Podcasts about frege

Cinquième épisode d'une série sur l'histoire de la connaissance et de l'épistémologie de l'antiquité à nos jours.19è et début 20è siècle : Comment la science et la philosophie ont chamboulé notre perception de la réalité ?

François RecanatiPhilosophie du langage et de l'espritCollège de FranceAnnée 2023-2024Colloque - Transparency, Indexicality and Consciousness : Transparency and A Posteriori PhysicalismColloque organisé par François Recanati, Professeur du Collège de France, chaire Philosophie du langage et de l'espritIntervenant(s)Gregory Bochner, Collège de FranceAccording to a posteriori physicalism, the apparent gap between consciousness and the physical world has its source not in the nature of consciousness (ontological gap), but only in features of the concepts we use to think about our conscious experiences (epistemic gap). It would be true that phenomenal consciousness is physical, but this would be knowable only a posteriori, due to the semantics of phenomenal concepts. While a posteriori physicalism thus postulates that the link between phenomenal and physical knowledge is in some sense opaque, Kripke had argued that phenomenal knowledge should in some sense be transparent, and recent objections to a posteriori physicalism draw on the Kripkean thesis of transparency. In this talk, I seek to disentangle two relevant transparency theses on behalf of the a posteriori physicalist: the comparative transparency of mental content ("Boghossian's transparency") (Frege, Boghossian) and the thesis that phenomenal concepts reveal the essence of the experience they denote ("revelation") (Kripke, Chalmers, Nida-Rümelin, Goff). In a first part, I present my own compatibilist response to the conflict between externalism and Boghossian's transparency. The "pragmatic two-dimensionalism" it involves – which combines ideas from Lewis, Stalnaker, and Recanati – rejects the (Fregean) claim, common to all brands of what I call "classical two-dimensionalism," that what plays the role of mode of presentation is also what fixes reference. In a second part, I compare the roles of the two transparency theses in the knowledge argument and related cases. I argue that Boghossian's transparency plays a neglected yet essential role in epistemic arguments against physicalism. The most fundamental conflict these arguments highlight is really one between Boghossian's transparency, classical two-dimensionalism, and a posteriori physicalism. In the third and final part, I argue that classical two-dimensionalism (and the way it forces us to pose the problems) is the culprit. It becomes possible to maintain Boghossian's transparency and a posteriori physicalism once we endorse the pragmatic sort of two-dimensionalism I advertize.

François RecanatiPhilosophie du langage et de l'espritCollège de FranceAnnée 2023-2024Colloque - Indexical Dynamics : Indexical Dynamics and Composite Modes of PresentationColloque organisé par François Recanati, Professeur du Collège de France, chaire Philosophie du langage et de l'espritIntervenant(s)Víctor M. Verdejo, Pompeu Fabra UniversityWith roots in Frege's famous remarks (1956, 296), reflection on Rip van Winkle's fantastic story has played a key role in the philosophical study of indexical dynamics (Kaplan 1989, Perry 1997, Branquinho 2008, Ludlow 2019). Consider now the Reverse van Winkle case: Rip van Winkle falls asleep at time t and, while he feels like it's been a very long slumber, only a few seconds have actually passed when he wakes up at time t'. Suppose Rip van Winkle utters "Today is fine" both at t and t' but, while he fully accepts the associated thought at t, he hesitates at t'. The Reverse van Winkle case shows that, if we accept the 'Intuitive Criterion of Difference' (Evans 1982), a particular understanding of the relation between indexicality and thought is wrongheaded. According to this 'linguistic' view, indexicality is a property of linguistic terms only and these terms express thoughts relative to a particular context. If this view were correct, sameness of context of utterance, indexical expression and reference should guarantee sameness of thought. However, the target case shows that the same (day-based) indexical term – "today" – and the same relevant context to refer to the same day may involve conflicting rational attitudes, and hence different thoughts. The case can be raised even if one doesn't accept (contra Perry 1997: 35-38 or Ludlow 2019: 72-75) that the first "today"-thought at t is remembered at t'. One only requires that Rip, at t', doesn't change his mind with respect to the thought expressed at t (cf. Kaplan 1989: 537-538). We should not however haste to embrace the view that indexicality is an essential aspect of thought. If this were so, it should be possible for thoughts to be indexically individuated. Yet sometimes, as the (Reverse) van Winkle case illustrates, thoughts expressed with (same or different) indexicals change with contexts and sometimes they don't. What should be done? To analyse the target case, I will invoke a "composite mode of presentation", i.e. "a mode of presentation that, although 'static', i.e. deployed at a given time in thinking of the object, rests on distinct simultaneous relations to the object, and on distinct ways of gaining information (distinct information channels) based on these relations" (Recanati, forthcoming; see also Dickie & Rattan 2010, Recanati 2016). Thus, in the Reverse van Winkle scenario, at t', Rip takes recourse to two different modes of presentation (MOPs) of a particular day, one based on memory or awareness of it before falling asleep, and one based on his direct awareness of the day in question. While one would typically merge these MOPs into one composite MOP to think and reason, indexically, about a day, Rip van Winkle fails to do so because of his especial predicament. Rip van Winkle has different thoughts, based on different MOPs. But these MOPs would typically constitute one and the same composite MOP in normal circumstances. More needs to be said, however, to fully characterize the cases in which composite MOPs based on different primitive MOPs of a referent are indeed available. My proposal is that this happens when the thinker is aware of the co-referentiality of primitive MOPs. Such awareness – which can be spelled out in a number of ways – may link very different indexical and demonstrative MOPs (perceptual, testimonial, memory-based...). However, composite MOPs need not be restricted to thought expressible with indexicals or demonstratives, and may carry over to any co-referential singular and general terms. This suggests a view in which the MOPs associated with indexicals are correctly attributed to the thought itself, but where such MOPs are not so different from conventional, non-indexical MOPs. Finally, while the awareness of co-reference signals the presence of a composite MOP, there is a sense in which composite MOPs may be acknowledged whether or not a thinker – such as Rip van Winkel – is aware of the co-referentiality of their constituent MOPs. This is also the sense in which different subjects unaware of one another may express the very same thought via different utterances of "Today is fine" on the same day.

François RecanatiPhilosophie du langage et de l'espritCollège de FranceAnnée 2023-2024Colloque - Indexical Dynamics : Indexical Dynamics : Belief Retention and Cognitive SignificanceColloque organisé par François Recanati, Professeur du Collège de France, chaire Philosophie du langage et de l'espritIntervenant(s)Vojislav Bozickovic, University of BelgradeIn relation to Frege's claim that one can express the same thought today by means of 'yesterday' that one expressed yesterday by means of 'today', Perry remarks:But should the Thought be the same? The belief expressed by "The midterm elections be today" on Tuesday motivates responsible citizens to go to the polls. The belief expressed by "The midterm elections be yesterday" on Wednesday will not motivate responsible voters to go to the polls. It seems the cognitive significance of the beliefs are different (Perry, J., Revisiting the Essential Indexical, 2020, 51-52).In contrast with this, Kaplan, who once held a similar view claims:I may be tracking the passing days very carefully. I became acquainted with the day yesterday and expressed that way of being acquainted in my use of 'today'. Assuming no recognition or tracking failures and no memory failures, I should be able to continue to have the day in mind in the same way today, though of course I will refer to it as 'yesterday'. Here we see, …, that the cognitive significance of an utterance should not be identified with linguistic meaning… We need to leave linguistic meaning and turn to industrial-strength ways of having in mind to give a proper analysis of the notions in this area. (Kaplan, 'An idea of Donnellan', 2012, 138).In following Kaplan in that we need to turn to industrial-strength ways of having in mind since, inter alia, it is not obvious what relation between the utterances of 'today' and 'yesterday' must obtain in order to ensure the internal continuity that constitutes retaining the original belief (Kaplan, Demonstratives 1989, 537, n. 64), I argue that ways of having in mind are best spelt out in terms of (neo-)Fregean persisting modes of presentation. True, this makes them short of being explanatory of the subject's behaviour as something they are supposed to do. But, neither are, or so I shall argue, the linguistic meanings of 'today' as 'yesterday' – as alternative contenders for being the bearers of cognitive significance – fit for this role, so much emphasized by Perry. As a result, the thought that is expressed stays the same through the change of context, "despite lower-level differences" (Evans, G., The Varieties of Reference, 196).

François RecanatiPhilosophie du langage et de l'espritCollège de FranceAnnée 2023-2024Colloque - Indexical Dynamics : Cognitive Dynamics as Mental Vehicle Identity: A Parity Argument from PolysemyColloque organisé par François Recanati, Professeur du Collège de France, chaire Philosophie du langage et de l'espritIntervenant(s)Michael Murez, Université de NantesAccording to Fregean theories, thinking the same thought requires thinking not only about the same referent, but also thinking about it in the same way, under the same concept. Fregean theories face 'Schiffer's Puzzle' (Schiffer, 2005; Buchanan, 2016), i.e., some thoughts have what Schiffer calls "the relativity feature": "[their] entertainment requires different people, or the same person at different times, to think of [the same referent] in different ways" (Schiffer, 2005: 138). Paradigmatic examples are provided by 'cognitive dynamics' (Kaplan, 1989): A thinker thinks of some day as "today", a day passes, and the same thinker, keeping track of time, now thinks of the same day as "yesterday". The thinker is disposed to reason diachronically according to a pattern known as 'trading on coreference' (Campbell, 1988), which is often taken to indicate redeployment of the same concept. Yet it is tempting to say that the concepts expressed by "today" and "yesterday" are different, since they play different cognitive roles. According to Schiffer (2005: 149), "[i]t's clear the Fregean theory can't accommodate the relativity feature", because contra (e.g.,) Frege (1956 [1918]) and Evans (1981), there is no plausible account of what the concept which remains the same cross-contextually, and is expressed by different indexicals, is supposed to be. Against Schiffer and others, I defend a broadly Fregean position, which allows for diachronic identity between concepts, despite changes in (many aspects of) cognitive role and means of linguistic expression. I argue that such a position is independently motivated if, unlike traditional Fregeans, we identify concepts not with elements of content, but with 'robust' mental vehicles (Reference omitted for review). Concepts so construed are not individuated by the thinker's conception of their referent (the properties and relations they represent it as instantiating). My basic strategy for responding to Schiffer's puzzle is Fodorian in spirit (Fodor, 1990: 167): changes in a thinker's global inferential/behavioral dispositions across contexts trace back to aspects of their broader psychological state, which are not individuative of their concepts. They correspond to conceptional rather than conceptual change. This reply to Schiffer's Puzzle faces at least three objections: i) it seems to require conceptual atomism, which is unpopular; ii) it takes at face value the possibility of diachronic trading on coreference, which is controversial (e.g., Recanati, 2021); iii) it conflicts with the plausible principle that concepts themselves change along with modes of reference determination.In response, I will argue that i) my position is compatible with a plausible molecularist view of concepts; ii) diachronic trading on coreference based on enduring concepts, even granting it is unnecessary for assessments of rationality, is required for psychological explanation, and non-negotiable for vehicularists about concepts; iii) the empirical hypothesis that cognitive dynamics involves mere conceptional change is supported by a parity argument from cases which, I argue, analogously involve 'trading on coreference' despite change in modes of reference determination. The relevant cases, which to my knowledge have yet to be brought to bear on issues surrounding cognitive dynamics, involve regularly polysemous expressions, such as "bottle", which can mean a container or its contents. These expressions support cross-meaning anaphora, such as "Haddock gulped down the bottlei and tossed iti overboard" (Ortega-Andrés & Vicente, 2019; Quilty-Dunn, 2021). The overall shape of my argument is that there are strong benefits to analyzing such cases as involving the relativity feature and conceptual identity, and there are strong costs to rejecting a parallel treatment of prototypical cases of cognitive dynamics involving indexicals. Thus, we should adopt a unified treatment of all such cases in terms of concept/mental vehicle identity.

François RecanatiPhilosophie du langage et de l'espritCollège de FranceAnnée 2023-2024Colloque - Indexical Dynamics : Dynamic Modes of presentationsColloque organisé par François Recanati, Professeur du Collège de France, chaire Philosophie du langage et de l'espritIntervenant(s)François Recanati, Professeur du Collège de France, chaire Philosophie du langage et de l'espritIn a famous passage Frege wrote:"If someone wants to say today what he expressed yesterday using the word 'today', he will replace this word with 'yesterday'. Although the thought is the same, the verbal expression must be different in order that the change of sense which would otherwise be effected by the differing times of utterance may be cancelled out."What Frege says here is compatible with two possible views. On one view, indexicality is not an intrinsic property of certain thoughts, but a property of certain linguistic expressions or, rather, of the relation between these expressions and the thoughts they (contribute to) express: indexical sentences express thoughts only with respect to context, and different indexical expressions have to be used to express the same thought in different contexts. On another view, indexicality is 'essential' (Perry): it is a property of thoughts themselves and not merely of their linguistic expression. According to this view there are indexical thoughts, corresponding to the indexical sentences that express them. Still, it is possible to hold, with Frege, that 'the thought is the same' when you think of a certain day as 'today' and when, the following day, you think of it as 'yesterday'. Although indexical, the thought that is expressed is 'dynamic' and stays the same through the change of context, despite lower-level differences (Evans).The second view is attractive but it raises the issue of 'cognitive dynamics' (Kaplan): when does an indexical thought become another thought because of a contextual change, and when does it stay the same despite the change? This workshop is devoted to that issue, and to the more general issue of the nature of indexical thought.I propose a couple of revisions to the standard criterion of difference for modes of presentation attributed to Frege. First, we need to broaden the scope of the criterion so that not merely the thoughts of a given subject at a given time may or may not involve the same way of thinking of some object, but also the thoughts of a subject at different times. Second, we need to 'relativize' the criterion of difference to particular subjects in particular situations. Thanks to these revisions, we can make sense of Evans' notion of a dynamic mode of presentation that persists through time despite lower-level changes. I show how this idea can be cashed out in the mental file framework.

François RecanatiPhilosophie du langage et de l'espritCollège de FranceAnnée 2023-2024Colloque - Indexical Dynamics : Ephemeral Episodes, Durable ContentsColloque organisé par François Recanati, Professeur du Collège de France, chaire Philosophie du langage et de l'espritIntervenant(s)Maria de Ponte Azkarate, University of the Basque CountryKepa Korta, University of the Basque CountryIn this paper I discuss two approaches to certain context-sensitive cognitive episodes, focusing on temporal indexicals and tense. The first approach is David Kaplan's (1979, 1989). The second is the reflexive-referential approach used by Korta and Perry in Critical Pragmatics (2011). I argue for the second approach.I take utterances and beliefs to be cognitive episodes: Things or events that occur in space and time, that have cognitive contents, and have causes and effects (Perry, 2019, 2020, de Ponte, Korta and Perry, 2023). I consider what seems to be an issue of detail. On Kaplan's approach, contexts are sets, quadruples of a speaker, time, location and world, and episodes (utterances) do not appear in the theory, but are modeled by pairs of expressions and contexts. An expression has a character (meaning); an expression-in-context has a content (proposition or component thereof.) On the reflexive-referential theory, episodes appear in the theory; they are what the theory is about. Speaker-of, time-of, and location-of are roles, that is, functions from an episode to the object that stands in the appropriate relation.I argue that this difference is more significant that it might seem. The reflexive-referential theory inherits a key insight of Kaplan's theory, and of John Perry's earlier view: the distinction between different ways in which information can be discovered, believed and asserted. But the inclusion of episodes has several advantages. First, it has advantages for understanding the relation between the content of cognitive episodes, their causal roles and their cognitive significance. Second, it accounts for —and makes use of— the fact that episodes have many other properties in addition to having speakers, locations, and times, that can be relevant to understanding their cognitive significance. Reflexive-referential theory has its roots on Frege (and Russell), but it supposes a clear departure from his views (its starting point is Perry's (1979) rejection of the doctrine of propositions, defended by Frege and Russell). I believe, however, that it is actually more amiable to Frege's program than the interpretation given by the so-called neo-Fregeans (most notably, Evans, 1981). In particular, I argue that the issue of cognitive dynamics can be dealt with in the reflexive- referential account.

François RecanatiPhilosophie du langage et de l'espritCollège de FranceAnnée 2023-2024Colloque - Indexical Dynamics : Dynamic Content and the Prospects for a Three-level Account of ContentColloque organisé par François Recanati, Professeur du Collège de France, chaire Philosophie du langage et de l'espritIntervenant(s)Bernardo Marques, ENS de ParisIn recent decades, a compelling factor contributing to the popularity of referentialist accounts lies in their apparent ability to reconcile their main tenets with Frege's original insights about cognitive significance. To achieve this integration, numerous referential accounts have embraced a two-level understanding of content, exemplified by Perry's articulation of a division between 'reflexive' and 'referential' content. (Kaplan, 1978; Perry, 1977; Recanati, 1993)The primary challenge faced by these accounts is commonly known as the 'cognitive dynamics' problem (Evans, 1981; Kaplan, 1989). At its core, this challenge involves the task of elucidating how an individual can maintain a propositional attitude amidst changes in spatial or temporal locations, all the while employing distinct indexical terms (Prosser, 2005). Two-dimensional approaches, as advocated by Kaplan, Recanati and Perry, appear to falter in the face of this challenge, as they contend that each indexical term possesses a distinct character, and this character, in turn, determines the psychological role of thoughts and is equated with the mode of presentation. (Prosser, 2019) This has convinced many theorists that a solution to the challenge of cognitive dynamics must individuate a singular mode of presentation in a way that does not dependent on a particular indexical term.Throughout my paper, my goal is to address this difficulty through the distinction of three levels of content for any utterance. I posit the hypothesis that an additional level of content can resolve certain issues for which a two-level account seems insufficient. I support this claim with two categories of motivations — historical and explanatory. Historically, I draw attention to the notable resemblance between the two-level framework proposed by Perry, Kaplan, and Recanati and the three-level model pioneered by Peirce. Peirce's three-level account distinguishes an immediate, a dynamic, and a final interpretant (Atkin, 2008). This leads me to establish a parallel between Peirce's immediate and final interpretant and Perry's reflexive and referential content, respectively. Additionally, I also notice the absence in Perry's framework of an equivalent to Peirce's dynamic interpretant.In this paper, I argue that Peirce's notion of dynamic interpretant offers a compelling starting point for addressing the problem of cognitive dynamics within a referentialist framework. Since two- dimensional accounts fall short in fixating a singular mode of presentation for different indexes amidst changes in spatial and temporal location that express the same propositional attitude, I propose that this explanatory gap can be filled by a dynamic content. I define 'dynamic content' as a type of content that captures the perspectival features of a subject, corresponding to a contextual instantiation at a personal level. Therefore, in a dynamical situation, even if the characters differ due to the use of different indexes, the modes of presentations are not necessarily different. This is because the dynamic content remains the same, suggesting that both the character and the dynamic content contribute to determine the psychological role of thought and the mode of presentation. In this sense, I argue that the dynamic content provides the required resources to address the challenge of cognitive dynamics.

François RecanatiPhilosophie du langage et de l'espritCollège de FranceAnnée 2023-2024Colloque - Indexical Dynamics : Content-Bearers and IndexicalityColloque organisé par François Recanati, Professeur du Collège de France, chaire Philosophie du langage et de l'espritIntervenant(s)Tadeusz Ciecierski, University of WarsawOne potential conservative reaction to the concept of indexicality of content involves a theory that treats indexicality as a property inherent to content-bearers. While this view aligns intuitively with linguistic cases, as indexicality is commonly seen as a property of expressions, it requires further elucidation when applied to intentional (mental) states as content-bearers. In this paper, I aim to present a theory that elucidates the indexicality of attitudes and other mental states by examining the properties of the bearers or vehicles of content. The theory I shall present departs from an account of indexicality rooted in Frege's philosophy, specifically a hybrid expression view (cf. Frege, 1956). Various versions of this view (cf. Künne, 1992; Künne, 2010; Textor, 2007, 2015; Kripke, 2008; Penco, 2013; Ciecierski, 2019) share the common feature of conceiving content-bearers as complex objects. These objects, in addition to narrowly conceived components (linguistic expressions in the case of utterances or mental representations/forms in the case of mental states), consist of contextual elements such as the speaker, time of utterance, or place of utterance. Recognizing the differences in these content-bearers allows for the expression of a single standard and non-indexical content through appropriately contextually coordinated bearers, while different non-indexical contents are expressible by uncoordinated bearers. One potential advantage of this theory is its uniform treatment of linguistic and mental indexicality. However, the theory is not immune to objections (cf. Perry, 1977, 491; Kaplan, 1989, 538). A notable challenge arises in explaining the intuition that an individual who loses track of time, like Rip van Winkle, shares the same thought when considering that today is sunny (on a day d in 1789) and when thinking that yesterday was sunny (on a day d' in 1800). One response to this challenge (cf. Tichy, 1986, 40; Textor, 2011, 168) suggests that a person who loses track of time fails to accurately capture the content of the thought that yesterday was sunny (on a day d' in 1800). While successful in addressing the challenge, this response rejects the initial intuition entirely and contradicts the idea of the transparency of mental content. To address this problem, I propose the internalistic version of the hybrid expression view of indexicality. While the standard hybrid expression view adopts an externalistic perspective, claiming that a hybrid expression (content-bearer) consists of a vehicle and an aspect of the relevant externally existing context of utterance (Externalistic Hybridity Claim), the internalistic version posits that a hybrid expression consists of a vehicle and an aspect of the relevant mental representation of a possible context of utterance (Internalistic Hybridity Claim). Accepting Internalistic Hybridity allows for a nuanced treatment of cases where individuals are "lost in time." For instance, Rip van Winkle, while entertaining the thought that yesterday was sunny, grasps the content of the hybrid representation consisting of a vehicle (the mental counterpart of "yesterday") and the representation of the time of utterance corresponding to d+1 1789. Consequently, he fails to grasp the content that it was sunny on d'-1 1800, but he apprehends a different yet related content. His mistake in content attribution is a result of a factual error—selecting the wrong context as actual. This analysis aligns with the intuitive transparency of mental content: Rip van Winkle grasps the appropriate content and maintains a disposition to differentiate between it and the content expressed had the time of utterance been located on a specific day in 1800. After presenting the view, in the final sections of the paper, I will argue that Internalistic Hybridity is consistent with direct reference.

If you're anything like Ivan (oof, sorry), you've heard of Pygmalion but never caught more than the gist. Some sort of project from the early 70s, similar to Sketchpad or Smalltalk or something, yet another promising prototype from the early history of our field that failed to take the world by storm. Our stock-in-trade on this show. But you've probably heard of Programming by Demonstration. And you've certainly heard of icons — you know, those little pictures that have become indelibly part of computing as we know it. Pygmalion is the originator of these concepts… and more! The best introduction to Pygmalion is Mariano Guerra's No-code History: Pygmalion, which includes a clearly articulated summary of the big ideas, motivation, and design, with a video demonstration of the programming interface, key terminology, and links. The most introduction to Pygmalion — or Pig Million, The Millionth Pig, as it'll surely come to be known — is the subject of today's episode: the original paper by David Canfield Smith. Links $ We don't run ads on this show anymore. Sometimes Ivan makes a fake ad for a nonsense product like CarrotGrid or Hest, but those don't pay for the dirt & vapor we grow them in. But what if they could? Gonna just get this one out of the way: Quotation — and I quote, "A crucial semantic distinction between direct and indirect speech is that direct speech purports to report the exact words that were said or written EXACTLY AS THEY WERE SAID OR WRITTEN, LU, whereas indirect speech is a representation of speech in one's own words WHICH IS ALSO TOTALLY FINE, BUT JUST BE COOL ABOUT IT HEY?" @TodePond@mas.to: but wouldn't it be funny... if i quoted those statements on a podcast... and the podcast editor thought... "that doesn't sound right, bret can't have said that"... (he can do no wrong after all)... and so they thought i was just paraphrasing him wrong... and they didn't mark them as quotes like all the other quotes in the show... wouldn't that be funny DrawDeadFish.com Shout out to Brian Hempel who sent us (among other treats) this concise summary of Pig Million from the seminal book Watch What I Do: Programming by Demonstration. Recent FoC Patreon bonus episodes were about the game Baba is You and, on our first ever video episode, the design of a visual representation for machine code. Leda and the Swan. Lenna, a sexist test image that was and to some extent still is widely used in computer graphics. Living Computation Lu: Biscuit Jimmy: Biscuit Ivan: Limp Bizkit Fine, I might as well link to Frege and analogy. Aaron Sloman's INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: The Role of Intuition and Non-Logical Reasoning in Intelligence Ivan: Platonism Jimmy: Neoplatonism Lu: Neuplatonism I would never Derrida Nosey words History of the alphabet TodeTode Lu: Conlang Ivan: Conlon Nancarrow, beloved (by Ivan, at least) composer of music for the Player Piano. Here's a baby-faced Adam Neely with the scoop if you're new to Nancarrow. Welcome. Jimmy: Conway Twitty Autological words Heterological words School for Poetic Computation Programming by Demonstration Player vs Environment For the video demonstrating the programming model, check Mariano's post Open Canvas Working Group Lu's project CellPond, and their SPLASH talk StageCast Creator Marcel Goethals makes a lot of cool weird stuff and is a choice follow. Why does it say "Put all the metal back in the ground" at the bottom of the show notes? Music featured in this episode: Various old stuff by Ivan. The music for StageCast Creator is called Between Two Tigers. Conlon Nancarrow's Study No. 47 Wagner, the new Witness haunting every episode. ! Send us email, share your ideas in the Slack, and catch us at these normal places: Ivan: Mastodon • Website Jimmy: Mastodon • Website Lu: Mastodon • Website See you in the future! https://futureofcoding.org/episodes/072See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Der SAQ-Podcast tritt in die swingin' sixties ein. Groovy, baby! Diese Folge werden Max und Adrian achtsam und reden darüber, wofür sie dankbar sind. Adrian erzählt von effektiver Bewältigung psychologischer Traumata mit EMDR. Einer günstigen, leicht durchführbaren und leicht wissenschaftlich prüfbaren Methode, die auf einem glücklichen Zufall basiert. Max geht etwas weiter zurück in der Zeit und erzählt von philosophischen Errungenschaften, die mit den Grundstein für die heutige psychologische Wissenschaft gelegt haben. Die Rede ist vom Linguistik-Turn in der Philosophie. Ein echtes Turn-On für heutige Philosoph- und WissenschaftlerInnen. Yeah, baby, yeah!

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În ciuda tuturor aparențelor și a mesajelor contradictorii apărute pe piața neagră internațională, a apărut un nou episod!! Căci dacă ne-a mâncat în știți voi și am mușcat din felia empiristă a filosofiei, acuma dară trebuie să mestecăm, să înțelegem, să pricepem domnule ce și cum.  Or nimeni nu este mai propice tăticul lor (al empiriștilor), mare barosan anticartezian, el capo de tutti impresii senzoriale in capo, decât John Locke. Cei mai astuți dintre voi vor spune "Bă, Jambonel, da' ce facem ne întoarcem în timp? Parcă am vorbit deja despre Locke?" Răspunsul meu este același pe care l-am dat soției mele când m-a întrebat dacă am dus gunoiul și m-am decis să mint decât să fac față realității: "Desigur că da!" Invitați speciali: Russell, Dacia, un bou, o vacă, Aristotel, alte vaci, Obadiah Stane, Descartes (că ne-ntoarcem și la el), Frege, nea Mișu. 00:00 Intro17:34 Epistemologia empiristă (partea critică)27:26 Epistemologia empiristă (partea constructivă)52:02 Filosofia mentalistă a limbajuluiSupport the show

“Als het één van de taken van de filosofie is om de heerschappij van het woord over de menselijke geest te verbreken - ten eerste door misverstanden over de relaties tussen concepten te verhelpen die bijna onvermijdelijk ontstaan door ons taalgebruik, en, ten tweede, door onze gedachten te bevrijden van datgene waarmee zij door de uitdrukkingsmiddelen van de alledaagse taal worden opgezadeld - dan kan mijn Begriffsschrift een nuttig werktuig zijn voor de filosoof” Zo beschrijft Gottlob Frege het belang van zijn filosofische project: het opschonen van de wiskundige en filosofische taal.  Waarom was de introductie van onder meer de kwantor zo'n revolutie in wiskunde en filosofie?Op welke manier kwam hij met een antwoord op de oude filosofische droom van onder andere Leibniz?En hoe bracht hij de linguistic turn in gang? Te gast: Wim VanrieDe denker die centraal staat: Frege

Ich glaube, wenn man eine Umfrage machen würde, wer wichtige Philosophinnen und Philosophen des letzten Jahrhunderts waren, dann würde man bestimmt die Namen Sartre, Arendt, Adorno und Foucault hören. Das sind aber alles sogenannte "kontinentale" Philosoph*innen und das ist eben gerade nicht die Schule, die aktuell die Universitäten bestimmt. Denn dort regiert die sogenannte "analytische Philosophie". Aber was ist das eigentlich genau und wieso ist von den Analytikern in der Allgemeinheit Wittgenstein sicherlich noch recht bekannt, aber bei Frege und Russell wird's dann eventuell schon dünn? Darüber spreche ich in dieser Folge mit Albert Newen. Er ist Professor für Philosophie des Geistes und Kognitionswissenschaften an der Ruhr-Universität Bochum und hat die Einführung zur analytischen Philosophie im Junius Verlag geschrieben.

------------------Support the channel------------ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thedissenter PayPal: paypal.me/thedissenter PayPal Subscription 1 Dollar: https://tinyurl.com/yb3acuuy PayPal Subscription 3 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ybn6bg9l PayPal Subscription 5 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ycmr9gpz PayPal Subscription 10 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y9r3fc9m PayPal Subscription 20 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y95uvkao   ------------------Follow me on--------------------- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/thedissenteryt/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/TheDissenterYT   This show is sponsored by Enlites, Learning & Development done differently. Check the website here: http://enlites.com/   Dr. Elmar Unnsteinsson is an Assistant Professor and Ad Astra Fellow at University College Dublin, School of Philosophy. He is also the Principal Investigator of two research projects funded by The Icelandic Research Fund, The Confused Intentions Project and Insincerity for Fragmented Minds, both based at UCD and University of Iceland, where he has a part-time position as a Research Scientist. Dr. Unnsteinsson works on topics in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, history of analytic philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of linguistics, and cognitive science. He is the author of Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference.   In this episode, we focus on Talking About. We discuss different theories of reference. We talk about Frege's Curse, and identity confusion. We discuss the distinction between representational states and representational acts, and implicit beliefs. We talk about expressionist and intentionalist approaches to speaker meaning. Finally, we get into Dr. Unnsteinsson's edenic intentionalism, and we talk about self-directed speech, and some challenges to his theory. -- A HUGE THANK YOU TO MY PATRONS/SUPPORTERS: PER HELGE LARSEN, JERRY MULLER, HANS FREDRIK SUNDE, BERNARDO SEIXAS, OLAF ALEX, ADAM KESSEL, MATTHEW WHITINGBIRD, ARNAUD WOLFF, TIM HOLLOSY, HENRIK AHLENIUS, JOHN CONNORS, FILIP FORS CONNOLLY, DAN DEMETRIOU, ROBERT WINDHAGER, RUI INACIO, ZOOP, MARCO NEVES, COLIN HOLBROOK, PHIL KAVANAGH, SAMUEL ANDREEFF, FRANCIS FORDE, TIAGO NUNES, FERGAL CUSSEN, HAL HERZOG, NUNO MACHADO, JONATHAN LEIBRANT, JOÃO LINHARES, STANTON T, SAMUEL CORREA, ERIK HAINES, MARK SMITH, JOÃO EIRA, TOM HUMMEL, SARDUS FRANCE, DAVID SLOAN WILSON, YACILA DEZA-ARAUJO, ROMAIN ROCH, DIEGO LONDOÑO CORREA, YANICK PUNTER, ADANER USMANI, CHARLOTTE BLEASE, NICOLE BARBARO, ADAM HUNT, PAWEL OSTASZEWSKI, NELLEKE BAK, GUY MADISON, GARY G HELLMANN, SAIMA AFZAL, ADRIAN JAEGGI, PAULO TOLENTINO, JOÃO BARBOSA, JULIAN PRICE, EDWARD HALL, HEDIN BRØNNER, DOUGLAS FRY, FRANCA BORTOLOTTI, GABRIEL PONS CORTÈS, URSULA LITZCKE, SCOTT, ZACHARY FISH, TIM DUFFY, SUNNY SMITH, JON WISMAN, DANIEL FRIEDMAN, WILLIAM BUCKNER, PAUL-GEORGE ARNAUD, LUKE GLOWACKI, GEORGIOS THEOPHANOUS, CHRIS WILLIAMSON, PETER WOLOSZYN, DAVID WILLIAMS, DIOGO COSTA, ANTON ERIKSSON, CHARLES MOREY, ALEX CHAU, AMAURI MARTÍNEZ, CORALIE CHEVALLIER, BANGALORE ATHEISTS, LARRY D. LEE JR., OLD HERRINGBONE, MICHAEL BAILEY, DAN SPERBER, ROBERT GRESSIS, IGOR N, JEFF MCMAHAN, JAKE ZUEHL, BARNABAS RADICS, MARK CAMPBELL, TOMAS DAUBNER, LUKE NISSEN, KIMBERLY JOHNSON, BENJAMIN GELBART, JESSICA NOWICKI, LINDA BRANDIN, NIKLAS CARLSSON, ISMAËL BENSLIMANE, GEORGE CHORIATIS, VALENTIN STEINMANN, PER KRAULIS, KATE VON GOELER, ALEXANDER HUBBARD, LIAM DUNAWAY, BR, MASOUD ALIMOHAMMADI, JONAS HERTNER, URSULA GOODENOUGH, DAVID PINSOF, SEAN NELSON, MIKE LAVIGNE, JOS KNECHT, ERIK ENGMAN, AND LUCY! A SPECIAL THANKS TO MY PRODUCERS, YZAR WEHBE, JIM FRANK, ŁUKASZ STAFINIAK, TOM VANEGDOM, BERNARD HUGUENEY, CURTIS DIXON, BENEDIKT MUELLER, THOMAS TRUMBLE, KATHRINE AND PATRICK TOBIN, JONCARLO MONTENEGRO, AL NICK ORTIZ, AND NICK GOLDEN! AND TO MY EXECUTIVE PRODUCERS, MATTHEW LAVENDER, SERGIU CODREANU, BOGDAN KANIVETS, ROSEY, AND GREGORY HASTINGS!

In this episode, Xavier Bonilla has a dialogue with Stephen Houlgate on Hegel's Logic and his philosophy of being. They discuss the main aims of Hegel's Logic and the use of categories, why Hegel believed Kant's Logic is not critical enough, categories of thought and natural kinds, and separating thinking and being. They discuss Hegel and Heidegger on being, Hegel on objectivity and being presuppositionless, and pure being, becoming, and nothing. They discuss Nietzsche and Hegel on becoming, Dasein, Hegel and Frege on quantity, differential calculus, linking the Phenomenology of Spirit and Logic, and many more topics. Stephen Houlgate is professor of philosophy at the University of Warwick. He has his PhD from the University of Cambridge and his main interest is the work of Hegel. He has published numerous books, including the most recent two volume, Hegel on Being. Get full access to Converging Dialogues at convergingdialogues.substack.com/subscribe

François RecanatiPhilosophie du langage et de l'espritCollège de FranceAnnée 2023-2024Colloque - The Social World: Foundational Issues - On the Mood for FictionIntervenant(s)Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, université de BarceloneRésuméHow should we think of the utterances that convey (literary) fictions? Searle (1974/5) (and before him MacDonald (1954), with better arguments) influentially argues that they are (non-deceptive) mere pretense – the simulation of acts like assertions or questions. They don't constitute sui generis, dedicated representational practices of a specific kind, fictionalizing, on a par with assertions or questions. This has been the standard view in analytic philosophy until the 1990s, casually endorsed already by Frege, and then by many others like Austin, Kripke and van Inwagen. Even though authors including Alward (2009), Predelli (2019, 2020), and Recanati (2021) still endorse the view, Walton (1990) and others provide in my view decisive objections (cf. in particular de Gaynesford 2009), mostly predicated on its lack of explanatory power for different aspects of fictionality that good theories should and can provide. Walton himself also rejects views of the kind MacDonald and Searle question, which take fictionalizing to be a sui generis speech act, but his arguments are uncompelling; Currie (1990) nicely articulated one such account inside a Gricean framework, showing its explanatory power. Recently other writers have argued that a more conventionalist, Austinian framework provides better accounts, including García-Carpintero (2013), Abell (2020) and Bergman & Franzén (2022). While following Currie I suggested classifying speech acts of fictionalizing as directives, the latter authors defend classifying them as declarations – like giving out players, naming ships or sentencing offenders. In my paper I'll question the declaration view, but I'll also explore another alternative to the directive account, by considering whether fictionalizings are a variety of constative act, along lines that Predelli (1997), Recanati (2000), and Reimer (2005) have theorized.Manuel García-Carpintero a obtenu son doctorat à l'université de Barcelone, où il enseigne depuis. Il travaille dans le domaine de la philosophie du langage et de l'esprit, ainsi que sur des questions épistémologiques et métaphysiques connexes. Il termine actuellement un livre sous contrat avec Oxford University Press sur la nature des actes de langage en général et de l'assertion en particulier, intitulé Tell Me What You Know.Ce colloque international se tient en prélude à la soutenance de thèse de Maryam Ebrahimi Dinani, assistante de recherche du Pr Recanati. Il réunit deux des membres du jury (Kathrin Koslicki, de l'Université de Neuchâtel, et Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, de l'Université de Barcelone) et deux invités (Indrek Reiland, de l'Université de Vienne, et Olivier Massin, de l'Université de Neuchâtel), sous la présidence de Kevin Mulligan, de l'Université de Genève.

Un saludo queridos oyentes y mecenas. Continuamos con el bloque del desarrollo científico en el XIX y hoy lo hacemos tratando el espectacular avance que tuvieron las matemáticas durante dicho siglo. Nombres como los de Cantor y Frege están ya consagrados al adelanto universal de las teorías matemáticas. 📗ÍNDICE COMPLETO 1. INTRODUCCIÓN. >>> https://go.ivoox.com/rf/116935067 2. LAS MATEMÁTICAS. (Tratado en el audio de hoy). 3. GEOMETRÍAS NO EUCLIDIANAS. 4. LA TEORÍA DE LA EVOLUCIÓN BIOLÓGICA. 5. LA FÍSICA DEL XIX. 6. LA LINGÜÍSTICA. 7. EL NACIMIENTO DE LA PSICOLOGÍA EXPERIMENTAL. 8. EL ORIGEN DE LA SOCIOLOGÍA CIENTÍFICA. ***** 🎼Música de la época: Sinfonía nº4 de Mahler compuesta en 1900 y estrenada en Munich en 1901. **** 🎨Imagen: El alemán Gottlob Frege, considerado el padre de la lógica matemática y de la filosofía analítica, **** 👍Pulsen un Me Gusta y colaboren a partir de 2,99 €/mes si se lo pueden permitir para asegurar la permanencia del programa ¡Muchas gracias a todos!

Carlo Penco"Artificiale e naturale"Festival Filosofiahttps://festivalfilosofia.itFestival Filosofialezioni magistraliCarlo PencoArtificiale e naturaleCodifiche logiche e tecnologiche del linguaggioVenerdì 15 settembre 2023, ore 15:00, SassuoloIn che modo la formalizzazione del linguaggio diviene strumento fondamentale della ricerca, capace di compensare i limiti del linguaggio naturale? Cosa dimostra il linguaggio degli algoritmi, con i vari bot intelligenti da Eliza a ChatGPT4? Carlo Penco è stato a lungo professore di Filosofia del linguaggio presso l'Università degli Studi di Genova, dove continua ad insegnare Teorie della comunicazione. Ha insegnato anche Filosofia della scienza presso l'Università di Lecce ed è stato visiting presso l'Università d'Islanda a Reykjavik, l'Università di Barcellona, il King's College e l'Institute of Philosophy (Londra), l'Università di Pittsburgh. È stato presidente della Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica e ha lavorato nei comitati editoriali e scientifici di diverse riviste. Ha dedicato numerosi studi alle filosofie di Ludwig Wittgenstein e Gottlob Frege, curando anche edizioni di autori quali Michael Dummett e John L. Austin. Ha indagato temi di filosofia del linguaggio, di filosofia analitica e di filosofia della mente, esplorando i rapporti tra pragmatica e semantica, i fondamenti della scienza cognitiva, le forme di Intelligenza Artificiale e le modalità di ragionamento di senso comune, insieme all'ontologia e alle teorie della comunicazione. Ha scritto articoli su riviste scientifiche internazionali e tra le sue ultime pubblicazioni in italiano ricordiamo: Frege (Roma 2010); Significato e teorie del linguaggio (a cura di, con Andrea Bottani, Milano 2013 2a ed.); Introduzione alla filosofia del linguaggio (Roma-Bari 2004, 20167); Come non detto. Usi e abusi dei sottintesi (con Filippo Domaneschi, Roma-Bari 2016); Frege. Logica, Pensiero e linguaggio. I fondamenti dell'aritmetica e altri scritti (a cura di, con Eva Picardi, Roma-Bari 2021).Carlo Penco"Come non detto"Laterza Editorihttps://ilpostodelleparole.it/carlo-penco/carlo-penco-non-detto/IL POSTO DELLE PAROLEascoltare fa pensarehttps://ilpostodelleparole.itQuesto show fa parte del network Spreaker Prime. Se sei interessato a fare pubblicità in questo podcast, contattaci su https://www.spreaker.com/show/1487855/advertisement

Vaden comes out swinging against David Chapman's work on meta-rationality. Is Chapman pointing out a fatal flaw, or has Popper solved these problems long ago? Do moose see cups? Does Ben see cups? What the f*** is a cup? We discuss - Chapman's concept of nebulosity - Whether this concept is covered by Popper - The relationship of nebulosity and the vagueness of language - The correspondence theory of truth - If the concept of "problem situation" saves us from Chapman's critique - Why "conjecture and criticism" isn't everything References - The excellent Do Explain (https://doexplain.buzzsprout.com/) podcast. Go listen, right now! - In the cells of the eggplant (https://metarationality.com/), David Chapman - Chapman's website (https://meaningness.com/about-my-sites) - Jake Orthwein on Do Explain (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=irmwL97zGcM&ab_channel=DoExplainwithChristoferL%C3%B6vgren), Part I Chapman Quotes Reasonableness is not interested in universality. It aims to get practical work done in specific situations. Precise definitions and absolute truths are rarely necessary or helpful for that. Is this thing an eggplant? Depends on what you are trying to do with it. Is there water in the refrigerator? Well, what do you want it for? What counts as baldness, fruit, red, or water depends on your purposes, and on all sorts of details of the situation. Those details are so numerous and various that they can't all be taken into account ahead of time to make a general formal theory. Any factor might matter in some situation. On the other hand, nearly all are irrelevant in any specific situation, so determining whether the water in an eggplant counts, or if Alain is bald, is usually easy. David Chapman, When will you go bald? (https://metarationality.com/vagueness) Do cow hairs that have come out of the follicle but that are stuck to the cow by friction, sweat, or blood count as part of the cow? How about ones that are on the verge of falling out, but are stuck in the follicle by only the weakest of bonds? The reasonable answer is “Dude! It doesn't matter!” David Chapman, Objects, objectively (https://metarationality.com/objective-objects) We use words as tools to get things done; and to get things done, we improvise, making use of whatever materials are ready to hand. If you want to whack a piece of sheet metal to bend it, and don't know or care what the “right” tool is (if there even is one), you might take a quick look around the garage, grab a large screwdriver at the “wrong” end, and hit the target with its hard rubber handle. A hand tool may have one or two standard uses; some less common but pretty obvious ones; and unusual, creative ones. But these are not clearly distinct categories of usage. David Chapman, The purpose of meaning (https://metarationality.com/purpose-of-meaning) Popper Quotes Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem. And its description presupposes a descriptive language, with property words; it presupposes similarity and classification, which in their turn presuppose interests, points of view, and problems. ‘A hungry animal', writes Katz, ‘divides the environment into edible and inedible things. An animal in flight sees roads to escape and hiding places . . . Generally speaking, objects change . . . according to the needs of the animal.' We may add that objects can be classified, and can become similar or dissimilar, only in this way—by being related to needs and interests. This rule applies not only to animals but also to scientists. For the animal a point of view is provided by its needs, the task of the moment, and its expectations; for the scientist by his theoretical interests, the special problem under investigation, his conjectures and anticipations, and the theories which he accepts as a kind of background: his frame of reference, his "horizon of expectations". Conjectures and Refutations p. 61 (italics added) I believe that there is a limited analogy between this situation and the way we ‘use our terms' in science. The analogy can be described in this way. In a branch of mathematics in which we operate with signs defined by implicit definition, the fact that these signs have no ‘definite meaning' does not affect our operating with them, or the precision of our theories. Why is that so? Because we do not overburden the signs. We do not attach a ‘meaning' to them, beyond that shadow of a meaning that is warranted by our implicit definitions. (And if we attach to them an intuitive meaning, then we are careful to treat this as a private auxiliary device, which must not interfere with the theory.) In this way, we try to keep, as it were, within the ‘penumbra of vagueness' or of ambiguity, and to avoid touching the problem of the precise limits of this penumbra or range; and it turns out that we can achieve a great deal without discussing the meaning of these signs; for nothing depends on their meaning. In a similar way, I believe, we can operate with these terms whose meaning wehave learned ‘operationally'. We use them, as it were, so that nothing depends upon their meaning, or as little as possible. Our ‘operational definitions' have the advantage of helping us to shift the problem into a field in which nothing or little depends on words. Clear speaking is speaking in such a way that words do not matter. OSE p. 841 (italics in original) Frege's opinion is different; for he writes: “A definition of a concept ... must determine unambiguously of any object whether or not it falls under the concept . . . Using a metaphor, we may say: the concept must have a sharp boundary.” But it is clear that for this kind of absolute precision to be demanded of a defined concept, it must first be demanded of the defining concepts, and ultimately of our undefined, or primitive, terms. Yet this is impossible. For either our undefined or primitive terms have a traditional meaning (which is never very precise) or they are introduced by so-called “implicit definitions”—that is, through the way they are used in the context of a theory. This last way of introducing them—if they have to be “introduced”—seems to be the best. But it makes the meaning of the concepts depend on that of the theory, and most theories can be interpreted in more than one way. As a result, implicity defined concepts, and thus all concepts which are defined explicitly with their help, become not merely “vague” but systematically ambiguous. And the various systematically ambiguous interpretations (such as the points and straight lines of projective geometry) may be completely distinct. Unending Quest, p. 27 (italics added) What I do suggest is that it is always undesirable to make an effort to increase precision for its own sake—especially linguistic precision—since this usually leads to loss of clarity, and to a waste of time and effort on preliminaries which often turn out to be useless, because they are bypassed by the real advance of the subject: one should never try to be more precise than the problem situation demands. ... One further result is, quite simply, the realization that the quest for precision, in words or concepts or meanings, is a wild-goose chase. There simply is no such thing as a precise concept (say, in Frege's sense), though concepts like “price of this kettle” and “thirty pence” are usually precise enough for the problem context in which they are used. Unending Quest, p. 22 (italics in original) Contact us Follow us on Twitter at @IncrementsPod, @BennyChugg, @VadenMasrani Check us out on youtube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_4wZzQyoW4s4ZuE4FY9DQQ Come join our discord server! DM us on twitter or send us an email to get a supersecret link How nebulous is your eggplant? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.

Simon Blackburn was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and Edna J. Koury Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Though he has worked in many areas of philosophy, he is best known for his contributions to metaethics and the philosophy of language. Simon and Robinson discuss the distinction between ethics and metaethics before primarily focusing on the latter, where they explore the concept of realism. Simon's latest books are Lust and Mirror, Mirror. OUTLINE: 4:31 Simon's History with Metaethics 8:20 Distinguishing Ethics and Metaethics 12:57 On Moral Realism 39:42 Frege and the True  43:57 Moral Quasi-realism 54:52 Moral Quasi-realism and Living a Good Life  Robinson's Website: http://robinsonerhardt.com Robinson Erhardt researches symbolic logic and the foundations of mathematics at Stanford University. Join him in conversations with philosophers, scientists, weightlifters, artists, and everyone in-between.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/robinson-erhardt/support

This episode of the Popperian Podcast features an interview that Jed Lea-Henry conducted with Donald Gillies. They speak about Donald's time at the London School of Economics, his personal and professional experiences with Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, the importance of an historical approach to philosophy, specifically how we should understand truth in medicine, and the history of medical discovery. In 1966 Donald Gillies became a graduate student in Karl Popper's department at LSE, doing a PhD with Imre Lakatos. Since then he has carried out research in the philosophy of science and mathematics broadly in the tradition of Popper, Lakatos and Kuhn, while being strongly influenced by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. He focussed much of his research on the philosophy of probability, which, with the invention of Bayesian nets etc, extended into causality. And then went on to work on the philosophy of AI, the philosophy of medicine, and in the application of history and philosophy of science to questions of research assessment and organisation. He is currently retired as Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of Science and Mathematics at University College London. *** Donald Gillies' full biography and academic work can be found at: Donald A. Gillies – Personal Website (wordpress.com) Support via Patreon – https://www.patreon.com/jedleahenry Support via PayPal – https://www.paypal.me/jrleahenry Shop – https://shop.spreadshirt.com.au/JLH-shop/ Support via Bitcoin - 31wQMYixAJ7Tisp773cSvpUuzr2rmRhjaW Website – The Popperian Podcast — Jed Lea-Henry Libsyn – The Popperian Podcast (libsyn.com) Youtube – The Popperian Podcast - YouTube Twitter – https://twitter.com/jedleahenry RSS - https://popperian-podcast.libsyn.com/rss *** Underlying artwork by Arturo Espinosa

Tommaso Dopo Frege | Giovanni Ventimiglia by Angelicum Thomistic Institute

Richard Kimberly Heck has been a professor of philosophy at Brown University since 2005, at which time they left their post at Harvard, where they had taught for over a decade. On the way to receiving their PhD in philosophy and linguistics at MIT, they studied at Duke and Oxford. Riki has also been a guest on three prior episodes of Robinson's Podcast—5, 17, and 41—that covered the philosophy of sex, pornography, and gender. In this episode, however, Robinson and Riki turn to the philosophy of language, and more particularly the reference relation. They pick up with Frege and travel up through Russell, Carnap, Strawson, Kripke, and Lewis, up to the present, covering a range of topics including Fregean senses, the descriptive theory of names, ordinary language philosophy, natural kinds, possible worlds, externalism, and more. Check out http://robinsonerhardt.com and stay up to date! OUTLINE 00:00 In This Episode… 00:37 The Importance of Names 9:59 Recent Shifts in Philosophy of Language 12:44 Riki's Interest in Frege 17:35 Who Was Frege? 30:05 Uber Sinn und Bedeutung 48:33 Knowledge by Description and Acquaintance 55:06: The True and The False 1:00:41 Bertrand Russell On Denoting 1:17:50 Distinguishing Representations 1:20:54 P.F. Strawson and Ordinary Language Philosophy 1:31:43 Carnap on Meaning and Necessity 1:34:52 Kripke and Lewis on Naming and Possible Worlds 1:55:19 Current Work on Naming 2:02:15 Experimental Philosophy of Language 2:12:20 On Twin Earth 2:19:31 A Digression on Philosophical Practice 2:25:14 Ty Burge and Natural Kinds 2:27:55 Referential Vagueness 2:33:08 Internalism and Externalism 2:38:40 Sense, Reference, and Sex 2:41:16 Sense, Reference, and The Begriffsschrift Robinson Erhardt researches symbolic logic and the foundations of mathematics at Stanford University. Join him in conversations with philosophers, scientists, weightlifters, artists, and everyone in-between. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/robinson-erhardt/support

The following conversation is with Tyler Burge. Burge is an American Philosopher who is the Flint Professor of Philosophy at UCLA.  He is the author of numerous articles in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, epistemology, philosophy of language and logic, and history of philosophy.  His most recent books are Origins of Objectivity (2010) and Perception: First Form of Mind (2022).  He has published the first three of several projected volumes of essays: Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege; Foundations of Mind; Cognition Through Understanding.  Two books of essays on his work, with replies, are Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, and Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind.Rate and subscribe if you enjoy the content and follow 'overcoming_the_divide'  on Instagram!Time Stamps::30 Intro3:40 What is anti-individualism 6:45 Plato, Aristotle and anti-individualism 8:45 Environment and up-bringing11:05 Morals and Justice17:45 Morally wrong but accepting of the circumstances22:39 Machiavellianism and Politics30:00 One's interpretation of art Music: Coma-Media (intro)                 WinkingFoxMusic (outro)Recorded: 1/13

Nicla Vassallo"Donne, donne, donne"Mimesis Edizionihttps://mimesisedizioni.itStereotipi, pregiudizi, costruzioni socioculturali segui- tano a penalizzare le donne anche quando sembrano elogiarle, negando la loro differenza singolare, la loro unicità di esseri umani, a cui occorre riconoscere i diritti e i doveri di ogni altro essere umano, in ogni luogo del mondo. La filosofa Nicla Vassallo propone in questo volume una concezione di donne radicalmente altra. Con intensità e rigore, mette a nudo le immagini preconcette e le parole distorte con cui ci si riferisce alle donne e mostra come queste siano alla base dei fatti aberranti di cui le donne sono vittime. Mai come oggi, nel mondo del web e della comunicazione globale, i codici del maschile generano effetti di rimozione delle reali bellezze e dei doni di umanità e intelligenza di cui le donne sono portatrici. Il tentativo è quello di giungere a una verità condivisa, da rimettere comunque in discussione. Per- tanto, l'autrice si confronta non solo con femminismi e filosofie femministe, ma anche con i loro effetti pratici: tempi e luoghi in cui le donne assumono o non assumono rilevanza rispetto alla storia, nonché l'incidenza delle donne in un mondo difficile e complesso, intessuto di interdipendenze di ordine fisico e biologico e immerso in un fitto reticolo di appartenenze: classi sociali, isti- tuzioni, partiti, etnie, religioni, economie, ecosistemi. Per questo suo taglio peculiare, il volume si presenta come un esperimento unico nel panorama degli studi sulle donne.Nicla Vassallo, filosofa di fama internazionale, specializzatasi al King's College London, è Professore Ordinario di Filosofia teoretica presso l'Università di Genova, Ricercatore Associato Isem/Cnr e Alumna King's College London. La sua figura di intellettuale si distingue per l'eleganza, il rigore e la consapevolezza della propria funzione pubblica. Il suo pensiero e le sue ricerche scientifiche hanno innovato e rinnovato settori dell'epistemologia, della filosofia della conoscenza, della metafisica, dei gender studies. Membro di consigli direttivi e comunicati scientifici di autorevoli riviste specialistiche, oltre che di associazioni e fondazioni, ha collaborato con testate giornalistiche quali la Repubblica, Corriere della sera, L'Unità, e la Domenica del Sole 24. Ha scritto e co-curato numerosi volumi, oltre a essere autrice di oltre centocinquanta articoli scientifici, tra cui vanno annoverate diverse voci enciclopediche. Della sua importante produzione scientifica, in italiano e in inglese, ci limitiamo a ricordare alcuni volumi: Filosofia delle donne (2007), Teoria della conoscenza (2008), Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation (2008), Donna m'apparve (2009), Piccolo trattato di epistemologia (2010), Terza cultura (2011), Per sentito dire. Conoscenza e testimonianza (2011), Conversazioni (Mimesis 2012), Reason and Rationality (2012), Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance (2014), Il matrimonio omosessuale è contro natura: Falso! (2015), Breve viaggio tra scienza e tecnologia con etica e donne (2015), Against sex and gender dualism in gender-specific medicine (2015), Meta-philosophical reflection on feminist philosophies of science (2016), Non annegare. Meditazioni sulla conoscenza e sull'ignoranza (2019), Contextualism, factivity and closure (2019), Fatti non foste a viver come bruti. Brevi e imprecisi itinerari per la filosofia della conoscenza (2021). Nel 2013 ha pubblicato la sua prima raccolta di poesie, Orlando in ordine sparso, e successivamente Metafisiche insofferenti per donzelle insolenti (2017), nonché Pandemia amorosa dolorosa (2021). Ha vinto il premio di filosofia “Viaggio a Siracusa” nel 2011. Dal Fai è stata giudicata la “filosofa italiana dalla brillante carriera internazionale”. Pur non considerandosi un'attivista, s'impegna da sempre a favore dei diritti umani e civili, e contro le violenze sulle donne.https://niclavassallo.netIL POSTO DELLE PAROLEAscoltare fa Pensarehttps://ilpostodelleparole.itQuesto show fa parte del network Spreaker Prime. Se sei interessato a fare pubblicità in questo podcast, contattaci su https://www.spreaker.com/show/1487855/advertisement

Is it time for the English-speaking world to move on from analytic philosophy?Looking for a link we mentioned? It's here: https://linktr.ee/philosophyforourtimesFocusing on logic and the meaning of words, analytic philosophy sought to put philosophy on a scientific footing. Yet a century on and critics argue the core questions about the relationship between language and the world have been largely abandoned as insoluble, while the focus on logic and the aping of science is out of sync with the contemporary environment.Should we see analytic philosophy as the high point of an enlightenment scientism that has been in retreat almost since its inception and which is no longer relevant? Or can it be revived by applying its focus on rationality and the logic of words to the divisive and emotional disputes that beset current culture?Distinguished philosopher of language and the senses Barry Smith, Wittgensteinian expert Maria Balaska and maverick post-post modern philosopher Hilary Lawson lock horns over whether philosophy's fixation on language has held us back. Rufus Duits hosts. There are thousands of big ideas to discover at IAI.tv – videos, articles, and courses waiting for you to explore. Find out more: https://iai.tv/podcast-offers?utm_source=podcast&utm_medium=shownotes&utm_campaign=[iai-tv-episode-title] See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Richard Kimberly Heck has been a professor of philosophy at Brown University since 2005, at which time they left their post at Harvard, where they had taught for over a decade. On the way to receiving their PhD in philosophy and linguistics at MIT, they studied at Duke and Oxford. While Professor Heck's primary research focus has been logic and Frege, over the past few years they have shifted to the philosophy of sex and pornography. This is Robinson and Riki's third conversation on the subjects. Their first and second were episodes 5 and 17, though the installments are not sequential and only linked by topic. Among other things, Robinson and Riki discuss empirical approaches to the philosophy of sex, understanding oneself as a gendered person, and the depiction of oral sex in pornography. Linktree: https://linktr.ee/robinsonerhardt Twitter: https://twitter.com/robinsonerhardt Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/robinsonerhardt/ Twitch (Robinson Eats): https://www.twitch.tv/robinsonerhardt YouTube (Robinson Eats): youtube.com/@robinsoneats TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@robinsonerhardt --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/robinson-erhardt/support

The most significant figure in the history of logic after Aristotle is 19th-century German philosopher Gottlob Frege. Frege's work in logic and philosophy is foundational to the “analytic” tradition in philosophy and has had a strong influence on mathematics and computer science. This lecture discusses his revolution in logic and critiques its philosophical foundations. Recorded live on July 6, 2022 as part of the Objectivist Summer Conference.

When I look at the common thread that runs through all of my professional experiences, it is clear that I love to combine mathematics with technology to produce game-changing solutions. My inspiration came from my formal education, work experience and the breakthrough innovations developed by Alan Turing (and Frege and Church before him). Turing imagined machines with amazing computational power and ultimately brought them to life. His innovations tipped the scales of WWII and set the stage for the information revolution – of which I am an active part. Early in my career, I used computational mathematics and software development capabilities to develop automations that boosted internal productivity, drove client efficiencies and improved regulatory compliance. Most recently I founded Coordisc and developed CDM, a technology product that has the potential to completely reorder the global financial system. CDM establishes a better exchange market for commodities by conducting all trades at market-clearing prices with radically improved price discovery, lower total cost of transactions and the elimination hedging needs. Only a fraction of current tradeflow can get this product off the ground and prove its power. From there, CDM can be scaled rapidly. It is not lost on me that I have an enormous responsibility to produce algorithmic technology products that drive results, but also protect ethics and morality. One does not need to look beyond recent financial crises or their Facebook feeds to see that our rush for more powerful technology has eroded our civic, political, cultural and societal systems. I view myself as an “algorithmist with a conscience” and use tools such as game theory to design products ethically. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/wvuncommonplace/message

This week we shift back to the start of the analytic tradition in philosophy with Frege's "Sense and Reference". We are going to take you guys through some interesting linguistic philosophy as well as what we think are the best objections to this view. As always DM us on instagram if anything is not making 'sense'!

La RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI Educational), in collaborazione con l'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici e con l'Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, si è proposta di diffondere nel mondo, tramite le nuove forme di espressione e di comunicazione sociale consentite oggi dalla tecnica, la conoscenza della filosofia nel suo svolgimento storico e nei termini vivi della cultura contemporanea. A tale scopo è nata, nel 1987, l'Enciclopedia multimediale delle scienze filosofiche, che è anche un laboratorio di sperimentazione di nuovi linguaggi, nuove tecnologie e modelli organizzativi. Un'impresa ardua che regge sopra un paradosso: la cultura infatti è l'unico bene dell'umanità che, se diviso fra tutti, piuttosto che diminuire, poiché ciascuno ne riceverebbe solo una parte, diventa più grande, perché molti partecipano a esso. Questa peculiarità della cultura, che spiazza le rigide leggi del mercato, può forse spiegare perché quest'opera sia nata all'interno della RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana piuttosto che in una televisione commerciale. La RAI, in modo accorto, senza trascurare gli esiti commerciali, peraltro già tangibili, e prima ancora di qualunque altro ente televisivo europeo, americano o giapponese, ha dimostrato ancora una volta di sapere svolgere un'insostituibile funzione etico-civile legata alla sua vocazione di servizio pubblico. Quest'opera è stata fatta propria dall'UNESCO che, "considerato l'alto valore scientifico e culturale di quest'enciclopedia, si impegna a garantirne la massima diffusione possibile attraverso le televisioni pubbliche di tutti gli Stati membri dell'organizzazione, attivando la sua rete di istituti, agenzie e collaboratori". (dall'accordo RAI-UNESCO siglato a Parigi il 17 dicembre 1996). I princìpi e le finalità che hanno ispirato questa enciclopedia sono contenuti in un Appello per la filosofia che l'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, la RAI e l'Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana hanno rivolto ai governi e ai parlamenti di tutti i paesi del mondo. Renato Parascandolo ####################################################################################### Nell'aprile del 2002 Odifreddi ha registrato per l'Enciclopedia Multimediale delle Scienze Filosofiche, diretta da Renato Parascandolo, una Storia della logica in 24 lezioni-interviste di circa mezz'ora l'una, raccolte nel 2007 da Rai Trade in un cofanetto di 6 dvd. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/vito-rodolfo-albano7/message

Richard Kimberly Heck has been a professor of philosophy at Brown University since 2005, at which time they left their post at Harvard, where they had taught for over a decade. On the way to receiving their PhD in philosophy and linguistics at MIT, they studied at Duke and Oxford. While Professor Heck's primary research focus has been logic and Frege, over the past few years they have shifted to the philosophy of sex and pornography. This is Robinson and Riki's second conversation about pornography. The first, captured in episode five, was a general introduction to the topic. In this episode they discuss—among other topics—depictions of female sexuality in pornography, villains in the same, the ethics of sexual fantasies, and consent on college campuses. Instagram: @robinsonerhardt TikTok: @robinsonerhardt Twitch: @robinsonerhardt --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/robinson-erhardt/support

Richard Kimberly Heck has been a professor of philosophy at Brown University since 2005, at which time they left their post at Harvard, where they had taught for over a decade. On the way to receiving their PhD in philosophy and linguistics at MIT, they studied at Duke and Oxford. While Professor Heck's primary research focus has been logic and Frege, over the past few years they have shifted to the philosophy of sex and pornography. Among other topics, Robinson and Riki discuss this transition, along with the difficulties of studying pornography as an academic, the subject's aesthetic dimension, and the transformative power of queer pornography. Instagram: @robinsonerhardt --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/robinson-erhardt/support

Noah Healy Founder at CoordiscWhen I look at the common thread that runs through all of my professional experiences, it is clear that I love to combine mathematics with technology to produce game-changing solutions. My inspiration came from my formal education, work experience and the breakthrough innovations developed by Alan Turing (and Frege and Church before him). Turing imagined machines with amazing computational power and ultimately brought them to life. His innovations tipped the scales of WWII and set the stage for the information revolution – of which I am an active part.Early in my career, I used computational mathematics and software development capabilities to develop automations that boosted internal productivity, drove client efficiencies and improved regulatory compliance. Most recently I founded Coordisc and developed CDM, a technology product that has the potential to completely reorder the global financial system. CDM establishes a better exchange market for commodities by conducting all trades at market-clearing prices with radically improved price discovery, lower total cost of transactions and the elimination hedging needs. Only a fraction of current tradeflow can get this product off the ground and prove its power. From there, CDM can be scaled rapidly.It is not lost on me that I have an enormous responsibility to produce algorithmic technology products that drive results, but also protect ethics and morality. One does not need to look beyond recent financial crises or their Facebook feeds to see that our rush for more powerful technology has eroded our civic, political, cultural and societal systems. I view myself as an “algorithmist with a conscience” and use tools such as game theory to design products ethically.OwnerOwnerCoordisc · Jun 2013 - Present · 9 yrs 3 mosJun 2013 - Present · 9 yrs 3 mosFounded a company that developed the Coordinated Discovery Market (price discovery achieve via a coordination game), a technology product that established a better exchange market for commodities by conducting all trades at market-clearing prices with radically improved price discovery, lower total cost of transactions and the elimination hedging needs. Developed/verified the system via discovering a method for pricing transaction costs and creating a disruptive commodity marketplace. Collaborated with academics and financial leaders to promote the system and devise an effective go-to-market strategy.Mick Smith, Consultant M: (619) 227.3118 E: mick.smith@wsiworld.com Commercials Voice Talent:https://www.spreaker.com/user/7768747/track-1-commercials Narratives Voice Talent:https://www.spreaker.com/user/7768747/track-2-narrativesDo you want a free competitive analysis? Let me know at:https://marketing.wsiworld.com/free-competitive-analysis?utm_campaign=Mick_Smith_Podcast&utm_source=SpreakerWebsite:https://www.wsiworld.com/mick-smithLinkedIn:https://www.linkedin.com/in/gmicksmith/Twitter:gmicksmithFacebook business page:https://www.facebook.com/thedoctorofdigital/Instagram:mick_wsi_world & burningamericaMake an appointment:https://app.hubspot.com/meetings/mick-smithBe sure to subscribe, like, & review The Doctor of Digital™ Podcast:https://www.spreaker.com/show/g-mick-smith-phds-tracksYoutube:https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCFDPh9Ich2xppSKQIP2HpmgSign up for the Doctor Up A Podcast course:https://doctor-up-a-podcast.thinkific.com/Fan of the show? Support the episodes here:https://podinbox.com/thedoctorofdigitalpodcastPodpage: https://www.podpage.com/the-doctor-of-digitaltm-gmick-smith-phd/Join the Burning America Community:https://www.patreon.com/SmithConsultingWSITheDoctorofDigitalPodcastAuthor of Burning America: In the Best Interest of the Children? https://burning-america.comburningamerica on Instagram Kindly welcome a sponsor to The Doctor of Digital Podcast and be sure to check out their article: Why Quality Over Quantity is the Key to Effective Contenthttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1at5wZVy3hgHZFAbFrvm0lG2cBUa-UPbnCWn5IFoavRI/edit#If you are looking for more information or would like to sponsor an episode of The Doctor of Digital inform me at mick.smith@wsiworld.com.

Episode: 2805 Gottlob Frege and Formal Logic.  Today, a man of logic.

Mark Siderits' How Things Are: An Introduction to Buddhist Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2022) is a wide-ranging survey of how Buddhist philosophers think about the nature of the world. The book takes readers through topics such as the well-known claim that there is no self, in addition to issues involved in causation, consciousness, and the metaphysics of time. Siderits argues that, as mereological nihilists, Buddhists deny the existence of conventional persons as well as the more ontologically robust self. He shows how their sparse ontology makes use of causation as the central explanation for the wholes that ordinary people mistakenly take to exist. Throughout the book, Siderits makes connections between seminal analytic thinkers like Russell and Frege as well as more contemporary work in metaphysics. Written for philosophically-trained readers, the book emphasizes reconstruction of the arguments for important Buddhist metaphysical ideas, grounded in references to particular texts, thinkers, and traditions. Malcolm Keating is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Yale-NUS College. His research focuses on Sanskrit works of philosophy in Indian traditions, in the areas of language and epistemology. He is the author of Language, Meaning, and Use in Indian Philosophy (Bloomsbury Press, 2019) and host of the podcast Sutras & Stuff. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Mark Siderits' How Things Are: An Introduction to Buddhist Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2022) is a wide-ranging survey of how Buddhist philosophers think about the nature of the world. The book takes readers through topics such as the well-known claim that there is no self, in addition to issues involved in causation, consciousness, and the metaphysics of time. Siderits argues that, as mereological nihilists, Buddhists deny the existence of conventional persons as well as the more ontologically robust self. He shows how their sparse ontology makes use of causation as the central explanation for the wholes that ordinary people mistakenly take to exist. Throughout the book, Siderits makes connections between seminal analytic thinkers like Russell and Frege as well as more contemporary work in metaphysics. Written for philosophically-trained readers, the book emphasizes reconstruction of the arguments for important Buddhist metaphysical ideas, grounded in references to particular texts, thinkers, and traditions. Malcolm Keating is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Yale-NUS College. His research focuses on Sanskrit works of philosophy in Indian traditions, in the areas of language and epistemology. He is the author of Language, Meaning, and Use in Indian Philosophy (Bloomsbury Press, 2019) and host of the podcast Sutras & Stuff. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/philosophy

Mark Siderits' How Things Are: An Introduction to Buddhist Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2022) is a wide-ranging survey of how Buddhist philosophers think about the nature of the world. The book takes readers through topics such as the well-known claim that there is no self, in addition to issues involved in causation, consciousness, and the metaphysics of time. Siderits argues that, as mereological nihilists, Buddhists deny the existence of conventional persons as well as the more ontologically robust self. He shows how their sparse ontology makes use of causation as the central explanation for the wholes that ordinary people mistakenly take to exist. Throughout the book, Siderits makes connections between seminal analytic thinkers like Russell and Frege as well as more contemporary work in metaphysics. Written for philosophically-trained readers, the book emphasizes reconstruction of the arguments for important Buddhist metaphysical ideas, grounded in references to particular texts, thinkers, and traditions. Malcolm Keating is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Yale-NUS College. His research focuses on Sanskrit works of philosophy in Indian traditions, in the areas of language and epistemology. He is the author of Language, Meaning, and Use in Indian Philosophy (Bloomsbury Press, 2019) and host of the podcast Sutras & Stuff. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history

Mark Siderits' How Things Are: An Introduction to Buddhist Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2022) is a wide-ranging survey of how Buddhist philosophers think about the nature of the world. The book takes readers through topics such as the well-known claim that there is no self, in addition to issues involved in causation, consciousness, and the metaphysics of time. Siderits argues that, as mereological nihilists, Buddhists deny the existence of conventional persons as well as the more ontologically robust self. He shows how their sparse ontology makes use of causation as the central explanation for the wholes that ordinary people mistakenly take to exist. Throughout the book, Siderits makes connections between seminal analytic thinkers like Russell and Frege as well as more contemporary work in metaphysics. Written for philosophically-trained readers, the book emphasizes reconstruction of the arguments for important Buddhist metaphysical ideas, grounded in references to particular texts, thinkers, and traditions. Malcolm Keating is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Yale-NUS College. His research focuses on Sanskrit works of philosophy in Indian traditions, in the areas of language and epistemology. He is the author of Language, Meaning, and Use in Indian Philosophy (Bloomsbury Press, 2019) and host of the podcast Sutras & Stuff. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/buddhist-studies

Mark Siderits' How Things Are: An Introduction to Buddhist Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2022) is a wide-ranging survey of how Buddhist philosophers think about the nature of the world. The book takes readers through topics such as the well-known claim that there is no self, in addition to issues involved in causation, consciousness, and the metaphysics of time. Siderits argues that, as mereological nihilists, Buddhists deny the existence of conventional persons as well as the more ontologically robust self. He shows how their sparse ontology makes use of causation as the central explanation for the wholes that ordinary people mistakenly take to exist. Throughout the book, Siderits makes connections between seminal analytic thinkers like Russell and Frege as well as more contemporary work in metaphysics. Written for philosophically-trained readers, the book emphasizes reconstruction of the arguments for important Buddhist metaphysical ideas, grounded in references to particular texts, thinkers, and traditions. Malcolm Keating is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Yale-NUS College. His research focuses on Sanskrit works of philosophy in Indian traditions, in the areas of language and epistemology. He is the author of Language, Meaning, and Use in Indian Philosophy (Bloomsbury Press, 2019) and host of the podcast Sutras & Stuff. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/indian-religions

912 When I look at the common thread that runs through all of my professional experiences, it is clear that I love to combine mathematics with technology to produce game-changing solutions. My inspiration came from my formal education, work experience and the breakthrough innovations developed by Alan Turing (and Frege and Church before him). Turing imagined machines with amazing computational power and ultimately brought them to life. His innovations tipped the scales of WWII and set the stage for the information revolution – of which I am an active part. Early in my career, I used computational mathematics and software development capabilities to develop automations that boosted internal productivity, drove client efficiencies and improved regulatory compliance. Most recently I founded Coordisc and developed CDM, a technology product that has the potential to completely reorder the global financial system. CDM establishes a better exchange market for commodities by conducting all trades at market-clearing prices with radically improved price discovery, lower total cost of transactions and the elimination hedging needs. Only a fraction of current tradeflow can get this product off the ground and prove its power. From there, CDM can be scaled rapidly. It is not lost on me that I have an enormous responsibility to produce algorithmic technology products that drive results, but also protect ethics and morality. One does not need to look beyond recent financial crises or their Facebook feeds to see that our rush for more powerful technology has eroded our civic, political, cultural and societal systems. I view myself as an “algorithmist with a conscience” and use tools such as game theory to design products ethically. ________ Want your customers to talk about you to their friends and family? That's what we do! We get your customers to talk about you so that you get more referrals with video testimonials. Go to www.BusinessBros.biz to be a guest on the show or to find out more on how we can help you get more customers! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/businessbrospod/support

Mark and Adam are here to talk about metaphysics, but man, are they angry about it! In this episode, they break down the various approaches to metaphysics in the Modern Era, from Schopenhauer's Idealism, the concept of teleology, to Peirce's triadic system. Even though they are not as entertained by metaphysics as they are by many other topics, they will discuss it all the same!  Follow us on Twitter! @UlmtdOpinions

The best epistemology chapter yet! In this episode, Mark and Adam heavily agree with a lot of what is being said about the philosophical approaches to knowledge in the Modern Era. John Henry Newman and Ludwig Wittgenstein are highlights with their respective opinions on the role of reason and the grounds for doubt. They also break down Peirce's scientific method, Frege's beliefs on logic, and Bertrand Russell's knowledge by acquaintance and description.  Follow us on Twitter! @UlmtdOpinions

Adam's favorite topic: language! In this episode, Mark and Adam break down the various philosophical opinions on language in the Early Modern Era of philosophy. They discuss Frege's sense and reference, Russell's theory of description, an Wittgenstein's picture theory, language-games, and private language. Well, they discuss these topics for about half the episode. The second half is all about the use of language in our current political climate and how important it is to keep language open and to always do your research.

*The handout for this lecture is available on the IMS Facebook Page (link in Bio) or by emailing ims@chi.ac.uk Cora Diamond is a leading American philosopher who is well known for her contributions to the interpretation of Wittgenstein and Frege, for her contributions to the philosophy of logic, mind, language, as well as to ethics, the philosophy of literature, and the philosophical inquiry into our relation as humans to other animals. Her three areas of greatest influence are in the philosophical foundations of logic, the interpretation of Wittgenstein, and the ethical treatment of animals. Partly under the influence of lessons she arrives at through her own original reading of Wittgenstein, she has criticised mainstream tendencies in analytic philosophy across a dizzying range of subdisciplines. Alongside publishing a dozen or so of the most widely discussed articles on Wittgenstein ever written, she has written several dozen articles advancing powerful and influential criticisms of almost every major living figure who takes themselves to be applying Wittgenstein's ideas to some major area of philosophical research – be it in philosophical logic, contemporary moral theory, animal studies, philosophy and literature, or the study of the history of the analytic tradition of philosophy. Her work has thereby given rise to one whole movement in the interpretation of Wittgenstein (known in the contemporary literature as the resolute reading), to yet another in contemporary moral philosophy and metaethics (known as the realistic spirit approach to ethical problems), and to yet a third in the more narrowly focused field of the moral status of animals (known as the our fellow creatures approach). She has taught at the Universities of Swansea, Sussex, Aberdeen and since 1971 at the University of Virginia, where she is now professor emerita.

On this episode, Adam is...well, kinda bored actually. Mark and Adam break down the approaches to logic of various philosophers in the Modern Era of philosophy. They look at the empiricist logic of Mill, Frege's refoundation of logic, the inductive reasoning of Peirce, and the saga of the Principia Mathematica, all while discussing the absolute importance of being able to use logical reasoning. Stay tuned after the outro to listen to an overly long argument about whether or not we are same sides of a different coin!  Follow us on Twitter! @UlmtdOpinions

The Analytic Philosophy vs Continental Philosophy divide is a faultline running through modern philosophy. In this episode we explore the origins of this divide and why these two paths diverged when their founders were in close contact. Edmund Husserl and Gottlob Frege were the two men that gave rise to Continental Philosophy and Analytic Philosophy respectively and surprisingly they were in close contact — critiquing each other's work. But despite this closeness, there is a historical backdrop to their concerns that invites us to reconsider this difference. Much like the Empiricism/Rationalist divide of the two centuries before Frege and Husserl, the Continental/Analytic divide ran along the line of the English Channel and seems to have been as much a divide of temperament as of philosophy. The British empiricists and the Anglo-American Analytic tradition are concerned more with a non-human standpoint — what reality is out there and how we can gain purest access to it. On the other the Rationalists and Continentals are more concerned with the human element — what it's structure is like and what that tells us about the structure and nature of reality. This difference in focus on the human and non-human element widened into an irreparable chasm by the time of Martin Heidegger and Bertrand Russell. _________________ ⭐ Support the channel (thank you!) ▶ Patreon: patreon.com/thelivingphilosophy ▶ Ko-fi: ko-fi.com/thelivingphilosophy_________________⌛ Timestamps:0:00 Introduction1:14 A Tale of Two Schools3:28 The Continental Arising7:18 The Analytic Tradition9:12 A Metaphilosophical Problem?

How many people in our lives are really fully-fledged people to us and not just NPCs? How do we wrap our minds around the fact that everyone is their own individual person? All this and more probably will not be answered in this episode of Unlimited Opinions! Mark and Adam look at more philosophers in the Modern Era of philosophy, including Frege's birth of analytical philosophy, British Idealism, and Wittgenstein's various philosophical beliefs. Language is discussed heavily, and Mark and Adam describe its importance in every aspect of human life.  Follow us on Twitter! @UlmtdOpinions