Lomdus On The Amud: Following The Oraysa Schedule

What exactly must the yavam and yevamah have in mind when performing chalitzah?The sugya on Yevamos 106a says that chalitzah requires the kavanah of both parties—but the Acharonim debate what kind of kavanah this actually is.The Chacham Tzvi and Minchas Chinuch explore whether chalitzah requires the type of da'as needed to create a kinyan and a halachic chalos. The Beis Meir, Sho'el U'Meishiv, and Ketzos challenge that approach and raise the possibility that the requirement is one of kavanat hamitzvah and lishmah.Rav Chaim Brisker and the Shaarei Yosher develop a fundamentally different understanding: the yavam and yevamah do not themselves create the heter. Rather, their kavanah gives the physical act its halachic identity as a ma'aseh chalitzah, and once that act exists, the Torah itself creates the resulting heter.Along the way, we examine the Rambam, Ramban, Rashba, Tosafos, the cases of a katan and cheresh, the role of גדול עומד על גביו, and why removing a shoe can be either an ordinary physical act—or a halachic act powerful enough to release a yevamah to the shuk.

In Yevamos 105b, the dramatic encounter between Avdan and רבי ישמעאל ברבי יוסי becomes the basis for a powerful yesod in tochachah, lashon hara, and judging others. Why was Avdan punished only after he himself stepped through the talmidim—the very behavior for which he had just criticized רבי ישמעאל? The Chafetz Chaim connects this to the remarkable case of Yehu, who was commanded by Hashem to destroy the house of Achav, yet was later held accountable after he himself became connected to the same aveirah for which he had punished them. Together with the words of Rabbeinu Yonah, we explore a fundamental question: even when another person truly deserves criticism, can you be the one to expose or condemn him when you share the same failing? And even when speaking negatively is technically permitted for a genuine to'eles, how do we know that our motivation is really לשם שמים and not personal animosity or שמחה לאיד? A fascinating sugya about הפוסל במומו פוסל, the responsibility created when we judge another person, and the much higher standard the Torah demands from the one giving the תוכחה.

Yevamos 105a | Two Types of TeshuvaWhat makes the ten days between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur so unique? The Rambam discusses Aseres Yemei Teshuva in two separate places — first describing a time when teshuva is accepted immediately, and later describing the shofar's call to “wake up” and examine our lives.Why does the Rambam separate these two ideas?Based on an insight of Rav Soloveitchik, we explore two fundamentally different forms of teshuva: teshuva for a specific sin that we already recognize, and teshuva that begins before we even know what is wrong. Sometimes the challenge isn't fixing an aveirah — it's waking up, taking an honest look at the direction of our lives, and discovering what needs to change.A powerful perspective on the avodah of Aseres Yemei Teshuva and the journey from Rosh Hashanah to Yom Kippur.

The Gemara teaches that even when the verbal recitation of Chalitzah is not essential, the Yavam and Yevamah still have to be capable of saying it. But what happens when someone can speak perfectly well — and simply cannot hear?A fascinating discussion in the Rashash and Ramban may reveal two very different reasons why this is a problem. Is the issue that the person is not considered capable of performing the Kriah, or is there a separate requirement for Beis Din to teach them what to say?An interesting case — where Beis Din teaches the person first and only afterward they lose their hearing — brings the distinction into sharp focus.

A real case from the Noda BiYehuda: after chalitzah was performed on his right foot, a yavam suddenly claimed he was actually left-footed — and that he had hidden it on purpose. Could that invalidate the chalitzah and trap the widow again? A fascinating real-life application of the sugya of איטר רגל.

Can the Mossad use a “honey trap” according to halacha? We take the principles of Yael and Esther into the modern world of Israeli intelligence: undercover relationships, forbidden relations, false identities, and the extraordinary question of how far an operative may go when the security of Klal Yisrael is at stake.

Can one of the Torah's most serious prohibitions ever be permitted to save Klal Yisrael? We explore the remarkable cases of Yael and Esther, aveirah lishmah, yehareg v'al yaavor, and the debate among the Rishonim and Acharonim over whether saving the many—or all of Klal Yisrael—changes the rules.

The proposed heter triggered fierce opposition from leading poskim. In this episode, we examine a second side of the lomdus: perhaps Chalitzah is not simply a collection of actions that can be delegated at all. Unlike an ordinary mitzvah or transaction, Chalitzah may require a personal encounter between the Yavam and Yevamah before Beis Din. We explore how the definition of Chalitzah itself determines whether the entire concept of shlichus can ever apply.

A Chalitzah crisis in the 20th century ignited a major controversy across the Torah world: could a Yevamah who could not appear personally appoint a shaliach to perform her role in Chalitzah? We explore the lomdus behind the remarkable heter — perhaps the Yavam and Yevamah are fundamentally different. The Yevamah performs a maaseh Chalitzah, an action that may be transferable through shlichus, while the Yavam's physical presence is itself an indispensable part of the Chalitzah. What exactly does the Torah require from each side, and can shlichus accomplish an act when the person herself cannot be there?

If an onen is exempt from mitzvos, can he perform the mitzvah of chalitzah? The Chacham Tzvi asks a stunning question: at the very moment every yibum begins, the brother and widow are both onenim—so why doesn't that invalidate every case of yibum from the start? We explore the Chacham Tzvi's question, the Yaavetz's answer from Tosafos, and the Noda BiYehuda's fascinating principle about a temporary exemption causing a permanent loss.

Is chalitzah simply the procedure that releases a yevamah to remarry, or is performing chalitzah itself a mitzvah? And if it is a mitzvah, what happens when the woman refuses? Can Beis Din force her to participate in chalitzah even if she has no interest in remarrying? We explore the nature of the mitzvah of chalitzah and the fascinating question of whether a person can be compelled to perform it.

Yevamos 100b: The Kovetz Haaros Chakira - ירושת הבת במקום בן

Yevamos 100a: The Famous Yesod of the Ohr Samayach Minchas Kohen vs Chatas HaOf

Can a DNA test determine whether someone is Jewish? This episode explores the fascinating intersection of genetics and Halacha: how Jewish identity is established, whether DNA can qualify as a siman muvhak or rov, why mitochondrial DNA is especially relevant to maternal Jewish lineage, and when genetic evidence can — and cannot — be relied upon in determining Jewish status.

In this episode, we continue our exploration of one of the most fascinating modern questions in halacha: when one woman provides the egg and another carries and gives birth to the child, who is considered the halachic mother?We begin with the Gemara in Bechoros 21b and the famous concept that before forty days the developing fetus is considered “מיא בעלמא” — “mere water.” Could that suggest that motherhood has not yet been halachically established at conception?From there, we turn to the central source in our discussion: Yevamos 97b. The Gemara discusses twins whose conception occurred before their mother converted but whose birth occurred afterward — “הורתן שלא בקדושה ולידתן בקדושה.” Despite their conception taking place while their mother was still non-Jewish, their birth after conversion creates a halachically significant maternal relationship.Could this be evidence that maternal yichus is established specifically through birth?We then examine the remarkable Gemara in Megillah 13a concerning Esther, together with Rashi and the Beis HaOtzar, which appears to draw a striking distinction: fatherhood may begin at conception, while motherhood may only become fully established at birth.These sources build a powerful argument that the woman who gives birth is the halachic mother. But just as that conclusion begins to look convincing, Rabbi Akiva Eiger introduces a source that may turn the entire discussion upside down.

In the first of this two-part series on surrogacy in halacha, we explore one of the most fascinating questions created by modern reproductive technology: Who is the halachic mother — the woman who provides the egg, or the woman who carries the pregnancy and gives birth?What happens when the egg donor is Jewish but the surrogate is not — or the reverse? Is the child Jewish? And more fundamentally, what actually creates motherhood according to halacha?In Part One, we begin building the case for the birth mother, examining the Even Yekarah's remarkable case of transplanted reproductive organs; Targum Yonasan on Bereishis 30:21, which describes Yosef and Dinah being transferred between the wombs of Leah and Rachel; the Gemara in Bechoros 21b describing the fetus before forty days as “מיא בעלמא”; and the fascinating distinction between fatherhood and motherhood found in Megillah 13a regarding Esther.Most importantly, we return to our sugya in Yevamos 97b and the case of twins whose “הורתן שלא בקדושה ולידתן בקדושה” — conception occurred before their mother's conversion, but birth occurred afterward. Could this Gemara demonstrate that maternal identity is established through birth rather than conception?The sources seem to be building a powerful case for the woman who gives birth.But that is only one side of the story.In Part Two, we'll encounter the sources that challenge this conclusion — and potentially point us toward an entirely different definition of motherhood.

Why was the story of Yehuda and Tamar permitted before Matan Torah? This episode explores the deeper mechanics of yibum through the lens of the Kovetz Ha'aros: does yibum actively override the prohibition of eishes ach, or is the prohibition itself defined differently when the mitzvah of yibum applies? That question sheds new light on how yibum functioned before the Torah was given—and on the entire story of Yehuda and Tamar.

Must you mention the original author of a Torah thought for it to benefit his neshamah after his passing? Chazal teach that when someone repeats Torah in the name of a deceased scholar, “his lips move in the grave,” as though he is once again alive and speaking. But why should mentioning his name make any difference? Hashem certainly knows who originally said it—even if the person repeating it forgets the source or mistakenly attributes it to someone else.The Panim Meiros offers a fascinating answer: perhaps explicitly naming the author is not what creates the benefit at all. The true author may receive that benefit regardless, because everything is known in Shamayim. So why was Rabbi Yochanan deeply upset when his Torah was repeated without attribution? Because without the name of a respected authority attached to a teaching, people may question it, reject it, and eventually forget it. Attribution ensures that the Torah will be accepted, preserved, and repeated for generations—allowing its author's voice to continue living in this world long after his passing.

Can a nine-year-old boy actually perform yibum and acquire his deceased brother's wife? According to Rashi, although a minor ordinarily cannot create a marriage, yibum may be different: since it does not require conscious intent, the boy's act can create a real Torah-level acquisition.But that leads to a major problem. If he truly acquired the yevamah, why does the Mishnah treat the relationship as incomplete? And if he later grows up, marries a second woman, and dies, how can one brother perform chalitzah with the first woman while another still performs yibum with the second? Shouldn't the rule of “לא יבנה” prohibit rebuilding the family once chalitzah has taken place?The Oneg Yom Tov answers with a revolutionary distinction: acquiring the yevamah and fulfilling the mitzvah of yibum are not necessarily the same thing. A nine-year-old may be capable of creating the marriage, while still being unable to accomplish the mitzvah's deeper purpose of “הקמת שם”—perpetuating his deceased brother's name.This episode explores the surprising halachic status of a nine-year-old yavam and the profound difference between creating a legal relationship, fulfilling a mitzvah, and completing the Torah's ultimate purpose for that relationship.

A woman separates from her husband, becomes involved with another man before receiving her get, and later wants to marry him. When photographs of their relationship reach Beis Din, the case raises two fascinating questions: When do מעשי כיעור become enough evidence to prohibit a marriage, and can a woman claim she was a שוגג because she believed her marriage was already over? We explore a remarkable contemporary ruling through the Maharik, Rashba, Taz, Rama, and the surprising precedent of Esther HaMalka.

Yevamos 95b: The Fake Eliyahu Affair: The Maharik & Binyan Tziyon

Yevamos 95a: גדר אחות אשתו — כיצד זנות האחות יכולה לאסור את אשתו עליו?

Yevamos 94b: יבמה לשוק — למה נחשב דבר שבערוה שצריך שני עדים?

Yevamos 94a: האם גט פסול אוסר אותה על כהן? — נפקא מינה בגט שאינו מתיר

Yevamos 93b: Hotel Reservations and אין אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם

Yevamos 93a: אין אדם מקנה דבר שלא באו לעולם - How did Esav sell the Bechora?

Yevamos 92b: The Geder of the Issur Yibum if the Yevamah is Mezaneh

Yevamos 92a: The Lav of Zenus according to the Rambam

Yevamos 91b: The Astonishing Chiddush of the Kli Chemdah — Is There No Aveirah B'Shogeg by a Lav She'ein Bo Ma'aseh?The Kli Chemdah suggests an astonishing chiddush: when someone violates a lav she'ein bo ma'aseh b'shogeg, it may not be considered a ma'aseh aveirah at all.A lav can be violated through an action or through a conscious decision not to act. But when someone is shogeg—completely unaware of the prohibition—and there is no physical action, what exactly constitutes the aveirah? There was neither an act of violation nor a conscious decision to refrain from doing what the Torah required.The Kli Chemdah brings a fascinating proof from Rashi in Berachos 2a regarding nosar. Rashi explains that Chazal prohibited eating korbanos after chatzos out of concern that a person might continue eating until after daybreak, when the meat becomes nosar.But why does Rashi focus specifically on eating the meat after daybreak? Simply leaving korban meat uneaten until morning itself violates “Lo Sosiru ad boker.”The Kli Chemdah answers with his remarkable yesod: merely forgetting to finish the korban before morning is a lav she'ein bo ma'aseh committed b'shogeg. There is no action and no conscious decision to violate the prohibition—and therefore, he argues, there is no ma'aseh aveirah at all.Chazal therefore made their gezeirah to prevent the person from actually eating the nosar, an active violation.A startling way to understand the very definition of an aveirah b'shogeg—and an extraordinary chiddush of the Kli Chemdah.

When a Bas Kohen becomes a zonah, why does she lose her right to eat terumah? Does the status of zonah actually strip away her Kedushas Kehunah, or does she remain a Bas Kohen while acquiring a new pesul that prevents her from eating terumah? A fascinating chakirah that may lie at the heart of a dispute between the Rambam and Tosafos—and has surprising implications for a Bas Levi and Maaser Rishon.

Yevamos 90b: When Does the Mitzvah of Tzitzis Begin? — The Fascinating Chiddush of Tosfos

Rav Elchanan Wasserman's Chakirah: Does Chazal Uproot the Mitzvah—or Does It Still Exist?When Chazal tell us to refrain from fulfilling a Torah mitzvah through שב ואל תעשה, what exactly are they accomplishing?Did they actually remove the Torah obligation, leaving no mitzvah to perform? Or does the mitzvah remain fully intact, with Chazal merely instructing us not to fulfill it in that particular circumstance?This profound chakirah of Rav Elchanan Wasserman (Kovetz He'aros, Siman 69) reshapes the way we understand the authority of Chazal and the relationship between Torah law and Rabbinic enactments. Through classic examples such as shofar, lulav, and tzitzis, we'll uncover a fundamental machlokes that has far-reaching implications throughout Shas.A deep, elegant lomdus that changes the way you'll think about "יש כח ביד חכמים לעקור דבר מן התורה בשב ואל תעשה."

חקירת הגר"ח בתורם מן הרע על היפה: מעשה האיסור או חסרון בקיום מצות תרומה?

אין תורמין מן הטמא על הטהור – The יסוד of the קובץ הערות

עד אחד נאמן – The חידוש of היתר עגונה

The Famous Chakirah: Is Eid Echad b'Issurin a Din of Eidus or Ne'emanus?

Yevamos 87b: Hakdamah to the 10th Perek of Yevamos

The Aruch LaNer's Famous Chakirah: How Does a Kohen Son Feed His Mother Terumah?

Yevamos 86b: Minchas Chinuch - how can Chazal uproot the Din Deoraisa of Ma'aser to Leviim

Yevamos 86a: The Chakira of the Assun Deoraisa - Tevel

Yevamos 85b: The Shaagas Aryeh's Chakirah in “Divrei Sofrim Tzerichin Chizuk”

Yevamos 85a — Part Two: The Chakirah That Defines Lifnei Iver

Yevamos 84b: The Question That Redefines Lifnei Iver

Yevamos 84a: Aruch LaNer's Brilliant Insight -Why Rebbe Was Only Allowed One Halcha

Yevamos 83b: Rav Tzvi Pesach and the Story of the Water During the 1948 War

Yevamos 83a: The Minchas Chinuch's Chakirah—Ma'aseh or Tzemichah?

Yevamos 81b: Bitul by Ner Chanukah Part 2

Yevamos 81a: Bitul by Ner Chanukah Part 1

Yevamos 80b: The Yesod of the שערי יושר in the שיטת הרמב״ם – ספק דאורייתא לחומרא

Yevamos 80a: קושיית התוספות בעניין קטן ובר־עונשין, התראת ספק, ויסוד השערי יושר

Yevamos 79b – 's Classic Piece on ערוה אחר נפילה