Podcasts about zvi rosen

In Vidal v. Elster (the “Trump Too Small” case), the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a federal limitation on registering trademarks that include other people’s names. All the Justices agreed that, though the limitation was content-based, it didn’t need to be judged under strict scrutiny. But behind this unanimity was a major rift about whether the Court should decide these matters by focusing on history and tradition, or should instead build on more recent precedents such as those dealing with “limited public forums.” Which is the better approach – and which is the one most likely to gain majority support in the future?Featuring:Prof. Barbara Lauriat, Associate Professor of Law & Dean’s Scholar in Intellectual Property, Texas Tech University School of LawProf. Lisa Ramsey, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of LawProf. Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of LawModerator: Prof. Zvi Rosen, Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law

Artificial intelligence is the most important technological tool being developed today, but the use of preexisting copyrighted works to train these AI systems is deeply controversial. At the end of 2023 the New York Times sued OpenAI and Microsoft, alleging that OpenAI's use of articles from the New York Times to train their ChatGPT large language model constitutes copyright infringement. An answer is due at the end of February, and it's expected the case will revolve on the question of whether the use of the copyrighted content of the Times was a fair use. The fair use analysis will likely turn on whether the use of copyrighted content to train a AI system "transforms" the work in a way which makes the use fair. The Supreme Court has spoken on this question twice recently, holding that Google's use of parts of Oracle's Java programming language to build the Android operating system was transformative, but that the licensing of a Andy Warhol work based on a photograph by Lynn Goldsmith was not transformative of Goldsmith's work. Also important and perhaps most on-point is a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that Google's Image Search system is transformative of the photographs it indexes and displays as thumbnails.To help understand this case Professors Charles Duan from the American University Washington College of Law and Zvi Rosen of the Simmons School of Law at Southern Illinois University was joined by Steven Tepp of Sentinel Worldwide, who is also a Lecturer at the George Washington University School of Law and formerly of the U.S. Copyright Office. John Moran of Holland & Knight moderated the panel and provided additional perspective.

On May 18, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of rock and roll photographer Lynn Goldsmith in a dispute between Goldsmith and the Andy Warhol Foundation regarding Warhol's works based on Goldsmith's photo of the musician Prince. The fair use doctrine excuses from liability certain unlicensed uses of copyrighted works, and the question before the Court was whether Warhol's creation of a series of paintings copied from the photo, and the licensure of those paintings to periodicals, constituted a fair use. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that it did not.Intellectual property law professor Zvi Rosen, who filed an amicus brief in the case in support of Goldsmith, joined us to break down the decision and answer audience questions.Featuring:- Zvi Rosen, Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law

Zvi Rosen, Professor at the Southern Illinois University School of Law, joins Gus to discuss copyright law. Rosen, a copyright expert, shares some history on copyright law before turning to the main focus of the conversation: how copyright law applies to computer software.Follow Zvi Rosen on Twitter @zvisrosenFollow Gus Hurwitz on Twitter @GusHurwitzFollow NGTC on Twitter @UNL_NGTCLinksNebraska Governance and Technology Center

The Supreme Court is considering a lawsuit between rock and roll photographer Lynn Goldsmith and the Andy Warhol Foundation regarding Warhol's works based on Goldsmith's photo of the musician Prince. The fair use doctrine excuses from liability certain unlicensed uses of copyrighted works. The question before the Court in Warhol v. Goldsmith is whether Warhol's creation of a series of paintings copied from the photo, and the licensure of those paintings to periodicals, constitutes a fair use. Underlying the case are core intellectual property questions about the nature and scope of the fair use doctrine.Following oral arguments on October 12, Zvi Rosen, who filed an amicus brief in the case in support of the respondent (Goldsmith), joined us to break down the case.Featuring:Zvi Rosen, Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law

The Supreme Court is considering a lawsuit between rock and roll photographer Lynn Goldsmith and the Andy Warhol Foundation regarding Warhol's works based on Goldsmith's photo of the musician Prince. The fair use doctrine excuses from liability certain unlicensed uses of copyrighted works. The question before the Court in Warhol v. Goldsmith is whether Warhol's creation of a series of paintings copied from the photo, and the licensure of those paintings to periodicals, constitutes a fair use. Underlying the case are core intellectual property questions about the nature and scope of the fair use doctrine.Following oral arguments on October 12, Zvi Rosen, who filed an amicus brief in the case in support of the respondent (Goldsmith), joined us to break down the case.Featuring:- Zvi Rosen, Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law

On February 24, 2022 the Supreme Court decided Unicolors, Inc v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, LP. Joining today to discuss this decision is Zvi Rosen, Assistant Professor at SIU Law, former Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law.

Join us virtually to hear a discussion on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Unicolors, Inc v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, LP. Featuring: — Zvi Rosen, Assistant Professor at SIU Law, and was a Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law. He has previously taught at University of […]

On April 5, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Google v. Oracle. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that Google's use of a Java program constituted "fair use" under federal copyright law. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Alito joined. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. A panel of experts joins us to discuss the case, their differing views on the ruling, and its implications for copyright and intellectual property law.Featuring: -- Prof. Michael Risch, Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law-- Prof. Zvi Rosen, Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law-- Moderator: Prof. Sandra Aistars, Clinical Professor, Senior Scholar and Director of Copyright Research and Policy, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University

On June 30, 2020 the Supreme Court released its decision in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.. In an 8-1 decision, the Court upheld the ruling of the lower court, which found that “Booking.com” is not a generic term, and is thus eligible for trademark protection. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion for the Court, writing that a website styled “generic.com” does not qualify it for federal trademark protection if the term has meaning to consumers; however, because “Booking.com” does not necessarily signify to consumers an online hotel reservation service, it is therefore not a generic term, and qualifies for protection. Justice Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer dissented. Joining us today to discuss this case and its implications is Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University’s School of Law

On June 30, 2020 the Supreme Court released its decision in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.. In an 8-1 decision, the Court upheld the ruling of the lower court, which found that “Booking.com” is not a generic term, and is thus eligible for trademark protection. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion for the Court, writing that a website styled “generic.com” does not qualify it for federal trademark protection if the term has meaning to consumers; however, because “Booking.com” does not necessarily signify to consumers an online hotel reservation service, it is therefore not a generic term, and qualifies for protection. Justice Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer dissented. Joining us today to discuss this case and its implications is Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University’s School of Law

On June 30, the Supreme Court released its decision in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.. In an 8-1 decision, the Court upheld the ruling of the lower court, which found that “Booking.com” is not a generic term and is thus eligible for trademark protection. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion of the Court; in that opinion, Justice Ginsburg first noted that a website styled “generic.com” does not qualify for federal trademark protection if the term has meaning to consumers, but because “Booking.com” does not necessarily signify to consumers an online hotel reservation service, it is therefore not a generic term and qualifies for protection. Justice Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer dissented. Our expert will discuss the decision and its implications.  Featuring:-- Mr. Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of Law

On June 30, the Supreme Court released its decision in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.. In an 8-1 decision, the Court upheld the ruling of the lower court, which found that “Booking.com” is not a generic term and is thus eligible for trademark protection. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion of the Court; in that opinion, Justice Ginsburg first noted that a website styled “generic.com” does not qualify for federal trademark protection if the term has meaning to consumers, but because “Booking.com” does not necessarily signify to consumers an online hotel reservation service, it is therefore not a generic term and qualifies for protection. Justice Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer dissented. Our expert will discuss the decision and its implications.  Featuring:-- Mr. Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of Law

On May 4, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., a case presenting the question whether the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.In 2011 and 2012, Booking.com sought trademark protection for its web address name, “Booking.com”--but the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected the application. “Booking” was either generic and not protectable, the PTO stated, or else a descriptive mark to which the addition of “.com” was insufficient to demonstrate the “secondary meaning” necessary for federal protection of a descriptive mark. Booking.com filed a civil action in federal district court to appeal the PTO rejection and prevailed: the district court held that “Booking.com” as a whole was a descriptive mark that had acquired secondary meaning; that is, it was sufficiently distinctive to establish a mental association in the mind of the relevant public between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. The PTO in turn appealed, but a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted the PTO’s cert petition to address whether--given that generic terms may not be federally registered as trademarks--the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.To discuss the case, we have Art Gollwitzer, partner at Michael Best & Friedrich LLP and Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law. As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On May 4, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., a case presenting the question whether the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.In 2011 and 2012, Booking.com sought trademark protection for its web address name, “Booking.com”--but the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected the application. “Booking” was either generic and not protectable, the PTO stated, or else a descriptive mark to which the addition of “.com” was insufficient to demonstrate the “secondary meaning” necessary for federal protection of a descriptive mark. Booking.com filed a civil action in federal district court to appeal the PTO rejection and prevailed: the district court held that “Booking.com” as a whole was a descriptive mark that had acquired secondary meaning; that is, it was sufficiently distinctive to establish a mental association in the mind of the relevant public between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. The PTO in turn appealed, but a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted the PTO’s cert petition to address whether--given that generic terms may not be federally registered as trademarks--the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.To discuss the case, we have Art Gollwitzer, partner at Michael Best & Friedrich LLP and Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law. As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

In its very first case on copyright, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall was faced with the question of whether its own reports are protected by copyright, and decided in the negative. This term, the Supreme Court is called upon to clarify the scope of that decision, which it has not further clarified since two cases heard in 1888. The question presented in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc. is whether the annotations to the Official Code of Georgia are "government edicts" and thus not within the scope of copyright, even though they lack the force of law. This case also raises implicit questions as to other quasi-governmental publications of which the copyright status is often surprisingly amorphous.To discuss the case, we have Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law and Sy Damle, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

In its very first case on copyright, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall was faced with the question of whether its own reports are protected by copyright, and decided in the negative. This term, the Supreme Court is called upon to clarify the scope of that decision, which it has not further clarified since two cases heard in 1888. The question presented in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc. is whether the annotations to the Official Code of Georgia are "government edicts" and thus not within the scope of copyright, even though they lack the force of law. This case also raises implicit questions as to other quasi-governmental publications of which the copyright status is often surprisingly amorphous.To discuss the case, we have Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law and Sy Damle, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

In its very first case on copyright, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall was faced with the question of whether its own reports are protected by copyright, and decided in the negative. This term, the Supreme Court is called upon to clarify the scope of that decision, which it has not further clarified since two cases heard in 1888. The question presented in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc. is whether the annotations to the Official Code of Georgia are "government edicts" and thus not within the scope of copyright, even though they lack the force of law. This case also raises implicit questions as to other quasi-governmental publications of which the copyright status is often surprisingly amorphous.Featuring:-- Mr. Sy Damle, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP-- Mr. Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of Law

In its very first case on copyright, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall was faced with the question of whether its own reports are protected by copyright, and decided in the negative. This term, the Supreme Court is called upon to clarify the scope of that decision, which it has not further clarified since two cases heard in 1888. The question presented in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc. is whether the annotations to the Official Code of Georgia are "government edicts" and thus not within the scope of copyright, even though they lack the force of law. This case also raises implicit questions as to other quasi-governmental publications of which the copyright status is often surprisingly amorphous.Featuring:-- Mr. Sy Damle, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP-- Mr. Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of Law

On Nov. 5, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Allen v. Cooper, which involves a dispute over the way state sovereign immunity and federal copyright law interact when an author alleges state infringement of that author’s federal copyright.Petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, contend that North Carolina violated their federal copyrights by publishing video and photographic footage that Allen had taken of the pirate Blackbeard’s sunken flagship, Queen Anne’s Revenge. Allen also challenges the validity of a recently passed North Carolina statute providing that photographs and video recordings of shipwrecks in the custody of North Carolina are public records. This law, he contends, was enacted in bad faith to undermine his copyright claim.Allen and Nautilus sued North Carolina and various of its officials in federal district court. Although the district court rejected defendants’ invocation of sovereign immunity from suit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment, concluding that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act does not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which ultimately shields respondents from all of Allen’s and Nautilus’s claims.The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act in providing remedies for authors of original expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by states.To discuss the case, in this special panel episode, we have Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of Law, Prof. Josh Blackman, Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston, and our moderator, Kevin R. Amer, Deputy General Counsel at the U.S. Copyright Office.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On Nov. 5, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Allen v. Cooper, which involves a dispute over the way state sovereign immunity and federal copyright law interact when an author alleges state infringement of that author’s federal copyright.Petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, contend that North Carolina violated their federal copyrights by publishing video and photographic footage that Allen had taken of the pirate Blackbeard’s sunken flagship, Queen Anne’s Revenge. Allen also challenges the validity of a recently passed North Carolina statute providing that photographs and video recordings of shipwrecks in the custody of North Carolina are public records. This law, he contends, was enacted in bad faith to undermine his copyright claim.Allen and Nautilus sued North Carolina and various of its officials in federal district court. Although the district court rejected defendants’ invocation of sovereign immunity from suit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment, concluding that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act does not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which ultimately shields respondents from all of Allen’s and Nautilus’s claims.The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act in providing remedies for authors of original expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by states.To discuss the case, in this special panel episode, we have Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of Law, Prof. Josh Blackman, Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston, and our moderator, Kevin R. Amer, Deputy General Counsel at the U.S. Copyright Office.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

In this episode, Zvi S. Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law, discusses his article "An Empirical Study of 225 Years of Copyright Registrations," which he co-authored with Richard Schwinn, Research Economist at the U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy. Rosen and Schwinn's article "presents the first complete record of US copyright registrations from 1790 through 2015, using all available records of registrations and renewals to paint a picture of copyright law and its intersection with creativity and the economy." Rosen describes how the process of copyright registration and the nature of works registered has changed over time. And he explains how the data he and Schwinn collected and analysed sheds new light on the history of the creation of works of authorship in the United States. Rosen is on Twitter at @zvisrosen. His scholarship is available on SSRN. And he blogs at "Mostly IP History." See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

In this episode, Amelia Smith Rinehart, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, discusses her article "E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Company: The First Skirmish between Patent Law and the Sherman Act," which she wrote for the "Forgotten IP" symposium organized by Shubha Ghosh and Zvi Rosen, and published in the Syracuse Law Review. Rinehart describes the creation of the National Harrow Company in 1890, an early "patent pool," and how the Company's use of its harrow patents brought it into tension with the newly-enacted Sherman Act. She discusses the legal and policy questions at stake in the Supreme Court's opinion finding no Sherman Act violation in Bement, and how they inform the relationship between patent and antitrust law today. Rinehart is on Twitter at @ameliarinehart.Keywords: patent law, trusts, Harrow Trust, patent-antitrust cases See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc. Varsity Brands, Inc. designs and manufactures clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the clothing incorporate many elements but do not consider the functionality of the final clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two-dimensional artwork of the designs at issue in this case, which were very similar to ones that Star Athletica, LLC was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other claims, that Star had violated the Copyright Act. Star countered that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to the Copyright Office. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Star argued that Varsity did not have valid copyrights because the designs were for “useful articles” and cannot be separated from the uniforms themselves, all of which tends to make an article ineligible for copyright. Varsity argued that the copyrights were valid and had been infringed. The district court granted summary judgment for Star and held that the designs were integral to the functionality of the uniform. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, however, and held that the uniforms Varsity designed were copyrightable. -- By a vote of 6-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that a feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection under the Copyright Act of 1976 only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article, and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic or sculptural work -- either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression -- if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated; that test is satisfied here. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kennedy joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Zvi Rosen, who is a Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law.

On October 31, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc. Varsity Brands, Inc. designs and manufactures clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the clothing incorporate many elements but do not consider the functionality of the final clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two-dimensional artwork of the designs at issue in this case, which were very similar to ones that Star Athletica, LLC was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other claims, that Star violated the Copyright Act. Star countered that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to the Copyright Office. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Star argued that Varsity did not have valid copyrights because the designs were for “useful articles” and cannot be separated from the uniforms themselves, all of which tends to make an article ineligible for copyright. Varsity argued that the copyrights were valid and had been infringed. The district court granted summary judgment for Star and held that the designs were integral to the functionality of the uniform. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, however, and held that the uniforms Varsity designed were copyrightable. -- The question now before the U.S. Supreme Court asks what the appropriate test is to determine when a feature of a useful article is protectable under section 101 of the Copyright Act. -- To discuss the case, we have Zvi Rosen, who is an adjunct professor at New York Law School.

On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz. Between 2003 and 2007 Husky International Electronics sold and delivered electronic device components worth more than $160,000 to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. Chrysalis, then under the financial control of Daniel Ritz, failed to pay for the goods and Ritz encouraged the transfer of funds from Chrysalis to various other companies. Ritz held substantial ownership stakes in these companies, which had not given reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the Chrysalis funds. -- In May 2009, Husky sued Ritz in federal district court, seeking to hold him personally liable for Chrysalis’s debt. Ritz filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and Husky then filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court alleging actual fraud, to preclude a discharge of Ritz’s debts. The bankruptcy court ruled that Husky had failed to prove actual fraud, however, and the district court affirmed that decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit likewise affirmed the lower court judgments, finding no record evidence of a false representation by the debtor, which the Fifth Circuit deemed a necessary predicate to establish actual fraud. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether the “actual fraud” bar to discharge under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code applies only when the debtor has made a false representation, or whether the bar also applies when the debtor has deliberately obtained money through a fraudulent-transfer scheme that was actually intended to cheat a creditor. -- By a vote of 7-1, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that the term "actual fraud" in Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code encompasses fraudulent conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a false representation. The majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Zvi Rosen, who is a visiting scholar at Hofstra University Maurice A. Deane School of Law.

On March 1, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz. Between 2003 and 2007 Husky International Electronics sold and delivered electronic device components worth more than $160,000 to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. Chrysalis, then under the financial control of Daniel Ritz, failed to pay for the goods and Ritz encouraged the transfer of funds from Chrysalis to various other companies. Ritz held substantial ownership stakes in these companies, which had not given reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the Chrysalis funds. -- In May 2009, Husky sued Ritz in federal district court, seeking to hold him personally liable for Chrysalis’s debt. Ritz filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and Husky then filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court alleging actual fraud, to preclude a discharge of Ritz’s debts. The bankruptcy court ruled that Husky had failed to prove actual fraud, however, and the district court affirmed that decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit likewise affirmed the lower court judgments, finding no record evidence of a false representation by the debtor, which the Fifth Circuit deemed a necessary predicate to establish actual fraud. -- The question now before the Supreme Court is whether the “actual fraud” bar to discharge under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code applies only when the debtor has made a false representation, or whether the bar also applies when the debtor has deliberately obtained money through a fraudulent-transfer scheme that was actually intended to cheat a creditor. -- To discuss the case, we have Zvi Rosen, who is a visiting scholar at Hofstra University Maurice A. Deane School of Law.