Podcasts about cournot

Les Rendez-vous de PHILOPOP- émission du 15-12- 2024La superstitionC'est une croyance qui interprète des événements comme des signes exprimant une intention surnaturelle, et détermine une conduite appropriée (prières, offrandes, sacrifices, rites) pour infléchir en sa faveur les puissances surnaturelles (qu'il s'agisse d'un Dieu ou des dieux)1- Superstition et hasarda- Pour le superstitieux, la mort tragique d'un homme tué par une tuile qui tombe d'un toit ne résulte pas de la rencontre fortuite de séries de causes indépendantes (définition rationnelle du hasard par Cournot), mais d'une intention surnaturelle (exemple tiré de l'appendice de la 1ère partie de l'Ethique de Spinoza, 1677, et dans L'Essai sur les fondements de la connaissance et sur les caractères de la critique philosophique de Cournot, 1851)b- b- Le hasard, notion dont la source est superstitieuse, témoigne de notre pensée primitive: "Le hasard est le mécanisme se comportant comme s'il avait une intention" (Deux sources de la morale et de la religion, H. Bergson, 1932)2- Les causes de la superstition et l'explication de la formation des interprétations superstitieusesa- La superstition naît de l'incertitude de l'avenir et est engendrée par la crainte (Préface du Traité théologico-politique de Spinoza, 1670). L'exemple d'Alexandre le Grand.b- La formation imaginaire des présages et des prodigesc- Par les prodiges, les hommes imaginent que Dieu (ou les dieux) intervient comme une volonté analogue à la leur (anthropomorphisme), en produisant des événements qui leur sont favorables ou défavorables (anthropocentrisme). D'où le problème pratique de la superstition comment faire pour gagner la faveur divine ?3- Les conséquences intellectuelles, morales et politiques de la superstitiona- Elle entraîne une mentalité obscurantiste qui favorise l'intolérance et fait le lit du despotisme : la haine de la raison et le rejet de toute réflexion critique. Le besoin de certitude et l'intoléranceb- Sous "couleur de religion", la superstition est le moyen le plus efficace d'assurer la domination d'un gouvernement despotique, quand elle est stabilisée et canalisée par l'institution d'un culte4- Superstition et religionEst-elle une perversion de la croyance religieuse ou doit-on identifier toute forme de croyance religieuse à la superstition ?- La croyance est une conviction subjective, l'assentiment à un contenu qu'elle ne peut justifier objectivement. La superstition religieuse est une croyance aux signes de ce contenu (reliques, miracles, rituels etc...) qui prétend s'ériger en savoir (elle est une illusion)- Croire à la révélation, est-ce être superstitieux ? Religions révélées et religion naturelle.Bibliographie:- Appendice de la 1ère partie de l'Ethique et la Préface du Traité théologico-politique de Spinoza- Deux sources de la morale et de la religion de Bergson (chapitre II)- Critique de la raison pure ("De l'opinion, de la science et de la foi"), et La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison (4ème partie, 2ème section) de Kant.- Pour lire et comprendre la Préface du Traité théologico-politique de Spinoza, cette conférence- vidéo de PHILOPOP avec son plan : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GhKDrRiKplk

Comment utiliser la technologie pour rejoindre les gens? Comment la pandémie a tout changé pour les Églises? Est-ce que le ministère sur internet est un vrai ministère?  Qui bénéficie du ministère sur le web?   Site internet: https://questiondecroire.podbean.com/ ApplePodcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/question-de-croire/id1646685250/ Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4Xurt2du9A576owf0mIFSj/     Contactez-nous: questiondecroire@gmail.com Stéphane: www.eglisesainteclaire.org Joan: www.erfz.ch Marie-Pierre: www.e-glise.fr   Notre commanditaire: L'Église Unie du Canada   * Musique de Lesfm, pixabay.com * Photo de Andrew Neel, unsplash.com

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: All the posts I will never write, published by Self-Embedded Agent on August 14, 2022 on LessWrong. This post has been written for the first Refine blog post day, at the end of the week of readings, dicussions, and exercises about epistomology for doing good conceptual research. (/with courtesy to Adam Shimi who suggested the title and idea. ) Rationality, Probability, Uncertainty, Reasoning Failures of The Aumann Agreement Theorem The famous Aumann Agreement Theorem states that rational reasoners can never agree-to-disagree. In day-to-day life we clearly have many situations where rational reasoners cannot agree-to-disagree. Are people just bad rationalist or are there more fundamental reasons that the Aumann Agreement Theorem can fail. I review all the ways in which the Aumann Agreement Theorem can fail that I know of - including failures based on indexical information, computational-complexity obstacles, divergent-interpretations-of-evidence, Hansonian non-truth-seeking and more. Warren Buffet: The Alpha of Wall Street If we observe a trader that consistenly beat the market that should be evidence against the Efficient Market Hypothesis. A trader could also just have been lucky. How much should we update against the EMH and how much should we expect the trader to beat the market in the future? Can we quantify how much information the market absorbed? This is very reminiscent of Wows Bayesian surprise in Bayesian statistics. The Bid-Ask Spread and Epistemic Uncertainty/ Prediction Markets as Epistemic Fog of War If you know A will resolve you should buy shares on A, if you know not A will happen you should buy shares on not A. If you think A will not resolve you should sell shares on A. The Bid-ask Spread measures bet resolution uncertainty Suppose an adversary has an interest in showing you A and t. There is a -> selective reporting When an earnings call come in.. bid-ask spread increases. Where Forecasting goes Wrong... Forecasting is now a big deal in the rationalist community. I argue that a slavish adherence to Bayesian Orthodoxy leads to missing most of the value of prediction markets. What do we mean when we talk about Probability? Possibility theory is prior to Probability Theory. Probability theory is possibility theory + Cournot's principle. Cournot's principle that an epsilon/zero probability possible event will never happen is the fundamental principle of probability theory. cf Shafer on history of Cournot's principle. But what happens when we observe a epsilon/zero probability event? We obtain a contradiction requiring belief revision. Wow!1! I made a productive mistake An exposition of 'Bayesian Surprise attract Human Attention', focused on the notion of 'Bayesian surprisal' measured in wows. There has been a ton of interest in Predictive Processing and Friston's Free Energy Principle. The discussion is often hampered by equivocation between different quantitites that are the log of something. This post will try to clearly disambiguate between these notions and give both mathematical and intuitive explanations. I argue that the notion of a 'productive mistake' can be formalized as the choice to engage with a high wow high entropy source. Compare risk-seeking behaviour in MaxCausalEnt and Schmidthuber's Artificial Curiosity? Foundations of Reasoning Atocha Aliseda's Axioms of Abduction A book review of Aliseda's underappreciated 'Abductive Reasoning'. From SEP: In the philosophical literature, the term “abduction” is used in two related but different senses. In both senses, the term refers to some form of explanatory reasoning. However, in the historically first sense, it refers to the place of explanatory reasoning in generating hypotheses, while in the sense in which it is used most frequently in the modern literature it refers to the place of explan...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: All the posts I will never write, published by Self-Embedded Agent on August 14, 2022 on LessWrong. This post has been written for the first Refine blog post day, at the end of the week of readings, dicussions, and exercises about epistomology for doing good conceptual research. (/with courtesy to Adam Shimi who suggested the title and idea. ) Rationality, Probability, Uncertainty, Reasoning Failures of The Aumann Agreement Theorem The famous Aumann Agreement Theorem states that rational reasoners can never agree-to-disagree. In day-to-day life we clearly have many situations where rational reasoners cannot agree-to-disagree. Are people just bad rationalist or are there more fundamental reasons that the Aumann Agreement Theorem can fail. I review all the ways in which the Aumann Agreement Theorem can fail that I know of - including failures based on indexical information, computational-complexity obstacles, divergent-interpretations-of-evidence, Hansonian non-truth-seeking and more. Warren Buffet: The Alpha of Wall Street If we observe a trader that consistenly beat the market that should be evidence against the Efficient Market Hypothesis. A trader could also just have been lucky. How much should we update against the EMH and how much should we expect the trader to beat the market in the future? Can we quantify how much information the market absorbed? This is very reminiscent of Wows Bayesian surprise in Bayesian statistics. The Bid-Ask Spread and Epistemic Uncertainty/ Prediction Markets as Epistemic Fog of War If you know A will resolve you should buy shares on A, if you know not A will happen you should buy shares on not A. If you think A will not resolve you should sell shares on A. The Bid-ask Spread measures bet resolution uncertainty Suppose an adversary has an interest in showing you A and t. There is a -> selective reporting When an earnings call come in.. bid-ask spread increases. Where Forecasting goes Wrong... Forecasting is now a big deal in the rationalist community. I argue that a slavish adherence to Bayesian Orthodoxy leads to missing most of the value of prediction markets. What do we mean when we talk about Probability? Possibility theory is prior to Probability Theory. Probability theory is possibility theory + Cournot's principle. Cournot's principle that an epsilon/zero probability possible event will never happen is the fundamental principle of probability theory. cf Shafer on history of Cournot's principle. But what happens when we observe a epsilon/zero probability event? We obtain a contradiction requiring belief revision. Wow!1! I made a productive mistake An exposition of 'Bayesian Surprise attract Human Attention', focused on the notion of 'Bayesian surprisal' measured in wows. There has been a ton of interest in Predictive Processing and Friston's Free Energy Principle. The discussion is often hampered by equivocation between different quantitites that are the log of something. This post will try to clearly disambiguate between these notions and give both mathematical and intuitive explanations. I argue that the notion of a 'productive mistake' can be formalized as the choice to engage with a high wow high entropy source. Compare risk-seeking behaviour in MaxCausalEnt and Schmidthuber's Artificial Curiosity? Foundations of Reasoning Atocha Aliseda's Axioms of Abduction A book review of Aliseda's underappreciated 'Abductive Reasoning'. From SEP: In the philosophical literature, the term “abduction” is used in two related but different senses. In both senses, the term refers to some form of explanatory reasoning. However, in the historically first sense, it refers to the place of explanatory reasoning in generating hypotheses, while in the sense in which it is used most frequently in the modern literature it refers to the place of explan...

Vamos falar de Jogos mas não dos electrónicos. Vamos falar de xadrez e de póquer, mas não vamos ensinar como jogar mas sim do que está subjacente.Vamos falar do Dilema do Prisioneiro que, quer acredite ou não, explica muita vida fora das prisões.Joana Pais estreia-se no IN PERTINENTE ao lado de Hugo Van Der Ding e ambos vão levar-nos a esta Teoria que está presente nas nossas vidas em muito mais momentos do que aqueles dos quais temos consciência. Interpelada por Hugo, a Joana explica e contextualiza a Teoria dos Jogos, e depois põe-na em prática, ao vivo, desafiando o Hugo para um jogo. Ouça e, se lhe apetecer, jogue com eles ‘em directo'.REFERÊNCIAS E LINKS ÚTEIS:John von Neumann: -Artigo de 1928: Theory of Parlor Games, publicado em alemão: v. Neumann, J. (1928) Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Math. Ann. 100, 295–320 (1928). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847- Livro de 1944 com Oskar Morgenstern:v. Neumann, J, Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press. Émile BorelAntoine-Augustin Cournot:- Livro de 1838:Cournot, A.A. (1838) Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses (Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth). RAND Corporation:https://www.rand.org/John Nash:- Artigo de 1951:Nash, J. (1951). Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), 286–295. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529- Prémio em Ciências Económicas em memória de Nobel em 1994, com Reinhard Selten e John C. Harsanyi.-Filme: A Beautiful Mind (Uma Mente Brilhante) de 2001Dilema do Prisioneiro:Formulado por Merrill Flood e Melvin Dreshner da RAND Corp., com Albert Tucker em 1950.Colin F. Camererhttps://www.hss.caltech.edu/people/colin-f-camererArtigo sobre a teoria da hierarquia cognitiva (cognitive hierarchy theory):Camerer, C. F.,  Ho, T.-H. e Chong, J.-K. (2004). A cognitive hierarchy model of games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (3), 861-898. ISSN 0033-5533. doi:10.1162/0033553041502225.BIOSJOANA PAISJoana Pais é professora de Economia no ISEG da Universidade de Lisboa. Obteve o seu Ph.D. em Economia na Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona em 2005. Atualmente é coordenadora do programa de Mestrado em Economia e do programa de Doutoramento em Economia, ambos do ISEG, e membro da direção da unidade de investigação REM - Research in Economics and Mathematics. É ainda coordenadora do XLAB – Behavioural Research Lab, um laboratório que explora a tomada de decisão e o comportamento económico, político e social, suportado pelo consórcio PASSDA (Production and Archive of Social Science Data). Os seus interesses de investigação incluem áreas como a teoria de jogos, em particular, a teoria da afetação (matching theory), o desenho de mercados, a economia comportamental e a economia experimental.HUGO VAN DER DING Hugo van der Ding nasceu nos finais dos anos 70 ao largo do Golfo da Biscaia, durante uma viagem entre Amesterdão e Lisboa, e cresceu numa comunidade hippie nos arredores de Montpellier. Estudou História das Artes Decorativas Orientais, especializando-se em gansos de origami. Em 2012, desistiu da carreira académica para fazer desenhos nas redes sociais. Depois do sucesso de A Criada Malcriada deixou de precisar de trabalhar. Ainda assim, escreve regularmente em revistas e jornais, é autor de alguns livros e podcasts, faz ocasionalmente teatro e televisão, e continua a fazer desenhos nas redes sociais. Desde 2019 é um dos apresentadores do programa Manhãs da 3, na Antena 3.

Es tobt eine Ölkrise, die (noch) niemand bemerkt - was steckt dahinter und was si

The quantity-choice oligopoly games are Cournot (simultaneous) and Stackelberg (sequential).

We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition.

In this lecture we will talk about: Cournot’s model of oligopoly, Bertrand’s model of oligopoly, war of attrition, and first and second price sealed bid auctions.

We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition.

We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition.

In this study we analyze how markets work in the Information Society. In particular we concentrate on three important markets: the software market, the broadcasting market and "technology markets" where intellectual property rights can be traded. All these markets are characterized by modes of competition that are rather unorthodox and beyond simple Cournot or Bertrand models. Therefore, extended models are needed to gain insights about competition in the Information Society.