Podcasts about ketubot

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

Two more answers (altogether five) are brought to reconcile the contradiction between the braita and the Mishna in Ketubot 29a. From where does Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul learn that if one can neutralize the pursuer, one is not allowed to kill him? When one is pursuing another and either the pursuer, the pursued or the one trying to stop the pursuer causes damage - who is exempt from payment and who is liable to pay? Why?  What is the basis for the opinions of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Eliezer who add more cases to the list where one can kill one who is about to commit a certain transgression? Rabbi Yochanan quotes Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak saying that the rabbis sat in an attic in Lod and ruled that if one is threatened by death unless they transgress one of the commandments, they should transgress the commandment and not be killed, as the commandments were given to "live by them." However, there are three exceptions to the rule - idol worship, inappropriate sexual relations and murder (yehareg v'al yaavor). What is the source for the three exceptions? There are also certain circumstances in which one must give oneself over to be killed rather than transgress any commandment - if it is in public and if it is a time of religious persecution. What is the definition of public? How was Esther permitted to engage in relations with Achashverosh if it was public? Rava and Abaye each provide an answer.  Are Bnei Noach also commanded to give themselves over to be killed if asked to transgress one of the Noahide laws in public? 

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

Two more answers (altogether five) are brought to reconcile the contradiction between the braita and the Mishna in Ketubot 29a. From where does Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul learn that if one can neutralize the pursuer, one is not allowed to kill him? When one is pursuing another and either the pursuer, the pursued or the one trying to stop the pursuer causes damage - who is exempt from payment and who is liable to pay? Why?  What is the basis for the opinions of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Eliezer who add more cases to the list where one can kill one who is about to commit a certain transgression? Rabbi Yochanan quotes Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak saying that the rabbis sat in an attic in Lod and ruled that if one is threatened by death unless they transgress one of the commandments, they should transgress the commandment and not be killed, as the commandments were given to "live by them." However, there are three exceptions to the rule - idol worship, inappropriate sexual relations and murder (yehareg v'al yaavor). What is the source for the three exceptions? There are also certain circumstances in which one must give oneself over to be killed rather than transgress any commandment - if it is in public and if it is a time of religious persecution. What is the definition of public? How was Esther permitted to engage in relations with Achashverosh if it was public? Rava and Abaye each provide an answer.  Are Bnei Noach also commanded to give themselves over to be killed if asked to transgress one of the Noahide laws in public? 

Today is the song of the Pered/Mule . As we know, a horse and a donkey make a mule. That doesn't even sound like a creature to me. What is his greatness? His song is: פֶּרֶד אוֹמֵר. יוֹדוּךָ יְיָ כָּל מַלְכֵי אָרֶץ כִּי שָׁמְעוּ אִמְרֵי פִיךָ: (תהילים קלח ד) All the kings of the world will praise You, because they heard the words of Your mouth. What does this refer to? We need to go to the Gemara in Kiddushin 31A, where it says the great Ulah made a derasha on why it says Imrei ficha / Words of Your mouth and not Ma'Amareh Ficha When Hashem said, Anochi V'Lo Yiheh Lecha, I am Hashem, there is no one but Me, the nations heard about that and thought He only cares about Himself. But when they heard Kabed et Aviva V'et Imecha, they reverted to belief in the original statements. The Maharsha explains the word Imre comes from imra , which is the end of a garment. So when they got to the end of the first half of the Luchot and they heard, on the side of ben Adam L'Makom , that Hashem brought in parents, they said, " So He's not just out for Himself." Moreover, the Chatam Sofer says, simply speaking, Kibud Av V'Em is between man and man. Only the first four commandments, so to say, concerned Hashem. The other six were for people. So when they saw that Hashem gave the majority to Ben Adam L'Chavero, that impressed them. That's our pasuk. The next piece of information is a Tosafot in Hagiga 2B that quotes a Tosefta in the fifth perek that a certain Tanna said You're not allowed to ride on a mule because a mule is kilayim . It's a mixture of a donkey and a horse, and therefore you can't benefit from it. Although we don't hold like that, they questioned, "What about the pasuk in Melachim 1,1 that says Shlomo Hamelech was on a mule? How can it be forbidden? To which the Yerushalmi says (in the perek of Kilayim) that this mule was created at the beginning of time, according to the opinion that God created mules as well. So, what exactly is the purpose of Hashem creating a mule from the beginning of time- just for Shlomo Hamelech to ride on? What's going on? The Chatam Sofer, in his sefer Torat Moshe on sefer Likutim, says that a horse symbolizes arrogance, as we said in a previous lesson. And the Ramban writes this on Ki Gaoh Gaah Sus V'Rochbo Rama B'Yam , that Hashem was more arrogant or more powerful than the horse and its rider. And the hamor/donkey symbolizes humility . The donkey keeps his head down, he doesn't bother anybody. That's why Abraham Avinu, Moshe Rabbenu, and Mashiach, BeH b'yamenu, all ride on donkeys, which symbolize humility. The king has a mixture. On one hand, he has to be arrogant. It says He can't forgo his honor because he's the king. The king has to be in charge of the country, he has to be tough. On the other hand, internally, his heart has to be broken, as it says, he is not allowed be externally arrogant. On one hand, externally, he has to show a royal appearance. There are many laws about his kavod. He can't bathe with people.. etc. It says that he has to be the king above you, and upon you. The Gemara in Ketubot 17 says, if a king forgives his honor, the honor is not forgiven. The Torah tells us, You shall place the king upon you. Which the Gemara says means, fear has to be upon you. So on one hand, the king has to be feared. He has to have a presence. But inside, he can't be arrogant. Therefore, God wanted Shlomo Hamelech to ride on this mule. It has the blend of the horse, which has a little bit of arrogance, and the donkey, which has humility. Beautiful. That's what the mule represents. And Hashem is similar. On one hand, Hashem is the king. Ge'ut Lavesh/He wears arrogance. On the other hand, it says, wherever you find Hashem's greatness, you find His humility. We see this in the Aseret HaDibrot. Hashem says four things about Himself, and then suddenly tells us, Respect your parents, and so on. And that's when the nations of the earth said, " יוֹדוּךָ יְיָ כָּל מַלְכֵי אָרֶץ All the kings will praise God." Why the kings? Because the kings look to God and say, " Look at how, how God acts. He has a blend of arrogance and humility. And therefore, the song of the mule is the song of the blend of arrogance and humility. His song is, " Listen, oh, kings of the world, listen and look at the way Hashem acts." And our first major king, (David Hamelech was the first king, but it says Shlomo Hamelech was the full strength, he was the 15th generation from Avraham Avinu. He was the moon in its fullest phase. And that is the ultimate- even with all his wives and his wealth and his power, with that, he still had a blend of humility. That's the message of the mule. And that's the message to all of us, to have this blend and appreciate these Middot.

Rebecca Hornstein serves as executive director of Boston Workers Circle: Center for Jewish Culture & Social Justice, but she is also a talented artist who creates ketubot (Jewish marriage contracts, often crafted to be beautiful art pieces), through a project called Rituals for Revolutionaries. She joins Dan and Lex for a conversation that covers ketubot, the power of Jewish ritual moments, and a magical Yiddish word that may be new to you: “veltlich” (“secular” or “worldly”). This episode is the 6th conversation in an ongoing Judaism Unbound mini-series exploring Jewish weddings.Sign up for Apocry-Fest: Hanukkah Unbound and Un-Canonized by heading to www.JudaismUnbound.com/apocryfest. Do so, and we'll send you all sorts of cool Apocryphal (ApocryFUN!) stuff, during Hanukkah, to help enrich your experience of this holiday! Access full shownotes for this episode via this link. If you're enjoying Judaism Unbound, please help us keep things going with a one-time or monthly tax-deductible donation -- support Judaism Unbound by clicking here!

¿Sabías que en muchas bodas judías hombres y mujeres no bailan juntos? Esta práctica, que sorprende a muchos, tiene raíces en la halajá, la historia y los cambios culturales de las comunidades judías. En este episodio de Judaísmo Picante, exploramos: • ¿Es el baile mixto una prohibición halájica o una costumbre moderna? • ¿Qué dice el Talmud sobre bailar con la novia? • ¿Cómo se vivía el baile en la Edad Media y el Renacimiento judío? • ¿Qué influencia tienen las normas sociales y las interpretaciones contemporáneas? Acompáñame en un viaje a través de textos bíblicos, talmúdicos e históricos para descubrir cómo la danza ha unido y dividido a nuestras comunidades. ¡Este episodio no es solo un análisis, sino una invitación a reflexionar sobre nuestra conexión con la tradición y el futuro que queremos bailar juntos! Fuentes: Ruptura y Reconstrucción: La Transformación de la Ortodoxia Contemporánea; Éxodo 15:20; Eclesiastés 3:4; Jueces 11:34; II Samuel 6:5, 14; Ketubot 17a; Berajot 20a; Sefer HaJinuj, Ley 188; Kiddushin 70a; Hiddushei HaRITVA, Kiddushin; Beit HaBehirah, Ketubot; Shabat 13a; Levush de Mordejai Yaffo; Bayyit Hadash de Yoel ben Shmuel Sirkes; The Jews in the Renaissance de Cecil Roth; A Jewish Dancing Master of the Renaissance: Guglielmo Ebreo de Otto Kinkeldey; Ya'arot Davar de Rabino Yonatan Eyebschutz; Arukh HaShulhan, Orah Hayyim 529:7 de Rabino Yehiel Michel Epstein; Igrot Moshe, Orah Hayyim, Parte 4, No. 35 y Even HaEzer, Parte 2, No. 13 de Rabino Moshe Feinstein; Rabino Ovadiah Yosef; Leyes de Platón; Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History de William H. McNeill; Rab Golinkin. Spotify: open.spotify.com/show/6l3kxIeAgGavsMSvEKDnzd Instagram: /pasionygratitud ¡Te invitamos a suscribirte y dejar tus comentarios! El Rab Diego lee personalmente cada uno de los mensajes.

Our Gemara cites a mishnah from Ketubot regarding not determining status, specifically of a kohen, when there is testimony from only one witness - with caveats and those who say we do trust the one witness, depending. Refining the dispute - can witness testimony be combined (that is, when the witnesses are not testifying together). Plus, a dispute over an IOU, which turns out to be forged - though the debt is real.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Audrey Mondrow from her children and grandchildren. "You are an example of a lifetime learner." Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in honor of the marriage of their daughter, Sophia Altman today, and also the recent marriage of their son, Isaac Altman, and the yahrtzeit of Moshe Rabbeinu. "Sending brachot that the ultimate Shadchan find matches for all of those who are looking." Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia (Sara Devora) Simmons in loving memory of her father, Avraham Nachum ben Yisroel Simelis z"l on his yahrzeit today. "Survivor of the Kovno ghetto, "a brand plucked from burning fire" he planted the seeds of Torah learning with his enduring faith still inspiring today and in the future." There is another unsuccessful attempt to find a source to show that a betrothed woman who is widowed receives the ketuba money, even if she did not have a written ketuba. Therefore, Abaye's support for Rabbi Yochanan's reading of the Mishna in Ketubot 88b is edited and is derived directly from the words of the Mishna by rejecting the possibility that the Mishna was referring only to a place where in general they did not write ketubot and women used their get documents to collect their ketuba money. Therefore the Mishna is referring even to a case where a ketuba was written and yet we allow the woman to collect her ketuba money even without producing the ketuba document and do not trust the husband to claim it was already paid. The Mishna says if one finds a get or will or gift document, one cannot return it because maybe the person changed their mind and decided not to give it. This implies that if the husband/owner says now that he wants to give it (after we find it) he can, even if time has elapsed. This contradicts a Mishna in Gittin 27 that rules that one can only give a get that was found immediately and not after time has elapsed, as perhaps someone else with the same name lost it and it is not the get written for this man and this woman. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between a place where there are caravans and it is known that there are two couples with the same names. Rabbi Zeira raises the same contradiction but between the Mishna in Gittin and a Tosefta, not from an inference from our Mishna. He resolves it in the same way as Raba, however, it is unclear if he limits the Mishna to a case where there are caravans or also when it is known that there are two people with the same names. If he disagrees with Raba on that issue, what is the root of their debate? Why did Raba choose to bring the contradiction from our Mishna and Rabbi Zeira to bring it from the Tosefta? Rabbi Yirmia and Rav Ashi each bring two other resolutions to the contradiction between the Tosefta and the Mishna in Gittin.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Audrey Mondrow from her children and grandchildren. "You are an example of a lifetime learner." Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in honor of the marriage of their daughter, Sophia Altman today, and also the recent marriage of their son, Isaac Altman, and the yahrtzeit of Moshe Rabbeinu. "Sending brachot that the ultimate Shadchan find matches for all of those who are looking." Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia (Sara Devora) Simmons in loving memory of her father, Avraham Nachum ben Yisroel Simelis z"l on his yahrzeit today. "Survivor of the Kovno ghetto, "a brand plucked from burning fire" he planted the seeds of Torah learning with his enduring faith still inspiring today and in the future." There is another unsuccessful attempt to find a source to show that a betrothed woman who is widowed receives the ketuba money, even if she did not have a written ketuba. Therefore, Abaye's support for Rabbi Yochanan's reading of the Mishna in Ketubot 88b is edited and is derived directly from the words of the Mishna by rejecting the possibility that the Mishna was referring only to a place where in general they did not write ketubot and women used their get documents to collect their ketuba money. Therefore the Mishna is referring even to a case where a ketuba was written and yet we allow the woman to collect her ketuba money even without producing the ketuba document and do not trust the husband to claim it was already paid. The Mishna says if one finds a get or will or gift document, one cannot return it because maybe the person changed their mind and decided not to give it. This implies that if the husband/owner says now that he wants to give it (after we find it) he can, even if time has elapsed. This contradicts a Mishna in Gittin 27 that rules that one can only give a get that was found immediately and not after time has elapsed, as perhaps someone else with the same name lost it and it is not the get written for this man and this woman. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between a place where there are caravans and it is known that there are two couples with the same names. Rabbi Zeira raises the same contradiction but between the Mishna in Gittin and a Tosefta, not from an inference from our Mishna. He resolves it in the same way as Raba, however, it is unclear if he limits the Mishna to a case where there are caravans or also when it is known that there are two people with the same names. If he disagrees with Raba on that issue, what is the root of their debate? Why did Raba choose to bring the contradiction from our Mishna and Rabbi Zeira to bring it from the Tosefta? Rabbi Yirmia and Rav Ashi each bring two other resolutions to the contradiction between the Tosefta and the Mishna in Gittin.