Podcasts about Gemara

Study Guide There are two general principles employed by the Mishna to determine the order of precedence among sacrifices: A sacrifice offered more frequently takes priority. A sacrifice of greater sanctity takes priority. The Mishna elaborates on which sacrifices are considered more frequent and which are deemed more sanctified. In its discussion of sanctity, it emphasizes the unique attributes of each type of sacrifice and provides examples illustrating the precedence of one sacrifice over another. However, certain situations are not explicitly addressed, and the Gemara raises questions about the law in those cases, attempting to infer the answers from the Mishna's examples. The Gemara further examines each ruling of precedence in the Mishna, suggesting that the order could, in fact, be reversed. In every instance, the Gemara explains why the Mishna chose its particular order and not the alternative.

Ravina bar Shila holds that the imurim, parts of kodashim kalim designated for burning, that are taken out of the Azara before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. The Gemara explores whether this aligns with a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, but Rav Papa clarifies that their disagreement pertains to a different case. The Gemara examines the order of precedence in the Mishna, which places bird offerings before meal offerings, and sin-related meal offerings before voluntary ones. Although one could argue for reversing the order, the Mishna's reasoning is deemed stronger and thus upheld. A sin offering, even of a bird, takes precedence over any burnt offering, even of an animal. This hierarchy is supported by three verses addressing different scenarios. Although three tannaitic sources appear to challenge this principle, the Gemara resolves these contradictions. Sin offerings also precede guilt offerings, except the guilt offering for a metzora (leper), because it comes to purify the leper. This offering, along with the guilt offering of a nazir, differs from other guilt offerings in two distinct ways. The order of precedence for sacrifices also applies to the consumption of their meat. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir disagree about whether spices of teruma may be added when cooking sacrificial meat. Rabbi Shimon permits it, while Rabbi Meir prohibits it due to the risk of disqualifying the teruma, which would then require burning.  

The Gemara makes one final attempt to answer the question of whether the airspace of the altar can sanctify disqualified items just as the altar does. The attempt is rejected. The Mishna teaches that liquid sacred vessels sanctify liquids, and vessels used for dry ingredients sanctify dry items. Liquid vessels cannot sanctify dry items, nor vice versa. If sacred vessels are punctured, they only sanctify if they can still perform their original function and remain whole. All sanctification occurs only within the Azara. Shmuel limits the first ruling of the Mishna to measuring utensils, but bowls and similar items can sanctify even dry ingredients. His proof is a verse regarding flour mixed with oil that was placed into a bowl generally used for liquids (Bamidbar 7:13). Rav Acha questions this proof since flour mixed with oil is not exactly a solid, and Shmuel provides two possible answers. Shmuel further rules that sacred vessels sanctify only when they are whole, filled with the entire amount needed for the offering, and can only sanctify items from within. Variants of this teaching differ slightly, as one version reads "from inside the Azara" instead of "from within the vessel" and another includes both. The difference between two of these versions is whether overflow is sanctified. Rabbi Yohanan qualifies the ruling that if there is not a complete amount, the item inside will not be sanctified. He explains that this applies only when there was no intent to reach the full amount, but if one intends to add enough to reach the requisite measure, each portion becomes sanctified as it is placed inside. A braita is brought to support this. Rav or Rav Asi qualifies the Mishna's ruling that dry vessels do not sanctify liquids and vice versa. This applies to sanctification for offering on the altar, but they are sanctified to the extent that the contents can become disqualified. Some say his statement was made regarding a different braita about meal offerings brought from orla and diverse kinds. A braita teaches that damaged sacred vessels cannot be repaired by melting or patching. Similarly, knives with defects cannot be sharpened to remove the blemish, and if a blade slips out, it cannot be reattached. This ruling reflects the principle that there is "no poverty in a place of affluence," referring to the Temple as a place of affluence. Abba Shaul recalls a defective knife in the Temple that was buried so that is would not be used. Another braita, based on the same principle, explains that the clothes of the kohanim must be woven, not stitched, and if they become soiled, they cannot be washed with cleaning agents such as natron or soap. Abaye clarifies that they can be laundered if only mildly dirty, but if cleaning them would require agents, they cannot be cleaned even with water alone. Some say they may never be washed at all. A braita describes the kohen gadol's robe as entirely blue, with hem decorations resembling unopened pomegranates and children's buttons. Bells were attached, either seventy‑two in total or thirty‑six according to differing opinions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson notes that this dispute parallels disagreements about the number of shades in leprous afflictions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson explains that the Torah juxtaposes sacrifices with priestly garments to teach that just as sacrifices atone, so too do the garments. Each garment corresponds to atonement for a specific sin: the tunic for murder, the pants for sexual immorality, the turban for arrogance, the belt for improper thoughts, the breastplate for judicial errors, the ephod for idolatry, the robe for lashon hara, and the tzitz for brazenness. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who taught that murder and lashon hara have no atonement through sacrifices, only through other means - egla arufa for murder and ketoret, incense, for slander. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between situations: when the murderer is known, the tunic atones; when unknown, the egla arufa atones. Regarding lashon hara, they distinguish between public lashon hara, which is atoned by the robe with its bells, and private lashon hara, atoned by the ketoret, which is offered in the sanctuary, a private space.

  Raba and Rav Chisda disagree on two issues. If items were not completely consumed on the altar, removed before midnight, and returned after midnight, at what point are they considered "consumed" such that they no longer need to be put back on the altar if removed again (assuming they have not yet turned to ash, in which case they would not need to be returned)? Raba rules that they are considered consumed at midnight of the following night, while Rav Chisda holds that the cutoff is dawn. If the items were not returned until after dawn, Raba still maintains that midnight of the next night renders them consumed, whereas Rav Chisda insists they can never be rendered consumed. Rav Yosef challenges the premise of both opinions, which assume that items not on the altar at midnight cannot be rendered consumed. He argues instead that midnight itself renders all items consumed, even if they were removed before midnight and not yet returned to the altar. Rava asked Raba: If items remain at the top of the altar all night, does that prevent them from becoming disqualified through lina (remaining overnight)? Raba answered that they are not disqualified, but Rava did not accept this response. A braita is cited, providing a source in the Torah that the ramp and sanctified vessels also sanctify disqualified items. If such items are placed on the ramp or the altar, they do not need to be removed. Reish Lakish posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding disqualified items placed in sanctified vessels. Initially, Rabbi Yochanan thought the question was whether they were sanctified to the extent that they could not be redeemed. Reish Lakish clarified that he was asking whether items placed in sanctified vessels could be brought ab initio on the altar. Rabbi Yochanan answered yes, based on the Mishna, but this answer was rejected since the Mishna could be read differently. The Gemara then asks: Does the airspace of the altar sanctify items? At first, it attempts to prove that the airspace does sanctify from the Mishna's statement: "Just as the altar sanctifies, so does the ramp." Items sanctified by the ramp must be carried through the altar's airspace to reach it. If the airspace does not sanctify, then carrying them would be akin to removing them, and once removed, they could not be returned. However, this proof is rejected, since it is possible to bring them to the altar by dragging rather than lifting. Rava bar Rav Chanan then attempts to prove the opposite from the case of a bird burnt offering brought at the top of the altar. If the airspace sanctifies, then there could be no case of pigul (disqualification due to improper intent), because as long as the offering remains on the altar, it could be sacrificed even the next day. Thus, a thought to offer it the next day would not constitute pigul. Rav Shimi rejects this argument, explaining that one could still have a pigul thought to remove the offering and then put it back on the altar the next day, which would indeed be disqualifying.

  According to the Mishna, in a burnt offering, items that are connected to the meat but not the meat itself—such as bones, hooves, horns, and sinews—are left on the altar if they remain attached to the meat. However, if they are detached, they must be removed from the altar. This ruling is derived from two different verses in the Torah: in Vayikra 1:9 it says that everything is burned on the altar, while in Devarim 12:27 it specifies that in burnt offerings, meat and blood are brought on the altar. This opinion in the Mishna is attributed to Rebbi, while another tannaitic view interprets "everything" more broadly to include these parts, with the limiting verse excluding bones, sinews, etc. only once they have already been consumed by the fire and separated from it. Rabbi Zeira qualifies Rebbi's opinion, explaining that if these parts became separated from the meat but moved closer to the pyre, they are to remain on the altar. The Gemara rejects this explanation, and Rabba offers a different interpretation of Rabbi Zeira's qualification. He explains that the qualification was not on Rebbi's words themselves but on an inference drawn from them—that if they separate, they must be removed from the altar, though they still retain sanctity and cannot be used for personal benefit. Rabba then distinguishes between items that separated before the blood was placed on the altar and those that separated afterward. If they were still attached at the time of the blood sprinkling and later separated, they are considered sanctified items that became disqualified, which are forbidden for benefit. But if they were already detached at the time of sprinkling, they were never destined for the altar and are therefore permitted for the kohanim's use, as derived from a gezeira shava from the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar takes the opposite approach. If they were still attached when the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling permits them, so there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, though they remain prohibited by rabbinic law. However, if they were already detached, the sprinkling has no effect on them, and they remain in their original consecrated state, making one liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Mishna further explains that if any of the disqualified offerings that are meant to remain on the altar (as mentioned in Zevachim 84a) fall off the altar, or if an ember of wood falls off, they do not need to be returned. The Mishna also rules that if parts of the sacrifice that are to be burned on the altar fall off, they must be put back on if this occurs before midnight. After midnight, however, they do not need to be returned. The Gemara limits this ruling to items that have hardened but not yet reduced to ash. Items not yet consumed to that state must be returned regardless of the time, while items already reduced to ash do not need to be returned. Rav brings a source for the significance of midnight in this law from a drasha on the verses in Vayikra 6:2–3. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on this braita from a Mishna in Yoma 20a, and Rabbi Yochanan brings a different drasha to explain the Mishna.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

Finishing chapter 8: If the kohen brought the blood of the offering into the Sanctuary unintentionally, the offering remains valid - implying that if he had done so intentionally, it would have invalidated the offering, but it seems to remain acceptable anyway. Plus, the Gemara lines up the various opinions to clarify them. Also, beginning chapter 9, with a new mishnah! On how the altar sanctified that which was fit for the altar - with a baseline of the burnt-offering. With discussion of what remains on the altar once it has been put there - even if it should not have been put there initially. Also, more on when that which has been brought on the altar, and should not have been - were they sanctified from their placement on the altar even though they shouldn't have been there? With credit to Rabbi Yehoshua for following his own thinking, though it may not have sat well across the board - for example, something that is fit for the altar, but wasn't offered at that time (certainly, there's no absolute agreement about such cases). Note also that not everything that is to be consumed by fire has the same status of sacrifices (for example, incense).

On the debate over what items can be taken down from the altar, and which must remain here - and then, against the backdrop of the several tannaitic views, the decision was made. With libations in a different category from the offerings themselves, apparently. Also, a new mishnah! Paying new attention to that which became invalidated before bringing them into the courtyard, let alone on the altar... With a specific list, including idolatry, bestiality, and more. Also, the Gemara on this mishnah that addresses 3 exclusions from the altar - as brought in a beraita -- exclusions for which the blood indeed would be brought down. Specifically, assessing Rabbi Yehudah's view.

Given the clear categorization and classification of all of the various factors for the sacrifices, Ullah addresses cases of "kodshim kalim" - when the parts of these offerings were on the offering before the sprinkling of the blood (which was usually necessary to make them suitable for the altar). Plus, a key distinction between animals that were already slaughtered as compared to those that were alive - and already brought to the altar (and then brought down). Also, what about a blemished animal that ended up on the altar? With comparisons brought between bird offerings and animal offerings - specifically, for example, in the case of cataracts. Plus, the timing of placement on the altar - if the blemish precedes the consecration of the specific animal. Also, delving into the details of bestiality - with birds, no less.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

Study Guide In the dispute among the five Tannaim regarding which items remain on the altar even if they have become invalid, Reish Lakish points out cases where there is a practical halakhic difference between the various opinions. According to the Gemara, his novelty lies in one specific case, where he wanted to emphasize that Rabbi Shimon still maintains his position in a case of libations that accompany the sacrifice but were not brought on the same day the sacrifice was offered. There is also a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda regarding which types of disqualifications fall under the rule of "if they have ascended [the altar], they do not descend." The Gemara cites a braita that explains the textual basis for their respective opinions.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Study Guide In the dispute among the five Tannaim regarding which items remain on the altar even if they have become invalid, Reish Lakish points out cases where there is a practical halakhic difference between the various opinions. According to the Gemara, his novelty lies in one specific case, where he wanted to emphasize that Rabbi Shimon still maintains his position in a case of libations that accompany the sacrifice but were not brought on the same day the sacrifice was offered. There is also a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda regarding which types of disqualifications fall under the rule of "if they have ascended [the altar], they do not descend." The Gemara cites a braita that explains the textual basis for their respective opinions.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Study Guide Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim - is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in? Or taken out and brought to the altar and then back to the parochet?   Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon disagree regarding sacrifices whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary. Is the offering disqualified merely by the act of bringing the blood inside, or only if the blood is actually presented on the altar? The Gemara cites sources for each opinion and explains the underlying basis of their debate. Rabbi Yehuda rules that blood brought into the Sanctuary accidentally is exempt from disqualification. But what would he say if the blood was brought in intentionally, would it be disqualified only if it was presented? Rabbi Yirmia introduces a braita to address this question. Items that are disqualified are not meant to be placed on the altar. Yet if they are placed there, the altar sanctifies them and they must remain. However, there is a tannaitic dispute regarding which types of items are not removed once placed on the altar. Five different opinions are presented, and the Gemara explores the reasoning behind each of these views and why they disagree.

In the beginning of this week's Parashat Vayishlach, Ya'akov Avinu is preparing to confront Esav, who wanted to kill him. Rashi tells us that Ya'akov prepared himself in three ways: sending gifts, praying, and strategizing for a potential battle. Why did Rashi list them in this order—placing tefillah second, between sending gifts and preparing for war? The Be'era Parashah explains that Rashi is teaching a fundamental principle about tefillah. Hashem built into the nature of the world that prayer works. And just as giving gifts and preparing for war are normal hishtadlut that people do, so too tefillah operates within the natural order. It is not considered miraculous to have prayers answered. For this reason, the Maharsha writes that although the Gemara teaches that a miracle performed for a person can deduct from his merits, anything attained through tefillah—even the greatest salvations—does not take away any merits, because tefillah is never considered a miracle. This understanding should give us tremendous chizuk. The answering of tefillah is part of how the world was created to function. Tefillot are so powerful that they can change decrees no matter how impossible the odds may appear. Chazal tell us that in Shamayim it had been decreed that Esav would marry Le'ah and Ya'akov would marry Rachel—"the older for the older, and the younger for the younger." The Alshich adds that Le'ah had four overwhelming hurdles preventing her from marrying Ya'akov. First, the heavenly decree had designated her for Esav. Second, the Pasuk testifies to Rachel's beauty. Third, the Pasuk tells us that Ya'akov loved Rachel. And fourth, Ya'akov worked for seven years for Rachel and took great precautions not to be deceived by Lavan. Yet Le'ah prayed so intensely, so persistently, with so many tears that her eyes became tender. And through those tefillot, she overturned the decree and all the natural odds. Chazal say that the greatness of tefillah is such that not only did Le'ah avoid marrying Esav, she even preceded Rachel to marry Ya'akov. And because of those same tefillot, she gave birth to six of the twelve Shevatim—the Bechor, the Kehunah, the Levi'im, the Meluchah, and the lineage of Mashiah—all emerging from her prayers. The Pasuk in Parashat Vayera says that the angels were sent to destroy Sedom while Avraham was still standing before Hashem. The next Pasuk tells us that Avraham prayed for Sedom to be spared. The Seforno explains: even though the decree had already been issued and the angels had already arrived in Sedom, Avraham still prayed, because he understood the ways of Hashem. As Chazal tell us Even if a sharp sword is already touching a person's neck, he should still pray, because tefillah can work no matter how desperate the situation seems. This past year, a woman received the difficult news that she had a tumor, lo 'alenu. At that time, she strengthened herself in guarding her speech and devoted herself to encouraging others to do the same. She was told that she would need the strongest form of chemotherapy. The doctors warned her of every side effect—especially that it was absolutely guaranteed she would lose all her hair. She asked them if there was anything at all she could do to avoid this. Their answer was clear: with the dosage she required, there was a one-hundred-percent certainty she would lose every strand. But she strengthened herself with the knowledge that with Hashem, nothing is fixed. She poured her heart into tefillah—not only for a full recovery, but also that she should not lose any of her hair. Today, Baruch Hashem the tumor has been completely removed. And amazingly, she did not lose even one strand of hair throughout the entire process. The doctors had no explanation. But the explanation is clear. She prayed to the Creator of the world—the One Who decides whether hair falls out or remains. Tefillah is wondrous, and Hashem created it to work as part of the natural order of the world. The more a person recognizes Hashem's power and involvement in every aspect of his life, the deeper, stronger, and more effective his tefillah becomes. Shabbat shalom.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Study Guide Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim - is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in? Or taken out and brought to the altar and then back to the parochet?   Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon disagree regarding sacrifices whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary. Is the offering disqualified merely by the act of bringing the blood inside, or only if the blood is actually presented on the altar? The Gemara cites sources for each opinion and explains the underlying basis of their debate. Rabbi Yehuda rules that blood brought into the Sanctuary accidentally is exempt from disqualification. But what would he say if the blood was brought in intentionally, would it be disqualified only if it was presented? Rabbi Yirmia introduces a braita to address this question. Items that are disqualified are not meant to be placed on the altar. Yet if they are placed there, the altar sanctifies them and they must remain. However, there is a tannaitic dispute regarding which types of items are not removed once placed on the altar. Five different opinions are presented, and the Gemara explores the reasoning behind each of these views and why they disagree.

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

It is not uncommon for a person to feel down about himself when he looks around and notices other people's strengths and talents. He sees that his friends give more charity than he does. He sees that they pray with more concentration. They understand the learning more quickly, and everything seems to come easier for them. And he begins to wonder, "What is my life worth? I have nothing that I excel in." A young man once wrote a painful letter to Rav Shlomo Wolbe about his struggle in yeshivah. He felt everyone else understood the Gemara and shiurim right away, while he worked so hard just to grasp the basics. Others remembered what they learned, while he forgot. He felt he was accomplishing nothing, and it was breaking him. Rav Wolbe wrote back that he was suffering from a bad case of jealousy and explained- Seeing other people's strengths can make a person feel like he has nothing. But if he would only realize what priceless gifts Hashem has given him, his whole outlook would change. A person must know that when it comes to our avodat Hashem, if we use the strengths and weaknesses we were given to serve Hashem, we can reach the highest levels of kedushah. A person's strengths were not given randomly. And his weaknesses were not an accident. They are the exact tools he is meant to have to serve Hashem with. If a person truly knew that Hashem gave him a very specific job and that this is all Hashem wants from him, he would never care what anyone else has. He has a mission that nobody else could ever fulfill. No one else could do his job in this world. We are never measured against what other people do. In fact, if a person was blessed with outstanding talents, that only means he carries greater responsibility. And if he does not use those gifts properly, he will be held more accountable for them. Sometimes the very people we envy are the ones who will face harsher judgment if they fail to live up to their potential. A person should be happy learning the way he knows best. He should be happy praying the way he can. He should be happy giving the amount of tzedakah he is capable of giving. If he fulfills his maximum potential with his own tools, he can reach the same greatness as the greatest people of his generation. But if someone constantly thinks, "Why can't I understand like him?" or "Why can't I remember like him?" he can destroy his entire mission in this world. Shelomo Hamelech taught us that jealousy causes rotting of the bones. It decays a person from the inside. It takes all the beautiful gifts Hashem gave him and makes them rot, because he feels worthless compared to others and stops using them. Instead of building, jealousy paralyzes. Instead of growing, it shrivels. We are in this world for one reason: to serve Hashem. Everything else is secondary. Hashem did not ask us to be someone else. He only asked us to be who He created us to be. And what He gave us is exactly what we need to succeed. If we had what others had, we would be wasting our life. This applies to middot as well. If a person is naturally anxious, it is because that is the area he must refine. If someone is short-tempered, it is because that is the battlefield Hashem gave his neshamah. If someone struggles with motivation or patience or trust, that is not a flaw in the system — it is the system. Hashem is the only One who knows our mission. And He built each of us perfectly to accomplish it. There never was and never will be another person with your exact combination of talents, fears, urges, childhood experiences, temperament, and circumstances. Every detail was planned by our loving Creator who wants us to succeed in the mission that we were sent here to fulfill. Instead of focusing on what everyone else has, we should be thanking Hashem for who we are-because that is the only way we can be successful in this world

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

Study Guide When different bloods are mixed together, how are they brought on the altar? If both sacrifices require the same number of placements, that number is performed, with the assumption that the blood placed on the altar represents a combination of both offerings. However, if the mixture includes blood from a sacrifice requiring one placement and another requiring four, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree on the proper procedure. Why does the Mishna introduce the case of blood from blemished animals mixed with valid blood, when it has already discussed a similar case regarding limbs of blemished animals mixed with valid limbs? The Gemara then cites a Mishna in Parah 9:1, which deals with waters of the red heifer that became mixed with ordinary water. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis dispute whether such water can be used, and if so, in what manner. Three possible explanations are offered to clarify Rabbi Eliezer's position. The Gemara proceeds to challenge these explanations: first, a difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's interpretation, which remains unresolved. Then, five difficulties are posed against Rav Ashi's explanation, drawn from various braitot and our Mishna. Each of these is resolved through the method of ukimta, limiting the ruling to specific circumstances. Finally, one additional difficulty is raised later in the sugya, which remains unresolved.

A long mishnah that begins on daf 79b: More on mixtures of blood - first, that of an animal with no blemish with that of an animal with a blemish. Which necessitates spilling that mixture down the drain. But the cases here recognize the difference between what is ideal and what needs to be tolerated, or is considered acceptable once it has already been done. Which moves the discussion to the question of placing blood in 4 places or only 1 place on the altar - which some of the blood needs the 4 places, and some the 1, which turns into a dispute over "bal tosif" vs. "bal tigra" -- adding or suppressing to the mitzvah. Also, the Gemara discusses a parallel mishnah - where the dispute is about a blemished limb, rather than this mixture issue. Plus, whether these mixtures work to "blend" -- and when can you cover your bases?

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Study Guide When different bloods are mixed together, how are they brought on the altar? If both sacrifices require the same number of placements, that number is performed, with the assumption that the blood placed on the altar represents a combination of both offerings. However, if the mixture includes blood from a sacrifice requiring one placement and another requiring four, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree on the proper procedure. Why does the Mishna introduce the case of blood from blemished animals mixed with valid blood, when it has already discussed a similar case regarding limbs of blemished animals mixed with valid limbs? The Gemara then cites a Mishna in Parah 9:1, which deals with waters of the red heifer that became mixed with ordinary water. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis dispute whether such water can be used, and if so, in what manner. Three possible explanations are offered to clarify Rabbi Eliezer's position. The Gemara proceeds to challenge these explanations: first, a difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's interpretation, which remains unresolved. Then, five difficulties are posed against Rav Ashi's explanation, drawn from various braitot and our Mishna. Each of these is resolved through the method of ukimta, limiting the ruling to specific circumstances. Finally, one additional difficulty is raised later in the sugya, which remains unresolved.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

The Mishna addresses the case of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances: under what circumstances can it still be offered on the altar? If the mixture retains the appearance of blood, it may be brought. If it is mixed with a substance of the same color, such as wine or blood not designated for sacrifice, but had that substance been water the blood would still be recognizable, then the blood is likewise valid for the altar. Rabbi Yehuda, however, rules that blood is not nullified in other blood, since they are of the same essence. Therefore, even if only a minimal amount of sacrificial blood is present in a mixture with other bloods, it may still be sprinkled on the altar. By contrast, if the blood is mixed with disqualified blood, such as the blood that flows after the initial spurt of slaughter, the mixture must be spilled and cannot be used. Rabbi Eliezer permits it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, limits the Mishna's ruling to a case where another substance spilled into the blood. But if blood dripped into water, each drop would be nullified upon contact, immediately rejected from altar service. Once rejected, it cannot later be accepted, even if the majority of the final mixture is blood. This principle of "rejection" applies only to kodashim, not to mitzvot such as the commandment to cover the blood after slaughter. Reish Lakish rules regarding a mixture of pigul and notar: if one eats them together, there is no punishment of lashes. From this, the Gemara derives three principles about mixtures: (1) even forbidden items can nullify one another; (2) the rule that an item imparting taste is considered significant and not nullified is not a Torah law; (3) a warning given in a case of doubt (hatra'at safek) is not considered a valid warning. A difficulty is raised against the second principle. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve it, the derivation is rejected. Reish Lakish was speaking of pigul and notar involving two similar items, i.e. meat and meat, which are nullified by majority since their taste is indistinguishable. Taste is only a factor when dissimilar items are mixed, where the flavor is perceptible. The Gemara then questions: if similar items are nullified by majority, why does the Mishna, in the case of wine and blood, assess whether the wine would be noticeable if it were water? Since both taste and visibility rely on the same concept, it seems the Mishna treats two similar items as if they were different. If so, why not apply the same reasoning to Reish Lakish's case of pigul and notar, viewing them as distinct, and if they impart taste, liability should follow? After one failed attempt to reinterpret the Mishna, the Gemara resolves the difficulty differently: there is a tannaitic dispute. The Mishna reflects Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, while Reish Lakish follows the rabbis. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from a Mishna Mikvaot 10:6. To explain it, one must assume the Mishna is authored by Rabbi Yehuda, since it employs the principle of "we view the item as if…". Yet at the end of the Mishna, purification waters are nullified in a mikveh if the mikveh waters are the majority. This stands in opposition to Rabbi Yehuda's stance that similar items are treated as different and are not nullified based on appearance.