Podcasts about Gemara

If the remainder of the mincha offering becomes impure, lost, or burned before the kometz is offered, according to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua's approaches regarding sacrifices, one can explain what they would each hold on whether the kometz may still be burned. In the case of animal sacrifices, Rabbi Eliezer permits the sprinkling of the blood even if there is no meat left, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua forbids it. Rav explains that Rabbi Yehoshua's restriction only applies if the entire remainder is lost; however, if even a portion remains, the kometz may be burned. This aligns with his view on animal sacrifices - that if even an olive-bulk of meat or sacrificial fats remains, the blood may be sprinkled. Does the kometz require a sacred vessel after being taken from the meal offering, or can it be brought by hand to the altar? Rabbi Shimon and the Sages differ on this requirement, with Rabbi Shimon ruling that a vessel is not required at this stage. The Gemara explores three different approaches to explain the underlying logic of Rabbi Shimon's lenient view, bringing braitot to challenge the different opinions. If the kometz is split into two parts, the Mishna rules that it can be burned in two separate actions. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about whether it can be split into more than two parts. What is the basis of their debate? Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Chanina disagree about the exact point at which the burning of the kometz renders the remainder permitted for consumption.  

The Mishna lists different elements of the mincha and other offerings that are essential. The Gemara delves into the derivations for each of these. Some elements are repeated Torah, and this repetition serves as an indicator that the act must be performed in that specific way. Others are deemed essential due to a specific formulation in the verse - a word that indicates a particular detail is necessary. The Gemara delves into two specific issues related to items on the list. One involves the four species of the lulav. A statement of Rav Chanan bar Rava is brought—that the essential element of the four species is that they be present, but they do not all need to be taken at once. A difficulty is raised against him from a braita that makes clear that the species need to be bound together. This is resolved by explaining that there are two different Tannaitic positions on this, based on whether or not the species are required to be bound. The second issue is the sprinkling of the blood of the Red Heifer, which must be performed while facing the Sanctuary. There are two contradictory braitot: one holds that if the blood is not sprinkled while facing the Sanctuary, it is disqualified, while another holds that it is not. Two resolutions are brought - either each source reflects a different Tannaitic position, or each is addressing a different situation.

Living Emunah 2891 The Power of a Simple Word of Praise When Yitro heard about how Hashem saved the Jewish people from Mitzrayim, he immediately exclaimed, "Baruch Hashem asher hitzil etchem." Baruch Hashem for saving you. As the pasuk says: וַיֹּאמֶר יִתְרוֹ בָּרוּךְ ה' אֲשֶׁר הִצִּיל אֶתְכֶם מִיַּד מִצְרַיִם וּמִיַּד פַּרְעֹה The Gemara says that the Jewish people were held accountable for not saying "Baruch Hashem" before Yitro did. Although they did sing the Az Yashir, the Be'er Yosef explains that they did not praise Hashem specifically for saving them from the dangers of Egypt and Pharaoh. Furthermore, they sang as a group with ruach hakodesh, whereas Yitro said his praise on his own. We have no idea how valuable it is when an individual says even one word of praise to Hashem. The Chachmei Kabbalah, who understand what takes place in the upper worlds, teach us that praising Hashem creates a massive impact in Shamayim. When Hashem is praised here, all the angels gather and praise Him above, and the honor of Hashem becomes glorified in both the upper and lower worlds. In Birkat Hamazon we say, "Ve'al hakol Hashem Elokeinu anachnu modim lach u'mevarchim et shemecha," and the Chesed La'alafim explains these words based on how the Alshich explains the pasuk: כִּי טוֹב חַסְדְּךָ מֵחַיִּים שְׂפָתַי יְשַׁבְּחוּנֶךָּ (תהלים ס״ג:ד)׳ There is a kindness that Hashem does for us that is greater than life itself. What is that kindness? That Hashem gives us the zechut to say His praises. The angels in Heaven wish they could say even one word of praise to Hashem in this world. In Shamayim, Hashem is revealed, and it is obvious that He should be praised. But in this world, Hashem is hidden, and we do not understand His ways. If someone in this world can say one word of praise, it is the greatest zechut. Those who have passed on and now see the glory of Hashem and the value of praising Him wish they could return to this world for just one moment to say one word of praise. This is the meaning of what we say in Birkat Hamazon "Ve'al hakol Hashem Elokeinu anachnu modim lach.... Above all, we thank You, Hashem, for the mitzvah of Birkat Hamazon that You gave us, which consists of praises and thanks for the food we ate, as the Torah commands: וְאָכַלְתָּ וְשָׂבָעְתָּ וּבֵרַכְתָּ אֶת ה' אֱלֹקֶיךָ Through this, Hashem shows us His great love for us. He knows how valuable mitzvot are in this world, and He gives them to us so that He can reward us for all eternity for performing them. A person can give praise to Hashem at any moment, in any language, and in any way he wants. When people are enjoying blessing and goodness, their praises are extremely valuable. But even more so is when a person is going through difficulties or struggles and nevertheless rises up and praises Hashem despite what he is experiencing. Those praises are infinitely greater. Every time we say the words "Baruch Hashem," we are praising Hashem. The Zohar says that the Jewish people could not receive the Torah until Yitro said those words, "Baruch Hashem." How fortunate we are that we can say them at any time. Even if we do not understand the true value of praising Hashem, we should make use of the opportunity to do so as much as we can. Shabbat Shalom

The tzitz (headplate of the Kohen Gadol) effects atonement only for the disqualification of impurity (tum'ah) and not for other disqualifications such as yotzei (sacrificial meat taken outside its boundaries), piggul (improper intent), notar (remnants left past the legal time), or ba'al mum (a blemished animal). Both in the braita and in the discussions of the amoraim, these laws are derived from the biblical verses - establishing that the tzitz atones specifically for impurity and not for other types of disqualifications. The Gemara highlights a contradiction between two braitot: one states that the tzitz atones for an individual's offering only if it occurred inadvertently (shogeg), while the other states that the tzitz atones whether it occurred inadvertently or intentionally (mezid). The Gemara offers four potential solutions to resolve this contradiction, the first of which is rejected.  

The Gemara in Masechet Shabbat (119) speaks of the great merit earned by responding "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" to Kaddish, stating that responding "with all one's strength" has the ability to annul harsh decrees issued against a person. The conventional understanding of this teaching is that it refers to responding with Kavana (concentration), with full attention and emotion. However, Tosafot cite an explanation that the Gemara speaks here of responding in a loud voice. Accordingly, the Shulhan Aruch writes that one should respond to Kaddish both with Kavana, and in a loud voice. Although it is proper to respond to Kaddish out loud, one must ensure not to turn his response into a spectacle. The purpose of Kaddish is to bring glory to Hashem – not to bring glory to oneself. Therefore, if one responds to Kaddish in a manner that brings attention to himself, this undermines the entire purpose of this prayer. Generally speaking, it is improper when responding to the Hazzan's prayer to do so more loudly than the Hazzan. The verse in Tehillim (34:4) states, "Gadelu L'Hashem Iti" – "Give praise to G-d with me," implying that the leader and the congregation should pray together, at the same volume, without trying to drown out each other. Accordingly, when responding to Kaddish, one should ensure not to respond in a louder voice than the Hazzan (or of whoever it is who recites Kaddish). Interestingly, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Jerusalem, 1910-1995) maintained that this Halacha does not apply to the response of "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba." He contended that "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" is not a response to the Hazzan, but rather an independent declaration. Therefore, one may recite "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" even more loudly than the Hazzan. The accepted Halacha, however, does not follow this view, and instead treats "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" as a response, which must therefore not be declared in a louder voice than the Hazzan's. Accordingly, the Kaf Ha'haim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939) writes that the Hazzan or person reciting Kaddish should ensure to say Kaddish loudly, so that the congregation can answer out loud without answering more loudly than him. Summary: One should respond to Kaddish with concentration and in a loud voice, though one should not respond more loudly than the Hazzan (or other person reciting Kaddish). Therefore, one who recites Kaddish should do so loudly, so that the congregation can respond loudly but not more loudly than his recitation.

A Mishna in Chagigah 20b explains that sanctified items placed in the same sanctified vessel are considered combined for purposes of impurity; for example, if a tvul yom touched one, everything else in the vessel would become impure. However, this is only if they are all touching. The sons of Rabbi Chiya asked Rav Kahana if that would hold true even if they weren't touching. Rav Kahana derived from the word "tzeiruf" used in the Mishna there that they would combine. They ask two more related questions and Rav Kahana answers them. Then, Rav Kahana asks them a question about whether combining two items in a bowl, when not touching, would be valid for taking a kemitza (if the dough of the mincha was split into two parts). They attempted to make a comparison between the case in question and the case in our Mishna regarding the two minchas that got mixed together. However, Rava rejects the comparison as it is likely they were touching. Rabbi Yirmia asks a follow-up question about items being connected regarding impurity—in a case where the item is attached through water (in a pipe) to something outside of the vessel. Would the impurity extend to there as well? Or what if the outside piece became impure, would it extend to the other piece in the bowl as well? If a mincha offering was divided and one part became impure and was then added to a bowl with its other half, if a tvul yom then comes and touches the impure half while it is in the bowl with the other, is the other piece impure as well? This is in essence asking whether once something is impure, can impurity be added again? Rava asked this question and Abaye tried to answer it from a Mishna in Keilim 27:9, explaining that there is no such concept that once something is impure it cannot become impure again, but Rava rejects his proof as the cases aren't comparable. The Gemara further tries to prove Abaye's point from the continuation of that Mishna, but that is rejected as well. Rava and Abaye disagree about a case where there are three pieces—two from the original, one of which was lost temporarily, and a third that came to replace the lost half. What is the relationship between the three for laws of impurity and laws of kemitza?

The Gemara in Masechet Shabbat (119) teaches that responding "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" to Kaddish "with all one's strength" has the power to annul harsh decrees. According to some versions of this passage, even if a decree of seventy years of suffering was issued against a person, he can have the decree repealed by answering "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" with all his "strength." The common understanding of this expression – "with all one's strength" – is that it refers to full Kavana (concentration). Answering to Kaddish with concentration, focusing on the meaning of the words, has the power to annul harsh decrees. People often look for effective "Segulot," especially when they are dealing with some kind of problem or crisis, or when they have an important court case or business deal. Unfortunately, they generally overlook what might be the most obvious and most well-documented "Segula" of all – responding to Kaddish with full concentration. No matter what harsh punishment has been decreed against a person, he has the opportunity to have it annulled by responding to Kaddish properly. People who talk during Kaddish need to remember that they can gain far more by concentrating during Kaddish than they do with any conversation they have with their fellow. The "return on investment" for properly concentrating during Kaddish is far greater than we could ever imagine. The Yeser Ha'ra (evil inclination), knowing the great benefits of concentrating on Kaddish, lures a person to disregard Kaddish, and to engage in conversation instead of listening and responding properly. But speaking during Kaddish – even words of Torah! – is strictly forbidden by Halacha, and by doing so, one forfeits the immense rewards that this special prayer offers, and becomes liable to punishment, Heaven forbid. The Bet Yosef brings the story of Rabbi Hama who saw Eliyahu Ha'nabi leading thousands of camels loaded with "anger and wrath," and Eliyahu said that all this anger is for those who engage in conversation during the recitation of Kaddish. And the Kaf Ha'haim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939) cites the Mateh Moshe as relating that a certain Torah scholar had a student who died young, and the student appeared to him in a dream, with an unseemly mark on his forehead. The student explained that this mark was his punishment for speaking during Kaddish. One should not fold his Tallit or Tefillin, or engage in other activity, during the recitation of Kaddish, so that he can fully concentrate on the words. This applies to all the Kaddish recitations – the Kaddishim recited during the prayer service, the Kaddish recited after Torah learning, the Kaddish recited at an Arayat, and so on. Rav Yisrael Bitan cites an opinion that this applies only when one responds, "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba," though Rav Bitan disagrees, and maintains that this is forbidden even while listening to Kaddish. He adds, however, that this is forbidden only through "Da'amiran Be'alma," which is the essential Kaddish. During the remainder of Kaddish, which is a later addition to Kaddish, it is permissible to engage in other activities. If someone fell behind during the prayers, and needs to complete the previous prayer during Kaddish, he should do so only after "Da'amiran Be'alma." Until that point, he should remain silent and respond to the Kaddish. Rav Bitan cites this ruling from the Mishna Berura.

On today's pages, Menachot 21 and 22, the Gemara details the three specific locations in the Temple where salt was stored: the Chamber of Salt, the ramp, and the top of the altar. This logistical precision highlights a deeper truth: that which is important enough to preserve must be stored with intentionality and care. From ancient chambers to your own kitchen counter, how does the way we "house" our essentials change our relationship to them? Listen and find out.

Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.

Numerous sources emphasize the great importance and value of answering to Kaddish. In Masechet Berachot (6b), the Gemara teaches that when Hashem comes into the synagogue and sees that there are fewer than ten men present, "Miyad Hu Ko'es" – He immediately becomes angry. The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) raised the question of why the Gemara adds the word "Miyad" – "immediately." What is added by telling us that G-d's anger is aroused instantly? The Ben Ish Hai answers by suggesting that "Miyad Hu Ko'es" means that Hashem grows angry because of "Yad" – the letters Yod and Dalet. The letter Yod equals 10, alluding to the minimum of ten Kaddishim which one should hear and respond to each day, and Dalet equals 4 – referring to the four recitations of Nakdishach which a person should hear and respond to each day. When people do not come to the Minyan, Hashem becomes angry – even though the people can pray privately, because they cannot respond to Kaddish or Nakdishach. The Gemara in Masechet Sota (49a) states that although the world's condition has been worsening progressively since the Bet Ha'mikdash was destroyed, it is sustained in the merit of the "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" response to Kaddish, and of the recitation of the Kidusha De'sidra (a section of the U'ba Le'sion prayer). Moreover, the Gemara in Masechet Shabbat (119b, according to one version of the text) teaches that if a person was deemed worthy of seventy years of suffering, he can have the decree rescinded in the merit of responding "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" with all his strength. The Gemara further states that the merit of this response can bring a person atonement even for the sin of idolatry. Another passage there in the Gemara teaches that if a person responds "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" with all his strength, the gates of Gan Eden are opened for him. Similarly, the Sefer Hasidim (Rabbenu Yehuda Ha'hasid, Germany, 1150-1217) writes that one who regularly responds "Amen" in this world earns the privilege of doing so also in the world to come. This is alluded to in the verse in Tehillim (89:53), "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen" ("Blessed is G-d forever, Amen and Amen"). The phrase "Amen Ve'amen" alludes to the response of "Amen" both in this world and the next. Another important source is the Gemara's teaching in Masechet Berachot (3a) that when Jews gather in the synagogue and declare, "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba," Hashem exclaims, "Fortunate is the king whose subjects praise him this way!" The Bet Yosef cites the Zohar as explaining that Kaddish is recited in Aramaic, instead of Hebrew, because it has the unique power to oppose the Kelipot ("shells," the harmful spiritual forces). We use the inferior language, Aramaic, so we can attack the Kelipot in their language, as it were, and this has the effect of eliminating the forces of evil from the world. Tosafot (Shabbat 119b) cite a story from the Midrash about Rabbi Yishmael Kohen Gadol, who was shown how the dreadful punishments that are decreed upon Beneh Yisrael are avoided in the merit of the response of "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba." And the Zohar states that the sign of a great Torah scholar is if he fervently looks for opportunities to respond to Kaddish. If a person rushes out of the synagogue before the final Kaddish, then even if he is a scholar, he cannot be considered a true Talmid Hacham. The Gaon of Vilna (1720-1797) writes that those who answer "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" will be spared the suffering from the upheavals that will occur before the arrival of Mashiah. The Mishna Berura cites a passage from the Midrash describing Hashem's reaction when Jews assemble to learn Torah and then recite Kaddish – He turns to angels and exclaims, "See how My children praise me!" Importantly, however, Rav Moshe Zakuta (1625-1697) writes that one must respond "Amen" with Kavana (concentration). If a person answers mindlessly, without paying attention, then he is included, Heaven forbid, in G-d's warning, "U'bozai Yekalu" – that those who disgrace Him will be shamed (Shemuel I 2:30). It is told that Rav Mordechai Gifter (1915-2001), the esteemed Rosh Yeshiva of Telz in Cleveland, once traveled with eight students to Toronto for a wedding. They were altogether nine men, and thus could not form a Minyan, but they assumed that they would have time upon arriving in Toronto to join a Minyan for Minha. As it happened, however, the plane made an emergency landing in some small town between Cleveland and Toronto. The group needed to recite Minha there, despite not having a Minyan. To their astonishment, a worker in the airport approached them as they were starting to pray and informed them that he was Jewish and wished to join them. He could not even read Hebrew, but he told the group that he wanted to recite Kaddish, and he needed their help. They made a Minyan, and helped him recite Kaddish. Afterward, Rav Gifter spoke to him and asked why he, a Jew without any religious background, wished to pray and recite Kaddish. The man explained that his father passed away several days earlier. The night before he met this group in the airport, his father came to him in a dream and told him he needed him to recite Kaddish for him. The man asked his father how he could recite Kaddish, as he lived in a town without a Jewish community. "Don't' worry," his father said, "tomorrow I'll send you a Minyan so you can recite Kaddish." This story demonstrates how everything happens for a purpose, and that nothing is random – but additionally, it teaches us the importance of Kaddish, and the great benefit it brings to the soul of the deceased when the children recite Kaddish.

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The braita initially listed two items offered on the altar that do not require salting: wood and blood. However, the Gemara notes a difficulty: this braita appears to follow the position of Rebbi, yet Rebbi himself maintains that blood does require salting. Consequently, the Gemara emends the text, removing "wood" and replacing it with libations (wine). To support this, a second braita is cited which lists wine, blood, wood, and incense as exempt from salting. Yet, this proof-text presents its own challenge, as it aligns neither with Rebbi (who requires salting for blood) nor with the Rabbis (who require it for incense). Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that this braita follows Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, who uses a different categorization based on the characteristics of a mincha (meal offering) to determine which items require salt. A further challenge on the braita quoted in Menachot 20a is raised. The braita implies that blood is excluded from salting only because of a specific scriptural derivation (drasha). However, according to Zeiri, if blood is salted, it becomes disqualified for use on the altar regardless; if so, why is a drasha necessary to exclude it? To resolve this, the Gemara distinguishes between two levels of salting: a small amount of salt, which might not disqualify the blood but is still excluded by the verse, and a large amount, which renders the blood physically unfit for the altar. This leads to a discussion regarding the status of salted or coagulated blood: is it still considered "blood" enough to be valid for the altar, and conversely, does the prohibition against eating blood still apply to it? A braita is then introduced expounding on the biblical verses regarding salting to derive various procedural laws. These include the type of salt required, the quantity ushttps://five.libsyn.com/showed, and the specific method of application. Another braita clarifies the legal status of salt found in the sanctuary: if salt is found directly on a sacrificial limb, it is considered sanctified and subject to the laws of meila (misappropriation of sacred property). However, if the salt is found on the altar's ramp or on the roof of the altar itself, it does not carry this sanctity. A Mishna in Shekalim states that the rabbis allowed the kohanim to benefit from the salt of the Temple. Shmuel explains that this permission applies only to the kohanim's offerings and not for eating. The Gemara analyzes whether Shmuel meant that salt is permitted only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbidden for the meat the kohanim eat, or if it is permitted for seasoning their sacrificial meat but forbidden for use with non-sacred food. The Gemara initially concludes that since the kohanim were even permitted to use Temple salt for tanning animal hides, they must certainly be allowed to use it to season the holy meat they consume. Under this view, Shmuel's restriction only excludes using the salt for personal, non-sacred food. This is further supported by the logic that if even an Israelite's sacrifice is salted with Temple salt, a kohen's sacrifice surely would be as well, meaning the court's special decree must have addressed something else. However, Rav Mordechai suggests an alternative reading that could reinstate the first possibility: that the court permitted salt only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbade it for the meat the kohanim eat. He explains that the Mishna's decree was specifically necessary to account for the position of Ben Buchri, as will be explained further on.

On today's pages, Menachot 19 and 20, the Gemara explores the legal weight of a single conjunction, asking how the word "and" can transform the requirements of a Temple sacrifice. Through the divergent readings of Rabbi Shimon and the Sages, we see that the difference between a valid offering and a disqualified one often hangs on the placement of a comma or the reach of a pronoun. How can learning to read between the lines of an ancient law help us find more clarity in the complex narratives of our own lives? Listen and find out.

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

There are several different kinds of Kaddish, the first of which is commonly known as "Hasi Kaddish" – "half-Kaddish." The term "Hasi Kaddish" is actually a misnomer, as the text of this Kaddish is in fact the complete original text, composed either by the Ansheh Kenesset Ha'gedola (Men of the Great Assembly) at the beginning of the Second Commonwealth, or several generations later, by the Tanna'im. The prayers added to the other Kaddish texts were introduced later, during the period of the Geonim or the period of the Rishonim. These other texts are known to us as "Kaddish Titkabal," "Kaddish Yeheh Shelama," and "Kaddish Al Yisrael" (which is also referred to as "Kaddish De'Rabbanan"). "Kaddish Titkabal" includes a request that our prayers be answered, and it is recited after the Amida prayer, and after Shelihot. "Kaddish Yeheh Shelama" is said after the recitation of a text of Torah She'bi'chtab (Tanach), such as following an Arayat. Finally, "Kaddish Al Yisrael" is recited after a session of studying Torah She'be'al Peh (the oral Torah), such as Mishna or Gemara. This text contains a prayer for the wellbeing of the Torah scholars and their students (which is why this Kaddish is also known as "Kaddish De'Rabbanan" – the Rabbis' Kaddish). We recite this Kaddish in the morning after the Korbanot section, which includes the Mishnayot of "Ezehu Mekoman" and the Berayta of Rabbi Yishmael. It is recited again at the end of the prayer service, following the recitation of the Ketoret text which includes passages from the Gemara. This final "Kaddish Al Yisrael" after the Ketoret is known as "Kaddish Yatom" – the mourner's Kaddish, as it is recited by those in mourning for a parent. The Arizal taught that the recitation of this Kaddish by a mourner has the ability to extricate the parent from Gehinnom and bring him or her to Gan Eden. These final three Kaddish texts conclude with a prayer for peace and material blessings. The Rabbis explain that we first pray that "Yitgadal Ve'yitkadash Shemeh Rabba" – that G-d's Name should be glorified and become known throughout the world, before proceeding to ask for our personal needs. This is based on the concept that we must first pray for G-d's sake, so-to-speak, for the glory of His Name, and in this merit our personal requests will be granted. The Tur (Rabbenu Yaakob Ben Asher, Germany-Spain, 1269-1343) brings a teaching of the Midrash that if a person includes in his prayers the plea that Hashem should act for the sake of His Name ("Aseh Lema'an Shemecha, Aseh Lema'an Yeminecha…"), then he will be given the merit to greet the Shechina. We should pray not only for our own benefit, but also for the sake of the glorification of G-d's Name. This notion is alluded to in the first four words of Kaddish – "Yitgadal Ve'yitkadash Shemeh Rabba." These words begin with the letters Yod, Vav, Shin and Resh, which have the combined numerical value of 516. The Sages teach that Moshe Rabbenu prayed 515 times for the privilege of entering the Land of Israel, whereupon G-d commanded him to stop praying. Some commentators explain that Moshe was told to stop because if he had recited a 516 th prayer, then his prayer would have been accepted (and it was decreed that Moshe must not go into the land). Moshe prayed solely for the purpose of "Yitgadal Ve'yitkadash Shemeh Rabba," for the sake of the glorification of the divine Name, and not for his personal benefit, and his prayer therefore would have deserved to be accepted. When our intentions are sincere, when we pray for our needs so we can succeed in our mission in the world, the mission of bringing honor to the Almighty, then we are worthy of having our prayers answered.

Wherever you have the word "torah" (meaning, law, not the Torah in total) and the word "chukah" (meaning, statute) - then the capacity to invalidate the offering kicks in . But does that mean either/or or both? It certainly sounds like both - but the Gemara tracks it through and either/or sounds better by the end... Plus, the list of occasions or specific categories of people for which these terms are present in context in the Torah. Also, scriptural repetition about the requirements of the grain-offering establishes those details (where the repetition takes place) as essential. But the offering itself must be a permanent one for this essential status. Until the case where temporary status seems not to be a problem, in light of the number of repetitions...?

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved. The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance. The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed. The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi  Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion.

If one has intent to leave blood over from an animal sacrifice, does everyone agree that doing so would invalidate the offering? The Tannaim hash it out - with a focus on Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua. With a lot of heartfelt drama in the details of this passage. Also, a new mishnah: If you didn't do a whole slew of the tasks associated with the grain-offering, the tasks on that list won't invalidate the offering. Plus, the Gemara that delves into the specifics of those tasks, and why those details matter to preserve the validity of the offerings. And more on the Temple service for the shelamim - peace-offerings too. Plus, the 15 tasks associated with these grain-offerings all together.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved. The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance. The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed. The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi  Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion.

On today's page, Menachot 17, we encounter the "spicy ones" of Pumbedita and a fascinating debate over two distinct models of intellectual excellence. The Gemara tells a story of three legendary sages who find themselves exhausted and frustrated by a brilliant but temperamental colleague whose sharp mind makes him nearly impossible to follow. It serves as a timeless reminder that while "uprooting mountains" is impressive, the stability of the "Sinai" model is what actually allows for a sustained, inclusive conversation. Is it possible to be too smart for the good of the community? Listen and find out.

The Aruch Ha'shulhan (Rav Yechiel Michel Epstein, 1829-1908) writes that the text of the Kaddish prayer was likely written by the Ansheh Kenesset Ha'gedola ("Men of the Great Assembly") during the first years of the Second Commonwealth. This prayer expresses the wish that G-d's Name should be glorified and become known throughout the world. The destruction of the first Bet Ha'mikdash marked a grave Hilul Hashem – desecration of G-d's Name – and so when Jews returned to their land and began rebuilding the Temple, the Rabbis composed this special prayer that the glory of G-d's Name should be restored. The Yalkut Yosef (Hebrew edition) notes that this theory might be supported by the Gemara's comment (Berachot 33a) that our prayers and blessings were written by the Ansheh Kenesset Ha'gedola. However, as noted by Rav Yisrael Bitan, the Gemara did not specifically mention Kaddish, and thus this proof is not conclusive. In any event, this is the opinion followed also by Rav Shlomo of Worms (Germany, d. 1096), in his Siddur. He explains that after seventy years in Babylonian exile, the Jews' primary language was Aramaic, instead of Hebrew, and for this reason the Kaddish text was written in Aramaic. A different view is presented by the Orhot Haim (Rav Aharon of Lunel, late 13 th -early 14 th century), who maintained that the Kaddish text was written several generations later, by the Tanna'im. The unique significance of the Kaddish prayer, and its precious value, is clearly expressed in several passages in the Gemara. In Masechet Berachot (3a), the Gemara tells that Rabbi Yossi was once traveling and stopped to pray in one of the ruins of Jerusalem. While he was there, he heard a voice weeping and lamenting, "Woe unto the children because of whose iniquities I destroyed My home, burned My sanctuary, and exiled them among the nations." Afterward, he was informed by Eliyahu the Prophet that this cry is sounded three times each day. However, Eliyahu added, when Jews assemble in synagogues and study halls and pronounce in Kaddish, "Yeheh Shemeh," the Almighty "nods His head," so-to-speak, and regrets having driven the Jewish People into exile. The Kaddish recitation thus arouses G-d's love and compassion, and brings the final redemption closer. Moreover, the Gemara teaches in Masechet Shabbat (119b) that if one answers "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba" with all his might, harsh decrees that were issued against him are rescinded. And the Gemara states in Masechet Sota (49a) that since the destruction of the Bet Ha'mikdash, the world's condition has been increasingly worsening, yet the world survives in the merit of "Kiddusha De'sidra" and the Kaddish recited after Torah study. ("Kiddusha De'sidra" refers to the section known to us as "U'ba Le'sion," when we cite several verses followed by their Aramaic translation.) Rav Amram Gaon (9 th century) tells that Rabbi Yishmael was once shown by an angel the horrific tragedies that were decreed to befall the Jewish People. The angel explained that new decrees are issued against the Jews every day, but these decrees are left unfulfilled in the merit of the Jews' recitation of "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba." There was once a member of our community who suffered a stroke, and the family, who heard of the great power of Kaddish to annul harsh decrees, brought a Minyan to the rehabilitation center. They prayed there with the patient, ensuring to have special Kavana (concentration) when responding "Yeheh Shemeh Rabba." The patient quickly recovered, returned to work, and lived for many years – a clear demonstration of the special power of Kaddish.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

On today's page, Menachot 16, we explore the disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Meir over what constitutes a "disqualified" intention. In a culture obsessed with metrics and return on investment, the Gemara offers a different way to live: by mastering every minute detail until we are fully immersed in the task. How does focusing on the small things help us re-enchant a world that often feels broken? Listen and find out.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is effective to permit the other (pure) bread to be eaten. But if it does not atone for food items, the blood can be sprinkled, but since the bread was not complete at the time, it is forbidden to eat, as per Rabbi Yochanan's opinion in Menachot 9b. However, Rav Papa's explanation is rejected on three counts. First, Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis also disagree in a case where the item that was to be offered on the altar becomes impure. Second, Rabbi Yehuda's position by the Paschal sacrifice, as appears in the braita, demonstrates that the phrase "the communal offerings are not divided" has no connection at all to the tzitz atoning. Third, the Mishna states explicitly the reason for Rabbi Yehuda's position and it is because the communal offerings are not divided and not on account of the tzitz. In a thanksgiving (toda) offering, if there is a pigul thought about the meat, the breads are disqualified, but a pigul thought about the bread only disqualifies the bread, but not the meat. The same holds true for the two sheep regarding the accompanying breads. After attempting one explanation, which is rejected, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind the law – the bread comes on account of the animal offering, but the animal offering does not come on account of the bread. Both cases were necessary to bring, as one may have thought that the sheep and the accompanying breads are waved together and therefore might be considered completely one unit, but they are not. There are three different versions of a question Rabbi Elazar asked Rav. The first version: if one slaughters the animal for the toda offering with a thought to eat a half an olive-bulk of the meat and half an olive-bulk of the bread, do they combine to make the bread pigul? Rav answers that it is. The Gemara asks why a kal v'chomer reasoning isn't employed to lead us to say that the bread wouldn't be pigul, as it cannot even make the meat pigul. A difficulty is raised against that suggestion as in a similar situation regarding mixed breeds in a vineyard, that kind of kal v'chomer isn't used. But they distinguish between the two cases, resolving the difficulty. The second version has the same type question asked but regarding the two sheep offering and the accompanying breads. The third version of the question is about the meaning of someone's language if they slaughtered the sheep to "eat an olive-bulk of its friend tomorrow." Does "its friend" refer to the other sheep (it would not be pigul, as the sheep is a "permitter") or to the bread (it would be pigul as bread is not a "permitter")? Rav brings a tannaitic source which makes it clear that the meaning was the other sheep. The Gemara rejects this proof of Rav. What is the relationship between the sacrifice and its libations regarding pigul? Rabbi Meir holds that if the libations were already placed in a sanctified vessel and the sacrifice is brought with a pigul intent, the libations are disqualified as well. But a pigul thought regarding the libations only disqualifies the libation, not the sacrifice. In the Tosefta Zevachim 5:1, the rabbis bring counter arguments to Rabbi Meir. First, they view the libations as completely separate and do not agree with Rabbi Meir that they become disqualified if the sacrifice becomes pigul, as they can be brought up to ten days later. When Rabbi Meir qualifies his ruling to a case where the libations are brought together with the offering, the rabbis continue with another claim. Since the libations can be designated to a different sacrifice, that proves that they are not inherently connected. Rava explains that Rabbi Meir must have held that the libations cannot be designated for a different sacrifice. In the Tosefta, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree as well regarding the oil of the leper – if the guilt offering becomes pigul, does the oil become pigul as well, and the same discussion ensues.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Rabbi Yosi and the rabbis debate in the Mishna whether a pigul thought about eating one of the two loaves, while slaughtering both sheep of the Shavuot offering, would render only one loaf pigul or both. Rav Huna explains that Rabbi Yosi, who held that only one loaf is disqualified, would hold the same for a pigul thought about one limb of an animal sacrifice - and only that limb, and not the others, would be pigul. The Gemara brings a braita as a difficulty against Rav Huna. Since the braita cannot be explained according to the rabbis, it can only be explained according to Rabbi Yosi; however, the braita shows that the two breads combine to a requisite amount of an olive-bulk. That implies that the breads are viewed as one unit, and all the more so regarding parts of an animal's body. They attempt to emend the braita to fit with the rabbis' position, but that attempt is rejected due to the language of the braita. Rav Ashi and Ravina each raise difficulties for Rav Huna's position from other tannaitic sources. Rabbi Yochanan explains Rabbi Yosi's position and finds a way to reconcile it with the braita as well, by using drashot on the verses that lead to halakhot regarding the breads, which show that sometimes they are viewed as one unit and sometimes as two. Likewise, in the Mishna and braita—if the kohen does not combine them in his thoughts, they are treated as separate. If he does, they are considered combined. A braita explains that a thought during slaughtering can combine with a thought about sprinkling the blood to reach a requisite amount. A difficulty is raised from a braita of Levi. Rava tries to reconcile the braita with Rebbi's position, but Abaye rejects his suggestion. Even though a difficulty is raised against Abaye, he resolves it.  

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Learn a daily class on a Daf of Gemara, the perfect Daf Yomi class; clear and engaging shiurim from Rabbi Avraham Meyer Zajac. Or browse the series for classes on any Masechta and tractate of your choice.

Study Guide The Mishna states that an intent to eat half an olive-bulk and an intent to burn half an olive-bulk do not combine to create a status of pigul. The Gemara infers from this Mishna that two intents regarding eating - one concerning an item meant to be eaten and one concerning an item not meant to be eaten - would indeed combine to render the item pigul. This inference, however, contradicts the previous Mishna. Rabbi Yirmia simply rules that this Mishna follows a different opinion than the previous one, while Abaye rejects the inference entirely. The second chapter begins with a debate between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis regarding whether a pigul thought about burning the incense beyond the proper time would disqualify the mincha and render the remainder pigul. Reish Lakish explains the basis for Rabbi Yosi's position, that it is not pigul, as he holds that one permitter (matir) cannot turn another matir into pigul. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's explanation, but it is ultimately resolved. Rabbi Yannai rules that a kohen must collect the frankincense, and if this was performed by a non-kohen, it is disqualified. Rabbi Yirmia explains the reasoning by comparing it to holacha (conveying the offering to the altar), which requires a kohen. A difficulty is raised against this comparison, but it is resolved. Rav Meri brings a proof for Rabbi Yannai, but it is rejected. The Mishna raises a debate concerning offerings that consist of several parts—such as the two lambs and two loaves of bread (on Shavuot) or the two bowls of frankincense and two sets of six loaves of the showbread (Lechem HaPanim). The question is whether pigul thoughts during the sacrificing of the lambs or the burning of the frankincense regarding only a portion of the bread (e.g., one of the loaves) render all the loaves pigul.