Podcasts about federal rules

Today, Jim Garrity examines a critical issue in trial practice: whether an incomplete deposition—cut short when the deponent becomes unavailable—can be admitted at trial, particularly when the opposing party had no opportunity for cross-examination. Drawing on a new Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision and Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Jim explores the court's decision, the key factors trial lawyers should argue for or against exclusion, and the balancing test that should be used when essential testimony hangs in the balance. Discover practical strategies for both offering and opposing use of incomplete deposition transcripts in high-stakes litigation. Thanks for listening!SHOW NOTESInsight Terminal Solutions, LLC v. Cecelia Financial Management, et al., No. 24-5222, 2025 WL 2434894 (6th Cir. August 25, 2025) (reversing trial court's ruling that deposition was categorically inadmissible because defendants did not have an opportunity to cross-examine a 30 B6 deponent before his death)Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a) (setting three-part test for admissibility of deposition testimony at trial)Treharne v. Callahan, 426 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1970) (court upheld the district court's discretionary admission of written interrogatory answers given by the now-deceased defendant, even though the plaintiff could not cross-examine; under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 33, answers to interrogatories can be used to the same extent as depositions, which are admissible if the witness is dead; further, the need for the evidence—being the only defense evidence—outweighed the lack of cross-examination, especially where death was not caused by the party offering the evidence and there was no fault involved)Duttle v. Bandler & Kass, 127 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (magistrate declined to exclude a deposition taken without defense counsel present, even though the witness died before cross-examination could occur; under Rule 32(a), depositions of deceased witnesses may be admitted if the party had notice and opportunity to participate, and the prejudice to the party proffering the deposition (who would lose critical evidence) outweighed potential prejudice to the opponent. Court proposed that any prejudice could be minimized by stipulating to facts the defense might have developed via cross-examination, reducing the impact of any lost impeachment opportunity)Derewecki v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 353 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1965) (trial and appeals courts admitted decedent's incomplete depositions as evidence, despite the absence of cross-examination by the defendant who had no chance to cross-examine before the witness died; Rule 26 authorized admission of depositions when the deponent is deceased as long as the circumstances justified it, and both parties had agreed the deposition was “completed” for evidentiary purposes; further, the harm in excluding the sole direct evidence of how the accident occurred outweighed the right to cross-examination. Courts must consider whether the lack of cross is due to fault; here, no such fault was shown)Waterman S. S. Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 414 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1969) (deposition of a witness who died before any cross-examination by the adverse party was admitted in bench trial; where there was no realistic possibility that cross-examination would have materially aided the party, exclusion was not required. Further, deposition testimony corroborated by other evidence; thus, lack of cross-examination did not affect the outcome)In re Reingold, 157 F.3d 904 (5th Cir. 1998) (testimony excluded at trial level; exclusion reversed. Trial court excluded party-plaintiff's perpetuation deposition, taken while the plaintiff was gravely ill and ended before cross-examination could be completed due to the witness's declining condition and ultimate death; Fifth Circuit held this exclusion to be a clear abuse of discretion and granted mandamus relief directing admission of the video deposition; FRCP 32(a) creates strong presumption favoring admission of a deceased witness's deposition. Exclusion is only justified by a specific and particularized showing of prejudice, such as stating what crucial areas would have been dealt with in cross-examination; a mere generalized complaint about the lack of cross is insufficient. Since the opposing party had already conducted a substantial deposition of the witness in prior proceedings, the risks of prejudice were further minimized)

Montana's Medicaid office is struggling to process applications in a timely manner. The state is planning to fast track new work requirements and eligibility checks – which would mean even more paperwork for applicants and state officials.

This conversation provides a comprehensive overview of civil discovery, focusing on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and New York state law. It emphasizes the importance of understanding Rule 26 as the foundation of discovery, the concept of proportionality, and the various tools available for gathering information. The discussion also covers the duties of disclosure, the role of expert testimony, and the significance of e-discovery in modern litigation. Key best practices for managing electronically stored information (ESI) and the potential consequences of failing to meet discovery obligations are highlighted, making this a vital resource for law students and practitioners alike.TakeawaysCivil discovery is critical for aspiring lawyers.Rule 26 is the central nervous system of discovery.Proportionality is essential in determining the scope of discovery.Automatic disclosures streamline the discovery process.Expert testimony requires detailed disclosures under Rule 26.The meet and confer process is mandatory and strategic.Depositions and interrogatories are key tools for gathering information.Requests for production must clearly specify ESI needs.Understanding privilege is crucial in discovery.Cost management is vital to avoid excessive litigation expenses.civil discovery, FRCP, e-discovery, legal process, litigation, Rule 26, proportionality, discovery tools, legal obligations, attorney-client privilege

You will be hearing a lot about motions to dismiss indictments based on the Trump Administration and DOJ's “vindictive prosecution” in violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the DOJ Manual. But the very FIRST such motion has been filed by Kilmar Abrego Garcia, who was illegally removed to El Salvador and tortured, and then had a phony indictment brought against him by Trump's DOJ. Will Judge Crenshaw order Abrego Garcia's release from federal detention on his criminal charges this week and dismiss his indictment? Michael Popok takes a hard look at the new filing and makes a stunning prediction. Thanks to Ground News! Go to https://Ground.News/AF to cut through misinformation, critically analyze the news shaping our lives and hold the media accountable. Save 40% off unlimited access to Ground News with my link or scan the QR code on screen. Remember to subscribe to ALL the MeidasTouch Network Podcasts: MeidasTouch: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/meidastouch-podcast Legal AF: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/legal-af MissTrial: https://meidasnews.com/tag/miss-trial The PoliticsGirl Podcast: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/the-politicsgirl-podcast The Influence Continuum: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/the-influence-continuum-with-dr-steven-hassan Mea Culpa with Michael Cohen: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/mea-culpa-with-michael-cohen The Weekend Show: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/the-weekend-show Burn the Boats: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/burn-the-boats Majority 54: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/majority-54 Political Beatdown: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/political-beatdown On Democracy with FP Wellman: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/on-democracy-with-fpwellman Uncovered: https://www.meidastouch.com/tag/maga-uncovered Coalition of the Sane: https://meidasnews.com/tag/coalition-of-the-sane Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This conversation delves into the complexities of authentication in evidence law, focusing on the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Article IX. It explores the practical methods for authenticating evidence, the challenges posed by digital evidence, the critical role of chain of custody, and the implications of spoliation. The discussion also highlights the distinction between authentication and relevance, the standards for expert testimony, and provides practical guidance for law students preparing for exams and legal practice.TakeawaysAuthentication is crucial for establishing the reliability of evidence.The judge's role is to determine if evidence can be considered by a jury.Rule 901 outlines the basic requirements for authentication.Digital evidence presents unique challenges due to its manipulability.Chain of custody is essential for maintaining evidence integrity.Spoliation can lead to severe legal consequences.Relevance and authentication are distinct legal hurdles.Expert testimony must meet specific admissibility standards.Law students should anticipate authentication objections in court.Understanding the evolving nature of evidence law is vital for legal professionals.authentication, evidence law, Federal Rules of Evidence, digital evidence, chain of custody, spoliation, relevance, expert testimony, law students, legal practice

Congresswoman Stacey Plaskett, the Delegate from the U.S. Virgin Islands, became the lone remaining defendant in a civil case filed by six survivors of Jeffrey Epstein's abuse after the court dismissed the claims against other parties. The survivors alleged that Plaskett was complicit in Epstein's sex trafficking operation, accusations that she forcefully denied. In April 2025, a second amended complaint reiterated the charges, to which Plaskett responded by filing a motion to dismiss, calling the claims baseless and defamatory. She has consistently framed the lawsuit as politically motivated and lacking in legal merit.Prior to this, in July 2024, Plaskett filed a motion under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking sanctions against the survivors' attorney. Rule 11 motions are designed to punish parties or lawyers for filing frivolous, unfounded, or harassing litigation. Plaskett argued that the case against her was precisely that.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.610915.127.0.pdf (courtlistener.com)

In July 2024, Delegate Stacey Plaskett filed a lawsuit under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking sanctions against the attorney representing six survivors of Jeffrey Epstein's abuse. Plaskett argued that the amended lawsuit against her was frivolously filed, lacked any factual or legal foundation, and was intended to harass rather than pursue a legitimate legal claim. She sought sanctions to penalize and deter what she viewed as a baseless and politically motivated suit.However, the court denied her Rule 11 motion, concluding that the survivors' filing was neither frivolous nor made for improper purposes. The ruling underscored that the suit was grounded in sufficient factual and legal claims, and that the plaintiffs' allegations merited judicial consideration rather than sanctions. In essence, the denial affirmed that the litigation could proceed on substantive grounds.Also....In the released segment of her May 9, 2023 deposition, Stacey Plaskett was pressed on her awareness of Jeffrey Epstein's role in the Virgin Islands and the extent of his influence with local officials and institutions. The questioning focused on whether she had knowledge of Epstein's financial relationships, his political donations, or his contacts with Virgin Islands leadership during the period when he was operating in the territory. Plaskett largely distanced herself from Epstein, stating that she had no direct involvement with him and little knowledge of his activities beyond what was publicly known.Attorneys also asked Plaskett about government oversight, her interactions with agencies connected to Epstein's business holdings, and whether she had ever received benefits, contributions, or favors traceable to Epstein or his companies. In the available transcript, she denied having such connections and emphasized that she was not involved in decisions related to Epstein's finances or residency. While limited to roughly 25 pages, the deposition underscores how central Virgin Islands political figures were to JPMorgan's defense and the USVI's allegations—whether officials ignored red flags about Epstein or knowingly permitted him to operate.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.com

Congresswoman Stacey Plaskett, the Delegate from the U.S. Virgin Islands, became the lone remaining defendant in a civil case filed by six survivors of Jeffrey Epstein's abuse after the court dismissed the claims against other parties. The survivors alleged that Plaskett was complicit in Epstein's sex trafficking operation, accusations that she forcefully denied. In April 2025, a second amended complaint reiterated the charges, to which Plaskett responded by filing a motion to dismiss, calling the claims baseless and defamatory. She has consistently framed the lawsuit as politically motivated and lacking in legal merit.Prior to this, in July 2024, Plaskett filed a motion under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking sanctions against the survivors' attorney. Rule 11 motions are designed to punish parties or lawyers for filing frivolous, unfounded, or harassing litigation. Plaskett argued that the case against her was precisely that.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.610915.127.0.pdf (courtlistener.com)Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

In July 2024, Delegate Stacey Plaskett filed a lawsuit under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking sanctions against the attorney representing six survivors of Jeffrey Epstein's abuse. Plaskett argued that the amended lawsuit against her was frivolously filed, lacked any factual or legal foundation, and was intended to harass rather than pursue a legitimate legal claim. She sought sanctions to penalize and deter what she viewed as a baseless and politically motivated suit.However, the court denied her Rule 11 motion, concluding that the survivors' filing was neither frivolous nor made for improper purposes. The ruling underscored that the suit was grounded in sufficient factual and legal claims, and that the plaintiffs' allegations merited judicial consideration rather than sanctions. In essence, the denial affirmed that the litigation could proceed on substantive grounds.Also....In the released segment of her May 9, 2023 deposition, Stacey Plaskett was pressed on her awareness of Jeffrey Epstein's role in the Virgin Islands and the extent of his influence with local officials and institutions. The questioning focused on whether she had knowledge of Epstein's financial relationships, his political donations, or his contacts with Virgin Islands leadership during the period when he was operating in the territory. Plaskett largely distanced herself from Epstein, stating that she had no direct involvement with him and little knowledge of his activities beyond what was publicly known.Attorneys also asked Plaskett about government oversight, her interactions with agencies connected to Epstein's business holdings, and whether she had ever received benefits, contributions, or favors traceable to Epstein or his companies. In the available transcript, she denied having such connections and emphasized that she was not involved in decisions related to Epstein's finances or residency. While limited to roughly 25 pages, the deposition underscores how central Virgin Islands political figures were to JPMorgan's defense and the USVI's allegations—whether officials ignored red flags about Epstein or knowingly permitted him to operate.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

This conversation delves into the concept of judicial notice, a procedural mechanism that allows courts to accept certain facts as true without formal evidence. The discussion covers the distinctions between adjudicative and legislative facts, the framework of Federal Rule of Evidence 201, and the categories of facts that can be judicially noticed. It emphasizes the importance of due process, the differences in jury instructions between civil and criminal cases, and the implications of judicial notice on appeal. The conversation also touches on the interplay between judicial notice and other legal doctrines, as well as global perspectives on the application of judicial notice. Finally, it provides essential exam preparation tips for law students.takeawaysJudicial notice is a powerful tool for efficiency in legal proceedings.Understanding the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts is crucial for legal practice.Federal Rule of Evidence 201 governs the application of judicial notice.Not all facts are eligible for judicial notice; they must be indisputable.Judicial notice can be taken at any stage of the legal process, including appeals.Due process safeguards are essential when taking judicial notice.In civil cases, judicially noticed facts are conclusive for juries, while in criminal cases, they are not.Judicial notice cannot substitute for actual proof in contested matters.Wikipedia is not a reliable source for judicial notice in court.Mastering the rules surrounding judicial notice is vital for law exams.judicial notice, Federal Rule of Evidence 201, adjudicative facts, legislative facts, legal shortcuts, due process, jury instructions, appellate courts, evidence law, legal education

Rene Thomas Folse, JD, Ph.D. is the host for this edition which reports on the following news stories: WCAB En Banc Concludes Electronic Testimony Must be Readily Permitted. Cal Supreme Court Improves Arbitration Rules for Employers. Federal Rule 702 Helps Monsanto Defend Roundup Cancer Case. Spine Device Company CEO Sentenced for False Statements to CMS. Kidnapping Charges Added to LAPD Officer Facing Insurance Fraud. L.A. Fire Captain Charged with Falsifying Disability Claim. OSHA Hosts Safe and Sound Week August 11-17. PET-enabled Dual-Energy CT is Major Step Forward in Imaging.

In October 2020, Ghislaine Maxwell filed a combined memorandum opposing Virginia Roberts Giuffre's request to extend the deposition deadline and, separately, moved for sanctions under Federal Rule 45. Maxwell argued that Giuffre served subpoenas in ways that directly violated Rule 45(a)(4), which requires timely pre-notice to all parties before serving a non‑party subpoena for documents. Specifically, Maxwell noted that Giuffre attempted to subpoena witnesses—such as Jeffrey Epstein, Sarah Kellen, and Nadia Marcincova—without providing proper advance notice to the defense, including issuing subpoenas before notifying Maxwell's counselMaxwell framed this as part of a broader pattern of bad‑faith discovery tactics: she emphasized that Giuffre squandered the discovery period, failed to diligently schedule depositions, and attempted to secure depositions well past the court‑ordered cutoff without showing good cause. In support, she detailed her own efforts to coordinate schedules and comply with rules, contrasted with Giuffre's “last‑minute scramble,” and urged the court to reject the extension of deadlines and impose sanctions under Rule 45 and Rule 37 for the procedural violationsto contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.447706.1137.19.pdf (free.law)

In October 2020, Ghislaine Maxwell filed a combined memorandum opposing Virginia Roberts Giuffre's request to extend the deposition deadline and, separately, moved for sanctions under Federal Rule 45. Maxwell argued that Giuffre served subpoenas in ways that directly violated Rule 45(a)(4), which requires timely pre-notice to all parties before serving a non‑party subpoena for documents. Specifically, Maxwell noted that Giuffre attempted to subpoena witnesses—such as Jeffrey Epstein, Sarah Kellen, and Nadia Marcincova—without providing proper advance notice to the defense, including issuing subpoenas before notifying Maxwell's counselMaxwell framed this as part of a broader pattern of bad‑faith discovery tactics: she emphasized that Giuffre squandered the discovery period, failed to diligently schedule depositions, and attempted to secure depositions well past the court‑ordered cutoff without showing good cause. In support, she detailed her own efforts to coordinate schedules and comply with rules, contrasted with Giuffre's “last‑minute scramble,” and urged the court to reject the extension of deadlines and impose sanctions under Rule 45 and Rule 37 for the procedural violationsto contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.447706.1137.19.pdf (free.law)

Congresswoman Stacey Plaskett, the Delegate from the U.S. Virgin Islands, became the lone remaining defendant in a civil case filed by six survivors of Jeffrey Epstein's abuse after the court dismissed the claims against other parties. The survivors alleged that Plaskett was complicit in Epstein's sex trafficking operation, accusations that she forcefully denied. In April 2025, a second amended complaint reiterated the charges, to which Plaskett responded by filing a motion to dismiss, calling the claims baseless and defamatory. She has consistently framed the lawsuit as politically motivated and lacking in legal merit.Prior to this, in July 2024, Plaskett filed a motion under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking sanctions against the survivors' attorney. Rule 11 motions are designed to punish parties or lawyers for filing frivolous, unfounded, or harassing litigation. Plaskett argued that the case against her was precisely that.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.610915.127.0.pdf (courtlistener.com)Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

In July 2024, Delegate Stacey Plaskett filed a lawsuit under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking sanctions against the attorney representing six survivors of Jeffrey Epstein's abuse. Plaskett argued that the amended lawsuit against her was frivolously filed, lacked any factual or legal foundation, and was intended to harass rather than pursue a legitimate legal claim. She sought sanctions to penalize and deter what she viewed as a baseless and politically motivated suit.However, the court denied her Rule 11 motion, concluding that the survivors' filing was neither frivolous nor made for improper purposes. The ruling underscored that the suit was grounded in sufficient factual and legal claims, and that the plaintiffs' allegations merited judicial consideration rather than sanctions. In essence, the denial affirmed that the litigation could proceed on substantive grounds.Also....In the released segment of her May 9, 2023 deposition, Stacey Plaskett was pressed on her awareness of Jeffrey Epstein's role in the Virgin Islands and the extent of his influence with local officials and institutions. The questioning focused on whether she had knowledge of Epstein's financial relationships, his political donations, or his contacts with Virgin Islands leadership during the period when he was operating in the territory. Plaskett largely distanced herself from Epstein, stating that she had no direct involvement with him and little knowledge of his activities beyond what was publicly known.Attorneys also asked Plaskett about government oversight, her interactions with agencies connected to Epstein's business holdings, and whether she had ever received benefits, contributions, or favors traceable to Epstein or his companies. In the available transcript, she denied having such connections and emphasized that she was not involved in decisions related to Epstein's finances or residency. While limited to roughly 25 pages, the deposition underscores how central Virgin Islands political figures were to JPMorgan's defense and the USVI's allegations—whether officials ignored red flags about Epstein or knowingly permitted him to operate.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

In October 2020, Ghislaine Maxwell filed a combined memorandum opposing Virginia Roberts Giuffre's request to extend the deposition deadline and, separately, moved for sanctions under Federal Rule 45. Maxwell argued that Giuffre served subpoenas in ways that directly violated Rule 45(a)(4), which requires timely pre-notice to all parties before serving a non‑party subpoena for documents. Specifically, Maxwell noted that Giuffre attempted to subpoena witnesses—such as Jeffrey Epstein, Sarah Kellen, and Nadia Marcincova—without providing proper advance notice to the defense, including issuing subpoenas before notifying Maxwell's counselMaxwell framed this as part of a broader pattern of bad‑faith discovery tactics: she emphasized that Giuffre squandered the discovery period, failed to diligently schedule depositions, and attempted to secure depositions well past the court‑ordered cutoff without showing good cause. In support, she detailed her own efforts to coordinate schedules and comply with rules, contrasted with Giuffre's “last‑minute scramble,” and urged the court to reject the extension of deadlines and impose sanctions under Rule 45 and Rule 37 for the procedural violationsto contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.447706.1137.19.pdf (free.law)Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

In October 2020, Ghislaine Maxwell filed a combined memorandum opposing Virginia Roberts Giuffre's request to extend the deposition deadline and, separately, moved for sanctions under Federal Rule 45. Maxwell argued that Giuffre served subpoenas in ways that directly violated Rule 45(a)(4), which requires timely pre-notice to all parties before serving a non‑party subpoena for documents. Specifically, Maxwell noted that Giuffre attempted to subpoena witnesses—such as Jeffrey Epstein, Sarah Kellen, and Nadia Marcincova—without providing proper advance notice to the defense, including issuing subpoenas before notifying Maxwell's counselMaxwell framed this as part of a broader pattern of bad‑faith discovery tactics: she emphasized that Giuffre squandered the discovery period, failed to diligently schedule depositions, and attempted to secure depositions well past the court‑ordered cutoff without showing good cause. In support, she detailed her own efforts to coordinate schedules and comply with rules, contrasted with Giuffre's “last‑minute scramble,” and urged the court to reject the extension of deadlines and impose sanctions under Rule 45 and Rule 37 for the procedural violationsto contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.447706.1137.19.pdf (free.law)Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

This conversation delves into the Best Evidence Rule (BER), a crucial aspect of evidence law that is often misunderstood by law students. The discussion covers the core principles of the BER, its application in various contexts, and the exceptions that allow for secondary evidence. It also addresses modern challenges posed by digital evidence and social media, as well as strategies for effectively tackling evidence exam questions. The conversation emphasizes the importance of understanding the nuances of the BER for both academic success and practical legal application.TakeawaysThe Best Evidence Rule is critical for law school exams.Understanding the BER can save time on complex exam questions.The rule requires the original document to prove its content.The BER applies broadly to various forms of evidence, including digital.Exceptions to the BER allow for secondary evidence in specific situations.Modern challenges include the authenticity of digital evidence.Exam strategies should focus on spotting the BER issue quickly.Independent knowledge can exempt testimony from the BER.The jury decides factual questions related to the BER.Mastering the BER is essential for success in law school and the bar.Best Evidence Rule, law school, evidence exam, legal principles, Federal Rules of Evidence, exam strategies, digital evidence, authentication, legal education, law students

In October 2020, Ghislaine Maxwell filed a combined memorandum opposing Virginia Roberts Giuffre's request to extend the deposition deadline and, separately, moved for sanctions under Federal Rule 45. Maxwell argued that Giuffre served subpoenas in ways that directly violated Rule 45(a)(4), which requires timely pre-notice to all parties before serving a non‑party subpoena for documents. Specifically, Maxwell noted that Giuffre attempted to subpoena witnesses—such as Jeffrey Epstein, Sarah Kellen, and Nadia Marcincova—without providing proper advance notice to the defense, including issuing subpoenas before notifying Maxwell's counselMaxwell framed this as part of a broader pattern of bad‑faith discovery tactics: she emphasized that Giuffre squandered the discovery period, failed to diligently schedule depositions, and attempted to secure depositions well past the court‑ordered cutoff without showing good cause. In support, she detailed her own efforts to coordinate schedules and comply with rules, contrasted with Giuffre's “last‑minute scramble,” and urged the court to reject the extension of deadlines and impose sanctions under Rule 45 and Rule 37 for the procedural violationsto contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.447706.1137.19.pdf (free.law)Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

In October 2020, Ghislaine Maxwell filed a combined memorandum opposing Virginia Roberts Giuffre's request to extend the deposition deadline and, separately, moved for sanctions under Federal Rule 45. Maxwell argued that Giuffre served subpoenas in ways that directly violated Rule 45(a)(4), which requires timely pre-notice to all parties before serving a non‑party subpoena for documents. Specifically, Maxwell noted that Giuffre attempted to subpoena witnesses—such as Jeffrey Epstein, Sarah Kellen, and Nadia Marcincova—without providing proper advance notice to the defense, including issuing subpoenas before notifying Maxwell's counselMaxwell framed this as part of a broader pattern of bad‑faith discovery tactics: she emphasized that Giuffre squandered the discovery period, failed to diligently schedule depositions, and attempted to secure depositions well past the court‑ordered cutoff without showing good cause. In support, she detailed her own efforts to coordinate schedules and comply with rules, contrasted with Giuffre's “last‑minute scramble,” and urged the court to reject the extension of deadlines and impose sanctions under Rule 45 and Rule 37 for the procedural violationsto contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.447706.1137.19.pdf (free.law)Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

Ghislaine Maxwell filed a formal motion in January 2024 seeking sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b) and 37(c), arguing that Virginia Giuffre had failed to comply with both a court-ordered discovery directive and Rule 26(a) disclosure requirements. Maxwell's team, led by attorney Laura Menninger, detailed repeated instances in which Giuffre withheld or failed to fully disclose critical medical records and the identities of treating health providers—information essential to assessing her claims for emotional and physical distress. They characterized these omissions as intentional and willful, highlighting Giuffre's failure to identify providers like Dr. Lightfoot in Australia, among others, despite clear court orders and confirmations made during an April 21, 2016 hearing.Maxwell contended these violations had prejudiced her defense and undermined the integrity of the discovery process—arguing that lesser sanctions would be insufficient. Her motion sought a range of potential consequences under Rule 37(b), such as preclusion of Giuffre's damages claims or striking portions of her case, as well as cost-shifting remedies available under Rule 37(c), including attorney's fees and possibly an adverse inference against Giuffre. The motion emphasized that Giuffre and her counsel were well aware of the consequences of non-compliance and that her continued delays and omissions should trigger serious sanctions.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:epstein-documents-943-pages - DocumentCloud

Ghislaine Maxwell filed a formal motion in January 2024 seeking sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b) and 37(c), arguing that Virginia Giuffre had failed to comply with both a court-ordered discovery directive and Rule 26(a) disclosure requirements. Maxwell's team, led by attorney Laura Menninger, detailed repeated instances in which Giuffre withheld or failed to fully disclose critical medical records and the identities of treating health providers—information essential to assessing her claims for emotional and physical distress. They characterized these omissions as intentional and willful, highlighting Giuffre's failure to identify providers like Dr. Lightfoot in Australia, among others, despite clear court orders and confirmations made during an April 21, 2016 hearing.Maxwell contended these violations had prejudiced her defense and undermined the integrity of the discovery process—arguing that lesser sanctions would be insufficient. Her motion sought a range of potential consequences under Rule 37(b), such as preclusion of Giuffre's damages claims or striking portions of her case, as well as cost-shifting remedies available under Rule 37(c), including attorney's fees and possibly an adverse inference against Giuffre. The motion emphasized that Giuffre and her counsel were well aware of the consequences of non-compliance and that her continued delays and omissions should trigger serious sanctions.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:epstein-documents-943-pages - DocumentCloudBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

Ghislaine Maxwell filed a formal motion in January 2024 seeking sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b) and 37(c), arguing that Virginia Giuffre had failed to comply with both a court-ordered discovery directive and Rule 26(a) disclosure requirements. Maxwell's team, led by attorney Laura Menninger, detailed repeated instances in which Giuffre withheld or failed to fully disclose critical medical records and the identities of treating health providers—information essential to assessing her claims for emotional and physical distress. They characterized these omissions as intentional and willful, highlighting Giuffre's failure to identify providers like Dr. Lightfoot in Australia, among others, despite clear court orders and confirmations made during an April 21, 2016 hearing.Maxwell contended these violations had prejudiced her defense and undermined the integrity of the discovery process—arguing that lesser sanctions would be insufficient. Her motion sought a range of potential consequences under Rule 37(b), such as preclusion of Giuffre's damages claims or striking portions of her case, as well as cost-shifting remedies available under Rule 37(c), including attorney's fees and possibly an adverse inference against Giuffre. The motion emphasized that Giuffre and her counsel were well aware of the consequences of non-compliance and that her continued delays and omissions should trigger serious sanctions.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:epstein-documents-943-pages - DocumentCloudBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

In her formal response to the government's motion, Ghislaine Maxwell opposed the unsealing of grand jury transcripts in her criminal case, arguing that such a release would violate long-standing principles of grand jury secrecy and unfairly prejudice her rights. Her legal team emphasized that the transcripts in question contain sensitive testimony and confidential material that should remain protected under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Maxwell's attorneys insisted that the government's request lacked compelling justification and that releasing the materials would serve no legitimate public interest while potentially influencing public perception and undermining her right to a fair trial.Furthermore, Maxwell's response accused the government of attempting to circumvent established legal norms for tactical purposes. Her defense argued that any disclosure could taint potential jurors and further inflame the already intense media scrutiny surrounding her case. They maintained that the government had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances to override the presumption of secrecy traditionally afforded to grand jury proceedings. In closing, Maxwell's team urged the court to deny the motion and preserve the confidentiality of the grand jury materials to uphold judicial integrity and due process.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.539612.803.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

In her formal response to the government's motion, Ghislaine Maxwell opposed the unsealing of grand jury transcripts in her criminal case, arguing that such a release would violate long-standing principles of grand jury secrecy and unfairly prejudice her rights. Her legal team emphasized that the transcripts in question contain sensitive testimony and confidential material that should remain protected under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Maxwell's attorneys insisted that the government's request lacked compelling justification and that releasing the materials would serve no legitimate public interest while potentially influencing public perception and undermining her right to a fair trial.Furthermore, Maxwell's response accused the government of attempting to circumvent established legal norms for tactical purposes. Her defense argued that any disclosure could taint potential jurors and further inflame the already intense media scrutiny surrounding her case. They maintained that the government had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances to override the presumption of secrecy traditionally afforded to grand jury proceedings. In closing, Maxwell's team urged the court to deny the motion and preserve the confidentiality of the grand jury materials to uphold judicial integrity and due process.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.539612.803.0.pdf

In her formal response to the government's motion, Ghislaine Maxwell opposed the unsealing of grand jury transcripts in her criminal case, arguing that such a release would violate long-standing principles of grand jury secrecy and unfairly prejudice her rights. Her legal team emphasized that the transcripts in question contain sensitive testimony and confidential material that should remain protected under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Maxwell's attorneys insisted that the government's request lacked compelling justification and that releasing the materials would serve no legitimate public interest while potentially influencing public perception and undermining her right to a fair trial.Furthermore, Maxwell's response accused the government of attempting to circumvent established legal norms for tactical purposes. Her defense argued that any disclosure could taint potential jurors and further inflame the already intense media scrutiny surrounding her case. They maintained that the government had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances to override the presumption of secrecy traditionally afforded to grand jury proceedings. In closing, Maxwell's team urged the court to deny the motion and preserve the confidentiality of the grand jury materials to uphold judicial integrity and due process.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.539612.803.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

Host Paul W. Grimm continues his conversation with Professor Maura R. Grossman on the legal system's growing challenges with generative AI and deepfakes. They explore how AI-generated images, video, and audio differ from traditional fakes—and why they present unique evidentiary challenges and ethical problems for lawyers and judges. They also discuss the legal implications of the “liar's dividend,” the psychological impact of AI-generated evidence on juries, and potential updates to the Federal Rules of Evidence. In the absence of new rules dealing with AI evidence, they explain how early case management, protective orders, and Rules 403 and 901 can address a few of these challenges.ADDITIONAL RESOURCESGrossman, Grimm & Coglianese "AI in the Courts: How Worried Should We Be?" (Judicature)This Judicature article offers a discussion of the pros and cons of AI in the legal profession following the rise of ChatGPT and other large language models (LLMs).Federal Rules of Evidence – In particular, this episode focuses on:Rule 104(a) & (b): Preliminary vs. conditional relevanceRule 403: Exclusion of prejudicial evidenceRule 901: Authentication of evidenceRule 702: Expert testimony ABOUT THE HOSTJudge Paul W. Grimm (ret.) is the David F. Levi Professor of the Practice of Law and Director of the Bolch Judicial Institute at Duke Law School. From December 2012 until his retirement in December 2022, he served as a district judge of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, with chambers in Greenbelt, Maryland. Click here to read his full bio.

Steve Gruber discusses news and headlines 

The process of unsealing federal grand jury records is deliberately difficult, wrapped in layers of legal insulation under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Only a federal judge—not the President, not the Attorney General—can authorize disclosure, and even then, only if the requester demonstrates a “particularized need” that outweighs the default presumption of secrecy. Motions must be surgically precise, narrowly tailored, and supported by compelling legal justification. Even successful requests often result in redacted or restricted disclosures, not public transparency. The system is built to prioritize protection over exposure, and accountability often takes a backseat to process.While the courts claim this structure safeguards the integrity of justice, it frequently appears to serve power over truth—especially when politically sensitive material is involved. The legal mechanisms for disclosure exist on paper but function in reality as bureaucratic gatekeeping. Victims, journalists, and the public are told they can seek access, but few ever get it—and fewer still get anything meaningful. The result is a growing skepticism: that secrecy has become less about shielding the innocent and more about shielding the institution itself. The question is, will the courts continue to protect that secrecy at all costs, or will the demand for real transparency finally break through?to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.com

The process of unsealing federal grand jury records is deliberately difficult, wrapped in layers of legal insulation under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Only a federal judge—not the President, not the Attorney General—can authorize disclosure, and even then, only if the requester demonstrates a “particularized need” that outweighs the default presumption of secrecy. Motions must be surgically precise, narrowly tailored, and supported by compelling legal justification. Even successful requests often result in redacted or restricted disclosures, not public transparency. The system is built to prioritize protection over exposure, and accountability often takes a backseat to process.While the courts claim this structure safeguards the integrity of justice, it frequently appears to serve power over truth—especially when politically sensitive material is involved. The legal mechanisms for disclosure exist on paper but function in reality as bureaucratic gatekeeping. Victims, journalists, and the public are told they can seek access, but few ever get it—and fewer still get anything meaningful. The result is a growing skepticism: that secrecy has become less about shielding the innocent and more about shielding the institution itself. The question is, will the courts continue to protect that secrecy at all costs, or will the demand for real transparency finally break through?to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

The process of unsealing federal grand jury records is deliberately difficult, wrapped in layers of legal insulation under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Only a federal judge—not the President, not the Attorney General—can authorize disclosure, and even then, only if the requester demonstrates a “particularized need” that outweighs the default presumption of secrecy. Motions must be surgically precise, narrowly tailored, and supported by compelling legal justification. Even successful requests often result in redacted or restricted disclosures, not public transparency. The system is built to prioritize protection over exposure, and accountability often takes a backseat to process.While the courts claim this structure safeguards the integrity of justice, it frequently appears to serve power over truth—especially when politically sensitive material is involved. The legal mechanisms for disclosure exist on paper but function in reality as bureaucratic gatekeeping. Victims, journalists, and the public are told they can seek access, but few ever get it—and fewer still get anything meaningful. The result is a growing skepticism: that secrecy has become less about shielding the innocent and more about shielding the institution itself. The question is, will the courts continue to protect that secrecy at all costs, or will the demand for real transparency finally break through?to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

In the memorandum of law filed on June 24, 2025, Best Buy Co., Inc. moves to dismiss the complaint brought by Latroya Grayson, arguing that her claims are legally insufficient and fail to meet the required pleading standards. Best Buy asserts that Grayson's complaint lacks specific factual allegations tying the company to any actionable misconduct. They contend that her claims are vague, conclusory, and do not provide enough detail to establish liability under any legal theory presented. Best Buy emphasizes that the complaint does not demonstrate how the company engaged in or was directly responsible for any wrongdoing that could support the causes of action alleged..Furthermore, Best Buy argues that even if the facts alleged were accepted as true, they do not constitute a viable claim under the applicable law. The memorandum highlights deficiencies in Grayson's legal assertions, including a failure to show damages or injury traceable to Best Buy's conduct. The company also challenges any implied legal theories within the complaint as speculative and unsupported. As such, Best Buy requests that the court dismiss the case in its entirety with prejudice, citing the insufficiency of the complaint to survive a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.633985.71.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

In the memorandum of law filed on June 24, 2025, Best Buy Co., Inc. moves to dismiss the complaint brought by Latroya Grayson, arguing that her claims are legally insufficient and fail to meet the required pleading standards. Best Buy asserts that Grayson's complaint lacks specific factual allegations tying the company to any actionable misconduct. They contend that her claims are vague, conclusory, and do not provide enough detail to establish liability under any legal theory presented. Best Buy emphasizes that the complaint does not demonstrate how the company engaged in or was directly responsible for any wrongdoing that could support the causes of action alleged..Furthermore, Best Buy argues that even if the facts alleged were accepted as true, they do not constitute a viable claim under the applicable law. The memorandum highlights deficiencies in Grayson's legal assertions, including a failure to show damages or injury traceable to Best Buy's conduct. The company also challenges any implied legal theories within the complaint as speculative and unsupported. As such, Best Buy requests that the court dismiss the case in its entirety with prejudice, citing the insufficiency of the complaint to survive a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.633985.71.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

In the memorandum of law filed on June 24, 2025, Best Buy Co., Inc. moves to dismiss the complaint brought by Latroya Grayson, arguing that her claims are legally insufficient and fail to meet the required pleading standards. Best Buy asserts that Grayson's complaint lacks specific factual allegations tying the company to any actionable misconduct. They contend that her claims are vague, conclusory, and do not provide enough detail to establish liability under any legal theory presented. Best Buy emphasizes that the complaint does not demonstrate how the company engaged in or was directly responsible for any wrongdoing that could support the causes of action alleged..Furthermore, Best Buy argues that even if the facts alleged were accepted as true, they do not constitute a viable claim under the applicable law. The memorandum highlights deficiencies in Grayson's legal assertions, including a failure to show damages or injury traceable to Best Buy's conduct. The company also challenges any implied legal theories within the complaint as speculative and unsupported. As such, Best Buy requests that the court dismiss the case in its entirety with prejudice, citing the insufficiency of the complaint to survive a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.633985.71.0.pdf

In the memorandum of law filed on June 24, 2025, Best Buy Co., Inc. moves to dismiss the complaint brought by Latroya Grayson, arguing that her claims are legally insufficient and fail to meet the required pleading standards. Best Buy asserts that Grayson's complaint lacks specific factual allegations tying the company to any actionable misconduct. They contend that her claims are vague, conclusory, and do not provide enough detail to establish liability under any legal theory presented. Best Buy emphasizes that the complaint does not demonstrate how the company engaged in or was directly responsible for any wrongdoing that could support the causes of action alleged..Furthermore, Best Buy argues that even if the facts alleged were accepted as true, they do not constitute a viable claim under the applicable law. The memorandum highlights deficiencies in Grayson's legal assertions, including a failure to show damages or injury traceable to Best Buy's conduct. The company also challenges any implied legal theories within the complaint as speculative and unsupported. As such, Best Buy requests that the court dismiss the case in its entirety with prejudice, citing the insufficiency of the complaint to survive a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.633985.71.0.pdf

In this 39-page motion filed on April 7, 2025, Sean Combs' legal team asks the court to exclude any reference to alleged prior sexual assaults under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 404(b). They argue that Rule 413 only applies when a defendant is formally charged with a sexual assault offense, which Combs is not—his current charges involve racketeering, sex trafficking, and related crimes, but not specific counts of sexual assault. Therefore, they assert the government's attempt to admit uncharged sexual assault allegations under Rule 413 is legally improper and violates the plain text and legislative intent of the rule.Additionally, the motion challenges the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 404(b), which governs the use of prior bad acts to show motive, opportunity, or intent. Combs' attorneys argue that the government's notice is procedurally deficient and that the proposed evidence relies heavily on impermissible character inferences—essentially suggesting that because Combs allegedly committed bad acts before, he is more likely to have committed the crimes he's charged with now. They also invoke Rule 403, saying the evidence has low probative value, is highly inflammatory, and would result in mini-trials over unrelated allegations, confusing the jury and unfairly prejudicing Combs. At minimum, the defense requests a preliminary hearing to assess the reliability of the evidence before it's presented at trial.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.213.0.pdf

In this 39-page motion filed on April 7, 2025, Sean Combs' legal team asks the court to exclude any reference to alleged prior sexual assaults under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 404(b). They argue that Rule 413 only applies when a defendant is formally charged with a sexual assault offense, which Combs is not—his current charges involve racketeering, sex trafficking, and related crimes, but not specific counts of sexual assault. Therefore, they assert the government's attempt to admit uncharged sexual assault allegations under Rule 413 is legally improper and violates the plain text and legislative intent of the rule.Additionally, the motion challenges the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 404(b), which governs the use of prior bad acts to show motive, opportunity, or intent. Combs' attorneys argue that the government's notice is procedurally deficient and that the proposed evidence relies heavily on impermissible character inferences—essentially suggesting that because Combs allegedly committed bad acts before, he is more likely to have committed the crimes he's charged with now. They also invoke Rule 403, saying the evidence has low probative value, is highly inflammatory, and would result in mini-trials over unrelated allegations, confusing the jury and unfairly prejudicing Combs. At minimum, the defense requests a preliminary hearing to assess the reliability of the evidence before it's presented at trial.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.213.0.pdf

In this 39-page motion filed on April 7, 2025, Sean Combs' legal team asks the court to exclude any reference to alleged prior sexual assaults under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 404(b). They argue that Rule 413 only applies when a defendant is formally charged with a sexual assault offense, which Combs is not—his current charges involve racketeering, sex trafficking, and related crimes, but not specific counts of sexual assault. Therefore, they assert the government's attempt to admit uncharged sexual assault allegations under Rule 413 is legally improper and violates the plain text and legislative intent of the rule.Additionally, the motion challenges the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 404(b), which governs the use of prior bad acts to show motive, opportunity, or intent. Combs' attorneys argue that the government's notice is procedurally deficient and that the proposed evidence relies heavily on impermissible character inferences—essentially suggesting that because Combs allegedly committed bad acts before, he is more likely to have committed the crimes he's charged with now. They also invoke Rule 403, saying the evidence has low probative value, is highly inflammatory, and would result in mini-trials over unrelated allegations, confusing the jury and unfairly prejudicing Combs. At minimum, the defense requests a preliminary hearing to assess the reliability of the evidence before it's presented at trial.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.213.0.pdf

In this 39-page motion filed on April 7, 2025, Sean Combs' legal team asks the court to exclude any reference to alleged prior sexual assaults under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 404(b). They argue that Rule 413 only applies when a defendant is formally charged with a sexual assault offense, which Combs is not—his current charges involve racketeering, sex trafficking, and related crimes, but not specific counts of sexual assault. Therefore, they assert the government's attempt to admit uncharged sexual assault allegations under Rule 413 is legally improper and violates the plain text and legislative intent of the rule.Additionally, the motion challenges the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 404(b), which governs the use of prior bad acts to show motive, opportunity, or intent. Combs' attorneys argue that the government's notice is procedurally deficient and that the proposed evidence relies heavily on impermissible character inferences—essentially suggesting that because Combs allegedly committed bad acts before, he is more likely to have committed the crimes he's charged with now. They also invoke Rule 403, saying the evidence has low probative value, is highly inflammatory, and would result in mini-trials over unrelated allegations, confusing the jury and unfairly prejudicing Combs. At minimum, the defense requests a preliminary hearing to assess the reliability of the evidence before it's presented at trial.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.213.0.pdf

In this 39-page motion filed on April 7, 2025, Sean Combs' legal team asks the court to exclude any reference to alleged prior sexual assaults under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 404(b). They argue that Rule 413 only applies when a defendant is formally charged with a sexual assault offense, which Combs is not—his current charges involve racketeering, sex trafficking, and related crimes, but not specific counts of sexual assault. Therefore, they assert the government's attempt to admit uncharged sexual assault allegations under Rule 413 is legally improper and violates the plain text and legislative intent of the rule.Additionally, the motion challenges the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 404(b), which governs the use of prior bad acts to show motive, opportunity, or intent. Combs' attorneys argue that the government's notice is procedurally deficient and that the proposed evidence relies heavily on impermissible character inferences—essentially suggesting that because Combs allegedly committed bad acts before, he is more likely to have committed the crimes he's charged with now. They also invoke Rule 403, saying the evidence has low probative value, is highly inflammatory, and would result in mini-trials over unrelated allegations, confusing the jury and unfairly prejudicing Combs. At minimum, the defense requests a preliminary hearing to assess the reliability of the evidence before it's presented at trial.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.213.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

In this 39-page motion filed on April 7, 2025, Sean Combs' legal team asks the court to exclude any reference to alleged prior sexual assaults under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 404(b). They argue that Rule 413 only applies when a defendant is formally charged with a sexual assault offense, which Combs is not—his current charges involve racketeering, sex trafficking, and related crimes, but not specific counts of sexual assault. Therefore, they assert the government's attempt to admit uncharged sexual assault allegations under Rule 413 is legally improper and violates the plain text and legislative intent of the rule.Additionally, the motion challenges the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 404(b), which governs the use of prior bad acts to show motive, opportunity, or intent. Combs' attorneys argue that the government's notice is procedurally deficient and that the proposed evidence relies heavily on impermissible character inferences—essentially suggesting that because Combs allegedly committed bad acts before, he is more likely to have committed the crimes he's charged with now. They also invoke Rule 403, saying the evidence has low probative value, is highly inflammatory, and would result in mini-trials over unrelated allegations, confusing the jury and unfairly prejudicing Combs. At minimum, the defense requests a preliminary hearing to assess the reliability of the evidence before it's presented at trial.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.213.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

In this 39-page motion filed on April 7, 2025, Sean Combs' legal team asks the court to exclude any reference to alleged prior sexual assaults under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 404(b). They argue that Rule 413 only applies when a defendant is formally charged with a sexual assault offense, which Combs is not—his current charges involve racketeering, sex trafficking, and related crimes, but not specific counts of sexual assault. Therefore, they assert the government's attempt to admit uncharged sexual assault allegations under Rule 413 is legally improper and violates the plain text and legislative intent of the rule.Additionally, the motion challenges the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 404(b), which governs the use of prior bad acts to show motive, opportunity, or intent. Combs' attorneys argue that the government's notice is procedurally deficient and that the proposed evidence relies heavily on impermissible character inferences—essentially suggesting that because Combs allegedly committed bad acts before, he is more likely to have committed the crimes he's charged with now. They also invoke Rule 403, saying the evidence has low probative value, is highly inflammatory, and would result in mini-trials over unrelated allegations, confusing the jury and unfairly prejudicing Combs. At minimum, the defense requests a preliminary hearing to assess the reliability of the evidence before it's presented at trial.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.213.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

In this 39-page motion filed on April 7, 2025, Sean Combs' legal team asks the court to exclude any reference to alleged prior sexual assaults under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 404(b). They argue that Rule 413 only applies when a defendant is formally charged with a sexual assault offense, which Combs is not—his current charges involve racketeering, sex trafficking, and related crimes, but not specific counts of sexual assault. Therefore, they assert the government's attempt to admit uncharged sexual assault allegations under Rule 413 is legally improper and violates the plain text and legislative intent of the rule.Additionally, the motion challenges the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 404(b), which governs the use of prior bad acts to show motive, opportunity, or intent. Combs' attorneys argue that the government's notice is procedurally deficient and that the proposed evidence relies heavily on impermissible character inferences—essentially suggesting that because Combs allegedly committed bad acts before, he is more likely to have committed the crimes he's charged with now. They also invoke Rule 403, saying the evidence has low probative value, is highly inflammatory, and would result in mini-trials over unrelated allegations, confusing the jury and unfairly prejudicing Combs. At minimum, the defense requests a preliminary hearing to assess the reliability of the evidence before it's presented at trial.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.213.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

In this episode, Jim Garrity argues for more frequent videotaping of depositions, especially those of parties and witnesses likely to be unavailable at trial. The reason? Unlike live witnesses - who are generally called once in trial - videotaped testimony can be played two or more times. This technique utilizes one of the most effective tools of persuasion ever invented, repetition, borrowed straight from Madison Avenue, where repetition is everything. Clips played during the trial, during closing, and sometimes in opening by consent or court order, allow you to essentially present the same witness and testimony multiple times. This kind of repetition isn't possible with live witnesses, and is far superior to reading deposition transcripts to the jury. In a world where people are accustomed to getting their information through video, reading a transcript of testimony is likely to test your jurors' attention span (and patience). Garrity discusses a UCLA professor's "7-38-55 rule" to underscore the point. The gist of this rule is that when people communicate, only 7% of the message is conveyed through words, 38% through tone and voice, and a whopping 55% through body language. That's what makes the presentation of deposition testimony by video clips so powerful. Listen in!SHOW NOTESSmith, et al. v. City of Chicago, etc., Case No. 21-cv-1159, 2025 WL 1744919 (N. D. Ill. June 24, 2025) (denying use of video depo testimony in opening, but allowing it in closing argument that was admitted into evidence during trial, over objections by defendants that permitting video testimony during closing statements would be “unfairly prejudicial because it emphasizes testimony that is presented by video through repetition, and that opportunity does not exist for a live witness”)Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. C-05-00334 RMW, 2008 WL 190990, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2008) (denying use of video depo testimony in opening, but would consider allowing reading from transcript; “If the parties wish to read a portion of a deposition transcript in their opening statement, they are to exchange any excerpt with opposing counsel sufficiently in advance of opening statements so that the court can rule on any dispute over use”)Doe v. City of San Diego, No. 12CV689-MMA (DHB), 2014 WL 11997809, at *6 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2014) (collecting cases refusing to allow playing of videotaped deposition testimony during opening statements) (“See In re Ethicon, Inc., 2014 WL 505234, at *8 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 5, 2014) (“[T]he use of video clips during opening statements is precluded as to all parties ....”) (quoting In re Bard, Inc., 2013 WL 3282926, at *8 (S.D. W. Va. June 27, 2013)); Carpenter v. Forest Meadows Owners Ass'n, 2011 WL 3207778, at *7 (“Video recordings of the deposition will not be permitted.”) (emphasis in original); Chopourian v. Catholic Healthcare W., No. 09–2972 KJM, 2011 WL 6396500, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2011) (denying the plaintiff's motion to use portions of videotaped depositions during opening statement); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 2008 WL 190990, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Neither side shall use any videotaped deposition testimony in its opening statement.”); but see Sadler v. Advanced Bionics, LLC, at *3 (W.D. Kent. April 1, 2013) (providing that the court “may” consider allowing the parties to utilize videotaped deposition testimony during opening statements); MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 2002 WL 32349903, at *2 (permitting party to play segments of video deposition in its opening statement))Beem v. Providence Health & Servs., No. 10-CV-0037-TOR, 2012 WL 13018728, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 19, 2012) (rejecting request to play videotaped deposition during opening, and rejecting argument by plaintiff that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3), she may use the deposition of an adverse party “for any purpose,” stating that “What Plaintiff proposes to do, is to introduce evidence during opening statement. The Court will not allow the showing of video deposition excerpts during opening statement. The motion is denied.”)K.C. ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, No. 02-2715-STA-CGC, 2013 WL 5972192, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 8, 2013) (“there is no per se ban on the use of video excerpts of depositions in closing arguments”; also citing 88 C.J.S. Trial § 300 (2013) (“[T]here is no blanket prohibition against counsel playing selected portions of a videotaped deposition for a jury during closing argument, and trial courts have discretion to permit, or to refuse, the replaying of videotape segments in closing argument.”)MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chron. Pub. Co., No. 01-C-0177-C, 2002 WL 32349903, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 2, 2002) (allowing use of video depo excerpt in opening, stating, without further discussion, that “Defendants may use excerpts from the video deposition of David Straden during opening argument. Counsel are to advise plaintiff's counsel promptly of the particular excerpts they intend to show”)Sadler v. Advanced Bionics, LLC, No. 3:11-CV-00450-TBR, 2013 WL 1340350, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 1, 2013) (preliminarily allowing use of videotaped deposition testimony in opening statements, saying If this testimony is otherwise admissible at trial and is not unnecessarily lengthy, the Court may consider allowing this procedure for both parties”)Northfield Ins. Co. v. Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. SACV 03-0492-JVS, 2003 WL 25948971, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2003) (subject to further objection and ruling before trial, “The Court is generally of the view that a party in opening statement may use any piece of evidence which the party in good faith believes will be ultimately received at trial. Rule 32(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the use of a party deposition “for any purpose”) you like the shoes I wore in high schoolSmith v. I-Flow Corp., No. 09 C 3908, 2011 WL 12627557, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2011) (“The Court denies I–Flow's request to bar use in opening statement of excerpts from video deposition testimony. The Court will expect plaintiffs to disclose by no later than noon on the Friday before the start of trial any such excerpts they intend to use in opening statements and will expect defendants to make reciprocal disclosures by no later than 5:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the start of trial.”)Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3) (providing that "An adverse party may use for any purpose the deposition of a party or anyone who, when deposed, was the party's officer, director, managing agent, or designee...") (emphasis added)

In response to the Court's request during the November 22, 2024, hearing, defendant Sean Combs has submitted a letter addressing the permissible scope of his communications under the Court's order and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23.1. Combs' legal team outlines the types of interactions he is allowed to engage in, ensuring compliance with the Court's directives while upholding his First and Sixth Amendment rights. The letter emphasizes the importance of balancing the need to prevent potential jury tampering or undue influence with Combs' constitutional rights to free speech and a fair trial.The submission seeks to clarify the boundaries of acceptable communications, proposing guidelines that would allow Combs to maintain necessary personal and professional interactions without violating legal restrictions. By providing this detailed briefing, Combs' attorneys aim to assist the Court in establishing clear parameters that protect the integrity of the judicial process while respecting the defendant's fundamental rights.(commercial at 11:31)to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.85.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

​In a motion filed on April 16, 2025, Sean "Diddy" Combs' legal team requested the exclusion of two prior incidents from his upcoming federal trial. The first pertains to a 1999 nightclub shooting at Club New York, where Combs was present and initially charged but later acquitted. His attorneys argue that introducing this event would be more prejudicial than probative, potentially biasing the jury by suggesting a propensity for violence. They contend that this incident lacks direct relevance to the current charges and would unfairly influence the jury's perception.The second incident involves a 2016 alleged assault at a recording studio, which the defense also seeks to exclude. Combs' lawyers assert that this event is unrelated to the current case and its inclusion would serve only to prejudice the jury. They argue that admitting such evidence would violate Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403, which restrict the use of prior bad acts to prove character and caution against evidence that could cause unfair prejudice. The defense maintains that these incidents do not provide legitimate insight into the allegations at hand and should not be presented during the trial.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.240.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

​In a motion filed on April 16, 2025, Sean "Diddy" Combs' legal team requested the exclusion of two prior incidents from his upcoming federal trial. The first pertains to a 1999 nightclub shooting at Club New York, where Combs was present and initially charged but later acquitted. His attorneys argue that introducing this event would be more prejudicial than probative, potentially biasing the jury by suggesting a propensity for violence. They contend that this incident lacks direct relevance to the current charges and would unfairly influence the jury's perception.The second incident involves a 2016 alleged assault at a recording studio, which the defense also seeks to exclude. Combs' lawyers assert that this event is unrelated to the current case and its inclusion would serve only to prejudice the jury. They argue that admitting such evidence would violate Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403, which restrict the use of prior bad acts to prove character and caution against evidence that could cause unfair prejudice. The defense maintains that these incidents do not provide legitimate insight into the allegations at hand and should not be presented during the trial.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.240.0.pdfBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

Our podcast show being released today is Part 2 of our two-part series featuring two former CFPB senior officers who were key employees in the Enforcement Division under prior directors: Eric Halperin and Craig Cowie. Eric Halperin served as the Enforcement Director at the CFPB from 2010 until former Director, Rohit Chopra, was terminated by President Trump. Craig Cowie was an enforcement attorney at the CFPB from July 2012 until April 2015 and then Assistant Litigation Deputy at the CFPB until June 2018. Part 1 of our two-part series was released last Thursday, June 12.  The purpose of these podcast shows were primarily to obtain the opinions of Eric and Craig (two of the country's most knowledgeable and experienced lawyers with respect to CFPB Enforcement) about the legal and practical impact of (i) a Memo to CFPB Staff from Mark Paoletta, Chief Legal Officer, dated April 16, 2025, entitled “2025 Supervision and Enforcement Priorities” (described below) which rescinded prior priority documents and established a whole new set of priorities which in most instances are vastly different than the Enforcement Priority documents which guided former directors,  (ii) the dismissal without prejudice of the majority of enforcement lawsuits that were pending when Acting Director Russell Vought was appointed to run the agency, and (iii) other drastic steps taken by CFPB Acting Director Russell Vought to minimize the functions and staffing at the agency. That included, among other things, an order calling a halt to all work at the agency, including the pausing of ongoing investigations and lawsuits and the creation of plans by Vought to reduce the agency's staff (“RIF”) from about 1,750 employees to about 250 employees (including a reduction of Enforcement staff to 50 employees from 258). We described in detail the 2025 Supervision and Enforcement Priorities as follows: ·       Reduced Supervisory Exams: A 50% decrease in the overall number of exams to ease burdens on businesses and consumers. ·       Focus on Depository Institutions: Shifting attention back to banks and credit unions. ·       Emphasis on Actual Fraud: Prioritizing cases with verifiable consumer harm and measurable damages. ·       Redressing Tangible Harm: Concentrating on direct consumer remediation rather than punitive penalties. ·       Protection for Service Members and Veterans:Prioritizing redress for these groups. ·       Respect for Federalism: Minimizing duplicative oversight and coordinating with state regulators when possible. ·       Collaboration with Federal Agencies: Coordinating with other federal regulators and avoiding overlapping supervision. ·       Avoiding Novel Legal Theories: Limiting enforcement to areas clearly within the Bureau's statutory authority. ·       Fair Lending Focus: Pursuing only cases of proven intentional racial discrimination with identifiable victims and not using statistical evidence for fair lending assessments. Key Areas of Focus: ·       Mortgages (highest priority) ·       FCRA/Regulation V (data furnishing violations) ·       FDCPA/Regulation F (consumer contracts/debts) ·       Fraudulent overcharges and fees ·       Inadequate consumer information protection Deprioritized Areas: ·       Loans for "justice involved" individuals ·       Medical debt ·       Peer-to-peer lending platforms ·       Student loans ·       Remittances ·       Consumer data ·       Digital payments We also described the status of a lawsuit brought by the union representing CFPB employees and other parties against Vought seeking to enjoin him from implementing the RIF. The Court has granted a preliminary injunction which so far has largely prevented Vought from following through on the RIF. The matter is now on appeal before the DC Circuit Court of Appeals and a ruling is expected soon. These podcast shows complement the podcast show we released on June 5 which featured two former senior CFPB employees, Peggy Twohig and Paul Sanford who opined about the impact of the April 16 Paoletta memo and proposed RIF on CFPB Supervision. Eric and Craig considered, among other issues, the following: 1.  How do the new Paoletta priorities differ from the previous priorities and what do the new priorities tell us about what we can expect from CFPB Enforcement? 2.  What do the new priorities tell us about the CFPB's new approach toward Enforcement priorities? 3.  What can we learn from the fact that the CFPB has dismissed without prejudice at least 22 out of the 38 enforcement lawsuits that were pending when Vought became the Acting Director?  What types of enforcement lawsuits are still active and what types of lawsuits were dismissed? 4.  What are the circumstances surrounding the nullification of certain consent orders (including the Townstone case) and the implications for other consent orders? 5. Has the CFPB launched any new enforcement lawsuits under Vought? 6. What level and type of enforcement is statutorily required? 7.  Realistically, what will 50 employees be able to do in the enforcement area? 8. What will be the impact of the Supervision cutbacks be on Enforcement since Supervision refers many cases to Enforcement? 9.  Will the CFPB continue to seek civil money penalties for violations of law? 10.  What types of fair lending cases will the CFPB bring in the future?11.  Will Enforcement no longer initiate cases based on the unfairness or abusive prongs of UDAAP? Alan Kaplinsky, former practice group leader for 25 years and now Senior Counsel of the Consumer Financial Group, hosts the podcast show. Postscript: After the recording of this podcast, Cara Petersen, who succeeded Eric Halperin as head of CFPB Enforcement, resigned abruptly on June 10 from the CFPB after sending out an e-mail message to all its employees (which was shared with the media) which stated, in relevant part: “I have served under every director and acting director in the bureau's history and never before have I seen the ability to perform our core mission so under attack,” wrote  Petersen, who had worked at the agency since it became operational in 2011. She continued: “It has been devastating to see the bureau's enforcement function being dismantled through thoughtless reductions in staff, inexplicable dismissals of cases, and terminations of negotiated settlements that let wrongdoers off the hook.” “It is clear that the bureau's current leadership has no intention to enforce the law in any meaningful way,” Petersen wrote in her e-mail. “While I wish you all the best, I worry for American consumers.” During this part of the podcast show, we discussed the fact that the CFPB has entered into agreements with a few companies that had previously entered into consent agreements with former Director Chopra. After the recording of this podcast, the Federal District Court that presided over the Townstone Financial enforcement litigation involving alleged violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act refused to approve the rescission or undoing of the consent agreement based on Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because of the strong public policy of preserving the finality of judgments.

In response to the Court's request during the November 22, 2024, hearing, defendant Sean Combs has submitted a letter addressing the permissible scope of his communications under the Court's order and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23.1. Combs' legal team outlines the types of interactions he is allowed to engage in, ensuring compliance with the Court's directives while upholding his First and Sixth Amendment rights. The letter emphasizes the importance of balancing the need to prevent potential jury tampering or undue influence with Combs' constitutional rights to free speech and a fair trial.The submission seeks to clarify the boundaries of acceptable communications, proposing guidelines that would allow Combs to maintain necessary personal and professional interactions without violating legal restrictions. By providing this detailed briefing, Combs' attorneys aim to assist the Court in establishing clear parameters that protect the integrity of the judicial process while respecting the defendant's fundamental rights.(commercial at 11:31)to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.85.0.pdf

In a letter submitted in United States v. Combs, 24-cr-542 (AS), the defense provides additional legal support for its objection to the admission of Government Exhibit GX A-629-A. The prosecution introduced the exhibit on the basis that it contained statements made by Mr. Combs's head of security, known as “Uncle Pauly,” and argued they were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), which allows for the admission of statements made by an agent or employee concerning a matter within the scope of that relationship. However, during proceedings, the Court questioned whether the statements qualified under that rule, prompting the defense to elaborate on its position.The defense argues that the statements in GX A-629-A fall outside the bounds of Uncle Pauly's agency relationship with Mr. Combs and therefore cannot be considered admissible under the cited rule. Specifically, the defense contends that the content of the statements does not pertain to matters within the scope of Uncle Pauly's responsibilities as head of security. Because Rule 801(d)(2)(D) only permits statements concerning an agent's authorized duties, the defense insists that the exhibit should be excluded from evidence, reinforcing its objection with legal precedent to support its interpretation.In our second document...In a letter addressed to Judge Subramanian, the Government urges the Court to formally admit Exhibit GX 10C-114 into evidence, rather than limiting its use to that of a demonstrative aid. The Government argues that the content and context of the exhibit meet the necessary legal standards for admissibility and are directly relevant to the case at hand. They likely emphasize that the exhibit has probative value that outweighs any prejudicial effect, and that it provides substantive evidence supporting the Government's case.The request to elevate GX 10C-114 from a demonstrative to an official exhibit suggests that the Government views this piece of evidence as crucial for jury consideration during deliberations. While demonstratives are typically used to help explain or visualize other admitted evidence, they are not sent back with the jury. By seeking its admission as an exhibit, the prosecution signals its intent to ensure the jury has access to this material during deliberations, reinforcing its evidentiary weight and importance in establishing elements of the charged offenses.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:gov.uscourts.nysd.628425.363.0.pdfgov.uscourts.nysd.628425.375.0.pdf