Decisive Point – the USAWC Press Podcast Companion Series

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The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is the U.S. Army’s institute for geostrategic and national security research and analysis. SSI conducts global geostrategic research and analysis that creates and advances knowledge to influence solutions for national security problems facing the Army and the nation. SSI serves as a valuable source of ideas, criticism, innovative approaches, and independent analyses as well as a venue to expose external audiences to the U.S. Army’s contributions to the Nation.

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    • Jan 26, 2023 LATEST EPISODE
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    Latest episodes from Decisive Point – the USAWC Press Podcast Companion Series

    Dr. Conrad Crane – Parameters Spring 2023 Preview

    Play Episode Listen Later Jan 26, 2023 6:32


    In this episode, Parameters acting editor-in-chief offers a preview of the upcoming Parameters Spring demi-issue and touches on what the full Spring issue will include. Keywords: Afghanistan, Daoism, gender and conflict, climate change Episode transcript: Parameters Spring 2023 Preview Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point, a U.S. Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I'm here with Parameters acting editor-in-chief and Strategic Studies Institute historian and researcher, Dr. Conrad Crane. Thank you for being here today, Con. Dr. Conrad Crane Oh, always glad to talk to you, Stephanie. Host Let's talk about the spring demi-issue of Parameters that's due out in the next few weeks. This issue includes a substantial piece by Afghanistan expert Joseph Collins. I hope to talk with him in detail later, but I'm curious . . . from your perspective, what does Collins bring to the Afghanistan conversation? Crane I've known Joe for a lot of years. We are at West Point together, teaching in different departments. He's a long-serving Army officer. He's been a deputy assistant secretary of defense, he's watched Afghanistan for decades. He's written three books on it and about 40 articles. There are a few people I trust more to really analyze what went wrong in Afghanistan than Joe Collins. Host Why are you focusing this demi-issue on Afghanistan? Crane When I got my first assignment in the Strategic Studies Institute over 20 years ago, one of my first research projects was to look at the Army's response to losing in Vietnam. And I ended up doing a monograph entitled Avoiding Vietnam: The US Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia, which can actually be downloaded from the SSI publications website. What I found was that, basically, the Army as an institution ran away from Vietnam. They really didn't do any systematic institutional study of the defeat. They immediately focused on the Yom Kippur War and large-scale combat operations. And what significant discussion analysis did occur in an Army venue occurred in the pages of Parameters. That's about the only place you could find it. Right now, it kind of looks like deja vu all over again. We have the service that is not doing any systematic studies that I know of of why we failed in Afghanistan. I feel that Parameters needs to step up again and become the forum for discussion about that. The service really needs to analyze what went wrong in Afghanistan, because we have never been able to never do this again. Again, we are focused on major combat operations, large-scale combat operations looking at Ukraine. But we can't just forget about Afghanistan. We need to really take a hard look at what went wrong there and get what lessons and insights we can for the future. Host So continuing the Afghanistan theme, for SRAD Directors Corner, Colonel George Shatzer plans to review and comment on two books—The Fifth Act, America's End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman and The 40-Year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold by Tariq Ali. These really round out the issue. Care to comment? Crane Let me talk about all three of the items that are going to be in this demi-issue. We'll start with Joe. You know, Joe Collins is looking at the long-term focus on what went wrong in Afghanistan. He's going to focus on the historical difficulties in governing there the Afghan republics two inefficient corrupt governments, ineffective American strategy, operational shortcomings by American forces, an ineffective Afghan military, Pakistan's duplicitous policies, and the strength and determination of the Taliban. So he's looking at it with a very broad scope but basically from an American perspective.

    COL Everett S. P. Spain, COL Katie E. Matthew, and COL Andrew L. Hagemaster – Why Do Senior Officers Sometimes Fail in Character? The Leaky Character Reservoir

    Play Episode Listen Later Jan 20, 2023 15:20


    In this episode, the authors argue senior officers may fail in character because their rate of character development throughout their careers typically decreases as environmental stressors rise. They conceptualize character as an open system with both gains and leaks over time and integrate existing scholarship on personality and ethical development to create the Leaky Character Reservoir framework and then explain how it applies to Army officers' careers. Military leaders will gain a new understanding of character and find specific actions officers, units, and the US Army can undertake to strengthen the character of its senior officers. Click here to read the article. Keywords: character, ethics, personality, conditioning history, adult development, moral development  Episode transcript: Why Do Senior Officers Sometimes Fail in Character? The Leaky Character Reservoir Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonels Everett S.P. Spain, Katie Matthews, and Andrew L. Hagemaster, authors of “Why Do Senior Officers Sometimes Fail in Character? The Leaky Character Reservoir.” Spain is the head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy. Matthew is an Academy professor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy. Hagemaster is a clinical aeromedical and operational psychologist in the Army. Thank you for joining me today. I'm really excited to talk to you. Your article argues senior officers may fail in character because their rate of character development throughout their careers typically decreases as environmental stressors rise. Give us some background and maybe an example or two of failed character. Everett Spain Thanks, Stephanie. This is Everett Spain. So, this started when I was helping with the Battalion Commander Assessment Program at Fort Knox a few years ago—maybe three years ago—and a friend and colleague of mine from the surge in Iraq from 2007–08 days was Major General Matt McFarland. At the time of the conversation (he) was commander of 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, and he invited me to lunch. After we caught up a little bit personally, he said, “Hey, there's something I've been wondering (that) I'd like your thoughts on.” I said, “What's that, sir?” He said, “Well, I've noticed that back in World War I and World War Two, a lot of senior officers were getting relieved due to lack of battlefield competence directly related to leadership or their tactical abilities.” He said, “But now all the reliefs I see of senior officers is due to character. Do you know what's going on?” And so we talked about it back and forth a little bit. And we flowed some hypotheses. But in the end, I said, “Hey, sir. Let me look at this a little bit and see if I can engage some of my teammates and circle back to you with a more thoughtful perspective.” So when I got back to West Point, I queried my faculty for anyone who was interested in diving into this with me. Colonel Katie Matthew raised her hand. I think her quote was “put me in coach.” And Col. Andrew Hagemaster volunteered, as he always does, as a great teammate. And so, over the last few years, we looked into this from a variety of perspectives. And what we kind of discovered is a new way to look at character, for all of us—since we're probably considered senior officers as well—is that character is not a permanent gain. When you have character, there are losses as well. And the bottom line that we'll talk about a little bit more throughout this podcast is that we'd better increase our rate of character inputs...

    MAJ Thomas H. Nassif and CPT George A. Mesias – Leader Perspectives on Managing Suicide-related Events in Garrison

    Play Episode Listen Later Jan 3, 2023 13:27


    Leaders who have personally experienced the aftermath of a suicide-related event can provide important lessons and recommendations for military leadership and policymakers. This podcast executes a thematic analysis of interviews with leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers who responded to garrison suicide-related events and explores leader decision-making related to memorials, investigations, and readiness Click here to read the article. Keywords: suicide postvention, garrison, military leader, chaplain, behavioral, health provider Episode Transcript: Leader Perspectives on Managing Suicide-related Events in Garrison Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point Welcomes Major Thomas H. Nassif and Captain George a Mesias, co-authors of "Leader Perspectives on Managing Suicide-related Events in Garrison” with Dr. Amy Adler. This article was featured in the Parameters Winter 2022–23 edition. Nassif, a research psychologist at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), serves as the Institute's lead on mindfulness training research efforts with the US Army War College and the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. He's also the principal investigator on a military suicide research grant funded by the congressionally directed medical research programs. Mesias is a licensed clinical social worker and researcher at WRAIR. He's advised commands and planned behavioral health operations across the Korean theater of operation and served as behavioral health officer for a Stryker Brigade. He is an Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training master trainer and a graduate of the Army Social Work Child and Family Fellowship Program. Dr. Amy B. Adler is a clinical research psychologist and senior scientist at the Center for Military Psychiatry and Neuroscience at WRAIR. She's had numerous randomized trials with Army units, published more than 180 journal articles and chapters, and served as lead editor of Deployment Psychology and Anger at Work, both published by the American Psychological Association. Your article opens with, “In the last decade, suicide has become a leading cause of death for service members, claiming more lives than combat and transportation accidents.” This is a hard topic to ease into. What else do we need to know about service members and suicide for this article? MAJ Thomas H. Nassif Suicide is a difficult topic for a number of reasons. And many, if not all of us have been touched by it in some way, and the ripple effects across the unit and community when there's a suicide-related event. It's a really important topic, and there are many initiatives that the Army is engaged in that address risk factors and prevention. Our paper tackles a different part of the problem. you probably heard of prevention. What we're going to talk about today is postvention, in other words, what leaders do in the aftermath of a suicide-related event. First some terminology. So we define a suicide-related event as death by suicide, suicide attempt, or suicide intent. And by leader, we're referring to chaplains, behavior health providers, and unit leaders. And the leaders that we focused on in the article were chaplains, behavior health providers, and unit leaders. Although postvention has been studied in a deployed setting, we focused on garrison settings, which run the risk of being overlooked. CPT George A. Mesias This is Captain Mesias. I'm a licensed clinical social worker. As a social worker, I've served as a therapist for soldiers, and I've served as a behavioral health officer for a Brigade combat team. Suicide is an often-discussed topic due to ACE tra...

    MAJ John T. Pelham IV – Security Force Assistance Brigades and US Indo-Pacific Command Multi-domain Competition

    Play Episode Listen Later Dec 20, 2022 7:30


    Security force assistance brigades can enable multi-domain convergence in competition in the US Indo-Pacific Command. Rather than focusing on conventional Joint force capabilities, this podcast analyzes recent US Army operational experience in security force assistance and security cooperation in US Indo-Pacific Command and identifies capability gaps and opportunities for competition. Finally, military leadership and policymakers will find recommendations on how US Army security force assistance and security cooperation can shape environments and deter conflict in the US Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility. Click here to read the article. Keywords: SFAB, multi-domain, competition, deterrence, USINDOPACOM Episode transcript: Security Force Assistance Brigades and US Indo-Pacific Command Multi-domain Competition Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Major John T Pelham IV, author of "Security Force Assistance Brigades and US Indo-Pacific Command Multi-domain Competition," which was featured in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Pelham is an armor officer currently serving as Deputy Chief 5 for the First Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. His Master of Military Arts and Science thesis, "Examining the Security Force Assistance Brigade's Role in Future Army Strategic Deterrence," was published by the Institute of Land Warfare in September 2021. His article "Examining Capability Gaps in the SFAB Cavalry Squadron" was published in the July 2021 issue of the Cavalry and Armor Journal. Welcome to Decisive Point. I'm really glad you're here. Major John T. Pelham IV Well, thank you for having me. Host You take a step back in your article from Joint force capabilities and focus instead on analyzing recent US Army operational experience and security force assistance and security cooperation in US Indo-Pacific commands. What problem in the Indo-Pacific does your article address? Pelham I think it's a couple of problems ma'am. First of all, I think it's how do we compete with the pacing threat as outlined in the interim National Security Strategy and the recently published National Security Strategy in terms of how do we compete with China and other adversaries in Indo-Pacific Theater—preferably below the level of armed conflict? Moreover, how do we as an army contribute to the Joint force in a theater that is roundly dominated by the air and maritime domains? This project actually came about from a conversation with Brigadier General Lombardo of Army G 3 5 7 Training. When I was writing my SAMS monograph, I had written my Master of Military Arts and Science thesis on the role of the SFAB and future Army strategic deterrence. And from that conversation, he said, "You know what I would be interested to know is what is the Army's contribution to multi-domain competition, particularly in the Pacific theater?" And that stems also from a conversation I had with the Chief of Armor, in a Q&A session with him. I said, "You know, hey, sir, what do you feel is the armor branch's role in the Indo-Pacific given the physical constraints of that domain for land force, particularly heavy mechanized forces?" And he said something to the effect of, well, most of our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific Theater, they have armies, and most of those armies have a competent mechanized component. That is where the armor branch can make its contribution because even if it's not our armor that is serving as a flexible deterrent or enabling competition in the theater below the level of armed conflict, we can leverage our expertise and our ability to work by, with,

    COL Benjamin W. Buchholz – Planning for Positive Strategic Shock in the Department of Defense

    Play Episode Listen Later Dec 16, 2022 11:30


    A concept of positive strategic shock would benefit the US Department of Defense's planning processes. Some US doctrine demonstrates awareness of the need to plan for negative strategic shocks but lacks consideration of positive strategic shock—any shock with a non-zero-sum outcome—which could create a situation where the Department of Defense misses opportunities. This podcast clarifies the term "positive strategic shock," provides a brief review of where and how planning for any sort of strategic shock currently occurs, and makes recommendations based on three methods for thinking about strategic shock. Click here to read the article. Key words: shock, positive, non-zero-sum, planning, doctrine Episode transcript: Planning for Positive Strategic Shock in the Department of Defense Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Benjamin W Buchholz, author of “Planning for Positive Strategic Shock in the Department of Defense,” which was featured in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Buchholz is a foreign area officer and recent Army War College distinguished graduate. He's published four books—The Tightening Dark, Sirens of Manhattan, One Hundred and One Knights, and Private Soldiers, as well as numerous articles and shorter works. Thanks for joining me today, Colonel Buchholz. I'm glad you're here. Col. Benjamin W. Buchholz Thank you, I appreciate it. Host You talked about positive strategic shock in your article. Please expand on that concept. Buchholz Positive strategic shock is not a new term, but it is a term that I'm using in a different way than has been used previously. In the planning literature that's out there right now, there is a thing called positive strategic shock, but it's used to identify the delta between when a negative shock occurs and then an organization catches back up to status quo or to a median level of performance. And that delta is called, sometimes, positive strategic shock. In my opinion, that's not actually positive, that's just making up for a negative. So I wanted to look at the case where something truly positive happens in an environment, and so I define that as an incident that is non-zero-sum—something that's good for all parties—a win win situation. Host Can you give me some examples of negative and positive strategic shock? Buchholz I think it's important to mention, you know, that this paper is about strategic shocks. So, we can all think of a lot of tactical- and operational-level shocks which are more on the weapons systems and that sort of thing, but for something to be really strategic it needs to change doctrine, change the way cultures think about things, change the world order in a way. So, we're talking about real igh-level stuff. The paper goes into a lot of detail on that. Maybe an unfortunate amount of detail. Probably the more interesting portion of this is what's the difference between negative and positive, and that can be kind of a subjective answer. So, in order to make it an objective answer, the way I define it is that negative is zero-sum thinking, whereas positive is a non-zero-sum. And that's a complex way to say a win-win situation. Where all parties benefit. Where rising water, you know, floats all boats. There are lots of ways to say that sort of thing. I think in DoD we overly fixate, and for good reason, on negative shocks. So, the adversary has developed some new system, some new methodology, some new culture, even, that we saw in the Cold War with communism. Whereas, what I'm really trying to say in this paper is that there's an opposite end of this spectrum that sometimes t...

    COL Tyrell O. Mayfield – Indian Perspectives: Insights for the Indo-American Partnership

    Play Episode Listen Later Dec 15, 2022 11:50


    To buttress stability in the Indo-Pacific, the United States must understand how India sees the region and the world. The theories and ideas of Kautilya, a leading but little-studied Indian philosopher, provide significant insight into Indian perspectives on strategic partnerships and silent war. India has lived out Kautilyan perspectives in its recent foreign policy; therefore, a US understanding of the Indian perspective could advance the national security interests of both countries, clarify recent Indian security responses around the world, and provide a basis for a mutually beneficial pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Click here to read the article. Key words: Indo-Pacific, Kautilya, Quad, US-India partnership, realism Episode transcript: Indian Perspectives: Insights for the Indo-American Partnership Host You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Tyrell O. Mayfield, author of “Indian Perspectives: Insights for the Indo-American Partnership,” which was published in the Winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Mayfield is the deputy foreign policy advisor to the chief of staff of the US Air Force. He holds a master's degree in international relations from the University of Oklahoma and master's degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School and the US Army War College. He's the co-editor of Redefining the Modern Military: The Intersection of Profession and Ethics, published in 2018. Your article discusses Indian philosopher Kautilya. I look forward to hearing about this. But first, thanks for being here, Ty. COL Tyrell Mayfield Thank you, Stephanie. It's my pleasure, and I'm glad to join you. I just want to open by making sure, it's clear that our conversation here today reflects my own thoughts and not the policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the government. But I'm very happy to be here, and I look forward to talking with you. Host We're glad to have you. Let's just jump right in and get started. Please briefly explain Kautilya's perspectives. Mayfield Sure, so the writings of Kautilya . . . first of all, he's a leading Indian philosopher, and I find them a useful lens for understanding India's pursuit of national interests. Kautilya was an Indian statesman and a political advisor who emerged around 300 BCE and provided a realist outlook on geopolitics through his foundational work. Importantly, Kautilyan theory provides a culturally and historically informed construct for thinking about Indian behavior and Indian interests and Indian foreign policy. And his logic continues to influence strategic thought today. And I think it's manifest in some of India's national security interests in its assessment of its geography and its international relations, which I hope we get to talk a little about. Host You assert in your article that the United States needs to understand how India sees the region and the world. And you suggest that the theories and ideas of Kautilya might lend some insight here. Give us some context. What's the situation in the Indo-Pacific right now as it applies to this topic. Mayfield Sure, well, the United States is clearly identified the PRC, China, as its pacing challenge. And the US has been trying desperately for a number of years, maybe a decade now, to pivot away from Southwest Asia, pivot away from Europe, and to focus on the Pacific with an eye on controlling, or at least shaping and influencing the rise of the PRC. India is central to advancing American interests in that region. It's an enormous state and a huge player in the area. But it's been a difficult partner for the United States to approach.

    COL Dan Herlihy – Cognitive Performance Enhancement for Multi-domain Operations

    Play Episode Listen Later Dec 9, 2022 8:10


    Despite its desire to achieve cognitive dominance for multi-domain operations, the Army has yet to develop fully and adopt the concept of cognitive performance enhancement. This article provides a comprehensive assessment of the Army's efforts in this area, explores increasing demands on soldier cognition, and compares the Army's current approach to its adversaries. Its conclusions will help US military and policy practitioners establish the culture and behaviors that promote cognitive dominance and success across multiple domains. Click here to read the article. Keywords: cognitive performance, resilience, neuroethics, human performance, information overload Episode transcript: Cognitive Performance  Enhancement for Multi-domain  Operations Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Dan Herlihy, author of “Cognitive Performance Enhancement for Multi -domain Operations,” which was published in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Herlihy commands the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg, NC, and has a background in airborne and Special Operations engineering. He holds master's degrees in civil engineering and strategic studies from Missouri S&T and the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, respectively. Welcome to Decisive Point, Dan. Colonel Dan Herlihy Hi Stephanie, thanks for having me. Host Cognitive performance enhancement for multi-domain operations—where does the army currently stand on this? Herlihy The army is somewhat quiet on cognitive performance, particularly cognitive performance enhancement, and does not address the topic directly in its warfighting doctrine. So, the new FM, 3-0, operations, our Army's capstone doctrine, discusses the pursuit of decision dominance and briefly mentions cognitive effects, while describing defeat mechanisms later on in the text. But 3-0 does not touch on the cognitive domain in a deep or meaningful way. The Army research and medical community is much more in tune with the importance of cognitive performance enhancement. In fact, Army Futures Command, TRADOC, and the Army Resilience Directorate have a number of programs and initiatives aimed at exploring this concept. Many of these stakeholders played a part in the development and publication of FM 7-22, the Army's Health and Holistic Fitness Manual. And that does a much better job describing the cognitive domain and introducing the topic of cognitive enhancement. Even so, 7-22 describes cognitive skill as one of five factors associated with mental readiness and features a far less prominent role in the writing than physical readiness does. Host You say in your article that there are increasing demands on soldier cognition. Please explain. Herlihy As we've seen warfare evolve and now bringing in the space domain and cyber domain, there are clearly more cognitive demands for our soldiers than there were in the past. Warfare has always been cognitively demanding, but as we add nearly limitless streams of information and data through the cyber and space domains—all the way to the soldier and leader level—this becomes more and more prominent. On top of that, we see the speed of combat increasing, so our leaders are expected to make decisions more quickly and without hesitation to exploit brief windows of convergence against our adversaries. With that, we also see more complex war fighting systems, as our technology continues to grow and become more capable. All that combined just puts more of a cognitive load on our soldiers. Host How does the US' approach compare to its adversaries? Herlihy

    Dr. Sarah J. Lohmann – What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare

    Play Episode Listen Later Dec 5, 2022 9:31


    Dr. Sarah J. Lohmann – What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare The Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the long-term energy dependencies on Moscow that Europe will neither be able to resolve quickly nor without great sacrifice. Russia's hybrid warfare—a combination of kinetic strikes against key infrastructure, information manipulation, malign finance, economic coercion, and cyber operations—has used Ukraine to target the heart of Europe's energy security. This war has forced the Continent to consider how to realize its economic, environmental, and geostrategic energy goals on its own. This study found systemic dependencies and cyber vulnerabilities in critical energy infrastructure throughout the European continent could impact the Alliance's political stability and threaten military effectiveness. Forward mobility and troop readiness are affected directly by energy shortfalls and increasing cyber vulnerabilities across NATO. The main findings related to cyber and malign influence provide a sobering view of the challenges of hybrid warfare on energy security in NATO nations. Click here to read the monograph.   Keywords: Ukraine, NATO, critical energy infrastructure, Internet of Things, malign influence, microgrids, Russia, hybrid warfare Episode transcript: What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Sarah J. Lohmann, editor and author of What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare, which was published by the US Army War College Press in 2022. Lohmann is an acting assistant professor in the Henry M. Jackson School for International Studies at the University of Washington and a visiting professor at the US Army War College. Her current teaching and research focus on cyber and energy security, counterterrorism, and emerging and disruptive technology. She received her PhD from the Universitat der Bundeswehr, her masters from American University, and her bachelors from Wheaton College. Hi Sarah, welcome to Decisive Point. Dr. Sarah J. Lohmann Thanks for having me. Host Let's talk about What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare. How did you get involved in the research for this book? Lohmann Thanks for asking. That's a great question. We, that is NPS based in Monterrey, and I, focused on this particular topic around energy security. We've both been doing research in our own areas. And then we went to NATO headquarters, and we launched a research map, inviting scholars from across NATO countries to brainstorm with us. This was about three years ago, and we launched it right there from NATO headquarters. NATO did bless the project, and then Army War College brought me on to work on this specific research. Host What were your main takeaways on what's defined hybrid warfare during the Ukraine War, specifically as it pertains to energy security and critical infrastructure? Lohmann So, there are three main landmarks. It's targeting the emerging tech environment. It's using cyberattacks and kinetic attacks as two sides of the same sword. And it's leveraging information operations and malign influence to create greater impact. So let me talk a little bit more about what that looks like in the energy security environment. What does it look like with emerging tech? Basically, this creates a lot of new vulnerabilities to the energy critical infrastructure environment during hybrid war because malicious cyber actors, whether nation states or cyber criminals, are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities created by the Interne...

    COL George Shatzer – SRAD Director’s Corner: Preserving Taiwan as Strategic Imperative

    Play Episode Listen Later Dec 1, 2022 14:11


    In the fourth installment of the SRAD Director's Corner, Shatzer focuses on the Taiwan/China relationship. He reviews The Trouble with Taiwan: History, the United States and a Rising China by Kerry Brown and Kalley Wu Tzu-hui and Taiwan Straits Standoff: 70 Years of PRC–Taiwan Cross-Strait Tensions by Bruce A. Elleman and shows how these books might help strategists better understand the contentious and violent history of cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China so they can deal with the problem today and in the future. Click here to read the article. Keywords: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait tensions, Taiwan Strait, PRC Episode Transcript: SRAD Director's  Corner: Taiwan as Strategic Imperative Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point,  a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.   Decisive Point welcomes Colonel George Shatzer, director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Department in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. Schatzer is the author of SRAD Directors Corner. In this issue, he focuses on preserving Taiwan as strategic imperative.  In your SRAD Directors Corner series, you review books of possible interest to contemporary military strategists—especially those serving in the US Army in joint positions. The Winter issue contains the fourth installment of this series, and the focus is on Taiwan. Thank you for joining us again.  Col. George Shatzer Well, it's great to be back, and I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these important issues.  Host You profiled the security challenge from China in your first review article in the series. Well, that article mentioned Taiwan. It had a broader focus. Maybe you could briefly summarize the key points from that first article and then describe why you decided to narrow in on Taiwan, this time.  Shatzer The first article appeared in the spring edition of Parameters this year and reviewed The Long Game by Rush Doshi and The Strategy of Denial by Elbridge Colby. You are right that both books took a wider or grand strategic look at what the People's Republic of China's global ambitions are and what the United States should do about them.   Doshi argues that the PRC has patiently planned for decades to overtake the United States as the world's dominant power. He describes how the PRC has first sought to blunt the US's control of affairs, regionally, and then attempted to build its own control over the region and then how the PRC has expanded those blunting and building efforts globally. Doshi speaks to all aspects of national power when he recommends how the US should essentially follow its own blunting and building strategy to curb the PRC's growth.   Colby, though, focuses on just military power in his book, but still from a strategic perspective, and doesn't get deeply into any operational matters. He suggests the US overtly build an anti-hegemonic coalition to check PRC advances.   Both authors, of course, mentioned Taiwan, but their books include far more than that.  I always planned to come to Taiwan as its own topic in the article series. And with the events this past summer following US Speaker of House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and the violent PRC reaction, it was clearly the right time to do that.   The potential for armed conflict between the US and the PRC might well be the highest it's been since the Korean War era and the first Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954 to 1955. This is no theoretical or purely academic problem, either. The PRC has attacked Taiwan and held territory several times in the past. The US has intervened many times, and the PRC has been very clear and vocal about its willingness to attack again.

    Dr. Jeffrey McCausland – Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options

    Play Episode Listen Later Nov 4, 2022 10:35


    Now that Vladimir Putin has chosen a path of escalation in his unnecessary war of aggression against Ukraine, it is imperative Western policymakers know the consequences and how he might escalate further. This podcast examines recent events on the battlefield; the implications of the announced annexation of territory, mobilization of forces, and threats to employ “all means” to defend Russian territory; the domestic ramifications and Russian thinking on “hybrid warfare”; and the possible weaponization of food and energy as Putin determines future escalatory steps. It will assist American and European leaders in determining policies to deal with the ongoing crisis at this moment and prepare for an uncertain future. Click here to read the article. Keywords: Russia-Ukraine war, Putin, escalation, hybrid warfare, nuclear weapons Episode transcript: "Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options" Stephanie Crider (Host)  You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs.  The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government, Decisive Point welcomes doctor Jeffrey McCausland, author of “Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options,” which was featured in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters.  McCausland is a visiting professor at Dickinson College and a retired US Army Colonel, a national security consultant for CBS Radio and television. He's the founder and CEO of Diamond 6 leadership and strategy and the author of Battle Tested! Gettysburg Leadership Lessons for 21st-century Leaders, published by Post Hill Press in 2020.  Welcome to Decisive Point.  I'm really glad you're here.  Dr. Jeffrey McCausland Stephanie, it's great to be with you.  Host Your article, “Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options” addresses Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent escalation in his war against Ukraine. In what three ways did Putin escalate the war?  McCausland We have to consider, Stephanie, that escalation occurs vertically as well as horizontally, and he's actually done or threatened to do both.  You know vertically it's the use of more and more sophisticated military equipment.  As the war progressed to use thermobaric weapons, he attacked civilian population as his situation on the battlefield deteriorated, he's threatened to use nuclear weapons, and he's mobilized additional military forces, as well as the economy.  But then there's also a horizontal explanation.  Moving, if you will, in that direction, and here we see the Russians using hybrid warfare.  And, therefore, using the food weapon, shutting off the export of grain to around the world.  I'm fully convinced the Russians were behind the attack on the Nord Stream pipeline and effort to intimidate Europeans about the possible use of energy and the use of overall energy as a weapon as he has done that to manipulate particularly Western Europ ean public opinion potential. Potential threats and nuclear power plants like around Zaporizhya, which he can kind of press or not as he sees fit. And if he were to cause a major disaster there, he could have similar effects to a nuclear weapon with, perhaps, not exactly as much international backlash. He could try to blame it on the Ukrainians. And recently, he's made threats to go after US and European satellites. So he's escalated both vertically with more weaponry as well as horizontally.  Host So, given all this, what are his options now?  McCausland Those options are to, again, further process horizontally or as well as vertically--the recent suspension of the food export was an example of that. It now seems to be back online. There is some suggestion he may try to expand the war to Belarus. Move Russian military forces into Belarus and use that as a geographic loc...

    Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff – Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century

    Play Episode Listen Later Oct 31, 2022 13:40


    To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete. This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one's own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary's cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one's most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary's challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one's rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran. Click here to read the monograph. Keywords: strategy, international competition, coercion theory, game theory, Russia, China, Iran Episode Transcript: Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-First Century  Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, author of Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-First Century, which was published by the US Army War College Press in August 2022. Pfaff is the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. A retired Army foreign area officer for the Middle East and North Africa, he has a doctorate in philosophy from Georgetown University. Welcome back to Decisive Point, Tony. (C. Anthony Pfaff) Hey, thanks. Very happy to be here.  Host Why did you take on this topic? (Pfaff) It had been kind of, I think, boiling for a little while. In fact, one of the topics of the year, when we started it about two years ago, was, you know, rethinking coercion and competition. And that, I think, came from a strong sense of frustration over the way the United States was competing globally at the time. China was not only asserting itself in the South China Sea and getting more aggressive over Taiwan, as it is still doing now, but it was also building relations globally—particularly, in continents like Africa—that was threatening to displace US influence. And then you had Russia. You know, you got the invasion of Ukraine, which is a very obvious failure of deterrence. But even before the invasion, Russia was a . . . very much a destabilizing influence—particularly, in Europe—already having seized Crimea, supporting Ukrainian separatists, while at the same time using sort of gray zone means, like social media and others, to sow domestic instability or uncertainty within United States and, uh, its European allies.

    Henry D. Sokolski – Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War

    Play Episode Listen Later Oct 28, 2022 8:37


    After Russia's unprecedented seizure of Ukraine's nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces' targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large, operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This podcast analyzes these concerns. It compares Russia's assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities. Click here to read the article. Keywords: Zaporizhzhya, nuclear reactors, Law of War Manual, Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, radiation Episode Transcript: “Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War”  Stephanie Crider (Host) You're listening to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production focused on national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Henry D. Sokolski, author of “Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War,” which was published in the winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues among policymakers, scholars, and the media. He teaches graduate-level classes on nuclear policy in Washington, DC.  He's also a senior fellow for nuclear security studies at the University of California in San Diego's (University of California, San Diego's) School of Global Policy and Strategy. Welcome back to Decisive Point, Henry. It's great to chat with you again. (Henry D. Sokolski) Well, thank you for having me.  Host Absolutely. My pleasure. In your article, you note that Russia's seizure of Ukraine's nuclear plant in Zaporizhzhya should inspire the US to adjust its military planning and policies when it comes to hostile military forces and operating nuclear plants. What about this situation inspired your article?  (Sokolski) Well, I think what got me going was something halfway around the globe in Taiwan. The election of the current president in 2016 came with a pledge to shut down their nuclear power plants. They had three and one partially constructed. And when I went and visited, it occurred to me that one of the strongest arguments in support of the government's position was not being made, and that was that these plants were targets, and . . . uh, the more I looked into that, the more I discovered that, indeed, the Chinese were targeting those plants and planning to target them and that the radiation releases, depending on the time of the year, could be quite remarkable and devastating. And I . . . I worked that, and then I started looking around the world. By the time Zaporizhzhya occurred, I was ready. So that was six years of research that I had been doing on this topic and . . . and problems there. Host So this isn't the first nuclear plant to be attacked. How is this situation different from other attacks? (Sokolski) Well, it's different in several ways. First of all, this is the first nuclear power plant to be attacked . . . uh, we have lots of history in the Middle East of plants being attacked, but they either weren't operating, or they weren't power plants. Power plants are big.

    Dr. Thomas Bruscino and Louis G. Yuengert – The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force

    Play Episode Listen Later Oct 3, 2022 11:15


    COL Eric Bissonette, Dr. Thomas Bruscino, COL Kelvin Mote, CDR Matthew Powell, COL Marc Sanborn, COL James Watts, Louis Yuengert – The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force The US military must create standing, numbered, and regionally aligned Joint warfighting headquarters— American Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)—around a command council and a staff organized into Joint centers and cells. Calls for standing Joint force headquarters are not new, but the demonstrated military effectiveness of the Joint Task Force (JTF) model coupled with increasing service-specific resource requirements and tightening fiscal constraints have resulted in little evolution in joint force headquarters construction since the end of World War II. Analysis of the historical record has shown that joint warfighting is best conducted with a Joint warfighting command subordinate to the geographic combatant commands. However, the Joint Task Force model is problematic because the ad-hoc, post-crisis activation of JTFs, along with their antiquated command and control structure, inherently puts the United States at a strategic and operational disadvantage. In the future, the US military will primarily maintain its competitive advantage, especially in great-power competition, by being a superior and sustainable joint force sooner than its adversaries. The proposed AEFs draw on generations of hard-earned experience to maintain and grow American supremacy in Joint warfighting in an increasingly dangerous world Click here to read the monograph. Keywords: Joint warfighting, Joint Task Forces, American Expeditionary Forces, functional staffs, operations process, Command Councils, Joint warfighting concept, service warfighting concepts, multi-domain operations Episode Transcript: The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Thomas Bruscino and Louis Yuengert, coauthors of The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force, with Colonels Eric Bissonette, Kelvin Mote, Marc J. Sanborn, James Watts, and Commander Matthew B. Powell. Bruscino is an associate professor of history in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. He holds a PhD in military history from Ohio University. Yuengert is a retired Army colonel and an associate professor of practice in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the US Army War College. He holds a master's degree in operations research from the Georgia Institute of Technology and a master's degree in strategic studies from the US Army War College. Welcome to Decisive Point, gentlemen. (Thomas Bruscino) Happy to be here. (Louis Yuengert) Yeah, it's great to be here. Host Great. Let's just jump right in here. Your work offers an alternative approach to the Joint Task Force for Joint warfighting headquarters. Give our listeners some background. Why the need for change? (Yuengert) So Stephanie, Tom and I were teaching—this was two years ago—in the Carlisle Scholars Program. And in the scholars program, there's a requirement that the students do two additional research projects. The reason we have the program is so that they have the space to do that. And in this case, one of the student committees for the Military Strategy and Campaigning course that Tom teaches identified that how we are organized for Joint warfighting was a vulnerability—and,

    Dr. Erik W. Goepner – “Linking Trauma to the Prevalence of Civil War”

    Play Episode Listen Later Sep 30, 2022 15:09


    Dr. Erik W. Goepner – "Linking Trauma to the Prevalence of Civil War" This podcast argues the more trauma endured by a population, the more civil war the country will experience in the future. Drawing on mental health, trauma, and neurobiological research, it builds a new theory of civil war that fills existing gaps in current civil-war literature, and then tests the theory via statistical analysis of a large sample size (large-n statistical analysis). The conclusions will help policymakers and US military leadership better understand civil wars and the limits of American power to end them. Click here to read the article. Keywords: civil war, violence, insurgency, trauma, mental illness Episode Transcript: “Linking Trauma to the Prevalence of Civil War” Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Erik W. Goepner, author of “Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War,” which appeared in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Goepner has a PhD in public policy from George Mason University. A retired US Air Force colonel, he currently works as a civil servant in the federal government. Welcome to Decisive Point, Erik. Thank you for being here. (Erik W. Goepner) Hi, Stephanie. It's nice to be with you. Host Let's get started. Your article argues the more trauma endured by a population, the more civil war the country will experience in the future. Lay the groundwork for us, please. (Goepner) Sure. The trauma theory kind of has its origins in the experiences and observations of my Provincial Reconstruction Team. We were in southern Afghanistan in 2010—height of the surge, give or take—and the president had said words to the effect of “You have 18 months to get it done.” So we were busy iterating. If we found something that worked, we would do as much of it as we could—kind of channel your Will Ferrell, “more cowbell” here. And if we were doing things that weren't achieving objectives, we tried to, as dispassionately and quickly as we could, jettison them and just stop doing them. Not long into our deployment, we started to see different evidence that suggested trauma was having a huge, negative impact in Afghanistan and a significant impact on our ability to kind of achieve an enduring peace in the country. We're in a culture—particularly, with the Pashtuns—where emotional control is like a really big deal. We'd go to shūrās, which are Afghan meetings where they have 20, 30, 40 village elders and government officials, and we'd see men going into hysterics. We would see examples of towns that were firmly under the control of insurgents rise up very briefly; push the insurgents out; and then, just as soon, kind of kowtow and capitulate to the insurgents again. But, perhaps most importantly, we'd see violence used frequently in everyday settings. You know, think of the idea of normalizing the use of violence in your everyday life. So we'd be with a district chief. The district chief would get angry at another official in the public setting, would just smack the official in the head—like, really hard. You'd have middle-aged, field-grade officers in the Afghan police or the Afghan army. And when they would have a dispute, instead of debating it or just maybe flipping each other the bird, they would actually get into a full-blown brawl, you know, right there at the police headquarters. And so that normalization of violence is kind of what got me thinking about this. Then, when I got back from my deployment, I had a chance to do some more focused research. And it turns out that the civil-war literature tend...

    MAJ John Fernandes, MAJ Nicolas Starck, CAPT Richard Shmel, MAJ Charles Suslowicz, Dr. Jan Kallberg, and LTC Todd Arnold – “Assessing the Army's Cyber Force Structure”

    Play Episode Listen Later Sep 23, 2022 9:32


    MAJ John Fernandes, MAJ Nicolas Starck, CAPT Richard Shmel, MAJ Charles Suslowicz, Dr. Jan Kallberg, and LTC Todd Arnold – "Assessing the Army's Cyber Force Structure" The skill and capacity of Army cyber forces have grown in the decade since their creation. This podcast focuses on needed structural changes to the Army's portion of the Cyber Mission Forces that will enable their continued growth and maturity since the Army's past organizational and structural decisions impose challenges impacting current and future efficiency and effectiveness. This assessment of the current situation highlights the areas military leadership must address to allow the Army's cyber forces to continue evolving to meet the needs of multi-domain operations. Click here to read the article.     Keywords: workforce development, task organization, cyberspace operations, unity of effort, unity of command Episode Transcript: “Assessing the Army's Cyber Force Structure”  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the United States government. Decisive Point welcomes from the United States Military Academy Major John Fernandes, Lieutenant Colonel Todd Arnold, and Dr. Jan Kallberg, who coauthored “Assessing the Army's Cyber Force Structure” with Major Nicholas Starck, Captain Richard Schmel, and Major Charles Suslowics. The article was published in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Welcome to Decisive Point. Your recent Parameters article discusses assessing structural divides in the Army cyberspace force for better support operations. Lay the groundwork for us here and give us some background, please. (John C. Fernandes) Hi, this is John. I guess I'll get started. So the Cyber branch and the cyber units have been around for about 10 years now. And so, we thought it would be a good time to look at some of the decisions we made initially and see if the decisions were the right ones and at what challenges may have arisen and how we might need to change things as we move forward to make sure that we're the most effective force that we could be. So that's the basis of the article. (Todd Arnold) This is Todd. And to add onto what John was saying, really a good time to do that reassessment now because the entire Cyber Mission Force and the Army's teams have all been operating for the last three years as fully mission capable. So all the teams across all of the different services are now built and working and then doing their missions fully for a few years. And it's a good point to actually go back and reassess them with “OK, did all those decisions we were making when we were rapidly building the force—do they still make sense?” Host Can you briefly explain the offense/defense split and your considerations for mitigation? (Arnold) Yeah. I'll start with a little bit on why there's a split. So when we were initially building up the Cyber branch, it was built kind of piecemeal. Some of the offensive teams started getting built first. And the two previous branches that had been doing a little bit in each of the offensive and defensive work started building units separately. The Army tasked them to build those separately. And nobody was really doing it fully. (Military Intelligence or) MI was doing a little bit in the offensive side, and Signal Corps was doing a little bit in the defensive side. And the Army said, like, “Hey, start building these things up.” And so those two separate branches started building the offensive and defensive teams. And then we formed a branch because we were looking at how the other services were doing it,

    Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff – “Professionalizing Special Operations Forces”

    Play Episode Listen Later Sep 20, 2022 12:04


    Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff – "Professionalizing Special Operations Forces"   The special operations community could best address the perceived ethical crisis it faces by professionalizing as an institution. While earlier assessments have attributed special operations forces' ethical issues to a focus on mission accomplishment that led to a broken force generation process and a high operations tempo, such diagnoses obscure a more comprehensive solution. Using sociologist Andrew Abbott's work on professions as a framework, this article explores the benefits of building the kinds of institutions that can claim a jurisdiction, develop and certify expert knowledge, and establish and apply a code of ethics that addresses special operations unique concerns so that it builds trust and better serves the American people. Click here to read the article.     Keywords: special operations, military ethics, professional studies, professional expertise, professional jurisdictions, civil-military relations Episode Transcript: “Professionalizing Special Operations Forces”  Stephanie Crider (Host) (Prerecorded Decisive Point intro) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, author of “Professionalizing Special Operations Forces,” which appeared in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Pfaff is the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and is senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. He holds a doctorate in philosophy from Georgetown University. Alright. It's always nice to chat with you, Tony. Thank you for making time for this today. (C. Anthony Pfaff) My pleasure. Great to be back.  Host Let's cut to the chase. Your article opens with this sentence: “Special operations forces (SOF) appear to be experiencing an ethical crisis.” Diagnose the problem for us, please.  (Pfaff) Yeah. This article got its start when I was asked by, actually, a couple of members of the special operations community to weigh in on what they were characterizing as a crisis. And if you recall, in 2020, they were in response to a number of very high-profile ethical failures. Congress, on two occasions, asked special operations to do an ethics review. I'm not going to be able to tell you the extent of the crisis or what its current status is now. But I will tell you, if Congress—who's, in some way, your client—is asking for reviews, you have a problem. It's a professional problem because it's saying your client—in this case, Congress—doesn't trust you. At least a little bit. And while it's never all or nothing, that's just still not a good thing. So in response, in terms of the diagnosis, you know, special operations did do a comprehensive review, which was a good start. It left much of the blame to external factors like a high (operations tempo or) optempo that was leading to breakdowns in leadership. I think it mentioned also training and so on that set conditions for ethical failure. It also pointed out interestingly that . . . and some of the services from there was an emphasis on physical fitness and, I think, specialized skills and, among other things, led to a sense of entitlement among some of the operators that also contributed to ethical failures, which I think is also something important to note. Another part of the problem might be—they didn't connect the dots all the way, but—special operators start off in another service. And it's that service that trains them to be special operators.

    Dr. Heather S. Gregg – “The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq”

    Play Episode Listen Later Sep 19, 2022 10:04


    Dr. Heather S. Gregg – “The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq” The remarkable life of early-twentieth-century British adventurer Gertrude Bell has been well documented through her numerous travel books and biographies. Bell's role as a grand strategist for the British government in the Middle East during World War I and the postwar period, however, is surprisingly understudied. This monograph offers insights into the role women play as grand strategists. It shows how Bell helped to devise Great Britain's military strategy in the Middle East during World War I and its creation of the modern state of Iraq. Studying Bell as both a military strategist and a grand strategist offers important insights into how she helped to devise British military strategy in the Middle East. These insights include Britain's efforts to work through secret societies and saboteurs to undermine the Ottoman Empire during the war as part of the Arab Bureau and the country's attempts to stabilize the region after the war through the creation of the modern state of Iraq. As importantly, studying Bell offers a glimpse into how this extraordinary woman was able to become one of the principal architects of British strategy and the exceptional set of skills and perspectives she brought to these efforts. Bell's education, firsthand knowledge of the region, fascination with archaeology, and, above all, her ability to make and maintain relationships with key individuals were invaluable tools for shaping and promoting British efforts at retaining influence as a great power in the postwar era as well as Britain's aims to secure key resources for the empire, including military bases and oil. Ultimately, Bell helped to shape British strategy in the region from 1915–26 because she was a woman, not in spite of it. She had access to both men and women within the local population, she used her social skills to connect and influence key actors in the region, and she brought decades of learning and firsthand experience traveling through the region and speaking with its people to inform and shape her grand strategy. Additionally, Bell's grand strategy offers important lessons for the challenges of creating peace and stability after war. Britain's efforts at stability operations in Iraq following World War I demonstrate the inherent tensions in balancing an intervening country's objectives and priorities with those the intervening country is trying to stabilize—especially, the challenges of creating transitional governments and including the population in stability operations. Bell's unique legacy offers insights into the roles women have played and continue to play as influencers of grand strategy in male-dominated contexts and the importance of including diverse perspectives in strategic thinking. Click here to read the monograph. Keywords: Gertrude Bell, World War I, grand strategy, military strategy, Arab Bureau, Middle East, Mesopotamia, Iraq Episode Transcript: The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Heather Gregg, author of The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq, which was published by the US Army War College Press in July 2022. Gregg is a professor at the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. She's the author of The Path to Salvation: Religious Violence from the Crusades to Jihad and Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Dr. Arthur I. Cyr – “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Miscalculation, Nuclear Risks, and the Human Element”

    Play Episode Listen Later Sep 14, 2022 11:08


    Nuclear weapons have vastly raised the stakes and potential costs of crisis, making leadership and related human qualities of judgment and temperament crucial. This podcast analyzes one exceptionally dangerous US-Soviet confrontation, which barely averted war. Military and policy professionals will see how understanding the perspectives, incentives, and limitations of opponents is important in every conflict—and vital when facing crisis situations like nuclear war. Click here to read the article. Keywords: Cuba, deterrence, leadership, missile crisis, nuclear weapons Episode Transcript: “The Cuban Missiles Crisis: Miscalculation, Nuclear Risks, and the Human Dimension” Stephanie Crider (Host) (Prerecorded Decisive Point intro) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Arthur I. Cyr, author of “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Miscalculation, Nuclear Risks, and the Human Dimension,” which was featured in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Cyr has served as the vice president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and president of the Chicago World Trade Center (World Trade Center Chicago). He taught at the University of Chicago, University of Illinois, Northwestern University, and Carthage College and is the author of After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia, published by New York University Press in 2000. Welcome to Decisive Point, Art. I'm glad you're here. (Arthur I. Cyr) Well, thank you for your kind invitation and for the opportunity to do the article for Parameters. Host Of course. We're excited to have you. Your article talks about the Cuban missile crisis. Give us some context, please. What makes this crisis distinct from others? (Cyr) It was particularly close—a particularly close call. It was particularly increasingly evident with the passage of years after the October 1962 confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. It was geographically close. We and our allies had put lots of weapons, including nuclear missiles, in Turkey and Italy, close to the Soviet Union. But this was only 90 miles away from the US, and the communist threat 90 miles away was a major theme in the legendary presidential campaign between John Kennedy and Richard Nixon. Kennedy, in effect, outflanked Nixon on that. Host Will you please briefly walk us through the highlights of the Cuban missile crisis? (Cyr) Yes. Cuba had become an increasingly intense focus in American politics. At the very beginning of the Kennedy administration, uh, the administration stumbled badly with the disastrous and total failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion—CIA effort to land anti-Castro . . . heavily armed anti-Castro exiles at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and launch an insurgency, which they confidently told the president would be successful. That, it's clear now, not only fed controversy in the US, but encouraged Nikita Khrushchev to place the missiles in Cuba following a very steady buildup of conventional forces there. Host Let's talk about some of the lessons learned. Some of these weren't even evident for years. Can we talk about that? What were they? (Cyr) Yes, indeed. Well, the problem of perception and, especially, misperception of the other side, always a great and perhaps principal challenge in international relations, which is why diplomas . . . diplomacy is such an important and, also, difficult occupation—Cuba, Castro, the US, Kennedy, Soviet Union—that they're very reckless. Nikita Khrushchev had very different perceptions of what would be accepted and what was possible in international relatio...

    Dr. Roger Cliff – Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA – 2020 PLA Conference Papers

    Play Episode Listen Later Aug 31, 2022 5:09


    Dr. Roger Cliff – “Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA” Although the People's Liberation Army is not yet a global expeditionary force on par with the US military, the former has nevertheless significantly expanded its ability to operate abroad. Through enhanced technological capabilities, robust relationships with foreign militaries, increased access to overseas military bases and dual-use facilities, and the implementation of major structural reforms, the People's Liberation Army has built a more integrated joint force capable of conducting a wider and more complex array of missions. This volume advances the understanding of the People's Liberation Army's capability to conduct overseas missions by examining China's military relations with Europe, Africa, and Latin America; the country's military activities in the Indian Ocean, polar regions, and Pacific Island countries; and the emerging roles of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force and the Joint Logistic Support Force. This volume finds the People's Liberation Army is engaged in a wide range of activities throughout the world, including port calls, joint exercises, seminars, and personnel exchanges. China sells weapons to some parts of the world and seeks to acquire military and dual-use technology from others. In addition, the People's Liberation Army seeks to increase its capability to operate in parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean, Pacific Island countries, and polar regions, where the organization has only had a minimal presence in the past Click here to read the monograph. Keywords: China, People's Liberation Army, PLA Rocket Force, Chinese expeditionary operations, Pacific Island countries    

    COL George Shatzer – “SRAD Director’s Corner: Understanding North Korea and Key to Security in East Asia”

    Play Episode Listen Later Aug 25, 2022 11:07


    COL George Shatzer –“SRAD Director's Corner: Understanding North Korea and Key to Security in East Asia” In this episode, Colonel George Shatzer focuses on North Korea and the Kim family regime. He reviews Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer's Insights into North Korea's Enigmatic Young Dictator by Jung H. Pak and Rationality in the North Korean Regime: Understanding the Kims' Strategy of Provocation by David W. Shin and shows how these books might help readers better understand North Korea's leader Kim Jong-Un and the implications of his actions for US foreign and military policy in the region. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security in East Asia. Click here to read the article. Keywords: North Korea, Kim Jong-Un, nuclear, China, South Korea    

    Dr. Zenel Garcia and Dr. Kevin D. Modlin – “Sino-Russian Relations and the War in Ukraine”

    Play Episode Listen Later Aug 18, 2022 15:06


    Claims that China has taken “Russia's side” in the Ukrainian War oversimplify Sino-Russian relations. Garcia and Modlin contend Sino-Russian relations are a narrow partnership centered on accelerating the emergence of a multipolar order to reduce American hegemony and illustrate this point by tracing the discursive and empirical foundations of the relationship using primary and secondary materials. Furthermore, they highlight how the war has created challenges and opportunities for China's other strategic interests, some at the expense of the United States or Russia. Click here to read the article. Keywords: China, Russia, Ukraine war, multipolarity, strategic partnership  

    Dr. John Nagl – “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars”

    Play Episode Listen Later Aug 10, 2022 14:18


    Released  10 August 2022. Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less than enviable combat record in irregular warfare. Through a detailed historical analysis, this article provides perspective on where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given more time or executed differently. In doing so, it provides lessons for future Army engagements and argues that until America becomes proficient in irregular warfare, our enemies will continue to fight us at the lower levels of the spectrum of conflict, where they have a good chance of exhausting our will to fight. Click here to read the article. Keywords: victory, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, irregular warfare, landpower Episode Transcript: “Why America's Army Can't Win America's Wars”  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. John Nagl, author of “Why America's Army Can't Win America's Wars,” which was featured in the autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Nagl is an associate professor of warfighting studies at the US Army War College. He is author of Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice. Welcome to Decisive Point, John. Thank you for being here. (John Nagl) It's terrific to be here, Stephanie. Thanks for having me. Host Let's talk about “Why America's Army Can't Win America's Wars.” You note in your article that since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less-than-enviable combat record. Ouch. Give us a brief overview of where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat. (Nagl) Yeah, I think “ouch” is the right word. And, of course, I love the Army dearly and care about the well-being of the nation. I've seen what happens when wars go badly. It's very painful to write that, but it's intended to be tough love for an organization that really matters. And for the most important country in the world, I might add. What I argue in the article is that the United States government is one, three, and one in our nation's wars, and I'll go through them quickly. Korea (the Korean War), the first war after World War II, where the United States was decisive and won decisively: Korea ended in an armistice. The important lesson for that, I think, is the United States was unprepared for conventional combat in Korea. It was unprepared to be the global hegemon that the international order yearns for and so desperately needs. And we learned from that. We created a state of readiness. The 2nd Infantry Division in Korea's motto is “Fight tonight,” and they're ready. And that readiness for combat—for conventional combat—is something that the American Army, I think, can be enormously proud of. But, since Korea, with Vietnam (the Vietnam War); the first Iraq war (the Persian Gulf War); Afghanistan (the Afghanistan War); and the second Iraq war (the Iraq War), Operation Iraqi Freedom, our record is decidedly not as good. We are, I would argue, one and three in those wars, with (Operation) Desert Storm being a clear win, but Vietnam and Afghanistan being decisive losses, and the second Iraq war, the current Iraq war—it's still too soon to tell, but it's hard to put it in the win column. So I looked for—as I thought about the combat record of the United States military since World War II, I tried hard to isolate what it was that led to that less-than-enviable combat record. That's really the point of the article. Is there something in common with the wars that we don't do well in that provides lessons for the Army as it thinks...

    Dr. Richard A. Lacquement and Dr. Thomas P. Galvin – Framing the Future of the US Military Profession

    Play Episode Listen Later Aug 8, 2022 12:43


    Released  8 July 2022. The military profession needs to be redefined by examination of its expertise and jurisdictions of practice, whereas previously the focus was on securing its professional identity. Twenty years ago, the original Future of the Army Profession research project responded to growing concerns among officers that the Army was no longer a profession in light of the post–Cold War drawdown and the onset of global operations including Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the profession faces recurrent challenges raised by the changing character of war, the renewal of great-power competition, crises surrounding issues of sexual harassment and assault, the effects of a major global pandemic and associated social and political unrest, and the growing societal distrust toward professions in general. Richard Lacquement and Thomas Galvin propose that the questions of professional identity, while still important, are now less salient than those about the professions' jurisdictions of practice and domains of expert knowledge. Clarifying them will help better prepare US military professionals to exercise discretionary judgment effectively. They also propose a new Future of the US Military Profession research effort that addresses these jurisdictions across service, joint, and defense enterprises to clarify the divisions of professional work and responsibilities. This is a must-read for any steward of the military profession. Click here to read the monograph. Keywords: character, leadership, self-awareness, effectiveness If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.    

    Dr. Tami Davis Biddle – “Character Traits Strategic Leaders Need”

    Play Episode Listen Later Jul 5, 2022 15:10


    Released  5 July 2022. Strategic leaders must possess a range of skills to work successfully in complex environments. To use those skills to best effect, they rely on character traits that enhance the likelihood of their effectiveness as leaders and maximize their success when working in teams. Certain character traits facilitate work in demanding settings that rely heavily on communication, integration, and cooperation. Programs designed to educate senior leaders must help future national security professionals identify these character traits and then practice and hone them. Highlighting individuals with challenging roles in World War II, this podcast analyzes the character traits that enabled them to succeed in their work. Click here to read the article. Keywords: character, leadership, self-awareness, effectiveness, self-development If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform. Author information: Tami Davis Biddle retired as the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College, where she is now a Distinguished Fellow. She has written extensively on military history, airpower, and strategy. The author of Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare (2002), she is currently writing Taking Command: The United States in the Second World War for Oxford University Press.  

    Dr. Alexander G. Lovelace – “Tomorrow's Wars and the Media”

    Play Episode Listen Later Jun 30, 2022 13:21


    Released  30 June 2022. Distilling lessons from the author's book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, this podcast provides applicable suggestions for the US military today. As in World War II, the press is both a weapon and a possible vulnerability in modern warfare. Click here to read the article. Keywords: press, World War II, public affairs, TikTok, media Episode Transcript  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Alexander G. Lovelace) Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Alexander G. Lovelace, author of “Tomorrow's Wars and the Media,” which was featured in the summer 2022 issue of Parameters. Lovelace is a scholar-in-residence at the Contemporary History Institute of Ohio University. His first book, The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II, is being published by the University Press of Kansas in 2022. (Host) It's great to have you on Decisive Point, Alex. Thanks for making time for us.  (Lovelace) Thank you for having me. (Host) Let's jump right in. Your essay offers practical suggestions for how the press can be used by public affairs officers, commanders, and policymakers to achieve victory in coming conflicts. You say these lessons are applicable for today's wars, even when they're fought on TikTok. So give us some historical context. How did we get here? (Lovelace) The Second World War was a media war for two big reasons. The first one is that all sides really tried to harness the media as a weapon during that conflict. This really came out of the philosophical and technological mindset of total war. There's a real philosophical shift where warfare is suddenly not so much something you do to the enemy army, but also has to involve the enemy population. That grows from the French Revolution up to World War II, and it's accompanied also by a technological shift. Warfare is becoming much more deadly, particularly for civilians. At the same time, the media is also part of this change. You have technology such as telegraphs and photography which has a military use but also has a civilian use and a media use for civilian press. So by World War II, which is the first total war, at least the first one that is openly fought as such, the media is going to play a big role in that. So that's one reason. The second reason is even as commanders are trying to use the media as a weapon, they're also being susceptible to it influencing their decisions on the battlefield. You have these two things: the media as a weapon and the media being used by commanders, influencing commanders' decisions, and it creates a model of military-media relations which survives total war. We haven't fought many total wars lately, but, in the era of limited war, the media is still a big factor. Vietnam becomes a television war, and there's a big debate over how much that influences. But you see this throughout the war on terror (war on terrorism) and up to the current conflict in Ukraine, which some commentators have called a TikTok war because a lot of Americans and a lot of news is being shared on the latest information-sharing platform. (Host) Can you explain in a little bit more detail how the news influences commanders' battlefield decisions? (Lovelace) The news really influences commanders' decisions in, I would say, three big ways. The first one is maybe the most obvious to Hollywood. It's the general who's media-obsessed, wants publicity,

    Zachary Kallenborn – “InfoSwarms: Drone Swarms and Information Warfare”

    Play Episode Listen Later Jun 23, 2022 12:44


    Released  23 June 2022. This podcast discusses drone swarms, which can be used at sea, on land, in the air, and even in space, are fundamentally information-dependent weapons. No study to date has examined drone swarms in the context of information warfare writ large. This article explores the dependence of these swarms on information and the resultant connections with areas of information warfare—electronic, cyber, space, and psychological—drawing on open-source research and qualitative reasoning. Overall, the article offers insights into how this important emerging technology fits into the broader defense ecosystem and outlines practical approaches to strengthening related information warfare capabilities. Click here to read the article. Keywords: information warfare, drone swarms, unmanned systems, cyberwarfare, electronic warfare Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. (Guest 1: Zachary Kallenborn) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Zachary Kallenborn, author of “InfoSwarms: Drone Swarms and Information Warfare,” which was featured in the summer 2022 issue of Parameters. Kallenborn is a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a research affiliate of the Unconventional Weapons and Technology program at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), a senior consultant at ABS Group, and a self-proclaimed US Army “mad scientist.” He is the author of publications on autonomous weapons, drone swarms, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. Zach, I'm glad you're here. Thanks for making time to chat with me today. (Kallenborn) Thanks for having me. (Host) Your article explores the dependence of drone swarms on information and the resultant connections with areas of information warfare—electronic, cyber, space, and psychological warfare—drawing on open-source research and qualitative reasoning. Put this in context for us, please. (Kallenborn) The context of the discussion is looking at drone swarms—a rapidly emerging technology that numerous states are developing. Obviously got the big players—China, Russia, the United States are all developing this technology. But even smaller powers, like South Africa. And this technology is even already being used in combat. We saw just last year that Israel used a drone swarm in combat in the fight against Gaza. Now, before jumping into these sort of larger issues of information warfare, it's important to understand briefly what we mean by “drone swarm” here. We're not necessarily talking about simply large numbers of drones used en masse, which is often how the term is used within media, but really what we're talking about is drones that have some level of communication and coordination between them so that they're operating effectively as a singular unit instead of, say, 10, 15 individual drones. Now, what that means is there's potentially a range of capability within that. Because if we're talking about simply coordination and communication at the basic level, that's a pretty simple thing. So in the case of like the Israel example, likely all they're really doing is just doing some coordinated searches over an area to help identify a target. It's not anything all that fancy or unusual, but we can imagine in the future how artificial intelligence and autonomy may make coordination communication fairly significant. You could imagine, for example,

    MAJ Brandon Colas – “Defining and Deterring Faits Accomplis”

    Play Episode Listen Later Jun 17, 2022 12:06


    Released  17 June 2022. This podcast examines faits accomplis—how states attempt to seize disputed territory using military force, hoping to avoid war in the process—and offers suggestions for how to deter them. Since 1945, faits accomplis have become the most common means by which states attempt to take over territory, even though they frequently result in armed conflict. US deterrent efforts, however, often focus on stopping invasions, not limited land grabs. This study combines the traditional literature on deterrence with Dan Altman's recent research on faits accomplis to suggest Department of Defense leaders should frame territorial disputes as a real estate market they can both analyze and manipulate. Click here to read the article. Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, deterrence, territorial disputes, gray zone, brinkmanship, escalation Author information: Major Brandon Colas is a US Army foreign area officer currently embedded with the United Kingdom Strategic Command Defence Intelligence in London as a liaison officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Episode Transcript: Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guest and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Brandon Colas) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Mr. Brandon Colas, author of “Defining and Deterring Faits Accomplis,” which was featured in the Summer 2022 issue of Parameters. Colas is anArmy officer [unintelligible] currently embedded with the United Kingdom Strategic Command Intelligence Center in London as a liaison officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Welcome to Decisive Point, Brandon. It's great to have this chance to chat with you. Let's talk about your article, “Defining and Deterring Faits Accomplis.” This study combines the traditional literature of deterrence with Dan Altman's recent research on faits accomplis to suggest Department of Defense leaders should frame territorial disputes as taking part in a real-estate market that they can both analyze and manipulate to discourage our opponents from conquering without conquest. What does this look like? Please give us an outline here. (Colas) So when I started this research, I began with Tom Schelling (Thomas C. Schelling) and his 1968 classic and, in a lot of ways, Schelling—even though his book is breezy, it's academic lectures that he's talking about. It really has defined the US deterrence discussion ever since. And so Schelling talks about brute force and coercion. And so, brute force—we used to think like (Adolf) Hitler, Poland 1940, right? And coercion would be just building up those forces on the border until the other side caves and gives up their territory or makes those concessions that you're wanting. So again, going back to Hitler, you think about him entering Denmark unopposed, right? So those are sort of the two classic examples. But more recent international relations research, especially led by Dan Altman, who's at Georgia State (University), has looked at small, limited territorial seizures. He calls them faits accomplis, so there's limited territory that's disputed. There's the use of military force, but the aggressor statement still attempts to avoid war in the process. And what's interesting, Altman goes back from 1945 to present, and he discovers that there's only four cases of brute force actually being used to seize territory since then. And so that's when one state again uses their military to completely absorb another state. And those cases—some of them succeeded, like North and South Vietnam. Some of them failed, like Iraq and Kuwait,

    CPT Mark T. Vicik – “Strengthen Arctic Governance to Stop Russian and Chinese Overreach”

    Play Episode Listen Later Jun 15, 2022 12:49


    Released  15 June 2022. This podcast argues shortfalls in the international institutions governing the Arctic have allowed Russia and China to expand control over the region. It provides an overview of regional governance and power dynamics, outlines a three-part approach to correcting deficiencies, highlights attempts by Russia and China to circumvent international governance, examines how the Arctic's governing institutions address Russian and Chinese growth in the region, and focuses on the institutional failures that have allowed Russia and China to expand—failures academic scholarship and US policy have not adequately addressed. Practitioners will find specific steps for rectifying issues with Arctic institutions to support the United States' interests in the region. Click here to read the article. Keywords: geo-economics, economic statecraft, Russia, gray-zone warfare, hybrid warfare, geopolitics, Artic, Author information: Captain Mark T. Vicik, US Army, is a student at the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He holds a bachelor of arts degree in international relations and Middle East and North Africa studies from the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. He conducts research on and writes about Arctic great-power dynamics and security issues and is the author of “The Future Arenas of Great Power Competition,” which was published in The SAIS Review of International Affairs. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.  

    MAJ Ryan J. Orsini – “Economic Statecraft and US-Russian Policy”

    Play Episode Listen Later Jun 7, 2022 6:27


    Released  7 June 2022. This podcast assesses the American-Russian economic relationship, identifying how Russia exploits strategic asymmetries to gain advantage in the space below armed conflict and how the United States can modernize its economic statecraft. It draws upon a wide range of comparative research, from US-Russian military thought to the American-Eurasian economic interrelationship, to evaluate the full range of economic statecraft within a single dyad of countries in the context of coercion theory. This analysis will assist American policymakers in reforming priorities and processes according to principles of economic statecraft to sustain ongoing American coercion and set conditions for advantage upon the return to bilateral competition. Click here to read the article. Keywords: geo-economics, economic statecraft, Russia, gray-zone warfare, hybrid warfare, geopolitics Author information: Major Ryan J. Orsini, US Army, is an infantry officer assigned as a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a master of public policy degree from Georgetown University. If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or any other major podcasting platform.

    COL George Shatzer – “SRAD Director’s Corner: Russia's Strategy and Its War on Ukraine”

    Play Episode Listen Later Jun 1, 2022 9:39


    Released  1 June 2022. In this podcast, Colonel George Shatzer, director of the Strategy Research and Analysis Department of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, discusses books of relevance to US Joint planners and strategists, as well as those of allies and strategic partners. He applies his experience and education as a US Army senior strategist to extract insights useful to anyone contemplating how to confront the challenges of today's strategic environment. Click here to read the article. Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, Russian military theory, integrated warfare, NATO Author information: Colonel George Shatzer is the director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Department in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College.

    Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II – “Putin's Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Implications for Strategic Studies”

    Play Episode Listen Later May 26, 2022 12:01


    Released  26 May 2022. This podcast examines critical issues for the field of strategic studies raised by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, including the waning of major war, strategic coercion, and “War Amongst the People.” Drawing on previous scholarship and current events, this commentary considers the questions raised by the first major war of the twenty-first century. It provides recommendations for scholars and senior leaders on how to work together to address the questions of strategy and policy that have and continue to arise as the war progresses. Click here to read the article. Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, strategic coercion, gray zone, compellence Author information: Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II had a distinguished career in the US Army and is currently the editor-in-chief of the US Army War College Press, which includes Parameters. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College. He holds a doctorate in modern history from Princeton University and is the author of six books, including War's Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (2021), Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (2017), Reconsidering the American Way of War (2014), Clausewitz and Contemporary War (2007), Imagining Future War (2007), and After Clausewitz (2001), and more than 100 articles and monographs on strategic thinking, military theory, and military history.

    Dr. Meghan Fitzpatrick, Dr. Ritu Gill, and Maj. Jennifer F. Giles – “Information Warfare: Lessons in Inoculation to Disinformation”

    Play Episode Listen Later May 23, 2022 14:27


    Released  23 May 2022. While propaganda and disinformation have been used to destabilize opposing forces throughout history, the US military remains unprepared for the way these methods have been adapted to the Internet era. This article explores the modern history of disinformation campaigns and the current state of US military readiness in the face of campaigns from near-peer competitors and proposes education as the best way to prepare US servicemembers to defend against such campaigns. Click here to read the article. Keywords: propaganda, disinformation, media literacy, military education, inoculation Author information: Dr. Meghan Fitzpatrick, a strategic analyst with Defence Research and   Canada (DRDC) Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA), is a widely published author on trauma and resilience. Her current work looks at how militaries are navigating the increasing importance of the information environment. Since joining DRDC, she has received recognition for her research, including the CORA Award for Outstanding Achievement in Defence Analysis. Dr. Ritu Gill has a PhD in social psychology from Carleton University and is currently a section head with DRDC. Her research examines online influence activities, specifically, how the Internet and social media influence the information environment, including the analysis of online audiences, and how deception techniques employed by adversaries, such as disinformation, impact audiences. She has been part of international defence research collaborations and was co-lead for the NATO Human Factors and Medicine Research Task Group “Digital and Social Media Assessment for Effective Communication and Cyber Diplomacy.” Major Jennifer F. Giles, US Marine Corps, is currently a communication strategy and operations officer, a foreign area officer who advises commanders' strategic and cultural engagement plans in the Pacific theater, and an instructor at the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training Program. She wrote Disrupting Disinformation: Force Protection through Media Literacy Training and recently spoke on media literacy and adversary disinformation for the Defense Information School “DINFOS Live.”

    COL Zhirayr Amirkhanyan — “A Failure to Innovate: The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War”

    Play Episode Listen Later May 16, 2022 16:08


    Released  16 May 2022. The root cause for the defeat of the Armenian forces in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War was flawed military doctrine inherited from the Soviet Union. This article analyzes the major problems faced by Armenia, uncovers the main reasons for unsuccessful innovation, tests empirical findings against some of the most authoritative theories in the field, and outlines current research on the conflict, while substantiating the analysis with established scholarship in the field of military innovation. Click here to read the monograph. Keywords: Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia, Turkey, Thomas Kuhn, military innovation Author information: Colonel Zhirayr Amirkhanyan is currently a PhD candidate at the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. He was the head of defense policy planning branch of the Defense Policy Department at the Ministry of Defence of Armenia.

    Dr. Patrick Paterson – Civil-Military Relations: Guidelines in Politically Charged Societies

    Play Episode Listen Later May 5, 2022 12:12


    Released  5 May 2022. Current events warrant a review of US civil-military relations doctrine. This article examines eight principles of military subordination to elected civilian officials and addresses the fundamental question at the heart of civil-military relations theory and practice—what options, if any, does the military have when civilian leadership disregards military advice? Examples drawn from US history provide an important framework to understand the complex interrelational dynamics at play. Click here to read the monograph. Keywords: civil-military, apolitical, civilian, defense policy, US Constitution, professionalism Author information: Dr. Patrick Paterson is a professor of practice of national security studies in the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. He completed his PhD in conflict resolution at Nova Southeastern University. He has a master's degree in national security studies from the Naval Postgraduate School, a master's equivalent from the Argentina Naval War College in Buenos Aires, and a master's degree in political science from American University. His latest book, The Blurred Battlefield (2021), addresses the need for hybrid doctrines on the use of force for Latin American militaries combating violent crime groups.

    Henry D. Sokolski – Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future

    Play Episode Listen Later May 5, 2022 16:03


    Released  5 May 2022. Does it matter if more countries have nuclear weapons? Will the weaponization of space make nuclear weapons less of a threat or even obsolete?  In this podcast, author Henry D. Sokolski gives an overview of his monograph, Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, and explores potential future nuclear trends. Click here to read the monograph. Keywords: strategy, nuclear energy, drones, nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles Author information: Henry D. Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, DC. He previously served in the Senate as a nuclear and military legislative aide, in the Pentagon as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, and as a full-time consultant on proliferation issues in the Secretary of Defense's Office of Net Assessment. Mr. Sokolski also served as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Senior Advisory Group, on two Congressional nuclear proliferation commissions, and has authored and edited numerous volumes on strategic weapons proliferation, including Best of Intentions: America's Campaign against Strategic Weapons Proliferation.

    Dr. James R. McKay, Dr. H. Christian Breede, Dr. Ali Dizboni, and Dr. Pierre Jolicoeur – “Developing Strategic Lieutenants in the Canadian Army”

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 27, 2022 7:56


    Released 27 April 2022. This Canadian contribution to Parameters' Strategic Lieutenant series shows how domestic context creates the conditions for professional military education reform to a greater extent than the global strategic context. The podcast assesses the junior officer education delivered by Canada's military colleges and analyzes interviews with key stakeholders responsible for the formulation and implementation of reform at the military colleges. Click here to read the article. Keywords: education reform, strategic context, leadership, professional military education Episode Transcript  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: James R. McKay) (Guest 2: Ali Dizboni) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Dr. James R. McKay and Dr. Ali Dizboni, who coauthored “Developing Strategic Lieutenants in the Canadian Army” with H. Christian Breede and Pierre Jolicoeur. The article was published in the spring 2022 issue of Parameters. McKay is the current chair of war studies at the Royal Military College of Canada and was educated at Bishop's University, the Royal Military College of Canada, and King's College London. Dizboni is an associate professor and the current chair of the Military and Strategic Studies program at the Royal Military College of Canada. He received his master of science degree and PhD from the Université de Montréal in the fields of political science and international relations. He's fluent in Arabic, English, French, and Persian. Breede is an associate professor of political science at the Royal Military College of Canada and the deputy director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen's University as well as the associate chair of the Royal Military College's public administration program. He holds a PhD in war studies from the Royal Military College of Canada and has published on the topics of foreign and security policy, with a research focus on societal cohesion and technology. Jolicoeur is a professor of political science at the Royal Military College of Canada. A specialist of the conflicts in the former Soviet republics, he is currently writing a book on Russian foreign policy. Thank you both for your contribution to Parameters and for joining me on this podcast today. The Parameters Strategic Lieutenant series asks what leads governments to reform entry-level officer professional military education: the global, strategic environment or the domestic, political environment? Your article says the Canadian answer tends toward the latter. So, let's unpack this. Please tell us a little bit about the Canadian military education system. (McKay) The Canadian military education system for junior officers is oriented on a couple of sources. You have those that enter the officer corps through the Canadian military colleges, which (like American military colleges) are degree-granting institutions. We have two of them, but they are ”triservice.” So what that means is, at the Canadian Armed Forces level, we're primarily educating them and socializing them into the profession of arms. The services handle the lion's share of the training. And I say “lion's share” because some of it does belong to the Canadian Armed Forces. So they tend to be a four-year degree program with four pillars, which include physical fitness; second language, so everyone has to meet a certain standard of the other official language; the degree; and the military training they do receive at the college,

    Mr. Bert B. Tussing, Dr. John Eric Powell, and COL Benjamin C. Leitzel – “Contested Deployment”

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 26, 2022 15:16


    Released 26 April 2022. Early in academic year 2018, a group of US Army War College faculty and students came together in pursuit of an integrated research project devoted to an examination of contested deployment and the growing realization the US homeland can no longer be considered an inviolable zone in preparing for war. Expecting free movement of forces in mobilization, movement to ports of embarkation, and deployment against the nation's adversaries is beneath reason. Two oceans and benevolent neighbors to the north and south can no longer be considered a significant buffer against internal and external enemies. Adversaries of the United States will seek to disrupt or disable the movement of its forces long before they can be placed in combat against foes overseas, and the nation must be prepared for this opposition. Click here to read the IRP. Keywords: infrastructure, cyber, transportation, Contested Deployment  

    Dr. Jason Healey – “A Bizarre Pair: Counterinsurgency Lessons for Cyber Conflict”

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 26, 2022 14:33


    Released 27 April 2022. The lessons of counterinsurgency have deeper implications for cyber conflict than previous research has identified. Two decades of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan provide insights into the cyber strategy of defending forward including treating major cybersecurity and technology companies as host-nation partners and focusing on winning the hearts and minds of global netizens. Click here to read the original article. Keywords: cyber conflict, counterinsurgency,  Iraq, Afghanistan, cybersecurity Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the podcast guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Jason Healey, author of “A Bizarre Pair: Counterinsurgency Lessons for Cyber Conflict,” featured in the autumn 2020 issue of Parameters. Healey is a senior research scholar at Columbia University School for International and Public Affairs, specializing in cyber conflict, competition, and cooperation. This episode of Decisive Point reexamines Healey's article through the lens of Russia and Ukraine. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Jason “Jay” Healey)  (Host) Welcome back to Decisive Point, Jason. Let's talk about your 2020 article “A Bizarre Pair: Counterinsurgency Lessons for Cyber Conflict.” That is a bizarre pair. Can you lay the groundwork for us, please? (Healey) Sure, absolutely. Cyber has long been realized, back to at least the early 90s, as an interesting method of irregular warfare. Some of the very first writing on this—people like John Arquilla and Dorothy Denning and Winn Schwartau—would write about how technology-dependent societies are going to be open to asymmetric attack because of these cyber vulnerabilities and cyber capabilities—especially the United States, which has historically had these oceans, and we didn't have to worry about direct attack—that adversaries could use cyber as irregular warfare to affect us. In fact, we could use cyber as irregular warfare against them. We could have advantages by being a high-tech power. And so that aspect had been relatively well written about. The effects of it were maybe exaggerated; we thought maybe cyber would have more impact then, in the 90s, than we do 20-odd years later. But the ideas were relatively well baked. What I was trying to do with this article is to flip that around—to say, we're 20-plus years into fighting irregular warfare ourselves, especially counterinsurgency and civil wars, so what can we take from those hard-won lessons? To think and apply them to fighting and winning in cyberspace. (Host) You laid out some pretty specific lessons. Can you walk us through those? What lessons can cyber take from counterinsurgency? (Healey) The lessons that I took—of saying, “Boy, what can we learn about how to win in cyberspace based on the lessons from irregular warfare”—really fit in three areas. The least interesting, I thought, was on deception: For both cyber and irregular warfare, the attackers are relying on deception to succeed. That was a parallel, but I wasn't quite sure what we take from that. The other two, I thought there were stronger recommendations. First is that cyber conflict really depends on the host nation. Now, the host nation in this case isn't an actual nation; it is the technology companies, the main cybersecurity companies that are out there. And they are creating and maintaining the terrain of cyberspace. I had helped set up the very first cyber command back in 1998. One of my friends from there went on to Verizon. And he said, “Jay,

    COL Gerald J. Krieger – “Water Wars of the Future: Myth or Reality?”

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 25, 2022 10:57


    Released 25 April 2022. This article provides background and context for regional trends and historic agreements focused on the Nile River Basin, offers a comprehensive assessment of security challenges, and presents focus areas for future investment and cooperation. The policy recommendations will serve American interests better and improve agricultural practices in the region. Without a marked alteration of existing aid from Western countries, the water scarcity situation will continue without producing the required infrastructure improvements. Click here to read the original article. Keywords: diplomatic history, water management, sub-Saharan Africa, Nile River Basin, Egypt Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1 Gerald J. Krieger) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Gerald J. Krieger, author of “Water Wars of the Future: Myth or Reality?,” featured in Parameters' Spring 2022 issue. Krieger works at US Army Forces Command. Previously, he served as an associate dean of strategic studies at the National Defense University of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He has published several articles on wide-ranging topics and is primarily interested in international relations, with a focus on the greater Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the South China Sea and US foreign policy in these regions. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. First, I really just want to thank you for joining me today. I'm glad you're here, and I'm excited to talk about your article, “Water Wars of the Future: Myth or Reality?” It dials in on the Nile River basin and the security challenges there. It offers policy recommendations that will serve American interests better and improve agricultural practices in that region. Can you lay the groundwork for us? How do things like population growth and climate change affect this topic? (Krieger) Well, when most people think of the Nile River basin, or NRB, water scarcity is not something that comes to mind. It almost seems counterintuitive that there would be areas . . . and water is going to be an issue in the basin because it's the second-longest river in the world. However, that's not quite true. Egypt, for example, is one of the most arid countries. And some around the region get very little—up to 10 millimeters a year—of rainfall. So, climate change is exacerbating water access issues in already-arid regions. In addition, population growth around the planet is going to approach nine billion by 2050, based on UN estimates. That Nile River basin is expected to double and approach nearly one billion people in that region alone. Egypt's population, with 100 million people, is expected by 2030 to hit 128 million. So all of these things are contributing factors. Just seven years ago, for instance, in sub-Sahara (sub-Saharan) Africa, not necessarily just the Nile River basin, there were 783 million people without access to clean drinking water, which adds to health and nutrition issues and things like that. And climate change, irregular rainfall patterns, can cause floods, which, obviously—loss of life and devastating consequences. So then droughts, multiyear droughts in particular, in the Nile River basin alone, there's 300 million people living on less than a dollar a day. So, they're on that cusp of existence, you know, where little things kind of add up and make a huge difference over time. And, in particular, if you look at climate change and projected patterns and different models, temperature in Egypt . . .

    LTC Andrea M. Peters, LTC Michael A. Washington, LTC Lolita Burrell, and COL James Ness – “Rethinking Female Urinary Devices for the US Army ”

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 19, 2022 13:20


    Released 19 April 2022. As women assume more combat roles in the US military and continue to operate in austere environments with varied mission sets, the Department of Defense must rethink its approach to equipment and uniform development to accommodate female anatomical differences. This podcast analyzes the results of a study conducted during the Sandhurst Military Skills Competition at the United States Military Academy to determine the effectiveness of commercial off-the-shelf products the Army has adopted to aid female urination—products used by competition participants that may not be the best or healthiest options for women. Click here to read the original article. Keywords: urology, female urinary diversion device, women, inclusion, combat Episode Transcript  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. (Guest 1 Andrea M. Peters) (Guest 2 Michael A. Washington) (Guest 3 Lolita Burrell) (Guest 4 James Ness)   (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Lieutenant Colonels Andrea M. Peters, Michael A. Washington, and Lolita Burrell, and Colonel James Ness—authors of “Rethinking Female Urinary Devices for the US Army,” featured in Parameters Spring 2022 issue. Peters serves in the United States Military Academy Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership. She holds a PhD in industrial engineering FOS human factors engineering from University of Miami. Washington serves in the United States Military Academy Department of Chemistry and Life Science. He holds a PhD in emerging infectious disease from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Burrell serves in the United States Military Academy Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership. She holds a PhD in medical psychology from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Ness serves in the United States Military Academy Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership and holds PhD in developmental psychology from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I'm glad you're here. Our topic today is female urinary diversion devices, also known as FUDDs. Help us understand the issue.   (Peters) Absolutely, thanks Stephanie. The background of this study first came about when I was an (second-in-command officer or) XO for a engineer battalion with a infantry brigade. And so, during that time, when we were on convoys or we were jumping to a different site and we stopped within those locations, it was always a fight to find a place to urinate. And I had not felt that feeling of—not necessarily in that training environment—the lack of safety. But if I would have been deployed forward and how to do that, it would definitely be a sense of uncomfortableness, lack of safety, and then just concerned with what I was doing within that space of urinating in a host nation. And it kind of goes back to some of the pilot studies that I ended up doing later on in life for my PhD, which started around 2018. And some of my colleagues were actually talking about how when they were in Iraq, they were exposing themselves in the middle of a busy street—how there weren't facilities around. And, so, putting together from 2015 up into that 2018–2019 timeframe, where I was doing some of my pilot studies, I really didn't know if it was just a “me” problem and . . . and very specific to the units that I was in, or did this problem span across the Army for women, whether they were in combat zones or whether they were in training-type sites. And because of the feedback that we received, it was not just an exclusive, “me” problem. And, so,

    COL Maximillian K. Bremer and Dr. Kelly A. Grieco – “Air Littoral: Another Look” Revisited

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 18, 2022 10:04


    Released 18 April 2022. In this podcast, COL Maximillian K. Bremer and Dr. Kelly A. Grieco apply concepts from their 2021 article “Air Littoral: Another Look” to current events in Russia and Ukraine. Click here to read the original article. Episode Transcript  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Maximilian K. Bremer and Dr. Kelly A. Grieco, authors of “The Air Littoral: Another Look,” featured in the winter 2021–22 issue of Parameters. Bremer is the director of the Special Programs Division at Air Mobility Command. He's a 1997 distinguished graduate of the US Air Force Academy. He has an (master of public policy or) MPP from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and an (master of applied arts and sciences or) MAAS from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Grieco is a resident senior fellow with the New American Engagement Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, which focuses on challenging the prevailing assumptions governing US foreign policy and seeks to develop effective solutions that preserve US security and prosperity. She received her PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Maximilian K. Bremer) (Guest 2: Kelly A. Grieco) (Host) Welcome back, Max and Kelly. The last time you were here, we talked about your 2021 article “The Air Littoral: Another Look.” For our listeners who maybe haven't heard that episode or read the article, please just give us a brief recap on that piece. (Bremer) OK, Stephanie, thanks. And thanks for having us back for this follow-up. We're both very excited to have this chat and really appreciate you and Parameters reaching out to us. Our original Parameters article talked about the area between the ground and the blue skies, and we refer to that as the air littoral—this region of transition that could be accessed from, and give access to, both the ground and the blue skies. It discussed what we saw as a progressively contested zone of transition, with this contestation coming from the increasingly democratized technology which allows improved access, persistence, and lethality in and through the air littoral. We then went on to ask what that meant for the future Joint Force. (Grieco) I think the important thing here is that this article was really about the changing character of conflict and identifying that this convergence of threats, new threats to air superiority in the air littoral, meant that we need to update doctrinal concepts. So, in the past, air superiority was either won or lost in what we're calling “the blue skies.” And the blue skies are really where high-end fighters and bombers typically operate. And if you won air control—you won that battle for the blue skies—it typically conferred control at all altitudes. But what we're seeing increasingly is that even if you win in the blue skies, it doesn't mean that you're going to actually have control of lower-altitude airspace. And as a result, we really need to update doctrinal concepts around air control and not just think of it in terms of being localized in time and lateral space, but also think about vertical control as well. And that's really important, I think, for both the Air Force and the Army to be thinking about—to conceptualize this air-control challenge as a vertical dimension—and will actually be more challenging, I think, for the Army and Air Force, than some of the traditional air superiority challenges because it's going to ...

    Dr. Tor Bukkvoll – “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas”

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 14, 2022 12:03


    Released 14 April 2022. In this podcast, Tor Bukkvoll revisits his 2016 Parameters, article and examines Russian Special Forces and their potential use in Ukraine today. Click here to read the original article. Episode Transcript:  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The views and opinions expressed on this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Conversations on Strategy welcomes Dr. Tor Bukkvoll, author of “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas,” featured in Parameters' 2016 summer issue. Bukkvoll is a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. He's a specialist on Russia and Ukraine, particularly in the areas of defense and security policy. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1: Tor Bukkvoll)   (Host) Thank you so much for joining me, Tor. I'm really glad you're here. We're here to talk about your 2016 article, which opens with this sentence: “This article investigates the roles special operations forces (SOF) have fulfilled in Russian warfare against Ukraine—both in Crimea and in Donbas.” Please give us some background. Russian Special Operations Forces in Ukraine in the past—what do we need to understand here? (Bukkvoll) So what we need to understand, in terms of the role these forces have played in Russian policy towards Ukraine, is that they played a major—maybe the most important—role in the annexation of Crimea. And then, secondly, they played an important (but not so important) role in the warfare in Donbas. There may have been Russian Special Operations Forces in Ukraine, also, prior to the events of 2014. But I think it makes sense to start with the annexation of Crimea, because these forces played such an important role there. And that was, first of all, in terms of the so-called SSO, which in Russian stands for Sil Spetsial'nykh Operatsiy. This is a relatively new Russian special operations force that was firmly established in 2013 but had been built up for a number of years before that. What you should know is that in Soviet times, special operations forces tended to be more like what in the West would be called light elite infantry. So, the famous Spetsnaz forces that we heard so much about, they are more like the US (Army) Rangers than the US special operations forces like (First US Special Forces Operational Detachment) Delta and the (US Navy) SEALs and so on. But this new force, SSO, was particularly built on the example—or was supposed to be—the Russian “Delta Force.” Specifically, the Russian military referred to “Delta” when they talked about SSO. And in Crimea, this SSO force, they started their annexation by taking over the buildings or the parliament and the government in Crimea. And then they occupied those buildings for 24 hours—basically, it seems to me, from the sources I've seen, to check out what the Ukrainians would do at that time. Would they try to stop the annexation, or would they not? And the Ukrainians, for a number of reasons, did nothing or very little. And that became the first step in the annexation of the whole peninsula. And the SSO continue to play a big role here in cooperation with Spetsnaz GRU, which is the special operations forces of the Russian military intelligence. These are the “Rangers” forces I talked about before that then worked in tandem with the SSO to take over most of the Ukrainian military infrastructure on that peninsula. So this operation, taking place on 27th of February 2014, is today one of the most important operations that Russian Special Operations Forces have ever done. And President (Vladimir) Putin even named the 27th of February as the day of special op...

    Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff – “Chinese and Western Ways of War and Their Ethics”

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 13, 2022 10:26


    Released 13 April 2022. In this podcast, Pfaff argues understanding the ethical logic available to one's adversaries will allow US leaders and planners to leverage China's behavior and optimally shape US policies and actions. Click here to read the original article. Episode Transcript: Chinese and Western Ways of War and Their Ethics  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1 Anthony Pfaff) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Anthony Pfaff, author of “Chinese and Western Ways of War and Their Ethics,” featured in Parameters Spring 2022 issue. Dr. Pfaff is the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Welcome, Dr. Pfaff. I'm glad you're here. Let's talk about China and the West, war, and ethics. Your thesis for this piece posits how one fights shapes how one governs that fighting. The article relies on traditional and contemporary scholarship from both East and West to describe differences in how each views the practical and ethical aspects of war and how they can interact. Understanding the ethical logic available to one's adversaries allows one to better understand their behavior as well as how to better shape one's own actions and policies to avoid misunderstanding. Some people think China is unethical. Let's just start there. In fact, you note that in December of 2020, then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe claimed the Chinese government has “no ethical boundaries” in their pursuit of power. Please expand on that. (Pfaff) Yeah. Sure. This is a common refrain. A big theme in it is that the other side—they're unethical. And I wanted to write this because it's not true. Now, they may be doing some things which by our own lights are unethical; they may be doing some things that are unethical by their own lights. What I'm not doing in this paper is adjudicating. And I'm not saying that there is a moral equivalency between the kinds of things China does and the kinds of things the United States does. I'm not saying there's a moral equivalency between the kind of aims that the United States has and China has. I think we can make arguments that a lot of what the Chinese do is in fact unethical. However, it is wrong to say they aren't considering it. There is a fairly rich conversation even in their own People's Liberation Army (PLA) journals and think tanks and conferences, and all that, where they do raise these kinds of concerns. So what I wanted to do is kind of map out: How do these concerns arise, and what shapes how they get expressed in Chinese policy in Chinese thinking as well as our own? And I thought it was important to contrast it with how we do it so a reader can understand, “Oh, this is sort of a natural process that all security communities, states—however you want to define it—do.” These are almost unavoidable categories but do affect not how we just think about fighting, but how we think about the norms governing that fighting. To say the other side just doesn't have any is to oversimplify and to miss a lot. It risks misinterpreting what in fact the other side actually thinks it's doing and thinks it's responding to. (Host) Let's talk about the ways and ethics of war. What do you mean by this, and how are the Western and Eastern ways of war different? (Pfaff) In terms of what I'm talking about here, in terms of what a way of war is and how it relates to the ethics of war,

    David J. Katz – “Multidimensionality: Rethinking Power Projection for the 21st Century”

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 8, 2022 11:51


    Released 8 April 2022. In this podcast, strategist David Katz argues American military strategists must incorporate multidimensional power projection into their planning processes to counter adversarial actions by gray-zone actors. By developing a more complete concept of power projection, the United States can apply its resources more effectively Click here to read the original article. Episode Transcript: Multidimensionality: Rethinking Power Projection for the 21st Century  Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1 David Katz) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes David Katz, author of “MultiDimensionality: Rethinking Power Projection for the 21st Century,” featured in Parameters' Winter 2018–2019 issue. Katz works as a senior analyst at US Special Operations Command, J35 Transnational Threats Division, Counterthreat Finance. A West Point graduate, he served in the US Army as an infantry officer and Green Beret captain. He also worked as an institutional investor and advisor before founding his own firm that provided advanced analytics on more than $3 billion dollars of clients' private equity investments. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Your 2018 Parameters article argues that American military strategists must incorporate multidimensional power projection into their planning processes to counter adversarial actions by gray-zone actors. Let's start there. Please briefly walk us through the basic concept of your article. (Katz) Well, when you stand on the shoulders of giants—in this case, two senior (People's Liberation Army Air Force or) PLA Air Force political officers who wrote Unrestricted Warfare: (Two Air Force Senior Colonels on Scenarios for War and the Operational Art in an Era of Globalization), I think we should start with that, which was published in 1999. I think it opened up an entire, new range of military operations. In this case, it was unrestricted—hence the title, Unrestricted Warfare. So that's where I start from in order to develop multidimensionality. I think that as a critique, the US strategy community has tended to gravitate from unrestricted warfare into what they call “informationalized warfare,” where it's really the principal child, as they see it, of unrestricted warfare. But philosophically, I think there's a profound question to consider. And that is, “What is warfare if it's unrestricted?” What isn't warfare? In fact, let me restate that. If warfare is unrestricted, as the PLA Air Force political officers, Colonel Qiao Liang (pronounced “Crow”) and Colonel Wang (Wang Xiangsui) wrote in 1999, if warfare is unrestricted, what isn't warfare? We need to consider that, which led me down a path to multidimensionality. Now, two questions I typically get are: “What's the difference between multidimensionality and multiple-domain operations, or MDO?” And, “What's the difference between multidimensionality and concepts like (diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement or) DIMEFIL?” And we'll get there. But I think let's just go down sort of the nuts and bolts of multidimensionality. Multidimensionality is really just a strategic framework where we, as US strategists, consider every available dimension of power projection or engagement, and we pick those from that available universe where we possess a usable advantage, whether it's strategic or tactical, whether it's persistent or transitory. For example, a single instance of power projection can range from a scaled, macro power projection,

    CPT Gustavo Ferreira and MAJ Jamie Critelli – “China’s Global Monopoly on Rare-Earth Elements”

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 6, 2022 14:13


    Released 4 April 2022. This article delivers a novel economic analysis of US dependence on China for rare-earth elements and sheds light on how Western nations may exploit the limitations of limit pricing to break China's global monopoly in rare-earth element production and refinement. This analytical framework, supported by a comprehensive literature review, the application of microeconomic and industrial organization concepts, and two case-study scenarios, provides several policy recommendations to address the most important foreign policy challenge the United States has faced since the end of the Cold War. Click here to read the original article. Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1 Gustavo Ferreira) (Guest 2 Jamie Critelli)   (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Captain Gustavo Ferreira and Major Jamie Critelli, authors of "China's Global Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements,” featured in the Parameters Spring 2022 issue. Ferreira holds a PhD in agricultural economics from Louisiana State University. He's a senior agricultural economist with the US Department of Agriculture and serves as an agricultural officer at the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. Critelli is a civil affairs officer serving in the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. He's an independent farm business owner and has worked globally in agriculture supply-chain rules on five continents. He holds a master of business administration and supply chain management from ETH Zurich. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Gustavo [and] Jamie, thanks for joining me. Let's jump right in. Your article sheds light on how Western nations may exploit the limitations of limit pricing to break China's global monopoly on rare-earth element production and refinement. What's the working definition of “rare earth elements” here?  (Ferreira) Good morning, Stephanie. Thank you for having us. So rare-earth elements are a set of 17 different metallic elements that fall into two different categories. You have the heavy and the light based on the separation process (once they get mined and get processed), which tends to be rather complex. And contrary to what the title suggests, rare-earth elements are abundant in the Earth crust. They have their rarity status coming from being typically highly scattered and mixed together with other minerals, and they're rarely found in concentrations that make it profitable to extract. Oftentimes, they are a byproduct of other mining activities. It's important to understand rare-earth element reserves tend to be geographically more concentrated than other natural resources, such as oil and gas, but they're also in line with other key mineral resources, such as copper, where they're concentrated in one or two countries at the global scale. In terms of uses, it's important to highlight they're desired because they have unique characteristics, such as magnetic strength, and, consequently, they're used in a wide range of ubiquitous consumer goods, such as flat-screen TVs and cell phones. Other important industrial applications include wind turbines and electrical vehicles. And one that's typically a very visible application of this resource is in the military space. These minerals are key inputs for many weapons systems, such as jet fighter engines, missile guidance systems, satellites, ammunition, and so on. It's always good to put a number on it to emphasize the current demand for these inputs. An F135 fighter jet (engine) requires about 920 pounds of rare-earth minerals—just to put ...

    LTC Danielle Holt and COL Susan Davis — “Interrupting Bias in Army Talent Management”

    Play Episode Listen Later Apr 4, 2022 10:23


    Released 4 April 2022. This article addresses the impact of diversity, equity, and inclusion on talent management. It explains how systemic bias impairs the US Army's ability to harness cognitive diversity. It stresses the value of cognitive diversity among teams and senior leadership and how cumulative bias impacts the entire career cycle of an individual. It concludes by offering practical suggestions to reduce bias in the assignment, promotion, and selection processes. Click here to read the original article. Episode Transcript:   Stephanie Crider (Host) (Prerecorded Decisive Point intro) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. (Guest 1 Danielle Holt) (Guest 2 Susan Davis) (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Lieutenant Colonel Danielle Holt, US Army, and Colonel Susan Davis, US Army, authors of “Interrupting Bias in Army Talent Management,” featured in Parameters' Spring 2022 issue. Holt is a general surgeon assigned as deputy chief, Department of Surgery at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and Uniformed Services University. She's a graduate of the US Army War College and holds a doctor of medicine degree from Vanderbilt University School of Medicine. Davis is a physical therapist assigned to the People First Task Force. She's a graduate of the US Army War College and holds a doctor of physical therapy degree from Baylor University. I'm happy you're here, Sue and Danielle, welcome. Let's talk about your article. In it, you say, “Army Talent Management must include development of a more innovative and inclusive culture to meet future threats.” There were some significant changes to the system in 2020, let's start there. What changed?   (Davis) Hi, this is Sue, and thanks for having us. Absolutely, I'd say 2019 and 2020 were huge changes in the Army, in the talent management arena, and it was very exciting. The Army is trying to keep up with contemporary practices and modernize the system, if you will, and they had been working for several years on many initiatives. And there were some big ones that were rolled out in 2019 and 2020. Specifically, the ones that we talk about a little bit—and that are probably the most well-known as well—is, first, the Army talent alignment process—which really simply is a new way of determining where officers go for their next assignment. It essentially is a electronic platform that generates a market-style hiring system. Much like the civilian side, resumes are exchanged, interviews may occur, and you can exchange information, etcetera. And then, officers that are slated to move and units that may have an open position indicate their preferences, and they run an algorithm, and this then determines where an officer goes next. That was a very big change in the legacy system. It was more just a conversation with a career manager or—if you're in the (Army Medical Department or) AMEDD—a consultant. And so, this was a big change. And so, we talk about it a little bit. And the other one was the Command Assessment Program. And this was a new initiative to do a very thorough assessment of the candidates who are potentially going to be commanders at the O-5 and O-6 level. And instead of just reviewing their written record and evaluations and where they had been, they brought them in for four or five days of a battery of assessments and interviews and gathered much more information and data on them. So, we talk about these specifically, one, because they're very impactful—they represented really big changes—but also because, like all personnel management processes, whether in the military or civilian, they can be vulnerable to unconscious bias creeping in if it's not mitigated. So, since that was the topic of our paper, unconscious bias, we did take a closer look at those two.   (Host)

    On “The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security” Review and Reply

    Play Episode Listen Later Mar 30, 2022 7:30


    Released 30 March 2022. This commentary responds to Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid's article “The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security” published in the Autumn 2021 issue of Parameters (vol. 51, no. 3). Click here to read the original article. Episode Transcript:   Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. The guests in speaking order on this episode are: (Guest 1 Dr. Shannon Reid)   (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Shannon Reid, coauthor of “The Alt-Right Movement and National Security” by Dr. Reid and Dr. Matthew Valasik, featured in Parameters' Autumn (Fall) 2021 issue. Retired US Air Force Major General Charles J. Dunlop replied, disagreeing with Reid and Valasik's articles. His thoughts as well as Reid and Valasik's reply are in the Parameters Spring 2022 issue.   Reid is an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. She is the lead author of Alt-Right Gangs: A Hazy Shade of White. Valasik is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University. He's the coauthor of Alt-Right Gangs: A Hazy Shade of White. Dunlap retired from the Air Force in 2010, after more than 34 years of service. He currently teaches at Duke Law School and is the executive director of its Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security. His 1992 essay “The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012” was selected for Parameters' 40th Anniversary Edition. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.   Shannon, thanks for joining us. I'm glad you're here. Your article talks about the white-power movement and its history with the military from the Civil War to today. What was the overarching goal of your original article?   (Reid) So the overarching goal of the main article is to really bring attention to the fact that we have a white-power/far-right issue in the military, and it's not a new problem. As you mentioned, we go back all the way to the Civil War. But it is an area of focus that needs attention and cannot continue to be pushed out of the way as something we don't want to focus on.   (Host) Military-affiliated citizens supporting DVEs (that's domestic violent extremists)—how bad is it?   (Reid) Part of the problem is we really don't have any idea. The issue with not studying something is that we only have anecdotes and guesses. While Major General Dunlap said we're overestimating, the truth of the matter is we really don't know if it's an overestimation or underestimation because all we're seeing is when somebody either commits a violent crime or gets in trouble for supporting white-power messaging and is removed from the military. So all we are seeing is a very tail end of what the problem is. But if we continue to say either (a) we don't want to look at this because we feel like it does a disservice to the image of the troops or (b) assuming that we're overestimating, because it's only a proportion of the individuals who are part of these groups really does not allow us to tackle the actual problem, but rather allows it to continue fairly unfettered. Because they know that no one is really interested in looking into it in a more in-depth way.   (Host) Dunlap, in his reply to you, gave an example illustrating how, he says, the numbers are small. And he also notes that exaggerating the problem beyond what data shows dangerously erodes public confidence in the armed forces. It diminishes the propensity of minorities to join, and it gives succor to America's enemies around the world. You say your position is concentrated on the need for t...

    COL Maximillian K. Bremer and Dr. Kelly A. Grieco – “Air Littoral: Another Look”

    Play Episode Listen Later Feb 8, 2022 10:09


    Released 8 February 2022. Assessing threats to the air littoral, the airspace between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers, requires a paradigm change in American military thinking about verticality. This article explores the consequences of domain convergence, specifically for the Army and Air Force's different concepts of control. It will assist US military and policy practitioners in conceptualizing the air littoral and in thinking more vertically about the air and land domains and the challenges of domain convergence. Click here to read the article. Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production, featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. Decisive Point welcomes Colonel Maximillian K. Bremer and Dr. Kelly A. Grieco, authors of “Air Littoral: Another Look.” Colonel Bremer is the director of the Special Programs Division at Air Mobility Command. He is a 1997 distinguished graduate of the US Air Force Academy, he has an MPP from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and an MAAS from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Dr. Grieco is an assistant professor of military and security studies in the Department of International Security at the Air Command and Staff College. She received her PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Max. Kelly. Thanks for joining me today. I'm really glad you're here. Your research looks at air littoral, which is the space between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers, and how the US military thinks about its verticality. What has changed in recent decades that makes this a priority? Colonel Maximilian K. Bremer Well, Stephanie, first, thanks for having us on. And thanks to Parameters for publishing this paper. It's really a privilege. So you're asking what's changed? Well, in a nutshell, democratization and technological advancement have led to increased access and persistence in the space that we're calling the air littoral. Basically, more users with more technology are driving innovation both in the military and civilian realms. Changing the way that we access and persist in any domain will alter the way we contest that domain--the way we seek dominance. The air littoral, until recently, was mostly a realm of transit to and from the blue skies. Persistent access within the air littoral was just not tenable. But it is now, and that drives a change in how we utilize the domain. Before, we could think about airspace as layered flat maps, and now we have to understand the interaction vertically and persistently from the ground all the way to the edge of space. Dr. Kelly A. Grieco As Colonel Bremer suggests, what has changed is increased access and persistence to the air littoral. Russia in eastern Ukraine, for example, has been able to access the airspace and deny it to the Ukrainian Air Force mainly using not manned aircraft but a combination of air defense and electronic warfare systems. And they have then been able to exploit this airspace using multiple drones flying simultaneously at different altitudes over target areas to spot for artillery rockets. This example illustrates two important changes in my mind. First, manned aircraft are no longer essential for accessing or exploiting the airspace, or at least parts of the airspace. And second, increasingly, both nonstate actors and strategic competitors will use small unarmed systems--things like drones, low flying missiles, and loitering munitions to gain persistent access to the air littoral and then exploit it. Host What is the working definition of air superiority? And where does the United States fall on this topic? Do we still rule the skies? Grieco No. At least not the same way we did 10 or even five years ago. In joint doctrine, air control exists on a spectrum based on the degree to which an adv...

    Dr. Todd Greentree – “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?”

    Play Episode Listen Later Jan 24, 2022 10:59


    Released 24 January, 2022. Critics of the Afghan war have claimed it was always unwinnable. This article argues the war was unwinnable the way it was fought and posits an alternative based on the Afghan way of war and the US approach to counterinsurgency in El Salvador during the final decade of the Cold War. Respecting the political and military dictates of strategy could have made America's longest foreign war unnecessary and is a warning for the wars we will fight in the future. Click here to read the article. Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Todd Greentree, a former US Foreign Service officer who served as a political military officer in five conflicts, including El Salvador and Afghanistan. He's a member of the Changing Character of War Center at Oxford University and teaches in the Global and National Security Policy Institute at the University of New Mexico. Greentree is the author of "What Went Wrong in Afghanistan," featured in Parameters winter 2021-2022 issue. Welcome, Todd. I'm so glad you're here. Let's talk about your article. Some people would argue the Afghan war was unwinnable. You assert it was unwinnable the way it was fought. What do you mean by that? Dr. Todd Greentree Thank you, Stephanie. Great to be here. The idea that it was unwinnable the way it was fought is really tied to the purpose, sort of the reason why I was writing it, which is not just about what went wrong in Afghanistan, what lessons can be derived about counterinsurgency. This is really an article about US strategic behavior. Afghanistan was my fifth war. And I like to write what I know. So really, the origin of the article is from my own story. I   got the idea that we were maybe not doing this right, sort of when I stepped off the helicopter at Bagram in 2008. My first war had been El Salvador in the early 1980s. And so everything I learned were all from guys who had been in Vietnam. There's more about that in the article. For the next four years, though, I served with people who were…most of the people were from the 9/11 generation, and I was a political adviser to combat units out in the field and was super impressed with the astuteness that everybody was showing. So first, I was in Regional Command East, where General Mark Milley was the deputy commander for operations. But there was a problem with the entire effort in Afghanistan. We were on economy of force. But that economy of force was not being exercised for a strategic purpose, just to minimize the cost, because Iraq had sucked up all the attention and the bulk of the resources. Then I moved to Regional Command South into Taliban home country, and they had been raging there since 2006. It took three years for the US to adapt. I came back to Kandahar in 2010, at the height of the surge, with the 10th Mountain Division. They were in command of Regional Command South. And this was the main effort at the height of the surge. It was a strong coalition team. They knew what to do, how to partner with the Afghan army. They took it seriously. They were serious about aligning political and military strategies, which was my part of this. The overall strategy of the US, by 2009, was coming into focus, we'd had Stan McChrystal's math, the idea, here's our most experienced Special Operations commander who had come to the realization, as had many of the SOF guys, that attrition generates more insurgents. This led to a shift in the understanding of focus on the population rather than exercising firepower. General Petraeus, following McChrystal with Field Manual 3-24 and counterinsurgency doctrine and all of that. The problem was that when Obama announced the surge, he time-limited at the same time, which was a strategically incorrect thing to do ...

    Dr. Lukas Milevski – “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray”

    Play Episode Listen Later Jan 10, 2022 11:31


    Released 10 January, 2022. A titan of modern strategic studies, Colin S. Gray distinguished himself from other scholars in the field with his belief that grand strategy is indispensable, complex, and inherently agential. This article identifies key themes, continuities, conceptual relationships, and potential discontinuities from his decades of grand strategic thought. Gray's statement that “all strategy is grand strategy” remains highly relevant today, emphasizing the importance of agential context in military environments—a point often neglected in strategic practice. Click here to read the article. Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Lukas Milevski, an assistant professor at the Institute of History at Leiden University. He's published The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective (2018) and The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought (2016). He is the author of “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray,” featured in Parameters Winter 2021-22 issue. I'm glad you're here, Lukas. Thanks for joining me today. Let's talk about your article. “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S Gray.” Colin Gray, a Titan of modern Strategic Studies, often referred to grand strategy as equivalent to statecraft. War is more than a simple military contest, it inherently involves nonmilitary forms of power. Gray's, conception of grand strategy contradicts the mainstream interpretation, particularly favored in the United States, in which grand strategy is identified as the Master of Policy. Walk us through Gray's basic views on grand strategy. Dr. Lukas Milevski OK, well first of all, thank you for inviting me. Now there are four key features of Colin's basic understanding of grand strategy which are worth emphasizing. First grand strategy was in some ways a compromise, particularly between strategic studies characterized by the study of strategy, understood fairly strictly as military strategy, and security studies, which encompass security beyond military security— economic, environmental, human, etc. So grand strategy therefore was a compromise between the necessity to focus on war in strategic studies and the recognition that war, and indeed security, is more than just warfare as waged by militaries. Second, his personal definition of grand strategy is, and I'll quote here. “The direction and use made of any or all among the total assets of a security community and support of its policy goals as decided by politics.” Which he followed up by asserting that the theory and practice of grand strategy is the theory and practice of statecraft itself. So, for Colin, grand strategy was clearly rather enormous concept in both theory and in practice, and one which did actually go beyond war itself. Given that he stated that grand strategy and statecraft are essentially synonymous. Third,  grand strategy will  still strategy despite its enormity, means that it could be, had to be, and was understandable via the general theory of strategy, which he, throughout his career, sought to clarify ever further. This means, among other things, that as much as military strategy needs to be conducted, performed, or whatever word you prefer. So too does grand strategy. So there's performance and economic or financial sanctions. For example, just as much as , if quite different from, that found in military strategy. That said, Colin didn't really ever actually delve into how and nonmilitary power performed in application. Fourth, and finally, grand strategy is indispensable. Any military strategic judgment is inherently a grand strategic judgment. And often judgments needs to be made which are grand strategic rather than narrowly military strategic. You know, not every threat or every policy problem is necessarily solvable with armed force. Or even if it is, that task may be more easily done in combination with other instruments. Host

    Dr. Frank Hoffman – “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare”

    Play Episode Listen Later Dec 27, 2021 8:25


    Released 27 December, 2021. This article explores the current debate about service and Joint operating concepts, starting with the Army's multi-domain operations concept. It argues for adaptations to an old operational design technique—defeat mechanisms; updates to Joint and service planning doctrine; and discipline regarding emerging concepts. Rather than debate over attrition versus maneuver, combinations of a suite of defeat mechanisms should be applied to gain victory in the future.  Click here to read the article. Episode Transcript: Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs. Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Frank Hoffman, author of “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare,” featured in Parameters 2021 – 22 Winter issue. Dr. Hoffman is a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. His latest book, Mars Adapting: Military Change under Fire, was published this year. Frank, I'm glad you're here. Thank you for joining me. We're here to talk about your article that was published in Parameters Winter 2021 – 22, “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare.” Your article assesses several conceptual efforts to better posture US military for success and future wars. Specifically, you explore the debate between service and joint operating concepts and the opportunities and vulnerabilities of cyber-enabled systems to produce decisive effects at the operational level of war. Please set the stage for our listeners and explain the current debate. Dr. Frank Hoffman Sure, thank you. Great to be here today. It's just interesting that, you know, in the literature right now, we're going back to fundamentals about how we in the military conceive of, plan for, and conceptualize obtaining victory. And there seems to be quite a fervent debate going on both in the military literature and in the academic literature. In the current issue of “Survival,” published by double I double S in London, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Franz-Stefan Gady challenges American concepts and thinking about maneuver versus attrition, which is an age-old debate that goes back in the Army and the Marine Corps back to the 1980s. And Gady suggests that we need to reemphasize attrition, since maneuver, both in the sense of movement and mobility across the battlespace, is going to be much harder because of persistent surveillance, attacks from drones, drones as a source of ISR. His reading of future technology suggests that maneuver is going to be very hard and that we need to focus on buying capabilities to attrit the adversary. And this is also taken up by Michael Kofman from the Center for Naval Analysis, who argues that the Army and the joint world need to let loose their embrace of strategic or operational paralysis, you know, attempting to confuse commanders. And we need to reembrace attrition and firepower to destroy enemy capabilities, not by combinations and not by the way we currently think about it. And this is also then taken up by Dr. Heather Venable, who's a professor at the Air University. And she also argues that most of our thinking in the Army and the Marine Corps is based upon some rather thin historical cases drawn largely from either 1916's infiltration tactics or the theories of John Boyd and the OODA loop and this notion of cognitive paralysis and outmaneuvering the enemy in the broader sense through combinations of forces in modern combine arms. Those are the critics. In the service literature, in the joint world, and in the United States, we do seem to have this emphasis now on what in the Army is described as creating multiple dilemmas for the opponent as a theory of victory. I found in the Air Force's doctrine the same kind of theory of victory. And I've also found it in the latest British integrated operating co...

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