Podcasts about Gemara

What is an oath of testimony for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale sin offering? Anyone who cannot testify is excluded from responsibility, including women. The Gemara asks from where in the Torah is it derived that women cannot testify. They bring various braitot that all prove from the same verse, Devarim 19:17, each using a different drasha, that women cannot be witnesses. They learn other laws from that same verse regarding court cases, i.e. who stands and who sits, and requirements of the judges to be fair and balanced. What types of exceptions are made if a talmid chacham is being judged in the court?

What is an oath of testimony for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale sin offering? Anyone who cannot testify is excluded from responsibility, including women. The Gemara asks from where in the Torah is it derived that women cannot testify. They bring various braitot that all prove from the same verse, Devarim 19:17, each using a different drasha, that women cannot be witnesses. They learn other laws from that same verse regarding court cases, i.e. who stands and who sits, and requirements of the judges to be fair and balanced. What types of exceptions are made if a talmid chacham is being judged in the court?

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in honor of Shira Krebs, our fearless Minneapolis Hadran convener, on yesterday’s frailich wedding of her daughter Yonit to Yaakov Zinberg: Mazal tov!!! Tali Oberman sponsors today's daf in honor of her grandmother, Barbara Oberman, who has contributed greatly to the Jewish people and celebrated her 90th birthday this week. Would one be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one takes an oath of expression to fulfill a mitzva? There is a debate in the Mishna on this issue between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the rabbis. A braita teaches that one who takes an oath not to observe a mitzva or to observe a mitzva is not a valid oath. From where do they derive this? The working assumption is that the topic of the verse in the Torah is optional actions. From where is this derived? The Gemara brings three suggested answers, while the first one is rejected. If one takes an oath that repeats itself without adding on something new, the subsequent oaths are not valid and if one breaks them accidentally, one would be only obligated to bring one sacrifice. However, if the person were to go to a chacham to repeal the oath, the second oath would apply.  

The holiday of Shabuot is included among the three "Regalim" ("pilgrimage festivals"), when there is an obligation of Simha – to rejoice and be festive. The Gemara says that according to all views among the Sages, there is an obligation to enjoy oneself on Shabuot. Beyond the spiritual enjoyment that we experience by studying Torah, there is also a Halachic obligation to rejoice through physical enjoyment. The Sages teach that for men, this means indulging in meat and wine. Although there is a widespread custom to eat some dairy meals on Shabuot, one should make a point of eating meat on Shabuot, as well. One can fulfill this obligation with red meat, which resembles the meat of the sacrifices that were brought in the Bet Ha'mikdash on the holidays, or even with poultry, if that is what he enjoys, even though it does not technically qualify as "meat." If a person does not enjoy meat and wine, then he should eat whatever foods and drinks he enjoys. There is certainly no Misva on Yom Tob to eat foods that one does not enjoy. One is also obligated to make his children happy on Yom Tob. The Rambam (Rabbi Moshe Maimonides, Spain-Egypt, 1135-1204) writes that this is done by giving them treats, candies and the like. The Misva also requires making one's wife joyous, and the Rambam writes that one should purchase new clothing or jewelry for his wife before the festival. If one's wife does not need new clothing or jewelry, then he should buy her other gifts, even fine foods and the like. It is proper to immerse in a Mikveh on Ereb Shabuot to purify oneself in honor of the festival and in honor of the commemoration of Matan Torah.

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in honor of Shira Krebs, our fearless Minneapolis Hadran convener, on yesterday’s frailich wedding of her daughter Yonit to Yaakov Zinberg: Mazal tov!!! Tali Oberman sponsors today's daf in honor of her grandmother, Barbara Oberman, who has contributed greatly to the Jewish people and celebrated her 90th birthday this week. Would one be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one takes an oath of expression to fulfill a mitzva? There is a debate in the Mishna on this issue between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the rabbis. A braita teaches that one who takes an oath not to observe a mitzva or to observe a mitzva is not a valid oath. From where do they derive this? The working assumption is that the topic of the verse in the Torah is optional actions. From where is this derived? The Gemara brings three suggested answers, while the first one is rejected. If one takes an oath that repeats itself without adding on something new, the subsequent oaths are not valid and if one breaks them accidentally, one would be only obligated to bring one sacrifice. However, if the person were to go to a chacham to repeal the oath, the second oath would apply.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

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Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa."  Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day." The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression (shevuot bitui), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow. Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control. The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful. The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties. Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut, one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories. 

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa."  Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day." The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression (shevuot bitui), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow. Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control. The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful. The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties. Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut, one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law. 

In Parashat Behar, we are introduced to the mitzvah of Shemitah — the command for a landowner to let his land rest for an entire year. The Gemara in Sanhedrin teaches that one of the reasons behind this mitzvah is to remind the landowner that the land ultimately belongs to Hashem. It is Hashem who determines how much produce the land will yield and when it will be given. The farmer's efforts do not add to or subtract from that decision. This lesson applies to all forms of livelihood. The mitzvah of Shemitah teaches us that parnasah comes only from Hashem, and it is He who decides when and how much a person will receive. In the case of Shemitah, Hashem even provides extra produce before the seventh year begins — showing that He already knows who will follow the mitzvah and provides accordingly. More broadly, the Chovot HaLevavot gives guidance on how to approach our work with the proper mindset. In Sha'ar HaBitachon, perek dalet, he writes that Hashem does not instruct a person which job to take or what merchandise to sell. Therefore,it is only logical to conclude that a person's responsibility is to pray to Hashem for guidance and trust that He will guide him to the business that he wants him to be in. If the options in front of a person are equal in spiritual terms, he can be confident that whichever one he chooses is the one Hashem wants for him. Even if, in hindsight, another option appears to have been more successful or profitable, it does not mean the person made a mistake. Similarly, a person must know that he is never stuck — he can leave a job that no longer suits him — but he also must know that wherever he was until now was part of Hashem's plan. When it comes to Torah and mitzvot, however, Hashem has given us clear instructions. That is where our choices matter most. In the physical realm, though, where no clear command exists, Hashem takes responsibility to guide us where we need to be. For example, if a girl is offered a potential shidduch and chooses to date a certain boy who seems to be the best match, but ultimately it doesn't work out — and later she finds that another suggestion proves to be the right one — it does not mean she made the wrong choice. It also does not mean that had she chosen differently from the start, things would have been smoother. Hashem had reasons for wanting her to go through the earlier process. Every experience, even unsuccessful ones, shapes a person and contributes to his or her growth. The key is to avoid regret when it comes to decisions in the physical world. We must believe that Hashem is constantly guiding us. Even if new information comes to light that would have changed a decision, it still doesn't mean the decision was wrong. If Hashem had wanted us to act differently, He would have arranged for us to have that information sooner. Whenever we feel regret — thinking we would have been more successful or happier had we chosen differently — we must see that as an opportunity to strengthen our emunah. It is Hashem who decides our financial success, and what has occurred until now was never dependent on our choices. Success is not about choosing the right job, field, or investment. It's about placing our trust in the One who controls all outcomes. It is not the business or merchandise that brings parnasah — only Hashem does. To Him, it doesn't matter which field we choose. We are always led to choose what we are meant to choose, and our parnasah is exactly what Hashem has decreed for us. Our decisions never change that. Shabbat Shalom

A discussion about speech and eating. Which includes defining when one's speech incurs a requirement to bring an offering -- like the blasphemer? A nazir? Plus, "konamot." And oaths about eating that do not specify the details or amounts of prohibition... the Gemara specifies the inferred amounts, when nothing is stated. What about non-food? Does dirt count as eating? What about grapeseed, which isn't eaten outside of a mixture? How do you define that amount for eating? (Or how much dirt counts as eating). Also, a new mishnah! About one who swears about not eating - and then eats and drinks - is that a liability for 2 offerings, or only one? With other comparable cases.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law. 

Study Guide Shevuot 21 Today's daf is sponsored by Ruth Leah Kahan, Jessica Shklar, and Emily Michelson in commemoration of the seventh yahrzeit of their mother, Kadimah Freedman Michelson -- קדימה בת הרב אברהם זבי וחיה. We miss her every day. What is the type of oath that is included in the negative commandment - do not swear falsely in my (God's) name? There is a debate regarding Rabbi Yochanan's opinion on this matter  - is it referring to an oath on future actions or on past actions? Difficulties are raised on both approaches and are resolved. When Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna says that one is obligated for not keeping to one's oath by eating a minuscule amount, meaning there is no requisite amount, does he hold this across the board (as per Rabbi Shimon's opinion), or only for oaths? The Gemara proves from other sources that it is a unique ruling only for oaths.  

Study Guide Shevuot 21 Today's daf is sponsored by Ruth Leah Kahan, Jessica Shklar, and Emily Michelson in commemoration of the seventh yahrzeit of their mother, Kadimah Freedman Michelson -- קדימה בת הרב אברהם זבי וחיה. We miss her every day. What is the type of oath that is included in the negative commandment - do not swear falsely in my (God's) name? There is a debate regarding Rabbi Yochanan's opinion on this matter  - is it referring to an oath on future actions or on past actions? Difficulties are raised on both approaches and are resolved. When Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna says that one is obligated for not keeping to one's oath by eating a minuscule amount, meaning there is no requisite amount, does he hold this across the board (as per Rabbi Shimon's opinion), or only for oaths? The Gemara proves from other sources that it is a unique ruling only for oaths.  

It is customary to remain awake throughout the night of Shabuot and immerse oneself in Torah learning. The Shela (Rabbi Yeshaya Horowitz, 1565-1630) records a famous incident that occurred during the times of Maran (Rabbi Yosef Karo, author of the Shulhan Aruch, 1488-1575) that underscores the importance and inestimable value of this custom. He and several colleagues remained awake throughout the night of Shabuot studying Torah, and in the middle of the night, a heavenly voice announced to them that their learning was bringing indescribable delight and enjoyment to the heavens. However, the voice added, if they had a Minyan studying together, then they would bring even greater joy to the heavens, and their learning would attain an even higher level. Maran related this incident to the people the next day, and on the second night, they assembled a Minyan and again remained awake throughout the night. And that night, too, a voice burst forth from the heavens emphasizing the immense joy they brought to the Almighty. This incident demonstrates the unique importance and significance of this practice, and the profound impact it has upon the upper worlds. The custom is to read the special "Tikkun" which appears in Keri'eh Mo'ed. One should not belittle the importance of this reading. Even though it consists of simple verses and passages, this is a time-honored custom that should be respected and followed. The "Tikkun" generally takes approximately 2-3 hours (depending, of course, on the speed at which it is read), and after one completes the reading, he is certainly allowed and encouraged to study Gemara or any other area of Torah that he wishes to learn. Everyone should make a point of observing this ancient custom, and it is advisable to rest on Ereb Shabuot so that one will be able to remain awake throughout the night. It must be noted, however, that this custom which has been observed for generations certainly did not entail remaining awake throughout the night and then sleeping the entire next day. This accomplishes nothing other than reversing night and day, which has no value whatsoever. Undoubtedly, the custom was – and should be – to remain awake throughout the night, sleep a few hours after Shaharit to regain one's strength, and then learn Torah during the day. This is, without question, the way the custom was practiced, and this should be our practice, as well, each year on Shabuot. Summary: One should make every effort to observe the time-honored tradition to remain awake studying Torah on the first night of Shabuot, and to rest before the onset of Yom Tob to help him remain awake during the night. One should read the traditional "Tikkun" and then spend the remaining hours studying whichever area of Torah he chooses. One should not sleep the entire next day; he should instead sleep for several hours to regain his strength and then continue studying Torah.

1 section- Beraissa discussing the issurim of yeyra'eh and yeymatz'eh of chametz as relates to one's property and of others, and clarified in Gemara

The Gemara in Menachos 44a tells a fascinating story of a talmid who was about to succumb to a top Zonah until his Tzitzis miraculously slapped him in the face. After introducing her to Tzitzis, she ended up converting. This episode analyzes this story which is meant to show the great reward of mitzvos in this world.

The Gemara discusses a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then explains the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment. The man is a Torah scholar who engages in relations with his wife when she is about to menstruate. When she informs him in the middle of the act that she has begun menstruating, he withdraws immediately. He is considered shogeg (unintentional transgressor) regarding entering the woman's body, as he incorrectly assumed he would be able to complete relations before she began menstruating. He is also considered shogeg regarding his immediate withdrawal from her body, as he, despite being a Torah scholar, was unaware of the halakha requiring him to wait until he is no longer erect before withdrawing. Rava explains that the obligation to bring a sacrifice for each of these acts can be found in tannaitic sources. The rule about withdrawing appears in our Mishna, while the rule about entering appears in a Mishna in Nidda 14a. Rav Ada bar Matna debates with Rava whether the Mishna in Nidda actually refers to the case under discussion. Rav Ada suggests that it instead refers to withdrawal. Rava and Abaye disagree about why a man who withdraws while not erect is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. Rava maintains that intercourse without an erection is not considered a true act of intercourse. Abaye, however, argues that the exemption exists because a situation where his wife begins menstruating during intercourse is considered beyond the person's control (ones). Where can one find in the Torah a source for both a negative commandment (prohibition) and a positive commandment regarding a man's obligation to withdraw when not erect and to not withdraw when erect in the situation described above? Additionally, what is the source for the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in relations when a woman expects to begin her menstrual period soon? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the Mishna, though the precise point of their disagreement is unclear. Chizkia clarifies the subject of their debate.

Our Sages in several contexts emphasized the importance and value of the Misva of Hachnasat Orehim – welcoming guests. The Gemara comments that Hachnasat Orehim is even greater than "Kabbalat Peneh Shechina" (greeting the Shechina). Elsewhere, the Talmud teaches that a place where guests are not welcome will be destroyed, just as happened to the sinful city of Sedom, where hospitality was not allowed. Furthermore, the Mishna in Pe'a includes Hachnasat Orehim in its list of Misvot for which one is rewarded both in this world and the next. And other sources mention many Berachot that are earned through this Misva, including children, rain in its proper time, longevity, and others. Among the Halachic issues that arise when hosting guests is whether the hostess is permitted to pour wine or other alcoholic beverages for a male guest. We know that when a wife is a Nidda, she is not allowed to pour wine or other alcoholic beverages for her husband, unless she does so in an abnormal manner (such as by pouring with her left hand if she normally pours with her right). According to some Halachic authorities, this applies also to a married woman serving a man other than her husband, and thus a hostess should not pour for her male guests in the interest of modesty. By contrast, the work Ezer Mi'siyon writes that this restriction applies only to a married couple when the wife is a Nidda, and a hostess is permitted to pour alcoholic drinks for her guests. In practice, Rav Shayo, in his work Petah Ha'ohel (p. 87; listen to audio recording for precise citation), rules that generally a hostess should not pour wine for a male guest, and if she does, the guest should ensure not to look at her as she pours. However, if the hostess is hosting a large meal, with many guests around, then according to some Halachic authorities it is permissible for the hostess to pour for her guests. Summary: Generally speaking, a hostess should not pour wine or other alcoholic beverages for a male guest, unless she is serving a large meal and there are several other people at the table with them.

The Gemara discusses a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then explains the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment. The man is a Torah scholar who engages in relations with his wife when she is about to menstruate. When she informs him in the middle of the act that she has begun menstruating, he withdraws immediately. He is considered shogeg (unintentional transgressor) regarding entering the woman's body, as he incorrectly assumed he would be able to complete relations before she began menstruating. He is also considered shogeg regarding his immediate withdrawal from her body, as he, despite being a Torah scholar, was unaware of the halakha requiring him to wait until he is no longer erect before withdrawing. Rava explains that the obligation to bring a sacrifice for each of these acts can be found in tannaitic sources. The rule about withdrawing appears in our Mishna, while the rule about entering appears in a Mishna in Nidda 14a. Rav Ada bar Matna debates with Rava whether the Mishna in Nidda actually refers to the case under discussion. Rav Ada suggests that it instead refers to withdrawal. Rava and Abaye disagree about why a man who withdraws while not erect is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. Rava maintains that intercourse without an erection is not considered a true act of intercourse. Abaye, however, argues that the exemption exists because a situation where his wife begins menstruating during intercourse is considered beyond the person's control (ones). Where can one find in the Torah a source for both a negative commandment (prohibition) and a positive commandment regarding a man's obligation to withdraw when not erect and to not withdraw when erect in the situation described above? Additionally, what is the source for the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in relations when a woman expects to begin her menstrual period soon? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the Mishna, though the precise point of their disagreement is unclear. Chizkia clarifies the subject of their debate.

Gemara Chabura - Rabbi Karlinsky - Hilchos Yichud 07 by Shapell's Rabbeim

Today's daf is dedicated to Mimi and Rafi Schachat on the birth of a daughter! Rava and Rav Ashi each pose a series of unresolved questions concerning the minimum duration one must spend in the Temple to incur the obligation of bringing a sacrifice if they became ritually impure while inside. They debate whether these requirements apply only to unwitting impurity or also to intentional cases, and whether similar requirements would apply to a nazir who unknowingly entered a cemetery. The Mishna states that one who leaves the Temple by the shortest path after becoming impure will be exempt from bringing a sacrifice, while one who takes a longer path will be obligated. The Gemara then questions whether this distinction is measured in terms of time or physical distance. Rabbi Oshaya offers a ruling regarding a leprous house: if one enters backward with only their nose remaining outside, they would not become impure, as the Torah imposes impurity only when entering a house in the typical manner. A braita supports this reasoning, noting that an impure person entering the Temple through the roof would not be liable for entering the Temple while impure, as entering through the roof is not the conventional method. The Mishna clarifies that entering the Temple while impure is excluded from cases where the community would bring a bull offering for an erroneous court ruling. The bull offering applies only to sins requiring a fixed sin offering, not to those requiring a sliding scale offering. However, a bull sin offering would be brought for an erroneous court ruling involving nidda, specifically in a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then attempts to understand the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment.

Today's daf is dedicated to Mimi and Rafi Schachat on the birth of a daughter! Rava and Rav Ashi each pose a series of unresolved questions concerning the minimum duration one must spend in the Temple to incur the obligation of bringing a sacrifice if they became ritually impure while inside. They debate whether these requirements apply only to unwitting impurity or also to intentional cases, and whether similar requirements would apply to a nazir who unknowingly entered a cemetery. The Mishna states that one who leaves the Temple by the shortest path after becoming impure will be exempt from bringing a sacrifice, while one who takes a longer path will be obligated. The Gemara then questions whether this distinction is measured in terms of time or physical distance. Rabbi Oshaya offers a ruling regarding a leprous house: if one enters backward with only their nose remaining outside, they would not become impure, as the Torah imposes impurity only when entering a house in the typical manner. A braita supports this reasoning, noting that an impure person entering the Temple through the roof would not be liable for entering the Temple while impure, as entering through the roof is not the conventional method. The Mishna clarifies that entering the Temple while impure is excluded from cases where the community would bring a bull offering for an erroneous court ruling. The bull offering applies only to sins requiring a fixed sin offering, not to those requiring a sliding scale offering. However, a bull sin offering would be brought for an erroneous court ruling involving nidda, specifically in a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then attempts to understand the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment.

Gemara

Join us in Jerusalem for Ohr Samayach's Inaugural Yarchei Kallah event from July 7th to 9th, 2024! Featuring HaRav Yitzchak Breitowitz shlit"a & HaRav Asher Weiss shlit"a and more Click here for more information.   Dont miss this one of a kind experience! ---------------------------------------------------- Dedication opportunities are available for episodes and series at  https://ohr.edu/donate/qa   Questions? Comments? podcasts@ohr.edu   Yeshivat Ohr Somayach located in the heart of Jerusalem, is an educational institution for young Jewish English-speaking men. We have a range of classes and programs designed for the intellectually curious and academically inclined - for those with no background in Jewish learning to those who are proficient in Gemara and other original source material. To find the perfect program for you, please visit our website https://ohr.edu/study_in_israel​whatsapp us at https://bit.ly/OSREGISTER or call our placement specialist at 1-254-981-0133 today! Subscribe to the Rabbi Breitowitz Q&A Podcast at https://plnk.to/rbq&a   Submit questions for the Q&A with Rabbi Breitowitz https://forms.gle/VCZSK3wQJJ4fSd3Q7   Subscribe to our YouTube Channel at https://www.youtube.com/c/OhrSomayach/videos     You can listen to this and many other Ohr Somayach programs by downloading our app, on Apple and Google Play, ohr.edu and all major podcast platforms. Visit us @ https://ohr.edu  PRODUCED BY: CEDAR MEDIA STUDIOS  

Study Guide Shevuot 14 Questions on the braita at the end of Shevuot 13b are raised and answered.  The second chapter starts with a description of the 4 cases of "yediot ha'tuma" and explains the four cases. It also describes the laws of one who becomes impure while inside the Temple.  Rav Papa challenges the number four used in the Mishna and the Gemara brings 2 versions of his answer to his own question.  A few questions for which there are no answers regarding the criteria for having known something and then forgotten it, for which one is obligated to bring a sacrifice.

Study Guide Shevuot 14 Questions on the braita at the end of Shevuot 13b are raised and answered.  The second chapter starts with a description of the 4 cases of "yediot ha'tuma" and explains the four cases. It also describes the laws of one who becomes impure while inside the Temple.  Rav Papa challenges the number four used in the Mishna and the Gemara brings 2 versions of his answer to his own question.  A few questions for which there are no answers regarding the criteria for having known something and then forgotten it, for which one is obligated to bring a sacrifice.

Gemara Chabura - Rabbi Karlinsky - Hilchos Yichud 06 by Shapell's Rabbeim

There is a widely-accepted, time-honored custom to light candle in memory of a loved one, or of a Sadik, during the Shiba mourning period, and each year on the Yahrtzeit. Although this practice is not mentioned explicitly anywhere in the Talmud, it might be alluded to in two places. First, the Gemara relates that before Rebbi (Rabbi Yehuda Ha'nasi) passed away, he gave his sons a number of instructions, one of which was that there should be a candle lit by his place. Rashi explains that Rebbi's soul returned to his home every Friday night to be with his wife, ad so he asked that there would be a candle lit by his place in honor of Shabbat. But the Yabetz (Rav Yaakob Emden, Germany, 1697-1776) suggests that this might be a basis for the custom to light a candle in honor of one's deceased parent, as Rebbi's instruction could be understood to mean that he wanted his children to light a candle in his honor. Another possible source is the Gemara's discussion in Masechet Berachot (53) of the Beracha "Boreh Me'oreh Ha'esh" recited over a flame on Mosa'eh Shabbat. The Gemara states that this Beracha may be recited only over a candle that was lit for illumination purposes, as opposed to "Ner Shel Metim" – "the candle of the deceased" – which is lit in honor of the deceased, and not for illumination. This would certainly indicate that there was a practice to light candles in honor of the deceased. However, this might refer only to candles lit around the deceased before burial, as opposed to our practice to light candles during Shiba and on the Yahrtzeit. In the writings of the Rishonim, we find mention of this concept in the Kolbo (by Rav Yehonatan of Lunel, Provence, late 13th-early 14th century), in the section discussing the laws of Yom Kippur. He writes that it is customary to light candles on Ereb Yom Kippur in memory of one's deceased parents. This custom is brought by the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572) in his glosses to the Shulhan Aruch. The Mishna Berura (Rav Yisrael Meir Kagan of Radin, 1839-1933) writes that even the deceased are, in a sense, judged on Yom Kippur, and so we light candles in their memory as a source of merit for them. What's the explanation of this practice? How does lighting a candle benefit the soul of the deceased? One explanation is that lighting a candle in itself brings no benefit to the deceased, but when candles are lit in the synagogue, this fulfills a Misva which brings merit to the deceased's soul. Generations ago, candles were needed for illumination, and so lighting candles in the synagogue was a very important Misva. Indeed, it was customary years ago for people to donate oil for the lights in the synagogue in merit of a deceased parent. More generally, lighting candles enhances the atmosphere of the synagogue, and this, too, constitutes a Misva which brings merit to the deceased. (Interestingly, one contemporary work suggested that it would be appropriate to donate towards the synagogue's electric bill as a merit for the deceased, just as years ago people would donate oil for the lights.) According to this explanation, the value of lighting candles is only when it is done for a Misva, meaning, when the candles are lit in the synagogue. However, the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909), in his Torah Li'shmah, writes that the lighting itself brings comfort and joy to the soul of the deceased. He explains that a soul is like a candle, and similar entities are attracted to one another. Therefore, when a candle is lit at a place where the soul is present, the soul experiences some degree of enjoyment. However, the Ben Ish Hai emphasizes that this is relevant only in the place where the soul is present – namely, in the deceased's home during the Shiba period, or at the grave. According to the Ben Ish Hai, then, there is no purpose to light a candle in memory of the deceased in his or her home after the Shiba, or even during the Shiba if the mourning is observed somewhere other than the deceased's home. Regardless, the Poskim accorded great importance to this custom. It is mentioned in the major works on mourning (Gesher Ha'haim, Ma'abar Yabok). In fact, the Mishna Berura (261) writes that during the period of Ben Ha'shemashot after sundown on Friday afternoon, when it is permissible to ask a gentile to perform a Melacha (forbidden activity) on one's behalf when there is a great need, one may ask a gentile to light a Yahrtzeit candle. Meaning, if one forgot the light the candle before Shabbat, he may ask a non-Jew to do so during the period of Ben Ha'shemashot, because this is considered a matter of great need. Likewise, Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Israel, 1924-1998) writes that if one has Yahrtzeit on Yom Tob and forgot to light the candle before Yom Tob, he may light it on Yom Tob (from a preexisting flame). This is considered a significant enough need to permit lighting a candle on Yom Tob. When lighting the candle, the Ben Ish Hai writes, it is proper to declare that the candle is being lit for the "Menuhat Nefesh" ("rest of the soul") or "Iluy Nefesh" ("elevation of the soul") of the deceased, mentioning the deceased's name. It is also proper to give some charity at the time the candle is lit. Some opinions say it is preferable to use oil for this candle, because the word "Shemen" ("oil") has the letters of "Neshama," whereas others say wax should be used, because the letters of the word "Sha'ava" ("wax") represent the verse, "Hakisu Ve'ranenu Shocheneh Afar" – "Awaken and rejoice, those who lie in the earth," the verse which speaks of the resurrection of the dead in the future. Summary: There is a time-honored custom to light a candle in memory of a deceased loved one during the Shiba mourning period, and on the Yahrtzeit. According to one view, the candles are lit in the synagogue as a merit for the deceased, whereas others explain that a candle lit in a place where the deceased's soul is present brings joy and comfort to the soul. Therefore, according to many opinions, the candles should be lit only in the deceased's home during Shiba, at the grave, or in the synagogue.

Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Idan Alexander after 584 days in captivity. Wishing him a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages.  According to Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether or not animals left over from the previous year that were designated for the Tamid sacrifice can be redeemed without a blemish. The Gemara tries to find a source for Rabbi Yochanan's understanding that the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon, but they are not successful. According to Rabbi Shimon, they cannot - so what does one do with them? If they were designated for communal burnt offerings, they would sacrifice them as voluntary communal offerings on the altar meant to keep the altar busy at all times. If they were designated for communal sin offerings, they could not be used directly as voluntary burnt offerings so they would wait until they were blemished, redeem them, and buy animals with the money to be sacrificed as voluntary burnt offerings. There is a concern that if this were to be permitted, one may think that one can change the destination even at an earlier stage (before the atonement for that sacrifice is achieved.  The rabbis bring three tannaitic sources to support this. Another braita is brought to support the explanation that the extra animals designated for the Tamid sacrifice are used for voluntary burnt offerings. Can one purchase birds for the burnt offerings used to fill the altar? Shmuel also held like Rabbi Yochanan that according to Rabbi Shimon, the extra animals could be used as voluntary burnt offerings. What is the source for the fact that the goat offering brought inside on Yom Kippur atones also for intentional sins of impurity in the Temple?    

Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Idan Alexander after 584 days in captivity. Wishing him a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages.  According to Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether or not animals left over from the previous year that were designated for the Tamid sacrifice can be redeemed without a blemish. The Gemara tries to find a source for Rabbi Yochanan's understanding that the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon, but they are not successful. According to Rabbi Shimon, they cannot - so what does one do with them? If they were designated for communal burnt offerings, they would sacrifice them as voluntary communal offerings on the altar meant to keep the altar busy at all times. If they were designated for communal sin offerings, they could not be used directly as voluntary burnt offerings so they would wait until they were blemished, redeem them, and buy animals with the money to be sacrificed as voluntary burnt offerings. There is a concern that if this were to be permitted, one may think that one can change the destination even at an earlier stage (before the atonement for that sacrifice is achieved.  The rabbis bring three tannaitic sources to support this. Another braita is brought to support the explanation that the extra animals designated for the Tamid sacrifice are used for voluntary burnt offerings. Can one purchase birds for the burnt offerings used to fill the altar? Shmuel also held like Rabbi Yochanan that according to Rabbi Shimon, the extra animals could be used as voluntary burnt offerings. What is the source for the fact that the goat offering brought inside on Yom Kippur atones also for intentional sins of impurity in the Temple?    

Join us in Jerusalem for Ohr Samayach's Inaugural Yarchei Kallah event from July 7th to 9th, 2024! Featuring HaRav Yitzchak Breitowitz shlit"a & HaRav Asher Weiss shlit"a and more Click here for more information.   Dont miss this one of a kind experience! ---------------------------------------------------- Episode dedicated by Harold and Gilla Saltzman in appreciation for the Torah  learned from Rav Breitowitz over the years. Dedication opportunities are available for episodes and series at  https://ohr.edu/donate/qa   Questions? Comments? podcasts@ohr.edu   Yeshivat Ohr Somayach located in the heart of Jerusalem, is an educational institution for young Jewish English-speaking men. We have a range of classes and programs designed for the intellectually curious and academically inclined - for those with no background in Jewish learning to those who are proficient in Gemara and other original source material. To find the perfect program for you, please visit our website https://ohr.edu/study_in_israel​ whatsapp us at https://bit.ly/OSREGISTER or call our placement specialist at 1-254-981-0133 today!   Q&A Timestamps 7 May 00:00 - How do Hareidim balance being reclusive and being a light to the nations? 03:55 - Why do we have a modern-day obligation to give Maaser on money when the Torah only refers to it in regard to agricultural produce? 10:35 - Is there an issue of Tzar Baalei Chaim to tag the ears of cattle? What about piercing a person's ear? 17:35 - What caused the Mussar movement? Did they not need Mussar before that? 29:15 - Why is it forbidden to use electricity on Shabbos? 44:28 - Can someone lose his status as a Jew? 51:00 - What is the status of Amen? 56:34 - Is sirloin steak worse than pork? 01:06:22 - Why do we permit listening to music? 01:10:47 - In the Haftorah: when Dovid HaMelech made a mistake in how he transported the ark why should Uza be punished; how could he give such rebuke to Michal? 01:15:55 - Are wishing wells considered Avodah Zara and could one take the coins from them? 01:17:55 - Why is Birchas Cohanim in Loshon Yochid? 01:21:55 - Why should it be permitted to go on a ship on shabbat but not a train or a car? 01:27:34 - How is it that disparate people converge on the same interest? Subscribe to the Rabbi Breitowitz Q&A Podcast at https://plnk.to/rbq&a   Submit questions for the Q&A with Rabbi Breitowitz https://forms.gle/VCZSK3wQJJ4fSd3Q7   Subscribe to our YouTube Channel at https://www.youtube.com/c/OhrSomayach/videos     You can listen to this and many other Ohr Somayach programs by downloading our app, on Apple and Google Play, ohr.edu and all major podcast platforms. Visit us @ https://ohr.edu  PRODUCED BY: CEDAR MEDIA STUDIOS  

Study Guide Shevuot 11 Today's daf is sponsored by the Pittsburgh daf yomi group for a refuah shleima for Rabbi Amy Bardack, haRav Ahuva bat Liba who is having surgery today. "Wishing our organizer and leader a speedy recovery." In support of Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that leftover animals designated for communal offerings can be redeemed at the end of the year, Raba brings an example of incense which has inherent sanctity and can be redeemed at the end of the year. Rav Chisda disagrees with Raba as he holds that incense does not have inherent sanctity until a later stage when it is brought into a sanctified vessel just before being offered on the altar. Raba proves his position that it has inherent sanctity.  The Gemara then returns to Rav Chisda's original question of how can one redeem items with inherent sanctity. Raba answers that the court stipulates at the beginning of the year that any animals not needed will be only sanctified for their value. Abaye raises a difficulty from other communal offerings that cannot be redeemed if lost and replaced and then found. However, Raba answers that the stipulation is for typical, not atypical cases. Why, then, can the red heifer be redeemed in certain circumstances? The Gemara concludes that a stipulation is made because of its high value.  Abaye raises a further difficulty from our Mishna, as Rabbi Shimon answers a question about whether animals designated for one sacrifice that are leftover can be used for another with a particular answer instead of answering that the court stipulated such, as Raba would have said. Raba answers that Rabbi Shimon doesn't agree with the rabbis that the court can stipulate. Rabbi Yochanan and Raba's approach is based only on the rabbis' position.   

Study Guide Shevuot 11 Today's daf is sponsored by the Pittsburgh daf yomi group for a refuah shleima for Rabbi Amy Bardack, haRav Ahuva bat Liba who is having surgery today. "Wishing our organizer and leader a speedy recovery." In support of Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that leftover animals designated for communal offerings can be redeemed at the end of the year, Raba brings an example of incense which has inherent sanctity and can be redeemed at the end of the year. Rav Chisda disagrees with Raba as he holds that incense does not have inherent sanctity until a later stage when it is brought into a sanctified vessel just before being offered on the altar. Raba proves his position that it has inherent sanctity.  The Gemara then returns to Rav Chisda's original question of how can one redeem items with inherent sanctity. Raba answers that the court stipulates at the beginning of the year that any animals not needed will be only sanctified for their value. Abaye raises a difficulty from other communal offerings that cannot be redeemed if lost and replaced and then found. However, Raba answers that the stipulation is for typical, not atypical cases. Why, then, can the red heifer be redeemed in certain circumstances? The Gemara concludes that a stipulation is made because of its high value.  Abaye raises a further difficulty from our Mishna, as Rabbi Shimon answers a question about whether animals designated for one sacrifice that are leftover can be used for another with a particular answer instead of answering that the court stipulated such, as Raba would have said. Raba answers that Rabbi Shimon doesn't agree with the rabbis that the court can stipulate. Rabbi Yochanan and Raba's approach is based only on the rabbis' position.   

Study Guide Shevuot 10 This week's learning is sponsored by Moshe Silver in loving memory of Rebbitzen Miriam Maxine Elkins who passed away on Yom haAtzmaut. "Her love of Torah, the Jewish people, and the land and State of Israel was unsurpassed. Her loving family - Rabbi Dov Pearetz Elkins and her children - bear the lasting imprint of the passion she brought to everything she did, as do all of us who loved her." This week's learning is sponsored by Vicky Harari in loving memory of her father Abraham Eckstein. "He had a smile that could light up the room. He taught me what I know about love. As a Holocaust survivor, he taught me gratitude and resilience something that I have been relying on more today than ever." The Gemara continues to extrapolate verses to explain the basis of the opinions of Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Shimon in the Mishna regarding which sacrifices do each of the communal sin offerings atone for. Ulla explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the extra sheep left at the end of the year that were designated for the Tamid (daily) sacrifice, but were not needed, are redeemed and repurchased with money from that next year's funds. When Raba explained this halakha, Rav Chisda raised a difficulty - how can an item that is sanctified with kedushat haguf  be redeemed? Raba responds by bringing an example from the incense, which is sanctified and can be redeemed. However, this is rejected as the sanctity of the incense is kedushat damim, its value is sanctified, not kedushat haguf.

Study Guide Shevuot 10 This week's learning is sponsored by Moshe Silver in loving memory of Rebbitzen Miriam Maxine Elkins who passed away on Yom haAtzmaut. "Her love of Torah, the Jewish people, and the land and State of Israel was unsurpassed. Her loving family - Rabbi Dov Pearetz Elkins and her children - bear the lasting imprint of the passion she brought to everything she did, as do all of us who loved her." This week's learning is sponsored by Vicky Harari in loving memory of her father Abraham Eckstein. "He had a smile that could light up the room. He taught me what I know about love. As a Holocaust survivor, he taught me gratitude and resilience something that I have been relying on more today than ever." The Gemara continues to extrapolate verses to explain the basis of the opinions of Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Shimon in the Mishna regarding which sacrifices do each of the communal sin offerings atone for. Ulla explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the extra sheep left at the end of the year that were designated for the Tamid (daily) sacrifice, but were not needed, are redeemed and repurchased with money from that next year's funds. When Raba explained this halakha, Rav Chisda raised a difficulty - how can an item that is sanctified with kedushat haguf  be redeemed? Raba responds by bringing an example from the incense, which is sanctified and can be redeemed. However, this is rejected as the sanctity of the incense is kedushat damim, its value is sanctified, not kedushat haguf.

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of my uncle, Richard Cohen, Naftali ben Yosef haKohen v'Henna who passed away this week. He was a man who loved and appreciated by every person and was loved and appreciated by everyone who met him. The goat sin offering whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh kodashim on Yom Kippur atones for sins for one who knew they were impure, then forgot and went into the Temple or ate sacrificial items while impure and did not yet remember that they are impure. A braita explains from where this is derived. The different parts of the braita are analyzed. First, the braita suggested that perhaps it atones for the three most grievous sins - idolatry, murder and licentious behavior. The Gemara explains this suggestion - in what manner of performing these transgressions would one have thought this sacrifice could atone for? The first opinion in the braita, Rabbi Yehuda, is that entering the Temple/eating sacrificial items while impure is uniquely distinguished and therefore it is clear that is the one being atoned for by this special offering. The Gemara explains what the braita meant by 'uniquely distinguished' - as it has a sliding scale offering. Several other sacrifices are also uniquely distinguished, such as idol worship as one can only bring a sin offering of a female goat, a woman after childbirth, a leper, and a nazir who became impure who also can bring a sliding scale offering. Why are these not considered 'uniquely distinguished'? Rabbi Shimon derives this from the verse itself describing the offering, as it says "It atones for sanctified items from impurities." Why didn't Rabbi Yehuda accept that understanding - how does he understand the verse? Why doesn't this offering atone for all sins relating to impurity? Why is it only for a person who knew at first they were impure, then forgot, and does not have awareness of the sin? The braita explains that this atones for something not atoned by a sacrifice of an individual, as can be derived from the verse. What is being excluded by this derivation that isn't already obvious? Another derivation in the braita teaches why it specifically atones for a sin that can eventually be atoned for by an individual sin offering (when the person will realize that a sin was committed, and not for one where the person did not know before entering the Temple that one was impure, as that type can never be obligated to bring an individual offering. Why does this case need excluding, if it is already known that the latter is atoned for by the sin offering whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar on Yom Kippur? If the offering does not completely atone for the sin, but simply provides atonement until such time that the sinner realizes their sin and brings an individual offering, what is the purpose of the temporary atonement? Rabbi Zeira and Rava each offer a suggested answer - either to atone for the sin in case the sinner dies before realizing their sin or to protect from suffering. If the type of sin atoned for by the outer sin offering is derived from the inner sin offering, why can't the inner one atone for both types of sins? Or why can't the outer one atone for both?  

Study Guide Shevuot 9 Today's daf is sponsored by Leya Landau in loving memory of her mother Ita bat Zvi on her 3rd yahrzeit. "She loved learning and encouraged me to start learning the daf." Today's daf is sponsored by Naama Tal in loving memory of her grandmother Devorah Cohen, who always valued learning.  The Gemara analyzes the different opinions brought in the Mishna regarding the purposes of the goat sin offerings brought on the outer altar on Yom Kippur and on the regalim and Rosh Chodesh. What is the basis for each opinion?

Does the goat-offering atone for 3 different kinds of impurities? The verse indicates it won't atone for all kinds of impurities, only some of them. But what kind of impurities does it atone for? Perhaps for an idolater - but it's too egregious of a transgression. Perhaps for a woman after childbirth -- but what is her sin for which she brings a sin-offering? Perhaps she has (falsely) sworn off relations with her husband in the throes of labor (but it's a machloket). So the Gemara comes around to talking again about the impurity that is brought into the Temple or with regard to its sanctified foods -- inadvertently, to be sure. But how does this atonement relate to the atonement provided by the day of Yom Kippur? What if a person doesn't have time to bring the atoning offering before Yom Kippur?

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of my uncle, Richard Cohen, Naftali ben Yosef haKohen v'Henna who passed away this week. He was a man who loved and appreciated by every person and was loved and appreciated by everyone who met him. The goat sin offering whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh kodashim on Yom Kippur atones for sins for one who knew they were impure, then forgot and went into the Temple or ate sacrificial items while impure and did not yet remember that they are impure. A braita explains from where this is derived. The different parts of the braita are analyzed. First, the braita suggested that perhaps it atones for the three most grievous sins - idolatry, murder and licentious behavior. The Gemara explains this suggestion - in what manner of performing these transgressions would one have thought this sacrifice could atone for? The first opinion in the braita, Rabbi Yehuda, is that entering the Temple/eating sacrificial items while impure is uniquely distinguished and therefore it is clear that is the one being atoned for by this special offering. The Gemara explains what the braita meant by 'uniquely distinguished' - as it has a sliding scale offering. Several other sacrifices are also uniquely distinguished, such as idol worship as one can only bring a sin offering of a female goat, a woman after childbirth, a leper, and a nazir who became impure who also can bring a sliding scale offering. Why are these not considered 'uniquely distinguished'? Rabbi Shimon derives this from the verse itself describing the offering, as it says "It atones for sanctified items from impurities." Why didn't Rabbi Yehuda accept that understanding - how does he understand the verse? Why doesn't this offering atone for all sins relating to impurity? Why is it only for a person who knew at first they were impure, then forgot, and does not have awareness of the sin? The braita explains that this atones for something not atoned by a sacrifice of an individual, as can be derived from the verse. What is being excluded by this derivation that isn't already obvious? Another derivation in the braita teaches why it specifically atones for a sin that can eventually be atoned for by an individual sin offering (when the person will realize that a sin was committed, and not for one where the person did not know before entering the Temple that one was impure, as that type can never be obligated to bring an individual offering. Why does this case need excluding, if it is already known that the latter is atoned for by the sin offering whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar on Yom Kippur? If the offering does not completely atone for the sin, but simply provides atonement until such time that the sinner realizes their sin and brings an individual offering, what is the purpose of the temporary atonement? Rabbi Zeira and Rava each offer a suggested answer - either to atone for the sin in case the sinner dies before realizing their sin or to protect from suffering. If the type of sin atoned for by the outer sin offering is derived from the inner sin offering, why can't the inner one atone for both types of sins? Or why can't the outer one atone for both?  

Study Guide Shevuot 9 Today's daf is sponsored by Leya Landau in loving memory of her mother Ita bat Zvi on her 3rd yahrzeit. "She loved learning and encouraged me to start learning the daf." Today's daf is sponsored by Naama Tal in loving memory of her grandmother Devorah Cohen, who always valued learning.  The Gemara analyzes the different opinions brought in the Mishna regarding the purposes of the goat sin offerings brought on the outer altar on Yom Kippur and on the regalim and Rosh Chodesh. What is the basis for each opinion?

This week's learning is sponsored by Audrey Mondrow in loving memory of Bessie “Nanny” Mauskopf, Basha Leah bat Tzivia Chaya and Meyer Yehuda. "A very special mother. By example she taught me how to be a mother and grandmother. We miss her dearly. May her Neshama have an Aliyah." The Mishna in Negaim is similar to the Mishna in Shevuot regarding the two shades of white that are considered leprous in the Torah and the two that the Rabbis added, and elaborates a little more. The Gemara explains that the Mishna there doesn't match Rabbi Akiva's opinion as the Mishna connects between avot, main categories and toladot, sub-categories and Rabbi Akiva connects between the order of the shades of white, which would mean one main category, baheret, then the next main category, se’et, and then each of their sub-categories – first the one for baheret, then the one for se’et. From where do we know that this is Rabbi Akiva's position? The first attempt to find the source is unsuccessful but it is proven from a second source.  From where do we derive that baheret also has sub-categories if the word in the verse mentioning sub-categories, sapachat, is said in connection with se'et?  From where is it derived that the verses that obligate one to bring a sliding scale sin offering if one is impure refer to one who entered the Temple or ate sacrificial items? 

The Gemara in Kiddushin 30b provides guidance for one whose desires are aroused—drag yourself to the Beis Midrash. We analyze why and how this works.

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Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

This month's learning is sponsored by Bracha Rutner in loving memory of Anna Rutner. "She was a woman who was always curious about life. She came to the US in 1958 and learned English and made an incredible life for herself raising four children and seventeen grandchildren. She will always live on in our hearts and in the number of great-grandchildren named after her."  The Gemara begins with three structural questions regarding the Mishna. Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot? Why did the Mishna list all four cases that have two cases learned from the Torah and two from the rabbis, when in the context of Masechet Shabbat and Masechet Negaim (laws of leprosy), only the relevant case for the masechet is mentioned? Why did the Mishna begin with Shevuot, but when elaborating on the details, the case of impurity came first, and only after that does the Mishna move back to elaborate on laws of oaths? The Gemara explains in each of the four categories, what two cases appear in the Torah and what two are from rabbinic law. Does the Mishna follow Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva? At first glance, it doesn't seem to follow either opinion as in oaths, Rabbi Yishmael holds one does not bring a sacrifice on oaths relating to past actions, and Rabbi Akiva holds that one does not bring a sacrifice if one forgot that the Temple was in that place or that the item was a sacrificial item. The first answer given is that each could fit with the Mishna if we adopt a different understanding of the Mishna. One could explain that the Mishna brings a list of two cases that are four, but not all obligate one in a sacrifice. This explanation is rejected since the Mishna also lists four cases for leprous marks and one is obligated to bring a sacrifice upon becoming purified from all four cases, and the assumption is that all four cases in the Mishna are similar in that way. The second answer given is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael and the Mishna refers to the obligation to receive lashes for an oath of expression that one did not keep intentionally, not a sacrifice for not keeping the oath because one forgot. This accords with Rava's position that one can derive from the verse about false oaths that one receives lashes for an oath of expression about something that happened in the past. To make this explanation fit with the Mishna, Rabbi Yishmael would need to hold that one receives lashes for a negative prohibition that to transgress it, one does not do an action, as the oath, "I will not eat," and one does not eat, does not involve an action on the part of the one who does not fulfill the oath. This raises a difficulty as Rabbi Yochanan holds like all unattributed Mishnayot, such as ours and he also holds that one does not receive lashes if no action is performed. To resolve this difficulty, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds by a different unattributed Mishna and they quote a Mishna in Makkot regarding notar, leftover meat from the Pesach sacrifice. However, this suggestion is rejected, as that Mishna can be understood following Rabbi Yehuda's explanation that it is a negative prohibition that has a positive way to fix it, lav hanitak l'asei, for which one is exempt from lashes.   

The Gemara's introduction to Shevuot seems far afield - in its sidestepping to tzara'at blemishes and Shabbat details. So it explains the connection to lashes in the previous tractate. Plus, the sacrificial offerings that are brought on a sliding scale - dependent on one's economic status. Plus, the period of lapsed awareness of one's status as impure (for example). Also, whose opinion is represented in the mishnah? The Gemara first explains that it is not in line with the opinions of either Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva. Until it comes back around to Rabbi Yishmael.

We are proud to introduce the 3rd podcast in the Judaism Unbound family of podcasts: Survival Guide for a Spiritual Wilderness, hosted by Jericho Vincent. "We are the ancestors of the future." This new podcast offers a spiritual home for listeners seeking to connect Jewish ancestral, feminist wisdom with their own svara: moral intuition. Each episode of this limited series delves into a different story of our ancestor Miriam, illuminating her mystical teachings and offering practical tools for navigating and flourishing in personal or political spiritual wildernesses. We're thrilled to periodically feature episodes of Survival Guide for a Spiritual Wilderness here on Judaism Unbound. But we don't only feature those episodes alone. Lex Rofeberg and Rena Yehuda Newman, two members of Judaism Unbound's team, supplement each episode with some gemara (commentary) as well. We hope that our ideas will help spur you to form your own gemara, and channel your unique teachings -- about this podcast and beyond -- into the world. Delving into Miriam's Torah of patience and presence, this episode explores the Jewish mystical teaching of Chakeh-Mah, the ability to “wait for what.” we'll talk about the power of a Sufi sermon, the narrow place, Spiritual Chutzpah, razzle dazzle slave economics, time travel, moishiachtzeit, and a practice for bringing Miriam's living Torah into our own lives. R' Jericho talks about the definition of wisdom, Wait for What, what kind of salt we want to be, a concussion, descent for the sake of ascent, why you're alive in this moment, and a practice for bringing Miriam's living Torah into our own lives.Subscribe to Survival Guide for a Spiritual Wilderness anywhere that podcasts are found!