https://oraysa.org/ The Oraysa Amud V’chazara program fills the growing demand for a daily Gemara learning framework that balances the accountability of maintaining a steady pace while taking account the level of learning sophistication of today’s ben Torah. Developed in collaboration with leading Roshei Yeshiva and Gedolei Yisroel, the Amud V’chazra initiative incorporates features to enhance long-term retention of the Masechtos learned through multiple, built-in reviews, tests and stipends for achievement.

Yevamos 10b: ערוה הוא סתירה למצות היבום היסוד של חידושי רבי שלמה

Yevamos 10a: עוד בעניין הנ"ל ויסוד איסור אחות אשתו לאחר גירושין החקירה של הברכת שמואל

Yevamos 9b: התירוץ של האבנים מילואים לקושיית התוספות

Yevamos 9a: חייבים לאויו לרבי עקיבא ועשה דוחה לא תעשה

Yevamos 8b; עוד בעניין איסור דצרת ערוה

Yevamos 7b: עשה דוחה לא תעשה במאכלות אסורות

Yevamos 6b: עוד בעניין גדר מצות בנין בית הקדש

החקירה:האם איסורי נזיר מוגדרים כדין השוה בכל — דומיא דנדרים המחייבים כל אדם לשמור את מוצא שפתיו —אושהם דינים הנובעים מ“שם תואר” של נזיר, ואינם שייכים אלא למי שחלה עליו קדושת נזירות?---The Core QuestionThe sugya depends on defining the very nature of Nazirus:> Is Nazirus fundamentally like a neder (a universal halachic mechanism)?Or is it a unique halachic status — a “shem toar” — that the Torah applies only to someone who assumes the role of a Nazir?This distinction determines whether Nazir prohibitions are considered “equal to all” (שוה בכל) or “not equal to all” (אינו שוה בכל).---Side A – Nazirus is like a Neder (Issur Cheftza or Issur Gavra)According to the Mahar"i Ben Lev and Mahar"i Basan:When a person accepts Nazirus, he is creating an issur, either:On the object (wine becomes forbidden), orOn the person (the person becomes prohibited from cutting hair or drinking wine).Result:The mechanism is the same mechanism as nedarim, which applies to everyone.Therefore, even those who never became Nazirīm are bound by the same underlying halachic system:→ Nazir prohibitions count as “שוה בכל.”---Side B – Nazirus is a Halachic Status (“Shem Teva”)According to the Mahariṭ:Nazirus is not an issur-object and not an issur-person in the neder sense.It is a new kedusha-status placed on a person:→ The Torah gives special prohibitions only to one who possesses this status.Result:These laws apply only to people with that status.Therefore:→ Nazir prohibitions are “אינו שוה בכל.”--

Yevamos 4b:גדר איסור כלאים: מעשה לבישה או הנאת לבישהThis episode analyzes the precise geder ha-issur of shaatnez: What, at its core, does the Torah prohibit? The Gemara establishes that shaatnez is forbidden only when there is both levishah and hana'ah, which creates a central chakirah: Is the prohibition fundamentally the benefit one receives from shaatnez, with wearing serving merely as the mechanism for that benefit? Or is the essence the act of wearing shaatnez, with the requirement of hana'ah simply defining which act of wearing rises to the level of issur?Rashi's explanation suggests that hana'ah might be the central ingredient, and this has major implications for tzitzis. If mitzvos are not classified as personal enjoyment (mitzvos lav le'hanos nitnu), does that mean the prohibition of shaatnez never starts in a mitzvah setting? Or does the halachic act of levishah remain fully present, requiring a formal Torah-based allowance even when no physical pleasure is intended?

This episode lays out the fundamental chakirah in the sugya of עשה דוחה לא תעשה: when an aseh overrides a lav, what is the precise geder of that override?One model understands the mechanism as דחויה—the lav remains a full-fledged prohibition, but the aseh possesses greater halachic force and therefore pushes it aside (dacheihu) at the moment of conflict. The issur exists, but it is overridden due to the priority of kiyum aseh over shev v'al ta'aseh of the lav.The second model views the system as הותרה—that the lav simply does not apply (lo chal klal) in any situation where the Torah demands fulfillment of the competing aseh. According to this understanding, the Torah never spoke its lo sa'aseh in the context of a mitzvas aseh; the prohibition is absent rather than suppressed.This chakirah produces major nafka minos:• Whether we say aseh docheh lo sa'aseh even באפשר לקיים שניהם, if it is technically possible to satisfy both without conflict.• Whether one may lechatchilah create a situation that will require aseh docheh, or whether doing so improperly forces a dichuyah.• Whether, in cases of lav + aseh standing against an aseh (where the override cannot operate), the lav is still considered chal for malkus, or whether it is treated as nitcheh and therefore exempt from punishment.This section thus defines the underlying conceptual infrastructure of the rule: is aseh docheh lo sa'aseh an act of halachic force, where the mitzvah actively overrides, or an act of halachic definition, where the lav never attains status in that setting to begin with?

This episode presents Rav Akiva Eiger's classic kasha on Tzaras Tzarah: why does the Torah require a special pasuk of “litzror” to asser the second co-wife? Once the first tzarah becomes Eishes Ach, she would seem to carry the full status of an ervah, and an ervah ordinarily extends its halachic effect to a co-wife automatically. What, then, necessitates a new pasuk?Rav Nachum's yesod provides the framework: the halachos of yibbum operate within two distinct categories—issur and ptur mitzvah. An ervah does not merely forbid; she removes the mitzvah of yibbum and thereby creates a ptur that applies to her tzarah. Eishes Ach, however, is a pure issur—and precisely the issur overridden by yibbum. An issur of this type has no koach to generate a ptur for another woman.Accordingly, even when the first tzarah becomes Eishes Ach, she remains within the realm of issur and cannot affect her fellow co-wife. Without the pasuk, the Tzaras Tzarah would remain permitted. The pasuk is thus indispensable.This episode articulates Rav Akiva Eiger's kasha and Rav Nachum's yesod as two sides of the same structure, defining why only an ervah—through ptur—can extend to a tzarah, and why Eishes Ach cannot.

עיון ביסוד דין צרת ערוה, לבאר אם עיקרו מדין פטור מן היבום או שיסודו דין איסור שמחילה הערוה על צרתה, ולעמוד על מחלוקת הראשונים והגרי״ז בגדר החלות.

The Brisker Rav's yesod: niddah is a temporary issur on the act, not a contradiction to ishus.Ervah-type issurim uproot the relationship; niddah does not.Yibbum only conflicts with structural issurim, not issurei biah.A clear, concise explanation of why niddah never exempts from yibbum.

The Masechta opens by listing close relatives with whom yibum is not allowed — including cases of eishes ach (a brother's wife) outside the mitzvah of yibum.This immediately raises the core question: How can yibum ever work? Yibum is, by definition, marrying an eishes ach, which is normally an issur punishable by kares.Tosfos based on Kovetz He'aros 9Yibum works through the rule of aseh docheh lo sa'aseh — a positive mitzvah overriding a prohibition.The issur of eishes ach remains fully in place; it is simply overridden in this scenario.Tosafos asks: If yibum overrides ervah, why not apply it to other forbidden relatives, like a wife's sister?Tosafos answers: Yibum is allowed only because the Torah explicitly commands it. The override applies only here, nowhere else.Yad Ramah's Approach (Sanhedrin 53a):Yibum is not based on aseh docheh lo sa'aseh.Rather, the Torah's prohibition of eishes ach never applied to a case where yibum is possible.The issur applies only when the woman has children and yibum is off the table.Ramban's View (Toras Ha'adam):Agrees with the Yad Ramah.Compares it to a kohen becoming tamei for a mes mitzvah: it's not an exception — that case simply wasn't included in the original prohibition.So too, eishes ach simply doesn't apply in a scenario of yibum.Nafka Minas (Practical Differences Between the Views):Kiddushin with a Yevama:Rashi says kiddushin cannot take effect, because the issur of eishes ach still exists (fits with Tosafos/Rav Elchonon).According to Ramban/Yad Ramah, kiddushin might work, since eishes ach isn't present at all in a yibum case.Yibum for the Wrong Reasons:The Gemara warns it's like living with an ervah.Rambam says it's not actually an ervah at all — once the brother dies, the issur disappears.Rambam fits with Ramban: the issur is simply gone in a yibum case.Tosafos/Rashi fit the stricter language of the Gemara — the issur exists but is overridden.This sugya sets up a major theme of Yevamos:Is yibum an override of eishes ach, or is eishes ach simply not present when the Torah commands yibum?

Chagigah 27a: Can you make the Shulchan completely out of Gold?

Chagigah 26b: 2 Dinim in Lechem HaPanim

Chagigah 26a: Geder of how the touch of an Am Haaretz can be Metmeh Lmafreia

A clear, accessible breakdown of Reb Chaim's famous chiluk between meivi tumah and chotzetz, explaining why hovering alone isn't enough to block tumah without a true shem ohel. We then explore the Noda B'Yehuda's landmark application to umbrellas on Shabbos, showing how “ohel” for Shabbos works differently than “ohel” for tumah — two systems, two definitions, one sugya made simple.

A straightforward, step-by-step explanation of the sugya of ohel zaruk — the debate about whether a moving “tent” counts as an ohel to block or transmit tumah. We outline the basic machlokes, key nafka minas, and the two conceptual ways to understand tum'at ohel, all in simple, clear language.

Chagigah 25a: How were they Oleh LRegel from the Galil?

Chagigah 24b: Geder of Hechsher Tumah - Hilchos Tumah or Hilchos Ochlin?

Chagigah 23a: How can the Eifer Chatas become Tamei?

Chagigah 22b: Why isn't the Am Haaretz trusted bc he has a Migu?

Chagigah 21b: The Brisker Rav 's Chiddush on Iruv Mikvaos

This episode breaks down one of the most complex and sensitive halachic questions in Hilchot Niddah: Does wearing a medical cast create a Chatzitzah?We walk through the major positions of leading poskim — including Rav Eliezer Waldenberg, Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg, Rav Zvi Pesach Frank, and the Sidrei Taharah — and explain why this issue is so difficult.You'll hear:Why some poskim insist on removing the cast whenever possibleWhy others argue that a cast may not be considered a Chatzitzah, since it's medically necessary and not viewed as “objectionable”This is a clear, structured guide to one of the hardest real-life Chatzitzah dilemmas.

Chagigah 20b: ב דינים בעניין שימור במצה

How can kavannah after tevila still count? Isn't intention supposed to come before the act? In this episode, we explore the halachic mechanics of kavannah in tevila—whether it's a condition in the act itself or a din of hesech hadaas. We'll unpack how kavannah can sometimes take effect even after immersion, and what this teaches us about the deeper structure of mitzvos and the role of conscious intent in creating spiritual transformation.

If you washed your hands before Mincha and then sat down for Shalosh Seudos, do you need to wash again—and can you make a bracha? In this episode, we explore whether netilas yadayim requires specific kavannah for eating bread, or if any washing counts. We'll look at the classic case of washing for one reason but then deciding to eat, and uncover when a new washing and bracha are required—and when your first one still works.

Before eating bread, we wash our hands—but why? In this episode, we explore the reason behind netilas yadayim l'seudah: is it about cleanliness, holiness, or both? We'll discuss the decree of Chazal rooted in the purity laws of terumah, how it connects us back to the Beis HaMikdash, and why this simple act turns an ordinary meal into something sacred.

Is the prohibition of melacha on Chol HaMoed from the Torah or rabbinic? We'll explore both sides of the debate—and why it matters. The nafka mina is huge: if it's d'Oraisa, any doubt must be treated strictly (safek d'Oraisa l'chumra). If it's d'Rabbanan, we're lenient in cases of doubt. It also affects whether one may benefit from melacha done improperly and how seriously we treat violations. This episode breaks down the core question and its real-world halachic impact.

Why does Rabbeinu Yerucham hold that after the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash , midoraisa, we're only obligated to count the days of the Omer—but not the weeks? This unusual view has puzzled commentators for centuries. In this episode, we trace his reasoning back to an unexpected source—our very sugya—and uncover how a subtle shift in the Gemara's focus reshapes the entire mitzvah of Sefiras HaOmer in post-Mikdash times.

Chagigah 17a: Geder din Tashlumin by Shavuos, Tachanun for the Week after Shavuos

:מדוע סמיכה איננה מצוות עשה שהזמן גרמאמצוות סמיכה – סמיכת הידיים על הקרבן – נעשית דווקא ביום. אם כן, מדוע אין היא נחשבת מצוות עשה שהזמן גרמא? בפרק זה נעמיק בסוגיא, נברר כיצד חכמים הבינו את מהות הסמיכה, האם הגבלת הזמן מגדירה את עצם המצוה או רק את קיומה בפועל, ולמה נשים אינן חייבות אף על פי כן.

Chagigah 16a: Looking at the Hands of Kohanim during Birkas Kohanim and the Geder of The Mitzvah

The sugya of Ambatya becomes the halachic fault line for one of the most heated debates of the 20th century. In this episode, we trace how Rav Moshe Feinstein used this Gemara to rule that children born through donor insemination are not mamzeirim—and why the Satmar Rebbe fiercely disagreed. We'll explore the halachic logic, the hashkafic divide, and how a single sugya shaped the modern fertility discussion in the frum world.

Chagigah 15a:Milah on Shabbos: Does Artificial Insemination Delay the Bris? — Rabbeinu Chananel's GirsaWhen a baby is conceived through artificial insemination, and the birth falls on Shabbos, a halachic question arises: Is the bris milah held on the following Shabbos or postponed to Sunday? In this episode, we explore the critical girsa of Rabbeinu Chananel that frames the entire discussion. This is a deep dive into classic text, nuanced lomdus, and real-world halacha.

The Gemara teaches that night was created for Torah — and those who learn then are blessed with long life and a special chein. Rambam says most Torah wisdom is acquired at night, because it's the time you choose what matters most. When others rest, your learning stands out. In this episode, we'll explain why learning at night carries such extraordinary reward and spiritual power.

What's the halacha of learning Torah at night? Can you learn Tanach after tzeis? What if it's a public shiur? And what about learning after Veyitein Lecha? This episode breaks down the practical halachos and common scenarios — clearly and simply.

Chagigah 13b: Teaching Non Jews Torah - Geder HaIssur

Chagigah 13a: Teaching a Non Jew Torah + Lifnei Iver

This episode dives into the famous machlokes between Bais Shammai and Bais Hillel about what was created first — Heaven or Earth. Drawing on the Malbim (Bamidbar 19:2), we uncover the deeper worldview behind their disagreement: Is this world only a means to reach the next, or is it holy in its own right? We'll connect this to their different approaches to everyday life — like how they prepared for Shabbos — and see how one debate reflects an entire philosophy of how to live in this world.