Podcasts about unamir

On today's Zero Limits Podcast I am joined in the studio by a former Royal Australian Infantry Sergeant Dean Caswell and Youtube digital content creator.Cas enlisted into the military as an infantry soldier posting to 2/4RAR after a couple of years he was then posted to the 2nd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment where he spent majority of his soldiering career.Cas deployed on four operational tours of duty which saw service in Rwanda 1995 Central Africa with UNAMIR 2, INTERFET East Timor 1999 as the initial lodgement force, UNTAET East Timor 2002-2003 and a Multi Force Organisation MFO Operation MAZURKA to the Sinai Peninsula to monitor the peace agreement of the Camp David Accords that were put in place in 1978 BETWEEN Egypt and Israel. "BORN ON ANZAC DAY AS THE SON OF A SOLDIER, MY FATHER'S MY ROCK AS MY BELOVED DAUGHTER WILL GROW TO CALL ME. MY SCARS ARE WELL PAID FOR BUT HAVE ALSO GIFTED ME WITH THE LUXURY OF TIME, MY WISDOM IS NOW MY WEAPON AND I ENJOY A FIGHT" - Dean CaswellWebsite - www.zerolimitspodcast.comInstagram - https://www.instagram.com/zero.limits.podcast/?hl=enShow Sponsors www.3zeroscoffee.com.au Discount code 3ZLimitswww.getsome.com.au Discount code ZEROLIMITS

Both Tutsis and Hutus who opposed the genocidal government had taken refuge at Hotel Des Mille Collines since April 1994. When the government armed forces were deterred from their planned attacks on the hotel from 2 May by the French government, negotiations began with the RPF forces in order to relocate these refugees to RPF controlled zones. Unfortunately, the government soldiers and Interahamwe militia disregarded the agreement and set up roadblocks and attacked Tutsis being transported in UNAMIR trucks.

In today's episode, political leaders take to radio stations to call for the active participation of every citizen in the hunting and killing of Tutsis. While the killing continues in tens of thousands and bodies of victims are thrown in the Nyabarongo River, UNSG Boutros-Ghali proposes the withdrawal of UNAMIR contingents.

In today's episode, thousands of Tutsis take refuge at the Official Technical School of Kigali (ETO) where they believe the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda will keep them safe. Instead, the UNAMIR contingent stationed at ETO abandons the victims, leading to the death of over 2000 Tutsis.   Massacres continue to spread, taking place in schools, churches and homes across the country.

We veer back to a more serious movie as we bring back Jared Wall of Breaking Liberty to discuss Hotel Rwanda. The film chronicles the true story of Paul Rusesabinga (Don Cheadle), a brave hotel manager who risked his life and those of his family to take in more than 1,000 refugees during the 1994 genocide of the Tutsus by Hutu militia. Join us next week as we continue our discussion on The Godfather trilogy with our friend Keith Knight of Don't Tread on Anyone. Show notes: http://www.actualanarchy.com/199 Presented by ActualAnarchy.com Robert and I analyze popular movies from a Rothbardian/Anarcho-Capitalist perspective. We use movies as a starting point for people who may not be familiar with this way of thinking. Discussion of the plot and decisions that characters make in relation to morality and violations of the non-aggression principle are our bread and butter. We also will highlight and discuss any themes or lessons from Austrian Economics that we can glean from the film. The point is to show what anarchy actually is with instances that are presented in film. We publish at least once per week; and occasionally will do specials surrounding holidays or events (elections/olympics) and have guests. SUBSCRIBE, RATE AND REVIEW ON APPLE PODCASTS (or iTUNES)

When a country’s security is threatened, UN peacekeepers must intervene only after politicians have exhausted all possibilities for conflict prevention. This key conclusion emerged in the first debate in a new series of ‘Lessons from history’, held in Brussels by Friends of Europe on 19 March 2019. Featuring three peace and security experts, focused on UN operations in Africa, the event aimed to better prepare for future crises. “We can learn lessons from UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, home to around half the UN’s work in that field,” said the moderator Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow, Friends of Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary General at NATO. He wanted to look at Rwanda and Liberia, respectively considered as a failure and success in UN peacekeeping. What more can the EU and NATO do to support peacekeeping on this continent and beyond? All three panellists agreed that countries and peacekeepers must prioritise the prevention of conflicts, with intervention only a last resort. That is more important than ever, noted Alice Musabende – a survivor of the 1994 Rwanda genocide and now an academic at Cambridge University – because conflicts are increasingly complex and involve new peacekeepers such as China. “Rwanda was the greatest failure in UN history, but it was not a UN failure, it was ours,” said Linda Melvern, Investigative Journalist and former consultant to the ‘Military One’ trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). She said some UN peacekeepers had tried their best to defend the Tutsi population during the genocide. However there was a shocking lack of accountability from UN member states and decision-makers for the UN’s withdrawal in April 1994 from most of its peacekeeping operation (UNAMIR) in the country. Even today, many of the peacekeepers involved have not been properly debriefed. Rwanda did lead to the African Union (AU) taking more responsibility for intervening in the continent’s conflicts, added Ms Musabende. However, the AU is still under-resourced and mainly relies on funding from the EU, hence the importance of partnerships like this in peacekeeping. Rory Keane, Head of the UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security in Brussels (UNLOPS), noted that Rwanda and other conflicts had also led to reforms in the UN. These include better pre-deployment training for peacekeepers, plus a merger of the peace operations and political teams. The 15-year UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia ended in March 2018 and is roundly considered a success story. For Mr Keane, it underlined the value of a long-term investment in peace, having an exit strategy (the UN lacked this in Libya, leading to chaos and instability) and linking UN operations with local structures. He also said women played a vital role in the peace process, backed later by a female UN peacekeeping force from India. As for the EU, panellists praised its partnership with UN peacekeepers and its security capacity building, among other assets. According to Ms Musabende, Europeans and others must also stop “meddling in Africa and learn to listen more to what Africans themselves want in times of conflict.” The factsheet is available here: https://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/securing-future-lessons-history-1

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can’t we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton’s new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn’t we do something’ through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can’t we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton’s new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn’t we do something’ through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can’t we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton’s new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn’t we do something’ through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can’t we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton’s new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn’t we do something’ through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can’t we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton’s new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn’t we do something’ through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can't we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton's new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn't we do something' through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994.

I was in graduate school during Bosnia and Rwanda. Like everyone else, I watched the video footage and journalistic accounts that came from these two zones of atrocity. Like everyone else, I wondered how humans could do such things to each other. And like everyone else, I asked in anguish “why can't we do something.” Much of the scholarship about Rwanda focuses on this question. Most of it is good, solid, passionate work. but as Herman Salton points out, it largely concentrates on nation-states and their interaction with each other. Salton's new book, Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda (Oxford UP, 2017), asks ‘why couldn't we do something' through a new lens, that of the UN and its various administrative units. Salton, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asian University for Women reminds us that the UN, rather than being monolithic or powerless, had (and has) its own internal politics and actors. Salton argues that interactions between UN leaders and structures greatly shaped the decisions made by the Security Council and by UN representatives and soldiers on the ground in Rwanda. By doing so, he sheds new light on the decision to create UNAMIR, on the behavior of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the decision to remove UNAMIR early in the crisis and on the long-term impact of Rwanda on UN decisions about humanitarian intervention. Moreover, in the interview itself, Salton draws on his own experience in the UN to highlight the way the culture of the Security Council itself shapes the debates and decisions in that body. This podcast is part of an occasional series on the genocide in Rwanda. The series began with interviews with Michael Barnett and Sara Brown. Future interviews will feature Erin Jessee, Tim Longman, and others. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Hes the author of four modules in the Reacting to the Past series, including The Needs of Others: Human Rights, International Organizations and Intervention in Rwanda, 1994. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Empire Club of Canada Presents: Lieutenant General the Honourable Romeo A. Dallaire, O.C., C.M.M., G.O.Q, M.S.C., C.D., Retired Senator With A New Conceptual Base for Conflict Prevention The Honourable Romeo Dallaire has a distinguished career in the Canadian military, achieving the rank of Lieutenant General and Assistant Deputy Minister of Human Resources. In 1994, General Dallaire commanded the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, UNAMIR. His experiences there became the subject of the book Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, which was awarded the Governor General's Literary Award for Non Fiction in 2004 and was the basis of a full length feature film released in 2007. Medically released in 2000, due to PTSD, Senator Dallaire has worked as an author, lecturer and humanitarian, conducting research on conflict resolution and child soldiers at the Kennedy School at Harvard. His most recent book, They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children - the Global Quest to Eradicate the Use of Child Soldiers, introduces the Child Soldier phenomenon and solutions to eradicate it. General Dallaire helped reform the assistance provided to the new generation of veterans particularly affected by post traumatic stress disorder. General Dallaire was appointed to the Senate effective March 24, 2005, and is the Vice Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence as well as President of the Senate Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. He was appointed with Bishop Desmond Tutu to the United Nations Secretary General's Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention in the spring of 2006 and is a Fellow at the Montreal Institute of Genocide Studies, Concordia University. He is an officer in the Order of Canada since 2002, a recipient of the Pearson Peace Medal in 2005, a Grand Officer of the Order of Quebec in 2006. He holds honorary doctorates and fellowships from almost three dozen universities in Canada and the United States. Speaker: Lieutenant General the Hon. Romeo A. Dallaire, O.C., C.M.M., G.O.Q, M.S.C., C.D., Retired Senator *The content presented is free of charge but please note that the Empire Club of Canada retains copyright. Neither the speeches themselves nor any part of their content may be used for any purpose other than personal interest or research without the explicit permission of the Empire Club of Canada.* *Views and Opinions Expressed Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the speakers or panelists are those of the speakers or panelists and do not necessarily reflect or represent the official views and opinions, policy or position held by The Empire Club of Canada.*