Podcasts about regional command east

This edition features a stories on how International Security Assistance Forces have one less Haqqani Leader to worry about in Khost Province, Afghanistan and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan are working hard to fight the information war. Air Force Staff Sgt. James Zannetti takes us to Parwan Province where they're teaching young Afghan Journalists to be first with the truth. Sound bites include Ms. Mahtab Farid, U.S. Department of State Public Diplomacy Officer, Regional Command East, Combined Joint Task Force 101, Hometown: Washington, D.C. and Army Master Sgt. David Gillespie, Regional Command East Regional Communications Center, Information Operations Non Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC), Hometown: Clarksville, Tenn. Hosted by Lance Cpl. Benjamin Harris.

Released 24 January, 2022. Critics of the Afghan war have claimed it was always unwinnable. This article argues the war was unwinnable the way it was fought and posits an alternative based on the Afghan way of war and the US approach to counterinsurgency in El Salvador during the final decade of the Cold War. Respecting the political and military dictates of strategy could have made America's longest foreign war unnecessary and is a warning for the wars we will fight in the future. Click here to read the article. Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Todd Greentree, a former US Foreign Service officer who served as a political military officer in five conflicts, including El Salvador and Afghanistan. He's a member of the Changing Character of War Center at Oxford University and teaches in the Global and National Security Policy Institute at the University of New Mexico. Greentree is the author of "What Went Wrong in Afghanistan," featured in Parameters winter 2021-2022 issue. Welcome, Todd. I'm so glad you're here. Let's talk about your article. Some people would argue the Afghan war was unwinnable. You assert it was unwinnable the way it was fought. What do you mean by that? Dr. Todd Greentree Thank you, Stephanie. Great to be here. The idea that it was unwinnable the way it was fought is really tied to the purpose, sort of the reason why I was writing it, which is not just about what went wrong in Afghanistan, what lessons can be derived about counterinsurgency. This is really an article about US strategic behavior. Afghanistan was my fifth war. And I like to write what I know. So really, the origin of the article is from my own story. I   got the idea that we were maybe not doing this right, sort of when I stepped off the helicopter at Bagram in 2008. My first war had been El Salvador in the early 1980s. And so everything I learned were all from guys who had been in Vietnam. There's more about that in the article. For the next four years, though, I served with people who were…most of the people were from the 9/11 generation, and I was a political adviser to combat units out in the field and was super impressed with the astuteness that everybody was showing. So first, I was in Regional Command East, where General Mark Milley was the deputy commander for operations. But there was a problem with the entire effort in Afghanistan. We were on economy of force. But that economy of force was not being exercised for a strategic purpose, just to minimize the cost, because Iraq had sucked up all the attention and the bulk of the resources. Then I moved to Regional Command South into Taliban home country, and they had been raging there since 2006. It took three years for the US to adapt. I came back to Kandahar in 2010, at the height of the surge, with the 10th Mountain Division. They were in command of Regional Command South. And this was the main effort at the height of the surge. It was a strong coalition team. They knew what to do, how to partner with the Afghan army. They took it seriously. They were serious about aligning political and military strategies, which was my part of this. The overall strategy of the US, by 2009, was coming into focus, we'd had Stan McChrystal's math, the idea, here's our most experienced Special Operations commander who had come to the realization, as had many of the SOF guys, that attrition generates more insurgents. This led to a shift in the understanding of focus on the population rather than exercising firepower. General Petraeus, following McChrystal with Field Manual 3-24 and counterinsurgency doctrine and all of that. The problem was that when Obama announced the surge, he time-limited at the same time, which was a strategically incorrect thing to do ...

In May of 2009, 3rd Squadron 61st Cavalry Regiment deployed to Nuristan, Afghanistan a small eastern province bordering Pakistan. When they arrived, they occupied the most fringe outposts of Regional Command East, several of which were only accessible by helicopter, and then only during the cover of the darkest nights of each month, in order to avoid rocket propelled grenade attacks against the airframe.   The squadron commander for the deployment was then-lieutenant Robert “Brad” Brown. In preparation for that deployment, he, along with then-Colonel Randy George, went on the pre-deployment site survey to better understand the terrain and complex environment of which they were only months away from assuming responsibility. During that trip, they arrived at Combat Outpost Keating, a remote outpost named for Ben Keating, who had died attempting to drive one of the lumbering resupply vehicles down the treacherous road back to the forward operating base. Standing in that base built in a valley at the base of three mountains and backed up to two rivers, both men understood that there could be no delay in closing that base for the safety of their Troopers. Anyone who visited COP Keating knew full well that it was the tactically indefensible position in which you could ever place yourself.   But that wasn't the only conundrum. COP Keating wasn't alone. In order to close it, you would have to close the other two outposts in the surrounding area, almost simultaneously to ensure that they could provide reinforcing fires for one another. Concurrently, south of the forward operating base, one the observation posts that LTC Brown would be assuming responsibility for had recently been completely overrun by the Taliban, who attacked up a mountain as the Afghan National Army abandoned their post, forcing the remaining US Troopers to call for a broken arrow, requesting fire on their position as they were being overrun. And to complicate all of that, the going-in position of relieving the outgoing unit would have them arrayed across a vast swath of land, terribly difficult to resupply, with barely enough Troopers to simply pull security on their own position.   For multiple reasons they were unable to close COP Keating, OP Fritsche, and COP Lowell as quickly as they needed to. Unknown to the base closure planners of 3-61CAV, as they were simultaneously planning to close the three outposts in Kamdesh, the Taliban was planning a massive complex attack to prevent them from ever leaving.   On the morning of October 3rd, 2009 more than 400 insurgents attacked OP Fritsche and COP Keating simultaneously. A force of only 52 Troopers defended COP Keating, even after Afghan National Army abandoned their post and the insurgents broke through the perimeter, causing a small group of Troopers, led by Staff Sergeant Clint Romesha, to engage the enemy in close-quarters combat, retaking the COP. However, at the end of the day, the Troopers of Black Knight troop, 3rd squadron 61st cavalry regiment would be saying their final goodbyes to eight of their friends who had given their lives during that battle.   The diligent devotion of their squadron commander, however, ensured that this moment would not be easily erased from history. LTC Brown and his staff worked to guarantee the recognition of the heroic efforts of those who went above and beyond to place themselves in harm's way to protect each other, destroy the enemy, and bring the remains of their friends home. Those efforts to ensure recognition succeeded.   What has since become known as the “Battle of Kamdesh,” resulted in the following awards:   Two Medals of Honor for SSG Clint Romesha and SSG Ty Carter Two Distinguished Service Crosses for 1LT Andrew Bundermann and SSG Justin Gellagos (posthumously awarded) Nine Silver Stars 18 bronze stars with “V” device for valor 37 Army Commendation Medals with “V” device for valor And 27 Purple hearts for wounds sustained in combat   SSG Romesha authored the book “Red Platoon” and Jake Tapper authored “The Outpost,” which has since been turned into a major motion picture.   The fall-out of the battle, including the loss of life, took it's toll on everyone involved and amongst others within the squadron, however. The subsequent investigation held both COL George and LTC Brown responsible, even though the ISAF-commander at the time, GEN Stanley McChrystal, agreed there was nothing more they could have tactically done to prevent the disaster. Many of the Troopers completed their obligation and left the army, preferring lives of quiet and peace, away from the constant reminder of the toughest day of their life.   LTC Brown however, still had eight months left to command his squadron through a deployment in one of the most kinetic provinces in all of Afghanistan. The two artillery guns on his forward operating base fired over 6000 rounds total during their year-long deployment. He had lost two beloved Troopers before Keating, while sending back home dozens of wounded Troopers before and after the Battle for Kamdesh. To put it in context, in the first four months of his deployment, LTC Brown's squadron of rag-tag cavalrymen were attacked more than 238 times across seven separate locations. And yet, he persevered with courage, humility, devotion, and determination. It is why those of us who served with him as the commander of 3rd squadron 61st cavalry regiment unabashedly and unquestionably remember him, to this day, as the best leader we ever served with. As his former chaplain, I can guarantee that he's the real deal and I am humbled to know him. So without further ado, here is the one and only, Brad Brown.

Major General Jeffrey Schloesser (US Army Ret), former Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division and Regional Command-East and author of "Marathon War: Leadership in Combat in Afghanistan" joins the show to discuss the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Kicking off the show with the Buzz Question about who is responsible for the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. The suspect who robbed a smoke shop, carjacked a civilian and barricaded himself in an apartment has been arrested after a multi-hour standoff with police. Questions remain on possible ties to an earlier homicide at a nearby apartment complex. Major General Jeffrey Schloesser (US Army Ret), former Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division and Regional Command-East and author of "Marathon War: Leadership in Combat in Afghanistan" joins the show to discuss the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Current president of the Army Aviation Association of America (Quad-A) and retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Jeff Schloesser joins Rotor Radio to discuss the current state of Army aviation, future vertical lift technologies and more.Schloesser retired from service after 34 years that included commanding the 101st Airborne Division and Regional Command-East in Afghanistan and serving as assistant division commander of the 101st in Iraq. He commanded two Army Special Operations Aviation Battalions and flew with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, known as the Night Stalkers. Prior to military retirement, he was the Director of Army Aviation, leading the U.S. Army's $6 billion Aviation modernization and transformation plan.Currently serving as the president of Quad-A, Schloesser's day job is executive vice president of strategic pursuits at Bell, based at the company's Advanced Vertical Lift Center outside Washington, D.C. 

Captain Bobbie Ragsdale is an armor officer in the US Army and served in the 10th Mountain Division, deploying to Baghdad, Iraq as a Scout Platoon Leader. At the deployment’s completion in 2009, he returned to Ft. Polk where he served as a Troop Executive Officer and Assistant Operations Officer before deploying again to Wardak, Afghanistan in 2010. While in Afghanistan, he served simultaneously as TF Slugger’s Information Operations Officer, Civil-Military Operations Officer, and lead non-lethal planner. He led Regional Command (East)’s Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program in Wardak Province. CPT Ragsdale was then assigned to the Joint Readiness Training Center as a Platoon Observer Coach Trainer and Troop Commander. He completed his Master in Public Administration degree at Harvard’s Kennedy School in May, 2016. He is currently assigned to Camp Shelby, Mississippi as a company senior observer, coach, trainer with First Army.

Captain Bobbie Ragsdale is an armor officer in the US Army and served in the 10th Mountain Division, deploying to Baghdad, Iraq as a Scout Platoon Leader. At the deployment’s completion in 2009, he returned to Ft. Polk where he served as a Troop Executive Officer and Assistant Operations Officer before deploying again to Wardak, Afghanistan in 2010. While in Afghanistan, he served simultaneously as TF Slugger’s Information Operations Officer, Civil-Military Operations Officer, and lead non-lethal planner. He led Regional Command (East)’s Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program in Wardak Province. CPT Ragsdale was then assigned to the Joint Readiness Training Center as a Platoon Observer Coach Trainer and Troop Commander. He completed his Master in Public Administration degree at Harvard’s Kennedy School in May, 2016. He is currently assigned to Camp Shelby, Mississippi as a company senior observer, coach, trainer with First Army.

℠2014 - Regional Command East is said to be where the war in Afghanistan will be won or lost. Gail McCabe talks with MG Stephen Townsend, Commander, RC-East, and brings us a Closer Look.

Coalition Forces transferred ammunition over to the Afghan National Army for the first time marking progress for the Afghan National Army's success. Includes sound bites from Maj. Matt Boire, Ministry of Defense Ammunition Advisor, 2nd battalion, Princess Patricia, Canadian Light Infantry. Hometown: Shilo Manitoba, Canada; Maj. Raheem Shama, Commander, 22nd Bunker, Afghan National Army; WO Alexander Arabian, Ammo Accountability Officer, Task Force Lifeliner. Hometown: Warwick, R.I. and CWO3 Eric Thomas, Ammunition Manager for Ministry of Defense. Hometown: Charleston, W.Va. Also available in high definition.

In "This Week in the DoD" for April 6: Army Maj. Gen. Daniel Allyn spoked with Soldiers' Radio and Television about the state of affairs in Afghanistan's Regional Command-East and the region's future. Pentagon Press Secretary and acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs George Little delivered his first press briefing in the role of assistant secretary. He fielded questions about a possible North Korean missile test and about operations in Afghanistan. April is the Month of the Military Child. Barbara Thompson, director of Military Community and Family Policy for Children and Youth, spoke with the Pentagon Channel about the month, and what it means to be a military child today. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited troops aboard the USS Peleliu, commending them for their role in Afghanistan and outlining a defense strategy that will work well into the future. He said the crew of the Peleliu exemplifies the capabilities the future force will need. National Guard and civilian dentists, and one oncologist, visited Moldova to help teach dentists there and provide care for dozens of children in need. The visit was part of the North Carolina-Moldova state partnership, established in 1995.

FOB Shank | Day 31 — We’re in overtime! Due to the travel delays, we weren’t able to get to all of the regions in 30 days, so we’ve extended our trip until Sunday. We are now in Regional Command East, the "bread basket" of Afghanistan, or so I have been told. The goal now is to cover eastern Afghanistan. Throughout the trip we’ve been heavily concentrating on all of the international forces in Afghanistan. Looking back, I wish we could have covered more. There are 44 contributing nations here, and it’s really easy to write the number but it’s really hard to show what that number really means. Some countries are contributing thousands of troops while others are contributing a few. Other countries, like Japan, have contributed more than $5 Billion dollars to various projects in this country. We could spend years talking about all of this, but we’re restricted to 30 days because Ken and I are really looking forward to going back to our families. Produced by Tech Sgt. Raimondi.