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Rosenberg, Dip, and SGG break down the most misleading Survivor Series hot take floating around online, unpacking why it blew up and what the real takeaway should be.They dig into why War Games may have been the best night of Bronson Reed's career and what this moment could mean for his future in WWE.Plus, the MAJesty tackle a big question on every fan's mind: Should John Cena win his final match? And to top it off, Rosenberg opens up about the possibility of finally getting hair plugs and Diperstien… well, he definitely has an opinion.Listen to Cheap Heat Live Fridays 12pm- 2pm EST on Pro Wrestling Nation 24/7 on Channel 156.Call in at 844-344-4893Wanna stay MAJ?Join our PateronFollow @cheapheatpod on Instagram and TikTok @cheapheatpodsubscribe to Rosenberg's Youtube Channel.Email the show Rosenbergwrestling@gmail.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Prime Minister names his military secretary Maj.Gen. Roman Gofman as the next head of the Mossad, Body returned from Gaza identified as Thai national Sudtisak Rinthalak, Israeli swimmer Anastasia Gorbatenko wins bronze at European championships in 100-meter breastrokeSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

On today's Land Warfare Series program, sponsored American Rheinmetall, Maj. Gen. Tom Feltey, the commander of the US Army's 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, along with Col. Nick Dvonch, the division's artillery commander, and Col. Jose Reyes, the commander of the 2nd Armored Brigade “Blackjack,” join Defense & Aerospace Report Editor Vago Muradian to discuss the 26-02 brigade certification rotation last month at the National Training Center where the 1st Cav's novel waves-based approach to create advantage in highly contested future battlefields, whether in Europe, Asia or elsewhere, was tested under operational conditions.

For perspective on the U.S. military strikes on suspected drug boats and the legal concerns, Geoff Bennett spoke with retired Maj. Gen. Steven Lepper. He served as the Air Force's Deputy Judge Advocate General, and as such, was the service's second-highest-ranking uniformed lawyer. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy

Last time we spoke about the beginning of a conflict between the USSR and Japan. In the frost-hardened dawns by the Chaun and Tumen, two powers eye a ridge called Changkufeng, each seeing a prize and fearing a trap. On the Soviet side, weary front-line troops tighten their grip, while Moscow's diplomats coaxed restraint through Seoul and Harbin.  As July unfolds, Tokyo's generals push a dangerous idea: seize the hill with a surprise strike, then bargain for peace. Seoul's 19th Division is readied in secret, trains loaded with men and horses, movement masked, prayers whispered to avoid widening the rift. Japanese scouts in white Hanbok disguise, peering at trenches, wire, and watchful Russians. Russian border guards appear as shadows, counters slipping into place, yet both sides hold their fire. On July 29, a skirmish erupts: a platoon crosses a shallow line, clashes flare, and bodies and banners ripple in the cold air.    #178 Night Attacks and Diplomatic Strains: The Lake Khasan Conflict Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. A second troop train was scheduled to depart Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. At Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 16:00 when the division informed him that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 15:00 and that the Russians were assembling forces in that area. Suetaka ordered Sato's 3rd Battalion, which had not been slated to leave until the following night, to proceed to Kucheng; the remainder of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After consulting with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that "overall developments did not warrant optimism, it was imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield." One of Sato's first actions was to telephone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved, and at 17:30, Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 15:00. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artillery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 18:20, called for Sato to have two of his battalions, the 1st and 3rd, cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and to watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area. Sato arrived at 21:15 in Shikai. There, he assembled a number of his officers, including Yamada, and explained his plan: the 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to assist the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amid heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 22:15. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, though Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan, as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29–30 July. A night attack will be launched against Changkufeng on the night of 30–31 July." Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit, 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan, and, in addition, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. Most of these young officers, such as Seutaka dishing out orders were performing what the Japanese termed "dokudan senko" or "arbitrary or independent action". Japanese operational regulations actually contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stipulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact superiors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full responsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-à-vis the local forces and the chief of staff."  The Korea Army's version of events on 29 July, there was no mention of any report received from the division prior to 17:30. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divisional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August. The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 19:15. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. At 21:20 on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: "With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. At present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences." Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that: (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 18:20, 29th);  (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (22:00, 29th);  (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (06:40, 30th).  Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important communication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix.  After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be provoked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his command. Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at that time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about aggressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decisionmaking process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a positive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post were known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possessed considerable information about thinking at the Korea Army level: "Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been relatively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the deployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Reports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own initiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a troublesome matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been withheld and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be approved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Nakamura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have".  Nakamura added: "I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division." Such sanction had been granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post facto. At 01:20 on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phrasing that suggested his grave concern: "One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked." Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, the War Minister, and the Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura continued: "In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . unlawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fundamental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Manchurian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident".  The Korea Army, "painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major, was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By then, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had returned to Japan—an important fact, given the "Moltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembered that his AGS subsection had given him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. "It was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day." Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with minimal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this had been the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubordination, one could not overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted properly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur. It would have been unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "softer" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There had been no concern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army had been a many-layered process. The Army general staff had been of the opinion that initial guidance ought to have been provided to the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high command staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible Army general staff officers conferred at length. Stress had been laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It had also been evident that further information was required. On that basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng Incident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura had received the telegram at 16:50 and had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, then at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy, leave things to local units, which have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation without fail."  The Army general staff and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the division, well down the rungs of the ladder of command, was initiating actions that jeopardized the government's basic policy. Earlier quibbling about restraints on "unit-size" elements crossing into Manchuria had been abandoned after the firefight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. At 15:30, Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 18:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to assault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest had been Suetaka's acceptance of Sato's recommendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng.   Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid deployment of his forces across the river. At Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders conveyed orally by staff officers had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immediately, even if the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore, reinforce Senda's unit, and maintain a strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area." Around 23:20, the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 00:30 and reaching the crossing site at 03:00. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembered.  At the crossings, the hardworking engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 04:30, he traversed the river. The movement had been completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 08:00 did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147, already held by Noguchi's company west of Changkufeng. By then, plans had fallen behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembered torrential rains; other officers mentioned darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpointed a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff officer rightly thought that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to "attack at an opportune time," and that the night of 29–30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: "Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing operation approximately as scheduled".  Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses along the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery and established positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa was attached to the 75th Infantry on 29 July, he dispatched his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to traverse two weak, narrow bridges in the darkness. With two 15-centimeter howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit faced tense moments. The gun sites themselves were worrisome: they were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, and the single road to them from the unloading station ran through a paddy area and was similarly exposed. By 1200 hours on 30 July, Sato exerted operational control over the following units: his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting; Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng; a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52; and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; and from other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company; two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Regiment near Shachaofeng; and a 75-mm half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery comprising two 15-centimeter howitzers from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery was in place. The 19th Engineers operated near the crossing sites, though one platoon remained at Fangchuanting. Sato said, "We were now deployed at last, to cope with any situation." His command post was set in foxholes on open ground at Chiangchunfeng, a central hill that offered excellent observation and control over actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north. Not content with suspending the pullout of units and deploying additional combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to recall division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinary personnel from Nanam. At dawn on 30 July, Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to move 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail; most of the increment came from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 05:00 on 31 July. The preceding emergency measures were being implemented by Suetaka, even as he received Nakamura's calming telegram of 30 July enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by Kitano flying to the front. At 10:00 on 30 July, Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up cable: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on the army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in the Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." At 13:45, Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure … Chiangchunfeng and … the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an enemy attack, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 16:50, Nakamura received instructions from Tada: the Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were pursuing the desired policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. At 19:30, the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun. After his units had crossed the Tumen on 30 July, Sato Kotoku ordered a strict watch and directed preparations for an assault based on the plans. He conferred with Senda at Chiangchunfeng and observed the enemy. Even after dawn, the frontline commanders who had crossed the river remained uncertain about when the attack would be staged. While Sato's force conducted reconnaissance to prepare for a daytime offensive, orders arrived around 08:00 indicating, "We intend a night attack, so conceal your activities." Daytime movements were prohibited. Sato then explained the impression he had derived from Senda and the intelligence on which he based his estimates: " Exploiting the impasse in diplomatic negotiation, the enemy side had steadily reinforced front-line offensive strength and trespassed anew near Shachaofeng. They now had a battalion and a half of infantry plus 20 artillery pieces in the area, some south of Shachaofeng and the others at four positions immediately east of Lake Khasan. At least a dozen (maybe 20) tanks were deployed in the sector opposite us. About 300 well-armed, active Russian troops were at Changkufeng. I decided that an attack ought to be staged that night. First of all, we were going to chill the insolent enemy by a courageous night assault—a method characteristic of the Imperial Army. Then all kinds of fire power were to be combined in a surprise attack against the positions. Our intention was to jo lt the Russians, demonstrate the true strength of our combat fire, and, by a combination of night and dawn attacks, cut down losses which our left-flank units would have incurred if a night assault alone were staged. We had considered two plans—a night attack against Changkufeng by the 3rd Battalion from the north, or by the 1st Battalion from the south. On 30 July, I decided to execute the second plan, using my 1st (Nakano's) Battalion, to avoid simultaneous involvement around Shachaofeng where the foe was by now alerted."  The Japanese Army ordinarily favored surprise assaults without supporting guns, since firepower was regarded as secondary in close combat and artillery was in short supply. According to the regimental journal, telephone contacts from the morning of the 30th indicated that the division commander shared the same line of thinking as Sato. By noon, Suetaka made his stance explicit. A phone call from Kucheng conveyed to Sato the gist of a critical division order: first, a detailed briefing on Soviet troop concentrations and dispositions, firing positions, troops, and armor south of Shachaofeng; entanglements and forces at Changkufeng; large concentrations behind west of Khasan; tanks and ground formations moving north of the lake; a heavy concentration near the lake to the northwest; one confirmed and two suspected positions along the eastern shore and another with artillery far to the south. Then the order stated that K. Sato's forces, including the Takenouchi battalion from the 76th Infantry, one mountain artillery platoon, and one engineer platoon were to strengthen their positions and, at the same time, promptly evict from Manchurian territory the intruding and advancing enemy. However, pursuit must not be pushed too far lest the border be crossed. Shortly after noon, Suetaka issued another order to form a new force under Senda, who was to strengthen border security along the Shuiliufeng–Hunchun line. As with Sato, Senda was to eject the intruding and advancing enemy from Manchurian soil but not pursue them across the border. By midafternoon, Sato knew not only what he wanted to do but also Suetaka's intentions. At 15:30, he assembled all subordinate officers at Chiangchunfeng and dictated minute attack instructions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy continued to fortify points of importance along the Changkufeng–Shachaofeng line. Sato's plan was to annihilate hostile elements that had crossed the border north and south of Changkufeng. His concept went beyond a frontal assault. While Nakano's battalion would jump off south of Changkufeng, one reinforced company, Takeshita's 10th was to attack north. Since the sun rose at about 05:00, Sato intended to wipe out the enemy during three hours of darkness. Another battalion, Hirahara's 3rd would be held in reserve, with Ito's 6th Company ready to launch a night attack against Changkufeng from the northwest if necessary. Small forces deployed southeast at Hill 52 were to block the arrival of Soviet reinforcements around the southern shores of Khasan. Only after Changkufeng was secured and fire swept the high ground south of Shachaofeng would a reinforced battalion, Takenouchi's 1st from the 76th Regiment undertake a dawn assault to clear the Russians from that sector. An engineer platoon would assist both the night and dawn assault battalions with obstacle clearing. There would be no artillery support until dawn, when the available guns were to provide maximum coverage. Notably, even the movement of a single antitank gun warranted mention. Sato concluded the attack order by directing that each unit mask its intentions after sunset. Takenouchi was to act to check the enemy as soon as the sun went down. In connection with the dawn barrage against the enemy southwest of Shachaofeng, key personnel were to study the best way to exploit sudden fire described as gale and lightning. They were also to be ready to destroy enemy tanks. A green star shell would be fired to signal the success of the night attack. The code words were shojiki "honesty" and ydmo "bravery". At midnight, the regiment commander would be at the northwest foot of Chiangchunfeng. The order stressed typical night-attack precautions: secrecy and concealment, avoidance of confusion, antitank defense, and flare signaling of success. Sato added his own flair with his daily motto as code words and the reference to "whirlwind" fire. Impending action times were explicitly set when the order was issued at 15:30 on the 30th, more than ten hours before the 1st Battalion was to jump off. The key to success in a night assault lay in an absolute prohibition on firing by their side, and bold, courageous charging. Sato reminded his men that life is granted again after death. Nakano then assembled his company commanders east of Fangchuanting and issued his battalion order at 18:30. A few hours after Sato's briefing of the assault commanders, Suetaka arrived at the 75th Regiment command post. This visit late on 30 July is central to allegations that Sato, not Suetaka, conceived and executed the night attack on his own initiative. Divisional orders giving Sato his core mission had already been conveyed by telephone. After 16:00, Suetaka boarded a motorboat at Kucheng and went to the Manchurian side to verify front-line conditions. Soviet snipers south of Yangkuanping fired several shots, but his craft reached the Matsu'otsuho landing and proceeded to Chiangchunfeng to meet Sato. Sato described the situation: "frontline enemy forces had been reinforced steadily and had begun a vigorous offensive. The foe was provoking us, and the matter had grown very serious. I had already issued orders at 15:30 to take the initiative and deal the enemy a smashing blow." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, Russia and Japan lock eyes over Changkufeng. Diplomats urge restraint, yet Tokyo's generals push a bold gamble: seize a hill with a surprise strike and bargain later. Japanese divisions, engineers, and artillery edge toward the border, while Soviet sentries brace for a confrontation that could widen the war. 

For perspective on the U.S. military strikes on suspected drug boats and the legal concerns, Geoff Bennett spoke with retired Maj. Gen. Steven Lepper. He served as the Air Force's Deputy Judge Advocate General, and as such, was the service's second-highest-ranking uniformed lawyer. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 20-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world. Military correspondent Emanuel Fabian joins host Amanda Borschel-Dan for today's episode. The commander of Hamas’s East Rafah Battalion, his deputy, and two other terror operatives were confirmed by the military to have been killed early this morning after attempting to flee a tunnel in the southern Gaza Strip. The soldiers there recovered the weapon of a slain IDF soldier, Staff Sgt. Or Mizrahi, a Nahal fighter who was killed while battling terrorists on the Gaza border during the October 7, 2023, onslaught. Fabian updates on the Hamas operatives trapped in the tunnels. The IDF said it killed three Palestinians who crossed the Gaza ceasefire line in two separate incidents in the Strip’s south on Saturday, with two of them identified as young children. Fabian was in the Gaza Strip last week: We learn how the IDF is operating along the Yellow Line and whether Gazans are aware of the demarcation. Six Israeli soldiers were wounded, including three seriously, after coming under fire by gunmen during an arrest operation in southern Syria early Friday morning. While arrest operations in Syria are no longer unusual, they rarely are accompanied by gunfights. Fabian unravels what we know about the ambush. Officers of the police’s elite Yamam unit detained a cell of five terror operatives in the northern West Bank that was planning an “imminent” attack, security forces said this morning. The arrest comes as the military is continuing to carry out a major counterterrorism operation in several northern West Bank towns. We hear about Hamas smuggling attempts into the West Bank and a much-examined incident in which Border Police officers are now under investigation over the fatal shooting on Thursday of two unarmed Palestinian terror suspects in the West Bank’s Jenin. We end the program learning about Maj. Gen. (ret.) Dan Tolkowsky, the fifth commander of the Israeli Air Force and later a key figure in the development of Israel’s high-tech and venture capital sectors. He died overnight Friday in his home in Tel Aviv at the age of 104. Check out The Times of Israel's ongoing liveblog for more updates. For further reading: IDF vows to hunt down dozens of Hamas fighters still holed up in Rafah Brothers, 8 and 11, killed in south Gaza strike; IDF: ‘Suspects’ crossed Yellow Line Six soldiers hurt in gun battle as IDF detains terror suspects in southern Syria Attacker killed, IDF says, 60 reportedly detained in northern West Bank operation Shin Bet says it foiled Hamas plot to smuggle arms into West Bank using Israelis Border cops who killed unarmed terror suspects after surrender say they feared harm Dan Tolkowsky, former air force commander and Israeli tech pioneer, dies at 104 Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts. This episode was produced by Podwaves. ILLUSTRATIVE IMAGE: This picture taken on June 8, 2025, shows a tunnel at the European Hospital during a controlled embed organized by the Israeli military, in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip. (AFP)See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Hosťom Štefana Chrappu bol publicista a gréckokatolícky kňaz Miroslav Hamarčák, ktorý pôsobí aj na sociálnych sieťach pod menom „East Priest“ – „východný kňaz“. V rozhovore sme sa rozprávali o období adventu, o čase očakávania a o tom, ako ho prežíva on sám. Dotkli sme sa aj jeho digitálnej misie, ktorá má medzi ľuďmi veľmi dobrú odozvu a spája v sebe humor, hĺbku aj duchovné povzbudenie. Silnou témou je aj svedectvo lásky, ktoré spolu so svojou manželkou vydáva v každodennom živote. Majú tri deti, pričom ich najstaršia dcérka má Downov syndróm – a práve cez jej krehkosť možno jasnejšie vidieť Božiu silu, ktorá sa prejavuje v službe človeka človeku. | Hosť: Miroslav Hamarčák (publicista a gréckokatolícky kňaz). | Moderuje: Štefan Chrappa. | Tolkšou Hosť sobotného Dobrého rána pripravuje Slovenský rozhlas, Rádio Slovensko, SRo1. Reláciu vysielame každú sobotu po 8. hodine.

Chcesz więcej odcinków? Słuchaj i obserwuj Krzyk Horror Podcast, zostaw ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ i wyślij link z tym odcinkiem do tych, którzy lubią takie historie.Mały chłopiec gonił szczury w brudnym zaułku Leningradu. Nikt wtedy nie przypuszczał, że ta brutalna lekcja uczyni go w przyszłości jednym z najpotężniejszych ludzi świata. Jednak dla Władimira Putina sama władza to za mało. Pragnie czegoś więcej. Mają mu w tym pomóc naukowcy.

Mají za sebou vydání nové desky Sršeň a čeká je křest v La Fabrice. Do studia Rádia Praha dorazili rovnou z Krkonoš, kde se věnovali dalšímu ze svých hudebních projektů. Jak jejich společné album vznikalo? Co pro fanoušky chystají? A kdy se poprvé potkali? Nejen na to odpovídali Barbora Poláková a Štěpán Urban.

Mají za sebou vydání nové desky Sršeň a čeká je křest v La Fabrice. Do studia Rádia Praha dorazili rovnou z Krkonoš, kde se věnovali dalšímu ze svých hudebních projektů. Jak jejich společné album vznikalo? Co pro fanoušky chystají? A kdy se poprvé potkali? Nejen na to odpovídali Barbora Poláková a Štěpán Urban.Všechny díly podcastu Host Lenky Vahalové můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Cztery hale do 230 m długości, zużycie prądu jak Bydgoszcz i wody jak Elbląg. Tak ma wyglądać data center w Regułach. Lokalna społeczność mówi „stop”.Na przedmieściach Warszawy, w Regułach, prywatny inwestor planuje ogromne centrum danych na ponad 20-hektarowej łące pomiędzy osiedlami domów jednorodzinnych. Mają tam stanąć cztery budynki długości od 100 do 230 metrów. Protest podpisało już około 1200 mieszkańców.Prąd jak dla Bydgoszczy, woda jak dla Elbląga– Z dokumentacji inwestora wynika, że obiekt będzie zużywał rocznie tyle prądu, co miasto Bydgoszcz – mówi Marta Tymoszuk ze Stowarzyszenia Aktywnych Sąsiadów w Regułach.Jeszcze większe emocje budzi kwestia wody. – W upalne dni centrum ma zużywać tyle wody, co miasto wielkości Elbląga. Ta woda ma pochodzić z warszawskich wodociągów, które czerpią z Wisły. Jeśli wody zabraknie, kto dostanie ją pierwszy – mieszkańcy czy serwery? – pyta Tymoszuk.„Problem nie jest tylko lokalny”Według społeczników planowany obiekt to część większego „zagłębia” centrów danych na zachód od Warszawy. W samej gminie Michałowice planowane są już kolejne ośrodki, każdy z ogromnym zapotrzebowaniem na moc.– To nie jest tylko nasz lokalny spór. To kwestia energii, wody i środowiska całej aglomeracji – podkreśla przedstawicielka stowarzyszenia.Luka w prawie i walka o skalęW Polsce brak specjalnych przepisów regulujących lokalizację takich inwestycji. Jedynym realnym narzędziem gminy pozostaje miejscowy plan zagospodarowania.– Nie jesteśmy przeciwni centrum danych jako takiemu. Sprzeciwiamy się skali. Między domami jednorodzinnymi nie powinny wyrastać budynki długie na 230 metrów – podsumowuje Tymoszuk.

Dora a Dominik spolu pracují vůbec poprvé. A hned je čeká obří zkouška. Mají před sebou velký případ. Restorativní justice se nově rozjíždí i pro těžké trestné činy a do jejich kanceláře vstupuje zlomený otec, který přišel o dceru.

Last time we spoke about the Changkufeng Incident. In a frost-bitten dawn along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, a border notched with memory becomes the stage for a quiet duel of will. On one side, Japanese officers led by Inada Masazum study maps, mud, and the hill known as Changkufeng, weighing ground it offers and the risk of war. They glimpse a prize, high ground that could shield lines to Korea—yet they sense peril in every ridge, every scent of winter wind. Across the line, Soviet forces tighten their grip on the crest, their eyes fixed on the same hill, their tents and vehicles creeping closer to the border. The air hums with cautious diplomacy: Moscow's orders pulse through Seoul and Harbin, urging restraint, probing, deterring, but never inviting full-scale conflict. Yet every patrol, every reconnaissance, seems to tilt the balance toward escalation.   #177 The point of no return for the USSR and Japan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Days passed and the local emissaries had not been released by the Russians. Domei reported from Seoul that the authorities were growing worried; the "brazen" actions of Soviet front-line forces infuriated the Manchurians and Japanese. From Seoul, too, came ominous news that villagers were preparing to evacuate because they feared fighting would soon begin in the Changkufeng area. While diplomatic activity continued in Moscow without effect, the Tokyo press continued to report intense military activity throughout the Soviet Far East—the greatest massing of troops in months, with planes, armored cars, and motorized equipment choking the Trans-Siberian railway. The press was dominated by commentary about the danger of war. One enterprising Tokyo publisher ran advertisements under the heading: "The Manchukuo-Soviet Border Situation Is Urgent—Ours Is the Only Detailed Map of the Soviet Far East: Newspaper-size, in seven clear colors, offset printed, only 50 sen." Although the Manchukuoan foreign office issued a statement on 20 July about the dire consequences the Soviets were inviting, it is probable that the next Russian actions, of a conciliatory nature, were reached independently. Either Moscow had taken almost a week to make the decision, or the diplomatic conversations there had had an effect. Local Japanese authorities reported inactivity on the Changkufeng front from the morning of 23 July. On the next day, word was received that the USSR proposed to return the two emissaries as "trespassers." At midday on 26 July, the Russians released the blindfolded agents at a border site along the Novokievsk road. After completing the formalities, the Japanese asked the Russians for a reply concerning local settlement of the incident. According to Japanese sources, the "flustered" Colonel Grebennik answered: "My assignment today was merely to turn over the envoys. As for any request about the Changkufeng Incident, our guard commander must have asked for instructions from the central government. I think this is the type of matter which must be answered by the authorities at Moscow through diplomatic channels." Grebennik's postwar recollection does not differ appreciably from the Japanese version. Soviet sources mention a second effort by the Japanese military to deliver a message under more forceful circumstances. On 23 July a Soviet border unit drove off a four-man party. Russian cavalry, sent to investigate, discovered that the Japanese had pulled down a telegraph pole, severed lines 100–150 meters inside Soviet territory, absconded with wire, and left behind a white flag and a letter. Undated, unsigned, and written in Korean, the message struck Grebennik as being substantively the same as the communication delivered formally by the emissaries on 18 July. Japanese materials make no reference to a second, informal effort by local forces, but there is little reason to doubt that such an attempt, perhaps unauthorized, was made. Although Japanese efforts at low-level negotiations came to naught, two observations emerged from the local authorities and the press. First, on-the-spot negotiations had broken down; it had been difficult even to reclaim the emissaries, and the Russians in the Posyet region were using various pretexts to refer matters to diplomatic echelons. Second, the Russians had released the men. Some interpreted this as the first evidence of Soviet sincerity; possibly, the USSR would even return Matsushima's body as a step toward settlement. Other Japanese observers on the scene warned the public that it was imperative to stay on guard: "All depends on how diplomacy proceeds and how the front-line troops behave." Yet the excitement in the Japanese press began to abate. It is difficult to ascertain the nature of the decision-making process on the Russian side after the Japanese attempted local negotiations. The Soviets contend that nothing special had been undertaken before the Japanese provoked matters at the end of July. Grebennik, however, admits that after receiving the two Japanese communications, "we started to prepare against an attack on us in the Lake Khasan area." He and a group of officers went to Changkufeng Hill and sent as many border guards there as possible. Although he personally observed Japanese troops and instructed his officers to do the same, he denied categorically that the Russians constructed trenches and fortifications. Only the observation of Manchurian territory was intensified while instructions were awaited from higher headquarters. For its part, the Korea Army was carrying out Imperial general headquarters first instructions while pursuing a wait-and-see policy. On 16 July, Korea Army Headquarters wired an important operations order to Suetaka. With a view toward a possible attack against intruders in the Khasan area, the army planned to make preparations. The division commander was to alert stipulated units for emergency dispatch and send key personnel to the Kyonghun sector to undertake preparations for an attack. Lt. Col. Senda Sadasue, BGU commander of the 76th Infantry Regiment, was to reconnoiter, reinforce nearby districts, and be ready for emergencies. Particular care was enjoined not to irritate the Soviet side. Maj. Gen. Yokoyama Shinpei, the Hunchun garrison commander, was to maintain close contact with the BGU and take every precaution in guarding the frontiers. Like Senda, Yokoyama was warned against irritating the Russians. Korea Army Headquarters also dispatched staff to the front and had them begin preparations, envisaging an offensive. Upon receipt of the army order, Suetaka issued implementing instructions from his Nanam headquarters at 4:30 A.M. on the 17th. The following units were to prepare for immediate alert: the 38th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 75th Infantry Regiment, 27th Cavalry Regiment, 5th Antiaircraft Regiment, and 19th Engineer Regiment. The same instructions applied to the next units, except that elements organic to the division were designated: the 76th Infantry Regiment, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, and 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment. Another order enjoined utmost care not to irritate the Russians; Japanese actions were to be masked. Next came a directive to the forces of Senda and K. Sato. The former comprised mainly the 76th Infantry BGU and a cavalry platoon. The latter was built around the 75th Infantry Regiment, the Kucheng garrison unit, another cavalry platoon, two mountain artillery and one heavy field artillery battalion, and the 19th Engineers. Suetaka's idea about a solution to the border troubles had become concrete and aggressive. From the night of July 17, concentration would be accomplished gradually. The exact timing of the attack would be determined by subsequent orders; in Senda's area, there was no such restriction regarding "counteraction brought on by enemy attack." Division signal and intendant officers would conduct reconnaissance related to communications, billeting, food, and supplies. Sato and his subordinates were to reconnoiter personally. Having ordered the division to begin concentration and to stand by, Korea Army Headquarters was prepared the next morning, July 17, to direct the movement. Nevertheless, there was concern in Seoul that Suetaka's advance elements might cross the Tumen River into Manchurian territory, which could result in a clash with Soviet troops. Such an outcome might run counter to the principle established by Imperial general headquarters. Consequently, it was decided that "movement east of the river would therefore have to be forbidden in the Korea Army's implementing order." Nakamura transmitted his operational instructions to Suetaka at 6:00 on July 17: "No great change in latest situation around Lake Khasan. Soviet forces are still occupying Changkufeng area. Diplomaticlevel negotiations on part of central authorities and Manchukuoan government do not appear to have progressed. Considering various circumstances and with view to preparations, this army will concentrate elements of 19th Division between Shikai, Kyonghun, Agochi." Restrictions stipulated that the division commander would transport the units by rail and motor vehicle and concentrate them in the waiting zone in secret. Movement was to begin on the night of July 17 and to be completed the next day. Further orders, however, must govern unit advance east of the Tumen as well as use of force. The remainder of the division was to stay ready to move out. Troops were to carry rations for about two weeks.   Late that day, Suetaka received an order by phone for his subordinates in line with Seoul's instructions. Senda would handle the concentration of elements assembling at Kyonghun, and Sato would do the same for the main units arriving at Agochi. A communications net was to be set up quickly. Caution was to be exercised not to undertake provocative actions against the opposite bank of the Tumen, even for reconnaissance. The division would dispatch two trains from Hoeryong and four from Nanam. At 11:58 pm on 18 July, the first train left Hoeryong for Agochi. Concentration of units was completed by dawn. By that time, the Japanese had dispatched to the border 3,236 men and 743 horses. Past midnight on 20 July, Division Chief of Staff Nakamura wired headquarters that the division was ready to take any action required, having completed the alert process by 11 pm. Japanese scouting of the Changkufeng sector began in earnest after mid-July. Although the affair had seemed amenable to settlement, Sato took steps for an emergency from around the 14th. His thoughts centered on readiness for an attack against Changkufeng, which simultaneously required reconnaissance for the assault and preparation to pull the regiment back quickly to Hoeryong if a withdrawal was ordered. After arriving at Haigan on 18 July, Sato set out with several engineers. At Kucheng, the officers donned white Korean clothing, presumably the disguise directed by the division—and boarded native oxcarts for a leisurely journey southward along the Korean bank of the Tumen across from Changkufeng. The seemingly innocent "farmers" studied the river for crossing sites and Changkufeng Hill for the extent of enemy activity. On the hill's western slope, in Manchurian territory, three rows of Russian entanglements could be observed 300 feet below the crest. Only a handful of soldiers were visible, probably a platoon, certainly not more than a company. Infantry Captain Yamada Teizo conducted secret reconnaissance of the entire Changkufeng-Hill 52 sector for 314 hours in the afternoon of 18 July. Even after intense scanning through powerful binoculars, he could detect no more than 19 lookouts and six horsemen; camouflage work had been completed that day, and there were ten separate covered trench or base points. Barbed wire, under camouflage, extended about four meters in depth, yet even Yamada's trained eye could not determine whether there was one line of stakes or two. He jotted down what he could see and compared his information with that learned from local police. Artillery Colonel R. Tanaka shared the view that the Soviets had intruded. When he went reconnoitering along the Korean bank, he observed Russian soldiers entrenched around the hilltop, easily visible through binoculars at a range of two kilometers. Trenches had been dug 20 to 30 meters below the crest on the western slope. Eventually, there were three rows of barbed wire, the first just below the trenches and the lowest 100 meters under the summit. Tanaka estimated Soviet strength at two companies (about 200 men). Suetaka's intelligence officer, Sasai, recalls seeing barbed wire after Japanese units deployed to the front on 18–19 July; he had surmised then that the entanglements were being prepared out of fear of a Japanese assault.   To obtain first-hand information, the Gaimusho ordered a section chief, Miura Kazu'ichi, to the spot. Between 23 July and the cease-fire in August, Miura collected data at Kyonghun and transmitted reports from the consulate at Hunchun. On 28 July he visited Sozan on the Korean bank. He observed Soviet soldiers on the western slopes of Changkufeng, digging trenches and driving stakes. These actions were clearly on Manchukuoan territory even according to Soviet maps. Miura insisted that he saw no friendly troops on territory claimed by the Russians and observed no provocative actions by the Japanese. These statements are supported by a map drawn for him in early August by Division Staff Officer Saito Toshio, a sketch Miura retained as late as 1947. Miura's testimony is tempered by his assertion that he saw a red flag flying near the top of Changkufeng Hill. This contention conflicts with all evidence, as Russian lawyers at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East argued, it is improbable that a Soviet frontier post, highly interested in camouflage, would have hoisted a pennon so large that it could be seen from Sozan. Russian sources are unanimous in stating that no flag was put up until 6 August and that no trenches or entanglements were established by Soviet border guards in July, at least prior to the 29th. The two Army General staff consultants, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Seoul on 16 July, the day Korea Army Headquarters was ordering an alert for the 19th Division "with a view toward a possible attack against enemy intruders." Inada dispatched them mainly to inspect the frontline situation; but he had not fully decided on reconnaissance in force. At Shikai, Arisue and Kotani donned Korean garb and traveled by oxcart on the Korean side of the Tumen, reconnoitering opposite the Shachaofeng sector. Kotani was convinced that hostile possession of Changkufeng posed a serious threat to the Korean railway. He agreed with the division's estimate that, if the Japanese did decide to seize Changkufeng, it ought not to be too difficult. Arisue, as senior observer, dispatched messages from Kyonghun to Tokyo detailing their analysis and recommendations. Meanwhile, in Tokyo, on 17 July the central military authorities received a cable from the Japanese envoy in Moscow, Colonel Doi Akio, reporting that prospects for a diplomatic settlement were nil. The USSR was taking a hard line because Japan was deeply involved in China, though there were domestic considerations as well. The Russians, however, showed no intention of using the border incident to provoke war. It would be best for Japan to seize Changkufeng quickly and then press forward with parleys. Meanwhile, Japan should conduct an intensive domestic and external propaganda campaign. There was mounting pressure in the high command that negotiations, conducted "unaided," would miss an opportunity. Based on reports from Arisue and Kotani, that army seemed to be contemplating an unimaginative, ponderous plan: an infantry battalion would cross the Tumen west of Changkufeng and attack frontally, while two more battalions would cross south of Kyonghun to drive along the river and assault Changkufeng from the north. Inada sent a telegram on 17 July to Arisue for "reference." Prospects had diminished that Soviet troops would withdraw as a result of negotiation. As for the attack ideas Arisue mentioned, Inada believed it necessary to prepare to retake Changkufeng with a night attack using small forces. To avoid widening the crisis, the best plan was a limited, surprise attack using ground units. The notion of a surprise attack drew on the Kwantung Army's extensive combat experience in Manchuria since 1931.  The next morning, after the forward concentration of troops was completed, Suetaka went to the front. From Kucheng, he observed the Changkufeng district and decided on concrete plans for use of force. Meanwhile, Nakamura was curbing any hawkish courses at the front. As high-command sources privately conceded later, the younger officers in Tokyo sometimes seemed to think the commander was doing too good a job; there was covert sentiment that it might be preferable if someone in the chain of command acted independently before the opportunity slipped away. This is significant in light of the usual complaints by responsible central authorities about gekokujo—insubordination—by local commands. An important report influencing the high command's view arrived from Kwantung Army Intelligence on 19 July: according to agents in Khabarovsk, the USSR would not let the Changkufeng incident develop into war; Russians also believed there would be no large-scale Soviet intrusion into their territory. By 19 July, the Tokyo operations staff was considering the best method to restore control of the lost hill by force, since Seoul appeared to maintain its laissez-faire stance. On 18 July, Arisue and Kotani were instructed by Imperial General headquarters to assist the Korea Army and the 19th Division regarding the Changkufeng Incident. What the Army general staff operations officers sought was an Imperial General headquarters order, requiring Imperial sanction, that would instruct the Korea Army to evict the Russian troops from Changkufeng the way the Kwantung Army would, using units already under Nakamura's command. The sense was that the affair could be handled locally, but if the USSR sought to escalate the incident, it might be prudent for that to occur before the Hankow operation began. The IGHQ and War Ministry coordinated the drafting of an IGHQ order on 19–20 July: "We deem it advisable to eradicate Soviet challenges . . . by promptly delivering blow on this occasion against unit which crossed border at Changkufeng. That unit is in disadvantageous spot strategically and tactically; thus, probability is scant that dispute would enlarge, and we are investigating countermeasures in any case. Careless expansion of situation is definitely not desired. We would like you people also to conduct studies concerning mode of assault employing smallest strength possible for surprise attack against limited objective. Kindly learn general atmosphere here [Tokyo] from [Operations] Major Arao Okikatsu." The 20th of July proved to be a hectic day in Korea, and even more so in Tokyo. The division had informed the Korea Army that it was finally "ready to go," a message received in Seoul in the early hours. Then Arisue received a wire from Inada presenting limited-attack plans and noting that Arao was on the way. By that day, Japanese intelligence judged there were 400 Soviet troops and two or three mountain guns south of Paksikori. Russian positions at Changkufeng had been reinforced, but no aggressive intentions could be detected. Soviet ground elements, as well as materiel, appeared to be moving from Vladivostok and Slavyanka toward Posyet. Suetaka headed back to the front. Sato told him that it was absolutely necessary to occupy Chiangchunfeng Hill across the Tumen in Manchurian territory. Upon reaching the Wuchiatzu sector and inspecting the situation, Suetaka agreed to send a small unit to Chiangchunfeng on his own authority.  Colonel Sato Kotoku had ordered one company to move across the Tumen toward Chiangchunfeng on 21 July, a maneuver that did not escape the Russians' notice. On 24 July, the same day another Japanese unit occupied Shangchiaoshan Hill, Marshal Blyukher ordered the 40th Rifle Division, stationed in the Posyet area to be placed on combat readiness, with a force of regulars assigned to back the Soviet border guards; two reinforced rifle battalions were detached as a reserve. According to Japanese records, Russian border patrols began appearing around Huichungyuan, Yangkuanping, and Shachaofeng from 26 July, but no serious incidents were reported at that stage. At about 9:30 am on 29 July, Captain Kanda, the 2nd Company commander of Lieutenant Colonel Senda's 76th Border Garrison Unit, was observing the Shachaofeng area from his Kucheng cantonments. Through his glasses, Kanda observed four or five Soviet soldiers engaged in construction on high ground on the west side of Shachaofeng. Kanda notified Senda, who was at BGU Headquarters inspecting the forward areas. Senda transmitted the information to Suetaka. Deciding to cross the Tumen for a closer look, Senda set off with Kanda. A little after 11 am, they reached Chiangchunfeng Hill, where the men from Captain Noguchi's company were already located. Senda verified, to his own satisfaction, that as many as 10 enemy infantrymen had "violated the border" to a depth of 350 meters, "even by the Soviets' contention", and were starting construction 1,000 meters south of Shachaofeng. Senda decided to oust the Russian force "promptly and resolutely," in light of the basic mission assigned his unit. He telephoned Suetaka, who was in Kyonghun, and supplied the intelligence and the recommendation. Subordinates recalled Suetaka's initial reaction when the BGU reported a Soviet intrusion about a mile and a half north of Changkufeng. "The arrogant Russians were making fools of the Japanese, or were trying to. At stake was not a trifling hill and a few invaders, but the honor of the Imperial Army. In the face of this insult, the general became furious. He insisted upon smashing the enemy right away."  Kanda phoned 2nd Lieutenant Sakuma, who was still at Kucheng, and told him to bring his 25-man platoon across the river by 2 pm Sakuma crossed by boat and arrived at 1:30. Kanda set out from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20, took over Sakuma's unit, bore east, and approached within 700 meters of the enemy. He ordered the men not to fire unless fired upon, and to withdraw quickly after routing the Russians. It is said that the Japanese troops were fired upon as they advanced in deployed formation but did not respond at first. In a valley, casualties were incurred and the Japanese finally returned fire. Sakuma's 1st Squad leader took a light machine gun and pinned down the Russians facing him. Sakuma himself pressed forward with his other two squads, taking advantage of the slope to envelop the enemy from the right. At the same time, he sent a patrol to the high ground on the left to cover the platoon's flank. Thanks to the 1st Squad's frontal assault, the Russians had no chance to worry about their wings, and Sakuma moved forward to a point only 30 meters from the foe's rear. Kanda was now 50 meters from the Russians. When the enemy light machine gun let up, he ordered a charge and, in the lead, personally cut down one of the foe. Sakuma also rushed the Soviets, but when about to bring down his saber he was stabbed in the face while another Russian struck him in the shoulder. Grappling with this assailant, Sakuma felled him. Other Japanese attackers sabered two more Russians and shot the rest. By 3:10 pm the eight enemy "trespassers" had been annihilated. The covering patrol reported that five Soviet horsemen, with a light machine gun, were galloping up from Khasan. Sakuma had his platoon fire grenade dischargers, which smashed the enemy. Seventy more Russian soldiers now came, attacking from northwest of the lake and supported by fire from the east side. Using light machine guns and grenade dischargers, Sakuma checked them. Meanwhile, Miyashita's platoon, part of Noguchi's company, had departed from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20 pm and swung right until it reached the crestline between Changkufeng and Kanda's company. One squad faced 200 Russians on Changkufeng; the other faced the enemy south of Shachaofeng. Soviet forces opened intense machine-gun fire from Changkufeng and from the high ground east of the lake. After 20 minutes, Kanda's unit charged, two or three Russians fled, and Miyashita's platoon shot one down. Senda, who had gone with Miyashita, directed the platoon's movements and proceeded north, under fire, to Kanda's unit. Once the Russians had been cleared out, Senda forbade pursuit across the boundary and gradually withdrew his forces to the heights line 800 meters southwest. It was 4:30 then. By 5 pm Soviet reinforcements, apparently brought up from the Changkufeng and Paksikori sectors, advanced anew. With 80 men in the front lines, the enemy pushed across the border to a depth of at least 500 meters, according to the Japanese, and began to establish positions. Several tanks and many troops could be observed in the rear. Senda had Noguchi's company hold Chiangchunfeng. Kanda's unit, reinforced by 33 men from Kucheng, was to occupy the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, while Imagawa's company of the 76th Regiment was to occupy other high ground to the west. Senda then reported the situation to Suetaka in Kyonghun and asked for reinforcements. In Seoul, Army headquarters understood the developments reported by Suetaka as a response to the hostile border violation, and about 20 men of the Kucheng BGU under Lt. Sakuma drove the enemy out between 2:30 and 3 pm. Afterward, Sakuma pulled back to high ground two kilometers south of Yangkuanping to avoid trouble and was now observing the foe. Although Seoul had heard nothing about Japanese losses, Corp. Akaishizawa Kunihiko personally observed that Kanda had been wounded in the face by a grenade and bandaged, that Sakuma had been bayoneted twice and also bandaged, and that the dead lay on the grass, covered with raincoats. According to Suetaka "the enemy who had crossed the border south of Shachaofeng suffered losses and pulled back once as a result of our attack at about 2:30 pm". By about 4:30, Suetaka continued, the Russians had built up their strength and attacked the platoon on the heights southwest of Shachaofeng. Behind the Russian counterattack, there were now several tanks. Earlier, Suetaka noted ominously that several rounds of artillery had been fired from the Changkufeng area; "therefore, we reinforced our units too, between 5 and 6 pm., and both sides are confronting each other." Details as to the fate of Sakuma's platoon are not given, but it is now admitted that casualties were incurred on both sides. The Korea Army Headquarters consequently reported to Tokyo in the evening that, according to information from the division, 20 Japanese had driven out the Russians near Shachaofeng; 25 men from Senda's unit were occupying the heights 600 meters west of Changkufeng; and another 16 men were deployed in ambush at Yangkuanping. Such an enumeration would have tended to suggest that only a few dozen Japanese were across the Tumen on the 29th. But a review of the numbers of combat troops committed and the reinforcements sent by Senda reveals that Japanese strength across the river was in the hundreds by nightfall. In Moscow, Tass reported that on 29 July detachments of Japanese-Manchukuoan intruders had attempted to seize high ground apparently located 0.5 miles north of a Russian position. The assailants had been "completely repelled from Soviet territory, as a result of measures taken by Russian frontier guards," and instructions had been sent to the embassy in Tokyo to protest strongly. Walter Duranty, the veteran American correspondent in Moscow, heard that the Japanese press had published reports, likely intended for internal consumption, that hours of furious fighting had occurred at the points in question. Since the dispatches were unsubstantiated and "failed to gain credence anywhere outside Japan," Duranty claimed this may have forced the Japanese to translate into action their boast of "applying force" unless their demands were satisfied. "Now, it appears, they have applied force, unsuccessfully." The Soviet communiqué on the Shachaofeng affair, despite its firm tone, appeared unostentatiously in the following day's Pravda and Izvestiya under the headline, "Japanese Militarists Continue Their Provocation." The Japanese Embassy in Moscow heard nothing about the Shachaofeng affray until the morning of the 30th, when a wire was received from the Gaimusho that ten Russian soldiers had occupied a position northwest of Changkufeng and had begun trench work until ejected by frontier guards. Since the Russian communiqué spoke of afternoon fighting, American correspondents concluded that Soviet troops must have counterattacked and driven off the Japanese. No additional information was available to the public in Moscow on the 30th, perhaps because it was a holiday. Nevertheless, in the afternoon, Stalin's colleague Kaganovich addressed an immense crowd in Moscow on "Railroad Day" and at the conclusion of a long, vigorous speech said:  "The Soviet Union is prepared to meet all enemies, east or west." It certainly was not a fighting speech and there is no reason to suppose the Soviet will abandon its firm peace policy unless Japan deliberately forced the issue. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Diplomacy flickered as Moscow pressed restraint and Tokyo whispered calculated bravado. As July wore on, both sides massed troops, built trenches, and sent scouts across the river. A tense, hidden war unfolded, skirmishes, patrols, and small advances, until a fleeting moment when force collided with restraint, and the hill's future hung in the frost.

MAJ économique à Québec. Laïcité: le ministre Roberge annoncera sa vision jeudi. La rencontre Tougas-Dutrizac avec Stéfanie Tougas. Regardez aussi cette discussion en vidéo via https://www.qub.ca/videos ou en vous abonnant à QUB télé : https://www.tvaplus.ca/qub ou sur la chaîne YouTube QUB https://www.youtube.com/@qub_radioPour de l'information concernant l'utilisation de vos données personnelles - https://omnystudio.com/policies/listener/fr

Hostia: Tomáš Strémy (trestný právnik z Univerzity Komenského v Bratislave) a Martin Krajčovič (predseda Slovenskej aliancie moderného obchodu). | Nahrávka: Daniel Petričko (generálny riaditeľ Sekcie restoratívnej justície na Ministerstve spravodlivosti SR). | Ako sa situácia s krádežami v obchodoch vyvinula – graduje odvaha resp. drzosť páchateľov? Ako možno páchateľov charakterizovať a aké sú ich najčastejšie motivácie? Líši sa výskyt priestupkov v rámci regiónov? Vláda pristúpila k riešeniu formou novelizácie Trestného zákona – vrátiť by sa mal tzv. „horalkový“ paragraf, náhrada škody sa sprísňuje, hroziť bude až exekúcia. Čo všetko novela obsahuje v porovnaní s obdobím pred uvoľnenom sadzieb? Navrhuje v adekvátnej miere využívať alternatívne tresty? Má potenciál znížiť výskyt krádeží? Sú navrhované opatrenia efektívne aj voči nemajetným páchateľom? Nakoľko efektívne by boli napríklad drobné obecné práce, siahanie na sociálne dávky a pod.? Vláda pred prijatím zmien napr. radila obchodníkom mať viac zamestnancov SBS, kamerové systémy... Do akej miery to pomáha? Majú obchodníci dostatočné opatrenia, aby predchádzali krádežiam? | Krádeže menia Trestný zákon. | Moderuje: Soňa Mačor Otajovičová; | Diskusiu Z prvej ruky pripravuje Slovenský rozhlas, Rádio Slovensko, SRo1. Vysielame každý pracovný deň o 12:30 v Rádiu Slovensko.

Wielu przedsiębiorców buduje firmy z pasji, nie planuje sprzedaży. Pytanie: czy to dobrze? Gościem Jarosława Kuźniara w tym odcinku podcastu Technologicznie jest Maciej Traczyk – ekspert, który pomaga właścicielom firm przygotować swoje biznesy do sprzedaży.Najzdrowsze firmy to te, które są niezależne od swojego założyciela. Mają silne zespoły i potrafią rosnąć bez ciągłego gaszenia pożarów. Budowanie firmy z perspektywą exitu to nie zdrada swojej misji, ale odpowiedzialność. Bo w sprzedawalnej firmie możesz być inwestorem i trenerem, ale niekoniecznie zawsze zawodnikiem na boisku.Z tego odcinka podcastu Technologicznie dowiesz się:- Czym różni się firma „sprzedawalna” od tej „na sprzedaż”- Dlaczego przedsiębiorca powinien myśleć jak inwestor, nawet jeśli nie planuje exitu- Jakie elementy wpływają na wycenę firmy i co może ją obniżyć- Jakie błędy najczęściej popełniają właściciele przy budowaniu firmy- Dlaczego świadomość i przygotowanie na sprzedaż powinny zacząć się lata wcześniejMasz pytanie do ekspertów? Możesz je zadać tutaj: ⁠⁠https://tally.so/r/npJBAV ⁠⁠W aplikacji Voice House Club m.in.:✔️ Wszystkie formaty w jednym miejscu.✔️ Możesz przeczytać lub posłuchać.✔️ Transkrypcje odcinków Serii in Brief z dodatkowymi materiałami wideo.Dołącz: ​​⁠⁠https://bit.ly/VoiceHouseClub ⁠⁠Znajdziesz nas też:

Rosenberg, Dip and SGG break down John Cena's final MSG appearance and whether he should've led an all-time babyface Survivor Series team. They also discuss how booing Dominik Mysterio has become a nod of respect from the crowd to Dirty Dom.Then The MAJesty debates wrestling GOATs, Nikki Bella's potential value as a heel, and what movers should or shouldn't pack when Rosenberg moves (while Dip refuses to let anyone touch his underwear).Also, WWE Evolve Champion Jackson Drake joins the show to preview his title defense against Sean Legacy this coming week on NXT Gold Rush and his desire for a feud with Je'Von Evans.Listen to Cheap Heat Live Fridays 12pm- 2pm EST on Pro Wrestling Nation 24/7 on Channel 156.Call in at 844-344-4893Wanna stay MAJ?Join our PateronFollow @cheapheatpod on Instagram and TikTok @cheapheatpodsubscribe to Rosenberg's Youtube Channel.Email the show Rosenbergwrestling@gmail.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This week Eye on Veterans and Connecting Vets, Reporter Julia LeDoux had an informative conversation with VA Secretary Doug Collins. We asked many of the questions veterans have today. Collins shared his goals of lowering benefit claims processing times, simplifying the system and a revealed plans to overhaul the application. We also got a rare look at his military background as an Air Force Reserve Colonel, Chaplain and deployment to Iraq. He shared memories of a Thanksgiving, while stationed at Balad Air Base, and how his experience and faith guide his work today. We dove into topics like; veteran mental health, what's being done to lower veteran suicides and the connection between mental health and the medications so many veterans are prescribed. We asked his position on alternative treatments like psychedelics and cannabis. We also sought an explanation for why Congress recently blocked passage of The Maj. Richard Star Act. which defends veterans ability to receive both retirement and disability benefits. And we learned who he's (always) rooting for in college football! Find your VA benefits, and resources for all veterans here: https://www.va.gov/ Connect: CBS Eye on Veterans, Host, Phil Briggs phil@connectingvets.com Connecting Vets.com, Senior Veteran Affairs Reporter, Julia LeDoux julia.ledoux@audacy.com To learn more about listener data and our privacy practices visit: https://www.audacyinc.com/privacy-policy Learn more about your ad choices. Visit https://podcastchoices.com/adchoices

IN THIS SPECIAL edition of Anti-Social, live from the Give Miami Day Mission Control center, we interview two nonprofits that are using donor dollars for good. Maj. Gene Hogg of the Salvation Army talks about how his organization handles disasters -- both natural and large, and personal and tragic. Debra Albo-Steiger of the Children's Bereavement Center talks about how her group helps families deal with grief -- an often overlooked need that is so important when families deal with loss. These are just two organizations of about 1,400 that will benefit from Miami's single biggest day of community generosity. Listen, give, and know how much your gift helps others! Send us a textSupport the showSubscribe to the Key Biscayne Independent today

Už víc než rok protestují studenti v Srbsku proti režimu prezidenta Aleksandara Vučiće. Poslední velká demonstrace se odehrála na výročí tragédie, ke které došlo loni na začátku listopadu ve městě Novi Sad. Zemřelo při ní 16 lidí čekajících na vlakovém nádraží. Demonstranti z neštěstí viní zkorumpovaný a klientelistický režim, desetitisíce jich požadují předčasné volby. Mají ještě dnes studenti moc pohnout děním v zemi?Hostka: Magdaléna Fajtová - reportérka týdeníku Respekt, znalkyně balkánského prostoruČlánek a další informace najdete na webu Seznam Zprávy.Debatu jsme natáčeli před publikem v Divadle X10 v rámci oslav 17. listopadu Korzo Národní, které pořádá spolek Díky, že můžem.Sledujte nás na sociálních sítích X (Twitter), Instagram nebo Threads. Náměty a připomínky nám můžete psát na e-mail zaminutusest@sz.cz

Last time we spoke about the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict. The border between Soviet Manchuria and Japanese-occupied territories emerges not as a single line but as a mosaic of contested spaces, marks, and memories. A sequence of incidents, skirmishes along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, reconnaissance sorties, and the complex diplomacy of Moscow, Tokyo, and peripheral actors to trace how risk escalated from routine patrols to calibrated leverage. On the ground, terrain functioned as both obstacle and argument: ridges like Changkufeng Hill shaping sightlines, river valleys shaping decisions, and markers weathered by snow, wind, and drift. In command tents, officers translated terrain into doctrine: contingency plans, supply routes, and the precarious calculus of restraint versus escalation. Both nations sought to establish firmer defensive barriers against the other. Inevitably they were destined to clash, but how large that clash would become, nobody knew.   #176 The Changkufeng Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we broke down a general history of the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict and how it escalated significantly by 1938. Colonel Inada Masazum serving as chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March of 1938 would play a significant role in this story. When the Japanese command's attention was drawn to the area of Changkufeng, consideration was given to the ownership and importance of the disputed high ground. Inada and his operations section turned to an appraisal of the geography. The officers had been impressed by the strategic importance of the Tumen, which served to cut off the hill country from North Korea. In the Changkufeng area, the river was a muddy 600 to 800 meters wide and three to five meters deep. Japanese engineers had described rowing across the stream as "rather difficult."  Russian roads on the left bank were very good, according to Japanese intelligence. Heavy vehicles moved easily; the Maanshan section comprised the Russians' main line of communications in the rear. To haul up troops and materiel, the Russians were obliged to use trucks and ships, for there were no railways apart from a four-kilometer line between the harbor and town of Novokievsk. Near Changkufeng, hardly any roadways were suitable for vehicular traffic. On the right, or Korean, bank of the Tumen, there were only three roads suitable for vehicular traffic, but even these routes became impassable after a day or two of rain. In the sector between Hill 52 to the south and Shachaofeng to the north, the most pronounced eminences were Chiangchunfeng and the humps of Changkufeng. Rocky peaks were characteristically shaped like inverted T's, which meant many dead angles against the crests. The gentle slopes would allow tanks to move but would restrict their speed, as would the ponds and marshes. In general, the terrain was treeless and afforded little cover against aircraft. Against ground observation or fire, corn fields and tall miscanthus grass could provide some shielding. Between Chiangchunfeng and the Tumen, which would have to serve as the main route of Japanese supply, the terrain was particularly sandy and hilly. This rendered foot movement difficult but would reduce the effectiveness of enemy bombs and shells. The high ground east of Khasan afforded bases for fire support directed against the Changkufeng region. Plains characterized the rest of the area on the Soviet side, but occasional streams and swamps could interfere with movement of tanks and trucks. The only towns or villages were Novokievsk, Posyet, Yangomudy, and Khansi. At Kozando there were a dozen houses; at Paksikori, a few. The right bank was farmed mainly by Koreans, whose scattered cottages might have some value for billeting but offered none for cover. On the left bank, the largest hamlets were Fangchuanting, with a population of 480 dwelling in 73 huts, and Yangkuanping, where there were 39 cottages. Shachaofeng was uninhabited. Japanese occupation of Changkufeng would enable observation of the plain stretching east from Posyet Bay, although intelligence made no mention of Soviet naval bases, submarine pens, or airstrips in the immediate area of Posyet, either in existence or being built in 1938. As Inada knew, the Japanese Navy judged that Posyet Bay might have another use, as a site for Japanese landing operations in the event of war. In Russian hands, the high ground would endanger the Korean railway. This line, which started from Najin in northeastern Korea, linked up with the vital system in Manchuria at the town of Tumen and provided a short cut, if not a lifeline, between Japan and the Kwantung Army and Manchuria from across the Sea of Japan. Even from relatively low Changkufeng, six or seven miles of track were exposed to Soviet observation between Hongui and Shikai stations. The port of Najin, with its fortress zone, lay 11 miles southwest; Unggi lay even nearer. It was not the danger of Japanese shelling of Vladivostok, at an incredible range of 80 miles that was at stake but the more realistic hypothesis of Russian shelling of the rail line, and Russian screening of the Soviet side of the border. Hills and questions were thought to have two sides. It was the consensus of Japanese that Changkufeng Hill's potential value to the Russians far outweighed its possible benefits to them, or at least that the Japanese had more to lose if the Russians took the high ground by the Tumen. Inada nurtured few illusions concerning the intrinsic value of the heights. Despite the fact that the high command always had good reasons for quiescence in the north, Inada believed that the latest border difficulty could not be overlooked. By mid-July 1938 Inada's thoughts crystallized. The Japanese would conduct a limited reconnaissance in force known as iryoku teisatsu in the strategic sense. Whereas, at the tactical schoolbook level, this might mean the dispatch of small forces into enemy territory to seek local combat intelligence, at the Imperial General Headquarters level the concept was far more sweeping. There would also be useful evidence of mobilization and other buildup procedures. The affair at Changkufeng was merely a welcome coincidence, something started by the Russians but liable to Japanese exploration. Inada had no intention of seizing territory, of becoming involved in a war of attrition at a remote and minor spot, or of provoking hostilities against the USSR. The Russians would comprehend the nature of the problem, too. If they were interested in interfering seriously with the Japanese, there were numberless better locations to cause trouble along the Manchurian front; those were the places to watch. The cramped Changkufeng sector, described as "narrow like a cat's brow," could too readily be pinched off from Hunchun to render it of strategic value to either side. The bog land to the north interfered with the use of armored forces, while artillery sited on the heights along the Tumen in Korea could as easily control the area as batteries emplaced east of the lake. It was Inada's professional opinion that the Russians could commit three or four infantry divisions there at most, with no mechanized corps—no heavy tanks, in particular. No decisive battle could be waged, although, once the Russians became involved, they might have to cling to the hill out of a sense of honor. The military action would be meaningless even if the Japanese let the Russians have the heights. For their part, the Japanese would ostensibly be fighting to secure the boundary and to hold Changkufeng peak, beyond which they would not move a step onto Soviet soil. There would be no pursuit operations. Troop commitment would be limited to about one division without tank support. Japanese Air Force intervention would be forbidden. Matters would be directed entirely by Imperial General Headquarters working through the Korea Army chain of command and carried out by the local forces. Calm, clear, and dispassionate overall estimates and instructions would be based on materials available only in Tokyo. The command would not allow the Kwantung Army to touch the affair. Inada foresaw that the Japanese government might also seek a settlement through diplomacy. Although border demarcation was desirable and should be sought, the command would not insist on it, nor would it demand permanent occupation of Changkufeng summit. As soon as reconnaissance objectives had been achieved, the local forces would be withdrawn. As Inada described it "In the process, we would have taught the Russians some respect and given them a lesson concerning their repeated, high-handed provocations and intrusions. If a show of force sufficed to facilitate the negotiations and cause the Russians to back down, so much the better; the affair would be over and my point proved." The instrument for carrying out Inada's strategic design appeared to be ideal, the 19th Division, strenuously trained and high-spirited. It could be expected to perform very well if unleashed within defined limits. Colonel Suetaka was just the commander to direct local operations. Since he had been pleading to fight in China, an operation at Changkufeng might prove to be an excellent "safety valve." His staff was full of experienced, fierce warriors eager for battle. Until recently, the Korea Army commanding general had wisely kept the aggressive division away from Changkufeng Hill, but now Imperial general headquarters had its own overriding ideas and needs. How could the Japanese ensure that any military action would remain limited if the Russians chose to respond with vigor? Naturally, one infantry division, without armor or air support, could not withstand all of the Soviet forces in the maritime province. Inada answered that the mission to be assigned the 19th Division was merely the recapture of Changkufeng crest. If the Japanese side had to break off the operation, evacuation would be effected voluntarily and resolutely on Imperial general headquarters responsibility, without considerations of "face." At worst, the Japanese might lose one division, but the affair would be terminated at the Tumen River without fail. "Even so, we ought to be able to prove our theory as well as demonstrate our true strength to the Russians." In case the Soviets opted for more than limited war, the Japanese were still not so overextended in China that they could not alter their strategic disposition of troops. Although the Kwantung Army's six divisions were outnumbered four to one and the Japanese were not desirous of a war at that moment, the first-class forces in Manchuria could make an excellent showing. In addition, the high command possessed armor, heavy artillery, fighters, and bombers, held in check in Manchuria and Korea, as well as reserves in the homeland. There was also the 104th Division, under tight Imperial general headquarters control, in strategic reserve in southern Manchuria. Inada recalled "How would the Russians react? That was the answer I sought. Victory in China depended on it." By mid-July, the high command, at Inada's urging, had worked out a plan titled, "Imperial General headqaurters Essentials for Dealing with the Changkufeng Incident." Tada's telegram of 14 July to Koiso described succinctly the just-decided policy: the central authorities concurred with the Korea Army's opinion regarding the Changkufeng affair, then in embryo. Considering that Changkufeng Hill posed a direct threat to the frontier of Korea, Imperial General headqaurters would immediately urge the foreign ministry to lodge a stern protest. Next day, Tojo sent a telegram stating the Japanese policy of employing diplomacy; whether the Russians should be evicted by force required cautious deliberation in case the USSR did not withdraw voluntarily. On the basis of the guidance received from Imperial General headqaurters, the Korea Army drew up its own plan, "Essentials for Local Direction of the Changkufeng Incident," on 15 July. Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Sakae was sent promptly to the front from Seoul. At the same time, military authorities allowed the press to release news that Soviet troops were constructing positions inside Manchurian territory in an "obvious provocation." The government of Manchukuo was demanding an immediate withdrawal. Even then, those Japanese most closely connected with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident were not in agreement that everybody at command level was as ardent a proponent of reconnaissance in force as Inada claimed to be. Some thought that most, if not all, of his subordinates, youthful and vigorous, were in favor of the notion; others denied the existence of such an idea. Inada remained clear-cut in his own assertions. Everything done by the local Soviet forces, he insisted, must have been effected with the permission of Moscow; it was customary for the USSR not to abandon what it had once started. The Japanese Army never really thought that the Soviet Union would withdraw just as the result of diplomatic approaches. Therefore, from the outset, preparations were made to deal the Russians one decisive blow. Inada had recommended his plan, with its clear restrictions, to his colleagues and superiors; the scheme, he says, was approved 14 July "all the way up the chain of command, through the Army general staff and the ministry of war, with unexpected ease." The only real opposition, Inada recalled, came from the navy, whose staff advised the army operations staff, in all sincerity, to give up the idea of strategic reconnaissance. Inada adhered to his opinion stubbornly. He never forgot the grave look on the face of Captain Kusaka, the UN operations section chief, as the latter gave in reluctantly. The navy view was that the Changkufeng affair typified the army's aggressive policies as opposed to relative passivity on the part of the navy. Like Kusaka, Japanese Navy interviewees shared the fear that Changkufeng might prove to be the most dangerous military confrontation ever to occur between the USSR and Japan. In view of navy objections, one wonders where Inada could have drawn support for his concept of reconnaissance in force. If one accepts the comments contained in a letter from a navy ministry captain, Takagi Sokichi, to Baron Harada Kumao at the beginning of August, in the army and in a portion of the navy there existed "shallow-minded fellows who are apt to take a firm stand in the blind belief that the USSR would not really rise against us, neglecting the fact that the Russians had foreseen our weak points." Takagi also had violent things to say about "white-livered" Gaimusho elements that were playing up to the army. Although Takagi's remarks, expressed in confidence, were sharp, cautious injunctions were being delivered by the high command to the new Korea Army commander, General Nakamura Kotaro, who was about to leave for Seoul to replace Koiso. Nakamura's attitude was crucial for the course and outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. More of a desk soldier than a warrior, he characteristic ally displayed a wariness that was reinforced by the guidance provided him. This personal quality assumes even greater significance if one believes that the Russians may have initiated the Changkufeng Incident by exploiting the special opportunities afforded them by the routine replacement of the Korea Army commander, the temporary absence from Moscow of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the geographical as well as subjective gap between the Kwantung and Korea armies that was exposed during the Lyushkov affair. At 10:00 on 15 July Nakamura was designated army commander by the Emperor at the palace. Soon afterward, he was briefed by Imperial General headquarters officers. Hashimoto, the operations bureau chief, recalled that when he saw Nakamura off on 17 July, Hashimoto stressed prudence, limitation of any military action, and diplomatic solution of the problem. The new commanding general, Inada asserted, promised full cooperation. There was no mention, at this level, of Inada's concept of reconnaissance in force. When Nakamura reached Seoul, he found an Imperial order from Tokyo dated 16 July awaiting him. This important document stipulated that he could concentrate units under his command in Korea near the border against the trespassing Soviet forces in the Changkufeng area. Resort to force, however, was dependent upon further orders. This message was followed by a wire from Kan'in, the Army general staff chief. The Imperial order, it was explained, had been designed to support diplomatic negotiations. Simultaneous approval was granted for concentrating forces to respond swiftly in case the situation deteriorated. As for implementation of the Imperial order, discretion should be exercised in line with the opinion expressed earlier by Korea Army Headquarters. Negotiations were to be conducted in Moscow and Harbin, the location of a Soviet consulate in Manchukuo. Meanwhile, the command was dispatching two officers for purposes of liaison: Lt. Colonel Arisue Yadoru in Operations and Major Kotani Etsuo a specialist in Soviet intelligence. Inada advised Arisue that, apart from liaison flights inside the frontiers, particular care should be exercised with regard to actions that might lead to air combat. Nevertheless, although Inada stated that the Imperial order called for "a sort of military demonstration," he admitted that it meant preparatory action for an attack. The Korea Army senior staff officer, Iwasaki, recalled hearing nothing about secret intentions. Nakamura briefed his staff about the need for restraint, especially during this key period of the Wuhan operation. Koiso had disposed of speculation that he had issued an order to concentrate the 19th Division before Nakamura arrived, although he and Nakamura did have the opportunity to confer in Seoul before he departed for Japan. The Imperial order of 16 July, in response to Koiso's inquiry received in Tokyo on 14 July, had arrived in Seoul addressed to Nakamura; thereupon, the Korea Army chief of staff, Kitano, had the message conveyed to the division. By 21 July Koiso was back in Tokyo where, the day afterward, he advised the war minister, Itagaki, "to act prudently with respect to the Changkufeng problem." Why did the high command dispatch two field-grade liaison officers to Korea from the outset of the Changkufeng Incident? The Korea Army lacked operations staff. Its commander had been allotted prime responsibility, within the chain of command, for defense of northeastern Korea. At the beginning, the highest-ranking staff officer at the front was a major. Since there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the command and the forces in Korea, it was proper to send experts from Tokyo to assist. Imperial General headqaurters would observe the situation carefully, devise measures on the basis of the overall view, and issue orders which the Korea Army would implement through ordinary channels. It had not been the type of incident which required the army commander to go to the front to direct. This was the Korea Army's first test, and political as well as diplomatic problems were involved that the army in the field should not or could not handle. If Tokyo had left decisions to the division and its regiments, the latter would have been held to account, which was not proper. Imperial General headquarters had to assume responsibility and reassure local commanders of its full support. Imaoka Yutaka explained that operational guidance by Imperial General headquarters and line operations conducted by the 19th Division formed the core of the affair; the Korea Army, placed between, was "shadowy." Koiso had not been enthusiastic; this set the mood among the staff. Nakamura, who arrived with a thorough comprehension of AGS thinking, was basically passive. The Korea Army staff, in general, included no "wild boars."    There was an urgent need to monitor developments. Not only was the Korea Army unfamiliar with handling this type of incident, but many hitches occurred. There had been no practice in emergency transmission of coded wires between the Korea Army and Tokyo. Now telegram after telegram had to be sent; most were deciphered incorrectly and many were not decoded at all. Another problem centered on the lack of knowledge in Tokyo about the situation on the spot, which only visual observation could rectify. As a result, the two Army general staff experts, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Korea on 16 July. Kotani recalled that he was to collect intelligence and assist the local authorities. One of the first duties that he and Arisue performed was to disseminate the principle that use of force required a prior Imperial order. Also on 16 July, Japanese newspapers reported that the USSR was still concentrating troops, that the Manchukuoan government was watching intently, "decisive punitive measures" were being contemplated by the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities, and there were signs of a worsening of the crisis. Despite good reasons for this gloomy appraisal, the Japanese press had not yet given the incident page-one treatment. More alarming news was being disseminated abroad. Domei, the official Japanese news agency, reported that the situation would probably become worse unless Soviet troops were withdrawn. The position of the Japanese government impressed foreign correspondents as unusually firm. Informants characterized the Changkufeng Incident as the most serious affair since the clash on the Amur River in 1937. Irked by the Korea Army's timidity and eager for first-hand information, the Kwantung Army dispatched two observers to the front: from Intelligence, Ogoshi Kenji, and from Operations, Tsuji Masanobu. If you listen to my pacific war week by week podcast or echoes of war, you know I highlight Tsuji Masanobu as one of the most evil Japanese officers of WW2. No other way to describe this guy, he was a shithead. In his memoirs, Tsuji asserted that he and Ogoshi climbed Changkufeng Hill, discerned Soviet soldiers digging across the peak in Manchurian territory, and concluded that "probably even Tokyo could not overlook such a clear-cut case of invasion." Although his account aligned with the general thrust, Ogoshi contended that Tsuji could not have accompanied him. According to sources with the 19th Division, when Koiso learned that Tsuji and Ogoshi were disparaging the Korea Army's ability to defend Changkufeng, he ordered "those spies" ousted. Ogoshi replied that the army staff was not angry, but Koiso did become furious and ordered Ogoshi "arrested for trespassing." Ogoshi surmised that Koiso's concern was that emotional outsiders such as Tsuji could provoke trouble, perhaps even war, if they visited Changkufeng. This view was widely shared. Inada stated that he made a practice of keeping away to maintain the degree of detachment and impartiality required of high command authorities. One sidelight to the "fraternal" visit to the Changkufeng area by observers from Hsinking was provided by Lt. Colonel Katakura Tadashi, chief of the Kwantung Army's 4th Section, which handled Manchukuo affairs, primarily political direction. When Katakura visited the Operations Section, Tsuji and Ogoshi told him that an intrusion had been confirmed and that the Kwantung Army staff was studying ways to evict the Soviets. Katakura consulted Maj. General Ishiwara Kanji, acting chief of staff, who was already in possession of the draft of an operations order calling for offensive preparations by the Kwantung Army against the Russians at Changkufeng. Katakura asked for reconsideration of the order. This was not a matter to be handled solely by the operations staff. Borders and international affairs were involved; hence the 4th Section, along with the Manchukuoan government, the Gaimusho, and other agencies, were concerned. Field observers were expressing exaggerated personal opinions based on having seen Soviet sentries on a hilltop. If the matter fell within the Korea Army's defensive prerogative, that army ought to handle it. Apparently the Kwantung Army commander and Ishiwara agreed with Katakura, for the draft order was not approved. The so-called private message dispatched by a Kwantung Army staff officer just before Koiso's departure may have been provoked by this rejection of direct participation by forces under Kwantung Army command. Staff officers in Tokyo believed that Hsinking could not see the forest for the trees. In the high command's view, the Kwantung Army's deliberate escalation of a negligible frontier incident undoubtedly stemmed from a failure to grasp the strategic requirements of national defense—pursuit of the campaign in China, the nurturance of Manchukuo, and the buildup of operational readiness for the ultimate solution of the Soviet problem. The high command felt obliged to remind the Kwantung Army that, in dealing with the Changkufeng Incident, the central authorities pressed for a Russian pullback through diplomacy. Consequently, the Korea Army had been instructed to be ready to concentrate troops near Changkufeng as a "background." Meanwhile, it remained the Imperial will that utmost prudence be exercised. The Kwantung Army commander accordingly issued cautious instructions to subordinate units, especially those on the eastern border. The high command's injunctions did not end the discontent and recrimination at the lower levels of Kwantung Army Headquarters, nor did they quiet the concern felt in Tokyo. A former war minister told Baron Harada repeatedly in late July that the Kwantung Army was "no good," while the superintendent of police added that the Kwantung Army was embarrassing Foreign Minister Ugaki. Nevertheless, the Kwantung Army did exert self-restraint. For its part, the Korea Army naïvely sought to achieve entente with an antagonist who considered the case nonnegotiable. First, the government of Manchukuo was asked to lodge a formal protest with the USSR. The commissioner for foreign affairs at Harbin phoned V. V. Kuznetzov, the acting consul, on the night of 14 July and saw him on the 18th. Basing its contentions on maps, the Haensing regime demanded Soviet withdrawal from Changkufeng. The Japanese government was lodging similar protests within the framework of Japanese-Manchukuoan joint defense agreements. On the spot, the situation inflamed. During the afternoon of 15 July, a Japanese military police patrol from Korea reconnoitered at the foot of Hill 52, southeast of Changkufeng. The party came under Soviet gunfire and was driven back, abandoning the body of Corp. Matsushima Shakuni. Japanese sources claimed that a Russian ambush had been set inside Manchuria. The Russian side insisted that it was the Soviet frontier that had been violated by thirty meters. Kuzma Grebennik, the colonel commanding the 59th BGU, which covered the Posyet sector, asserted that Matsushima's effects included a notebook containing reconnaissance results and a camera with film of Soviet-claimed terrain, particularly Changkufeng Hill. According to Maj. Gilfan Batarshin, a subordinate of Grebennik, two Russian border guards from Podgornaya opened fire when the Japanese fled after being challenged. Japanese protests to the USSR about the death of Matsushima and the taking of his body were added to the negotiations concerning the disputed border and the alleged trespassing. Charge Nishi Haruhiko lodged a vigorous complaint in Moscow on 15 July but was answered by a counterprotest. Ambassador Shigemitsu underwent an identical experience during a conversation with Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov on 20 July. Shigemitsu retorted that the murder tended to exacerbate the negotiations. In his memoirs, he stated that the killing of Matsushima provoked the local Japanese border garrison unit. The shooting occurred as the Soviet military buildup continued, according to Japanese sources. Mechanized units were reported moving in the direction of Kyonghun from Barabash and Posyet Bay. Biplanes were reconnoitering the Hunchun Valley, within Manchurian territory, from the afternoon of 16 July. To the local Japanese authorities, it seemed that the Russians were adopting a challenging attitude. Although the Japanese-Manchukuoan side remained willing to negotiate—that is, to take no forceful actions if the Russians would withdraw, the latter appeared not to share such an intention. The Soviets were not only misinterpreting the Hunchun treaty to their advantage but were encroaching beyond what they claimed to be the line; they "lacked sincerity." Decisive use of force might have been imperative to secure the Manchurian border, which was Japan's legal responsibility. As far north as Tungning on the eastern Manchurian frontier, two Soviet ground divisions and considerable numbers of tanks and aircraft were reported massed in full view. At Changkufeng, Russian soldiers fortified the crest. Mountain guns were now seen with muzzles pointed toward Manchuria, and Japanese intelligence estimated that Soviet troop strength near Changkufeng had grown to 120 or 130 by the evening of 18 July. As Sawamoto Rikichiro, an Imperial aide, noted in his diary, "It would seem that settlement of the affair had become increasingly difficult." Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya sent two emissaries bearing the notice to the Soviet border. The pair, "blazing with patriotic ardor,"set out on 18 July, carrying a message in one hand and a white flag in the other. From Kyonghun came the report the next day that there had been an urgent, well-attended Soviet staff meeting at BGU Headquarters in Novokievsk all night, and that the Russian side had been discomfited by the Japanese request, which had been transmitted to higher authorities. Still, the emissaries did not return, while a stream of reports indicated a Soviet buildup along a dozen frontier sectors. Russian authorities had reportedly forced the natives to evacuate an area twenty miles behind their borders. From Japanese observation posts, Soviet convoys of men, guns, and horses could be sighted moving toward Novokievsk after being unloaded from transports originating at Vladivostok. Japanese Army Intelligence reported that on 18 July a regimental-size force had arrived at Novokievsk; artillery displacements forward were particularly visible by night east of Khasan. A confidential Gaimusho message indicated that Soviet truck movements between Posyet, Novokievsk, and the front had increased since the 20th. Russian intrusions, kidnappings, and sniping incidents were reported along the Manchurian borders, from Manchouli on the west to Suifenho on the east, between 18 and 25 July. Aircraft on daytime reconnaissance were detected as far as three miles inside Manchurian territory in the Hunchun area. Although the Japanese asserted that their forbearance was being tested, Izvestiya charged "Japanese militarists" with manufacturing an affair at Ussuri as well as at Changkufeng. The Japanese themselves received reports from the Changkufeng front that by 20 July the Soviets had 250 soldiers, armed with field pieces, trench mortars, howitzers, and light and heavy machine guns, on the southern slopes. The Russians were putting up tents capable of holding 40 men each; officers could be observed for the first time. On the evening of the 20th, the Soviets lobbed illuminating shells toward Manchurian territory. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Inada Masazum, studying maps and mud, saw Changkufeng Hill as a prize with peril, a test of nerve rather than a conquest. Tokyo's orders pulsed through Seoul and Harbin: guard, probe, and deter, but avoid full-scale war. Across the border, Soviet units pressed closer, lights and tents flickering on the hillside. The sea within sight whispered of strategy, diplomacy, and a warning: a single misstep could redraw Asia. And so the standoff waited, patient as winter.

Ascension, Part 2 ist da – und Prodigy fährt sämtliche Zeitwaffen, Gefühlskeulen und Lore-Bomben aus, die man in eine einzige Folge packen kann. In dieser Episode des Discovery Panel sprechen wir über: ✨ Asencias Zeitwaffe und den Angriff auf die Voyager-A ✨ Zero, der sich selbst opfert – und wiedergeboren wird ✨ Maj'el und Nova Squadron im größten Redemption-Arc seit TNG ✨ Uzaveh aus dem DS9-Roman „Paradigm“ (!) ✨ Wesley Crusher in einer seiner härtesten Szenen ✨ Chakotay & Janeway in einem stillen, emotionalen Moment ✨ Die „Boothby Supernova“ – das Shuttle-Manöver des Jahrhunderts ✨ Admiral Jellico, der konsequent… Jellico bleibt ✨ Und die große Frage: Steht uns ein Föderationskrieg bevor? Plus: Was bedeutet diese Folge für die zukünftige Zeitlinien-Logik von Prodigy? Viel Spaß mit dieser intensiven, liebevollen und leicht chaotischen Analyse!

Mají venku svou desku Pizza Pivo Dolce Vita, která tak trochu vystihuje určitou část jejich života. V novém dílu Bojs mluví Marcell a Fiedlerski o pocitech, rodičovství i vyrovnávání se se smrtí blízkých.

The MAJesty dive into a surprisingly heated debate: Is Sheamus actually a top-5 John Cena opponent?Kelani Jordan joins the show to share how she first met Carmelo Hayes, the moment that sparked her recent IDGAF attitude, and the dream opponents or even a potential Royal Rumble appearance that are on her radar.Dip also breaks down why he believes the current NXT roster might be one of the best ever, and for good measure, he weighs in with some strong opinions on Rosenberg's couch including why Peter desperately needs a new one.Listen to Cheap Heat Live Fridays 12pm- 2pm EST on Pro Wrestling Nation 24/7 on Channel 156.Call in at 844-344-4893Wanna stay MAJ?Join our PateronFollow @cheapheatpod on Instagram and TikTok @cheapheatpodsubscribe to Rosenberg's Youtube Channel.Email the show Rosenbergwrestling@gmail.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

GDP Script/ Top Stories for November 13th Publish Date: November 13th PRE-ROLL: SUGAR HILL ICE SKATING From the BG AD Group Studio Welcome to the Gwinnett Daily Post Podcast. Today is Thursday, November 13th and Happy birthday to Steve Zahn I’m Peyton Spurlock and here are your top stories presented by KIA Mall of Georgia. Fernbank celebrates holidays with 'Winter Wonderland' exhibit Salvation Army to kick off Red Kettle Campaign on Friday Atlanta awarded NWSL franchise that may call Marietta home Plus, Leah McGrath from Ingles Markets on pesticides All of this and more is coming up on the Gwinnett Daily Post podcast, and if you are looking for community news, we encourage you to listen daily and subscribe! Break 1: STRAND THEATRE STORY 1: Fernbank celebrates holidays with 'Winter Wonderland' exhibit Fernbank’s “Winter Wonderland” is back, running Nov. 22, through Jan. 11—and honestly, it’s kind of magical. Picture this: two floors packed with dazzling trees and displays, each one telling a story about how different cultures celebrate the season. Japan, Kenya, Scotland, Guatemala—just a few of the countries featured. It’s not just pretty lights, either. There’s a scavenger hunt (yes, for adults too) where you can hunt for ornaments and hidden treasures. Oh, and if you’re into nighttime vibes, check out WildWoods: AGLOW. Tickets? $25.95 for adults, cheaper for kids. Go online to snag them early—prices jump at the door. STORY 2: Salvation Army to kick off Red Kettle Campaign on Friday  Starting this Friday, the Salvation Army of Gwinnett County kicks off its Red Kettle Campaign—you know, those little red kettles and the cheerful bell ringers? They’ll be at 49 spots around the county, raising money to help folks in need. The goal this year? $150,000 by Christmas Eve. And it’s not just about the holidays. Last year, they served over 6,000 meals, gave 2,700+ nights of shelter, and helped hundreds of families with rent, utilities, and gifts for their kids. Want to help? Ring a bell or start a virtual kettle. Every penny stays local. Details at salvationarmygwinnett.org. STORY 3: Atlanta awarded NWSL franchise that may call Marietta home   Arthur Blank’s bringing pro women’s soccer to Atlanta—finally. On Tuesday, he announced he’s snagged the rights for an NWSL expansion team, shelling out a record $165 million. The team kicks off in 2028, playing home games at Mercedes-Benz Stadium. Blank’s already talking about a “world-class” training facility, and Marietta’s making its pitch hard. Mayor Steve Tumlin’s ready to pull out all the stops, even eyeing shovel-ready land near Atlanta United’s training ground. Atlanta’s soccer scene is booming—United, the U.S. Soccer Training Center, and now this. Blank’s betting big, and honestly? It feels like a win. We have opportunities for sponsors to get great engagement on these shows. Call 770.874.3200 for more info. We’ll be right back Break 2: 07.14.22 KIA MOG STORY 4: Gwinnett honors service members during Veterans Day Ceremony   Veterans Day isn’t about sales or shopping sprees—at least, it shouldn’t be. Retired Army Sgt. Maj. Kerry Dyer reminded everyone of that during Gwinnett County’s ceremony this week. “It’s a day for gratitude,” he said, standing before a crowd of veterans spanning generations, from Korea to the Gulf. “Not just for battles fought, but for lives lived in service.” Gwinnett, home to over 30,000 veterans, pulled out all the stops—marches, music, and heartfelt speeches. Judge Shawn Bratton called the turnout “unspeakably touching.” And with new veteran resource centers on the way, the county’s commitment feels real. Two words: thank you. STORY 5: Georgia Gwinnett College students dive into environmental science during inaugural Gwinnett River Rendezvous event Georgia Gwinnett College just pulled off something pretty cool—the first-ever Gwinnett River Rendezvous. Picture this: students, faculty, and volunteers fanning out across the county, collecting water samples from rivers and streams, then testing them back on campus for things like bacteria and turbidity. It wasn’t just science—it was hands-on, messy, real-world learning. For sophomore Andreas Forbes, it was a first. “I’m an environmental science major, but I hadn’t done anything like this before,” he said. “It felt real.” The data? It’s going straight to Gwinnett Water Resources to help track contamination. And GGC? They’re already planning next year’s rendezvous. We’ll be right back. Break 3: THE SUGAR HILL HOLIDAY And now here is Leah McGrath from Ingles Markets on pesticides Break 4: We’ll have closing comments after this Break 5: Ingles Markets 5 Signoff – Thanks again for hanging out with us on today’s Gwinnett Daily Post Podcast. If you enjoy these shows, we encourage you to check out our other offerings, like the Cherokee Tribune Ledger Podcast, the Marietta Daily Journal, or the Community Podcast for Rockdale Newton and Morgan Counties. Read more about all our stories and get other great content at www.gwinnettdailypost.com Did you know over 50% of Americans listen to podcasts weekly? Giving you important news about our community and telling great stories are what we do. Make sure you join us for our next episode and be sure to share this podcast on social media with your friends and family. Add us to your Alexa Flash Briefing or your Google Home Briefing and be sure to like, follow, and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. Produced by the BG Podcast Network Show Sponsors: www.ingles-markets.com www.kiamallofga.com Strand Marietta Holiday Celebration – City of Sugar Hill Ice Rink – Downtown Sugar Hill See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Sanjay Dixit, Bhau Torsekar & Maj.Gaurav Arya Host TJD Annual Summit 2025 Media Press Conference

Kradnúť už nechodia len hladní ľudia, ale všetci, ktorí majú problémy s dlhmi alebo drogami, a aj organizované skupiny, lebo ich k tomu motivovala vládna koalícia. Tvrdí to Zuzana Števulová, právnička a poslankyňa parlamentu za Progresívne Slovensko. Policajti podľa nej nemajú kapacity ani na veľké daňové zločiny, nie ešte na drobné krádeže.Majú protesty význam? Proti čomu a s akými požiadavkami sa vlastne opozičné strany chystajú na námestia? A budú naozaj niekde dva protesty v tom istom čase, alebo to majú opozičné strany s aktivistami dohodnuté?Rozhovor vo videopodcaste Ráno Nahlas viedol Peter Hanák.

Kradnúť už nechodia len hladní ľudia, ale všetci, ktorí majú problémy s dlhmi alebo drogami, a aj organizované skupiny, lebo ich k tomu motivovala vládna koalícia. Tvrdí to Zuzana Števulová, právnička a poslankyňa parlamentu za Progresívne Slovensko. Policajti podľa nej nemajú kapacity ani na veľké daňové zločiny, nie ešte na drobné krádeže.Majú protesty význam? Proti čomu a s akými požiadavkami sa vlastne opozičné strany chystajú na námestia? A budú naozaj niekde dva protesty v tom istom čase, alebo to majú opozičné strany s aktivistami dohodnuté?Rozhovor vo videopodcaste Ráno Nahlas viedol Peter Hanák.

CELÝ ROZHOVOR V DÉLCE 66 MIN. JEN NA ⁠HTTPS://HEROHERO.CO/CESTMIR⁠⁠⁠⁠ A ⁠HTTPS://FORENDORS.CZ/CESTMIR „Nekladu si otázku, jestli moje děti mají vzít úzlík a prchnout před Babišem. Spíš si říkám, jestli poznáme tu míru, kdy už to překročilo nějakou mez,“ říká režisér Jan Hřebejk, když přemýšlí o tom, jak snadno se může proměnit společnost, kterou považujeme za samozřejmou. V poslední době natáčí často na Slovensku a říká, že právě tam vidí, jak ubývá svobody a jak to vypadá, když nejsou u vlády lidé, které jste si přáli. Mluví o voličích, o politicích, kteří podle něj ohýbají pravidla, i o tom, jak snadno se z veřejného prostoru vytratí elementární slušnost. „To, co reprezentují v politice, je politický sajrajt,“ říká bez okolků, když mluví o zástupcích SPD a Motoristů. I když očekává na svá slova kritiku, hájí se s odkazem na Filipa Turka, že přece nelze vážně mluvit o lidech, kteří hajlují. A dokonce si myslí, že budoucí premiér Andrej Babiš v soukromí mluví o svých koaličních partnerech mnohem ostřeji, než on sám. Do rozhovoru promlouvají i jeho obavy a zkušenost člověka, který ve filmech desítky let hledá hranici mezi odvahou a selháním. „Strach dokáže úplně rozložit charakter,“ říká k tomu, jak obavy mění všechno. V debatách o Palestině a Izraeli zůstává Hřebejk nekompromisní, ale chápe, proč mladí lidé vidí svět jinak. „Mají čerstvé mozky, ale někdy neprokouknou, jakou hru s nimi kdo hraje,“ říká o kauze vyvěšení palestinské vlajky na FAMU a dodává, že celý konflikt vnímá jako neřešitelný. Důležité podle něj ale je, aby i v rozdělené společnosti zůstal prostor pro humor. A to nejen jako únik, ale i ventil, který člověka drží při zemi. „Humor tě brzdí, aby sis nezačal moc myslet,“ říká režisér. Hřebejk mluví také o tom, že víru jako katolík ztratil, ale naději ne. „Kdybych nevěřil v dobro, tak se zabiju,“ říká jasně. A zdůrazňuje, že věří, že žijeme ve vlídné zemi, kterou stojí za to chránit. Co je dnes odvaha a co jen póza? Jak poznat, že už jsme překročili hranici, kterou jsme si slíbili nikdy nepřekročit? Proč některé politiky vidí jako „spodinu“? A proč by Hřebejk čím dál tím raději točil hlavně filmy, v nichž je humor? I to se dozvíte v rozhovoru.

Intimní záběry, které obletěly Česko. Mají prý dokázat pokrytectví poslance Jindřicha Rajchla. Bylo ale ve veřejném zájmu je teď začít šířit? A co je a co není zásah do soukromí politiků? Téma pro Andreu Procházkovou z katedry ústavního práva Právnické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy, která působí v advokacii. Ptá se Matěj Skalický.Všechny díly podcastu Vinohradská 12 můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Intimní záběry, které obletěly Česko. Mají prý dokázat pokrytectví poslance Jindřicha Rajchla. Bylo ale ve veřejném zájmu je teď začít šířit? A co je a co není zásah do soukromí politiků? Téma pro Andreu Procházkovou z katedry ústavního práva Právnické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy, která působí v advokacii. Ptá se Matěj Skalický.

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 20-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world. Military correspondent Emanuel Fabian and Jewish world reporter Zev Stub join host Amanda Borschel-Dan for today's episode. In an indication of the uptick of events along Israel’s northern border, IDF troops conducted an overnight raid in southern Lebanon and destroyed several buildings that were being used by Hezbollah, the military says. This is the second ground operation inside Lebanon in the past several days, conducted outside of the five points Israel now holds inside its neighbor. We learn about the IDF's outlook for a stepped-up conflict. Upon assuming office, Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir appointed a panel of former senior military officers to conduct an external investigation into the series of the IDF's internal probes in its failures on and ahead of Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terror onslaught. Fabian explores the new panel's findings and where the IDF needs to fill in holes. Itai Ofir will become the military advocate general later this month after Defense Minister Israel Katz ratified his appointment Sunday. He will succeed Maj. Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, who resigned and admitted to authorizing the leak of the Sde Teiman detainee abuse video. Fabian describes an unusual rank jump that Ofir will need to be given to assume the role. After a dramatic negotiation process with several surprise turns, the next leadership of the World Zionist Organization has been selected. Just ahead of recording, Stub learned that Rabbi Doron Perez, chairman of the religious Zionist World Mizrachi movement and father of Cpt. Daniel Perez, who was killed in the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, will split the five-year term with the incumbent chairman of the WZO, Yaakov Hagoel. Last week, Yad Vashem, Israel’s World Holocaust Remembrance Center, said that it has recovered the names of five million Jews murdered in the Holocaust, a milestone it called “historic” in its decades-long mission to restore the identities of the six million Jews murdered by the Nazis.As part of its mission to mark every one of those six million as an individual, the museum wing has opened a new exhibit with deeply personal affects. Stub was at the new exhibit and reports back. Check out The Times of Israel's ongoing liveblog for more updates. For further reading: External panel appointed by IDF chief finds most of army’s Oct. 7 probes inadequate Katz okays Itai Ofir as next IDF legal chief, despite Netanyahu’s reported objection Lapid rips up ‘corrupt’ WZO leadership deal, opens door for Yair Netanyahu appointment World Zionist Congress devolves into chaos after Yair Netanyahu tapped for key role WZO heads likely to throw out thousands of suspect ballots as they meet on voter fraud Yad Vashem says it has compiled 5 million names of Jews murdered in Holocaust Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts. This episode was produced by Pod-Waves. IMAGE: Smoke rises following an Israeli airstrike in the village of Teir Debba, southern Lebanon, November 6, 2025. (AP Photo/Mohammad Zaatari)See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The plot thickens! The tale of the rape that never was, and now the suicide attempt that Maj. Gen. Yifat Tomer Yerushalmi seems to have faked, opens a window into everything that has been convulsing Israel in recent years.

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 20-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world. Military correspondent Emanuel Fabian joins host Amanda Borschel-Dan for today's episode. Hamas announced that the body of IDF officer Lt. Hadar Goldin, held by the terror organization since 2014, will be returned to Israel at 2 p.m. We learn about Operation Protective Edge, the Hamas operation to ostensibly recover Goldin’s body that occurred yesterday, as well as what’s happening with the 150-odd Hamas gunmen who are trapped in a tunnel in the same part of the southern Gaza strip in an IDF-controlled area. Military representatives on Saturday morning notified the family of Lior Rudaeff that his body was returned to Israel by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad on Friday night, after forensic experts completed their identification. Fabian describes what we know of Rudaeff's killing on October 7, 2023. Former military advocate general Maj. Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi was hospitalized this morning. This comes a day after her elusive phone was discovered on a Tel Aviv beach by passersby. Fabian takes up the thread of the Hollywood-esque narrative about Tomer-Yerushalmi, who is accused of multiple crimes, including obstruction of justice. We also hear about Itai Ofer, who has been named as Tomer-Yerushalmi's replacement, and the obstacles he faces to secure the role. Defense Minister Israel Katz said Thursday he was “declaring war” on weapon smuggling via drones over the Egyptian border, instructing the military to declare a closed military zone in the area and the Shin Bet to define such attempts as terrorism. Fabian describes the uptick in smuggling and weighs in on the measures currently taken against it. Check out The Times of Israel's ongoing liveblog for more updates. For further reading: Hamas claims to recover body of Hadar Goldin, IDF soldier killed and abducted in 2014 war PM rules out granting safe passage to 200 Hamas gunmen stuck in IDF-held Rafah Body of Lior Rudaeff returned from Gaza; he died battling Islamic Jihad terrorists on Oct. 7 Ex-IDF legal chief sent to house arrest, as her missing phone is found in the sea Katz taps ex-Defense Ministry legal adviser as next military advocate general after scandal Katz orders IDF to declare Egyptian border closed military zone over drone smugglings Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts. This episode was produced by Pod-Waves. Check out yesterday’s episode here: https://youtu.be/fiPzmecX8RM?si=EhCcG0fiPRv16R9U ILLUSTRATIVE IMAGE: Troops investigate a Hamas attack tunnel in southern Gaza's Rafah, in a handout photo issued on August 23, 2024. (Israel Defense Forces)See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Ben Elton, the writer of Filthy Rich & Catflap, sat down for a chat before his recent Perth show in support of What Have I Done?, an autobiography rich with Catflappian detail. Between Ben's new autobiography and this chat, a bunch of big questions are answered. He's dropped tons of new context around the creation of the show that should keep Filthy Rich scholars (??) updating texts and speculating for years. It's enorm! Fans of The Young Ones, Happy Families, Upstart Crow, The Thin Blue Line and Ben's many novs & musicals will have a field day with the book, getting handy new details. Tuck in Loobies, this is a holy grail ep!  Thanks again to Ben, the Regal Theatre, and the stage door manager dude downstairs at The Maj.  

CELÝ ROZHOVOR V DÉLCE 56 MIN. JEN NA ⁠HTTPS://HEROHERO.CO/CESTMIR⁠⁠⁠⁠ A ⁠HTTPS://FORENDORS.CZ/CESTMIR „Zajímala mě temná zákoutí lidské duše,“ popisuje sexuoložka a neurovědkyně Renáta Androvičová, proč se rozhodla pro svou profesi. Dnes pracuje v Národním ústavu duševního zdraví a zkoumá i fenomény, které většina lidí nechce ani pojmenovávat - znásilnění, sadismus nebo deviace. Do oboru ji přivedl zážitek, na který dodnes nezapomněla. „Profesor Weiss přivedl na živou hodinu sexuálního vraha. A tohle mně připadalo fascinující, tehdy něco secvaklo v mé hlavě,“ popisuje vědkyně zkušenost, která byla formující, ale také velmi náročná. Od té chvíle chtěla pochopit, proč někteří lidé jednají způsobem, který „vůbec nedává smysl“. Dělala stáže na ochranných léčbách a mluvila i s muži, kteří „neměli zapotřebí se někoho zmocňovat násilím, a přesto to dělali“ a dnes mluví i o tom, jak funguje jejich mozek. Boří také představy o genetických predispozicích. „Dědičnost se posouvá z rodiče na dítě asi ve 27 %. Zbytek je nesdílený vliv prostředí,“ říká expertka třeba o predispozicích k sexuálnímu násilí. O pubertě pak mluví jako o nejkritičtějším období a vysvětluje, jak se v ní začínají problémové vzorce utvrzovat a kdy ještě lze zabránit tomu, aby se touha proměnila v čin. Androvičová se věnuje ale i dnešnímu fenoménu incelů, kteří se podle ní často vyznačují slabšími sociálními dovednostmi, vysokou inteligencí nebo introverzí a postupně začínají hledat vysvětlení svého nezdaru v okolí. „Mají představu, že ženy jsou velmi primitivní bytosti a že je zajímá jen status, peníze nebo svaly,“ popisuje sexuoložka plochou představu incelů o ženách. Vysvětluje, že jejich online komunity nabízejí reálné řešení a zároveň připomíná, že existují i praktické cesty. „Naučit se sociální kompetence jde. Jen si ten člověk musí připustit, že nemusí být ‚zlí' jen ti druzí,“ tvrdí Androvičová. Otevírá také další vrstvy dnešní sexuality - parasociální vztahy, dostupnost pornografie či závislost na OnlyFans. „Myslela jsem si, že tam chodí singles a že je to snadná práce. Ani jedno z toho není pravda,“ přiznává sexuoložka. Platformy podle ní normalizují to, co dřív nebylo běžné a ženatí muži si zde budují „bezpečný ventil“, který je snadnější než realita. Androvičová také otevřeně přiznává, že ji vlastní práce začala vyčerpávat. „Už jsem tím trochu přesycená. Frustruje mě zjišťovat, že jsou tady nějaké biologické dispozice. Mrzí mě oběti, mrzí mě i pachatel. Celé mě to rozesmutňuje,“ říká s tím, že přemýšlí, že si od výzkumu na čas odpočine. Proč je důležité dozvídat se více o pachatelích znásilnění? Jak vypadají mozky mužů, kteří jednají donucovacím způsobem? A proč říká, že prevence musí začít dřív, než se „všechno zafixuje“? Pusťte si celý rozhovor, který vznikl v rámci série k dokumentu Virtuální přítelkyně.

Rosenberg and SGG break down CM Punk's biggest challenge since returning, finally winning the WWE World Heavyweight Championship and why fans are desperate to cheer Punk but just as eager to boo Cody Rhodes, even though Cody continues to prove he's the guy in WWE.They also discuss Jade Cargill's championship win and, whether she can rise to the moment, and SGG's take on what makes a true champion. Listen to Cheap Heat Live Fridays 12pm- 2pm EST on Pro Wrestling Nation 24/7 on Channel 156.Call in at 844-344-4893Wanna stay MAJ?Join our PateronFollow @cheapheatpod on Instagram and TikTok @cheapheatpodsubscribe to Rosenberg's Youtube Channel.Email the show Rosenbergwrestling@gmail.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Jak se dá využít superpřesný mikroskop k hledání slabin rakovinných buněk? - Vědecký projekt Rod a/nebo národ zkoumá, jak se spisovatelky v 19. století angažovaly ve feministických a národních hnutích ve střední Evropě. - Nová bezpečnostní aplikace Maják dokáže přivolat pomoc, vyslat nouzovou zprávu blízkým i jim třeba nasdílet polohu. Moderuje Lenka Vahalová.

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 20-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world. Editor David Horovitz joins host Amanda Borschel-Dan for today's episode. The intrigue surrounding the leaked surveillance camera footage from the Sde Teiman detention facility is unabating as a search continues at Hatzuk Beach in Tel Aviv for the phone of the former military advocate general, Maj. Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, whom police reportedly suspect of intentionally tossing it into the sea when she briefly disappeared Sunday evening. Horovitz updates us on the complicated case implicating the Military Advocate General’s Office and its many dramatic moments in the past few days. The Trump administration’s draft UN Security Council resolution to establish an international force in Gaza would reportedly give the US and other participating countries a broad two-year mandate to govern Gaza and be in charge of security there, according to an Axios report. We discuss the implications for such a step and whether it could be a way of bypassing the idea of a council of Palestinian technocrats ruling the strip. As media watchdog groups are denouncing a bill from the Communications Ministry that passed its first reading yesterday, saying that it is a step towards the end of free press and that the legislation would “give the government political control” over content and news broadcasts. Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi claims it is a way to take the news out of the hands of the monopoly of billionaires who own the media. Horovitz discusses some of the details of the bill and why many are concerned. During an era of public fissure in Israel, prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated 30 years ago today. Horovitz weighs in on that terrible day and why he insists there is hope for bridging Israel's gaps and moving toward societal healing. Check out The Times of Israel's ongoing liveblog for more updates. For further reading: IDF’s former top lawyer said to have approved leak of abuse video in group chat Timeline of a scandal: The 17 months of the Sde Teiman abuse and video leak affair Draft UN resolution would grant US and partners two-year mandate to govern Gaza Likud minister’s contentious media regulation bill passes first reading in Knesset Three decades on, a return to Rabin Square gives the slain premier’s right-hand man hope Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts. This episode was produced by Pod-Waves. IMAGE: US Vice President JD Vance speaks to the media as US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner stand next to him, in Kiryat Gat, Israel, October 21, 2025. (AP Photo/Francisco Seco)See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Naše mestá a obce sa sťažujú na nárast kriminality a agresívnych páchateľov. Podľa Smeru sú však za to zodpovedné médiá a opozícia, pretože o tom občanov informujú. Samosprávy zas hovoria, že sa ich občania prestávajú cítiť bezpečne. Podľa policajnej prezidentky je to však len ich pocit a kriminalita klesá. Slovensko medzi tým klesá v medzinárodných hodnoteniach právneho štátu aj vo vnímaní korupcie.Kde je teda pravda, aká je realita a čo sa s tým dá robiť? Čo požadujú obce a mestá a aká je u nich situácia s kriminalitou? Môže za nárast kriminality Smerácka novela trestného zákona? Pomohol by návrat takzvaného horalkového paragrafu? Ak policajti nestíhajú, pomôžu žandári? Majú ísť zlodeji za dve či tri drobné krádeže už za mreže? Alebo ako hovorí poslanec Smeru, mali by zlodeji nosiť nejaké bundy s nápisom "kradol som"? A ako sa s tým ďalej budú vyrovnávať samosprávy, ak im štát navyše v rozpočte zoberie takmer 300 miliónov eur?Braňo Závodský sa rozprával s predsedom Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska a primátorom Partizánskeho Jozefom Božikom a s riaditeľom mimovládky Transparency International Slovensko Michalom Piškom.

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 20-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world. Military correspondent Emanuel Fabian joins host Amanda Borschel-Dan for today's episode. As pressure mounts for the Hamas terror group to lay down its arms, we take a minute to focus on the terrorists' military capabilities and current activities. Hamas has still not returned all the bodies of the hostages. Before the weekend, Israel returned the bodies of 30 more Palestinians to Gaza as part of an ongoing exchange deal after Hamas handed over the bodies of two hostages, 84-year-old Amiram Cooper and 25-year-old Sahar Baruch. The subsequent Hamas transfer, however, did not proceed smoothly. Fabian fills us in. Four members of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force were killed in an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon on Saturday night, a day after Lebanese President Joseph Aoun accused Israel of responding to its offer to negotiate by intensifying its airstrikes. Fabian weighs in on whether his accusations hold water. The military’s top lawyer, Maj. Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, announced her resignation from the Israel Defense Forces on Friday, acknowledging that she had approved the leaking of a surveillance video from the Sde Teiman detention facility, which purported to show soldiers severely abusing a Palestinian detainee last year. We go through the timeline of this complicated scandal that is shaking the IDF to its core. Check out The Times of Israel's ongoing liveblog for more updates. For further reading: Partial remains handed over by Hamas are not of hostages, Israeli authorities assess US military publishes drone video of Hamas looting aid truck in Gaza IDF says strike in south Lebanon killed four elite Hezbollah operatives Lebanon accuses Israel of responding to negotiation offer by ‘intensifying’ attacks US envoy: Lebanon a ‘failed state,’ is unlikely to be able to forcibly disarm Hezbollah IDF’s top lawyer quits; says she approved leak of detainee abuse video Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts. This episode was produced by Pod-Waves. IMAGE: Members of the Qassam Brigades control crowds in the Nuseirat refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip, October 28, 2025. (Ali Hassan/Flash90)See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This week, The Majesty is talking about why the time is NOW to give Jade Cargill a massive push, plus reacting to WWE's WrestleMania Vegas tease poster that had everyone's thumbs busy with very mixed opinions.Dip also takes a trip down memory lane, discussing his classic WCW Galoob action figures, and we debate whether turning Jey Uso heel might be exactly what WWE Raw needs right now.Make sure to follow us on TikTok @cheapheatpod!!!!!!Listen to Cheap Heat Live Fridays 12pm- 2pm EST on Pro Wrestling Nation 24/7 on Channel 156.Call in at 844-344-4893Wanna stay MAJ?Join our PateronFollow @cheapheatpod on Instagram and subscribe to Rosenberg's Youtube Channel.Email the show Rosenbergwrestling@gmail.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Trump returns to DC after trade talks in Asia, meeting President Xi of China. Ret. Maj. Gen. Bill Crane explains risks of relying on China for critical minerals. Plus, nuclear testing, government shutdown updates, and Pope Leo XIV meets students at the Jubilee of the World of Education.

Jen tak si s přáteli sednout před televizi a zahrát si společně nějakou hru – kdysi poměrně běžný úkaz. Dnes čím dál vzácnější, a dokonce i tradičně kooperační tituly se hraní na jedné obrazovce zbavují. Mají ještě tyto hry budoucnost? A jaké vám doporučíme, pokud chcete třeba zábavu ve větším kolektivu? Debatuje Šárka s Alešem.

Paul is joined by Maj. Gen. Vinny Boles (Ret.), Leadership Expert and takes more of your calls Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The January 19, 1862, Battle of Mill Springs put Union Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas on the map. Thomas defeated a force of Confederates commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden and Brig. Gen. Felix Zollicoffer. Join Chief Historian Garry Adelman and author and historian Stuart Sanders as we explore this overlooked early action in the Blue Grass State.

The MAJesty debates whether CM Punk should win the World Heavyweight Championship now or if his victory deserves a more emotional story. Plus, Jimmy Uso joins the show to talk about Jey's superstardom, Naomi's pregnancy announcement, and the possibility of running back a WrestleMania rematch with his brother.And in true Cheap Heat fashion, things take a wild turn when Dip asks the all-important question, who were the smelliest wrestlers of the '80s and '90s?Listen to Cheap Heat Live Fridays 12pm- 2pm EST on Pro Wrestling Nation 24/7 on Channel 156.Call in at 844-344-4893Wanna stay MAJ?Join our PateronFollow @cheapheatpod on Instagram and subscribe to Rosenberg's Youtube Channel.Email the show Rosenbergwrestling@gmail.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Fresh off WWE Crown Jewel, The MAJesty dives into the fallout including what looks like a legitimate injury to Seth Rollins. Should Rollins be forced to vacate the World Heavyweight Championship? And if so, who's next in line to carry the title?Peter breaks down his travel nightmare en route to Orlando, while we try to make sense of why Dip remains the most technically challenged man in podcasting.Listen to Cheap Heat Live Fridays 12pm- 2pm EST on Pro Wrestling Nation 24/7 on Channel 156.Call in at 844-344-4893Wanna stay MAJ?Join our PateronFollow @cheapheatpod on Instagram and subscribe to Rosenberg's Youtube Channel.Email the show Rosenbergwrestling@gmail.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.