Podcasts about ketubot

Ketubot Daf 84 by Simon Wolf

Study Guide Ketubot 84 Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that a man’s right to inherit his wife’s property is a Torah law and he cannot make a stipulation against a law in the Torah. It was said Rav held like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel but not for the same reason. The Gemara brings four explanations for Rav - about what that Rashbag said did he agree and about what did he not agree? The first three suggestions are rejected. If someone dies and is owed money by someone or has an object being watched by someone, and there are a number of people who are owed money by the deceased, such as his widow (ketuba), a creditor and the heirs. Who has the first right to collect the money/object from the third party? If there are fruits detached from the ground and not on the property of one of the heirs, who has the first right to collect them? Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon debate what is the law in these cases. Even though Rabbi Akiva doesn't allow the creditor or the widow to seize the money/object, that is limited to a case where the husband dies, but if they seized it when he was still alive, they can claim rights to it after his death. Rav and Shmuel disagree with Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon - where do the possessions need to be in order to allow one of them to take it for themselves? A case was brought where they ruled like Rabbi Tarfon and when Reish Lakish heard this, he made them return the money to the heirs. Rabbi Yochanan disagreed with overturning the ruling. What was the basis for their disagreement? The Gemara first suggested that it is a debate regarding judges who rule incorrectly regarding something stated explicitly in a Mishna - do they need to undo the judgment and return the money or not? This suggestion is rejected and three other possible explanations are suggested. Rabbi Yochanan's relatives were owed money from a deceased man and they seized his cow. They went to Rabbi Yochanan for advice and he supported them. However, the case was brought before Reish Lakish and he ruled like Rabbi Akiva and made them return the cow to the heirs. Three other actual cases are brought - what was the ruling in each case?

Today's Talmud pages, Ketubot 82 and 83 and 84, give us a masterclass in how to make love last. Rabbi Dovid Bashevkin joins us to explain how the Ketubah works, and why it was designed to keep love in the air and marriages sustainable. Is getting married just too darn expensive? Listen and find out. Take One is a Tablet Studios production. The show is hosted by Liel Leibovitz, and is produced and edited by Darone Ruskay and Quinn Waller. Our team also includes Stephanie Butnick, Josh Kross, Mark Oppenheimer, Sara Fredman Aeder, Robert Scaramuccia, and Tanya Singer.  Check out all of Tablet's podcasts at tabletmag.com/podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

A new mishnah: what happens when a person dies and several people have claims on his money - whose claim is met first? Also, how the sages who debate the above the question accept or prioritize each other's views - with R. Tarfon and R. Akiva as the case in point.

Study Guide Ketubot 84 Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that a man’s right to inherit his wife’s property is a Torah law and he cannot make a stipulation against a law in the Torah. It was said Rav held like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel but not for the same reason. The Gemara brings four explanations for Rav - about what that Rashbag said did he agree and about what did he not agree? The first three suggestions are rejected. If someone dies and is owed money by someone or has an object being watched by someone, and there are a number of people who are owed money by the deceased, such as his widow (ketuba), a creditor and the heirs. Who has the first right to collect the money/object from the third party? If there are fruits detached from the ground and not on the property of one of the heirs, who has the first right to collect them? Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon debate what is the law in these cases. Even though Rabbi Akiva doesn't allow the creditor or the widow to seize the money/object, that is limited to a case where the husband dies, but if they seized it when he was still alive, they can claim rights to it after his death. Rav and Shmuel disagree with Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon - where do the possessions need to be in order to allow one of them to take it for themselves? A case was brought where they ruled like Rabbi Tarfon and when Reish Lakish heard this, he made them return the money to the heirs. Rabbi Yochanan disagreed with overturning the ruling. What was the basis for their disagreement? The Gemara first suggested that it is a debate regarding judges who rule incorrectly regarding something stated explicitly in a Mishna - do they need to undo the judgment and return the money or not? This suggestion is rejected and three other possible explanations are suggested. Rabbi Yochanan's relatives were owed money from a deceased man and they seized his cow. They went to Rabbi Yochanan for advice and he supported them. However, the case was brought before Reish Lakish and he ruled like Rabbi Akiva and made them return the cow to the heirs. Three other actual cases are brought - what was the ruling in each case?

Ketubot Daf 83 by Simon Wolf

[Shanah tovah! This episode is for Tuesday, September 27, the second day of Rosh Hashanah] A new chapter! Can you relinquish something that is your right to own? Specifically, can a husband recuse himself, as it were, from his wife's property? Or does it remain his for the produce of it, as those are the Torah's terms? Plus, whoever owns the given document is at a disadvantage - to what extent does the husband retain his rights? Also, a brief reflection on mortality, given how people handle their land (and how easily, or not so easily would they sell, depending on the commonality of consequences?). So, beyond the question of whether the adjustment to the Torah contract could even work, there's also the question of whether one would actually try!

[Shanah tovah! This episode is for Monday, September 25, the first day of Rosh Hashanah] More connections between yibum and the granting of a woman's ketubah, and other property considerations, as the yavam technically gets his hands on the property of the dead brother. Plus, a question how the yavam can come into control of her property - isn't it hers? Resh Lakish responds definitively that, yes, it's hers (which emends the mishnah!). Also, how the ketubah puts a lien on the husband's property - and how it was a surety for the wife even when the ketubah was a specific item, rather than the sum it came to be later. And how the sages made sure that divorce wouldn't be too easy, lest it be the result of a (normal) fight between the couple. Plus, the decree by Shimon ben Shetach establishing a ketubah that protects the woman better. [Who's Who: Shimon ben Shetach] PS: What are the implications for decorative ketubot?

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[Shanah tovah! This episode is for Sunday, September 25, Erev Rosh Hashanah] Who said halakhot were to be derived from the language of the ketubah? The mishnah connects the ketubah issues to that of sotah - the case of a woman suspected of adultery. The comparison leads to a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, regarding the terms of one's ketubah. Also, the question of whether a yevamah can collect her ketubah from the first husband while the yavam is alive? What would it mean for that money to be available? Moreover, how would everyone feel if that were put into practice? The mishnah is treated as important good advice.

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Ketubot Daf 82 by Simon Wolf

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The Mishna brings different statements a husband can make to relinquish his rights to her usufruct (nichsei melog) property. Which language exempts him from which rights? Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees regarding his right to inherit the property upon her death and holds that his right to inherit the property is a Torah law and he cannot make a stipulation against a law in the Torah. Why does it work for him to relinquish his rights by making a declaration, when in the case of a partnership, one who declares they want no share in the property does not relinquish one’s rights as it is likely one said it out of anger or frustration and didn’t actually mean it? How are the cases different? In the partnership case, what if they did a kinyan? Would it be effective? Why in the first case in the Mishna does the husband relinquish his rights only to the extent that she can sell the property? Why not the other rights instead or the other ones as well? Rabbi Yehuda states that to relinquish rights to the proceeds of the proceeds and the proceeds of those proceeds and so on, one needs to be very specific with the language. What aspect of the wording is the part that is critical – the words “proceeds or proceeds” or “forever?” If one only mentioned proceeds or proceeds and not proceeds alone, are the rights to the proceeds relinquished as well? Rav held like Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel but not for the same reason. What was Rav’s reason?

This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the refuah shleima of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah. "It was a zechut to be able to listen to Rabbanit Michelle’s live Daf zoom during the past three weeks while I was in Jerusalem." Today's daf is sponsored by Jason, Erica, and Raquel in honor of their mother, Patty Belkin's birthday. "Wishing a happy birthday to our amazing mother. Mom you renew and inspire us every day." Today's daf is sponsored for the shloshim of Howie Farkas, Shalom Tzvi ben Necha Dvora. If a woman dies while she is waiting to do yibum, does her yabam (the brother of her husband who is supposed to marry her) responsible to bury her? Abaye tries to prove that he does, as he inherits her ketuba from her first husband, and if he doesn't bury her, then he should be required to pay her ketuba to her heirs. Rava argues against this claim as the inheritance is from the brother, not from her, and he has no responsibility to pay the ketuba as a ketuba is not meant to be collected in the lifetime of the husband (when the wife is not free to marry as she pleases) and therefore, since the yabam was still alive and the wife was supposed to be married to him, the ketuba was not up for collection. This is derived from the wording of the ketuba "And when you get married to someone else, you will take what it written to you." Abaye rejects Rava's retort by pointing out that only Beit Shamai expounds the wording of the ketuba and he also holds (derived from laws of the Sotah) that a document that was meant to be collected is as if it's collected and since her ketuba was meant to be collected upon her husband's death, it is if it is hers already and that's why the yabam would be obligated to pay it in this case. In order to explain the fulfillment of the line in the ketuba "And when you get married to someone else, you will take what it written to you," according to Abaye, Rav Ashi explains that the "someone else" can be the yabam himself. Rava responds to Abaye by bringing a braita showing that one cannot claim a ketuba from a yabam. The proof is based on the fact that the braita suggests certain suggestions for a yabam who wants to access his brother's possessions. From the fact that the braita doesn't suggest to set aside money for her to get her ketuba payment, it is clear that the wife is not able to receive her ketuba in his lifetime, as Rava suggested earlier. Before answering the question, the Gemara questions why Rava didn't raise the same question from our Mishna. That question is answered by suggesting that our Mishna is just "good advice" and not the law. Then Abaye answers Rava's question by giving a different explanation as to why he can't put aside the ketuba money, as that would cause the wife to think that the husband dislikes her and wants to divorce her - and that is not good for a marriage!! What rights does a yabam have to his brother’s property in the event that he married his widow? Since the woman ketuba is liened to the property, he cannot sell it or promise it to anyone else. A case was brought in which he committed to his brother half the property, however, it was not his right to do that. However, even if he was not allowed to do it, it is valid anyway? There is a debate between Rav Yosef and Abaye about this. Rav Yosef tries to prove his position (that the sale is not valid) from a braita. Rav Manyumai, in support of Abaye says that the source he quoted is not a reliable source. Why?

A case is brought in which a yabam committed to share his brother’s inheritance with his other brother but as opposed to that case in Ketubot 81, he did a kinyan to show he wanted to make sure it was effective. However, they still ruled that it was not effective as a kinyan cannot be effective when the item isn’t yours to sell. The property of his brother is not his, even once he married the yavama. Once a yabam marries his brother’s wife, she is his wife for all intents and purposes. Why was this necessary to say – for what halacha? Why does he not need to give her a ketuba, but she uses the one she has from his brother (the first marriage)? Shimon ben Shatach instituted that all the husband’s property be liened to the ketuba. What was before he instituted this and why was it a necessary takana?

Ketubot Daf 81 by Simon Wolf

This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the refuah shleima of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah. "It was a zechut to be able to listen to Rabbanit Michelle’s live Daf zoom during the past three weeks while I was in Jerusalem." Today's daf is sponsored by Jason, Erica, and Raquel in honor of their mother, Patty Belkin's birthday. "Wishing a happy birthday to our amazing mother. Mom you renew and inspire us every day." Today's daf is sponsored for the shloshim of Howie Farkas, Shalom Tzvi ben Necha Dvora. If a woman dies while she is waiting to do yibum, does her yabam (the brother of her husband who is supposed to marry her) responsible to bury her? Abaye tries to prove that he does, as he inherits her ketuba from her first husband, and if he doesn't bury her, then he should be required to pay her ketuba to her heirs. Rava argues against this claim as the inheritance is from the brother, not from her, and he has no responsibility to pay the ketuba as a ketuba is not meant to be collected in the lifetime of the husband (when the wife is not free to marry as she pleases) and therefore, since the yabam was still alive and the wife was supposed to be married to him, the ketuba was not up for collection. This is derived from the wording of the ketuba "And when you get married to someone else, you will take what it written to you." Abaye rejects Rava's retort by pointing out that only Beit Shamai expounds the wording of the ketuba and he also holds (derived from laws of the Sotah) that a document that was meant to be collected is as if it's collected and since her ketuba was meant to be collected upon her husband's death, it is if it is hers already and that's why the yabam would be obligated to pay it in this case. In order to explain the fulfillment of the line in the ketuba "And when you get married to someone else, you will take what it written to you," according to Abaye, Rav Ashi explains that the "someone else" can be the yabam himself. Rava responds to Abaye by bringing a braita showing that one cannot claim a ketuba from a yabam. The proof is based on the fact that the braita suggests certain suggestions for a yabam who wants to access his brother's possessions. From the fact that the braita doesn't suggest to set aside money for her to get her ketuba payment, it is clear that the wife is not able to receive her ketuba in his lifetime, as Rava suggested earlier. Before answering the question, the Gemara questions why Rava didn't raise the same question from our Mishna. That question is answered by suggesting that our Mishna is just "good advice" and not the law. Then Abaye answers Rava's question by giving a different explanation as to why he can't put aside the ketuba money, as that would cause the wife to think that the husband dislikes her and wants to divorce her - and that is not good for a marriage!! What rights does a yabam have to his brother’s property in the event that he married his widow? Since the woman ketuba is liened to the property, he cannot sell it or promise it to anyone else. A case was brought in which he committed to his brother half the property, however, it was not his right to do that. However, even if he was not allowed to do it, it is valid anyway? There is a debate between Rav Yosef and Abaye about this. Rav Yosef tries to prove his position (that the sale is not valid) from a braita. Rav Manyumai, in support of Abaye says that the source he quoted is not a reliable source. Why?

A case is brought in which a yabam committed to share his brother’s inheritance with his other brother but as opposed to that case in Ketubot 81, he did a kinyan to show he wanted to make sure it was effective. However, they still ruled that it was not effective as a kinyan cannot be effective when the item isn’t yours to sell. The property of his brother is not his, even once he married the yavama. Once a yabam marries his brother’s wife, she is his wife for all intents and purposes. Why was this necessary to say – for what halacha? Why does he not need to give her a ketuba, but she uses the one she has from his brother (the first marriage)? Shimon ben Shatach instituted that all the husband’s property be liened to the ketuba. What was before he instituted this and why was it a necessary takana?

The Mishna brings different statements a husband can make to relinquish his rights to her usufruct (nichsei melog) property. Which language exempts him from which rights? Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees regarding his right to inherit the property upon her death and holds that his right to inherit the property is a Torah law and he cannot make a stipulation against a law in the Torah. Why does it work for him to relinquish his rights by making a declaration, when in the case of a partnership, one who declares they want no share in the property does not relinquish one’s rights as it is likely one said it out of anger or frustration and didn’t actually mean it? How are the cases different? In the partnership case, what if they did a kinyan? Would it be effective? Why in the first case in the Mishna does the husband relinquish his rights only to the extent that she can sell the property? Why not the other rights instead or the other ones as well? Rabbi Yehuda states that to relinquish rights to the proceeds of the proceeds and the proceeds of those proceeds and so on, one needs to be very specific with the language. What aspect of the wording is the part that is critical – the words “proceeds or proceeds” or “forever?” If one only mentioned proceeds or proceeds and not proceeds alone, are the rights to the proceeds relinquished as well? Rav held like Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel but not for the same reason. What was Rav’s reason?

כתובות פא

Dedicated by Morris and Julie Dweck in Honor of their children.

Outline of the Sugya: https://tinyurl.com/2ocn5824

Dedicated by Morris and Julie Dweck in Honor of their children.

Outline of the Sugya: https://tinyurl.com/2gvt3wfg

WhatsApp: https://chat.whatsapp.com/FXa7oyBAXeQ48vkXswmxz2 https://www.sefaria.org.il/Ketubot.82a Email: sruli@babbleontalmud.com

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כתובות פב

Ketubot Daf 80 by Simon Wolf

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How much food counts as "eating"? In terms of getting benefit from the property. What if one's animals eat? Also, back to husbands and wives and shared property - when it's worked by sharecroppers. Plus, a mishnah about a woman awaiting yibum, and in the interim, she inherits property. Who has the right to it?

A husband has rights to the proceeds of his wife’s usufruct property (nichsei melog). However, once the marriage ends, he has no rights at all. He can get back the money invested only if he was not able to benefit at all from the proceeds. How much does he need to benefit to have it considered that he did not benefit? In the event that he does get back his investment, he needs to swear about how much he spent. Rav Asi says only if the investment is equal to the gain. What did he mean by this? Abaye and Rava each have different explanations. If a husband brought in sharecroppers and then the marriage is dissolved, do they have the exact same rights as the husband or not? On what does it depend? Can a husband sell his rights to the proceeds? If land is inherited or gifted to a woman while she is waiting for yibum, both Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree that she can sell it. What happens to her possessions if she dies? On what does it depend? A yabam or husband cannot designate items for the woman for her ketuba collection to free up their land. Who is responsible to bury a woman waiting for yibum?

A woman on the verge of the second marriage who wants to keep her property from the clutches, as it were, of the new husband, and makes a gift of it to her unmarried daughter. Then the daughter gets married, the stuff goes to the husband, the daughter gets divorced, and the mother wants her property back. Can she get it back? R. Nachman tears up the document establishing the gift to the daughter. So is it really ever a gift? Also, a new mishnah: if a married woman inherits movable property and land, so the husband gets the benefits. And another 2 mishnayot: what if the wife has elderly slaves? How does that work with the husband's rights? Plus, who pays for the costs of property? A good deal of complications regarding the property that comes into a marriage, and then becomes estate planning, essentially.

Today's Talmud pages, Ketubot 79, 80, and 81, reminds us of our responsibilities for the deceased, beginning with their burial. Producer Darone Ruskay joins us to tell a wild tale of inheritance, cemeteries, and a promise that can't be broken. Why is one coveted New York burial plot standing a quarter empty? Listen and find out. Take One is a Tablet Studios production. The show is hosted by Liel Leibovitz, and is produced and edited by Darone Ruskay and Quinn Waller. Our team also includes Stephanie Butnick, Josh Kross, Mark Oppenheimer, Sara Fredman Aeder, Robert Scaramuccia, and Tanya Singer.  Check out all of Tablet's podcasts at tabletmag.com/podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

A woman gifted her property to her daughter in order that her husband not gain rights to the produce. When the marriage ended, she wanted her property back. Did the daughter need to return the property to the mother? Would the same hold true if she had gifted it to someone who wasn't her relative? On what does this depend? If the woman gets money or moveable items, she needs to sell them and buy land so that she retains the principle and the husband can have the produce from it. There is a debate regarding the status of produce attached to the ground at the time of the marriage - is it considered produce and given to the husband or is it considered the principle and they would need to evaluate its worth and purchase land with that amount. The Gemara raises issues with a number of different items - are they considered the principle or the produce? Who gets the double payment of a robber in a case where one robs the offspring of a melog animal? How does this correspond to a debate regarding the ownership of offspring of slaves and animals that are melog? There are proceeds that she can demand to get back when the marriage dissolves, as long as she pays for them, as they are important to her family. What happens with slaves that are old or trees/vines that are old? Do they need to be sold or can she claim that they are important to her family? Can the husband receive his investment expenditures back after the marriage if the profits didn't exceed the expenses? On what does it depend? 

Today's Talmud page, Ketubot 78, reminds us that Judaism isn't an ephemeral, ethereal religion: We're about life right now and right here on this earth, which means caring about... stuff. How do the things we own define us? And how might crass commercialism save our souls and save America? Listen and find out. Take One is a Tablet Studios production. The show is hosted by Liel Leibovitz, and is produced and edited by Darone Ruskay and Quinn Waller. Our team also includes Stephanie Butnick, Josh Kross, Mark Oppenheimer, Sara Fredman Aeder, Robert Scaramuccia, and Tanya Singer.  Check out all of Tablet's podcasts at tabletmag.com/podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices