Podcasts about aedpa

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you'll hear the Court's opinion in Jones v Hendrix. In this case, the court considered this issue: May a federal inmate who did not challenge their conviction on the ground that the statute did not criminalize their activity subsequently apply for habeas relief after the Supreme Court retroactively invalidates the circuit precedent on which the inmate relied in not challenging their conviction? The case was decided on June 22, 2023. The Supreme Court held that Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's (AEDPA) restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions by filing a §2241 habeas petition. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The majority first clarified the relationship between §2255 and §2241 in the context of federal prisoners challenging their sentences. Congress introduced §2255 to allow prisoners to challenge their sentences in the sentencing court, rather than through a habeas corpus petition under §2241. While the saving clause in §2255(e) preserved access to §2241 in specific situations, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) added restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions. The saving clause does not permit prisoners to circumvent AEDPA's restrictions, even if they are challenging a new interpretation of a criminal statute. The majority found unpersuasive arguments by both Jones and the federal government regarding when §2255 might be considered “inadequate or ineffective,” thus allowing recourse to §2241. AEDPA's restrictions reflect Congress's deliberate choice to balance finality with error correction in the justice system. Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan jointly dissented, arguing that Jones presents the precise type of mismatch contemplated in §2255(h) and would those remand for the lower courts to consider his claim under the proper framework. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion arguing that §2255 requires that Jones's petition alleging legal innocence should have been considered on the merits. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.  --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/scotus-opinions/support

Today, Hunter is joined by longtime criminal justice investigative journalist Radley Balko to discuss his newest reporting on Public Defender systems around the country. Over his storied career covering everything from police misconduct to legislation like AEDPA, Radley noticed that at the heart of so many cases was poor access to competent counsel. This spurred him in the fall of 2023 to start an investigative series into the inner workings of each state's public defender system. Today, Hunter and Radley discuss the first instalment that covered Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Alaska, and California.     Guests: Radley Balko, Investigative Journalist     Resources:   The Watch (Radley's Podcast) https://radleybalko.substack.com/ States of Indigent Defense Part 1 https://radleybalko.substack.com/p/the-states-of-indigent-defense-part Perpetual Crisis in Indigent Defense https://radleybalko.substack.com/p/the-perpetual-crisis-in-indigent Lee Enterprise Arizona https://tulsaworld.com/news/national/on-the-brink-of-crisis-arizona-s-public-defense-system-hit-hard-with-staffing-shortages/article_36323850-9373-11ed-ae95-77f4bfa2e383.html Larry Price https://www.star-telegram.com/news/nation-world/national/article271245217.html#tbl-em-lnvtce7s7qjuyz92fnl     Contact Hunter Parnell:                                 Publicdefenseless@gmail.com  Instagram @PublicDefenselessPodcast Twitter                                                                 @PDefenselessPod www.publicdefenseless.com  Subscribe to the Patron www.patreon.com/PublicDefenselessPodcast  Donate on PayPal https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=5KW7WMJWEXTAJ Donate on Stripe https://donate.stripe.com/7sI01tb2v3dwaM8cMN  

In this case the AEDPA and Brect must BOTH be followed.Support the show

Brown v Davenport, (2022), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court. The case concerned whether habeas relief may be granted if the Brecht v Abrahamson test alone is satisfied, or if the application of Chapman v California by the state courts was unreasonable because of AEDPA. The court held that federal courts can not grant habeas relief when state courts have already ruled on a prisoner's claim, unless the situation satisfies the test laid out in Brecht v Abrahamson, and the test laid out in AEDPA. Background In 2008, Ervine Davenport was convicted of first-degree murder. His conviction was challenged because during his trial he had been placed in shackles. His wrists, waist, and ankles were all restrained, but there was a curtain to prevent the jury from seeing the shackles. The state said that although the shackles were unconstitutional, they did not affect the jury's verdict. Michigan's Court of Appeals agreed with the state. The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed, however, after several jurors testified that they had seen the shackles or heard comments about them, and then sent the case back to the lower courts. The lower court again determined that the shackles did not affect the verdict, and the appellate court agreed with the state once again, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied an appeal. Davenport then challenged his conviction in the federal courts. The district court refused to hear the case. He then petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which agreed to hear the case. This appeals court cited the Deck v Missouri decision, and quoted from Holbrook v Flynn: "shackling is inherently prejudicial". The court found that the state had not met the burden of proof necessary to show that the jury was not influenced by the shackling, and provided habeas relief. The state attempted to have the decision stayed, but the court declined. … United States v Vaello Madero, (2022), was a United States Supreme Court case related to the constitutionality of the exclusion of United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico from the Supplemental Security Income program. In an 8 to 1 decision, the Court ruled that as Congress had been granted broad oversight of United States territories by Article Four of the United States Constitution, the exclusion of the territories by Congress from programs like Supplemental Security Income did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Background. The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program is a benefit for older or impaired citizens that are unable to take care of themselves. As established by Congress, the benefits are available to all citizens of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands, but does not cover residents of the other United States territories, including Puerto Rico. Jose Luis Vaello Madero was a recipient of SSI benefits while living in New York, and then moved to Puetro Rico in 2013. He continued to receive SSI benefits, but eventually the government discovered his new residence, terminated the SSI benefits and sought to recover approximately $28,000 he had improperly received while in Puetro Rico. A federal district judge and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that this exclusion violated the equal protection principle of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution's due process clause, which was first established in Bolling v Sharpe.

Davenport, convicted of first-degree murder following a jury trial where he sat shackled at a table with a “privacy screen,” argued that his conviction should be set aside because the Due Process Clause generally forbids such shackling absent “a special need.” On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing; jurors testified that the shackles had not affected their verdict. The federal district court found habeas relief unwarranted under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Sixth Circuit reversed without analyzing the case under AEDPA. The Supreme Court reversed. When a state court has ruled on the merits of a prisoner's claim, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief without applying both the Supreme Court's "Brecht" test and AEDPA. Brecht held that the harmless-error rule for direct appeals was inappropriate for federal habeas review of final state-court judgments. A state prisoner must show that a state court's error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the trial's outcome, AEDPA instructs that if a state court has adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief “unless” the state court's decision was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” presented in the state-court proceeding. The Court rejected Davenport's argument that the AEDPA inquiry represents a logical subset of the Brecht test, so the Sixth Circuit necessarily found that he satisfied AEDPA. AEDPA asks whether every fair-minded jurist would agree that an error was prejudicial, Brecht asks only whether a federal habeas court itself harbors grave doubt about the verdict. The legal materials a court may consult when answering each test also differ. Even assuming that Davenport's claim can survive Brecht, he cannot satisfy AEDPA. Nothing in Supreme Court precedent is inconsistent with the Michigan Court of Appeals' reliance on post-trial testimony from actual jurors. * Credit: Justia US Supreme Court. Available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-826/ --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus-opinions/support

The United States Constitution contains several provisions regarding the law of criminal procedure. Petit jury and venue provisions—both traceable to enumerated complaints in the Declaration of Independence—are included in Article Three of the United States Constitution. More criminal procedure provisions are contained in the United States Bill of Rights, specifically the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. With the exception of the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Vicinage Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and (maybe) the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, all of the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated to apply to the state governments. Several of these rights regulate pre-trial procedure: access to a non-excessive bail, the right to indictment by a grand jury, the right to an information (charging document), the right to a speedy trial, and the right to be tried in a specific venue. Several of these rights are trial rights: the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses at trial, the right to confront witnesses at trial, the right to a public trial, the right to a trial by an impartial petit jury selected from a specific geography, and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself. Others, such as the assistance of counsel and due process rights, have application throughout the proceeding. If a defendant is convicted, the usual remedy for a violation of one of these provisions is reversal of the conviction or modification of the defendant's sentence. With the exception of structural errors (such as the total denial of counsel), constitutional errors are subject to harmless error analysis, although they must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With the exception of a Double Jeopardy or Speedy Trial violation, the government will usually be permitted to retry the defendant. Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), these provisions are the source of nearly all reviewable errors in federal habeas review of state convictions.

When the federal judges that made up the en banc majority found that while there were factors that supported finding Brendan Dassey’s confession involuntary; that his confession was riddled with inconsistencies and that interrogators did offer up broad assurances that honesty would be rewarded with leniency, the slim majority determined that this was not enough to uphold what four other federal judges found to be a “profound miscarriage of justice.” For the majority climbing the insurmountable wall that AEDPA built took a judicial courage they lacked. In this episode of the Sixth Hour, I’m joined by Professor Brandon Garrett, a distinguished Professor of Law and constitutional scholar prolific in the study of the innocent exonerated by DNA testing whose empirical research on the criminal justice system includes false confessions, forensics, eyewitness testimony and so much more. Join us for a masterclass in AEDPA.

The United States Constitution contains several provisions regarding the law of criminal procedure. Petit jury and venue provisions—both traceable to enumerated complaints in the Declaration of Independence—are included in Article Three of the United States Constitution. More criminal procedure provisions are contained in the United States Bill of Rights, specifically the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. With the exception of the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Vicinage Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and (maybe) the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, all of the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated to apply to the state governments. Several of these rights regulate pre-trial procedure: access to a non-excessive bail, the right to indictment by a grand jury, the right to an information (charging document), the right to a speedy trial, and the right to be tried in a specific venue. Several of these rights are trial rights: the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses at trial, the right to confront witnesses at trial, the right to a public trial, the right to a trial by an impartial petit jury selected from a specific geography, and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself. Others, such as the assistance of counsel and due process rights, have application throughout the proceeding. If a defendant is convicted, the usual remedy for a violation of one of these provisions is reversal of the conviction or modification of the defendant's sentence. With the exception of structural errors (such as the total denial of counsel), constitutional errors are subject to harmless error analysis, although they must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With the exception of a Double Jeopardy or Speedy Trial violation, the government will usually be permitted to retry the defendant. Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), these provisions are the source of nearly all reviewable errors in federal habeas review of state convictions. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/law-school/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/law-school/support

QUESTION PRESENTED: Question One: In Gonzalez V. Crosby this Court held that a Rule 60(b) motion that either adds new habeas claim or attacks the court's previous resolution of the habeas claims, should be treated as a successive habeas petition under AEDPA's §2244. Does Gonzalez extend to post-judgment motions filed under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? a. If so, should a timely filed Rule 59(e) motion toll the the time to file a notice of appeal under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iv)? Question Two: Whether a pro se petitioner must be warned and given an opportunity to withdraw a post-judgment motion which has been recharacterized as a successive habeas petition if that recharacterization will effect his ability to file a timely notice of appeal? Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-6943_bq7c.pdf --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus/support

BI-PARTISAN HELL[col. writ. 8/27/18] (c)’18 Mumia Abu-Jamal In much of public discourse today, one hears the call for “bi-partisanship”, as in the nations two corporate political parties, working together to ‘get things done’.’One hears this mostly from corporate media elites, or intellectuals, who decry the lack of civility in today’s politics.What does this mean in the real world? It is a plaintive plea that politicians play nicer. In practice, however, it really means that they unite before their funders to bequeath more and more of the nations’s wealth on them. For the poor, the impoverished, the immigrant and the oppressed, it really means more war on them!  For the wealthy elites ever love disunion among the people; between irrelevancies -like race, ethnicity and social rank. They have ever and always tried to use race, language, age and other perceived differences, to drive workers at each other’s throats. They have ever stoked fear of the Other to secure their class ascendancy. That’s the lesson of Trumpism, but he is not alone in this. Do you oppose Trump because of his racist, fear-mongering call for the Wall? On April 23, 2006, the NY Daily News published an article quoting Hillary Clinton saying ‘We need a wall’. Immigrant wars, it seems, are bi-partisan, for both corporate parties utilize fear to drive voters to the polls. Bi-parisan politics brought us NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), the AEDPA (the so-called Effective Death Penalty Act), the Chinese Exclusion Act - and so much more. Bi-partisanship equals repression, amid the toothy smiles of political jackals. —(c)’18maj   

It’s a Christmas miracle! Steve Vladeck joins us again! He helps us understand how the Contract with America and a thicket of federal law have resulted in people remaining in prison even though their sentences are based on laws that have been found unconstitutional. Happy Holidays! This show’s links: Steve Vladeck’s faculty profile and writing Steve Vladeck, How an Obscure SCOTUS Procedure Can Solve AEDPA's Retroactivity Catch-22 (and a Growing Circuit Split) Teague v. Lane About the AEDPA Brown v. Allen (Justice Jackson in concurrence: “There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”) It was 100,000 cops on the beat, not 1 million. We regret the error. (1 million? Really?) About the Contract with America Tyler v. Cain Felker v. Turpin Johnson v. United States Steve Vladeck, The Johnson Retroactivity Circuit Split Plot Thickens… Steve Vladeck, Is the Solicitor General Playing a Shell Game With the Supreme Court Over Johnson Retroactivity? Steve’s (and others’) amicus brief in In re Butler on behalf of law professors Special Guest: Steve Vladeck.

What do the federal appeals courts’ striking down of same-sex marriage bans actually mean for marriage equality in the states? Are the state courts bound to follow these decisions while the Supreme Court pursues other interests? Well, Christian got this completely wrong last week, and luckily Michael Dorf is on the line to set us straight. Knowledge bombs galore are dropped. This show’s links: Michael Dorf’s profile, his writing, and his world-famous blog Dorf on Law Amicus, the new Slate podcast by Dahlia Lithwick Oral Argument 36: Firehose of Equality, the last episode in which Anthony Kreis was terrific and Christian made an error that led to this show Michael Dorf, No Massive Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage from South Carolina Michael Dorf, The Relative Importance of Inter-Circuit Conflict and State-Circuit Conflict as Cert Criteria About claim preclusion and nonmutual issue preclusion; United States v. Mendoza (holding that issue preclusion does not apply against the federal government) Colin Wrabley, Applying Federal Courts of Appeals’ Precedent The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution Lochart v. Fretwell, in which Justice Thomas concurred and briefly argued that the “Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court's interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court's interpretation” Martin v. Hunter’ Lessee About the grimly named Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which everyone calls “the AEDPA,” and pronounces ED-puh The federal habeas statute, reflecting in subsection (d) the deference required by the AEDPA to state court judgments on issues of federal law in habeas, which federal law must be “clearly established . . . by the Supreme Court” to be a constraint in habeas on states at all Teague v. Lane About the removal jurisdiction of federal courts, the ability of a defendant to move a state court action to a federal court under certain circumstances Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie — And of the New Federal Common Law (unfortunately only available for a fee on Hein Online) State v. Dukes (an intermediate South Carolina appellate ruling citing State v. Ford Motor Co. for the proposition that South Carolina courts are bound by the constitutional rulings of the Fourth Circuit) Kevin Walsh, Re: SSM Cert Denials (suggesting South Carolina should review and change its apparent approach to Fourth Circuit precedent) Michael Dorf, Should Anti-SSM Appeals Court Judges Rule For Same-Sex Marriage Based On The Cert Denials? Michael Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law (an article analyzing the general point applied in the above-linked blog post) Oral Argument 28: A Wonderful Catastrophe, which is all about and contains links for the famous Erie case Michael Dorf, How the Supreme Court’s Inaction on Same-Sex Marriage Echoes Its Conduct in the Civil Rights Era United States v. Windsor Michael Dorf, Cert Denied Is Justice Delayed: SCOTUS Kremlinology in the SSM Cases Stuart v. Laird and some background Special Guest: Michael Dorf.