The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Podcast

The Inquiry's Phase 2 report was released this week, distilling 400 days of evidence and more than three hundred thousand documents. The report concluded the fire which killed 72 people was the culmination of “decades of failure” by government and others in the construction industry. It set out a “path to disaster” stretching back to the early 1990s and criticised organisations at every level. It said companies in the industry were “dishonest” and that all deaths in the fire were “avoidable” and that residents were “badly failed” by those responsible for their safety.Presenter: Kate LambleProducer: Sharon HemansResearcher: May CameronSound Engineer: Hal HainesEditor: Penny Murphy

In the early hours of the 14th of June 2017, a fire broke out in a tower block in West London. This fire was both a personal tragedy and a national scandal.It began in Flat 16 of Grenfell Tower. Before long, the flames reached combustible cladding and insulation, which had been installed on the outside of the building. Less than twenty minutes later, the fire had climbed 19 storeys to the top of the tower, ripping through the flammable materials. The tower was engulfed in flames at a staggering speed. Seventy two people lost their lives, hundreds lost their homes.For the past six years, a public inquiry has been hearing evidence about what lies behind the worst residential fire in UK peacetime in one of the richest areas of the country. Kate Lamble has reported on it since the beginning. And in this series, she tries to understand what created the conditions for a fire which was both foreseeable and preventable.The answer takes us to the heart of how Britain works, from the government and regulation, to business. This is a story of corporate deceit, government deregulation and a construction industry engaged in a race to the bottom. It's a story of missed opportunities, unheeded warnings and the failure of a state to protect its citizens.

As the sun rises, the local council, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea are responsible for helping families try and find their loved ones and arranging accommodation for those who have just escaped Grenfell Tower.But as the situation spirals out of control, lost keys, “dehumanising” processes and slow support for residents lead to frustration and confusion.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

On the top floor of Grenfell Tower, Marcio Gomes and his family are waiting. Outside, the fire has wrapped itself around 3 sides of the building. But Marcio can't see any of this. He's relying on the information given to him by 999 call handlers, and they are telling residents they are safest to remain where they are. Marcio has a decision to make: does he wait for firefighters to reach him, or does he take his pregnant wife and daughters into the black void of suffocating smoke that has gathered in front of his door.In this episode, Kate tells the story of the final hours of the fire - of Rania Ibrahim and her daughters and Marcio Gomes and his family.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

When Ed Daffarn opens his door in the early hours of the morning of the 14th of June 2017, he is confronted by a wall of thick acrid smoke.As the combustible cladding and insulation burned, smoke gathered rapidly in the hallways and stairwells of Grenfell. It prevented many residents from leaving their flats - and ultimately, it is the smoke which killed those who died in the tower.The reason this smoke spread so quickly through the building is due to one small detail, which could easily be considered as inconsequential, but on the night of the fire was far from it.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

In the early hours of the 14th June 2017, the bell in North Kensington's fire station begins to ring. Firefighter David Badillo assumes it is a routine house fire. He expects that he and his colleagues will extinguish it quickly and head back to the station.But when he ventures inside the tower, David Badillo realises that this fire is like nothing he's seen before.In this episode, Kate tells the story of the beginning of the night of the fire and asks whether the firefighters who risked their lives were adequately trained and prepared for an event which, for many, was foreseeable.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

When Grenfell resident Ed Daffarn first heard about the multimillion pound refurbishment of the tower, he welcomed it. The estate had, in his view, become increasingly run down in recent years.But as the refurbishment progressed, he says residents felt their voices weren't heard. Meanwhile architects and contractors selected materials which would burn easily in a fire.Kate looks at how cost-cutting and a race to the bottom in the construction industry had devastating consequences for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

Why didn't the civil service act on warnings about combustible building materials?You've probably not heard of Brian Martin but he's central to the story of Grenfell. The civil servant responsible for the fire safety section of the building regulation guidance, he has described himself as the “single point of failure”.Kate talks to someone who tried to raise the alarm with him, and asks why he didn't act on warnings about dangerous cladding.Under the Conservative-Lib Dem coalition government, this was a time of deregulation and cutting red tape. Did these attitudes to health and safety prevent action being taken?Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

A tale of “deliberate and calculated deceit”.Beneath the cladding, a layer of insulation surrounded Grenfell Tower. This too was combustible and on the night of the fire, contributed to how quickly the flames spread. The companies which produced this insulation have been accused of misleading the construction industry about how combustible their products were.In this episode, Kate looks through some of the most jaw-dropping evidence from the public inquiry. Internal emails and company documents expose how insulation companies tested, marketed and sold their flammable products.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

How manufacturers sold combustible claddingWhen Marcio Gomes found out that Grenfell Tower, where he lived, was going to be covered in cladding, he assumed it must be safe. Today we know this material was the main cause of the spread of the fire at Grenfell Tower.The cladding installed on the tower was made by French company, Arconic - it was highly combustible. Prior to the fire at Grenfell, Arconic staff were warned that covering a tower block in this material could add the fuel power of an oil tanker to the outside walls. Why did they sell it anyway? And how was that allowed?Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

How a fire in Scotland in 1999 foretold the fire at Grenfell Tower.In 1999, a dropped cigarette started a tower block fire in a small town on the west coast of Scotland. The building, which had been recently clad in flammable materials, is said to have caught fire like matchwood. This was one of the first signs that combustible materials were being permitted in the building sector in the UK. These risks were even raised with the New Labour government – so why didn't they act?How did the UK's regulations allow for such materials to be used on high rise buildings? And how did government deregulation in the 1980s shape attitudes to health and safety?Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

As the world wakes up to news of a fire in West London, questions start about who's to blame.At 8.30am on the morning of the 14th of June 2017 Karim Mussilhy is searching for his uncle. It's over seven hours since the fire started, smoke is still pouring out of the top of Grenfell Tower and a toxic smell is hanging in the air. While residents stare up at the building in shock and Karim scours the streets for his uncle Hesham Rahman, civil servants and ministers also wake up to news of the fire and rush into Whitehall for an emergency meeting. At this moment is the first flicker of recognition that the state may have failed the residents of Grenfell tower – that they hadn't done what they should have done.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

In the early hours of the 14th of June 2017, a fire broke out in a tower block in West London. This fire was both a personal tragedy and a national scandal.It began in Flat 16 of Grenfell Tower. Before long, the flames reached combustible cladding and insulation, which had been installed on the outside of the building. Less than twenty minutes later, the fire had climbed 19 storeys to the top of the tower, ripping through the flammable materials. The tower was engulfed in flames at a staggering speed. Seventy two people lost their lives, hundreds lost their homes.For the past six years, a public inquiry has been hearing evidence about what lies behind the worst residential fire in UK peacetime in one of the richest areas of the country. Kate Lamble has reported on it since the beginning. And in this series, she tries to understand what created the conditions for a fire which was both foreseeable and preventable.The answer takes us to the heart of how Britain works, from the government and regulation, to business. This is a story of corporate deceit, government deregulation and a construction industry engaged in a race to the bottom. It's a story of missed opportunities, unheeded warnings and the failure of a state to protect its citizens.

A new 10-part series about the Grenfell Tower fire and why it happened.As the public inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower publishes it's final report, we're releasing ten-part series looking into why the fire happened, and how it could have been prevented. For the past six years, a public inquiry has been hearing evidence about what lies behind the worst residential fire in UK peacetime in one of the richest areas of the country. Kate Lamble has reported on it since the beginning. And in this series, she tries to understand what created the conditions for a fire which was both foreseeable and preventable.The answer takes us to the heart of how Britain works, from the government and regulation, to business. This is a story of corporate deceit, government deregulation and a construction industry engaged in a race to the bottom. It's a story of missed opportunities, unheeded warnings and the failure of a state to protect its citizens.

After more than four years, more than three hundred thousand documents, four hundred days of testimony and around £150 million, the Inquiry heard its final evidence. Lawyers for the core participants put forward the arguments they think the chair of the Inquiry, Sir Martin Moore-Bick, should consider as he produces his final report. Lead Counsel Richard Millett said all the deaths at Grenfell Tower were avoidable and strongly criticised companies and organisations involved in the refurbishment for failing to take responsibility. And Paulos Tekle, a Tower resident, whose five-year-old son lost his life on the night of the fire, tells us what he expects from the final report. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Luke Radcliff Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

"I couldn't undo the past, but I wanted to be a part of making things better” While the Inquiry has paused hearing evidence, Kate Lamble spoke in depth to Nick Hurd, a former Minister for Policing and the Fire Service and now the government's independent advisor on Grenfell. She asked about his experiences while in government immediately after the fire and discussed what the future holds for the tower itself and how to memorialise the site. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

Toxicologist Professor David Purser told the Inquiry that the rapid spread of smoke was the principal cause of death, and that burning cladding panels and insulation were the main source of this poisonous smoke. The Inquiry also heard closing statements for Module 4, covering the immediate aftermath of the fire. From next week it will turn into an inquest, so for this reason the podcast will not be covering those hearings. The podcast will return when the Inquiry produces its final report for the government. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry heard closing statements for Module 6, outlining how combustible materials came be tested, certified and regulated and ended up being installed on the outside walls of Grenfell Tower. Lawyers representing the Bereaved, Survivors and Residents said the Inquiry had exposed fault-lines in the “edifice of government” and another said the “seeds of the Grenfell Tower fire were sown 20 years earlier”. There was criticism of manufacturers, regulators, building control bodies and of the government, with barristers accusing a “cabal of ministers” of being “enslaved to the deregulatory agenda”. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, as we passed the fifth anniversary of the Grenfell Tower fire, two expert witnesses levelled a series of fierce criticisms at the building safety regime. José Torero, head of the civil engineering department at a London university, described the competence levels among fire safety professionals as “extremely poor” and called for the Stay Put strategy to be abandoned. And Luke Bisby, professor of fire and structures at Edinburgh University, told the Inquiry, that he was “incredulous” at the misuse of fire tests by a cladding firm, and said there was a “significant problem” with the level of competence of fire safety professionals. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry moved on from examining the aftermath of the fire and began hearing evidence from a series of experts in fire engineering. Luke Bisby, professor of fire and structures at Edinburgh University, described the results of a test on the cladding panels and insulation installed on the tower as the “most shocking experiment” he had ever seen. Barbara Lane, a fire safety expert, told the Inquiry that the culture inside the Building Control sector was of “worrying standards”. And Ivan Stoianov, an expert in water distribution systems, said that the quantity of water available for firefighters at Grenfell was “more than adequate.” Presenter: Sharon Hemans Producers: Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry heard about the confusion, lack of grip and poor communication within Whitehall, as ministers and civil servants dealt with the aftermath of the fire. Nick Hurd was given the initial responsibility for leading the government's response, despite being only two days into his ministerial position at the time of the Grenfell fire. He described the government's actions as “wholly inadequate”. A senior civil servant described the local authority's response to residential complaints about housing as a “sign of defensiveness” and the Mayor of London's chief of staff said that Grenfell residents were “failed by us as a society”. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry examined how central government responded to the aftermath of the disaster while continuing to hear about London-wide emergency response arrangements. The Chief Executive of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea took two days to ask for emergency help from other London councils, after being “leant on”. An email written by then Prime Minister Theresa May contained damning criticism of RBKC's response, describing their actions as “utter uselessness”. The British Red Cross said there was confusion over responsibilities between them and the council. Meanwhile this week the government announced that it was rejecting two of the recommendations made by the Inquiry back in 2019. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry continued to investigate the events immediately after the fire by digging deeper into what happened at local rest centres which were opened to support survivors. An official who volunteered to help with the relief effort described the scene at the largest centre as a shambles, with chaotic scenes, an intimidating armed police presence and a lack of organisation. The authorities tried to send some residents from the walkway flats next to the tower back to their homes, despite them having broken front doors and lacking gas or communal heating. And we heard that at the time of the Grenfell disaster that tower block fires were not included in the official London Risk Register – even though it did mention wildfires and moorland fires. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week we heard different views from senior managers as to how the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea coped in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. We discovered that the chief executive initially rejected offers of support because he had “great confidence” in the council. And the inquiry heard reports that - on the night after the fire - some residents who had been evacuated from nearby buildings ended up sleeping in their cars or in parks because the council failed to inform them about alternative accommodation. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Nicola Addyman

The Inquiry continued to hear evidence about the immediate aftermath of the fire. Rebecca Blackburn, a former Contingency Planning Officer for the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, described scenes inside the town hall as “pandemonium”. Her boss told the inquiry he regrets that he didn't speak up about weaknesses in the council's emergency plans and accepted he was too late in making some decisions about the response to the disaster. Survivors and relatives described chaotic scenes trying to find information about their loved ones and callousness in their treatment by the council. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry moved on from the technical discussions of the building regulations and the role of central government to focus on the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. Bereaved, survivors and relatives gave emotional evidence about their experiences directly after the disaster, saying they were “treated like criminals” with the authorities apparently most concerned about the possibility of rioting. They struggled to find officials on the ground in the hours after the disaster and there was little if any information available about who had died and who had survived. Many said they received poor support, including grossly unsuitable accommodation, causing more trauma. The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea admitted to numerous failings including in communication, accommodation and training. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, three politicians gave evidence. Eric Pickles, former housing secretary, told the Inquiry that he could not understand how the government's deregulation agenda could have discouraged civil servants from tightening fire safety standards, describing this as “inexplicable and unjust”. Stephen Williams, the minister responsible for implementing the coroner's recommendations after a previous tower block fire, admitted he had never read the coroner's original letter. And former minister Gavin Barwell told the Inquiry that his private office didn't receive key information.       Presenter: Kate Lamble     Producers: Sharon Hemans, Kristiina Cooper & Ben Henderson    Researcher: Marcia Veiga     Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones      Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, civil servant Brian Martin completed his evidence after more than seven days. In his concluding evidence, he said that there were several occasions on which he believed he could have prevented the Grenfell Tower fire from happening. And – almost five years on – politicians appeared for the first time. Two former ministers with responsibility for fire safety, Brandon Lewis and Lord James Wharton gave evidence – following calls to ‘bear the brunt of the blame' – to explain their decisions and policies. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, senior civil servant Brian Martin continued giving evidence to the Inquiry. As the only person to testify with experience working for both the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Building Research Establishment, the Inquiry learnt about the intricacies and inadequacies of his role overseeing building regulations guidance. He conceded that he had underestimated the risks posed by cladding used on high-rise buildings like Grenfell Tower, and that he had lulled his peers into a false sense of security over the dangers. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans, Kristiina Cooper and Nathan Gower Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry heard from three senior civil servants: Dame Melanie Dawes, the former permanent secretary at the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, said that she had not been informed about the risk of combustible insulation on high-rise buildings and conceded that the department had systemic failings. Brian Martin, a significant figure who was responsible for the fire safety section of the building regulation guidance, denied accusations of an information “cover up”. Louise Upton, who oversaw fire safety policy, was pressed on why she had resisted mandatory certification for fire risk assessors. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry heard about the work culture in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and how Richard Harral, the Head of Technical Policy, was left feeling angry, frustrated and so “deeply ashamed” that he quit three years into the role. The Inquiry also heard from Sir Ken Knight, the government's former Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor, who was asked why he didn't react sooner to a tower block fire in 2009. And Dennis Davis, the Executive Officer of the Fire Sector Federation, concluded that “fire safety is often perceived as a burden”. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry heard from inside Whitehall, as two civil servants, Bob Ledsome and Anthony Burd, gave evidence. It was revealed that the All-Party Parliamentary Group on fire safety chased housing ministers 16 times about a promised revision to the building regulation guidance. And we heard about a briefing that was prepared a few days after the Grenfell Tower Fire, which described the department's correspondence with this group as “appalling, delayed, partial and looks chaotic”. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry heard from Debbie Smith, a senior figure in the Building Research Establishment for more than 34 years. She failed to speak up at a meeting with the government two days after the Grenfell Tower fire about the “immediate and present risk to life” ACM panels on buildings over 18 metres presented. And there was a significant milestone, as Anthony Burd, a former senior civil servant, became the first government figure to appear. Presenter: Sharon Hemans Producers: Nathan Gower and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry heard that cladding similar to that installed on Grenfell Tower underwent a “catastrophic” fire test 16 years earlier. Sarah Colwell, Director of Fire Suppression Testing and Certification for the Building Research Establishment (BRE), described the speed of flame spread as “shocking”. We also heard that the BRE failed to alert the industry about widespread and potentially dangerous misinterpretations of building regulation guidance. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Nathan Gower and Sharon Hemans Researchers: Ben Henderson and Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, David Crowder, former Head of Investigation at the Building Research Establishment, told the Inquiry that an investigation into the Lakanal House fire in 2009, was shut down by the Government although it was “fundamentally incomplete”. David Metcalf, the Director of Window and Cladding Technology, explained how confusion over the use of the word “filler” in building regulation guidance created a “huge problem”, with insulation materials not meeting standards of limited combustibility. The Inquiry also heard from Lorraine Turner, Accreditation Director at United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS), who acknowledged there were shortcomings in UKAS' assessments of bodies within the construction industry. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Nathan Gower and Sharon Hemans Researchers: Ben Henderson and Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry heard how the National House Building Council (NHBC) approved Kingspan's combustible cladding insulation for many years. John Lewis, a fire engineer at the NHBC, admitted that a desire to collaborate with industry was a “corrupting” influence on their actions. It was also revealed that two days after the Grenfell fire, a senior civil servant asked the NHBC to support in public the government's assertion that Grenfell Tower's cladding was not permitted in the UK. Diane Marshall, who held final responsibility for approving building materials at NHBC, repeatedly defended the institution's actions. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week we heard closing statements for two modules of the inquiry on firefighting. Lawyers for the London Fire Brigade (LFB) and those representing the Bereaved, Survivors, and Residents (BSRs) strongly disagreed over the responsibility of the LFB for the failure to arrange an early evacuation of Grenfell Tower. The lawyer representing one of the BSR groups, Leslie Thomas, proposed a “Hillsborough Law” to require a duty of candour from those giving evidence. We interviewed Pete Weatherby QC, who represented BSRs during the first phase of the Grenfell Inquiry, and worked on the Hillsborough disaster inquest. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans, Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry questioned representatives from both the National House Building Council and Local Authority Building Control about the steps they took to restrict or approve the use of combustible materials in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Steve Evans, an NHBC manager, was warned at a conference 18 months before the Grenfell fire about the dangers of the combustible cladding which would eventually be installed on the tower. The former Technical Sales Director of the LABC, David Ewing, told the inquiry the company was gamed and played by insulation manufacturers. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry turned its attention to how building regulations were set and combustible materials tested and certified. Lawyers for the bereaved, survivors, and residents accused the government of concealing crucial information from previous fires, and industry bodies of knowingly approving unsafe building materials. Barry Turner, the former Director of Technical Policy at the Local Authority Building Control (LABC), agreed that his organisation's close relationship with insulation manufacturer, Kingspan, affected their response when questions were raised about the fire performance of Kingspan's K15 insulation. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans, Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

Andy Roe, Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, made a series of frank admissions this week. He said the LFB was aware of every single problem that contributed to the Grenfell Tower fire in advance of the night. A former LFB Commissioner, Ron Dobson, also gave evidence. He answered questions on why some of the recommendations that the Brigade committed to after the 2009 Lakanal House fire weren't addressed. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans, Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week evidence was presented by former London Fire Brigade Commissioner Dany Cotton, who previously told the Inquiry that the LFB could not have prepared for a fire like Grenfell Tower. This time, she conceded that in the years leading up to the fire, the LFB failed to take on board national guidance that warned how combustible cladding could lead to rapid fire spread, as it did at Grenfell. Evidence was also provided by another former LFB Commissioner, Ron Dobson. We heard how LFB Incident Commander training fell short of commitments they made in light of the 2009 Lakanal House fire. David Brown, former LFB Director of Operations, continued his evidence from last week covering the training of Control Room staff. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans, Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry continued to look at how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) trained its Control Room staff to deal with emergency calls. Evidence was provided by Joanne Smith, the Senior Operations Manager in the Control Room on the night of the Grenfell fire, and Tom George, former Assistant Commissioner for Operational Response accountable for staff training. The Inquiry heard how the LFB's training on emergency calls didn't include guidance on asking callers if they had any mobility issues. And a senior manager admitted she was embarrassed by the lack of clarity in the training. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans & Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Nicola Addyman