Podcasts about Gemara

Earlier, Rabbi Yochanan employed the principle that something that takes place in the Temple courtyard can obviously also be performed in the Sanctuary (such as slaughtering the peace offering), as the Sanctuary is more sanctified. However, in a different situation, a verse is needed to derive that items permitted to be eaten in the courtyard can also be eaten in the Sanctuary (in unique circumstances). Why was a verse needed if the principle of Rabbi Yochanan could have been used? The Gemara answers by distinguishing between a ritual (slaughtering) and eating. There are three debates between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding mincha (meal) offerings. First, if they are mixed outside the Temple courtyard, are they disqualified? Second, if the mincha batter is missing some part before the kemitza (handful) is taken, can it be refilled? Third, if the remainder is missing a part after the kometz is taken, can the kemitza be burned? In each debate, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind each approach. In all three instances, a support is brought for Rabbi Yochanan or a difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position which remains unanswered. In the third debate, a difficulty is also raised against Rabbi Yochanan's position but is resolved. The Mishna ruled that if the kohen performs the kemitza with his left hand, it is disqualified. The source for this is that when explaining the process of the leper's purification, the text specifically says "left hand." Since the text regarding the mincha offering simply says "hand" without the word "left," we can assume that if an action can be done with the left, the Torah will specifically say "left"; conversely, if it appears without specifying a hand, it must refer to the right hand. The Gemara questions this drasha, suggesting that perhaps the verse is not intended to teach about other mentions of the word "hand." However, after pointing out that the phrase "left hand" appears four times in the section on the leper's purification, it becomes clear that the repetition comes to teach that in other cases where the word "hand" is mentioned, it refers exclusively to the right hand.  

Rabbi Eliezer holds that when the Kohen accepts the blood from a sacrifice into a sanctified vessel, there must be enough collected in that single bowl to be used for placing the blood on the altar. If one collects some blood in one bowl and some in another, and later mixes them together before performing the placements, the blood is not sanctified. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Eliezer contradicts himself, as regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin), he holds that it is sanctified even if placed in two separate bowls. To resolve this, the Gemara first suggests that perhaps Rabbi Eliezer does not derive one law from another—specifically, a mincha offering from blood. However, this is rejected because Rabbi Eliezer does derive laws for a mincha from the bowls of frankincense of the Showbread. In conclusion, the Gemara distinguishes between learning a mincha offering from another mincha-style offering and learning a mincha offering from an animal sacrifice (blood). Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin and rules that it is not sanctified if placed in the vessel in parts. Rabbi Acha brings the source in the Torah for his prohibition, and the Gemara brings two braitot that support his opinion and contradict Rabbi Elazar's position. Rabbi Yochanan's position regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin) is questioned in light of a position he holds against Rav in a case of a regular mincha offering that is sanctified even before the person completely filled the vessel with the fine flour. Why does he differentiate between the cases? The Gemara then asks about Rav, who disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan and requires the vessel to be filled: would he hold like Rabbi Yochanan or Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin offering? They conclude that since he derives one item from another (on a different mincha-related issue), he would derive from the minchat chavitin to here, and therefore he must hold like Rabbi Yochanan by the minchat chavitin and requires it to be complete to sanctify. Since the Gemara mentions a different mincha-related issue where Rav derives one thing from another, they quote that source in its entirety and delve into his debate with Rabbi Chanina about mincha offerings where not all the parts were added yet to the bowl – are they sanctified without everything being there? At the beginning of the daf, Rabbi Elazar had made a comparison of taking the kometz from a mincha in the Sanctuary, which is permitted as it is derived from the bowls of frankincense from the Showbread. Rabbi Yirmia raises a difficulty against this from a braita, but the drasha in that braita is reinterpreted to fit with Rabbi Elazar's ruling.

As we know, the miracles that Hashem performed at Yetziat Mitzrayim were not only to take revenge on the Egyptians. They were also to teach us lessons that we would need for all generations. Rabbi Menashe Reizman quoted Rabbeinu Chaim Paltiel, who explained one of those lessons. The Egyptians believed in numerous gods, and every one of them was connected to their source of parnassah. They worshipped the sheep that gave them parnassah. They worshipped the Nile River that gave them parnassah. They worshipped Pharaoh, who they believed gave them parnassah. And Hashem made a mockery of all those gods, including the Baal Tzafon. Baal Tzafon was the place where Yosef hid all of the treasures that he accumulated during the years of famine. As long as Baal Tzafon stood, the Egyptians felt secure. It was their insurance policy. Even if the Nile failed, even if their livestock died, even if everything else collapsed, they still had mountains of gold hidden away there. Pharaoh emptied that treasure house and gave everything to the Egyptians in order to convince them to chase the Jews into the Yam Suf. That is what caused them to ultimately drown there, and that is how all of that wealth was transferred to Am Yisrael. Hashem was showing us that all of the things the Egyptians believed in were nothing. It was only Him who controlled everything. Sometimes a person becomes so wrapped up in his parnassah that he begins to trust in it. And if there is an issue with the product, or the customer, or the boss, he begins to tremble in fear that his parnassah is in jeopardy. Believing in the cause of parnassah is very similar to believing in the Egyptian deities. The Gemara says that whoever is somech geulah l'tefillah, no harm will befall him that day. Rabbeinu Yonah explains that if a person truly absorbs the message of the geulah from Mitzrayim, he will nullify all other imagined sources of help and rely fully on HaKadosh Baruch Hu. Only then can he truly pray. So long as a person believes that his refuah is in the hands of the doctor, and his future is in the hands of a diagnosis, how can he truly mean the words כי אל רופא רחמן ונאמן אתה that he says in tefilah? The more emotional involvement a person has in his hishtadlut, the weaker his emunah becomes. When it comes to parnassah, when a person truly believes that only Hashem is giving it to him, that only Hashem is marrying off his children, and that only Hashem is giving each person the house he needs to live in, then his kavanah in prayer becomes deep and real. First a person must nullify all other sources of support in the berachah of Ga'al Yisrael, and only then can he begin the Amidah properly. The Arugat HaBosem explains that the main essence of every berachah in the amidah is in its conclusion: כי אל גואל חזק אתה כי אל טוב וסלח אתה כי אל טוב ומטיב אתה Even though we must make hishtadlut, the Chazon Ish warns that we must not have emotional attachment to it. We must not lose our composure when hearing bad news about the industry we work in. Rather, we should remain calm, with the serenity of one who trusts that the same Hashem who helped him yesterday in one way can help him today in another way. The Gemara says that someone whose mind is preoccupied with worry in the performance of a mitzvah can be exempt from Keriat Shema. Then the Gemara asks: what about someone whose mind is preoccupied with worry because his merchandise sank at sea? Should he also be exempt? The Gemara answers no. He must remove the worry from his heart, because Hashem can provide his livelihood from somewhere else instantly. In fact, sometimes it is precisely through the sinking of the ship that his livelihood will come. Like the story of Rav Huna, who had four hundred barrels of wine turn sour into vinegar. One opinion in the Gemara says that afterward the emperor's daughter became ill and needed vinegar for healing. Suddenly vinegar was in great demand, and Rav Huna sold all of his vinegar at a great profit. He did not need wine in order to succeed. Hashem gave him even greater blessing through vinegar. Part of the purpose of Yetziat Mitzrayim is to bring us to one clear conclusion: כי אין כמוני בכל הארץ-there is no one like Hashem. Everything we could ever want or need comes only from Him. And the more deeply we believe that, the greater our tefillot and our avodat Hashem will become.

According to Yosi ben Yasiyan and Rabbi Yehuda the Baker, ben Beteira permits returning a kometz taken in a disqualified manner to the original dough, provided it has not yet been placed in a sanctified vessel. Rav Nachman challenges this ruling: if taking the kometz is a significant ritual, the act should be irreversible; if it is not, placing it in a sanctified vessel should be meaningless. Rav Nachman resolves this by explaining that while taking the kometz is indeed a ritual act, it is not complete until the kometz is placed in the vessel. If so, the Gemara objects, returning the kometz to the original dough - which is also held in a sanctified vessel - should complete the act and permanently disqualify it. This difficulty is answered in two ways. Rabbi Yochanan answers that one can derive a principle from here: sanctified vessels only sanctify items if they are placed inside with intent to sanctify. The Gemara questions this assumption, noting that it implies one could intentionally sanctify disqualified items; yet, Rabbi Yochanan previously answered Reish Lakish that disqualified items cannot be sanctified for the altar by being placed in a sanctified vessel. This contradiction is resolved by distinguishing between sanctifying an item to permit it to be offered on the altar (which is not effective) and sanctifying an item merely to disqualify it (which is effective). Rav Amram answers the original question by qualifying the case to when the kometz is returned to a heaping bowl. As a sanctified vessel only sanctifies what is within the walls of the vessel, the kometz is not sanctified to be disqualified when placed back in the original vessel. After raising a difficulty regarding the reality of this case, his answer is partially modified to a level bowl, not heaping. Rabbi Yirmia tells Rabbi Zeira that he derives from the fact that they did not suggest returning it to the vessel when it was on the ground, that the actions of kemitza do not need to be performed while a kohen is holding the vessel in his hands. Rabbi Zeira points out that this was an issue raised by Rav Nachman to Avimi, who explained that the kohen indeed needs to be holding the vessel. Rav Sheshet disagrees, holding that the Kohen does not need to be holding the vessel for all the actions of kemitza. He derives this from the laws of the Showbread, as he understands from a Mishna that the kohanim did not hold up the Table when the Showbread and bowls of frankincense was switched at the end of each week. Rav brings a third position: The first two actions - placing the dough in the bowl and taking the kemitza - do not require the kohen to be holding the vessel, but the kometz must be placed in a vessel held by a kohen, as it is parallel to accepting the blood of a sacrifice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, "If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument." As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected. Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v'chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v'chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural childbirth, one could reject that kal v'chomer as they both have a stringency that is not in a treifa as they have noticeable issues, whereas a treifa is not necessarily noticeable. The braita concluded that the source for a treifa not being able to be offered on the altar is derived from "from the cattle." However, two other verses also are used to exclude a treifa. Why are all three verses necessary? The Mishna rules that any meal offering that the kemitza is done by a non-kohen, onen, impure person, etc. (i.e. not in the proper manner), is disqualified. Ben Beteira disagrees and explains that if it was done with the left hand, one returns the kometz to the pile and redoes it with the right hand. If a kohen took the kemitza but there was something else in there like a pebble or frankincense, it is invalid as the kemitza must be a precise handful, no more and no less. The Gemara first questions the language of the Mishna – why does it list the mincha offering brought for a sin together separately from the others. The answer is that the Mishna is highlighting that even according to Rabbi Shimon who holds that a sinner's offering should not be glorious, it still needs to be done properly. Even though in Zevachim, the parallel Mishna relating to sacrifices does not single out the sin offering, the Gemara explains why there was no need there to explain it according to Rabbi Shimon, but there was a need here. Rav explains that any disqualification can be fixed by redoing it. At first, they question Rav's ruling in light of the rabbis' position in the Mishna, but then they explain that Rav holds like ben Beteira and is coming to explain that even though ben Beteira only mentioned the disqualification of the left hand in the Mishna, his ruling applies for all disqualifications. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this from tannaitic sources that show that this was clear even before Rav made his statement. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different explanation – that Rav was pointing out that ben Beteira permits it to be redone even if the kometz was placed in a sanctified vessel, which disagrees with a tannaitic opinion that it can be fixed only if it wasn't yet placed in a sanctified vessel. According to others, Rav is coming to teach the exact opposite and to show that he agrees with the tannaitic opinion that it can only be fixed if it was not yet placed in the vessel.

There are three different opinions about the status of the mincha offering of the omer that is offered for the sake of a different offering. Rav says it is completely disqualified, Reish Lakish holds it is valid, but the obligation to bring the mincha is not fulfilled and a new one must be brought, and Rava holds that it is valid and the obligation is fulfilled. Rav added another disqualified case to the list – a guilt offering of the nazir and leper. After a discussion about why he would distinguish between that guilt offering and a guilt offering for theft or misuse of consecrated property, the Gemara brings a braita that clearly contradicts Rav as it says explicitly that a guilt offering of a leper offered for the sake of the wrong sacrifice is brought on the altar. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position. If the omer offering that is brought for the sake of the wrong offering does not fulfill its obligation, how can it be offered on the altar as one can only offer on the altar items that can be eaten by Jews and this is an offering from the chadash (new grain) and the chadash is only permitted with the omer offering. Two answers are brought to resolve this difficulty. The first answer is brought by Rav Ada bar Ahava who suggests that since it will be permitted later that day, when the omer offering is brought correctly, it is not considered a forbidden item. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Ada, two are resolved but the last one is not. Rav Papa offers an alternative answer – that the actual omer offering does not permit the chadash, but the illumination of the eastern horizon on that day permits it (16th of Nisan). This suggestion of Rav Papa is further supported by claiming that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish both agreed that the chadash is permitted from that time and not from the offering of the omer, as is derived from a statement of Reish Lakish. A braita teaches that one can derive from a verse "from the cattle" that a treifa cannot be brought on the altar. However, the braita suggests that it could have been derived by a kal v'chomer, but since one can raise a difficulty against that kal v'chomer, it is derived from a verse. However, it is unclear what the difficulty could have been and the Gemara brings several possible suggestions. But difficulties are raised against each of them.

What happens in the case of a person who needs purification from tzara'at - a whole process - where the order of the tasks may make a difference in terms of validity - in the goal of using the case of tzara'at to answer the question the grain-offering, and ultimately rejecting it. Also, another parallel to animal sacrifices... in terms of paving the way for the sanctification of sacrifices, including, for example, melikah (of the bird). Plus, a kal va-chomer vs. verses understanding, where neither is quite rejected.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

There are three different opinions about the status of the mincha offering of the omer that is offered for the sake of a different offering. Rav says it is completely disqualified, Reish Lakish holds it is valid, but the obligation to bring the mincha is not fulfilled and a new one must be brought, and Rava holds that it is valid and the obligation is fulfilled. Rav added another disqualified case to the list – a guilt offering of the nazir and leper. After a discussion about why he would distinguish between that guilt offering and a guilt offering for theft or misuse of consecrated property, the Gemara brings a braita that clearly contradicts Rav as it says explicitly that a guilt offering of a leper offered for the sake of the wrong sacrifice is brought on the altar. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position. If the omer offering that is brought for the sake of the wrong offering does not fulfill its obligation, how can it be offered on the altar as one can only offer on the altar items that can be eaten by Jews and this is an offering from the chadash (new grain) and the chadash is only permitted with the omer offering. Two answers are brought to resolve this difficulty. The first answer is brought by Rav Ada bar Ahava who suggests that since it will be permitted later that day, when the omer offering is brought correctly, it is not considered a forbidden item. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Ada, two are resolved but the last one is not. Rav Papa offers an alternative answer – that the actual omer offering does not permit the chadash, but the illumination of the eastern horizon on that day permits it (16th of Nisan). This suggestion of Rav Papa is further supported by claiming that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish both agreed that the chadash is permitted from that time and not from the offering of the omer, as is derived from a statement of Reish Lakish. A braita teaches that one can derive from a verse "from the cattle" that a treifa cannot be brought on the altar. However, the braita suggests that it could have been derived by a kal v'chomer, but since one can raise a difficulty against that kal v'chomer, it is derived from a verse. However, it is unclear what the difficulty could have been and the Gemara brings several possible suggestions. But difficulties are raised against each of them.

Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, "If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument." As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected. Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v'chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v'chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural childbirth, one could reject that kal v'chomer as they both have a stringency that is not in a treifa as they have noticeable issues, whereas a treifa is not necessarily noticeable. The braita concluded that the source for a treifa not being able to be offered on the altar is derived from "from the cattle." However, two other verses also are used to exclude a treifa. Why are all three verses necessary? The Mishna rules that any meal offering that the kemitza is done by a non-kohen, onen, impure person, etc. (i.e. not in the proper manner), is disqualified. Ben Beteira disagrees and explains that if it was done with the left hand, one returns the kometz to the pile and redoes it with the right hand. If a kohen took the kemitza but there was something else in there like a pebble or frankincense, it is invalid as the kemitza must be a precise handful, no more and no less. The Gemara first questions the language of the Mishna – why does it list the mincha offering brought for a sin together separately from the others. The answer is that the Mishna is highlighting that even according to Rabbi Shimon who holds that a sinner's offering should not be glorious, it still needs to be done properly. Even though in Zevachim, the parallel Mishna relating to sacrifices does not single out the sin offering, the Gemara explains why there was no need there to explain it according to Rabbi Shimon, but there was a need here. Rav explains that any disqualification can be fixed by redoing it. At first, they question Rav's ruling in light of the rabbis' position in the Mishna, but then they explain that Rav holds like ben Beteira and is coming to explain that even though ben Beteira only mentioned the disqualification of the left hand in the Mishna, his ruling applies for all disqualifications. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this from tannaitic sources that show that this was clear even before Rav made his statement. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different explanation – that Rav was pointing out that ben Beteira permits it to be redone even if the kometz was placed in a sanctified vessel, which disagrees with a tannaitic opinion that it can be fixed only if it wasn't yet placed in a sanctified vessel. According to others, Rav is coming to teach the exact opposite and to show that he agrees with the tannaitic opinion that it can only be fixed if it was not yet placed in the vessel.

What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon's words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon's position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their obligation): the sinner's meal offering (minchat choteh) and the jealousy offering  of a Sotah (minchat kenaot) are completely disqualified if perfomed for the wrong purpose (shelo lishmah). What is the source for this? The Gemara initially presents a derivation for each of them from the sin offering (chatat), but after rejecting these derivations due to a difficulty regarding the guilt offering (asham), it brings a different exposition based on a gezeirah shava (verbal analogy) to both of these meal offerings. Rav adds the Omer meal offering to this list, stating that if it was performed for the wrong purpose, it is disqualified because it is intended to permit the consumption of the "new grain" (chadash), and if brought for the wrong purpose, it fails to permit it and is useless. He says the same regarding the nazirite's guilt offering (asham nazir) and the leper's guilt offering (asham metzora). If so, why are this meal offering and these sacrifices not mentioned in the Mishnayot in Menachot and Zevachim that list those disqualified if they were brought for the wrong purpose? The Gemara answers this question and settles the difficulty. The Gemara further challenges Rav: if the asham nazir and asham metzora are meant to "enable" (le'hachshir) a status change and fail to do so when brought for the wrong purpose, then the guilt offering for misappropriation (asham me'ilot) and the guilt offering for theft (asham gezeilot) - which are meant to "atone" (le'chaper) - likewise fail to atone; why then are they valid if brought for the wrong purpose? Rabbi Yirmiya makes a distinction between offerings that "enable" status (machshirim) and those that "atone" (mechaperim). He brings proof from the laws of sacrifices brought after the death of the owner, specifically citing a Mishna regarding a woman after childbirth (yoledet). Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, challenges this distinction (regarding the laws after death) from a Mishna in Nazir, where an enabling sacrifice is indeed brought after death.  

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

The Torah in Parashat Vaera traces the lineage of Moshe Rabbenu, informing us that he was son of Amram and Yochebed. Amram was a grandson of Yakaob Abinu's third son, Levi – specifically, he was the son of Levi's son, Kehat. Astonishingly, the Torah relates, Yochebed was Amram's aunt – she was the daughter of Levi, the sister of Kehat. The commentaries explain that Yochebed and Kehat had different mothers, and thus they were half-siblings. As such, the marriage between Amram and Yochebed was not forbidden by the Noachide laws, which apply to all mankind. These laws forbid marrying one's parent's full sister, but not a parent's half-sister. This union would, however, be proscribed by the Torah given to Beneh Yisrael. It turns out, then, that Moshe – the greatest leader and prophet in our nation's history, who brought us the Torah – was the product of a marriage that Torah law forbids. Moshe is not the only great leader with less-than-pristine origins. The Davidic line, which began with David and Shlomo and will – we pray very soon – culminate with Mashiah, also has its origins in problematic relationships. David descended from Peretz – the product of the relationship between Yehuda and his daughter-in-law, Tamar. David's great-grandmother was Rut, a convert from the nation of Moab, and although it was ultimately concluded that this marriage was permissible, there was considerable controversy as to whether a man may marry a woman from Moab. And the founder of the nation of Moab, Rut's ancestor, was conceived when Lot's daughter gave her father wine and had a relationship with him, thinking they this was needed in order to maintain the earth's population. Rav Menahem Recanti (Italy, 1223-1290) offers an explanation for this phenomenon, for why the great leaders emerged from less-than-ideal origins. The Satan, he writes, is always seeking to sabotage the rise of these righteous figures, to block these holy souls from descending into the world. Moshe brought us the Torah, which is the "antidote" to the Yeser Ha'ra (evil inclination), the greatest weapon we have in our struggle to overcome the Satan's efforts to lure us away from the service of G-d. And the Gemara teaches that when Mashiah arrives, he will destroy the Satan so it could no longer hurt the Jewish People. Therefore, the Satan will do everything in its power to obstruct the transmission of Torah, and to prevent the arrival of Mashiah. For this reason, Hashem arranged that Moshe and David would be produced from unions that the Satan would never bother to disrupt. The Satan welcomes problematic relationships such as those of Lot and his daughters, Yehuda and Tamar, and Amram and Yochebed. He would never try to interfere with them, because this is precisely what he wants – relationships that are from the Torah's ideal marriage. Moshe and David needed to be produced this way for the purpose of avoiding the Satan's interference. This reminds us never to be discouraged by the challenges that we face in the pursuit of greatness. Whenever we try to achieve something significant, we are going to confront obstacles. Whether it's in the process of finding a spouse and raising a family, the process of learning Torah and spiritual growth, starting a new organization or project – the Satan is always going to try to interfere. Rather than be surprised and discouraged by the problems that arise, we should expect them, stay strong, and proceed with confidence, trusting that Hashem is always helping us in our efforts to defeat the Satan and achieve to the very best of our ability.

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What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon's words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon's position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their obligation): the sinner's meal offering (minchat choteh) and the jealousy offering  of a Sotah (minchat kenaot) are completely disqualified if perfomed for the wrong purpose (shelo lishmah). What is the source for this? The Gemara initially presents a derivation for each of them from the sin offering (chatat), but after rejecting these derivations due to a difficulty regarding the guilt offering (asham), it brings a different exposition based on a gezeirah shava (verbal analogy) to both of these meal offerings. Rav adds the Omer meal offering to this list, stating that if it was performed for the wrong purpose, it is disqualified because it is intended to permit the consumption of the "new grain" (chadash), and if brought for the wrong purpose, it fails to permit it and is useless. He says the same regarding the nazirite's guilt offering (asham nazir) and the leper's guilt offering (asham metzora). If so, why are this meal offering and these sacrifices not mentioned in the Mishnayot in Menachot and Zevachim that list those disqualified if they were brought for the wrong purpose? The Gemara answers this question and settles the difficulty. The Gemara further challenges Rav: if the asham nazir and asham metzora are meant to "enable" (le'hachshir) a status change and fail to do so when brought for the wrong purpose, then the guilt offering for misappropriation (asham me'ilot) and the guilt offering for theft (asham gezeilot) - which are meant to "atone" (le'chaper) - likewise fail to atone; why then are they valid if brought for the wrong purpose? Rabbi Yirmiya makes a distinction between offerings that "enable" status (machshirim) and those that "atone" (mechaperim). He brings proof from the laws of sacrifices brought after the death of the owner, specifically citing a Mishna regarding a woman after childbirth (yoledet). Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, challenges this distinction (regarding the laws after death) from a Mishna in Nazir, where an enabling sacrifice is indeed brought after death.  

Study Guide There are three ways to resolve the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two braitot: in one, he states that a meal-offering (mincha) brought for a different purpose than its original intent is valid and fulfills the owner's obligation, while in the other, he states that it is valid but does not fulfill the owner's obligation. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to this contradiction. Raba explains Rabbi Shimon's words according to their simple meaning - that when it is evident from a person's actions that their stated thought was not sincere (or was a lie), we can disregard the thought and validate the offering. The Gemara raises nine challenges to Raba's position from other cases involving bird offerings and animal sacrifices where the actions clearly contradict the stated intent, yet the sacrifice still does not fulfill the owner's obligation. For most of these challenges, the Gemara answers that the cases are not truly comparable, but in some instances, it concedes that Rabbi Shimon would indeed agree that the sacrifice fulfills the owner's obligation in those scenarios as well. Rava and Rav Ashi resolve the difficulty differently. According to both, the principle of "its actions prove its intent" (ma'asav mochiach alav) must be interpreted in a different way. The Gemara raises a challenge against each of their views and subsequently resolves them. According to Rava's final position, it emerges that Rabbi Shimon would even validate a specific case of a sin-offering offered as a different sin-offering, and it would be accepted as fulfilling the obligation.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Study Guide There are three ways to resolve the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two braitot: in one, he states that a meal-offering (mincha) brought for a different purpose than its original intent is valid and fulfills the owner's obligation, while in the other, he states that it is valid but does not fulfill the owner's obligation. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to this contradiction. Raba explains Rabbi Shimon's words according to their simple meaning - that when it is evident from a person's actions that their stated thought was not sincere (or was a lie), we can disregard the thought and validate the offering. The Gemara raises nine challenges to Raba's position from other cases involving bird offerings and animal sacrifices where the actions clearly contradict the stated intent, yet the sacrifice still does not fulfill the owner's obligation. For most of these challenges, the Gemara answers that the cases are not truly comparable, but in some instances, it concedes that Rabbi Shimon would indeed agree that the sacrifice fulfills the owner's obligation in those scenarios as well. Rava and Rav Ashi resolve the difficulty differently. According to both, the principle of "its actions prove its intent" (ma'asav mochiach alav) must be interpreted in a different way. The Gemara raises a challenge against each of their views and subsequently resolves them. According to Rava's final position, it emerges that Rabbi Shimon would even validate a specific case of a sin-offering offered as a different sin-offering, and it would be accepted as fulfilling the obligation.

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Study Guide If one takes a dough of a mincha that was designated for a specific type of meal offering and takes the kemitza with the intention that it be offered for a different type of mincha, the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the mincha. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering - specifically in a mincha of a sinner and of the sotah. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase "but with the wrong intent does not fulfill the owner's obligation"? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling - one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning. It seems, at first glance, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who explains that a mincha offered for the sake of a different sacrifice is valid and fulfills the obligation of the owner. The Gemara refers then to a contradiction between two different sources within Rabbi Shimon - in one it says it does fulfill the obligation, in the other it says it does not. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to the contradiction. According to Rav Ashi's resolution, one can reconcile our Mishna with Rabbi Shimon in the same manner. But according to Raba and Rava, that is not possible, as their explanations for the second braita cannot be used for our Mishna, as the language of our Mishna would not fit with that explanation. Therefore, according to them, Rabbi Shimon must be offering a position that is counter to the position of our Mishna. After making mention of the contradictory sources of Rabbi Shimon, the Gemara brings the other braita and begins to explain the resolutions. Raba's explanation is brought and Abaye raises a difficulty, which Raba himself resolves. Then a number of other questions are raised against Raba.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Study Guide If one takes a dough of a mincha that was designated for a specific type of meal offering and takes the kemitza with the intention that it be offered for a different type of mincha, the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the mincha. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering - specifically in a mincha of a sinner and of the sotah. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase "but with the wrong intent does not fulfill the owner's obligation"? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling - one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning. It seems, at first glance, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who explains that a mincha offered for the sake of a different sacrifice is valid and fulfills the obligation of the owner. The Gemara refers then to a contradiction between two different sources within Rabbi Shimon - in one it says it does fulfill the obligation, in the other it says it does not. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to the contradiction. According to Rav Ashi's resolution, one can reconcile our Mishna with Rabbi Shimon in the same manner. But according to Raba and Rava, that is not possible, as their explanations for the second braita cannot be used for our Mishna, as the language of our Mishna would not fit with that explanation. Therefore, according to them, Rabbi Shimon must be offering a position that is counter to the position of our Mishna. After making mention of the contradictory sources of Rabbi Shimon, the Gemara brings the other braita and begins to explain the resolutions. Raba's explanation is brought and Abaye raises a difficulty, which Raba himself resolves. Then a number of other questions are raised against Raba.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

  Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however, the Gemara distinguishes between the two cases and rejects the comparison. Another discussion concerns a sacrifice slaughtered at night on a private altar. Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether such an offering is valid. Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan also dispute whether burnt offerings brought on private altars require hefshet and nituach - flaying and cutting into pieces - just as they do on the public altar. Although private altars operate with fewer restrictions, several laws apply equally to both private and public offerings. A braita entertains the possibility that time‑based limitations might not apply to private‑altar sacrifices, just as spatial limitations do not. However, a verse is cited to demonstrate that time restrictions indeed remain binding even for offerings brought on private altars.

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

More on the altars outside and prior to the Temple - from Gilgal to Nov & Givon, and Shilo (when private altars weren't allowed). The Gemara explains that a verse in Deuteronomy that speaks of "menuchah" (rest) and "nachalah" (inheritance) should be applied to Shilo and Jerusalem, or perhaps the reverse. Also, investigating the claim that there were no grain-offerings at a private altar. The Gemara also pushes for implicit recognition that bird-offerings and grain-offerings were fundamentally different from larger animal sacrifice, which seem to have been more special.

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Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai held that during the period of the Temple there were four distinct "camps," since the Ezrat Nashim constituted its own camp. However, in the period of Shilo there were only two camps. The Gemara struggles to identify which camp, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, did not exist in Shilo, since the Torah clearly assigns separate zones for each category of impurity - one who is impure from contact with a corpse, a zav, and a leper - implying the need for three distinct camps. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon's statement refers to an entirely different issue: during the period of Shilo, the Levite area did not function as a place of refuge for someone who killed unintentionally. This implies that in the wilderness the Levite camp did serve as a refuge zone, a point further supported by derashot on Shemot 21:13. A braita presents five different rabbinic opinions regarding which sacrifices were offered during the fourteen years after entering the Land, when the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal. Some maintain that only voluntary offerings brought by individuals were permitted. Rabbi Meir holds that meal offerings and Nazirite offerings were also brought. Rabbi Yehuda adds that even obligatory offerings could be brought in the Tabernacle (bama gedola), distinguishing between the central sanctuary and other locations. Rabbi Shimon limits which public offerings were brought. The Gemara then cites the scriptural basis for Rabbi Meir's position. Shmuel restricts the dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Meir specifically to the obligatory offerings of a Nazirite. However, after Rava introduces a contradictory braita, the Gemara revises Shmuel's statement, concluding that the dispute concerns specifically the voluntary offerings of a Nazirite. The Gemara brings a source from the Torah for the opinion of the rabbis (the second view) in the braita.

The Gemara explains the basis of the disagreement in the braita between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and how the second position of the Rabbis differs from the first position in the name of the rabbis in that same braita. Rabbi Shimon's source in the Torah for his view limiting the communal offerings brought in Gilgal is a verse in Yehoshua 5:10, which describes the Jews bringing the Paschal offering just a few days after crossing the Jordan River into the Land of Israel.  The reason the structure of Shilo was built with stone walls while its ceiling was only a curtain is derived from seemingly contradictory verses - some referring to Shilo as a "house" and others as a "tent." Four rabbis each cite a different verse to explain the law that during the period when the Tabernacle stood in Shilo, kodshim kalim and maaser sheni could be eaten anywhere within sight of Shilo. There is also a debate about whether the Tabernacle in Shilo was located in the territory of Yosef or Binyamin.  A braita discusses how many years the Tabernacle remained in each location and explains the calculations: thirty-nine years in the desert, fourteen in Gilgal, fifty-seven in Nov and Givon, and three hundred sixty-nine in Shilo.