Podcasts about Gemara

In the Torah verse regarding the purification of the leper (Vayikra 14:17), the word “right” appears three times - once in reference to the hand, once to the foot, and once to the ear. Rava explains that each mention teaches the requirement to use the right hand in a different ritual: one for kemitza (taking a handful of flour) in meal offerings, one for chalitza (the release ceremony of levirate marriage), and one for piercing the ear of a Jewish slave. According to Rabba bar bar Hanna, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, wherever the Torah uses the term “kohen,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Based on this, Rava’s drasha regarding kemitza teaches that not only the taking of the kometz (handful) must be done with the right hand, but also its placement into the kli sharet (sanctified vessel). Rabbi Shimon, who either does not require this part of the process or does not require it to be done with the right hand, agrees that the kemitza itself must be performed with the right hand, as derived from Vayikra 6:10, which compares the meal offering to the sin offering. Therefore, Rava’s interpretation applies specifically to the meal offering of a sinner, brought as part of a sliding scale offering. The Mishna rules that if the blood spills directly onto the floor from the animal, without first being collected in a sanctified vessel, the blood is disqualified. A braita teaches that the blood to be collected must be the spurting blood from the act of slaughter - not blood from a cut, nor residual blood that flows after most of the blood has exited the animal. The blood must flow directly from the animal into the kli sharet, from which it will be sprinkled on the altar. These laws are derived from Vayikra 4:5, in the context of the sin offering of the Kohen Gadol. Rav rules that all of the blood must be collected, based on Vayikra 4:7. According to Shmuel, the knife must be lifted immediately after slaughter to prevent blood from dripping off the knife into the vessel, since the blood must come directly from the animal. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explain that the animal’s throat must be held directly over the vessel to ensure the blood flows straight into it. Rabbi Asi posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding the airspace above a vessel. The Gemara brings three versions of the question and Rabbi Yochanan’s response: If the bottom of the vessel broke before the blood reached it, but the blood had already entered the vessel’s airspace, does this count as if the blood had reached the vessel? If so, the blood could be collected from the floor and used on the altar. To answer the question, Rabbi Yochanan cited a braita regarding a barrel into which fresh water streamed into its airspace, disqualifying it for use in the red heifer purification waters, as it is considered as though the water entered the vessel. However, this comparison is problematic, since the red heifer case does not involve a broken vessel. To justify the citation, the Gemara reframes the question as a two-pronged inquiry. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was drawn from the aforementioned braita. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was derived from the laws of sacrificial blood, which must reach the vessel directly. Since the blood passes through the airspace first, this implies that the airspace is treated as part of the vessel. If the animal becomes blemished after slaughter but before the blood is collected, brought to the altar, or poured, the blood is disqualified. A source is cited from the laws of the sin offering to support this. The Gemara attempts to extend this ruling to offerings of lesser sanctity, such as the Paschal sacrifice, but the proof is ultimately rejected.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza—an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both “kohen” and “finger,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either “finger” appears alone or “kohen” together with “finger”. According to Rabbi Yochanan’s rule that the mention of “kohen” implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava—a textual analogy—from the three mentions of “right” in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word “kohen”? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.

Even though the basin in the Temple must be large enough for four people to simultaneously wash their hands and feet from it, a kohen may also perform this washing using a smaller utensil - provided the water originates from the basin and the utensil is sanctified (a kli sharet). Reish Lakish ruled that a liquid suitable for completing the required volume of a mikveh may also be used to complete the volume of water in the Temple basin. However, such a liquid is not valid for the quarter-log amount required for netilat yadayim (ritual handwashing). The Gemara explores what types of liquids are excluded from use in netilat yadayim. Initially, it suggests excluding liquefied clay or aquatic organisms like red gnats, which are considered water-like. Both suggestions are ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara concludes that the exclusion applies to a case where one adds a se’ah of liquid to a mikveh that contains exactly forty se’ah, then removes a se’ah, repeating this process until half the mikveh consists of the added liquid. This method is acceptable for a mikveh and the Temple basin, but not for the quarter-log required for handwashing. Rav Papa introduces a unique case where such a liquid would be valid for tevilah (immersion) of very small items. Rabbi Yirmia, quoting Reish Lakish, stated that water from a mikveh may be used in the Temple basin. This raises a question: perhaps the basin requires flowing water rather than stagnant water. Although a tannaitic source seems to support this requirement, the Gemara resolves the issue by showing that it is a matter of dispute among the tannaim. The Mishna teaches that if an uncircumcised kohen performs sacrificial service in the Temple, the sacrifices are disqualified. This ruling is derived from Yechezkel 44:7,9. Similarly, a kohen who is impure disqualifies the sacrifices he offers. The elders of the South limit this disqualification to impurity from a sheretz (creeping creature), but not to impurity from contact with the dead, which is permitted when the majority of the community is impure. The Gemara challenges this view, noting that impurity from the dead is more severe as it lasts seven days and requires purification through the ashes of the red heifer. However, the elders argue that since communal sacrifices are accepted when the majority are impure from the dead but not from a sheretz, the same distinction applies to kohanim: a kohen’s sacrifice is not disqualified if he is impure from the dead. To better understand the elders’ position, the Gemara concludes that they must hold that someone impure from a sheretz on the 14th of Nissan may have the Paschal sacrifice offered on their behalf and eat it on the night of the 15th in a state of purity. Ulla explained that Reish Lakish strongly disagreed with the elders of the South. He argued that the laws governing the community are more lenient than those governing the kohanim. While the people may have their Paschal offering brought on their behalf when impure, a kohen’s offering is disqualified if he is impure from a sheretz. Therefore, if the Paschal offering cannot be brought on behalf of someone impure from the dead, then certainly a kohen who is impure from the dead should disqualify the sacrifice he offers. To resolve Reish Lakish’s difficulty, the Gemara suggests that the elders of the South may have held that even the Paschal offering could be brought on behalf of someone impure from the dead. This raises a question: how does this view align with the laws of Pesach Sheni?  

Several difficulties are raised against the conclusion that the elders of the South must hold that the Paschal sacrifice may be brought on behalf of someone who is impure from contact with the dead. After presenting a challenge based on a question posed by Rami bar Hama, the Gemara concludes that Rami bar Hama clearly disagrees with the elders of the South. He maintains that the Paschal sacrifice cannot be brought for someone who is impure, and if it is, the offering is disqualified. A baraita is cited as a challenge to Rami bar Hama’s position, but the difficulty is ultimately resolved. Notably, there are two different versions of this challenge. Additionally, the Gemara discusses the case of a kohen who sits while performing the sacrificial rites. In such a case, the sacrifice is disqualified. The source for this ruling is examined, and two textual proofs are brought to support it.

The Gemara discusses whether the Sukkah represents the Ananei HaKavod or physical huts. Rabbi Stark explains how not only were there actual clouds but they were clouds like you wouldn't believe.

Even though the basin in the Temple must be large enough for four people to simultaneously wash their hands and feet from it, a kohen may also perform this washing using a smaller utensil - provided the water originates from the basin and the utensil is sanctified (a kli sharet). Reish Lakish ruled that a liquid suitable for completing the required volume of a mikveh may also be used to complete the volume of water in the Temple basin. However, such a liquid is not valid for the quarter-log amount required for netilat yadayim (ritual handwashing). The Gemara explores what types of liquids are excluded from use in netilat yadayim. Initially, it suggests excluding liquefied clay or aquatic organisms like red gnats, which are considered water-like. Both suggestions are ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara concludes that the exclusion applies to a case where one adds a se’ah of liquid to a mikveh that contains exactly forty se’ah, then removes a se’ah, repeating this process until half the mikveh consists of the added liquid. This method is acceptable for a mikveh and the Temple basin, but not for the quarter-log required for handwashing. Rav Papa introduces a unique case where such a liquid would be valid for tevilah (immersion) of very small items. Rabbi Yirmia, quoting Reish Lakish, stated that water from a mikveh may be used in the Temple basin. This raises a question: perhaps the basin requires flowing water rather than stagnant water. Although a tannaitic source seems to support this requirement, the Gemara resolves the issue by showing that it is a matter of dispute among the tannaim. The Mishna teaches that if an uncircumcised kohen performs sacrificial service in the Temple, the sacrifices are disqualified. This ruling is derived from Yechezkel 44:7,9. Similarly, a kohen who is impure disqualifies the sacrifices he offers. The elders of the South limit this disqualification to impurity from a sheretz (creeping creature), but not to impurity from contact with the dead, which is permitted when the majority of the community is impure. The Gemara challenges this view, noting that impurity from the dead is more severe as it lasts seven days and requires purification through the ashes of the red heifer. However, the elders argue that since communal sacrifices are accepted when the majority are impure from the dead but not from a sheretz, the same distinction applies to kohanim: a kohen’s sacrifice is not disqualified if he is impure from the dead. To better understand the elders’ position, the Gemara concludes that they must hold that someone impure from a sheretz on the 14th of Nissan may have the Paschal sacrifice offered on their behalf and eat it on the night of the 15th in a state of purity. Ulla explained that Reish Lakish strongly disagreed with the elders of the South. He argued that the laws governing the community are more lenient than those governing the kohanim. While the people may have their Paschal offering brought on their behalf when impure, a kohen’s offering is disqualified if he is impure from a sheretz. Therefore, if the Paschal offering cannot be brought on behalf of someone impure from the dead, then certainly a kohen who is impure from the dead should disqualify the sacrifice he offers. To resolve Reish Lakish’s difficulty, the Gemara suggests that the elders of the South may have held that even the Paschal offering could be brought on behalf of someone impure from the dead. This raises a question: how does this view align with the laws of Pesach Sheni?  

Several difficulties are raised against the conclusion that the elders of the South must hold that the Paschal sacrifice may be brought on behalf of someone who is impure from contact with the dead. After presenting a challenge based on a question posed by Rami bar Hama, the Gemara concludes that Rami bar Hama clearly disagrees with the elders of the South. He maintains that the Paschal sacrifice cannot be brought for someone who is impure, and if it is, the offering is disqualified. A baraita is cited as a challenge to Rami bar Hama’s position, but the difficulty is ultimately resolved. Notably, there are two different versions of this challenge. Additionally, the Gemara discusses the case of a kohen who sits while performing the sacrificial rites. In such a case, the sacrifice is disqualified. The source for this ruling is examined, and two textual proofs are brought to support it.

Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.

Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree.   Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body.  Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A  braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?

The Gemara in RH 16a cites a 5-way machlokes when/how often the world is judged. This episode analyzes this machlokes.

Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.

Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree.   Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body.  Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A  braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?

The mishnah identified the person handling the offering with the status of a "tevul yom" -- one who is waiting until nightfall for the purity effected by immersing in the mikveh earlier in the day to kick in -- as one whose offering would not be valid. So the search for the source for this conclusion is undertaken by the Gemara - including a comparison to shaving the head and/or points of the face. Also, a sampling of the establishment of norms for those who might bring such a korban - in this case, a zav or one akin to a zav, with an unhealthy seminal emission (one who is a mehusar kippurim) - with a connection to the red heifer.

Chapter 2 - with 2 new forms of disqualification: the wrong person or a person with the wrong status bringing the offering -- or bringing it at the wrong time. The mishnah lists the many people who would invalidate the offering just by virtue of who they are or what their status is. And then the Gemara looks to source each of the people who would have invalidated the offering, with an effort to find the precise ones. Plus, the example of the "onen," the acute mourner, if he is the kohen gadol, whose service would invalidate the offering. As sourced in the story of Nadav and Avihu, and Aaron's refraining from offering sacrifices immediately after their shocking deaths.

Gemara with Rabbi Oster

Study Guide Zevachim 16 The Gemara presents three proofs that the service of a non-priest (zar) in the Temple is invalid: one from a verse, and two derived through a kal va-chomer argument. It then brings four proofs that the service of a mourner, before burial (onen), in the Temple is also invalid: two from verses and two from kal va-chomer reasoning. Rava attempts to limit the disqualification of the onen to the case of an individual offering, based on a kal va-chomer from ritual impurity that is permitted in communal offerings. In other words, if impurity does not invalidate a communal offering (when the majority of the community is impure), perhaps mourning should not invalidate it either. However, Rava bar Ahilai rejects this argument, claiming that accepting such a kal va-chomer would open the door to additional a fortiori arguments that could lead to incorrect halakhic conclusions, and therefore it should not be accepted.

Study Guide Zevachim 16 The Gemara presents three proofs that the service of a non-priest (zar) in the Temple is invalid: one from a verse, and two derived through a kal va-chomer argument. It then brings four proofs that the service of a mourner, before burial (onen), in the Temple is also invalid: two from verses and two from kal va-chomer reasoning. Rava attempts to limit the disqualification of the onen to the case of an individual offering, based on a kal va-chomer from ritual impurity that is permitted in communal offerings. In other words, if impurity does not invalidate a communal offering (when the majority of the community is impure), perhaps mourning should not invalidate it either. However, Rava bar Ahilai rejects this argument, claiming that accepting such a kal va-chomer would open the door to additional a fortiori arguments that could lead to incorrect halakhic conclusions, and therefore it should not be accepted.

Gemara with Rabbi Oster

Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.

The Gemara in Brachos 12b discusses whether saying Hamelech Hakadosh during eseres yemei teshuva is me'akeiv.

Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.

Gemara Chabura - Rabbi Karlinsky - Da'as Torah and Asei L'cha Rav 09 by Shapell's Rabbeim

התוכן הביאור במ"ש בגמ' שהעושה תשובה מאהבה "זדונות נעשו לו כזכיות": מצינו כו"כ חילוקי דרגות בחשיבות ההכנה לאיזה פעולה וביחסה להפעולה עצמה. לדוגמא: "מכשירי מצוה", ולדעת ר"א גם הם דוחים שבת (כמו המצוה). למעלה מזה – "עבודה שאינה תמה" בהיותה הכנה לעבודה שלאחרי' (כמו הולכת דם למזבח), ומ"מ יש לה גדר של "עבודה". ולאידך – סוג של הכנה שאין אפי' בגדר "מכשירי מצוה" (ואדרבה), כמו כללות הענין ד"ואספת דגנך וגו'". ורצה ה' שיהי' גם סוג של הכנה למצוה מענין ההפכי – ענין ה"נסיונות" שע"י דוקא מגיע למעלת בעל-תשובה ושכר גדול ביותר (אלא שאסור לאדם להעמיד א"ע בנסיון. וזהו מה שהגמ' צריכה להזהיר (גם) את הצדיק לא לומר "אחטא ואשוב" כדי להגיע למעלת בעל-תשובה...). ואם וכאשר ע"י ה"זדונות" דוקא – שכבר נפל בהם – בא למעלת תשובה מאהבה (כמבואר בתניא פ"ז), הרי ה"זדונות" עצמן בגדר "מכשרי מצוה" ועד "עבודה שאינה תמה" וכו' [ראה לקו"ש חי"ז ע' 183 ואילך]ב' חלקים משיחת וא"ו תשרי ה'תשל"ו ל"הנחה פרטית" או התרגום ללה"ק של השיחה: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=29-09-2025 Synopsis To explain the Gemara's statement that when one does teshuvah out of love, “His willful transgressions become like merits”: when it comes to preparation for a mitzvah, there are different levels. For example, machshirei mitzvah (actions that facilitate a mitzvah), which according to Rabbi Eliezer override Shabbos, just like the mitzvah itself. Above that is the level of an “incomplete service” that serves as a preparation for the subsequent service (such as bringing the blood of an offering to the Mizbeach), but is still classified as “service.” On the other hand, there is a kind of preparation that is not even considered machshirei mitzvah, such as “gathering your grain” etc. (although this is a necessary step for keeping the mitzvos of terumos, challos and maasros etc.), and moreover, Hashem desired that there should also be a kind of preparation for a mitzvah that comes through the opposite of a mitzvah – namely, a test, which is precisely the way one attains the level of a baal teshuvah and receives the greatest possible reward. (Though it is forbidden for a person to bring himself in a test, which is why the Gemara must warn even the tzaddik not to say, “I will sin and then do teshuvah” – lest the tzaddik think of sinning in order to subsequently attain the level of a baal teshuvah.) And if and when one's willful transgressions – which he has already committed – become the agent by which he comes to the level of teshuvah out of love (as explained in chapter 7 of Tanya), then the willful transgressions themselves attain the status of machshirei mitzvah, and even the status of “incomplete service” etc. [See Likkutei Sichos, vol. 17, p. 183 and onward].2 excerpts from sichah of 6 Tishrei 5736 For a transcript in English of the Sicha: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=29-09-2025

In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.

In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.

The Mishna teaches that improper intent (lo lishma) during a sin offering or a Pesach offering disqualifies the sacrifice if the intent occurs during one of the key rituals: collecting the blood, walking it to the altar, or applying it to the altar. Rabbi Shimon disagrees regarding the act of carrying the blood, arguing that it is non-essential since the slaughtering can be performed adjacent to the altar, rendering the walking unnecessary. The Gemara challenges the notion that intent during the collection of the blood can disqualify the offering, citing a braita that appears to contradict this. The resolution distinguishes between two types of improper intent: pigul (intent to consume the offering at an invalid time) and lo lishma (intent for the wrong type of offering). The braita addresses pigul, while the Mishna discusses lo lishma. However, this distinction is also questioned based on another braita concerning pigul. The issue is ultimately resolved by differentiating between the action to which the thought pertains and the action during which the thought occurs. A further question is raised regarding the sin offering, whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary and applied to the altar: does pigul apply during the kohen’s act of dipping his finger into the blood in preparation for placing it?

Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.

More on the timing of the slaughtering of the Korban Pesach - whether it needs to be done in the afternoon of the 14th of Nisan or whether the morning of the 14th works too. Also, a newborn animal and how it can't be offered and also can't be given as a tithe. Plus, the case of one who does wrong (eating forbidden fat), designates his sin-offering, becomes a heretic (so his designation is negated and the offering is disqualified), and then comes back to faith -- is the offering reinstated? What about someone who loses his cognitive abilities (at the same point where the first one became a heretic), and then he was healed - is the offering reinstated? Both cases are necessary, as the Gemara explains. What if the court rules that the fat isn't actually forbidden? And then retracts the ruling that it was permitted - is that offering disqualified or no? Plus, the time that all the sages agreed.

The Mishna teaches that improper intent (lo lishma) during a sin offering or a Pesach offering disqualifies the sacrifice if the intent occurs during one of the key rituals: collecting the blood, walking it to the altar, or applying it to the altar. Rabbi Shimon disagrees regarding the act of carrying the blood, arguing that it is non-essential since the slaughtering can be performed adjacent to the altar, rendering the walking unnecessary. The Gemara challenges the notion that intent during the collection of the blood can disqualify the offering, citing a braita that appears to contradict this. The resolution distinguishes between two types of improper intent: pigul (intent to consume the offering at an invalid time) and lo lishma (intent for the wrong type of offering). The braita addresses pigul, while the Mishna discusses lo lishma. However, this distinction is also questioned based on another braita concerning pigul. The issue is ultimately resolved by differentiating between the action to which the thought pertains and the action during which the thought occurs. A further question is raised regarding the sin offering, whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary and applied to the altar: does pigul apply during the kohen’s act of dipping his finger into the blood in preparation for placing it?

Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.

Have any questions, insights, or feedback? Send me a text!Length: 1 hour 26 minutesSynopsis: This morning (9/26/25), in our Friday morning Machshavah Lab series for women, we concluded (I think?) the introductory portion of our Iyov shiurim by taking up the question of when and whether Iyov lived. We read through the ten plus opinions in the Gemara, raised questions on what Chazal were trying to do, and then tried to answer them with a speculative theory (since I haven't found any satisfactory answers in the traditional or modern commentaries). We then surveyed the views of three Rishonim on whether Sefer Iyov is an allegory. When we return after the Moadim (בג"ה), we'll begin learning the text itself! -----מקורות:בבא בתרא דף טו עמוד אתלמוד ירושלמי סוטה ה:ורמב"ם - מורה הנבוכים ג:כברלב"ג - הקדמה לאיובאבן עזרא - איוב ב:יאRobert Eisen, The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy pp.114-117-----The Torah Content for the month of September is sponsored by Meir Areman in loving memory of his grandmother, Esther Chasha bas Meir Gedalya, who recently passed away on the 25th of Av. Tehei nishmasah tzerurah b'tzror ha'chayim.-----If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.-----Substack: rabbischneeweiss.substack.com/YU Torah: yutorah.org/teachers/Rabbi-Matt-SchneeweissPatreon: patreon.com/rabbischneeweissYouTube Channel: youtube.com/rabbischneeweissInstagram: instagram.com/rabbischneeweiss/"The Stoic Jew" Podcast: thestoicjew.buzzsprout.com"Machshavah Lab" Podcast: machshavahlab.buzzsprout.com"The Mishlei Podcast": mishlei.buzzsprout.com"Rambam Bekius" Podcast: rambambekius.buzzsprout.com"The Tefilah Podcast": tefilah.buzzsprout.comOld Blog: kolhaseridim.blogspot.com/WhatsApp Content Hub (where I post all my content and announce my public classes): https://chat.whatsapp.com/GEB1EPIAarsELfHWuI2k0HAmazon Wishlist: amazon.com/hz/wishlist/ls/Y72CSP86S24W?ref_=wl_sharel

Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.

The Gemara (Yoma 87a) tells that the great sage Rav was once insulted by the local butcher. Over the next several months, Rav waited for the butcher to apologize, but he never did. Finally, on Erev Yom Kippur, Rav decided to go and stand right outside the butcher shop so the butcher would see him. He hoped that if he would stand there, and make it very easy and convenient for the butcher to request forgiveness, he would. The butcher saw Rav standing outside his shop, and he shouted angrily, "I have nothing to say to you!" Not only did he refuse to ask forgiveness, he doubled down, insisting that he had nothing to apologize for. At that moment, a bone from the animal the butcherwas carving darted from the counter into his neck, killing him. The Rabbis of Mussar explain that although the butcher had offended Rav many months earlier, he was punished only now because he squandered the opportunity to apologize and make amends. All people make mistakes, and it is not easy to admit we were wrong and initiate a process of reconciliation. But what's inexcusable is avoiding reconciliation when the opportunity comes right to our doorstep. The butcher was wrong to offend Rav, and he was wrong for not going to request forgiveness – but what sealed his fate was failing to approach Rav when Rav made himself available. This story sheds light on a pronouncement by the prophet Yeshayahu about the Aseret Yemeh Teshuba – the ten-day period from Rosh Hashanah through Yom Kippur. Yeshayahu (55:6) turns to the people and exclaims, "Dirshu Hashem Be'himase'o, Kera'uhu Bi'hyoto Karob" – "Seek out G-d when He is accessible, call upon Him when He is near." Of course, G-d is always "accessible," and He is always "near." In all seasons, at all times of year, and at any time of day, in any circumstance, we can turn to Hashem for help, we can ask Him for forgiveness, and we can ask for whatever it is we need. However, the Gemara (Rosh Hashanah 18a) explains, during the Aseret Yemeh Teshuba, Hashem is especially close, and is especially receptive to our sincere prayers. During this period, the prayers recited by an individual have the same power as prayers recited together with a Minyan during the rest of the year. We can only imagine how powerful congregational prayer is during the Aseret Yemeh Teshuba! Indeed, Rav Chaim Brim of Jerusalem (1922-2002) would say that spiritual achievements which normally take weeks to attain can be reached in just a few moments during the Aseret Yemeh Teshuba. This is a special time, when our prayers and our efforts to repent and improve are particularly effective, many times more than at other times of the year. At first glance, it seems that Yeshayahu is encouraging us and advising us by calling upon us to turn to Hashem during this period of Aseret Yemeh Teshuba. As Hashem is close, it is recommended that we seize this opportunity for prayer and repentance. But in light of the Gemara's story about Rav and the butcher, we might conclude that Yeshayahu isn't just giving advice – he's issuing a stern warning. If Hashem is close, then we must initiate a process of "reconciliation," a process of Teshuba. It's not just a good idea – it's an obligation. We are flawed human beings, and so it is understandable that we will make mistakes. We are not expected to be perfect. And, it is understandable that we will find it difficult to acknowledge our mistakes, to admit wrongdoing, to confess that we've acted improperly and have made bad choices. This is embarrassing and uncomfortable. And, change is always challenging. But even if we could be excused the rest of the year for not making an effort to improve and ask Hashem for forgiveness, we have no excuse during this week, when Hashem specifically comes to us and invites us back. During the Aseret Yemeh Teshuba, Hashem is right here next to us with His arms open. He is ready to forgive us as long as we take the first step by admitting we were wrong and committing to try harder. If we don't seize this opportunity, this period when Teshuba is especially accessible, then we have no more excuses. Let's ensure not to make the butcher's mistake. Let's take full advantage of this special opportunity, and sincerely turn to Hashem in heartfelt prayer and with a firm resolve to improve, to correct our mistakes, and to enhance our relationship with our Father in heaven.

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering. A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them. Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s view, while Rabbi Ilai supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia’s proof is based on a kal va’chomer, which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ilai’s proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved. In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma—with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.

Study Guide Zevachim 8 If any of the four sacrificial rites of a sin offering - slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying it, or sprinkling it - are performed with the intent of a different sacrifice or for a different owner, the offering is disqualified. The Gemara investigates the source of this law. Initially, it cites verses that establish the requirement to slaughter, collect, and sprinkle the blood with the correct intent, both for the appropriate sacrifice and for the proper owner, and that failure to do so invalidates the offering. However, these sources do not explicitly prove that intent for a different sacrifice disqualifies the offering, nor that slaughtering and collecting must be done for the correct owner. The Gemara first attempts to derive this from verses concerning the sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper, but both are rejected due to unique stringencies in each case. It then explores combinations - nazirite and leper, nazirite and standard sin offering, or leper and standard sin offering - but each pairing is also dismissed, as each has its own distinctive stringency. Ultimately, Rava derives the requirement to perform all rites with the correct intent, from both the perspective of the sacrifice and the owner, from a verse that juxtaposes the peace offering with the sin offering, as the source for the basic law of proper intent is found in the laws of the peace offering, as explained in Zevachim 4. The verses previously cited in the sugya are then reinterpreted to teach that without proper designation, the offering is invalid—based on the principle that in kodashim (sacrificial laws), repetition in the Torah indicates necessity (l’akev). The proof from the verses above pertains to a standard sin offering. The Gemara then asks: how do we know the same applies to a sin offering brought for idol worship or to a sliding-scale offering (korban oleh veyored)? These cases are derived through comparative analysis with other offerings mentioned previously. The discussion shifts to the case of a Pesach offering. If one designates an animal for the Passover sacrifice but slaughters it on a day that is not Pesach, the offering is not disqualified and is instead brought as a peace offering. The father of Shmuel cites a verse from Vayikra 3:6, which discusses peace offerings, as the source. However, a difficulty arises: the verse may only support the case where the animal was offered as a peace offering. If it were offered with the intent for a different sacrifice, it might be disqualified. To address this, the Gemara explains that the term zevach in the verse encompasses other types of offerings. Yet this resolution is unsatisfactory, as it could still be argued that if the Pesach was offered with intent for any other sacrifice, it should be brought as that sacrifice, not necessarily as a peace offering. To resolve this, the Gemara presents two alternative derivations from the verse and proceeds to analyze their validity.  

A Pesach offering that is slaughtered outside its designated time with the intent of a different sacrifice is treated as a peace offering—regardless of which specific sacrifice the intent was for. The Gemara seeks the source for this ruling. Back on Zevachim 8, a verse concerning a peace offering was suggested as the basis, appearing to allude to the Pesach offering. After raising a difficulty with this derivation, the Gemara offers a particular explanation, which is ultimately rejected. A second approach is then proposed, but it faces the same challenge as the first. Three possible resolutions are offered; the first is dismissed, while the third is subjected to four objections—all of which are successfully resolved. The Gemara then raises a further question: perhaps the verse in question refers not to the Pesach offering, but to a guilt offering. After addressing that possibility, the Gemara probes deeper, suggesting that the verse may not refer to the Pesach offering at all. This concern is also resolved. Later, a statement from Mavog is introduced regarding a sin offering brought with improper intent. However, it is unclear what specific intent he refers to and what his ruling implies. Several interpretations are presented, each offering a different understanding of Mavog’s position than the one initially assumed.

Chazal tell us that on Rosh Hashanah, Sarah, Rachel, and Chana were remembered and decreed to have children. Rashi explains that on Rosh Hashanah, Hashem decreed for them that in the upcoming year they would each give birth. The Gemara also teaches that on Rosh Hashanah, Yosef was decreed to be released from the Egyptian prison where he had been locked away for twelve years. We already know that every person is judged on Rosh Hashanah, and whatever will happen in the coming year is decided on that day. So what is unique about these great tzaddikim being judged favorably on Rosh Hashanah? Some explain that the Gemara is teaching us the extent of what can happen on Rosh Hashanah. It was physically impossible for Sarah, Rachel, and Chana to conceive — and yet that changed on Rosh Hashanah. It was a foregone conclusion that Yosef would never leave prison. No one close to him even knew where he was. Tehillim describes his soul as bound in chains. And yet, on Rosh Hashanah, everything changed. The world itself undergoes a rebirth on Rosh Hashanah. Everything starts fresh. What was impossible before can suddenly become possible. This should fill us with chizuk . Rosh Hashanah brings with it so much opportunity in every area of life. What was true last year has no bearing on this year. No matter how long a person has been waiting for a yeshuah , no matter how stuck his situation seems, he should feel that on Rosh Hashanah everything can change in an instant. This past year, I heard of a woman in her upper 60s who got married for the very first time. After so many years, it would seem unthinkable. She could have said, "If I didn't find anyone in the last fifty years, why should I find someone now?" But last Rosh Hashanah, Hashem decreed that the time had come, and she celebrated the most joyous wedding with her friends and family. A man told me about his own miracle. He and his wife had struggled for years to conceive. Eventually, all the doctors told them the same heartbreaking verdict: It is impossible. They recommended a surrogate, which would cost $130,000 — money the couple simply did not have, after already draining their savings on unsuccessful treatments. They tried in every possible way to raise the funds, but every attempt was blocked. And then, suddenly, the woman discovered she was expecting. The doctors were shocked. The couple went from despair to the greatest joy. They told me: We never lost our faith in Hashem, no matter what the doctors said. This is the power of Rosh Hashanah. People who are sick can be decreed for refuah. People searching for their zivug can be decreed to find them. The Melech Malchei HaMelachim , the King of Kings, comes to be with us during the Aseret Yemei Teshuvah, beginning on Rosh Hashanah night. We must seize this glorious opportunity. Let us accept upon ourselves to strengthen in Torah and mitzvot, to refine our ways, and to pray with all our hearts. And in that merit, may we be blessed with a year of berachah and hatzlachah in every area of our lives.

In trying to answer whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments neglected after the animal was designated (between designation and slaughter) or only for those neglected before designation, the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon. He explains that the reason two goats are offered on Shavuot is that the second goat atones for impurities in the Temple that occurred after the first goat was offered. If both goats were designated at the same time, this would support the view that an offering can atone for sins committed after designation. A difficulty is raised with that proof because it assumes simultaneous designation; perhaps the second goat needs to be designated only after the first was offered. That possibility is hard to accept because the verse does not indicate a later designation. Rav Papa also rejects the proof, suggesting instead that the court could stipulate from the outset that the second goat will only become sanctified after the blood of the first goat is offered. Two objections are raised to Rav Papa’s reply. First, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the court's stipulations—he therefore would not recognize a court’s postponement of consecration, as shown by his ruling that animals reserved for one year cannot serve as the Tamid in the following year. Second, Rabbi Yirmeya’s question about whether the second goat can cover impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the first goat’s blood and the second’s implies it was understood that the goat covers from the time of designation. That second difficulty is, however, resolved, and the original question remains unanswered. There is a dispute between Raba and Rav Chisda about a toda (thanksgiving offering) brought on behalf of another who needs to bring a toda. Each presents his reasoning; Raba cites a baraita in support, but his proof is rejected. Rava gives six rulings about issues of incorrect intention during the sacrificial rites and adds a seventh about the nature of the olah (burnt offering). He teaches that the olah does not itself provide atonement; rather, it is a gift to God offered after a person has repented for not fulfilling a positive commandment. If the person has not yet repented, the offering provides no atonement, for the sacrifices of the wicked are despicable. The Mishna states that both a sin offering and a Pesach sacrifice brought for the sake of the wrong sacrifice or for the wrong person are disqualified. The Gemara first adduces the source for this rule for Pesach and then for the sin offering.