Podcasts about Gemara

A man gets blamed by the Gemara for destroying Jerusalem — and he didn't do anything. He wasn't invited to the party. He didn't start the fight. He just stood there and watched someone get humiliated and thrown out, and said nothing. That silence, Rabbi Prisman argues, is the real story of the Churban — not hatred, just people who stopped noticing each other. This Tisha B'Av, that's the connection worth making: not just mourning a building, but closing the gap between not hating someone and actually feeling their pain. Ahead of Tisha B'Av, a hard question worth sitting with: if "I don't hate anyone" is the bar you're clearing, is that actually enough?

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe continues exploring the Gemara in Tractate Ketubot, uncovering profound lessons about charity, human dignity, empathy, and trust in Hashem. Building on the previous discussion of anonymous giving, the Gemara recounts the generosity of Mar Ukva, who quietly supported a poor neighbor every year before Yom Kippur. When his son observed the recipient enjoying expensive aged wine, Mar Ukva's response was startling: rather than reducing his gift, he doubled it. Rabbi Wolbe explains that true tzedakah is not merely about meeting a person's minimum needs, but about understanding the life they once lived and the emotional pain caused by losing it. The Torah commands us not only to give, but to deeply appreciate another person's unique circumstances and preserve their dignity. The Gemara then examines the extraordinary generosity of Mar Ukva at the end of his life, when he reviewed his charitable giving and concluded that he had not done enough. Rabbi Wolbe uses this discussion to distinguish between ma'aser (tithing)—the portion of one's income entrusted to us by Hashem for distribution—and voluntary charity beyond the tithe. Through practical examples and inspiring stories, he illustrates that generosity is measured not by the absolute amount given, but by the proportion of one's means and the sincerity of one's heart. The episode also explores the halachic balance between giving generously and maintaining responsibility for one's own family's financial well-being. Rabbi Wolbe concludes with moving personal stories that demonstrate the incredible power of bitachon (trust in Hashem) and faithful tzedakah. He recounts the story of a struggling sofer who committed to giving twenty percent of his income despite having almost nothing, only to witness immediate and life-changing Divine blessing. He also shares remarkable experiences of donors whose acts of generosity were met with extraordinary providence. The overarching message is timeless: we often believe that holding onto money creates security, but the Torah teaches the opposite. Hashem entrusts resources to those who faithfully become channels of blessing for others. When we loosen our grip and allow Hashem to guide our generosity, we discover that true wealth is measured not by what we keep, but by what we faithfully give._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on May 15, 2026, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on June 30, 2026_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content._____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Hey Rabbi! Podcast: https://heyrabbi.transistor.fm/episodesPrayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud,  #Gemara, #Kesubos, #Rainmaker, #Faith, #Emunah, #Honesty, #JewishWisdom, #Tzedakah, #Charity, #HumanDignity ★ Support this podcast ★

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe continues exploring the Gemara in Tractate Ketubot, uncovering profound lessons about charity, human dignity, empathy, and trust in Hashem. Building on the previous discussion of anonymous giving, the Gemara recounts the generosity of Mar Ukva, who quietly supported a poor neighbor every year before Yom Kippur. When his son observed the recipient enjoying expensive aged wine, Mar Ukva's response was startling: rather than reducing his gift, he doubled it. Rabbi Wolbe explains that true tzedakah is not merely about meeting a person's minimum needs, but about understanding the life they once lived and the emotional pain caused by losing it. The Torah commands us not only to give, but to deeply appreciate another person's unique circumstances and preserve their dignity. The Gemara then examines the extraordinary generosity of Mar Ukva at the end of his life, when he reviewed his charitable giving and concluded that he had not done enough. Rabbi Wolbe uses this discussion to distinguish between ma'aser (tithing)—the portion of one's income entrusted to us by Hashem for distribution—and voluntary charity beyond the tithe. Through practical examples and inspiring stories, he illustrates that generosity is measured not by the absolute amount given, but by the proportion of one's means and the sincerity of one's heart. The episode also explores the halachic balance between giving generously and maintaining responsibility for one's own family's financial well-being. Rabbi Wolbe concludes with moving personal stories that demonstrate the incredible power of bitachon (trust in Hashem) and faithful tzedakah. He recounts the story of a struggling sofer who committed to giving twenty percent of his income despite having almost nothing, only to witness immediate and life-changing Divine blessing. He also shares remarkable experiences of donors whose acts of generosity were met with extraordinary providence. The overarching message is timeless: we often believe that holding onto money creates security, but the Torah teaches the opposite. Hashem entrusts resources to those who faithfully become channels of blessing for others. When we loosen our grip and allow Hashem to guide our generosity, we discover that true wealth is measured not by what we keep, but by what we faithfully give._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on May 15, 2026, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on June 30, 2026_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content._____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Hey Rabbi! Podcast: https://heyrabbi.transistor.fm/episodesPrayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud,  #Gemara, #Kesubos, #Rainmaker, #Faith, #Emunah, #Honesty, #JewishWisdom, #Tzedakah, #Charity, #HumanDignity ★ Support this podcast ★

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Gemara Chabura - Rabbi Karlinsky - Ani HaMehapech B'Charara-Poaching Employees 11 by Shapell's Rabbeim

Study Guide After the Gemara establishes the root of the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding a koy, Rav Papa clarifies the specific type of koy they dispute concerning the prohibition of slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno) and the distribution of priestly gifts (matnot kehuna). He also explains that the Mishna's ruling—which prohibits slaughtering a koy on Yom Tov due to the uncertainty of whether its blood requires covering (kisuy hadam)—aligns specifically with the Rabbis' position. The Gemara then introduces three other opinions regarding the exact definition of a koy. Rabbi Oshaya notes that the Mishna does not align with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who views any slaughter that is not fit for consumption—including the slaughter of sacrifices in general, since it does not permit the meat until the blood is sprinkled—as an invalid slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya). Consequently, under his view, one who slaughters an animal in the Temple and its offspring on the same day does not violate the prohibition of "you shall not slaughter it and its offspring on the same day" (oto v'et beno lo tishchatu b'yom echad). The Gemara questions why the Mishna omits the rule that one receives lashes for slaughtering an animal in the Temple courtyard whose time has not yet come (mechusar zman—because its mother was already slaughtered today) on account of slaughtering an unfit animal in the Temple, and offers two answers to resolve this.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Study Guide After the Gemara establishes the root of the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding a koy, Rav Papa clarifies the specific type of koy they dispute concerning the prohibition of slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno) and the distribution of priestly gifts (matnot kehuna). He also explains that the Mishna's ruling—which prohibits slaughtering a koy on Yom Tov due to the uncertainty of whether its blood requires covering (kisuy hadam)—aligns specifically with the Rabbis' position. The Gemara then introduces three other opinions regarding the exact definition of a koy. Rabbi Oshaya notes that the Mishna does not align with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who views any slaughter that is not fit for consumption—including the slaughter of sacrifices in general, since it does not permit the meat until the blood is sprinkled—as an invalid slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya). Consequently, under his view, one who slaughters an animal in the Temple and its offspring on the same day does not violate the prohibition of "you shall not slaughter it and its offspring on the same day" (oto v'et beno lo tishchatu b'yom echad). The Gemara questions why the Mishna omits the rule that one receives lashes for slaughtering an animal in the Temple courtyard whose time has not yet come (mechusar zman—because its mother was already slaughtered today) on account of slaughtering an unfit animal in the Temple, and offers two answers to resolve this.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Sponsored In honor of Harav Breitowitz sponsored by ComputerRabbis.com and his many listeners out in New York.

The Gemara discusses the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno). The Mishna presents various permutations of non-sacred animals (chullin) and consecrated sacrifices slaughtered either inside or outside the Temple courtyard, outlining the respective punishments incurred and the halakhic status of the meat. A braita derives from biblical verses that this prohibition applies to consecrated animals, and the Gemara subsequently demonstrates that it applies to non-consecrated animals as well. Since the laws of oto v'et beno are learned from consecrated animals, the Gemara questions why the prohibition also applies to crossbreeds (kilayim), which are unfit for the Altar. This is resolved by explaining that the word "or" (o) in the verse serves to include crossbreeds. This explanation raises a difficulty, as the word "or" should be needed to teach that one is liable for slaughtering either an ox or a sheep with its offspring, rather than needing to slaughter both to violate the prohibition. The Gemara resolves this by pointing to the singular word "its" (oto), which teaches individual liability. Alternatively, according to Chananya - who uses the word "its" to include male parents in the prohibition - it is already self-evident that one is liable for either animal individually, in accordance with Rabbi Yonatan's interpretive principle regarding the biblical prohibition of cursing one's parents. This discussion leads to a discussion about the  dispute between Chananya and the Rabbis r regarding whether the prohibition of oto v'et beno applies to both the father and mother, or exclusively to the mother.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

The Gemara discusses the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno). The Mishna presents various permutations of non-sacred animals (chullin) and consecrated sacrifices slaughtered either inside or outside the Temple courtyard, outlining the respective punishments incurred and the halakhic status of the meat. A braita derives from biblical verses that this prohibition applies to consecrated animals, and the Gemara subsequently demonstrates that it applies to non-consecrated animals as well. Since the laws of oto v'et beno are learned from consecrated animals, the Gemara questions why the prohibition also applies to crossbreeds (kilayim), which are unfit for the Altar. This is resolved by explaining that the word "or" (o) in the verse serves to include crossbreeds. This explanation raises a difficulty, as the word "or" should be needed to teach that one is liable for slaughtering either an ox or a sheep with its offspring, rather than needing to slaughter both to violate the prohibition. The Gemara resolves this by pointing to the singular word "its" (oto), which teaches individual liability. Alternatively, according to Chananya - who uses the word "its" to include male parents in the prohibition - it is already self-evident that one is liable for either animal individually, in accordance with Rabbi Yonatan's interpretive principle regarding the biblical prohibition of cursing one's parents. This discussion leads to a discussion about the  dispute between Chananya and the Rabbis r regarding whether the prohibition of oto v'et beno applies to both the father and mother, or exclusively to the mother.

If a bone is broken but the majority of its width is surrounded by flesh and skin, the animal is not considered a treifa—even if the break is above the knee joint (arkuva)—and the limb is not considered a limb severed from a living animal (ever min hachai). A case came before Rava where the bone was covered by a majority of "flesh" only when including soft sinews. Rava initially permitted this based on Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that soft sinews are considered like meat for fulfilling the mitzva of eating the Pesach sacrifice. However, Rav Papa challenged this from Reish Lakish's opposing view that such sinews do not count as meat, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan ultimately retracted his position, rendering the case forbidden. The Gemara clarifies additional questions regarding broken bones surrounded by skin and flesh in different manners, in some of which the flesh is no longer actually attached to the bone. The law of a ben pekua (a fetus found in its mother's womb after she was slaughtered) permits the fetus to be eaten without independent slaughter. This law also permits its placenta (shilya) to be eaten, as derived from the same verse from which the laws of ben pekua are derived. However, if even a small portion of the placenta emerged outside the womb prior to the mother's slaughter, it is forbidden to eat even the portion that remained inside out of concern that the head of the fetus may have emerged with it before the slaughter. If an animal carrying its first offspring miscarries a placenta, one does not have to treat the placenta with the sanctity of a firstborn (bechor). This is because perhaps the fetus inside was a female, and even if it was a male, perhaps it was a non-viable anomaly that is not fit for firstborn sanctity (such as a sheep that looks like a goat). In contrast, the placenta of a consecrated sacrifice is treated with sanctity, as sacrifices can also be brought from female animals, and therefore the likelihood of it having sanctity is much higher. The placenta is not considered food and therefore does not contract food impurity. Within this discussion, the Gemara inquires whether or not the hide of a domestic donkey that was cooked is susceptible to impurity. The Gemara presents two different versions of a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan regarding a placenta that emerges alongside a visible fetus. They debate whether perhaps there is a (second) hidden fetus inside the placenta, with each version of their debate applying this concern to different circumstances. Non-Jews used to bury placentas at intersections or hang them on trees as a superstitious remedy, and therefore these actions are forbidden under the prohibition of following non-Jewish customs (darchei ha-Emori). Regarding this, Abaye and Rava define the boundary, establishing that anything done for a proven medical remedy is permitted, while that which has no apparent medical benefit but is purely superstitious is forbidden.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

If a bone is broken but the majority of its width is surrounded by flesh and skin, the animal is not considered a treifa—even if the break is above the knee joint (arkuva)—and the limb is not considered a limb severed from a living animal (ever min hachai). A case came before Rava where the bone was covered by a majority of "flesh" only when including soft sinews. Rava initially permitted this based on Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that soft sinews are considered like meat for fulfilling the mitzva of eating the Pesach sacrifice. However, Rav Papa challenged this from Reish Lakish's opposing view that such sinews do not count as meat, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan ultimately retracted his position, rendering the case forbidden. The Gemara clarifies additional questions regarding broken bones surrounded by skin and flesh in different manners, in some of which the flesh is no longer actually attached to the bone. The law of a ben pekua (a fetus found in its mother's womb after she was slaughtered) permits the fetus to be eaten without independent slaughter. This law also permits its placenta (shilya) to be eaten, as derived from the same verse from which the laws of ben pekua are derived. However, if even a small portion of the placenta emerged outside the womb prior to the mother's slaughter, it is forbidden to eat even the portion that remained inside out of concern that the head of the fetus may have emerged with it before the slaughter. If an animal carrying its first offspring miscarries a placenta, one does not have to treat the placenta with the sanctity of a firstborn (bechor). This is because perhaps the fetus inside was a female, and even if it was a male, perhaps it was a non-viable anomaly that is not fit for firstborn sanctity (such as a sheep that looks like a goat). In contrast, the placenta of a consecrated sacrifice is treated with sanctity, as sacrifices can also be brought from female animals, and therefore the likelihood of it having sanctity is much higher. The placenta is not considered food and therefore does not contract food impurity. Within this discussion, the Gemara inquires whether or not the hide of a domestic donkey that was cooked is susceptible to impurity. The Gemara presents two different versions of a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan regarding a placenta that emerges alongside a visible fetus. They debate whether perhaps there is a (second) hidden fetus inside the placenta, with each version of their debate applying this concern to different circumstances. Non-Jews used to bury placentas at intersections or hang them on trees as a superstitious remedy, and therefore these actions are forbidden under the prohibition of following non-Jewish customs (darchei ha-Emori). Regarding this, Abaye and Rava define the boundary, establishing that anything done for a proven medical remedy is permitted, while that which has no apparent medical benefit but is purely superstitious is forbidden.

Gemara Chabura - Rabbi Karlinsky - Ani HaMehapech B'Charara-Poaching Employees 10 by Shapell's Rabbeim

A new mishnah! Handling the back legs of an animal, if a bone is broken, if the leg is intact... then kosher slaughtering renders the animal permitted for consumption. But where is the severing, with regard to the leg joint? And then the Gemara dives in, raising dispute on those same details -- whether the bone is broken, but the limb is not severed, how much flesh remains? Again, where is the break with regard to the leg joint?

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

The odd case of the entirety of an animal fetus that is permitted for food after its mother is slaughtered in a kosher way - and the entire fetus is permitted, even though some animal parts are usually prohibited, even with proper slaughtering. The Gemara presents two versions of the passage addressing the different opinions on this case. Also, the case of finding the fetus alive in the womb after kosher shechitah - it doesn't need shechitah, but what's the difference between that and the original case? Whether the ben pakuah (fetus, under these terms) steps on the ground. Also, is the offspring considered the ben pakuah of its father as well as of its mother? But at the rabbinic level, the ben pakuah should be slaughtered anyway. And also the decree was made for the future generations of the ben pakuah. Plus, the informative case of terumah and demai and the possibility of asking whether even an ignoramus has separated properly. [Who's Who: Rabbi Shimon Shazuri]

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

 Questions? Comments? We love feedback! Email us at info@baishavaad.org Rav Yosef Dovid JosilowskyQuestion: A fellow walks into someone's house, picks up an item that he wants, puts money on the table, and says, “I'm buying this item whether you like it or not.” Is this a valid sale?Answer: We said in the last segment that a forced sale is valid, and the Shulchan Aruch rules that this is true even if the seller does not say that he consents to the sale.There is a difficulty with this ruling in that it seems to contradict a Gemara in Bava Kama that defines the difference between a gazlan and a chamsan in that a gazlan steals without paying, while a chamsan does pay. The Gemara then asks: If someone gives money, people do not consider this to be a sin at all. Why is he classified as a chamsan? The Gemara responds that we are referring to a case where the seller never consented to the sale.This Gemara seems to be saying that a forced sale is only valid if the seller says that he consents. If so, how could the Shulchan Aruch rule against an explicit Gemara?The Nesivos Hamishpat explains that the Gemara is not talking about a sale that was forced by threatening to harm the seller. There, his expression of consent is not needed because we assume that he does agree to sell the item in order to save his life. This Gemara, however, is speaking about a case similar to the one in question, where someone simply took his friend's item against his will and paid for it. In this case, where the situation does not lead to the presumption that the seller probably consented to the sale, the Gemara says that his explicit consent is needed to validate the sale.Accordingly, we cannot say that the case in question is a valid sale unless the owner actually expresses consent to sell the item.

The Gemara cites two conflicting statements of Rav regarding a hanging limb of an animal. In one statement, Rav rules that eating this limb incurs lashes, while in the other, he rules it does not. Rav Yosef resolves this contradiction: if the animal dies naturally, death causes legal detachment (oseh nipul), retroactively defining the hanging limb as ever min hachai (a limb from a living animal) which incurs lashes for one who eats it. Conversely, if the animal is slaughtered, slaughter does not cause legal detachment (eino oseh nipul), meaning the limb is not treated as a separate forbidden entity and the eater does not receive lashes. Rava brings a biblical source for this differentiation between death and slaughter, and the Gemara raises two difficulties against his proof but resolves them both. Rav Chisda and Rabba dispute whether the debate between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis - regarding whether slaughter causes legal detachment for an emerged fetal limb - applies only when the fetus is alive, or even when the fetus is dead. Rav Chisda holds that when the fetus is dead, the emerged limb is definitely considered detached and carries impurity. In the course of a back-and-forth argument between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, it was mentioned that slaughtering would not remove impurity from an eight-month fetus, as it is not viable, and there is no type of eight-month fetus that can be validly slaughtered. However, a braita states that there are eight-month fetuses that can be permitted by slaughter. Rav Kahana reconciles this by differentiating between slaughtering the fetus itself and permitting the animal via its mother's slaughter (ben pekua). Rav Hoshaya inquires whether a live nine-month-old fetus can be validly slaughtered while still in utero. This question is evaluated under the views of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Chananya attempts to resolve this inquiry from a braita, but his answer is ultimately rejected by Rava. The Mishna introduces a dispute regarding the laws of ben pekua and whether they apply to a fully formed, nine-month-old fetus found inside its slaughtered mother. Rabbi Meir rules that the laws of ben pekua do not apply here, and the fetus requires its own independent slaughter. Conversely, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that as long as the fetus is still inside the womb, it is covered by the laws of ben pekua and is permitted by the slaughter of the mother. Operating under the Rabbis' position, Rabbi Eleazar states in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the mother's slaughter only covers the animal born from this womb regarding the laws of eating. In other halakhot, this animal is considered a distinct entity and standard animal laws apply to it. The Gemara presents two versions of what Rabbi Oshaya's statement was coming to exclude: the first version suggests it excludes the animal's fat, sciatic nerve, and blood from the mother's exemption, while the second version suggests it excludes using the animal for work or illicit cross-breeding. The first version is ultimately rejected based on other sources, leaving the second version as the preferred explanation. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the blood of a ben pekua (a nine-month fetus) is permitted as well. Rabbi Yochanan raises one difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, which the Gemara subsequently resolves. According to the position of the Rabbis, a question is asked whether one can redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi disagree. A second question is asked whether a ben pekua that is still in utero can be considered a separate unit for the laws of ritual impurity. This is a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and each one raises a difficulty against the other's position.

The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin (31a) tells that Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua made a point of always keeping his head covered, and he explained that since the Shechina hovered over his head at all times, it is appropriate to cover one's head as a sign of respect. This same Rav Huna is cited elsewhere (Shabbat 118b) as saying that he was worthy of reward for ensuring never to walk four Amot (cubits) with his hair uncovered. In a different context (Shabbat 156b), the Gemara teaches that wearing a hair-covering helps engender Yir'at Shamayim (fear of Heaven) and thus prevent us from sin. It tells that a woman was warned by astrologers that her infant son would be a thief as an adult. She understood this to mean that the boy was born with a natural inclination toward theft. In an effort to avoid this outcome, she saw to it that the child's head would always remain covered, so he would be cognizant of Hashem's presence at all times and thus stay away from sin. In addition, she fervently prayed to G-d that he would be righteous. Once, the Gemara says, when this boy was still a child, he was sitting beneath somebody's palm tree learning Torah, and his head covering blew off. He looked up and saw a cluster of luscious dates. Enticed, he ate the dates, which were somebody's private property – showing how a head covering helps protect a person from the Yeser Ha'ra (evil inclination). (Thanks to his mother's efforts, though, this boy grew to become Rav Nahman Bar Yishak, one of the great Sages of the Talmud.) Similarly, the Zohar (Balak 187a) teaches that one must avoid walking more than four Amot with his head uncovered, because the Shechina hovers over his head. The Zohar adds that this concept is alluded to in the verse in Kohelet (9:8), "Ve'shemen Al Roshecha al Yehsar" – "Oil shall not be lacking upon your head." The Shechina (divine presence) is compared to fire, and Misvot are the "oil," the fuel that sustains its presence in our lives. Covering our heads brings us Yir'at Shamayim so that we remain loyal to G-d's commands. The Zohar reiterates this point later (Pinhas 245b), citing the verse, "Melo Kol Ha'aretz Kebodo" (Yeshayahu 6:3) – G-d's glory fills the entire earth. We acknowledge and give honor to His presence by wearing a head covering. The Rambam, too, in his Guide for the Perplexed (3:52), emphasizes that the great Sages always ensured to cover their heads out of respect for the divine presence. However, as we know, there are many otherwise observant Jews (especially in our community) who do not wear a Kippa all the time. They make a point of wearing a Kippa when they enter the synagogue, but not throughout the day when they go about their ordinary affairs. Is this acceptable, or are these individuals failing to fulfill a Halachic obligation? This question depends on whether we regard head-covering as a strict Halachic requirement, or as a Middat Hasidut – a recommended measure of piety. The Maharam of Rothenberg (Germany, c. 1215-1293), cited by the Orhot Haim and Kolbo, maintained that Halacha does not forbid going about bareheaded, and the Sages who ensured to have their heads covered did so as a Middat Hasidut. This is also the clear implication of the Rambam, in the passage cited earlier, where he mentions that great Rabbis made a point of covering their heads – indicating that this is a recommended measure of piety, and not a binding Halachic obligation. The Maharshal (Rav Shlomo Luria, Poland, 1510-1573) drew proof to this view from a passage in the Midrash which emphasizes how Hashem deals with us far more kindly than mortal kings deal with their subjects. Normally, the Midrash comments, when a king's messenger reads to the masses a written royal decree, everyone is expected to stand, remove their hats, and listen with fear and trepidation. But when we read the Shema in fulfillment of G-d's decree, we are not required to stand and remove our head coverings. The Midrash here clearly implies that there would be nothing wrong with baring our heads – even for the recitation of Shema. The Shebut Yaakov (Rav Yaakov Reischer, 1661-1733) refutes this proof, noting that the Midrash later observes that Hashem does not demand that we hunt wild animals to bring them as sacrifices, but rather commands that we offer as sacrifices domesticated animals, which do not need to be hunted. Clearly, this does not mean that it would be acceptable to offer wild animals as sacrifices. By the same token, we cannot necessarily deduce from the Midrash that it is acceptable to recite Shema with our heads uncovered. Maran (Rav Yosef Caro, author of the Shulhan Aruch), in Bet Yosef (91), brings the aforementioned opinion of the Maharam of Rothenberg, that covering one's head is not strictly required, indicating that he concurred with this view. Elsewhere in Bet Yosef (46), however, Maran appears to imply otherwise. In discussing the blessing recited each morning, "Oter Yisrael Be'tif'ara" ("He who crowns Israel with splendor"), Maran explains that we are "crowned" in the sense that we, unlike other nations, are required to cover our heads. Maran adds that even those who maintain that this is not strictly required, agree that it is recommended as an act of piety. Here Maran clearly sides with the opinion that head-covering constitutes an outright Halachic obligation. Regardless, the Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1806) noted that in the Shulhan Aruch, Maran takes the position that covering one's head is recommended but not strictly required. In Siman 2, the Shulhan Aruch writes that "it is forbidden" to walk about "Be'koma Zekufa" – completely upright, appearing proud and overly confident. In the same sentence, the Shulhan Aruch writes that "one should not walk four Amot with his head bare." When it comes to "Koma Zekufa," the Shulhan Aruch uses the word "Assur" ("It is forbidden"), whereas regarding walking bareheaded, he writes simply that this should not be done. It would thus appear that although it is proper to wear a head-covering, this is not strictly required. However, the Taz (Rav David Ha'levi Segal, 1586-1667) writes that even assuming that head-covering was practiced in ancient times only as a Middat Hasidut, in modern times this has become a strict Halachic obligation. The Taz explains that since the Christians are accustomed to walk about bareheaded, doing so violates the prohibition of "Hukot Ha'akum" – following gentile practices. Hence, in the view of the Taz, one is required to wear a Kippa nowadays in order to avoid transgressing the Biblical prohibition of "Hukot Ha'akum." Hacham Ovadia Yosef disputes this claim. Based on the comments of the Mahari Kolon (Rav Yosef Kolon, d. 1480), Hacham Ovadia writes that one transgresses the prohibition of "Hukot Ha'akum" only if he does something with the specific intention of imitating gentile practices and resembling a non-Jew. If a person decides to leave his head uncovered in the interest of comfort, this does not violate the prohibition. Nevertheless, in a famous responsum in Yehaveh Da'at, Hacham Ovadia writes that nowadays, one is required to wear a Kippa, for a different reason – because this has become the "badge" or symbol of an observant Jewish man. By wearing a Kippa, one identifies himself as a member of the population of G-d-fearing Jews. Conversely, one who chooses not to wear a Kippa presents himself as being non-observant, thereby inviting suspicion, and for this reason, wearing a Kippa has today become an obligation. It seems, however, that this applies only in Israel, where the decision of whether or not to cover one's head is the clear marker of one's self-identification as religious or secular. Here in the United States, however, at least in some communities, this is not the case, and it is known that not all observant Jews ensure to keep their heads covered at all times. Therefore, while it is certainly preferred and advisable to wear a Kippa – and where a person fears antisemitism, he can wear a cap instead of, or over, his Kippa – one who wishes to leave his head uncovered has a basis on which to rely. (Indeed, in the school where I work, I advise the members of the basketball team to leave their Kippot off during games, because the Kippa would interfere with their playing; since the Kippa is not required as a strict obligation, it may certainly be removed for this purpose.) Nevertheless, wearing a Kippa when eating, praying, reciting Berachot and learning Torah is strictly required. Of course, one must wear a Kippa in the synagogue. In the presence of a Rabbi, it is proper to wear a Kippa in the interest of Derech Eretz (common courtesy). When a person wishes to fulfill the requirement of a Beracha by listening to its recitation by somebody else, he must wear a Kippa even though he remains silent, because he is considered as actually reciting the Beracha by listening to his fellow.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

The Gemara cites two conflicting statements of Rav regarding a hanging limb of an animal. In one statement, Rav rules that eating this limb incurs lashes, while in the other, he rules it does not. Rav Yosef resolves this contradiction: if the animal dies naturally, death causes legal detachment (oseh nipul), retroactively defining the hanging limb as ever min hachai (a limb from a living animal) which incurs lashes for one who eats it. Conversely, if the animal is slaughtered, slaughter does not cause legal detachment (eino oseh nipul), meaning the limb is not treated as a separate forbidden entity and the eater does not receive lashes. Rava brings a biblical source for this differentiation between death and slaughter, and the Gemara raises two difficulties against his proof but resolves them both. Rav Chisda and Rabba dispute whether the debate between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis - regarding whether slaughter causes legal detachment for an emerged fetal limb - applies only when the fetus is alive, or even when the fetus is dead. Rav Chisda holds that when the fetus is dead, the emerged limb is definitely considered detached and carries impurity. In the course of a back-and-forth argument between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, it was mentioned that slaughtering would not remove impurity from an eight-month fetus, as it is not viable, and there is no type of eight-month fetus that can be validly slaughtered. However, a braita states that there are eight-month fetuses that can be permitted by slaughter. Rav Kahana reconciles this by differentiating between slaughtering the fetus itself and permitting the animal via its mother's slaughter (ben pekua). Rav Hoshaya inquires whether a live nine-month-old fetus can be validly slaughtered while still in utero. This question is evaluated under the views of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Chananya attempts to resolve this inquiry from a braita, but his answer is ultimately rejected by Rava. The Mishna introduces a dispute regarding the laws of ben pekua and whether they apply to a fully formed, nine-month-old fetus found inside its slaughtered mother. Rabbi Meir rules that the laws of ben pekua do not apply here, and the fetus requires its own independent slaughter. Conversely, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that as long as the fetus is still inside the womb, it is covered by the laws of ben pekua and is permitted by the slaughter of the mother. Operating under the Rabbis' position, Rabbi Eleazar states in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the mother's slaughter only covers the animal born from this womb regarding the laws of eating. In other halakhot, this animal is considered a distinct entity and standard animal laws apply to it. The Gemara presents two versions of what Rabbi Oshaya's statement was coming to exclude: the first version suggests it excludes the animal's fat, sciatic nerve, and blood from the mother's exemption, while the second version suggests it excludes using the animal for work or illicit cross-breeding. The first version is ultimately rejected based on other sources, leaving the second version as the preferred explanation. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the blood of a ben pekua (a nine-month fetus) is permitted as well. Rabbi Yochanan raises one difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, which the Gemara subsequently resolves. According to the position of the Rabbis, a question is asked whether one can redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi disagree. A second question is asked whether a ben pekua that is still in utero can be considered a separate unit for the laws of ritual impurity. This is a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and each one raises a difficulty against the other's position.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

The Gemara presents biblical derivations establishing that undomesticated animals (chaya) are included in the legal category of domesticated animals (behema) and vice versa. This crossover applies to kosher signs, crossbreeding laws, sacrificial impurities, and miscarriages. The Mishna rules that if a fetus dies in utero and a midwife reaches inside and touches it, the midwife contracts seven-day corpse impurity, while the mother remains pure until the fetus emerges. Rabba establishes that just as absorbed impurity (tuma belua) does not pass on impurity, absorbed purity (tahara beluah cannot become impure. The Gemara seeks biblical and logical sources for these principles, evaluating various kal va-chomer (a fortiori) arguments, including extending this law to animals. Rava notes that both laws are already stated in Mishnayot concerning a swallowed ring, prompting the Gemara to clarify that Rabba's unique ruling applies to a case where someone swallows two rings simultaneously - one pure and one impure - and the impure ring does not make the pure one impure.

The Gemara (Shabbat 129a) teaches that one should ensure to purchase shoes for his feet even if this necessitates selling the "ceiling beams of his house." This might mean that the protection provided by shoes for the feet is more important than the protection provided by the roof of one's home. Elsewhere (Pesahim 113b), the Gemara warns that one who goes about barefoot is "excommunicated by G-d." Different reasons have been given for why one should not walk about without shoes. Rashi explains that walking around barefoot is undignified, and Torah Jews are obligated to conduct themselves in a dignified manner as befitting the children of the Almighty. Others explain, very simply, that walking around barefoot is dangerous, as one's feet might be bitten or stung, or might step on a sharp object. Some have noted that the Hebrew word for shoe – Na'al – may be read as an acrostic for the words "Nahash" (snake), "Akrab" (scorpion), "Lahash" ("hissing"). Similarly, some sources warn that one who walks about barefoot is more susceptible to catching a cold or some other virus. Rav Abraham Azulai (d. 1643) offered a Kabbalistic reason for this Halacha, explaining that after Adam and Hava's sin in Gan Eden, G-d placed a cursed upon the ground ("Arura Ha'adama Ba'aburecha" – Bereshit 3:17). It became the domain of the snake, which represents the Yeser Ha'ra (evil inclination) and forces of impurity, and slithers on the ground and eats the dirt. One who walks barefoot, touching the ground without any obstruction, exposes himself to the ground's impurity. Indeed, some commentators explain that the Egyptian sorcerers, who succeeded in mimicking some of the wonders that Moshe Rabbenu performed – such as changing their staffs to snakes, and transforming the water into blood – received their magical powers from the forces of impurity within the ground. For this reason, they were unable to match Moshe after he brought the third plague – the plague of Kinim (lice) – because the earth underneath Egypt was overrun by vermin (Shemot 8:13), and thus they could not access the forces of impurity. According to the Kabbalists, then, one must wear shoes in order not to connect himself to the Tum'a (impure) in the ground. In fact, some suggest that the word "Na'al" is an acrostic representing the phrase "Nahash Afar Lahmo" – "the snake's bread is dirt," alluding to the function of shoes to shield a person from the impurity of the ground, the domain of the snake. In theory, these different reasons yield interesting exceptions to this Halacha. For example, in warm climates, or during the summertime, walking about barefoot will not likely result in illness. And, in societies where walking barefoot has become accepted, it is not considered undignified. The Kabbalists teach that the ground of Eretz Yisrael does not contain the Tum'a that is present in the ground throughout the rest of the world. In practice, however, since we must concern ourselves with all these reasons, one should avoid walking about barefoot everywhere – even in warm regions, in societies where this is accepted, and in Eretz Yisrael. Inside one's home, however, none of these reasons apply: there is no concern of getting sick or being bitten or stung; there is no requirement to appear especially dignified within the privacy of one's home; and the floors are tiled such that one does not step directly on the ground. Thus, it is entirely permissible to walk about barefoot in one's home. This is the ruling of Hacham Ovadia Yosef. One should avoid walking about outside without shoes even if he wears socks. Although the socks protect the feet from the Tum'a of the ground, they do not offer protection from small creatures or sharp objects, and, in most societies, this would be considered undignified. Some sources mention the practice of going outside barefoot as a form of self-affliction for the purpose of achieving atonement for one's sins. People would intentionally endure the discomfort of walking barefoot and hurting themselves, or getting sick, so they could earn expiation for their wrongdoing. (This resembles the account of how the Arizal would roll in the snow during the winter in order to earn atonement.) Hacham Ovadia Yosef, however, opposed all practices of self-affliction, including voluntary fasts. He noted the Gemara's teaching that the Nazir must bring a sin-offering to atone for his self-denial, abstaining from wine. All the more so, we are discouraged from afflicting ourselves unnecessarily by fasting and causing ourselves pain. Hashem expects us to enjoy – in moderation – the comforts and joys of our world, not to deprive ourselves of them. Moreover, voluntary fasts and other extreme measures of piety can often bring more spiritual harm than benefit, as they frequently result in arrogance. Many people who observe such practices ensure to put themselves on display, or to tell their peers about what they do, in order to earn their admiration and esteem – a kind of exhibitionism which is the diametric opposite of piety. Primarily, though, Hacham Ovadia opposed these practices because they lead a person to overlook the most important and most beneficial means of atonement – Torah study. King Shlomo teaches in Mishleh (16:6), "Be'hesed Ve'emet Yechupar Avon" – "Iniquity shall be atoned through kindness and truth," and "Emet" ("truth") refers to Torah learning. In fact, in the blessing of the Amida in which we ask Hashem to help us repent, we begin, "Hashibenu Abinu Le'Toratecha" – "Bring us back, our Father, to Your Torah." The most important and most effective way to rectify one's wrongdoing and earn atonement is through Torah study. The sanctity of Torah has the ability to purge and cleanse the soul of all impurities. I am often approached by people seeking advice for how to attain forgiveness for various sins, and my response is always to attend more Torah classes and devote more time to Torah learning. This isn't my idea – it was written explicitly by Rabbenu Yona (Spain, 1200-1263) in his famous Iggeret Teshuba – a brief guide for those seeking to repent. He says that on the day that a person decides to perform Teshuba, he should immediately commit to increase his Torah learning: if he is accustomed to learning one page, then he should learn two; if he is accustomed to learning for one hour, then he should learn for two hours. Even regarding the six weeks of Shobabim, when there is a time-honored custom to fast on Mondays and Thursdays, the Sadikim teach that spending several hours a day learning achieves more than fasting. This is especially so in today's day and age, when we are not accustomed to abstaining from food, and fasting thus causes frailty which diminishes our productivity and our ability to learn Torah and observe Misvot. It must be emphasized that Torah learning has the ability to atone for even the most grievous sins. The Gemara in Masechet Menahot (110) teaches that one who learns Torah does not need to offer sacrifices for atonement. Even the sin of Lashon Ha'ra – a sin as severe as murder, idol-worship and immorality combined – can be atoned through genuine repentance and Torah learning. Rav Chaim of Volozhin (1749-1821) related that people would ask his mentor, the Gaon of Vilna (1720-1797), how they could atone for the severe sin of Hosa'at Zera ("wasting seed"), and he would respond, "If they devote themselves to Torah study, then they have nothing to worry about." The Gaon of Vilna did not advise these individuals to observe fasts or practice forms of self-affliction or self-deprivation; instead, he urged them to devote time to Torah learning, as this is the universal remedy for all spiritual maladies. (It goes without saying that rectifying this sin also requires common-sense measures such as avoiding places and devices that trigger the Yeser Ha'ra.) We should add that reading the Zohar, too, is beneficial for achieving forgiveness. Even if one does not understand what he reads, the words themselves have inherent sanctity that spiritually cleanse a person. In fact, the Arizal had the custom of reading a section of Tikkuneh Zohar each day from Rosh Hodesh Elul through Yom Kippur, when he would complete the entire work. Clearly, then, one should avoid all measures of self-deprivation, and should instead care for his physical wellbeing so he has the strength and mental energy to devote himself to Torah learning as much as he can.

The Mishna explains at what stage a delivery is considered a birth (even for a stillborn animal) to determine whether it exempts subsequent offspring from firstborn status, particularly in the case of a difficult birth where the fetus is extracted in pieces. Rav Huna and Raba disagree regarding when the majority of the animal emerges: does the sanctity of the firstborn apply retroactively or only from that moment onward? The Gemara presents two cases demonstrating the practical ramifications of this dispute. A difficulty is raised against Rav Huna's position from our Mishna, but it is ultimately resolved through a reinterpretation of the Mishna. A series of unanswered questions are then raised regarding whether a newborn is considered a firstborn if there is some type of chatzitza (interposition) between the fetus and the womb. The Mishna explains that touching a dead fetus while it is in utero does not convey the impurity of a carcass. However, the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosi haGelili debate whether this exemption applies to all animals - both kosher and non-kosher- or only to kosher animals, and the Gemara presents explanations for each position.