Raw oral argument audio from the US Supreme Court.
Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual" with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Eighth Circuit below followed binding circuit precedent to hold that discriminatory job transfers (and denials of requested transfers) are lawful under Title VII when they do not impose "materially significant disadvantages" on employees. The question presented is: Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees? THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: DOES TITLE VII PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION IN TRANSFER DECISIONS ABSENT A SEPARATE COURT DETERMINATION THAT THE TRANSFER DECISION CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT DISADVANTAGE?
The Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to lay "taxes on incomes ... without apportionment among the several States." Beginning with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), this Court's decisions have uniformly held "income," for Sixteenth Amendment purposes, to require realization by the taxpayer. In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit approved taxation of a married couple on earnings that they undisputedly did not realize but were instead retained and reinvested by a corporation in which they are minority shareholders. It held that "realization of income is not a constitutional requirement" for Congress to lay an "income" tax exempt from apportionment. App.12. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit became "the first court in the country to state that an 'income tax' doesn't require that a 'taxpayer has realized income."' App.38 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The question presented is: Whether the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states.
Whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by nondebtors against nondebtor third parties, without the claimants' consent.
1. Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment. 2. Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine. 3. Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has discretion to cancel removal of non-permanent residents who satisfy four eligibility criteria, including "that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the applicant's immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Congress stripped courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-removal determinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but expressly preserved their jurisdiction to review "questions of law." Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). And as this Court has already held, this "statutory phrase 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts"—that is, a "mixed question of law and fact." Guerrero- Lasprilla u. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1068-69 (2020). The question presented is whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), as three circuits have held, or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as the court below and two other circuits have concluded.
The Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal on one criminal charge and its verdict of guilty on a different criminal charge arising from the same facts were logically and legally impossible to reconcile. It called the verdicts "repugnant," vacated both of them, and subsequently held that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time on both charges. Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?
The Armed Career Criminal Act provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum. The question presented is: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach? The Armed Career Criminal Act mandates fifteen years in prison for federal firearm offenses where the defendant has three prior "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses." The ACCA defines a "serious drug offense" as "an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment often years or more is prescribed by law." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Four circuits have unanimously held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) incorporates the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense to which the ACCA applies. In the decision below, however, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the government's express invitation to reject those circuit decisions. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) instead incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the defendant's prior state drug offense. The question presented is: Whether the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense (as the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held), or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense (as the Eleventh Circuit held below).1 1 A related question is presented in Altman, et al. v. United States (No. 22-5877) (response requested Nov. 16, 2022) and Brown v. United States (No. 22-6389) (docketed Dec. 23, 2022).
Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., and under the Post- 9/11 GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit.
Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.
Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.
Section 1052(c) of Title 15 provides in pertinent part that a trademark shall be refused registration if it "[c]onsists of or comprises a name * * * identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent." 15 U.S.C. 1052(c). The question presented is as follows: Whether the refusal to register a mark under Section 1052(c) violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.
Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office." App. 5a. The question presented is: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.
Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official's personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.
In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
The questions presented are: 1. Under federal admiralty law, what is the standard for judging the enforcement of a choice of law clause in a maritime contract? 2. Under federal admiralty law, can a choice of law clause in a maritime contract be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the "strong public policy" of the state whose law is displaced? GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
The three-judge district court never mentioned the presumption of the South Carolina General Assembly's good faith, analyzed Congressional District 1 as a whole, or examined the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. It also disregarded the publicly available election data used to draw District 1 and legislator testimony demonstrating that politics and traditional districting principles better explain District 1 than race. And it never identified an alternative map that achieved the General Assembly's political objectives while similarly adhering to traditional criteria. The court nonetheless held that a portion of District 1 is racially gerrymandered and discriminatory, and therefore permanently enjoined elections there. After an eight- day trial featuring more than twenty witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the court rested this holding on its brief questioning of the experienced nonpartisan map drawer and its conclusion that he used a racial target as a proxy for politics in District 1. Plaintiffs did not pursue that theory at trial, and the court never explained why the General Assembly would use race as a proxy to draw lines for political reasons when it could (and did) use election data directly to do the job. The questions presented are: 1. Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent? 2. Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement m this circumstantial case? 3. Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics? 4. Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles? 5. Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data? 6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protects whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing at publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. When a whistleblower invokes the Act and claims he was fired because of his report, his claim is "governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). Under that incorporated framework, a whistleblowing employee meets his burden by showing that his protected activity "was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint." 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the employee meets that burden, the employer can prevail only if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior." Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv). The Question Presented is: Under the burden-shifting framework that governs Sarbanes-Oxley cases, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with a "retaliatory intent" as part of his case in chief, or is the lack of "retaliatory intent" part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof?
Does a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act "tester" have Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation's failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation?
Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute providing funding to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 12 U.S.C. 5497, violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 9, Cl. 7, and in vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the CFPB was receiving such funding.
The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). The question presented is whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3- point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold). ORDER OF 10/2/2023: THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED FURTHER HEREIN IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED. J. ROBERT BLACK, OF OMAHA, NEBRASKA, IS APPOINTED TO SERVE AS COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER IN THIS CASE.
Hennepin County confiscated 93-year-old Geraldine Tyler's former home as payment for approximately $15,000 in property taxes, penalties, interest, and costs. The County sold the home for $40,000, and, consistent with a Minnesota forfeiture statute, kept all proceeds, including the $25,000 that exceeded Tyler's debt as a windfall for the public. In all states, municipalities may take real property and sell it to collect payment for property tax debts. Most states allow the government to keep only as much as it is owed; any surplus proceeds after collecting the debt belong to the former owner. But in Minnesota and a dozen other states, local governments take absolute title, extinguishing the owner's equity in exchange only for cancelling a smaller tax debt, code enforcement fine, or debt to government agencies. 1. 2. The questions presented are: Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Takings Clause? Whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt plus, interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment?
In RJR Nabisco, this Court, applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, held that a civil RICO plaintiff states a cognizable claim under RICO's private right of action only if it alleges a "domestic"-not foreign-injury. 579 U.S. 325, 354 (2016). The Court left unresolved, however, what legal test determines whether an injury is foreign or domestic. Id. ("[D]isputes may arise as to whether a particular alleged in- jury is 'foreign' or 'domestic.' But we need not concern ourselves with that question in this case."). Since RJR Nabisco, the Courts of Appeals have divided three ways as to the proper legal test for assessing whether a foreign plaintiff suffers a "domestic" injury to intangible property-such as court judgments, arbitration awards, contract rights, patents, and business reputation or goodwill. The question presented is: Does a foreign plaintiff state a cognizable civil RICO claim when it suffers an injury to intangible property, and if so, under what circumstances. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325 (2016), this Court held that a plaintiff proceeding under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., must plead and prove a "domestic" injury to maintain a claim in U.S. court. Following RJR Nabisco, the courts of appeals have split on the issue of where a foreign plaintiff suffers its injury to its intangible property for purposes of the domestic-injury inquiry. On one hand, the Seventh Circuit correctly holds that the foreign plaintiff suffers its injury abroad. On the other, the court below and Third Circuit have adopted an open-ended balancing test to determine the location of the plaintiff's injury. Incorrectly applying that standardless test in reference to defendants' conduct, the Ninth Circuit held below that the plaintiff had suffered a domestic injury, even though he is a foreign resident with no alleged connection to the U.S. The question presented therefore is: Whether a foreign plaintiff with no alleged connection to the United States may nevertheless allege a "domestic" injury under RJR Nabisco sufficient to maintain a RICO action based only on injury to intangible property.
Whether the Bankruptcy Code expresses unequivocally Congress's intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes.
This case presents a clear, recognized, and intractable conflict regarding an important issue related to the preservation of legal claims for appeal. Parties may appeal only from "final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Thus the general rule is that "[a]n appeal from the final judgment brings up all antecedent issues," In re Kilgus, 811 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1987), and that "all interlocutory orders are reviewable on appeal from the final decree," Gloria Steamship Co. v. Smith, 376 F.2d 46, 47 (5th Cir. 1967). "Interlocutory orders therefore may be stored up and raised at the end of the case." Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 1988). Notwithstanding these precepts, the circuits have squarely divided over whether purely legal claims denied at summary judgment are reviewable on appeal after a jury trial where those claims have not been reasserted in a post-trial motion. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the 8-3-1 circuit split. But the panel declared itself bound by Fourth Circuit precedent and held that it would "not review, under any standard, the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and final judgment on the merits, even in circumstances where the issue rejected on summary judgment and not reasserted in a post-trial motion is a purely legal one." That holding was outcome-determinative-the sole basis on which the court refused to consider petitioner's PLRA exhaustion defense-and this case is a perfect vehicle for resolving the widespread disagreement over this important question. The question presented is: Whether to preserve the issue for appellate review a party must reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment.
Whether, to establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective "reasonable person" would regard the statement as a threat of violence.
The False Claims Act protects government programs from fraud by, inter alia, imposing civil liability on anybody who knowingly presents false claims for payment to the government or makes false statements that are material to such claims. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The statute defines "knowingly" to include acting with: (1) actual knowledge; (2) deliberate ignorance; or (3) reckless disregard of the falsity of information. See id. § 3729(b)(l)(A). The question presented is: Whether and when a defendant's contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it "knowingly" violated the False Claims Act. CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-111 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. This case presents the same question as No. 21-1326, United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. It also arises from the same court of appeals. The Court may wish to consider the two petitions together. The question presented is: Whether and when a defendant's contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it "knowingly" violated the False Claims Act. CONSOLIDATED WITH 21-1326 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual "because of such individual's * * * religion." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (2). The statute defines "religion" to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id. § 2000e(j). In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), this Court stated that an employer suffers an "undue hardship" in accommodating an employee's religious exercise whenever doing so would require the employer "to bear more than a de minimis cost." Id. at 84. 1. 2. The questions presented are: Whether this Court should disapprove the more-than-de-minimis-cost test for refusing Title. VII religious accommodations stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Whether an employer may demonstrate "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business" under Title VII merely by showing that the requested accommodation burdens the employee's co-workers rather than the business itself.
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 permits suits alleging misrepresentations in a registration statement only if the plaintiffs "acquir[ed] such security." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). Section 12(a)(2) of the Act provides that someone who "offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus" may be liable for misstatements in that prospectus "to the person purchasing such security." 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). For more than 50 years, every court of appeals to consider the question has held that "such security" in Section 11 means a share registered under the registration statement the plaintiffs claim is misleading. And this Court has held that Section 12 (a)(2) applies only when there is an obligation to distribute a prospectus-an obligation that exists only for registered shares. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77e. Departing from that well-established law, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit read "such security" to mean any share, registered or unregistered, and held that plaintiffs suing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) need not prove that they bought registered shares. The question presented is: Whether Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a noncitizen who is convicted of an "aggravated felony" is subject to mandatory removal and faces enhanced criminal liability in certain circumstances. One aggravated felony is "an offense relating to obstruction of justice." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The questions presented are: 1. Whether a state offense-like petitioner's accessory-after-the-fact offense here- that does not involve interference with an existing official proceeding or investigation may constitute an "offense relating to obstruction of justice." 2. Whether, assuming that the phrase "offense relating to obstruction of justice" is deemed ambiguous, courts should afford Chevron deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation of that phrase. THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: TO QUALIFY AS “AN OFFENSE RELATING TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE,” 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S), MUST A PREDICATE OFFENSE REQUIRE A NEXUS WITH A PENDING OR ONGOING INVESTIGATION OR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING? CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-331 FOR ONE ORAL ARGUMENT Whether dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, in violation of California law, is "an offense relating to obstruction of justice," 8 U.S.C. 110l(a)(43)(S). THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: TO QUALIFY AS “AN OFFENSE RELATING TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE,” 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S), MUST A PREDICATE OFFENSE REQUIRE A NEXUS WITH A PENDING OR ONGOING INVESTIGATION OR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING? CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-23 FOR ONE ORAL ARGUMENT.
The Internal Revenue Code generally requires the IRS, when it serves a summons on a third-party recordkeeper for records pertaining to a person "identified in the summons," to give that identified person notice of the summons. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(l). If the IRS issues a summons directing a bank to produce an accountholder's records, for example, it must generally notify that accountholder of the summons. Section 7609 then provides that "any person who is entitled to notice of a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to begin a proceeding to quash" that summons in district court. Id. § 7609(b)(2); see id. § 7609(h) (l). In other words, only a person entitled to notice of a summons can seek judicial review of that summons. There are a few exceptions to the notice requirement. As relevant here, the IRS need not provide notice of "any summons ... issued in aid of the collection of (i) an assessment made or judgment rendered against the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued; or (ii) the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person referred to in clause (i)." Id. § 7609(c)(2)(D). The question presented is whether the § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) exception applies only when the delinquent taxpayer owns or has a legal interest in the summonsed records (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the exception applies to a summons for anyone's records whenever the IRS thinks that person's records might somehow help it collect a delinquent taxpayer's liability (as the Sixth Circuit, joining the Seventh Circuit, held below). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1599.html
Whether admitting a codefendant's redacted out-of-court confession that immediately inculpates a defendant based on the surrounding context violates the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-196.html
District courts have discretion to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences unless a statute mandates otherwise. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Section 924(c)(l)(D)(ii) of Title 18 includes such a mandate, but only for sentences imposed "under this subsection." Efrain Lora was convicted and sentenced under a different subsection, Section 924(j), which does not include such a mandate. Lora therefore argued that the district court had discretion to impose concurrent sentences because Section 924(j) creates a separate offense not subject to Section 924(c)(l)(D)(ii); yet the Second Circuit ruled that the district court was required to impose consecutive sentences because Section 924(j) counts as "under" Section 924(c). This Court, however, has held that provisions like Sections 924(c) and 924(j) define separate offenses, not the same offense, because they set forth different potential punishments based on different elements. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 100 (2013). Four circuit courts have agreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion, although for distinct reasons (the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth). At least two circuits have disagreed (the Tenth and Eleventh). In addition to the numerous appellate decisions, this issue recurs in district courts frequently, because Section 924 is one of the most frequently charged federal criminal statutes. The question presented is: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii), which provides that "no term of imprisonment imposed ... under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment," is triggered when a defendant is convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-49.html
Whether the proper remedy for the government's failure to prove venue is an acquittal barring re-prosecution of the offense, as the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held, or whether instead the government may re-try the defendant for the same offense in a different venue, as the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1576.html
Whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), is facially unconstitutional on First Amendment overbreadth grounds. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-179.html
Section 112 of the Patent Act provides that a patent's "specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it," sufficient "to enable any person skilled in the art * * * to make and use the" invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The requirement that the specification teach skilled artisans "to make and use" the invention is referred to as the "'enablement'" requirement. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996). The questions presented are: 1. Whether enablement is "a question of fact to be determined by the jury," Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 1, 4 (1846), as this Court has held, or "a question of law that [the court] review[s] without deference," Pet. App. 6a, as the Federal Circuit holds. 2. Whether enablement is governed by the statutory requirement that the specification teach those skilled in the art to "make and use" the claimed invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112, or whether it must instead enable those skilled in the art "to reach the full scope of claimed embodiments" without undue experimentation-i.e., to cumulatively identify and make all or nearly all embodiments of the invention without substantial "'time and effort,'" Pet.App. 14a (emphasis added). LIMITED TO QUESTION 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-757.html
Respondent VIP Products LLC markets and sells dog toys that trade on the brand recognition of famous companies such as petitioner Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. The district court found that VIP's use of Jack Daniel's trademarks to sell poop-themed dog toys was likely to confuse consumers, infringed Jack Daniel's marks, and tarnished Jack Daniel's reputation. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that VIP's First Amendment interest in using Jack Daniel's trademarks as its own marks on funny dog toys conferred special protection from infringement claims and rendered VIP's commercial dog toys "noncommercial" and thus exempt from dilution-by-tarnishment claims. The questions presented are: I. Whether humorous use of another's trademark as one's own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act's traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead receives heightened First Amendment protection from trademark-infringement claims. 2. Whether humorous use of another's mark as one's own on a commercial product is "noncommercial" under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C), thus barring as a matter of law a claim of dilution by tarnishment under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-148.html
Under§ 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act, when a district court denies a motion to compel arbitration, the party seeking arbitration may file an immediate interlocutory appeal. This Court has held that an appeal "divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). The question presented is: Does a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration oust a district court's jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal, as the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have held, or does the district court retain discretion to proceed with litigation while the appeal is pending, as the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-105.html
Petitioners-all foreign nationals-were subjected to a $90 million damages award under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., for allegedly infringing respondent's U.S. trademarks. While trademark rights are distinctly territorial, the accused sales occurred almost entirely abroad. Of approximately $90 million in sales, 97% were purely foreign: They were sales in foreign countries, by foreign sellers, to foreign customers, for use in foreign countries, that never reached the United States or confused U.S. consumers. The Tenth Circuit nonetheless held that the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially to all of petitioners' foreign sales. Recognizing that the circuits have splintered in this area, the Tenth Circuit adopted an expansive view that other courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have concededly rejected. Under the Tenth Circuit's view, the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially whenever foreign defendants' foreign conduct allegedly diverts foreign sales from a U.S. plaintiff. Such an effect, the court held, sufficiently affects U.S. commerce because it prevents foreign revenue from flowing into the U.S. economy. The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in applying the Lanham Act extraterritorially to petitioners' foreign sales, including purely foreign sales that never reached the United States or confused U.S. consumers.
The Consolidated Decree in Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006), apportions the mainstream of the Colorado River in the Lower Basin ("LBCR") among three States, decrees rights to the LBCR for five Indian Reservations (but not the Navajo reservation) and various other entities, and prescribes how the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") shall operate the mainstream dams in satisfaction of the decreed rights and water delivery contracts entered under the Boulder Canyon Project Act ("BCPA''). The Court retained exclusive jurisdiction "for the purpose of any order, direction, or modification of the decree, or any supplementary decree, that may at any time be deemed proper in relation to the subject matter in controversy." Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added). The United States "assumes Indian trust responsibilities only to the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by statute," treaty, or regulation. U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 176-77 (2011). The federal treaties with the Navajo Nation ("Nation") do not require the Secretary to develop a plan to secure water for the Nation; and they do not address water at all. The doctrine of implied rights to water in Winters v. United States, 426 U.S. 207 (1908) ("Winters Doctrine") cannot justify imposing such a fiduciary duty on the Secretary. The questions presented are: I. Does the Ninth Circuit Opinion, allowing the Nation to proceed with a claim to enjoin the Secretary to develop a plan to meet the Nation's water needs and manage the mainstream of the LBCR so as not to interfere with that plan, infringe upon this Court's retained and exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of water from the LBCR mainstream in Arizona v. California? II. Can the Nation state a cognizable claim for breach of trust consistent with this Court's holding in Jicarilla based solely on unquantified implied rights to water under the Winters Doctrine? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1484.html Whether the federal government owes the Navajo Nation an affirmative, judicially enforceable fiduciary duty to assess and address the Navajo Nation's need for water from particular sources, in the absence of any substantive source of law that expressly establishes such a duty. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-51.html
May New Jersey unilaterally withdraw from the waterfront commission compact? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22o156.html
THE APPLICATION FOR STAY IS ALSO TREATED AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, AND THE PETITION IS GRANTED. THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: (1) WHETHER RESPONDENTS HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING; AND (2) WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT'S PLAN IS STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED AND WAS ADOPTED IN A PROCEDURALLY PROPER MANNER. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-535.html
(1) whether respondents have Article III standing, and (2) whether the plan exceeds the Secretary's statutory authority or is arbitrary and capricious. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-506.html
The federal aggravated identity theft statute provides: "Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated [elsewhere in the statute], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years." 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The question presented is whether a person commits aggravated identity theft any time he mentions or otherwise recites someone else's name while committing a predicate offense. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-10.html
Under Section 2333 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, U.S. nationals injured by "an act of international terrorism" that is "committed, planned, or authorized by" a designated foreign terrorist organization may sue any person who "aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism," and recover treble damages. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), (d)(2). The questions presented are: 1. Whether a defendant that provides generic, widely available services to all its numerous users and "regularly" works to detect and prevent terrorists from using those services "knowingly" provided substantial assistance under Section 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more "meaningful" or "aggressive" action to prevent such use. 2. Whether a defendant whose generic, widely available services were not used in connection with the specific "act of international terrorism" that injured the plaintiff may be liable for aiding and abetting under Section 2333. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1496.html
Section 203(c)(l) of the Communications Decency Act immunizes an "interactive computer service" (such as YouTube, Google, Facebook and Twitter) for "publish[ing] ... information provided by another" "information content provider" (such as someone who posts a video on YouTube or a statement on Facebook). This is the most recent of three court of appeals' decisions regarding whether section 230(c)(l) immunizes an interactive computer service when it makes targeted recommendations of information provided by such another party. Five courts of appeals judges have concluded that section 230(c)(l) creates such immunity. Three court of appeals judges have rejected such immunity. One appellate judge has concluded only that circuit precedent precludes liability for such recommendations. The question presented is: Does section 230(c)(l) immunize interactive computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider, or only limit the liability of interactive computer services when they engage in traditional editorial functions (such as deciding whether to display or withdraw) with regard to such information? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1333.html
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) preserves the rights of children with disabilities to bring claims under the Constitution and other federal anti-discrimination statutes, so long as they exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures if their non-IDEA suit "seek[s] relief that is also available under [the IDEA]." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). In the decision below, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act for failure to exhaust-even though that claim had been dismissed from petitioner's IDEA administrative proceedings, and even though petitioner had settled his IDEA claim with the school district to the satisfaction of all parties. The Sixth Circuit broke with eleven other circuits by holding that Section 1415(l)'s exhaustion requirement is not subject to a futility exception. The Sixth Circuit also held that Section 1415(l)'s exhaustion requirement applies even when the plaintiff is seeking money damages, a remedy that is not available under the IDEA. The questions presented are: 1. Whether, and in what circumstances, courts should excuse further exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative proceedings under Section 1415(l) when such proceedings would be futile. 2. Whether Section 1415(l) requires exhaustion of a non-IDEA claim seeking money damages that are not available under the IDEA. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-887.html
Whether U.S. district courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and in light of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1450.html
After the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied her application for withholding of removal, petitioner Leon Santos-Zacaria filed a petition for review. Although the government agreed that the court had jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit sua sponte dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), which requires a noncitizen to exhaust "all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right." This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review. 1. Eight circuits hold that Section 1252(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. Two circuits disagree, holding that exhaustion may be waived. Multiple courts and judges have called for further review of this issue. The first question presented is: Whether Section 1252(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims processing rule that may be waived or forfeited. 2. Further, petitioner's merits argument is that the BIA engaged in impermissible fact finding. In these circumstances, the Fifth Circuit, along with three other circuits, requires a noncitizen to file a motion to reopen or reconsider with the agency in order to satisfy Section 1252(d)(1)'s requirement that a noncitizen exhaust "remedies available * * * as of right." Two other circuits, recognizing that "[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board" (8 C.F.R. § 1003.2) disagree. The second question presented is: Whether, to satisfy Section 1252(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement, a noncitizen who challenges a new error introduced by the BIA must first ask the agency to exercise its discretion to reopen or reconsider. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1436.html
It is a bedrock principle of federalism that a statute does not abrogate sovereign immunity unless Congress's intent to abrogate is "unmistakably clear'' in the statutory text. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989). This Court and each of the other Circuits have held that a statute granting the federal courts jurisdiction over a category of claims without expressly addressing sovereign immunity does not abrogate. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 & n.4 (1991). The First Circuit nevertheless held, over a vigorous dissent, that 48 U.S.C. § 2126 (a) of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)-which grants federal jurisdiction over claims against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico and claims otherwise arising out of PROMESA, but says nothing about abrogation-eliminates the Board's immunity in its totality. While acknowledging that the statutory language "may not be as precise" as other instances of abrogation, the court held that certain provisions "impl[y]" that result. It did so even though jurisdiction was necessary for those claims not subject to immunity. The Question Presented is: Does 48 U.S.C.§ 2126(a)'s general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over claims against the Board and claims otherwise arising under PROMESA abrogate the Board's sovereign immunity with respect to all federal and territorial claims? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-96.html
Does the National Labor Relations Act impliedly preempt a state tort claim against a union for intentionally destroying an employer's property in the course of a labor dispute? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1449.html