Podcasts about gricean

One of the pivotal issues in contemporary philosophy of language is the nature of linguistic meaning: what is it in virtue of which a word or a phrase has a specific linguistic meaning it actually does? A foundational theory of meaning aims to provide a systematic answer to this question. Although this question has not been explicitly raised in Shiite uṣūl al-fiqh, the uṣūlīs have long been concerned with a related problem, namely, the nature of convention (waḍʿ), and have proposed several theories in this regard. It seems that by “waḍʿ,” the uṣūlīs mean (at least implicitly) the process or condition that bestows words and phrases with their meanings. Thus, from the uṣūlīs' theories of convention, we can infer their foundational theories of meaning, even if these theories are not explicitly formulated in uṣūl texts. One prominent uṣūlī theory of convention is the commitment (taʿahhud) theory, proposed by Nahāvandī (d. 1322), Ḥā'irī (d. 1355), Isfihānī (d. 1362), and most notably Khūʾī (d. 1413), among others. Given the close connection between the notions of convention and linguistic meaning in uṣūl al-fiqh, we can construct a foundational theory of meaning from the commitment theory of convention. At first approximation, such a theory of meaning runs as follows: Commitment Theory of Meaning: S means M in a group G if and only if the members of G are committed that whenever they intend to induce M (or induce a particular attitude relevant to M) in their audience, they utter S. This formulation is a schematic statement; depending on whether S is a word, a declarative sentence, or a non-declarative sentence, the parenthetic phrase (namely, “induce a particular attitude relevant to M”) will take a more specific form. The commitment theory of meaning is particularly interesting as it closely aligns with the basic idea of use theories of meaning, especially the intention-based theory of meaning developed by Paul Grice. In this paper, I will provide a detailed comparison between the commitment theory of meaning and the Gricean theory of meaning. I will then argue that although the commitment theory of meaning represents a significant step towards a sophisticated theory of meaning in uṣūl al-fiqh, it suffers from important problems in its accounts of both word meaning and sentence meaning. As we shall see, the Gricean theory of meaning fares better regarding at least some of these criticisms. Finally, I will tentatively propose that the notion of commitment might be employed in the context of William Alston's theory of meaning (another form of the use theory of meaning) to shed light on the nature of illocutionary rules.

François RecanatiPhilosophie du langage et de l'espritCollège de FranceAnnée 2023-2024Colloque - The Social World: Foundational Issues - On the Mood for FictionIntervenant(s)Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, université de BarceloneRésuméHow should we think of the utterances that convey (literary) fictions? Searle (1974/5) (and before him MacDonald (1954), with better arguments) influentially argues that they are (non-deceptive) mere pretense – the simulation of acts like assertions or questions. They don't constitute sui generis, dedicated representational practices of a specific kind, fictionalizing, on a par with assertions or questions. This has been the standard view in analytic philosophy until the 1990s, casually endorsed already by Frege, and then by many others like Austin, Kripke and van Inwagen. Even though authors including Alward (2009), Predelli (2019, 2020), and Recanati (2021) still endorse the view, Walton (1990) and others provide in my view decisive objections (cf. in particular de Gaynesford 2009), mostly predicated on its lack of explanatory power for different aspects of fictionality that good theories should and can provide. Walton himself also rejects views of the kind MacDonald and Searle question, which take fictionalizing to be a sui generis speech act, but his arguments are uncompelling; Currie (1990) nicely articulated one such account inside a Gricean framework, showing its explanatory power. Recently other writers have argued that a more conventionalist, Austinian framework provides better accounts, including García-Carpintero (2013), Abell (2020) and Bergman & Franzén (2022). While following Currie I suggested classifying speech acts of fictionalizing as directives, the latter authors defend classifying them as declarations – like giving out players, naming ships or sentencing offenders. In my paper I'll question the declaration view, but I'll also explore another alternative to the directive account, by considering whether fictionalizings are a variety of constative act, along lines that Predelli (1997), Recanati (2000), and Reimer (2005) have theorized.Manuel García-Carpintero a obtenu son doctorat à l'université de Barcelone, où il enseigne depuis. Il travaille dans le domaine de la philosophie du langage et de l'esprit, ainsi que sur des questions épistémologiques et métaphysiques connexes. Il termine actuellement un livre sous contrat avec Oxford University Press sur la nature des actes de langage en général et de l'assertion en particulier, intitulé Tell Me What You Know.Ce colloque international se tient en prélude à la soutenance de thèse de Maryam Ebrahimi Dinani, assistante de recherche du Pr Recanati. Il réunit deux des membres du jury (Kathrin Koslicki, de l'Université de Neuchâtel, et Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, de l'Université de Barcelone) et deux invités (Indrek Reiland, de l'Université de Vienne, et Olivier Massin, de l'Université de Neuchâtel), sous la présidence de Kevin Mulligan, de l'Université de Genève.

In today's pod-meal, Myq live-streams while recording and introduces a new segment called "out-of-context comments"! Thanks to all who listened live, and also thanks all who listen UN-live. UN-live listeners keep this podcast Alive! Also covered: names, nicknames, some of Myq's high school and junior high teachers and fellow students and various hijinks (at least one hijink), his dear friend Liz Glazer, Gricean maxims, and this fun sentence: "tune in tomorrow to find out what happened two days ago!"

In this Advanced English conversation, we talk about the Gricean Maxims for better conversation. The Four Grice principles are quality, quantity, relation, and manner. We discuss all Grice Maxims in detail, give examples of each, and share how to practice these principles in real conversations. And don't forget to check out our website for the writeup and podcast of this lesson: https://advancedenglish.co/blog/vrk1iwzi/gricean-maxims-examples-and-how-to-have-a-better-conversation --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/advanced_english/support

Wherein we talk a LOT. Jump right to: 1:50 The International Phonetic Alphabet 30:59 Corrections 36:08 Question 1: Computer languages: Are they languages (in a linguistic sense)? They have rules, syntax, even dialects. They can express certain complex ideas better than English, but they cannot (easily) express arbitrary ideas. 44:50 Question 2: What causes a compound word like ‘bluebird' (a bird that is blue) to become bahuvrihi like ‘Blackbeard' (not a beard that is black, but someone who has a black beard)? 58:31 Question 3: If you could snap your fingers and know a new language, what would it be? (Like taking a point in D&D linguistics, you know the language as if you were a native speaker.) No rules, no restrictions (unless you want to pick one per category: real, commonly used; real, uncommonly used; real, dead; fake movie language; conlang). 1:10:55 Last week's puzzler's answer 1:12:50 The new puzzler: Three incandescent lightbulbs in a room, three lightswitches outside the room. You can look inside the room once and only once, after which you must decide which lightswitch controls which lightbulb. Covered in this episode: The IPA (developed by the IPA) ≠ an IPA, although Eli occasionally enjoys the latter too ɹ, ə, æ, ʃ, Ʒ, ŋ, œ Apple's consistent failing of linguists Cursive IPA, which apparently exists How to learn IPA “Bendy banana vowels” Diphthong? Dip-thong? Dip-tong? It's up to you, really Computer languages have semantics but not pragmatics A return of Gricean maxims having relevance (so to speak) Compound words in Dutch versus in English The gradual squishing-together of English compound words “Website” is a single word, congrats to the AP style guide on finally joining the 21st century Grilled cheese is not made on a barbeque Agglutinative vs polysynthetic mostly means “where do you put the spaces” Producer Jenny with the LOTR linguistic hot take Producer Jenny with the (basic) elvish linguistic history Zulu is neat and has interesting noun classes/gender-that-isn't-gender Sign languages are awesome and should have more research done on them!! Also ASL is just a very useful second language in the US This podcast exists because of Diane Duane's Young Wizards series on multiple levels and y'all should read it (or listen! The audiobooks are so good!) Links and other post-show thoughts: IPA chart the Summer Institute of Linguistics cursive IPA totally was a thing typeit.org, and the Patreon Agglutinative vs polysynthetic languages and more! The Elvish languages mentioned: Quenya, Sindarin, and their shared ancestor, Common Eldarin (i.e., basically, “language of the elves”) Native Listening The Car Talk puzzle source Ask us questions: Send your questions (text or voice memo) to questions@linguisticsafterdark.com, or find us as @lxadpodcast on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook. Credits: Linguistics After Dark is produced by Emfozzing Enterprises. Eli edits, Sarah and Jenny transcribe and do show notes. Our music is “Covert Affair” by Kevin MacLeod. And until next time… if you weren't aware of your tongue in your mouth, now you are :)

Learn about Grice's Maxims as a guide to better conversation. Learn the 4 principles pf polite conversation so you can communicate with clarity and conversation. Using these conversation strategies you will notice an improvement in your communication and conversation skills.

– Would you like some coffee? – Coffee would keep me awake. Does that mean yes coffee, or no coffee? It depends! Is it the morning or the evening? Is the person trying to pull an all-nighter or take an afternoon nap? A computer looking strictly at the meanings of the words would be confused, but we humans do this kind of thing all the time without even noticing it. In episode 11 of Lingthusiasm, your hosts Gretchen McCulloch and Lauren Gawne talk about the hidden assumptions of cooperation that we bring to every conversation. They were formulated by the linguist Paul Grice, and are known as the Cooperative Principle or Grice’s Maxims. Not only does stating these assumptions explicitly help us understand conversations where we exchange messages beyond the literal meaning of our words, but it also explains a lot of humour – many jokes rely on creative flouting of Gricean Maxims! This month’s Patreon bonus was about language play: games like Pig Latin, rhyming slang, and Verlan, as nominated and voted on by our patrons. You can get access to it and previous bonuses about hypercorrection, the doggo meme, swearing, teaching yourself linguistics, and explaining linguistics to employers by supporting Lingthusiasm on Patreon. http://patreon.com/lingthusiasm We hit our next funding goal shortly after recording this episode, which will allow us to start bringing on guest linguists, so stay tuned for more info on upcoming interviews! For the links mentioned in this episode, check out our shownotes page at: http://lingthusiasm.com/post/164303700686/lingthusiasm-episode-11-layers-of-meaning

Sometimes we have to depend on philosophy to explain to us why something apparently simple is in fact extremely complicated. The way we use referring expressions – things that pick out the entities we want to talk about, such as “Mary”, or “that guy over there” – falls into this category, but is no longer just a matter for the philosophers; it's complicated enough to require highly interdisciplinary explanation. In his book, Computational Models of Referring: A Study in Cognitive Science (MIT Press, 2016) Kees van Deemter approaches the problem from a computational angle, asking how we can develop algorithms to produce referring expressions that are communicatively successful, efficient, and potentially even human-like in their performance. He draws on a broad range of work from across cognitive science to address this question, and in doing so, also gives us an excellent example of how computational thinking can inform linguistic theorising. In this interview, we discuss several aspects of this work, including the role (and limitations) of the Gricean maxims, the challenge of audience design and shared knowledge, and how the salience of different properties of an entity can and does enter systematically into our choice of referring expression. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/psychology

Sometimes we have to depend on philosophy to explain to us why something apparently simple is in fact extremely complicated. The way we use referring expressions – things that pick out the entities we want to talk about, such as “Mary”, or “that guy over there” – falls into this category, but is no longer just a matter for the philosophers; it’s complicated enough to require highly interdisciplinary explanation. In his book, Computational Models of Referring: A Study in Cognitive Science (MIT Press, 2016) Kees van Deemter approaches the problem from a computational angle, asking how we can develop algorithms to produce referring expressions that are communicatively successful, efficient, and potentially even human-like in their performance. He draws on a broad range of work from across cognitive science to address this question, and in doing so, also gives us an excellent example of how computational thinking can inform linguistic theorising. In this interview, we discuss several aspects of this work, including the role (and limitations) of the Gricean maxims, the challenge of audience design and shared knowledge, and how the salience of different properties of an entity can and does enter systematically into our choice of referring expression. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Sometimes we have to depend on philosophy to explain to us why something apparently simple is in fact extremely complicated. The way we use referring expressions – things that pick out the entities we want to talk about, such as “Mary”, or “that guy over there” – falls into this category, but is no longer just a matter for the philosophers; it’s complicated enough to require highly interdisciplinary explanation. In his book, Computational Models of Referring: A Study in Cognitive Science (MIT Press, 2016) Kees van Deemter approaches the problem from a computational angle, asking how we can develop algorithms to produce referring expressions that are communicatively successful, efficient, and potentially even human-like in their performance. He draws on a broad range of work from across cognitive science to address this question, and in doing so, also gives us an excellent example of how computational thinking can inform linguistic theorising. In this interview, we discuss several aspects of this work, including the role (and limitations) of the Gricean maxims, the challenge of audience design and shared knowledge, and how the salience of different properties of an entity can and does enter systematically into our choice of referring expression. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

David Etlin (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (21 November, 2013) titled "Vague Desire: The Sorites and the Money Pump". Abstract: The similarity between the sorites paradox of vagueness and the money pump of decision theory has been noted by Dummett (in "Wang's Paradox"), but the connection has not been widely recognized or developed. We argue that on one plausible philosophical theory of linguistic meaning, the Gricean intention based account (as developed in Schiffer's "Meaning"), the paradox of vagueness turn out to be a puzzle about intransitive preferences. Given this, one can solve the sorites paradox by diagnosing the appealing but mistaken principle connecting preference and choice leading to the money pump. We argue for a resolution of the money pump having consequences not only for diachronic principles of rational choice, but also the standard synchronic principle of rationalizable actions. Our approach to vagueness helps overcome worries about the arbitrariness of rejecting instances of the sorites step, and also supports a treatment of vague expressions that don't immediately lend themselves to soritical reasoning.

The recognition of speech acts – classically, things like stating, requesting, promising, and so on – sometimes seems like a curiously neglected topic in the psychology of language. This is odd for several reasons. For one, there's a rich philosophical tradition devoted to the topic. For another, it's in many ways a really classic linguistic problem: one of those things that speakers can do effortlessly, but for which it's extremely hard to explain how. With his new book From Utterances to Speech Acts (Cambridge University Press, 2013), Mikhail Kissine offers a stimulating contribution to the debate. His approach aims to identify certain broad classes of speech act with communicative processes that are genuinely fundamental to human interaction (not merely cultural creations). Moreover, it aims to account for the recognition of speech acts in a way that obviates the need for the classically Gricean process of multi-layered intention attribution: which, as we discuss, has the potential to explain how individuals with deficits in ‘mind-reading' can nevertheless grasp the intended purpose of ambiguous utterances. In this interview, we also discuss the major philosophical and practical contributions of this approach, and explore the consequences of it for our views of the nature of human-human communication.

The recognition of speech acts – classically, things like stating, requesting, promising, and so on – sometimes seems like a curiously neglected topic in the psychology of language. This is odd for several reasons. For one, there’s a rich philosophical tradition devoted to the topic. For another, it’s in many ways a really classic linguistic problem: one of those things that speakers can do effortlessly, but for which it’s extremely hard to explain how. With his new book From Utterances to Speech Acts (Cambridge University Press, 2013), Mikhail Kissine offers a stimulating contribution to the debate. His approach aims to identify certain broad classes of speech act with communicative processes that are genuinely fundamental to human interaction (not merely cultural creations). Moreover, it aims to account for the recognition of speech acts in a way that obviates the need for the classically Gricean process of multi-layered intention attribution: which, as we discuss, has the potential to explain how individuals with deficits in ‘mind-reading’ can nevertheless grasp the intended purpose of ambiguous utterances. In this interview, we also discuss the major philosophical and practical contributions of this approach, and explore the consequences of it for our views of the nature of human-human communication. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The recognition of speech acts – classically, things like stating, requesting, promising, and so on – sometimes seems like a curiously neglected topic in the psychology of language. This is odd for several reasons. For one, there’s a rich philosophical tradition devoted to the topic. For another, it’s in many ways a really classic linguistic problem: one of those things that speakers can do effortlessly, but for which it’s extremely hard to explain how. With his new book From Utterances to Speech Acts (Cambridge University Press, 2013), Mikhail Kissine offers a stimulating contribution to the debate. His approach aims to identify certain broad classes of speech act with communicative processes that are genuinely fundamental to human interaction (not merely cultural creations). Moreover, it aims to account for the recognition of speech acts in a way that obviates the need for the classically Gricean process of multi-layered intention attribution: which, as we discuss, has the potential to explain how individuals with deficits in ‘mind-reading’ can nevertheless grasp the intended purpose of ambiguous utterances. In this interview, we also discuss the major philosophical and practical contributions of this approach, and explore the consequences of it for our views of the nature of human-human communication. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

It's now well over 100 years since John Stuart Mill noted that, if I say “I saw some of your children today”, you get the impression that I didn't see all of them. This idea – that what we don't say can also carry meaning – was fleshed out 50 years ago by Paul Grice. Given the timeframe involved, you might be tempted to ask why we're still working on this today. (I work in this area myself, and I'm often tempted to ask…) Bart Geurts‘s engaging book Quantity Implicatures (Cambridge University Press, 2011) answers this question in several ways. For one thing, as the author observes, inferences of this type are very widespread in day-to-day interaction. For another, as this book also makes clear, some of these inferences are difficult to explain systematically, and this difficulty has begotten a wide range of contrasting and conflicting theories that make competing claims about the nature of pragmatics (and semantics) in general. In this interview, Geurts discusses the evidence that leads him to favour a Gricean view over a conventionalist account (one in which the richer meanings have the status of linguistic conventions), but also why he thinks the precise direction of recent Gricean approaches is not quite right. Following the trajectory of the book, we go on to look at more complex expressions, and discuss why these sometimes exotic constructions might enable progress to be made in distinguishing correct from incorrect theories.

It’s now well over 100 years since John Stuart Mill noted that, if I say “I saw some of your children today”, you get the impression that I didn’t see all of them. This idea – that what we don’t say can also carry meaning – was fleshed out 50 years ago by Paul Grice. Given the timeframe involved, you might be tempted to ask why we’re still working on this today. (I work in this area myself, and I’m often tempted to ask…) Bart Geurts‘s engaging book Quantity Implicatures (Cambridge University Press, 2011) answers this question in several ways. For one thing, as the author observes, inferences of this type are very widespread in day-to-day interaction. For another, as this book also makes clear, some of these inferences are difficult to explain systematically, and this difficulty has begotten a wide range of contrasting and conflicting theories that make competing claims about the nature of pragmatics (and semantics) in general. In this interview, Geurts discusses the evidence that leads him to favour a Gricean view over a conventionalist account (one in which the richer meanings have the status of linguistic conventions), but also why he thinks the precise direction of recent Gricean approaches is not quite right. Following the trajectory of the book, we go on to look at more complex expressions, and discuss why these sometimes exotic constructions might enable progress to be made in distinguishing correct from incorrect theories. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

It’s now well over 100 years since John Stuart Mill noted that, if I say “I saw some of your children today”, you get the impression that I didn’t see all of them. This idea – that what we don’t say can also carry meaning – was fleshed out 50 years ago by Paul Grice. Given the timeframe involved, you might be tempted to ask why we’re still working on this today. (I work in this area myself, and I’m often tempted to ask…) Bart Geurts‘s engaging book Quantity Implicatures (Cambridge University Press, 2011) answers this question in several ways. For one thing, as the author observes, inferences of this type are very widespread in day-to-day interaction. For another, as this book also makes clear, some of these inferences are difficult to explain systematically, and this difficulty has begotten a wide range of contrasting and conflicting theories that make competing claims about the nature of pragmatics (and semantics) in general. In this interview, Geurts discusses the evidence that leads him to favour a Gricean view over a conventionalist account (one in which the richer meanings have the status of linguistic conventions), but also why he thinks the precise direction of recent Gricean approaches is not quite right. Following the trajectory of the book, we go on to look at more complex expressions, and discuss why these sometimes exotic constructions might enable progress to be made in distinguishing correct from incorrect theories. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Transcript -- A detailed discussion by Dr Barry Smith about the Gricean Program and the meaning of linguistic expression in terms of the content of people’s psychological states, their beliefs and intentions

A detailed discussion by Dr Barry Smith about the Gricean Program and the meaning of linguistic expression in terms of the content of people’s psychological states, their beliefs and intentions