in which she secured a $745 million jury verdict for the plaintiffs. Her pro bono work also includes securing a $100 million jury verdict representing abortion providers whose lives had been threatened by an online “hit list.” “Better Off” is sponsored by Betterment. We love feedback so please leave us a rating or review in Apple Podcasts. "Better Off" theme music is by Joel Goodman, www.joelgoodman.com. Connect with me at these places for all my content: http://www.jillonmoney.com/  https://twitter.com/jillonmoney  https://www.facebook.com/JillonMoney  https://www.instagram.com/jillonmoney/  https://www.youtube.com/c/JillSchlesinger  https://www.linkedin.com/in/jillonmoney/  http://www.stitcher.com/podcast/jill-on-money  https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/better-off-jill-schlesinger/id431167790?mt=2

The issue of whether §7502(c) provides the exclusive means to prove timely filing of a document by a taxpayer is addressed yet again by the courts--and what the Third Circuit had to say, the IRS didn't like hearing.  In the case of Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n.-Int'l Longshoremen's Association Pension Fund et al. v. Commissioner, 2008 TNT 74-16 the Third Circuit held that the reports of the death of the common law mailbox rule were, in the words of Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated.  That places the Third Circuit in the same camp with the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and opposed to the positions of the Second and Sixth Circuits.The materials for this podcast are located at http://www.edzollars.com/2008-04-21_Mailbox.pdf.The podcast is sponsored by Leimberg Information Services, located on the web at http://www.leimbergservices.com.

This PodCast concerns the issue of whether "7502(c) provides the exclusive means to prove timely filing of a document by a taxpayer. What the Third Circuit had to say, the IRS didn't like hearing. In the case of Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n.-Int'l Longshoremen's Association Pension Fund et al. v. Commissioner, 2008 TNT 74-16 the Third Circuit held that the reports of the death of the common law mailbox rule were, in the words of Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated. That places the Third Circuit in the same camp with the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and opposed to the positions of the Second and Sixth Circuits. The materials for this podcast are located at http://www.edzollars.com/2008-04-21_Mailbox.pdf. This Podcast is sponsored by Leimberg Information Services, Inc. at http://www.leimbergservices.com Please visit our software, books, and PowerPoint Presentations site at http://www.leimberg.com

This PodCast concerns the issue of whether "7502(c) provides the exclusive means to prove timely filing of a document by a taxpayer. What the Third Circuit had to say, the IRS didn't like hearing. In the case of Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n.-Int'l Longshoremen's Association Pension Fund et al. v. Commissioner, 2008 TNT 74-16 the Third Circuit held that the reports of the death of the common law mailbox rule were, in the words of Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated. That places the Third Circuit in the same camp with the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and opposed to the positions of the Second and Sixth Circuits. The materials for this podcast are located at http://www.edzollars.com/2008-04-21_Mailbox.pdf. This Podcast is sponsored by Leimberg Information Services, Inc. at http://www.leimbergservices.com Please visit our software, books, and PowerPoint Presentations site at http://www.leimberg.com

This PodCast concerns the issue of whether "7502(c) provides the exclusive means to prove timely filing of a document by a taxpayer. What the Third Circuit had to say, the IRS didn't like hearing. In the case of Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n.-Int'l Longshoremen's Association Pension Fund et al. v. Commissioner, 2008 TNT 74-16 the Third Circuit held that the reports of the death of the common law mailbox rule were, in the words of Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated. That places the Third Circuit in the same camp with the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and opposed to the positions of the Second and Sixth Circuits. The materials for this podcast are located at http://www.edzollars.com/2008-04-21_Mailbox.pdf. This Podcast is sponsored by Leimberg Information Services, Inc. at http://www.leimbergservices.com Please visit our software, books, and PowerPoint Presentations site at http://www.leimberg.com

This PodCast concerns the issue of whether "7502(c) provides the exclusive means to prove timely filing of a document by a taxpayer. What the Third Circuit had to say, the IRS didn't like hearing. In the case of Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n.-Int'l Longshoremen's Association Pension Fund et al. v. Commissioner, 2008 TNT 74-16 the Third Circuit held that the reports of the death of the common law mailbox rule were, in the words of Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated. That places the Third Circuit in the same camp with the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and opposed to the positions of the Second and Sixth Circuits. The materials for this podcast are located at http://www.edzollars.com/2008-04-21_Mailbox.pdf. This Podcast is sponsored by Leimberg Information Services, Inc. at http://www.leimbergservices.com Please visit our software, books, and PowerPoint Presentations site at http://www.leimberg.com

This PodCast concerns the issue of whether "7502(c) provides the exclusive means to prove timely filing of a document by a taxpayer. What the Third Circuit had to say, the IRS didn't like hearing. In the case of Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n.-Int'l Longshoremen's Association Pension Fund et al. v. Commissioner, 2008 TNT 74-16 the Third Circuit held that the reports of the death of the common law mailbox rule were, in the words of Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated. That places the Third Circuit in the same camp with the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and opposed to the positions of the Second and Sixth Circuits. The materials for this podcast are located at http://www.edzollars.com/2008-04-21_Mailbox.pdf. This Podcast is sponsored by Leimberg Information Services, Inc. at http://www.leimbergservices.com Please visit our software, books, and PowerPoint Presentations site at http://www.leimberg.com