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Daily Halacha Podcast - Daily Halacha By Rabbi Eli J. Mansour
If a person wakes up in the middle of the night and wants to drink, he is not required to wash Netilat Yadayim. Many times, when people wake up in the middle of the night, they prefer not getting their hands wet, as this could – especially in the winter – make it difficult for them to go back to sleep. In such a case, it is permissible to recite the Beracha of "She'ha'kol" and drink without washing. The person may rely on the opinion that although it is forbidden to recite Shema or pray before washing Netilat Yadayim, reciting Berachot is allowed. This is the straightforward implication of the Gemara's discussion in Masechet Berachot (60b) about the morning blessings, as it appears to require reciting each Beracha as it is experienced – such as reciting "Poke'ah Ivrim" upon opening one's eyes, and reciting "Zokef Kefufim" upon sitting up straight, even before washing Netilat Yadayim. This is, in fact, the ruling of the Shulhan Aruch. Although we do not follow this opinion, nevertheless, one may rely on this view if he prefers not washing his hands before drinking in the middle of the night. He may recite "She'ha'kol" before drinking, and if he drinks a Rebi'it all at once, he recites "Boreh Nefashot" afterward. Hacham Ovadia Yosef cites those who claim that the person in this case should think the text of the Beracha in his mind without actually articulating it, rather than recite a Beracha without having washed Netilat Yadayim. However, Hacham Ovadia dismisses this opinion, noting that we do not consider the silent contemplation of a Beracha akin to its actual recitation. Therefore, it is preferable to rely on the view that permits reciting Berachot before Netilat Yadayim. If the person slept unclothed, then he should first wipe his hands on something before reciting the Beracha, in case he had touched an unclean part of his body. If a person wore pajamas, such that there is no concern that he touched an unclean part of the body, this is not necessary. If one drinks without Netilat Yadayim in the middle of the night, he should try to ensure not to touch the water that he will drink, as one should preferably avoid consuming food or beverages that were touched by somebody who had not washed Netilat Yadayim. Summary: If one wakes up in the middle of the night thirsty, and he does not want to get his hands wet, he may recite a Beracha and drink without washing Netilat Yadayim. He should ensure not to touch the water that he will drink. If there is a concern that he touched an unclean part of the body while sleeping, then he should wipe his hands on something before reciting the Beracha.
Study Guide The Gemara discusses a contradiction regarding the time for redeeming a firstborn donkey (peter chamor). One braita states that is can be done immediately, while another states that it cannot be performed before thirty days. Three resolutions are brought. Rav Nachman explains that if one redeemed it within thirty days, it is redeemed post-facto (b'dieved). Rav Sheshet suggests that the thirty-day timeframe teaches that one does not violate the prohibition against delaying the mitzva during this period. Rava resolves the conflicting opinions and explains that the dispute depends on whether one follows Rabbi Eliezer, who compares a firstborn donkey to a firstborn son, or the rabbis, who do not. The Mishna rules that if the owner does not wish to redeem the firstborn donkey, he decapitates it from behind and buries it. The commandment of redemption takes precedence. The Mishna lists additional mitzvot that have an order of precedence: the commandment of designation (ye'ida) takes precedence over the commandment of redemption for a Hebrew maidservant; the commandment of Levirate marriage (yibbum) originally took precedence over chalitza, but nowadays the commandment of chalitza takes precedence because people do not intend it for the sake of the mitzvah; and the commandment of redemption by the owner takes precedence over any other person in redeeming sanctified non-kosher animals. At the opening of the second chapter, the Mishna rules that if an Israelite buys, sells, enters a partnership in, or receives on a sharecropping contract (kibalat) a fetus or an animal of a Gentile, the offspring is exempt from firstborn status of kosher animals, as it is stated in the Torah "in Israel," excluding animals under joint or full ownership of Gentiles. Kohanim and Levites are obligated in the firstborn of a kosher animal, as their exemption applies only to pidyon haben and peter chamor. The Gemara asks why the masechet begins with laws of firstborn donkey and then of kosher animals given that kosher animals possess intrinsic sanctity (kedushat haguf) while a donkey possesses only monetary sanctity (kedushat damim). The Gemara answers that matters regarding non-kosher animals are few, and therefore the matter was concluded first, or because a firstborn donkey is cherished. Regarding transactions with a Gentile, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Nachmani said in the name of Resh Lakish, who quoted the words of Rabbi Oshaya, that an Israelite who gave money to a Gentile (and a Gentile who gave money to an Israelite) acquires through money alone, and does not require physical pulling (meshikha). This derives this from the verse "from the hand of your neighbor" (mi-yad amitekha), teaching that meshikha is required only between an Israelite and his neighbor, whereas a transaction with a Gentile is effected through money. Ameimar holds a dissenting opinion – that a transaction between a Gentile and an Israelite is effected through money. The Gemara analyzes how to understand the verse of amitekha according to Ameimar according to the positions of both Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. A difficulty is raised from a braita against the position of Rabbi Oshaya regarding one who buys pieces of silver (gruta'ot) from Gentiles and finds an idol inside, where ownership depends on whether money was given or physical pulling (meshikha) was performed. The Gemara resolves the difficulty through four different explanations.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
The Mishna lists animals that cannot be used for redemption, including a calf, an undomesticated animal, a slaughtered or treifa animal, a hybrid (kilayim), or a koy (a creature of doubtful status between a domesticated and undomesticated animal). Rabbi Eliezer permits redemption using a hybrid because it is nevertheless a lamb (born to two animals in the sheep family), but forbids a koy. The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Ben Bag Bag, who derives from a textual comparison (gezeira shava) of the word seh from the Paschal sacrifice that only a standard, kosher lamb or goat fulfills the obligation. Four questions are asked regarding animals that may or may not be used to redeem a firstborn donkey. The first question: may a fetus that was in the womb of its mother when she was slaughtered (ben pekua) be used? At first, the Gemara assesses that the question is according to the Sages' position regarding a ben pekua, and not Rabbi Meir's. Mar Zutra holds it is invalid because it does not require ritual slaughter, and therefore it is considered equivalent to a slaughtered animal. Rav Ashi permits it because the Torah repeats the word tifdeh (redeem) to include all kosher sheep. The second question: can an animal that does not resemble its mother (nidmeh) be used for redemption? At first, the Gemara assesses that the question is according to the Sages' position and not Rabbi Eliezer's, since it is clear he would permit it, given that even kilayim is permitted for use. Two sources are brought to answer the question, but in the end, each source is inconclusive. The third question: may consecrated animals that became blemished (pesulei hamukdashin) be used to redeem a firstborn donkey? Rav Mari son of Rav Kahana proves from the verse comparing them to a gazelle and a deer (k'tzvi v'ka'ayal) that just as a gazelle or deer cannot be used to redeem a firstborn donkey, blemished consecrated animals likewise cannot be used. The final question: may one use an animal that possesses Sabbatical year sanctity for redemption? One clearly cannot use it to redeem a definite firstborn donkey, as the Torah specifies that Sabbatical produce is designated "for eating" (l'okhla) and not for commerce (l'skhora). To answer the question, a statement of Rav Chisda is brought showing that one may use a Sabbatical year animal to redeem a doubtful firstborn donkey, according to Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Chisda ruled on other issues regarding animals with the sanctity of the Sabbatical year—that they are exempt from firstborn status and obligated in priestly gifts. A difficulty is raised from a braita regarding halla, but it is resolved. If an Israelite gives an unredeemed firstborn donkey to a kohen, the kohen is not permitted to keep it until a lamb is designated in its place immediately, as kohanim were suspected of taking firstborn donkeys without properly redeeming them. If one designates a lamb for redemption and the lamb dies, Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages dispute who bears responsibility. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the owner remains responsible to provide another lamb (comparing it to redemption of a firstborn son, pidyon haben), whereas the Sages hold that the owner is free of responsibility (comparing it to the redemption of second tithe, ma'aser sheni). Testimony from Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Tzadok confirms the Sages' view that the kohen receives nothing if the designated redemption dies before reaching him. Rav Yosef and Rava subsequently explain the source for Rabbi Eliezer's position.
The Gemara gives us Rav and Shmuel — but Rav's position raises a fascinating question: how can this Kiddushin possibly work?The answer is not one step, but two.We follow Rav carefully and uncover the two separate stages that have to happen for the Kiddushin to take effect. Then, through the Rashba and Chazon Ish, we see why neither stage alone is enough — and how putting the two together suddenly makes Rav's entire position click.A classic example of a short line in the Gemara hiding a much deeper mechanism underneath.
Daily Halacha Podcast - Daily Halacha By Rabbi Eli J. Mansour
The Talmud (Berachot 26a) distinguishes between ordinary restrooms and those used in ancient Persia, which featured a long, diagonal duct beneath the room, such that the bodily waste never remained in the room. Normal restrooms, the Gemara states, are overrun by forces of impurity, whereas the Persian restrooms are not, since the bodily waste does not remain there. Some Poskim compared modern-day bathrooms to the Persian restrooms discussed by the Gemara, since the waste products are immediately flushed away, as opposed to ancient latrines, where the waste remained in an opening in the ground. Hacham Ovadia Yosef, however, disagreed with this leniency, and maintained that modern-day restrooms cannot be compared to the Persian restrooms described by the Gemara. Those facilities were constructed in such a way that the bodily waste fell straight into the piping and immediately left the area, whereas in our restrooms, the waste remains for a few moments in the toilet before being flushed away. Therefore, our restrooms have the Halachic status of a latrine. As such, Hacham Ovadia ruled that one should not wash Netilat Yadayim in a bathroom, even if he walks outside to recite the Beracha. This is allowed only if one has no other option, such as if he stays in a hotel, and the only sink available is in the restroom. Since the hotel guest has no other sink available, he may wash in the bathroom and then recite the Beracha outside the restroom. If the toilet is in its own room, and there is a different room with a sink and shower, then one may wash Netilat Yaadayim in that washing room. Nevertheless, he should recite the Beracha outside that room, since the room is used for showering and dressing. It is preferable, however, to wash Netilat Yadayim somewhere else, such as in the kitchen sink, or a sink situated outside the restroom, in the hallway. Those who are stringent in this regard are worthy of blessing. Summary: One should not wash Netilat Yadayim in a restroom, unless he has no other option, such as in a hotel room, in which case he may wash in the restroom and then go outside the restroom to recite the Beracha. If one has a separate room for bathing, without a toilet, he may wash Netilat Yadayim in that room and then leave the room to recite the Beracha. Preferably, however, he should wash Netilat Yadayim somewhere else, such as in the kitchen.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
How much must one give to redeem a firstborn donkey? Rabbi Yosi bar Yehuda requires at least one shekel, whereas the Sages hold that any minimal amount is valid for redemption. Rav Yosef explained that the value of "any minimal amount" can even be a lamb worth a sixth of a zuz. However, in the story involving Rabbi Yehuda Nesia, Rabbi Tarfon presents three options—a generous eye, a stingy eye, and an average eye—ranging between two to four zuzim. To resolve this contradiction, it is explained that Rabbi Tarfon's ruling applies when one comes to consult, but if one acts on their own, a sixth of a zuz is sufficient. Reish Lakish rules that if the owner does not have a lamb to redeem it with, he may redeem it with its financial equivalent, as the Torah did not specify "a lamb" to be stringent upon him, but rather to be lenient. Initially, it was thought that he ruled in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, but because it is unreasonable to say he ruled like him (for two distinct reasons), his ruling is ultimately explained according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. If a person redeems someone else's firstborn donkey, the redemption is valid. However, the Gemara asks: to whom does the donkey belong after redemption—is it similar to consecrated property (hekdesh) and thus belongs to the redeemer, or not? This question is answered from the law stating that a thief who steals someone else's firstborn donkey pays double damages to the owner, showing that it is not treated as hekdesh. An Israelite who has ten doubtful firstborn donkeys in his house designates ten lambs for them, tithes them as animal tithe (ma'aser behema), and retains them for himself, since due to the doubt he is not obligated to give them to a kohen. The same applies to an Israelite who inherited ten definite firstborn donkeys from his maternal grandfather who was a kohen, who had inherited them from his maternal grandfather who was an Israelite, or untithed produce under similar circumstances, he sets aside the tithes for them and they remain his. One who purchases untithed, smoothed produce from a non-Jew in the Land of Israel is obligated to tithe it, because a non-Jew's ownership in the Land of Israel does not exempt produce from tithes. Nevertheless, the tithes belong to him and he does not give them to a kohen, since he can say to the kohen: "My rights to this produce comes from the rights of a person with whom you have no legal claim." A contradictory source is brought, but it is resolved by differentiating between teruma gedola and teruma of maaser (that the Levite gives to a kohen). In explaining the words of the Mishna, the Gemara clarifies that from the moment the owner redeems the donkey for a lamb, it becomes the property of the kohen and stands in his domain, so that even if it dies in the house of the owner, the kohen can still derive benefit from the lamb.
Welcome to Daily Bitachon . We have been discussing the concept that Sukkos is fundamentally an era of humility. Rav Avraham Schorr, in his Sefer Lekach VeHaLibov on Sukkos (page 20), teaches that the Yom Tov of Sukkos is intimately connected to Avraham Avinu. As the Midrash ( Bamidbar Rabbah, Nasso 14:2) notes, when Avraham invited the angels and said, "Hisha'anu tachas ha'etz" ("Rest beneath the tree"), it served as an allusion to the sukkah. Avraham Avinu is renowned for his defining middah : "V'anochi afar va'eifer" ("I am but dust and ashes")—the absolute pinnacle of humility. To genuinely build and inhabit that sukkah concept, one must embody humility. Why is this necessary? Rav Schorr explains that the sukkah is the dwelling place where Hashem's Shechinah is revealed. Hashem rests within the sukkah, and we enter to join Him. Yet, regarding someone lacking humility, the Gemara ( Sotah 5a) states that Hakadosh Baruch Hu proclaims: "Ein Ani v'hu yecholin ladur b'dira achas" ("I and he cannot dwell together in the same abode"), as it is written, "To'avas Hashem kol g'vah lev" ("Every haughty heart is an abomination to Hashem"). How can someone enter the sukkah while remaining self-absorbed? You can raise the physical walls and spread the sechach , but experiencing the true holiness of the sukkah—the intimate revelation of God—demands the character trait of Avraham Avinu. During the Hoshanos, we repeatedly plead, "Ani vahu hoshiah na" ("I and He, please save"). While this phrase carries many deep kabbalistic explanations, Rav Schorr interprets it along this theme: our prayer is to reach the spiritual standing where Ani v'Hu —man and God—can dwell together in one home. That humility is the primary objective of Sukkos. Uprooting the Idol Within Rav Schorr further cites the Alter of Kelm from Chochmah U'Mussar (Volume 1, Essay 10), who presents a penetrating insight: a person can navigate his entire life performing every mitzvah properly, yet remain completely self-serving. Our primary spiritual mission, he argues, is to uproot the idol residing within man. Where does the Torah speak of an internal idol? The Gemara ( Shabbos 105b) quotes the verse: "Lo yiheyeh b'cha eil zar, v'lo tishtachaveh l'eil neichar" ("There shall not be within you a strange god, nor shall you bow to an alien god"). Why does the verse use the seemingly repetitive terms eil zar and eil neichar , and why specifically "b'cha" ("within you")? The Gemara answers: What is the strange god that lives inside a person? That is the yetzer hara . Rav Shlomo Wolbe explains that eil zar literally signifies a "god of estrangement." The yetzer hara alienates you from Hashem until you become a stranger to Him, dissolving your genuine connection to the Divine. The Alter of Kelm takes this deeper: What is that inner eil zar ? It is ahavas atzmo —pure self-love. Self-absorption is modern avodah zarah . When a person serves only himself, he becomes a ba'al ga'avah (an arrogant individual). He transforms himself into the center of the universe; everything and everyone must revolve around his ego. Even his Torah and mitzvos risk becoming instruments of self-gratification. The Cure: Nosei B'Ol Im Chaveiro The Alter of Kelm emphasizes that nosei b'ol breaks the stranglehold of ahavas atzmo . By stepping into the lives of others, you dismantle your own self-centered existence. In the introduction to Sefer Nefesh HaChaim , Rav Yitzchak of Volozhin recounts a profound lesson from his father, Rav Chaim of Volozhin: "My father would frequently rebuke me whenever he noticed that I was not sufficiently sharing in the pain of others. He would constantly impress upon me: 'Zeh kol ha'adam' —this is the purpose of all mankind. 'Lo l'atzmo nivra' —man was not created for himself, 'rak l'ho'il l'acheirim, k'chol asher yimtza b'chocho la'asos' —but only to benefit others to the absolute limit of his ability." The root of his father's rebuke was simple: You are not partnering in the sorrow of your fellow man. This is the classic middah of nosei b'ol im chaveiro —bearing the yoke alongside one's friend. When someone else suffers, you must not stand by as an indifferent observer. You place your own neck under that yoke, feeling their distress as your own. This empathy is the ultimate antidote to ego. It pulls a person out of his narrow self-interest and forces him to acknowledge the world around him. This trait defined our greatest leaders: The Chafetz Chaim: Found sleeping on the hard floor one night, he was asked by his wife why he would not sleep in bed. He replied, "How can I sleep comfortably in a bed when Jewish soldiers are suffering in frozen trenches?" Reb Elimelech "Mike" Tress: Traveling with activists after World War II to visit displaced persons (DP) camps, he vanished from their hotel one evening. When he returned the next morning and was asked where he had been, he responded, "Where was I? I was sleeping on the floor of the camp with the survivors. We did not travel here to rest on comfortable hotel mattresses; we came to see and feel their pain." Moshe Rabbeinu: The Ultimate Model of Empathy It is no coincidence that the greatest exemplar of nosei b'ol was Moshe Rabbeinu. In Chochmah U'Mussar , the Alter of Kelm notes that the Torah introduces Moshe through consecutive acts of sharing the burden: He goes out to his brethren, sees an Egyptian striking a Jew, and intervenes. The next day, he sees two Jews fighting, and he steps in again—ultimately forcing him to flee Egypt. Arriving in Midian, he sees shepherds mistreating the daughters of Yisro, and once more, he stands up to protect them. Moshe Rabbeinu consistently shouldered the burdens of others. For this reason, the Torah crowns him as "anav mikol adam" —the humblest person on earth. Humility and empathy are inseparable: carrying another's yoke purges self-centeredness, allowing a person to live for those around him. Furthermore, when Hashem first appeared to Moshe at the burning bush, the message was: "Imo anochi b'tzarah" ("I am with them in their distress"). When an individual down below awakens his empathy for others, he mirrors and draws down Hashem's compassion into the world. Halachic Empathy in Practice In his pamphlet Mishnas Avraham (Year 3, Issue 3 for Sukkos), Rav Avraham Pam illustrates how this acute sensitivity to others consistently guided the greatest Torah luminaries: The Chafetz Chaim's Priority: During World War I, an entire community had access to only a single set of arba minim . During Hallel and na'anuim , the town sought to honor the Chafetz Chaim by giving him the set first. He adamantly refused, explaining: "There are other distinguished rabbis present. Am I to cause them heartache and public embarrassment merely to satisfy an individual minhag? Overlooking another's feelings borders on violating a Torah prohibition (d'oraita)!" The Rainy Sukkah: In Mishnah Berurah (639:35), the halachah addresses heavy rain on the first night of Sukkos. While some authorities suggest waiting until midnight ( chatzos ) in hopes that the rain will stop, the ruling is clear: if guests or family members are hungry, one may not wait. Causing others distress and hunger violates severe Torah principles, which take precedence over waiting for a more stringent performance of a mitzvah. Rav Chaim Volozhiner and the Shochet: When townspeople attempted to expel a local ritual slaughterer over a question regarding lung inspections, Rav Chaim intervened: "Checking the lungs is ultimately a Rabbinic requirement, as most animals are halachically assumed kosher. Are you going to violate explicit Torah prohibitions against lashon hara and machlokes (strife) to enforce a Rabbinic stringency?" Preserving Dignity: When a burial society refused to bury a deceased follower of the Radzyner Rebbe because the man wore techeiles (a custom not widely accepted in the town), they claimed that burying him with those tzitzis would cast aspersions on earlier generations buried without them. The Chafetz Chaim rebuked them sharply: "You are concerned about casting potential aspersions on the dead, yet you are willing to subject the living family to public humiliation and disgrace?" Conclusion These teachings bring us back to our essential Yom Tov task. Sukkos calls on us to strip away the internal idol of ahavas atzmo —self-absorption and ego. By genuinely caring for the dignity and needs of those around us, we merit the humility of Avraham Avinu and Moshe Rabbeinu, creating an abode where man and the Divine can dwell together.
Daily Halacha Podcast - Daily Halacha By Rabbi Eli J. Mansour
The Zohar teaches that one must not learn Torah or recite any Berachot before washing Netilat Yadayim in the morning. Nevertheless, if one heard a blessing before Netilat Yadayim, he may answer "Amen." Likewise, if one heard Barechu, Kaddish or Kedusha before washing, he may respond. This could happen if one lives near a synagogue and hears the prayers through his window. The reason for this leniency is that for the sake of fulfilling the Misva of answering "Amen" or responding to Kaddish or Kedusha, one may rely on the opinions that this is permitted before washing one's hands. The Gemara in Masechet Berachot (60) lists the blessings that one must recite in the morning, and according to several Rishonim, they are to be recited according to the sequence in which one experiences each blessing. Meaning, right when one hears the rooster's crow, he recites "Asher Natan La'sechvi Bina…"; right when he opens his eyes, he recites "Poke'ah Ivrim"; right when he steps on the ground, he recites "Roka Ha'aretz Al Ha'mayim"; and so on. These Rishonim clearly worked off the assumption that one may recite Berachot before washing his hands in the morning, as these blessings are, in their view, recited before Netilat Yadayim. The Shulhan Aruch accepts this position. Common practice is to recite all the morning blessings together later, after one is dressed, but the Shulhan Aruch's ruling may – and in fact should – be relied upon for the sake of answering "Amen" or responding to Kaddish or Kedusha. In such a case, one specifically should not be stringent and remain silent, as this stringency is in fact a leniency, as he forfeits the Misva of answering "Amen" or responding to Kaddish or Kedusha. One who wishes to be stringent should wipe his hands on a garment or cloth before answering if he slept without clothes. But if he slept with pajamas, such that his hands are most likely clean, then this is entirely unnecessary. If somebody slept with gloves – such as if he suffers from dry skin, or he wishes to keep his hands warm – then he may answer "Amen" and recite Berachot before washing in the morning even according to the Zohar, since the forces of impurity could not descend upon his hands. In fact, it is reported that Gaon of Vilna (1720-1797) would make a point of sleeping with gloves every night so his hands would never be affected by the forces of impurity. This was the practice also of the Rabbis of the community of Salonica. It should be noted that one who sleeps with gloves must nevertheless wash Netilat Yadayim in the morning to satisfy the view of the Rashba (Rav Shlomo Ben Aderet of Barcelona, 1235-1310) that the morning hand-washing is required because we are preparing to serve G-d, just as the Kohanim washed before serving G-d in the Bet Ha'mikdash. This reason, of course, is relevant even if one wore gloves. However, he does not recite a Beracha over the washing, because this washing is not required according to some opinions. If one hears thunder during the night, he should wipe his hands and then recite the Beracha over thunder. In general, though, we follow the view of the Kaf Ha'haim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939) to never recite the full text of the blessings over thunder and lightning, and to omit "Shem U'malchut" (meaning, the phrase "Hashem Elokenu Melech Ha'olam"). Hacham Ovadia Yosef maintained that one should recite the full text of these Berachot, but our practice follows the view of the Kaf Ha'haim. Summary: One may not learn Torah or recite Berachot before washing Netilat Yadayim in the morning. However, if one hears a Beracha, Kaddish, Barechu or Kedusha before washing, he may respond, and in fact should do so. If he had slept unclothed, such that his hands might be unclean, it is preferable to quickly wipe them on some material before responding. One who slept with gloves may recite Berachot before washing Netilat Yadayim, and may certainly answer "Amen" or respond to Kaddish, etc. He must nevertheless wash Netilat Yadayim, though without reciting a Beracha.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Even though Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding whether a firstborn donkey (peter chamor) is forbidden for benefit, Rabba maintains that Rabbi Shimon, who permits benefit prior to redemption, agrees that if the donkey was not redeemed and its neck was broken, it becomes forbidden for benefit. Rabba derives this law via a gezeira shava comparing the term "breaking the neck" (arifah) used here to that of an egla arufa, which is forbidden for benefit once its neck is broken. Rabba attempts to prove his assertion from a braita concerning a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Shimon over several items regarding susceptibility to food impurity, including a firstborn donkey. In that braita, Rabbi Shimon holds it is not susceptible to food impurity, which Rabba infers as evidence that it is forbidden for benefit after its neck is broken. However, Rabba's proof is rejected after two alternative explanations for the core debate in the braita are proposed, though ultimately both alternative interpretations are refuted as well. A further challenge is raised against Rabba from another braita, but this difficulty is successfully resolved. Rav Huna supported Rabba's ruling and cited two braitot to demonstrate that Rabbi Shimon considers the firstborn donkey forbidden for benefit after its neck is broken, yet both proofs are shown to be inconclusive. The Gemara then introduces a different version regarding how Rav Nachman's opinion was framed, connecting it directly to a Mishna that discusses betrothing a woman with a firstborn donkey. An alternative version of the sugya pertaining to that Mishna is presented as well. The opinion of Rabbi Yochanan (and some say Rabbi Elazar) is brought: he disagrees with Rabba and Rav Huna, holding that according to Rabbi Shimon, the donkey remains permitted for benefit even after its neck has been broken. Resh Lakish, however, agrees with the position of Rabba and Rav Huna.
A new mishnah! When two donkeys are born at the same time, and it's not clear which one should be offered as a first-born (or a male and female and not clear which was born first). Also, the redemption of the first-born donkey with a lamb (or a kid). Note that a lamb can be used multiple times to redeem a donkey, given the proper procedure. Also, the Gemara delves into the case of designating a lamb as a possible redeemer -- with the sharp question why the owner who designates the lamb has to designate, since it will remain in his possession regardless.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
The Gemara asks: מיתה מפלת או נישואין הראשונים מפילין.Rav Soloveitchik points out that נישואין הראשונים מפילין is extremely difficult to understand.How can the marriage itself be the cause of yibum?Those very נישואין are what create the issur of אשת אח. Before she married his brother, she was permitted to the future yavam. The marriage is what makes her assur.So how can the same marriage that creates the issur also be what creates the future נפילה to yibum?Rav Soloveitchik explains that yibum must somehow already be built into the original אישות. The marriage does not only create איסור אשת אח; it also creates the framework that can later produce היתר יבום if the husband dies childless.He sees this in the Rambam's language regarding a woman who was divorced and then remarried:הרי חזרה להיתרהHow can remarriage be called a “return to heter” when remarriage actually makes her אשת אח again?The answer is that she has returned to an אישות that carries within it the potential for yibum.That is the depth of the sugya: the very same נישואין that create the prohibition may also contain the future היתר.
When the progeny of an animal doesn't quite resemble the mother animal, but has some similar traits, will it require the first-born status? Note the complicating factors of a kosher animal giving birth to a non-kosher animal, or vice versa. Also, the Gemara delves into the non-kosher animals here, because the question of their milk (say, a camel), their brine, and more might seem logical -- that the milk would be prohibited as much as the non-kosher elements of the animals. But maybe the milk is allowed. Because even milk from a kosher animal (like cow's milk from a cow) seems a radical thing to be permitted.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Following the dispute between the tanna of our Mishna and Rabbi Yosi HaGelili, where each derived from a different verse the exemption from firstborn status for an animal that gave birth to an offspring resembling a different species, the Gemara clarifies what Rabbi Yosi HaGelili derives from the proof-verses of our tanna ("peter hamor" twice). Rabbi Yosi HaGelili derives from there the source for exempting horses and camels from firstborn status. Rav Achai raises a difficulty against his derivation, but the Gemara answers his objection. Our tanna derives this rule (exempting the firstborn of horses and camels) from a general rule and a detail (klal u'phrat): "All your livestock you shall designate as male" is a general rule, "ox and sheep and donkey" is a detail, and a general rule includes only that which is in the detail; therefore, firstborn laws apply only to a donkey and not to other non-kosher animals. The Gemara discusses a series of uncertainties regarding an animal that gave birth to a different species that possesses some of the mother's features: regarding a cow that gave birth to a donkey-like offspring, do we judge it like a goat that gave birth to a sheep-like offspring that looks somewhat like its mother, which is subject to firstborn status because both are subject to firstborn status, or perhaps here the laws are different because one is sanctified with intrinsic holiness (kedushat haguf) and the other with monetary value (kedushat damim), and one is kosher while the other is not? Subsequently, the Gemara inquires about a donkey that gave birth to a horse-like offspring and a cow that gave birth to a horse-like offspring. From the braitot, the Gemara proves that the obligation when there are partial features was stated regarding a cow that gave birth to a donkey-like offspring, but it remains unclear regarding the other questions. Regarding eating, the Mishna clarifies the principle that what emerges from the non-kosher is non-kosher, and it is not judged according to the offspring's appearance but rather according to its mother - this rule was intended to remember the law. The source showing that a kosher animal born from a non-kosher mother is forbidden to be eaten is from the verse "These you shall not eat," whereas a non-kosher offspring born from a kosher mother is permitted, as it is said, "the camel... it is non-kosher" - it is non-kosher, but a non-kosher born from a kosher mother is kosher. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and forbids a non-kosher animal born from a kosher mother based on the repetition of the word "camel" in Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and he derives the prohibition of milk from a non-kosher animal from the phrase "et ha-gamal" (the camel), whereas the Sages forbid milk from "camel" "camel" and do not derive laws from the word "et." To show that there are those who derive laws from the word, et, the Gemara brings the position of Shimon HaAmsoni, who derives laws from that word, but changed his position when he reached "You shall fear the Lord (et Hashem) your God," until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that it serves to include Torah scholars. The Gemara clarifies why a special verse was needed to forbid the milk of a non-kosher animal and presents two possible explanations. Afterwards, it discusses the source for permitting the milk of a kosher animal and presents six proofs, of which three are rejected. The Gemara cites a braita stating that a sheep that gave birth to a goat-like offspring or a goat that gave birth to a sheep-like offspring is exempt from firstborn status unless it possesses some of the mother's features, and Rabbi Shimon disagrees, maintaining that it is not obligated until its head and most of its body resemble its mother. The Gemara concludes with the question: Does Rabbi Shimon require its head and most of its body to resemble its mother regarding the prohibition of eating as well?
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The Kabbalists, based on the teachings of the Zohar, ensure to avoid walking four Amot (approx. 6-8 feet) after waking in the morning before washing Netilat Yadayim. The Zohar is cited as warning that walking four Amot before washing in the morning is a capital offense. Therefore, the Kabbalists have the practice of keeping water next to their beds so they can wash right at their bedside. The Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1806) writes that if a person did not leave water next to his bed, and needs to walk four Amot or more to access water for washing, he should walk two Amot at a time, and then pause, so that he does not walk four Amot all at once before washing. Others, however, disagree, arguing that this unnecessarily delays Netilat Yadayim. In their view, to the contrary, one should rush to the sink in the morning to wash Netilat Yadayim. Many later scholars noted that although Kabbalistic sources cite the Zohar as warning that one must not walk four Amot before washing, no such passage in the Zohar exists. However, the Hida testified that he saw this teaching in a handwritten manuscript of the Zohar. Regardless, some Poskim were lenient in this regard. The Bayit Hadash (Rav Yoel Sirkis, Poland, 1561-1640) noted that this stringency is not mentioned by the Shulhan Aruch, not even in the Bet Yosef. The Arsot Ha'haim suggested drawing proof from the Gemara's list of the morning blessings (Berachot 60b), which, according to some Rishonim, should be recited in sequence as one experiences each phenomenon. The Gemara lists the Beracha of "Ha'mechin Mis'adeh Gaber," which refers to the ability to walk about, before the Beracha over Netilat Yadayim – clearly indicating that people would walk first before washing their hands. However, Hacham David Yosef, in Halacha Berura, refutes this proof, noting that the Gemara perhaps refers to walking a distance shorter than four Amot. The Elya Rabba (Rav Eliyahu Shapira, Prague, 1660-1712) asserted that the Shulhan Aruch makes no mention of this stringency because harmful spirits do not exist nowadays, and so walking four Amot before washing in the morning is permissible. The Shebut Yaakob (Rav Yaakov Reischer, 1661-1733) writes that walking four Amot is forbidden only outdoors. Within the home, however, it is entirely permissible to walk about – even more than four Amot – before washing Netilat Yadayim. This leniency is brought by the Mishna Berura, who writes that one may rely on this position when necessary. In practice, those who wish to be lenient have Poskim on whom to rely. Moreover, one who goes to sleep after halachic midnight does not need to be concerned about this Halacha, since, in addition to the bases for leniency cited above, he may rely on the view of the Kabbalists that the impure spirits descend upon the hands only when one is asleep at the moment of midnight. On Shabbat, too, there is greater room for leniency, since the impure forces have less power on Shabbat due to the special sanctity of the day. Summary: The Kabbalists taught that it is forbidden to walk four Amot (approx. 6-8 feet) in the morning before washing Netilat Yadayim. Those who find it difficult to observe this stringency may be lenient, particularly if they go to sleep after Halachic midnight, and on Shabbat.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
The Gemara continues analyzing the dispute regarding whether firstborns were sanctified in the desert. According to Reish Lakish, they were not sanctified until entering the Land, whereas Rabbi Yochanan holds they were already sanctified in the wilderness. Rabbi Eleazar explains that Rabbi Yochanan derived his position from the verse "לי יהיו" ("they shall be Mine") – b'havayatan yehu, meaning that their holiness remains intact and does not lapse. Rabbi Yochanan explains the verse "והיה כי יביאך... והעברת" in accordance with the exposition of the Academy of Rabbi Yishmael: perform this mitzva so that you will inherit and enter the Land. Rav Mordechai notes to Rav Ashi that in his academy the dispute was taught with reversed attributions - Rabbi Yochanan said they were not sanctified (meaning they did not need to be sanctified anew), while Reish Lakish said they were sanctified. Rav Ashi clarifies that the underlying explanatory principle is the exact same, but a person is obligated to speak in the language of his teacher. Two questions are asked by the officer Quntroqos to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai. First, regarding the discrepancy between the detailed count of Levites (22,300) and their total sum (22,000), Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai explains that those additional 300 Levites were firstborns themselves, and a firstborn cannot discharge the firstborn obligation of another, as Abaye adds that it suffices for a firstborn to discharge his own personal holiness. Second, regarding the discrepancy between the silver collected (half a shekel for 601,550 men, equaling 201 kikar and 11 maneh) and the silver gathered and accounted for (100 kikar and 1,775 shekels, which equals 101 kikar and 11 maneh), Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai responds that Moses our teacher was a trustworthy treasurer and skilled calculator, and that the sanctuary maneh was doubled. After two failed attempts, Rav Chisda proves from a verse in Ezekiel that the sanctuary maneh was indeed doubled, and the Gemara establishes three principles regarding measures: additions may be made to measurements, additions cannot exceed a sixth, and this sixth is calculated from the outside. Rabbi Chanina relates three questions he asked Rabbi Eliezer in the Great Academy. Regarding why firstborn donkeys were singled out for redemption over horses or camels, Rabbi Eliezer explains that it is a divine decree (gezeirat hakatav), and also because donkeys assisted Israel during the Exodus, as every Israelite brought out ninety loaded Libyan donkeys with the silver and gold of Egypt. Regarding the place names Rephidim and Shittim, Rabbi Eliezer holds that they are literal place names, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua interprets them homiletically as allusions to behavior: Rephidim signifies that they loosened their grasp on Torah study, and Shittim signifies that they engaged in acts of folly. The Mishna rules that a cow giving birth to an offspring resembling a donkey, or a donkey giving birth to an offspring resembling a horse, is exempt from bekhora, as the repetition of the words "peter chamor" teaches that both the mother and offspring must be donkeys. Regarding consumption, an offspring born of a kosher animal that resembles an non-kosher animal is permitted to be eaten, while an offspring born of a non-kosher animal that resembles a kosher animal is forbidden, based on the principle that whatever emerges from the non-kosher is not kosher, and whatever emerges from the kosher is kosher. The Gemara compares our Mishna to a Mishna dealing with a ewe that gave birth to an offspring resembling a goat. Rav Yehuda derives from the verse "אך בכור שור..." that both parent and offspring must be of the same species, instead of using the verse in our Mishna. The Gemara explains the dispute between the tanna of our Mishna and Rabbi Yose HaGelili (upon whose view Rav Yehuda relied) regarding whether the textual derivations apply to monetary consecration (kedushat damim) and from there we learn to inherent sanctity (kedushat haguf) or the reverse. What does each do with the verse of the other?
Daily Halacha Podcast - Daily Halacha By Rabbi Eli J. Mansour
Is one allowed to put on clothing before washing Netilat Yadayim in the morning? Often, during the winter, people want to put socks on their feet before stepping on the cold floor and going to wash Netilat Yadayim. Is this permissible, or must one be concerned that the impurity will transfer from their hands onto their garments, thus causing harm? The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909), in the work for which he was named (Ben Ish Hai, Parashat Toledot, 6), cites the Arizal's teaching that one may not touch his clothing before washing his hands in the morning. He therefore bemoaned the common practice to put on socks before stepping on the cold floor in the morning during the winter. Hacham Ovadia Yosef, however, questions this ruling, noting that there is no indication in the Gemara that the hands contaminate garments or utensils before the morning hand-washing. Indeed, one obviously touches the handles of the washing cup before washing, and clearly there is no concern that the impurity will adversely affect the cup. For that matter, one touches his bedding before washing in the morning, and nowhere do we find any requirement to wash one's bedding each day because it is contaminated. Moreover, the Ben Ish Hai elsewhere – in Od Yosef Hai (Parashat Toledot, 10) – seems to have retracted this position. There the Ben Ish Hai brings the Minhat Aharon as ruling that one may not touch his garments before washing in the morning, but he then observes that very few people observe this stringency. He suggests that the harmful forces on one's hands do not affect garments, and so this is allowed – in direct contradistinction to his comments in Ben Ish Hai. Some proposed reconciling this contradiction by noting that the Od Yosef Hai was published posthumously by disciples of the Ben Ish Hai, and it is thus possible that they may have introduced their own opinions into the text. If so, then the lenient ruling in Od Yosef Hai does not represent the Ben Ish Hai's authentic position. Hacham Ovadia, however, vehemently dismisses this claim, writing that he personally knew the Ben Ish Hai's disciple who printed Od Yosef Hai – the great sage Rav Bension Hazan (1877-1951) – and he could certainly be trusted to authentically present the actual words of the Ben Ish Hai. Evidently, the Ben Ish Hai retracted his stringent opinion, and concluded that one may, in fact, touch his clothing before washing in the morning. Nevertheless, the Kabbalists taught the importance of keeping water beside one's bed so he can wash immediately upon waking, before touching anything. (One must ensure to keep the water next to the bed, and not underneath the bed, as food and water situated beneath a bed while someone sleeps on it becomes impure.) Rav Yisrael Bitan writes that those who follow this stringency are worthy of blessing, but this recommendation is only for the especially pious. He adds that there is certainly no need to be stringent if one goes to sleep after halachic midnight, in light of the Kabbalistic teaching that the impurity descends upon the hands only when one sleeps at the moment of halachic midnight. Summary: It is permissible to touch one's clothing and even to get dressed before washing Netilat Yadayim in the morning. The Kabbalists follow the custom to keep water next to their bed so they can wash immediately in the morning, but this practice is reserved for the especially pious.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.
The Mishna rules that if a Jew buys a donkey embryo from a non-Jew, sells one to him, enters into a partnership with him, or receives or gives an animal under a sharecropping agreement (kablanut), the offspring is exempt from bekhora. The Gemara questions why the Mishna needs to enumerate all these individual cases, and explains that each is necessary: selling must be taught so we do not fine a Jew who removes an animal from sanctity; partnering excludes Rabbi Yehuda's view that a joint partnership with a non-Jew is obligated in bekhora; and sharecropping (kablanut) is needed because the primary animal belongs to the Jew, and had we exempted it from the firstborn law, we might have thought this would cause people to think that in a regular animal there is no law of firstborn. The Gemara asks what Rabbi Yehuda's position is regarding selling an embryo to a non-Jew, given that he elsewhere permits selling a broken animal (shevura). Is an embryo treated like a broken animal because it cannot work, or is selling an embryo forbidden because it is standard practice, unlike a broken animal where there is a clear distinction (heker) since it is not standard practice? The Gemara first attempts to prove this from the Mishna, which mentions that selling an embryo is forbidden without noting a dissenting opinion. However, this proof is rejected, as Rabbi Yehuda clearly disagrees with another part of the Mishna without being mentioned there, so no proof can be brought from the Mishna. Next, a braita detailing fines for sharecropping (kablanut) transactions is brought to show that Rabbi Yehuda forbids it. However, the Gemara rejects this proof, clarifying that the fine in the braita applies specifically when giving a pregnant animal to be fattened. Ultimately, Rav Ashi proves from Rabbi Yehuda's own rationale in another braita—that a broken animal is permitted because it cannot heal—which implies that selling an embryo is forbidden, as it naturally grows and "heals." This entire sugya was also taught in a different manner, as a question of whether the Mishna's prohibition on selling an embryo is only according to the Rabbis or if Rabbi Yehuda agrees with it as well. As in the previous version, the conclusion is that Rabbi Yehuda also forbids it. The Gemara asks whether selling a healthy animal solely for its fetus is permitted, analyzing the doubts according to both Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. An attempt is made to resolve the question from the Mishna regarding one who gives an animal under sharecropping (kablanut for offspring), as the phrase "even though he is not permitted" is omitted there. However, the Gemara ultimately concludes that in other forbidden cases (such as partnership) the Tanna also omits "even though he is not permitted," so no answer to the question can be derived from the Mishna.