Purposeful violent conflict, typically refers to armed conflict or melee
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Listen and subscribe to Money Making Conversations on iHeartRadio, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, www.moneymakingconversations.com/subscribe/ or wherever you listen to podcasts. New Money Making Conversations episodes drop daily. I want to alert you, so you don’t miss out on expert analysis and insider perspectives from my guests who provide tips that can help you uplift the community, improve your financial planning, motivation, or advice on how to be a successful entrepreneur. Keep winning! Two-time Emmy and Three-time NAACP Image Award-winning, television Executive Producer Rushion McDonald interviewed Teri Williams. Thanks! The transcript from this episode of Money Making Conversations Masterclass features a powerful and informative interview with Teri Williams, President, COO, and owner of OneUnited Bank, the largest Black-owned bank in the United States. Here's a breakdown of the key highlights and takeaways:
Jim Norton and Matt Serra recap UFC Houston before welcoming two welterweights at very different stages of their careers to UFC Unfiltered.First up, Jean-Paul Lebosnoyani reflects on his hard-fought split decision win over Phil Rowe in his UFC debut. The Hermosa Beach native discusses the weigh-in faceoff tension, the lone dissenting judge's scorecard, and what he learned from going three full rounds inside the Octagon.Later, former UFC lightweight champion Rafael dos Anjos makes his fifth appearance on the show — his first since August 2023. RDA shares his thoughts from being in attendance at UFC Houston, opens up about tearing his ACL in his fight against Geoff Neal, and discusses his recent knee surgery and plans to return this summer. Now settled in Austin and preparing to get his school going, the veteran reflects on what continues to motivate him after more than 20 UFC wins.Listen in as Jim and Matt react to Sean Strickland's statement victory and some of their other takeaways from this past weekend's action in Houston.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Listen and subscribe to Money Making Conversations on iHeartRadio, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, www.moneymakingconversations.com/subscribe/ or wherever you listen to podcasts. New Money Making Conversations episodes drop daily. I want to alert you, so you don’t miss out on expert analysis and insider perspectives from my guests who provide tips that can help you uplift the community, improve your financial planning, motivation, or advice on how to be a successful entrepreneur. Keep winning! Two-time Emmy and Three-time NAACP Image Award-winning, television Executive Producer Rushion McDonald interviewed Teri Williams. Thanks! The transcript from this episode of Money Making Conversations Masterclass features a powerful and informative interview with Teri Williams, President, COO, and owner of OneUnited Bank, the largest Black-owned bank in the United States. Here's a breakdown of the key highlights and takeaways:
What would you fight for if you were free but still not equal? In 1777, brothers William and Benjamin Frank answered that question by enlisting in the Second Rhode Island Regiment of the Continental Army. Freeborn men of color, they gambled that military service would earn them what freedom alone had not: equality, land, and a better future. Historian Shirley Green, author of Revolutionary Blacks: Freeborn Men of Color, Soldiers of Independence, joins us to tell their story. Drawing on genealogical research rooted in her own family history, Green reveals what daily life looked like for free Black families in Revolutionary Rhode Island, how the Frank Brothers fought at the Battles of Red Bank, Monmouth, and Rhode Island, and how the Revolution ultimately divided them—one brother serving through Yorktown, the other crossing to the British side and resettling in Nova Scotia as a Black Loyalist. Their story is a window into the full range of Black experiences during the Revolution, and a reminder that for men like William and Benjamin Frank, choosing a side was never simple. It was a calculated gamble, shaped by promises made—and promises broken. Shirley's Website | Book |Show Notes: https://www.benfranklinsworld.com/434 EPISODE OUTLINE00:00:00 Introduction00:01:19 The Frank Brothers' Revolutionary Choices00:05:14 Discovering the Frank Brothers Through Family Oral History00:09:01 Blending Genalogy and Microhistory00:15:22 Life for Free Black Families in Early Rhode Island00:20:50 Why Free Black Men Joined the Continental Army00:24:00 Motivations: Land, Pay, and Equality00:29:15 The Gamble of Military Service Amid Policy Shifts00:41:13 Daily Life and Combat in the Integrated Regiments00:44:46 Ben Frank's Desertion00:52:51 The Book of Negroes01:00:02 Postwar Outcomes: Did Promises of Land, Pay, and Equality Hold?01:02:47 Lessons from Black Soldiers' Experiences01:07:26 ConclusionRECOMMENDED NEXT EPISODES
Today we jump back 15 years to two back-to-back episodes of the PWTorch Livecast from Feb. 16 and 17, 2011.On the Feb. 16, 2011 episode, PWTorch editor Wade Keller and PWTorch columnist Pat McNeill, they discuss a variety of topics including The Rock and what might happen from here, Vince McMahon, the Mystery G.M., Undertaker video, and A.J. Styles, plus in the previously VIP-exclusive Aftershow, the McNeill Mailbag includes a question on bad ring outfits.Then on the Feb. 17, 2011 episode, PWTorch assistant editor James Caldwell took live phone calls for 60 minutes discussing The Rock's role at WrestleMania 27, whether Rock will wrestle down the road, how Rock could play a role in the potential Cena-Miz WWE Title match at WrestleMania 27, Rock's promo broken down related to Cena, two different scenarios to book Miz-Jerry Lawler at Elimination Chamber, 2011 Hall of Fame, the digital age affecting the pro wrestling business and future PPV business, why WWE made roster cuts in 2010, Tough Enough's mainstream appeal and why Miss USA was announced as the first contestant, and more.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-podcast--3076978/support.
J'ai le plaisir de recevoir Mitra Hejazipour, joueuse d'échecs franco-iranienne, au parcours hors norme. Elle a commencé à jouer à six ans, dans une famille où chaque réunion devenait un tournoi, avant de devenir championne d'Iran, puis de quitter son pays pour défendre sa liberté et sa dignité. Exclue de l'équipe nationale iranienne en 2019 après avoir refusé de porter le hijab, elle s'installe en France, avant d'être naturalisée en 2023.La joueuse a décidé de raconter son histoire, véritable combat pour la liberté, dans un livre “La joueuse d'échecs”. Ce livre en forme de témoignage est donc le prolongement logique de cet engagement en faveur des droits des femmes.Dans cet épisode, on aborde notamment les sujets suivants :Pourquoi, en Iran, le témoignage d'une femme vaut-il légalement la moitié de celui d'un homme ?Pourquoi le silence peut-il devenir une forme de complicité ?Comment trouve-t-on le courage de tout reconstruire quand on sait qu'on ne pourra plus rentrer chez soi ?Et, comment agir pour la liberté de toutes les femmes ?Dans cet épisode, on parle d'exil, de loyauté, de peur et de responsabilité. On parle de ce moment où enlever un voile devient un acte irréversible. On parle aussi de concentration, de rage de vaincre, de santé mentale et de cette frontière fragile entre ambition et survie.C'est une conversation qui invite à mesurer la valeur de libertés que l'on croit parfois acquises.Je vous souhaite une très bonne écoute !Livre recommandé : 1984, Georges Orwell—Pour découvrir les coulisses du podcast : https://www.instagram.com/inpowerpodcast/Pour en savoir plus sur Mitra Hejazipour :https://www.instagram.com/mitrahejazipour/?hl=enhttps://www.instagram.com/mitra_chess/Pour suivre mes aventures au quotidien : https://www.instagram.com/louiseaubery/Si cet épisode vous a plu, vous aimerez sûrement celui-ci :https://shows.acast.com/inpower/episodes/angelique-kidjo-artiste Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.
Join me, a three-time Iraq War combat veteran, who has been through a decades-long journey with PTSd, and now walking through Post Traumatic Growth as I help you understand PTSd from a biblical perspective. Combat-related PTSd is something many Americans deal with, either as veterans or families of veterans. It's one of the most misunderstood issues of our day by mental healthcare professionals and church leaders. Yet, the answers are right there in the Bible if we're willing to look.SUBSCRIBE TO THE CHANNEL: https://www.youtube.com/@TheCombatChristianTRIVITA:Use my TRIVITA link to get started on your wellness journey: https://bit.ly/HealthyChristianCovenant Eyes: If you want to protect yourself and your loved ones from the dangers of p*rn, get Covenant Eyes: https://bit.ly/Restore-CovenantUSE CODE RESTORE30 at checkout to get your first 30 days FREE when you use the link ✅Other ways for you to support the ministry:
Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance. #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2. On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack. Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure.
In this week's Flagship Flashback episode of the Wade Keller Pro Wrestling Podcast from ten years ago (2-23-2016), PWTorch editor Wade Keller and ProWrestling.net head honcho Jason Powell from ProWrestling.net for their weekly live discussion with caller, email, and Twitter contributions looking at Shane McMahon's return, the Roman Reigns-Hunter angle, WrestleMania 32 speculation, Raw & Fastlane talk with callers, and more.Then in the previously VIP-exclusive Aftershow, Wade and Jason answered a range of email topics largely centered around Shane McMahon, Undertaker, and other Fastlane, Raw, and WrestleMania 32 topics. A look at the on-air and behind-the-scenes angles on Shane's return plus some Raw ratings analysis.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-podcast--3076978/support.
Today we jump back ten years to the Feb. 21, 2016 WWE Fastlane post-show featuring PWTorch assistant editor James Caldwell and PWTorch columnist Greg Parks presenting a full break down of WWE's second PPV of 2016, plus live calls and emails.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/pwtorch-dailycast--3276210/support.
In this week's 5 Yrs Ago Flashback episode of the Wade Keller Pro Wrestling Post-show (2-24-2021), we flash back to the "PWT Talks NXT" episode featuring Kelly Wells, Nate Lindberg, and Tom Stoup discuss Adam Cole's betrayal of Roderick Strong, Escobar vs. Karrion Kross in a No DQ, Io Shirai vs. Zoey Stark, Johnny Gargano vs. Dexter Lumis, Xia Li vs. Kacy Catanzaro, Grizzled Young Veterans vs. Killian Dainties & Drake Maverick, Tyler Rust vs. Leon Ruff, and more.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-post-shows--3275545/support.
Join the RPGBOT crew as they wrap up their Pulp Cthulhu experiment — answering listener questions, unpacking mechanics, debating wizard builds, and confirming once and for all that Pulp Cthulhu is less "existential dread" and more "Indiana Jones punches Nazis with a jetpack." Show Notes The finale Q&A session closes out the RPGBOT Quickstart series on Pulp Cthulhu with a reflective, mechanics-focused discussion on how the system actually played at the table. Framed as a conversation between players and Keeper, the episode explores whether the rules felt intuitive, what stood out, and how pulp action changes the traditional Call of Cthulhu experience. The discussion opens with character advancement — a system largely inherited from Classic Call of Cthulhu. Skills that succeed during play are marked, and during the development phase players roll to see if they improve — ironically increasing faster in weaker skills than stronger ones. This reinforces the system's organic growth model and is supplemented in Pulp by rewards like bonus Luck for completing story arcs. From there, the hosts explore how survivability mechanics shift the tone. Luck emerges as a defining feature of pulp play, enabling cinematic survival and bold risk-taking. The group reflects on moments where characters survived explosive stunts specifically because Luck allowed them to — a core distinction from the deadlier classic ruleset. Combat mechanics and optimization debates dominate the mid-episode. The team examines whether investing in unarmed combat can ever compete with firearms, concluding that while high damage bonuses and melee weapons help, impaling weapons and guns remain significantly deadlier due to extreme success multipliers. This highlights the game's grounded lethality — fists can work, but physics (and dice math) favor bullets. The Q&A also ventures into magic, psychic powers, and build decisions. Spellcasting is contextualized as powerful but dangerous, balanced by sanity costs and narrative risk. Psychic abilities, meanwhile, shine in investigation-driven play, especially those focused on information gathering rather than raw damage. Beyond mechanics, the episode emphasizes tone. Pulp Cthulhu thrives on cinematic improvisation and narrative escalation — encouraging Keepers to "yes-and" player creativity while maintaining credible stakes. The system sits between absurd heroics and genuine peril, echoing adventure films where quips and danger coexist. Balancing that tone is presented as the central challenge for running the game effectively. The session concludes with reflections comparing Classic and Pulp styles. Players note that pulp's higher success rates and survivability foster emotional investment and character attachment, contrasting with the grim inevitability of failure common in classic play. Ultimately, the Q&A serves as both debrief and endorsement — showcasing Pulp Cthulhu as a system that rewards boldness, supports cinematic storytelling, and invites players to lean into chaotic adventure while still respecting cosmic horror roots. Key Takeaways Character advancement mirrors Classic Call of Cthulhu — succeed during play, roll during development, and weaker skills grow fastest. Completing story arcs can reward extra Luck, reinforcing heroic pulp progression. Luck fundamentally changes survivability, enabling high-risk cinematic actions. Guns dominate combat efficiency due to impale mechanics and damage scaling. Melee can compete with investment and weapon choice, but fists alone lag behind ranged lethality. Psychic and investigative abilities often outperform damage powers in mystery-focused play. Spellcasting offers powerful tools but trades stability for sanity and narrative risk. Pulp tone encourages improvisation and cinematic problem-solving over tactical rigidity. Keeper skill lies in balancing absurd heroics with meaningful stakes. Compared to Classic, Pulp promotes character attachment through higher success and survivability. Welcome to the RPGBOT Podcast. If you love Dungeons & Dragons, Pathfinder, and tabletop RPGs, this is the podcast for you. Support the show for free: Rate and review us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any podcast app. It helps new listeners find the best RPG podcast for D&D and Pathfinder players. Level up your experience: Join us on Patreon to unlock ad-free access to RPGBOT.net and the RPGBOT Podcast, chat with us and the community on the RPGBOT Discord, and jump into live-streamed RPG podcast recordings. Support while you shop: Use our Amazon affiliate link at https://amzn.to/3NwElxQ and help us keep building tools and guides for the RPG community. Meet the Hosts Tyler Kamstra – Master of mechanics, seeing the Pathfinder action economy like Neo in the Matrix. Randall James – Lore buff and technologist, always ready to debate which Lord of the Rings edition reigns supreme. Ash Ely – Resident cynic, chaos agent, and AI's worst nightmare, bringing pure table-flipping RPG podcast energy. Join the RPGBOT team where fantasy roleplaying meets real strategy, sarcasm, and community chaos. How to Find Us: In-depth articles, guides, handbooks, reviews, news on Tabletop Role Playing at RPGBOT.net Tyler Kamstra BlueSky: @rpgbot.net TikTok: @RPGBOTDOTNET Ash Ely Professional Game Master on StartPlaying.Games BlueSky: @GravenAshes YouTube: @ashravenmedia Randall James BlueSky: @GrimoireRPG Amateurjack.com Read Melancon: A Grimoire Tale (affiliate link) Producer Dan @Lzr_illuminati
Doug Beck is the Missouri State Senator from Affton. He joins Megan Lynch with a look at legislation that would create new laws to help patients sue medical providers for malpractice using AI.
Brodie Adler returns to the SWN Podcast for a long overdue catch up.
In this week's Interview Classic podcast, we jump back to ten years ago this week (2-18-2016) when PWTorch editor Wade Keller interviewed Ethan Carter III (EC3) for a full hour live interview with live callers discussing his time in WWE Developmental, his experiences around Daniel Bryan, the TNA creative process this year, how worried he was about TNA's future, how much of his character is improvised by him, his picks for new TNA talent acquisitions, and more.Then, a bonus flashback (2-13-2016), PWTorch contributor Jim Valley presented episode #4 of the “Saturday Morning Wrestling” edition of the PWTorch Livecast with live calls and nostalgia featuring live talk with Memphis Wrestling historian Mark James, plus calls.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-podcast--3076978/support.
Today we jump back five years to two episodes of "The All Elite Aftershow."First, on the Feb. 18, 2021 episode, Mike McMahon and Andrew Soucek begin talking about the main event for AEW Revolution - Jon Moxley vs. Kenny Omega in an exploding barbed wire match. From there, they look at the rest of the Dynamite show and answer listener emails.Second, on the Feb. 25 episode, Mike and Andrew talk about AEW signing Paul Wight as a new commentator, as well as AEW launching its new show, Dark: Elevation. From there, the guys get into the email bag, with topics on AEW, Impact, and a lot more.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/pwtorch-dailycast--3276210/support.
Why is it that we train people to survive under pressure… but never teach them how to come home to themselves?After 20 years serving as a Navy Hospital Corpsman alongside Marines in some of the most demanding environments imaginable, Patrick Nardulli realized something profound: toughness wasn't the same as resilience.In this episode, Patrick shares his journey from combat medicine to nervous system regulation — including the moment a heart rate variability monitor revealed he was “thriving” on the outside but dysregulated beneath the surface.We explore:The difference between heart rate and heart rate variabilityWhy high performers often live in chronic sympathetic overdriveHow breath becomes the bridge between mind and bodyThe role of coherence in leadership and relationshipsPractical tools to regulate your nervous system in real timeShow Partners:Get your MENTAL FITNESS BLUEPRINT here! A special thanks to our mental fitness + sweat partner Sip SaunasPersonal Socrates: Better Question, Better LifeConnect with Marc: https://konect.to/marcchampagneTimestamps:02:00 — A guided coherence exercise to settle the nervous system05:00 — Growing up in Chicago and the call to serve07:00 — Combat deployments and the culture of toughness11:00 — The moment he saw resilience breaking in others14:00 — The HRV wake-up call: “I thought the device was broken”18:00 — Why experiential learning beats PowerPoints22:00 — Breath as the bridge between mind and body29:00 — Heart rate vs. heart rate variability explained31:00 — What coherence actually means34:00 — Why most people never intentionally exhale37:00 — Preparation, performance, recovery framework40:00 — When his wife felt his nervous system shift42:00 — Walking into the moonlight: a realignment moment45:00 — Simple practices anyone can start today46:00 — Final message: self-care is not selfish*Special props
In this week's 5 Yrs Ago Flashback episode of the Wade Keller Pro Wrestling Post-show (2-24-2021), PWTorch editor Wade Keller is joined by former Pro Wrestling Torch Newsletter columnist Eric Krol to discuss AEW Dynamite. They discuss the signing of “Big Show” Paul Wight and how he could be best utilized by AEW and whether it's a big deal or not. Then they delve into the matches and angles on Dynamite hyping Revolution including Jon Moxley's promo, Kenny Omega's segment, the Shaq-Cody video package, the Young Bucks angle with their dad and MJF and Chris Jericho, the Lance Archer-Rey Fenix main event, Nyla Rose vs. Britt Baker, Miro, Sting & Darby vs. Team Tez, and more with live callers and emails.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-post-shows--3275545/support.
Today we jump back 15 years to two back-to-back episodes of the PWTorch Livecast from Feb. 14 and 15, 2011.On the Feb. 14, 2011 episode, PWTorch assistant editor James Caldwell and PWTorch columnist Bruce Mitchell discussed with live callers tonight's Raw, predictions on the WrestleMania 27 guest host (The Rock, Barker, Bieber, someone bigger), plus why The Rock won't wrestle again, Triple H's potential return, Hunter's career on the line vs. Taker at WM27?, TNA's Against All Odds PPV and the incompetent things they do, putting the TNA Title back on Jeff Hardy, Jerry Lawler's family situation and how WWE will address it on Raw, WWE financials announced on Thursday, potential 2011 WWE Hall of Fame candidates, a second/third-generation edition of NXT Season 5?, and more.Then on the Feb. 15, 2011 episode, PWTorch editor Wade Keller and ProWrestling.net's Jason Powell discussed The Rock's return and his potential roles at WrestleMania, plus PPV pricing, Elimination Chamber speculation, Raw reaction, and in the VIP Aftershow TNA PPV talk, ideas for Vince Russo to improve without his crutches, Chris Jericho book review, and more thoughts on Raw and Rock.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-podcast--3076978/support.
In this week's episode of All Elite Conversation Club, PWTorch contributors Joel Dehnel and Gregg Kanner cover these topics:(00:00) Introductions(04:46) Double or Nothing relocating to Queens, New York - Louis Armstrong Stadium(07:17) Grand Slam Australia recap six solid matches(17:45) Brody King national media attention(20:53) Kenny Omega vs. Swerve Strickland main event(22:47) Swerve heel turn masterfully executed, slowly building(29:33) Hangman vs. MJF face-to-face Texas Death Match stipulation(38:21) Mark Davis vs. Jon Moxley opening match(42:52) Young Bucks vs. FTR tag title program established(47:09) Willow Nightingale vs. Mina Shirakawa vs. Marina Shafir vs. Megan Bayne TBS title(49:42) Kerwin Selfies tribute(51:01) Tomohiro Ishii hamstring injury(55:46) Brawling Birds Jamie Hayter & Alex Windsor vs. Vivo Van & Becca(56:36) Thunder Rosa return(57:51) Kevin Knight vs. Beast Mortos(58:29) Ricochet/GOA backstage(59:13) New Japan New Beginning USA February 27 show(01:00:12) Hook recruiting promo(01:01:45) Chris Jericho(01:06:52) Collision card(01:11:18) Revolution card(01:13:40) Zach email and triviaSend your thoughts and questions to allelitecc@gmail.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/pwtorch-dailycast--3276210/support.
BONUS: From Combat Pilot to Scrum Master - How Military Leadership Transforms Agile Teams In this bonus episode, we explore a fascinating career transition with Nate Amidon, a former Air Force combat pilot who now helps software teams embed military-grade leadership principles into their Agile practices. Nate shares how the high-stakes discipline of aviation translates directly into building high-performing development teams, and why veterans make exceptional Scrum Masters. The Brief-Execute-Debrief Cycle: Aviation Meets Agile "We would mission brief in the morning and make sure everyone was on the same page. Then we problem-solved our way through the day, debriefed after, and did it again. When I learned about what Agile was, I realized it's the exact same thing." Nate's transition from flying C-17 cargo planes to working with Agile teams wasn't as jarring as you might expect. Flying missions that lasted 2-3 weeks with a crew of 5-7 people taught him the fundamentals of iterative work: daily alignment, continuous problem-solving, and regular reflection. The brief-execute-debrief cycle that every military pilot learns mirrors the sprint cadence that Agile teams follow. Time-boxing wasn't new to him either—when you're flying, you only have so much fuel, so deadlines aren't arbitrary constraints but physical realities that demand disciplined execution. In this episode with Christian Boucousis, we also discuss the brief-execute-debrief cycle in detail. In this segment, we also refer to Cynefin, and the classification of complexity. Alignment: The Real Purpose Behind Ceremonies "It's really important to make sure everyone understands why you're doing what you're doing. We don't brief, execute, debrief just because—we do it because we know that getting everybody on the same page is really important." One of the most valuable insights Nate brings to his work with software teams is the understanding that Agile ceremonies aren't bureaucratic checkboxes—they're alignment mechanisms. The purpose of sprint planning, daily stand-ups, and retrospectives is to ensure everyone knows the mission and can adapt when circumstances change. Interestingly, Nate notes that as teams become more high-performing, briefings get shorter and more succinct. The discipline remains, but the overhead decreases as shared context grows. The Art of Knowing When to Interrupt "There are times when you absolutely should not interrupt an engineer. Every shoulder tap is a 15-minute reset for them to get back into the game. But there are also times when you absolutely should shoulder tap them." High-performing teams understand the delicate balance between deep work and necessary communication. Nate shares an aviation analogy: when loadmasters are loading complex cargo like tanks and helicopters, interrupting them with irrelevant updates would be counterproductive. But if you discover that cargo shouldn't be on the plane, that's absolutely worth the interruption. This judgment—knowing what matters enough to break flow—is something veterans develop through high-stakes experience. Building this awareness across a software team requires: Understanding what everyone is working on Knowing the bigger picture of the mission Creating psychological safety so people feel comfortable speaking up Developing shared context through daily stand-ups and retrospectives Why Veterans Make Exceptional Scrum Masters "I don't understand why every junior officer getting out of the military doesn't just get automatically hired as a Scrum Master. If you were to say what we want a Scrum Master to do, and what a junior military officer does—it's line for line." Nate's company, Form100 Consulting, specifically hires former military officers and senior NCOs for Agile roles, often bringing them on without tech experience. The results consistently exceed expectations because veterans bring foundational leadership skills that are difficult to develop elsewhere: showing up on time, doing what you say you'll do, taking care of team members, seeing the forest through the trees. These intangible qualities—combined with the ability to stay calm, listen actively, and maintain integrity under pressure—make for exceptional servant leaders in the software development space. The Onboarding Framework for Veterans "When somebody joins, we have assigned everybody a wingman—a dedicated person that they check in with regularly to bounce ideas off, to ask questions." Form100's approach to transitioning veterans into tech demonstrates the same principles they advocate for Agile teams. They screen carefully for the right personality fit, provide dedicated internal training on Agile methodologies and program management, and pair every new hire with a wingman. This military unit culture helps bridge the gap between active duty service and the private sector, addressing one of the biggest challenges: the expectation gap around leadership standards that exists between military and civilian organizations. Extreme Ownership: Beyond Process Management "To be a good Scrum Master, you have to take ownership of the team's execution. If the product requirements aren't good, it's a Scrum Master's job to help. If QA is the problem, take ownership. You should be the vessel and ownership of the entire process of value delivery." One of Nate's core philosophies comes from Jocko Willink's Extreme Ownership. Too many Scrum Masters limit themselves to being "process people" who set meetings and run ceremonies. True servant leadership means owning everything that affects the team's ability to deliver value—even things technically outside your job description. When retrospectives devolve into listing external factors beyond the team's control, the extreme ownership mindset reframes the conversation: "Did we give the stakeholder the right information? Did they make a great decision based on bad information we provided?" This shift from blame to ownership drives genuine continuous improvement. Building Feedback Loops in Complex Environments "In the military, we talk about the OODA loop. Everything gets tighter, we get better—that's why we do the debrief." Understanding whether you're operating in a complicated or complex domain (referencing the Cynefin framework) determines how tight your feedback loops need to be. In complex environments—where most software development lives—feedback loops aren't just for reacting to what happened; they're for probing and understanding what's changing. Sprint goals become essential because without knowing where you're headed, you can't detect when circumstances have shifted. The product owner role becomes critical as the voice connecting business priorities to team execution, ensuring the mission stays current even when priorities change mid-sprint. Recommended Resources Nate recommends the following books: Team of Teams by General McChrystal Extreme Ownership by Jocko Willink About Nate Amidon Nate is a former Air Force combat pilot and founder of Form100 Consulting. He helps software teams embed leadership at the ground level, translating military principles into Agile practices. With a focus on alignment, accountability, and execution, Nate empowers organizations to lead from within and deliver real results in a dynamic tech landscape. You can link with Nate Amidon on LinkedIn and learn more at Form100 Consulting.
This show features a fun exploration of possibilities for Drew McIntyre's opponents at WrestleMania. Is Cody Rhodes the least compelling option? Is Trick Williams so over that WWE should consider him? Or even Je'Von? Is L.A. Knight a dark horse? Could this still be the year of Randy Orton?PWTorch editor Wade Keller is joined by ProWrestling.net's Jake Barnett to review WWE Smackdown with live chat interactions throughout including the build for Uncle Howdy vs. Solo Sikoa, the Charlotte-Jade Cargill interaction, Kit Wilson's gimmick and who the joke is really on, the Trick-Carmelo Hayes dynamic, Oba Femi showing more personality this week, and much more.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-post-shows--3275545/support.
Luke and Juliane are very enthusiastic about Shroud by Adrian Tchaikovsky so half way through their review go deep into the spoiler zone. See every book/episode of the SFBRP here: https://www.sfbrp.com/episode-lists-3 See the SFBRP Must-Read List here: https://www.sfbrp.com/must-read Support Luke and Juliane financially via Patreon.com/lukeburrage Luke on Bluesky: @lukeburrage.bsky.social Discuss this book at Goodreads.com Luke writes his own novels, like “Minding Tomorrow”, “Combat”, “Get that rat off my face!” and “The Monster Story Conference”, so download them for free at: https://www.lukeburrage.com/fiction.html
Send a textThis episode tackles the most important—and most misunderstood—attribute in Air Force Special Warfare: integrity. Aaron and Peaches break down why integrity isn't about being perfect, looking good, or avoiding trouble—it's about owning mistakes immediately, telling the truth when it costs you, and keeping your word when no one is watching. From ND ownership, DUIs, and pipeline consequences to combat decision-making, gray-area ethics, and trust inside elite teams, this is a blunt reality check. You can't fake integrity, and once it's gone, nothing else matters. If you want to be trusted with lives, secrets, and missions, this is where it starts.⏱️ Timestamps: 00:00 Ones Ready intro and why integrity matters 02:00 Attributes-based selection explained 04:10 Defining integrity—owning mistakes 07:20 Ego, lies, and instant loss of trust 10:30 Life, wife, and truck—what trust really means 14:00 Team rooms, cages, and high-trust culture 17:45 Integrity with yourself before selection 21:30 DUIs, omissions, and why lying compounds pain 26:00 Ethical dilemmas and gray-area decisions 31:10 Combat examples and moral injury 36:00 Integrity feeds every other attribute 40:30 Final charge: your name is your bond
Today we jump back 15 years to two back-to-back episodes of the PWTorch Livecast from Feb. 10 and 11, 2011.On the Feb. 10, 2011 episode, PWTorch editor Wade Keller and ProWrestling.net's Jason Powell, discussed the WWE Financials just released today, then take live calls with a lot of people chipping in on how WWE could improve business, plus WrestleMania predictions and speculation. In the VIP Aftershow they discuss TNA Impact's big angles last week.Then on the Feb. 11, 2011 episode, PWTorch assistant editor James Caldwell took phone calls for 66 minutes on the previous night's TNA Impact, the Impact ratings, Eric Bischoff's show-opening promo capturing everything wrong with TNA's writing, WrestleMania 27 lacking star power, how WWE can quickly try to make up for a lack of marque "this is WrestleMania" matches, a potential Triple H vs. Undertaker WM27 match, more buzz for WM28 right now, how WWE can build for WM28 using this year's Mania, a potential WrestleMania 27 card with attraction matches involving Big Show and Wade Barrett, top Black pro wrestling stars of all-time, Sting's all-time best opponents, Vader in the early 1990s, DDP stalker angle in WWE, whether WWE and/or TNA will restore secondary titles, and more.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-podcast--3076978/support.
Today's Sports Daily covers the NBA planning to enact anti-tanking measure next season and lay out some concepts, the SF 49ers have a ton of traveling to do next season, a freakish stat on top 5 QB's drafted and the Super Bowl, & Winter Olympics hockey is awesome. Music written by Bill Conti & Allee Willis (Casablanca Records/Universal Music Group) Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
In this episode of PWTorch ‘90s Pastcast, Patrick Moynahan and Alex McDonald discuss issue #374 of the PWTorch including all the mostly good and some bad of WCW SuperBrawl VI featuring two cage matches, WWF files a formal FTC complaint against TBS, Flair wins the title as Miss Elizabeth turns on Savage, and much more. Contact us with questions, reactions, and more at torchpastcast@gmail.com.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/pwtorch-dailycast--3276210/support.
In this week's episode of the Wade Keller Pro Wrestling Post-show from five years ago (2-19-2021), PWTorch.com editor Wade Keller and PWTorch.com's Mike Meyers discussed WWE Friday Night Smackdown including more Roman Reigns-Edge interplay, Apollo Crews turns and injures Big E, Seth Rollins reacts to last week's segment, Sasha-Reginald dynamic explored, Six-Man Main Event, Otis turns, and more with live callers throughout.Then, in a bonus segment, a previously VIP-exclusive Wade Keller Hotline reviewing the year-ago episode of WWE Smackdown from Feb. 21, 2020 including the Bella Twins on a Moment of Bliss, a Goldberg-Fiend angle, Otis-Mandy date follow-up, Lacey Evans sit-down interview with Renee Young, Braun Strowman & Elias vs. Shinsuke Nakamura & Cesaro in a Symphony of Destruction match, Daniel Bryan vs. Heath Slater, Usos & New Day vs. Miz & Morrison & Robert Roode & Dolph Ziggler, and more.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-post-shows--3275545/support.
Aujourd'hui, Emmanuel de Villiers, entrepreneur, Bruno Poncet, cheminot, et Joëlle Dago-Serry, coach de vie, débattent de l'actualité autour d'Alain Marschall et Olivier Truchot.
Jim Norton and Matt Serra welcome two rising welterweights to UFC Unfiltered ahead of Saturday's UFC Fight Night in Houston.The guys kick off their preview of this weekend's card by breaking down the main event between Sean Strickland and Anthony Hernandez — with Jim offering up a prediction of his own.First up, Serbian knockout artist Uroš Medić makes his Unfiltered debut. “The Doctor” reflects on his journey from Serbia to Alaska to the UFC before outlining what he expects from 12th-ranked Geoff Neal in their fan-friendly co-main event clash this Saturday.Then, undefeated prospect Jacobe Smith calls in ahead of his third UFC appearance. After completing a full camp preparing for Seokhyeon Ko, Smith discusses the mindset shift required for a short-notice matchup against fellow unbeaten welterweight Josiah Harrell.Confident in his coaches' film study, Smith explains why he prefers trusting his athleticism and in-fight instincts rather than overthinking hypothetical scenarios.Stick around as Jim and Matt round out the show by locking in their official picks for Saturday's action.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
In this week's Flagship Flashback episode of the Wade Keller Pro Wrestling Podcast from five years ago (2-18-2021), PWTorch editor Wade Keller was joined by Jason Powell from ProWrestling.net and the Pro Wrestling Boom podcast. They discuss potential winners for both Elimination Chamber matches, NXT Takeover and Adam Cole's turn, Seth Rollins' return, Kenny Omega's presentation compared to Roman Reigns lately, the new Exploding Barbed Wire stipulation for Kenny Omega vs. Jon Moxley, the Lacey Evans pregnancy, Sting taking a big powerbomb from Brian Cage, and much more.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-podcast--3076978/support.
In this Dailycast episode of Wrestling Coast to Coast, Chris Maitland and Justin McClelland review the last two episodes of Reality of Wrestling Platinum, Booker T's Texas-based promotion that's been a launch pad for several notable wrestlers. We talk about the pros and cons of the promotion and cover several matches including ROW Champion Danny Limelight against Jesse Funaki, Gaspar Hernandez vs. Blake "Bulletproof" Troop, a Four-Way Tag match with one of our faves, the Mane Event, and much more. For VIP listeners, it's over to GCW for Holy Smokes and two particular matches chosen for particular reasons. First, Rey Horus battles Vengador in an epic lucha encounter, then Jordan Oliver goes one-on-one with Hammerstone in a match with an early contender for Finish of the Year.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/pwtorch-dailycast--3276210/support.
Swerve Strickland beats Kenny Omega in their first-ever singles match in the main event and then turns heel. Is this a smart move to turn Swerve? Is a key how elevated Kenny seems this year?Also, Brody King reacts to coming up short at Grand Slam Australia as fans chant "F-- Ice!" Plus, "Hangman" Adam Page and MJF in a (confusing or convoluted) segment setting up major stips for their Revolution title match. And more with an on-site correspondent giving details on the in-person experience.PWTorch editor Wade Keller is joined by PWTorch's Jarud Buhagiar to discuss just about everything else from Dynamite with live chat interactions throughout.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-post-shows--3275545/support.
Learn more about Black Spectacles ARE 5.0 exam prep here: https://www.blackspectacles.com/pricing?utm_source=youtube&utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=are_live_podcast On this episode of ARE Live, Black Spectacles hosts a discussion on why and how to pass the ARE 5.0 in 2026. You'll learn what order to take the exams in, how much time to study for each division, how to approach certain types of questions, what study tactics to pass the ARE 5.0, how to take advantage of Black Spectacles suite of study materials, how to study to pass the ARE 5.0 exams and more! Timestamps: 4:10 - What order to take the ARE 5.0 5:51 - Take similar division together [What order to take the ARE 5.0] 6:59 - Start with your strengths [What order to take the ARE 5.0] 8:01 - Follow the NCARB sequence recommended by Black Spectacles [What order to take the ARE 5.0] 9:45 - Study tactics to pass the ARE 5.0 10:06 - Learn the content [Study tactics to pass the ARE 5.0] 11:32 - Understand the exam format [Study tactics to pass the ARE 5.0] 16:33 - Combat external stressors [Study tactics to pass the ARE 5.0] 31:00 - Live Q&A See previous episodes or register for the next ARE Live at https://www.blackspectacles.com/podcast
In the thrilling conclusion of the RPGBOT.Pulp Cthulhu Actual Play, our heroes discover that Luck points are real, sanity is optional, and jetpacks are — scientifically speaking — extremely explosive plot devices. Bjorn steals the Necronomicon with telekinesis, Murray forgets who he is, everyone falls in love with the villain thanks to eldritch karaoke mind control, and the final boss fight is resolved using the timeless tactical doctrine of: "What if we shot the jetpack?" Featuring heroic sacrifice, catastrophic math, spontaneous dismemberment, and a helicopter extraction that arrives precisely when pulp cinema demands it — this episode delivers the important lesson that Call of Cthulhu isn't about surviving intact. It's about surviving spectacularly. Show Notes The finale opens with table banter and a brief plug for ongoing Pulp Cthulhu play opportunities before the Keeper resets the stage and reviews key mechanics — including luck recovery, spending luck for survival, and sanity system nuances. The players regain luck and receive a reminder of how it can modify rolls, negate damage, or even prevent death — rules that soon prove critical. A sanity check against newly transformed ghast enemies immediately escalates tension. Randall's character loses significant sanity and enters a bout of insanity, gaining amnesia and temporarily forgetting context and equipment while acquiring an "insane talent" that grants unusual resilience to pain. This mechanical disruption reinforces Call of Cthulhu's psychological stakes and introduces roleplay chaos at the outset of combat. Combat begins in the ritual chamber where Scarlet Arachnus attempts to complete her summoning. Gunfire exchanges with the ghasts while Arachnus deflects harm through magic. Randall lands a devastating critical hit on one creature, while Tyler pivots toward objective play — targeting the ritual itself. The Necronomicon becomes the center of the encounter as telekinesis is used to wrest control of the artifact from the villain, disrupting her casting momentum. The encounter spikes in complexity when Arachnus unleashes Siren Song, charming allies and nearly turning the party against itself. Iowa succumbs completely, while Tyler resists. Surrounded and nearly dead, Tyler resorts to a desperate solution — coordinating with Randall's jetpack maneuver. The resulting detonation obliterates Arachnus and the ghasts, collapses magical support sustaining the enemies, and nearly kills the party in the process. Randall survives only by spending luck to avoid certain death. After the blast, the ritual collapses, the remaining threats dissolve, and the survivors secure the artifact. Extraction arrives via helicopter — a fitting pulp cinematic conclusion — as the buried ruins vanish beneath the sand, ensuring their secrets remain hidden. The episode closes with post-session reflections on system feel and character impact, cementing the adventure as a chaotic but successful demonstration of Pulp Cthulhu's tone and mechanics. Key Takeaways Luck mechanics are central survival tools and dramatically influence outcomes Sanity loss meaningfully alters gameplay through narrative and mechanical disruption Insanity effects can produce both hindrance and unexpected advantages Objective-focused play (stealing the artifact) can end encounters faster than damage trading Mind-control effects reinforce Mythos horror stakes beyond physical threats Pulp tone encourages cinematic risk and heroic sacrifice Improvisation and environment use can resolve otherwise lethal encounters Narrative pacing culminates in high-stakes chaos followed by cinematic resolution Actual Play effectively demonstrates mechanics through emergent storytelling The finale showcases how Call of Cthulhu balances horror tension with pulp heroics Welcome to the RPGBOT Podcast. If you love Dungeons & Dragons, Pathfinder, and tabletop RPGs, this is the podcast for you. Support the show for free: Rate and review us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any podcast app. It helps new listeners find the best RPG podcast for D&D and Pathfinder players. Level up your experience: Join us on Patreon to unlock ad-free access to RPGBOT.net and the RPGBOT Podcast, chat with us and the community on the RPGBOT Discord, and jump into live-streamed RPG podcast recordings. Support while you shop: Use our Amazon affiliate link at https://amzn.to/3NwElxQ and help us keep building tools and guides for the RPG community. Meet the Hosts Tyler Kamstra – Master of mechanics, seeing the Pathfinder action economy like Neo in the Matrix. Randall James – Lore buff and technologist, always ready to debate which Lord of the Rings edition reigns supreme. Ash Ely – Resident cynic, chaos agent, and AI's worst nightmare, bringing pure table-flipping RPG podcast energy. Join the RPGBOT team where fantasy roleplaying meets real strategy, sarcasm, and community chaos. How to Find Us: In-depth articles, guides, handbooks, reviews, news on Tabletop Role Playing at RPGBOT.net Tyler Kamstra BlueSky: @rpgbot.net TikTok: @RPGBOTDOTNET Ash Ely Professional Game Master on StartPlaying.Games BlueSky: @GravenAshes YouTube: @ashravenmedia Randall James BlueSky: @GrimoireRPG Amateurjack.com Read Melancon: A Grimoire Tale (affiliate link) Producer Dan @Lzr_illuminati
PWTorch editor Wade Keller presents the Tuesday Flagship edition of the Wade Keller Pro Wrestling Podcast with guest co-host PWTorch columnist and PWTorch podcast host Greg Parks. They discuss these topics:Can C.M. Punk and Finn Balor both benefit from their Elimination Chamber match?Mailbag Topic: Can a stipulation elevate the potential Drew McIntyre vs. Cody Rhodes match at WrestleMania?Does WWE have any other match to offer as the WWE Title match than a rerun of Drew vs. Cody? What options exist? Should they swing wildly and have Je'Von Evans win the Chamber to shake up the status quo? Should they expand to a Triple Threat or Fatal 4-Way?Mailbag Topic: What woman's match could actually headline night 1 of WrestleMania? A.J. Lee vs. Becky Lynch? Jade Cargill vs. Charlotte or Rhea Ripley or other?The Big Mystery Box in WWE - Chris Jericho or a WrestleMania mascot or what?Kenny Omega vs. Swerve Strickland on DynamiteThe MJF-Brody King saga from media coverage to anti-ICE chants to the booking of the feud to what's next for Brody King?Wheeler Yuta's hair lossKris Statlander, Thekla, and Toni Storm's next movesTNA's first month or so on AMC and how they shook things up without overhauling the rosterMailbag Topic: Kit Wilson's gimmick, why Greg doesn't like it, and Wade's case why it's not really just a laughing matter (even if Kit pulls it off great).Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-podcast--3076978/support.
Nate Lindberg and Kelly Wells discuss Ethan Page vs. Shiloh Hill, the Neverending Story of Zaria and Sol Ruca, thoughts on how famous wrestlers really are, and more.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/pwtorch-dailycast--3276210/support.
In this week's 5 Yrs Ago Flashback episode of the Wade Keller Pro Wrestling Post-show (2-15-2021), PWTorch editor Wade Keller is joined by PWTorch's Robert Vallejos of the PWTorch Dailycast's “MMA Talk for Pro Wrestling Fans” to review WWE Monday Night Raw with live callers and emails. They discuss the Gauntlet Match booking and performance in particular by Drew McIntyre, the Lacey Evans pregnancy announcement, Randy Orton-Alexa Bliss, bad Matt Riddle President's Day humor, Xavier's trombone playing, Braun Strowman making threats when talking about Shane McMahon, the Miz vs. Kofi Kingston qualifier, the absence of Keith Lee and John Morrison, and more.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-post-shows--3275545/support.
The Joint Readiness Training Center is pleased to present the one-hundredth-and-thirty-second episode to air on ‘The Crucible - The JRTC Experience.' Hosted by MAJ Marc Howle, the Brigade Senior Engineer / Protection Observer-Coach-Trainer, and MAJ David Pfaltzgraff, BDE XO OCT (formerly the BDE S-3 Operations OCT), from Brigade Command & Control (BDE HQ) on behalf of the Commander of Ops Group (COG). Today's guests are JRTC's very own Unit Ministry Team: MAJ(CH) Sean Kitchens, CPT(CH) Byron Denman, SFC Malik Carrigan, and SFC Dannell Bing. This episode focuses on the employment of Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) in a combat training environment, highlighting both their doctrinal responsibilities and the persistent integration challenges observed at JRTC. A central theme is that UMTs possess two primary capabilities—religious support provision and commander advisement—yet often struggle with full integration into the staff process. The discussion emphasizes that advisement, particularly on morale, ethical climate, and the intangible health of the formation, is one of the chaplain's most critical contributions. However, without deliberate participation in battle rhythm events, shift-change briefs, MDMP touchpoints, and staff synchronization forums, UMTs can lose situational awareness and inadvertently become disconnected from the fight. Leaders note that successful teams deliberately synchronize internally, align with planning decision points, and ensure shared understanding between chaplain and religious affairs specialist to balance ministry presence with staff integration. The episode also explores the evolving role of UMTs in LSCO, particularly in high-casualty, non-linear environments where mass casualty events, temporary interment operations, and distributed maneuver demand proactive planning rather than reactive presence. The panel highlights the paradigm shift from fixed FOB-based ministry during the Global War on Terror to a more mobile, forward, and flexible posture in LSCO. Best practices include “spring-loaded” religious support to reinforce high-threat sectors, pre-assault ministry to shape morale before decisive operations, and deliberate home-station training focused on operational staff proficiency rather than solely garrison requirements. Ultimately, the conversation reinforces that UMT effectiveness depends on integration, operational awareness, and the ability to anticipate where religious support will have the greatest impact across the battlefield. Part of S13 “Hip Pocket Training” series. For additional information and insights from this episode, please check-out our Instagram page @the_jrtc_crucible_podcast Be sure to follow us on social media to keep up with the latest warfighting TTPs learned through the crucible that is the Joint Readiness Training Center. Follow us by going to: https://linktr.ee/jrtc and then selecting your preferred podcast format. Again, we'd like to thank our guests for participating. Don't forget to like, subscribe, and review us wherever you listen or watch your podcasts — and be sure to stay tuned for more in the near future. “The Crucible – The JRTC Experience” is a product of the Joint Readiness Training Center.
In Part 2 of our conversation with Joseph “Joey” Pena, the discussion moves from early trauma to operational reality.Joey shares what it was like being among the first boots on the ground in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, operating under martial law, and navigating a city where law enforcement had been compromised and order had collapsed.He recounts:• Taking back the French Quarter • Rules of engagement during “blue on blue” encounters • The presence of private security contractors • The breakdown of trust in uniform • Stop-loss extensions during the Iraq War • Leadership manipulating deployment orders • Combat deployments in Samarra and Sadr City • Living with hypervigilance after returning home • Setting boundaries in relationships while managing PTSDThis episode is not about glorifying combat. It is about what happens when systems fail, and what that does to the people inside them.For leaders, it is also a reminder:When structure collapses, human behavior changes fast.
In this episode of Down & Dirty with Michael Julian, we sit down with Joseph “Joey” Pena for one of the most raw and unfiltered conversations we've had.Joey opens up about surviving severe childhood abuse, growing up as a preacher's kid, and how early trauma shaped his identity long before he ever joined the military.From the 82nd Airborne to deployments in Iraq and responding to Hurricane Katrina, Joey shares what combat really looks like — and what happens after the uniform comes off.We discuss:• Childhood trauma and long-term psychological impact • Becoming a protector after being bullied • Katrina and witnessing societal breakdown • Combat deployments in Samarra and Sadr City • Stop-loss and military extension • PTSD, hypervigilance, and setting boundaries • Turning a .50 cal round into a wedding ring • Breaking generational cycles of violenceThis episode isn't about war stories. It's about accountability. Healing. And choosing not to pass pain forward.If you've ever struggled with trauma, identity, or rebuilding your life after chaos - this conversation is for you.
Il y a 4 ans, la Russie envahissait l'Ukraine. Depuis, l'Europe tout entière frissonne. Le lâchage des Américains et leurs exigences sont venus accélérer la prise de conscience du danger. Les Armées européennes ont donc décidé de monter en puissance. En Allemagne, dès la fin février 2022, Olaf Scholz alors chancelier annonce devant le Bundestag un changement d'époque pour la Bundeswehr. L'Allemagne -convaincue depuis la chute du Mur que la paix serait éternelle- se découvre vulnérable. Et va réagir. « Branle-bas de combat pour la Bundeswehr », un Grand reportage de Nathalie Versieux.
SPONSORS: 1) CHEERS HEALTH: Same night out — way better morning with Cheers. For a limited time our listeners are getting 20% off their entire order by using code JULIAN at https://CheersHealth.com #Cheers #ad2 2) AMENTARA: www.amentara.com/go/JULIAN - Discount Code: JD22 for 22% off your FIRST order. 3) MIRACLE BRAND: Upgrade your sleep with Miracle Made! Go to https://trymiracle.com/JULIAN and use code JULIAN to save over 40% and get a free 3-piece towel set. JOIN PATREON FOR EARLY UNCENSORED EPISODE RELEASES: https://www.patreon.com/JulianDorey WATCH PART 1 HERE: https://open.spotify.com/episode/5sKoh7cHdis895qcuBZbgi?si=53q5FcjGQhe_mT27HqUVkQ (***TIMESTAMPS in description below) ~ Jesse Hamel is a former Air Force Lt. Colonel & AC-130 Gunship Combat Aviator. He is now CEO of Victus Technologies, a drone warfare company he founded while studying at MIT. JESSE's LINKS: X: https://x.com/jhMITgunship VICTUS: https://www.getvictus.ai/ FOLLOW JULIAN DOREY INSTAGRAM (Podcast): https://www.instagram.com/juliandoreypodcast/ INSTAGRAM (Personal): https://www.instagram.com/julianddorey/ X: https://twitter.com/julianddorey JULIAN YT CHANNELS - SUBSCRIBE to Julian Dorey Clips YT: https://www.youtube.com/@juliandoreyclips - SUBSCRIBE to Julian Dorey Daily YT: https://www.youtube.com/@JulianDoreyDaily - SUBSCRIBE to Best of JDP: https://www.youtube.com/@bestofJDP ****TIMESTAMPS**** 00:00 – Evolution of Drone Warfare & Predator Origins 09:06 – Early Drone Problems, Hellfire & Ukraine Drones 19:06 – Cheap Mass Drones, AI & GPS Battlefield Threats 39:03 – Autonomy, Jamming, Directed Energy & Why Jesse Retired 52:39 – Russia / China Tech Race & Broken Defense Innovation Cycle 1:03:46 – Bureaucracy vs Startups & Fixing Military Innovation 1:13:50 – MIT Lessons, Humility & Building Agile Companies 1:22:46 – Why Jesse Rejected Big Defense Contractors 1:28:21 – GPS Warfare, Spoofing & Victus Solutions 1:38:36 – China Drone Race & Balloon Threats 1:48:32 – China Deception & US Drone Weakness 1:59:23 – China Investment, Data War & Machine Dominance 2:10:40 – Underwater Drones, Fravor & Underwater UFOs 2:15:59 – Spiritual Reality, Faith & Modern Disconnection 2:24:24 – Combat, Faith, WW3, WW4 & Cultural Decline 2:41:36 – Meritocracy, DEI Aftermath & Future Workforce 2:43:52 – Jesse's Work CREDITS: - Host, Editor & Producer: Julian Dorey - COO, Producer & Editor: Alessi Allaman - https://www.youtube.com/@UCyLKzv5fKxGmVQg3cMJJzyQ - In-Studio Producer: Joey Deef - https://www.instagram.com/joeydeef/ Julian Dorey Podcast Episode 385 - Jesse Hamel Music by Artlist.io Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Today we jump back 15 years to the Feb. 9, 2011 episode of the PWTorch Livecast featuring host PWTorch assistant editor James Caldwell and PWTorch columnist Pat McNeill, they discuss with live callers WrestleMania 28 announced for Miami and whether The Rock is the leading candidate as the 2012 Hall of Fame inductee, WrestleMania 27 match possibilities involving Undertaker, theories on why the 2/21/11 video could be Sting, where Sting could fit in in TNA, the WrestleMania guest host mystery likely being Rock, The Ultimate Fighter (Brock Lesnar) vs. Tough Enough (Steve Austin) this spring, TNA's PPV this weekend, McNeill's Live Events Center, and more. In the VIP Aftershow, they take McNeill VIP Mailbag questions on potential WrestleMania celebrities, all-time best Raw TV matches, Shawn Michaels as a future Tough Enough trainer, and more.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-podcast--3076978/support.
This winter has been incredibly cold in New York City. With long days spent inside and with the sun going down early, many might be struggling with Seasonal Affective Disorder, also known as seasonal depression. Dr. Paul Desan, associate professor of psychiatry at the Yale School of Medicine, gives listeners a better understanding of how Seasonal Affective Disorder works and tips for how to combat it.Stock graphic via iStock / Getty Images Plus
Today we jump back ten years to a pair of back to back PWTorch Livecasts from ten years ago.First, the Feb. 12, 2016 episode with PWTorch columnist Bruce Mitchell and Travis Bryant of the East Coast Cast wrapping up the week in pro wrestling focusing on Daniel Bryan's retirement and Titus O'Neil's suspension with live calls and emails.Then the Feb. 15, 2016 episode with PWTorch assistant editor James Caldwell and PWTorch columnist Pat McNeill host the Raw post-game show breaking down the top news from Raw. Then, live calls and emails for the remainder of the show.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/pwtorch-dailycast--3276210/support.
Before he ever wore the uniform, Rolan Smith lived a life of chaos, brotherhood, and near-death experiences that most people wouldn't survive. In this Urban Valor episode, Rolan shares what really led him to enlist in the United States Marine Corps — and how an 85 MPH crash in the middle of the desert nearly ended that path before it began.Raised in Amarillo, Texas, Rolan was the definition of a wild kid. Sports, trouble, loyalty — and a brotherhood with his best friend Price that would take them from Friday night lights to fire teams. This is the story of what happens before the war… when life itself is already throwing punches.
PWTorch editor Wade Keller is joined by PWTorch's Chris Griffin to discuss Je'Von Evans' big win in the main event and what his potential is. Plus, dissecting the pros and cons of what C.M. Punk and A.J. Lee said in their promos on the show. Also, the price of tickets for WrestleMania and entertainment in general. Plus Liv-Stephanie Vaquer, Finn Balor, and much more with live caller and chat interactions throughout.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-post-shows--3275545/support.
Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war. #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed: (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata, (2) comms failures, (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently. This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion. 2. Trust Kwantung localization. 3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks; 2) bombing risks escalation; 3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July. Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.