Podcasts about Talmud

There is a major disagreement between the Poskim regarding how many Berachot are recited before putting on Tefilin. Rabbenu Tam )R. Ya'akob b. Meir, 1100-1171, France) and the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, 1250-1327, Germany-Spain) rule that two Berachot are recited, one on the Shel Yad (Tefilin of the arm) and one for the Shel Rosh (Tefilin of the head). They hold that they are two distinct Misvot, requiring a separate Beracha on each. On the other hand, the Rif (Rabbi Yishak of Fez, Morocco, 1013-1103), as well as Rashi and Rambam disagree and hold that only one Beracha of "L'haniah Tefilin" is recited before the Shel Yad, and that covers both. Both sides bring a proof to their position from the same Gemara in Menahot. The Gemara states that if a person spoke in between putting on the Shel Yad and the Shel Rosh, he must make a Beracha on the Shel Rosh. From here, Rashi derives that one makes a special second Beracha on the Shel Rosh only if he spoke, but ordinarily there is only one Beracha. Rabbenu Tam interprets the Gemara in line with his position. He says that of course one always makes a Beracha on the Shel Rosh. The Gemara is saying that if he talks, he now has to make two Berachot on the Shel Rosh, since he interrupted the first Beracha made on the Shel Yad. There is disagreement as to what Rabbenu HaAri's opinion was. The Ben Ish Hai writes that the Arizal explained the reasoning for each opinion, but did not rule in favor of one practice. The Kaf HaHaim writes in SIman 25 that he has proof from Sha'ar HaKavanot that the Arizal held like Rashi and the Rif.This disagreement evolves into divergent practice between Ashkenazim and Sepharadim. The Sepharadim follow the opinion of the Rif and Rambam that only one Beracha is recited. The author of the She'elot U'Teshubot Min Hashamayim (Responsa from Heaven, Rabbi Ya'akob of Mirvish, d. 1243) would ask a Halachic question of the Heavens before going to sleep and would receive answers in his dream. When he asked whom to follow in this question, he saw the Pasuk "And I will establish my covenant with YISHAK." He understood from this that the Halacha is in accordance with the Rif-Rabbi YISHAK Alfasi. That is the accepted practice.The Bet Yosef cites the Rabbenu Ya'akob b. Habib who says that those who recite two Berachot should say, "Baruch Shem K'vod Malchuto L'Olam Va'ed" after the second Beracha. This is meant to alleviate the possibility that the second Beracha was said in vein. The Bet Yosef, after paying respect to this opinion, says that it is hard to understand. If the Ashkenazim have a genuine uncertainty whether to say the second Beracha, they must refrain from making the doubtful Beracha and not risk saying Hashem's name in vein. The Mishna Berura (Rav Yisrael Meir Kagan of Radin, 1839-1933) answers that saying "Baruch Shem…" is just a Humra, and not really because of a doubt. There ae enough authorities to rely on who rule in favor of saying the second Beracha. Interestingly, saying "Baruch Shem…" became the accepted practice of the Ashkenazim.The Be'ur Halacha (Rav Yisrael Meir Kagan of Radin, 1839-1933) cites Rabbi Akiva Eger (1761-1837) who suggests in his glosses to Shulhan Aruch a way for Ashkenazim to recite the second Beracha without entering a Halachic uncertainty. He says that they should say the first Beracha on the Shel Yad with explicit intent that it should NOT cover the Shel Rosh. The Peri Megadim objects to this solution, but does not explain why. The Be'ur Halacha explains that the Peri Megadim objected because it is changing a long standing Minhag (custom). For generations, Ashkenazim recited two Berachot on Tefilin and said "Baruch Shem…" If there was a better way to do it, the giants of the previous generations would have already done so.The Poskim discuss whether a Sepharadi may answer Amen to an Ashkenazi's second Beracha. Hacham Bension rules that there is no problem since it is a legitimate Beracha for the Ashkenazi reciting it. This ruling applies to other cases where an Ashkenazi recites a Beracha that Sepharadim do not, such as Hallel on Rosh Hodesh and a Beracha by women on the Lulav. It is important to note that this was also the opinion of Hacham Baruch, even though Hacham Ovadia disagreed. Hacham Ovadia held that any Beracha that one cannot make for himself is considered a Beracha L'vatala (in vein), and he should not answer Amen to someone else who makes that Beracha. According to him, one should not answer Amen to an Ashkenazi's second Beracha, nor to Hallel on Rosh Hodesh and a woman's Beracha on the Lulav.L'Ma'aseh, one can adopt a compromise suggested by Hacham Bension. He can avoid the issue altogether by synchronizing the end of the other person's Beracha with saying the Pasuk "Baruch Hashem L'Olam Amen v'AMEN," which ends with Amen. However, if one did not do so, he MAY answer Amen, in accordance with Hacham BaruchSUMMARYA Sepharadi may answer Amen to the second Beracha recited by an Ashkenazi on his Tefilin, as well as to all other Berachot which Ashkenazim recite, but Sepharadim do not.

Today's Daf Yomi page, Moed Katan 14, raises the question of prison. Rabbi Dovid Bashevkin joins us to explain why the rabbis compared the prison to a womb, and how this imagery continues to influence our thinking today. How should we think about criminal justice reform, according to the Talmud? Listen and find out.  Like the show? Send us a note at takeone@tabletmag.com. Follow us on Twitter at @takeonedafyomi and join the conversation in the Take One Facebook group. Take One is hosted by Liel Leibovitz and produced by Josh Kross, Sara Fredman Aeder, and Robert Scaramuccia. Check out all of Tablet's podcasts at tabletmag.com/podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In the Halachot of Tefilin, there is a discussion whether one must make a new Beracha if he puts on a second pair of Tefilin. Take for example the following case. A person comes to Shul without his Tefilin, so he borrows a pair and makes a Beracha on them. During the Tefila, he finds his own Tefilin, which are more Mehudar, and wants to put them on instead. Does he have to make a new Beracha of "L'haniah Tefilin" or not?Ostensibly, this should be a simple question. The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) already established in the Halachot of Sisit that if one wants to put on a different Tallit, he must make a new Beracha, even if he had specific intent to switch to the new Tallit when making the first Beracha. This ruling is accepted by Hacham Ovadia, and seemingly, the case of Tefilin should be no different. He should have to make a new Beracha. However, the Zera Emmet distinguished between the case of Tefilin and the Tallit, and ruled that one should NOT make a new Beracha on the Tefilin. He argued that there is a fundamental difference in the nature of the obligation of these two Misvot. Technically, there is no obligation to wear a four-cornered garment. Rather, if one chooses to wear it, he must tie Sisit. Therefore, once a person takes off the first Tallit, he has finished the Misva, and there is no obligation to continue doing so. When he put on a second Tallit, it is new Misva and requires a new Beracha. On the other hand, there is an active commandment to wear Tefilin for as much of the day as possible; the Misva is continuous. Therefore, even after he removes the first pair, his obligation continues. The second pair of Tefilin are a natural continuation of the first pair and do not need a new Beracha. Hacham Ovadia, in Yabia Omer vol. 3, brings down the opinion of the Zera Emmet, which implies that he agrees. Nevertheless, Hacham David in his responsa "Osrot Yosef," printed in the back of Halacha Berura on Tefilin, writes that he found a ruling of the Sefer HaEshkol (R. Avraham b. Yishak, 12th Century, France) regarding Hilchot Mezuza, from which he derives his opinion regarding Tefilin. The Sefer HaEshkol rules that if one removed a Mezuza in order to replace it with a more Mehudar Mezuza, he must make a new Beracha. Hacham David reasons that if this is true regarding Mezuza, which is a constant Misva that cannot be fulfilled by merely placing it one the doorpost once a day, certainly it is true regarding the Misva of Tefilin, which can be fulfilled fundamentally by putting them on once a day. Based on this, Hacham David rules that one must recite a new Beracha on the second pair of Tefilin. He argues that if Hacham Ovadia would have seen this ruling of the Sefer HaEshkol, he would have retracted his ruling in accordance with the Zera Emmet.The Halacha is in accordance with Hacham David. Nevertheless, it is preferable to avoid entering this dilemma in the first place. One should create an interruption between donning the two pairs of Tefilin, by taking a walk outside.SUMMARY:If one put on a second pair of Tefilin or Tallit, he must recite a new Beracha, even if he had intent to switch when making the original Beracha.

The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin (p. 101) states that it prohibited to take off Tefilin in front of one's rabbi. Rashi explains that doing so is disrespectful, since removing the Tefilin Shel Rosh requires removing one's hat. Based on this Gemara, the Shulhan Aruch (Siman 25) derives that it also prohibited for the same reason to remove Tefilin in front of a Sefer Torah. According to most Poskim, there would be no problem removing the Tefilin Shel Yad from one's arm in front of a rabbi or Torah, since that does not involve revealing a bare head. However, Aruch Hashulhan (Rav Yechiel Michel Epstein of Nevarduk, 1829-1908) rules that even removing the Shel Yad is disrespectful, if one exposes his upper arm. If he takes the Tefilin off from under his sleeve, he agrees that there is no problem.The Sefer Shevet Hakehati, as well as the Rivivot Ephraim (HaRav Ephraim Greenblatt, Memphis TN-Yerushalayim, 1932-2014) discuss whether it is permitted to put on Tefilin in front of the rabbi or Torah. They conclude that it is permitted, even though donning Tefilin also entails exposing a bare head. They argue that the very act of removing Tefilin is an expression of lessening Ol Malchut Shamayim (the yoke of Heaven) upon oneself, which is problematic in front of the Rav, whereas putting on Tefilin, is an acceptance of Ol Malchut Shamayim, which cannot be taken as a sign of disrespect.However, this Halacha does not apply nowadays for two reasons. First, the Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1807) writes in Birkeh Yosef that it ancient times, people wore full head coverings that made it impossible to remove Tefilin without exposing a bare head. Nowadays that we wear Kippot, it is possible to remove the Tefilin without taking off the Kippah. The second reason is brought by Rabbenu Yosef Haim of Baghdad (1833-1909) in his Od Yosef Hai. He argues that the prohibition of taking off Tefilin in front of the Torah was only in the times where the Torah was exposed without a case. Now that the Sepharadic Sefer Torah has a case, it is not disrespectful to remove the Tefilin, even if one exposes his head, as long as the case is closed. Even if this specific Halacha no longer applies, it underscores the paramount importance of showing respect for the Sefer Torah. If the Halacha was so concerned with exposing a bear head for a short moment, how much more so talking in the presence of the Sefer Torah and other forms of disrespect must be avoided.SUMMARYOne may take off Tefilin in front of the rabbi or Sefer Torah if he does not expose his head, or the Sefer Torah is in its closed case.

The Gemara in Rosh Hashanah states that the transgression of not wearing Tefilin is in a special category of harshness. One who is not scrupulous to wear Tefilin is classified as "Karkafta D'la Manach Tefilin"-The scalp that does not don Tefilin and receives an extended sentence in Gehenom. Normally, the maximum sentence in Gehenom is twelve months. However, such a person stays in Gehenom until his soul is incinerated and his ashes are placed under the feet of the Saddikim. The Rishonim debate what degree of not wearing Tefilin constitutes this special category of "Karkafta D'la Manach Tefilin." The Rif interprets the Gemara to mean someone who never wore Tefilin even once in his life. This seems to be Rambam's opinion in Hilchot Teshuba. According to this opinion, if a person wore Tefilin even once, he is saved from being included in that category of sinners. The Rosh, however, questions the Rif's interpretation, because the Rif's text of the Gemara read "A scalp that NEVER wore Tefilin," whereas his text did not have the word "Never."On the other hand, Rabbenu Tam understands the Gemara to refer to one who does not wear Tefilin because he is repulsed by them. However, if he doesn't wear them because he feels that he is unworthy, he is not included in that category. For example he may be concerned that he cannot maintain a clean body or the proper intent. If that is his motivation, although he will be held accountable, he is not called a "Karkafta D'la Manach Tefilin."If someone does not wear Tefilin, because he is lazy, The Bach holds that he is considered "Karkafta D'la Manach Tefilin." If it would be important to him, he wouldn't be lazy, and therefore, it is considered a derision of Tefilin and included in Rabbenu Tam's definition. Therefore, one must insure that his children and grandchildren don't fall into this category and are diligent to put on Tefilin, even on vacation days, when sometimes them may be lax in this important Misva. On the other hand, the Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1807) understood Rabbenu Tam to mean that only if one actively derides the Tefilin. Laziness is not included in that category. He brings a proof from one of Rabbenu Tam's students, Rabbi Eliezer of Metz, who clearly states that one who doesn't put on Tefilin because he is lazy, is punished, but is not considered "Karkafta…"The Bet Yosef understands from the Tur, who did not make any distinctions, that the category of "Karkafta" applies to all circumstances.This discussion underscores the supreme importance the Misva of Tefilin. While we are obligated to perform all the Misvot, there are certain Misvot that have more severe consequences than others. Therefore, one must insure that his Tefilin are Kosher. If one's Tefilin are invalid, he could put on Tefilin every day of his life and still, Has V'shalom, be considered "Karkafta D'la Manach Tefilin." To avoid this, he must buy the Tefilin from a reputable source and check them as mandated by the Halacha.

Is it permissible for a lender to stipulate with the borrower that along with the debt he must pay him a gift? Meaning, instead of demanding interest, the lender asks that the borrower give him a monetary gift when he repays the loan. Does changing the terminology from "interest" to "gift" suffice to circumvent the Torah prohibition of Ri'bitt (interest)?Rabbi Moshe Halevi, in his work Milveh Hashem (p. 114), rules that such an arrangement is unequivocally forbidden and likely constitutes a Torah violation of Ri'bitt. The term used in reference to what the lender receives in exchange for granting the loan is purely a matter of semantics; it does not change the fact that the borrower pays compensation for the loan. Regardless of whether the lender and borrower speak of this compensation as a gift or as interest, it nevertheless constitutes Ri'bitt and is strictly forbidden.This provision applies to Jewish-owned banks, as well. Many banks offer free gifts to new clients when they open an account. They make an initial deposit and in exchange they receive a free gift (such as a toaster or television). A Jewish client may not accept the free gift unless the bank's Jewish owner had signed a "Heter Iska" document which effectively avoids the prohibitions of Ri'bitt. Just as a Jewish client may not accept interest on savings in a Jewish-owned bank without a "Heter Iska," so may he not accept the perks offered by such a bank unless a proper "Heter Iska" has been signed.Summary: A lender cannot subvert the prohibition against taking interest by making an agreement whereby the extra money paid would be looked upon as a gift, rather than interest.

The Rambam (Rabbi Moshe Maimonides, Spain-Egypt, 1135-1204), in Hilchot Malveh Ve'loveh (5:12), establishes that the Torah prohibition of Ri'bitt, which forbids taking interest on loans from a fellow Jew, includes demanding favors from the borrower as a condition on the loan. Not only may the lender not demand that the borrower pay money or valuables in exchange for the loan, he may also not demand that he perform favors, such as studying Torah with him. Since the borrower does the favor as compensation for the time he was allowed to retain the lender's money, this arrangement constitutes Ri'bitt and is forbidden.This Halacha applies even if the borrower customarily studied with the lender before the loan was given. Since the lender specifically stipulated that the loan is granted on condition that the borrower continues studying with him, this constitutes Ri'bitt, despite the fact that the borrower in any event had been regularly studying with the lender. Rabbi Moshe Halevi (Israel, 1961-2001) codifies this Halacha in his work Milveh Hashem (p. 307).Summary: The prohibition against receiving or paying interest includes not only monetary interest payments, but also doing favors for the lender. Even if the borrower regularly did a certain favor for the lender before receiving the loan, the lender may not stipulate that he gives the loan on condition that the borrower continues providing the given service.

Would you like to sponsor an episode? A series? We'd love to hear from you : podcasts@ohr.edu https://podcasts.ohr.edu/ Visit us @ ohr.edu    00:00 Why can we pronounce or give people names with Hashem's name in it (such as Raphael, Gavriel, etc.)?   01:17 Why do we say “halleluka”?   02:56 Should we be davening for a shidduch at the right time or as soon as possible?   07:51 Why is there seemingly fewer gedolim than in generations before?   15:42 Are the 13 principles of faith deoraissa and why is there such an emphasis on Techias HaMeisim?   25:20 How do we understand Ashkenazic lighter skin color in accordance with the indigenous features of the Middle East and Avraham's origins?    27:23 In regards to a Canaanite slave, how do we reconcile the morality of slavery through a Torah lens?    36:53 Why can't a Canaanite slave be a Noahide follower?    44:47 Are people who don't know they're Jewish considered Jewish?   52:58 Is there an overlap of Jewish and Stoic philosophies?   58:04 As a Baal Teshuva, how do we catch up for Maaser we may have missed?    1:00:09 Do you give Maaser after taxes?   1:01:48 Do you have to pay Maaser on unrealized gains?   1:05:15 How do we understand the proverb one who hates gifts lives long, since Judaism puts such an importance on giving?   1:08:09 Are politicians puppets or do they have free will?   1:11:57 Was there anyone that created their own form of the Talmud aside from Rebbe?   1:14:53 Is it is possible for a kiddush Hashem to come from a non-religious Jew?   1:16:17 How did a Rishon with the name “Akiva” in his name understand how to spell his name?   1:17:25 What are practical ways to anticipate Mashiach (in preparation for the questions at the end of one's life)?   1:18:50 How can we bring Mashiach in today's age if we are so much lower spiritually than previous generations?   1:22:42 How do we view the chashuvos of living in Israel?   1:26:04 How do we understand the longing of the Chofetz Chaim to come to Israel but he didn't?   1:29:35 Could someone become as Kabballistically attuned as the Arizal today?   1:31:28 What lessons did the Rav take from his time in law school?     Produced by: Cedar Media Studios    

The Torah prohibition of Ri'bitt (receiving or paying interest) applies not only to the payment of interest, but also to acquiescing to the lender's will as a condition on the loan. Thus, for example, as Rabbi Moshe Halevi (Israel, 1961-2001) writes in his work Milveh Hashem (p. 159), one may not lend money to his fellow Jew on condition that he – the borrower – gives money to a third party, even to a gentile. Even though the lender does not receive any interest payment, this arrangement is nevertheless forbidden because the borrower must fulfill the lender's wish in exchange for receiving the loan. This applies even if the lender demands that the borrower pay money to a charitable cause, such as a poor person or a Yeshiva. Since the borrower must acquiesce to the lender's will and fulfill his wishes in exchange for the loan, this constitutes Ri'bitt and transgresses a Torah prohibition.In fact, a lender may not even demand that the borrower take money or one of his possessions and cast it to the river or otherwise destroy it. Even though nobody derives any benefit from the borrower's fulfilling the lender's wishes, imposing this condition nevertheless constitutes Ri'bitt because the borrower is required to fulfill the lender's wishes in exchange for the loan. (Milveh Hashem p. 160)The Sages extended this prohibition to cases where the lender gives the loan on condition that the borrower approaches a third party and asks in the lender's name that he give him a certain object or sum of money. Even though the borrower in this case actually receives something, rather than pays, as a condition for the loan, this arrangement is forbidden because it requires the borrower to acquiesce to the lender's wishes in exchange for the loan. As mentioned, however, this arrangement is forbidden only on the level of Rabbinic enactment, and does not transgress the Torah prohibition of Ri'bitt. (Milveh Hashem, p. 161)Summary: A lender may not give a loan on condition that the borrower fulfills his wishes, such as by paying money to a third party or even giving money to charity or destroying money. Even if the lender hinges the loan on the condition that the borrower ask a third party to give him (the borrower) something, this arrangement is forbidden.

In a previous Daily Halacha, we discussed the ruling of the Shulhan Aruch (Hoshen Mishpat 232:3) that if somebody purchases defective merchandise, he can demand that the transaction be voided and the seller must fully refund the money. The question arises, under what circumstances, if any, may the seller insist on maintaining the transaction and simply refund part of the payment to compensate for the defect? May he refuse to void the sale, and instead offer to return some money as compensation for the low defective portion only?The Shulhan Aruch (Hoshen Mishpat 232:4-5) rules that the answer to this question depends on the nature of the defect. Based on a responsum of the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, Germany-Spain, 1250-1327), the Shulhan Aruch writes that if the defect does not detract from the item's inherent functionality, and the object still serves its basic purpose, then the seller has the option of paying compensation rather than voiding the sale. The Rosh addresses the case of a person who purchased a residence and when he arrived he saw that vandals had broken the windows and doors. Since the house still retained it basic definition as a residence, and merely required some refurbishing, the sale was not voided. The seller was therefore entitled to maintain the transaction and simply pay for the repairs. If, however, vandals had toppled the house's walls, then it loses its status as a viable residence and the buyer can demand that the sale be voided. Since he did not receive that for which he paid the money – a viable residence – the sale is null and void and he is entitled to a complete refund of his payment.A modern application of this principle pertains to the sale of used electrical appliances. If the buyer discovers an unsightly mark or scratch on the appliance that has no effect on its operation, then he cannot demand a full refund; he is entitled only to compensation for having paid for a higher-valued item than what he in fact received. If, however, the appliance does not work properly, then he can certainly declare the transaction null and void and the seller must refund all the money he had paid. (But if the seller allows a refund even for a scratch, then of course one may return it.)Needless to say, in all such cases one must consult with a competent Halachic authority to determine whether the defect is inherent to the object's operation or but a minor imperfection.Summary: If a buyer purchases an object and discovers that it is inherently defective, such that it cannot serve its basic function, he can declare the sale void and demand a full refund. If, however, the object functions properly but has a minor defect, such as an electrical appliance with external scratches or marks, then the seller has the option of refunding part of the payment as compensation, rather than voiding the sale.See the book- "Pure Money" by Dayan Cohen, pages 150-151.

According to Halacha, every sale of merchandise is made on the implicit condition that it is not defective. If the buyer discovers a defect in the merchandise, he can demand a full refund even though he had not explicitly stipulated at the time of the sale that his payment is contingent upon the condition of the merchandise. Halacha considers it self-evident that a buyer renders payment on condition that the merchandise is in proper working order, and therefore upon the discovery of a defect the buyer can demand a full refund.The Shulhan Aruch (Hoshen Mishpat 232:3) applies this rule even in a case where the defect is discovered only several years after the transaction. Assuming it can be proven that the item was defective at the time of the sale, the buyer can demand that the sale be voided and that his money be returned. The Shulhan Aruch adds, however, that if the buyer used the merchandise after discovering the defect, then he effectively forgoes on his right to cancel the transaction, and he can no longer demand a refund. By using the item, he essentially declares that he is prepared to accept it despite its defect, and thus the transaction cannot be voided thereafter.Rabbi Yehoshua Falk (Poland, 1555-1614), in his commentary to the Hoshen Mishpat section of the Shulhan Aruch (the "Sema," 232:10), establishes an important qualification to the Shulhan Aruch's ruling. Namely, if people customarily inspect a certain item before purchasing it, then a buyer who purchased such an item without inspecting it cannot later demand a refund upon discovering a defect. Used cars, for example, are generally brought to a mechanic for inspection before being purchased. If a person purchases a used car without first inspecting it, he implicitly expresses his acceptance of the car regardless of its condition. Therefore, if he later discovers a significant defect in the car, the sale is nevertheless binding and he cannot demand a refund. Of course, it is unethical for a seller not to disclose to prospective buyers information about defects or possible defects in the car; a seller who withholds such information is deemed a sinner. Nevertheless, if he withheld this information and the buyer chose not to inspect the car, the sale is binding.Summary: If a person buys merchandise and discovers that it is defective, he may annul the sale and demand a full refund from the buyer, even several years later, assuming that the defect was present at the time of the sale. The buyer is not entitled to a refund if he used the item after discovering the defect, or if this kind of merchandise is normally inspected before being purchased (such as used cars) and he chose not to inspect it.See the book- "Pure Money" by Dayan Cohen, pages 147-148.

Whenever we study the Halachot relevant to property damages, we must carefully analyze the cases discussed in the Talmud and the Shulhan Aruch, and then see how these rules would apply in parallel situations that arise in modern-day life.A perfect example of this process is a Halacha codified in the Hoshen Mishpat section of the Shulhan Aruch (379:4) concerning a person who placed barrels of wine or oil in his fellow's property without permission. Even though the barrels were put there without the property owner's permission, and it causes an obstruction, the property owner is not permitted to deliberately damage the barrels. He is allowed, however, to have them removed at their owner's expense. Likewise, he may conduct himself normally in his property without bearing responsibility for the damage this causes to the barrels. So long as he did not deliberately damage the barrels, and the damage resulted from his normal conduct, he does not bear liability.A modern-day application of this rule is the case of a driver who parks in front of somebody's driveway without permission, thus blocking the homeowner's access to the driveway. Although the driver obviously acted improperly, the homeowner does not have the right to smash the car's windows or flatten its tires, for example. He may, however, call a towing company, have them tow the illegally-parked car, and then send the bill to the driver. Furthermore, if the parked car causes a partial obstruction, and when the homeowner attempts to drive into or out of his driveway he accidentally dents the parked car, he is not liable for the damages. Since he drove normally in or out of the driveway, he does not bear responsibility for the damages caused to the illegally-parked car.This rule would also apply to a car that causes an obstruction in the public domain, such as a double-parked car, that occupies public space in the street. If a driver drives normally down the street and accidentally side-swipes the double-parked car or knocks off its mirror, the driver is not required to compensate the owner of the double-parked car. Since the car caused an obstruction without permission, and the driver drove in normal fashion down the street, he does not bear liability.Summary: If a person parks his car in front of someone's driveway without permission, the homeowner may not intentionally cause damage to the parked car. He may, however, have it towed at the car owner's expense, and is not held liable for damages accidentally caused to the car by his attempts to drive in or out of his driveway around the parked car. Similarly, if a person illegally double parks in the street, people may not cause damage to the car, but they are not held liable for damages accidentally caused to the car as they attempt to drive normally down the street.

Among the "Pesuleh Edut" – people disqualified to serve as a witness – is a "Noge'a Be'edut," somebody who has a certain bias or prejudice in the case at hand. The most obvious case of a "Noge'a Be'edut" is that of a person who received money from one of the parties to testify. For example, a lender might want to pay somebody who witnessed the loan to come to court and testify that he lent the sum in question to the defendant. In such a case, the witness may not give testimony in court. If a witness gives testimony and it is then discovered that he had been paid, his testimony is invalidated. Even if afterward he repents and returns the money, he may not return to court to give testimony, due to the Halachic rule of "Kevan She'higid Shub Eno Hozer U'magid" – once a witness gave testimony, he cannot return to testify again.In light of this Halacha, one might, at first glance, question the common practice to pay witnesses to sign on a Get in the case of a divorce. How can a Bet Din accept witnesses who were paid for the service, if Halacha clearly disqualifies paid witnesses?The answer lies in a basic distinction between two different kinds of witnesses. The disqualification of paid witnesses applies to giving testimony about an event that transpired. If a person witnessed an event and his testimony is needed in the court, then he bears an obligation to go to Bet Din and give testimony, without pay. For example, if a person witnessed a loan, or if, in the times when Bet Din had the authority to punish violators of Torah law, a person witnessed a violation, he must come to Bet Din to testify about what he saw. In the case of a Get, however, as in the case of the Kiddushin at a wedding, witnesses are required not to testify about something that happened, but rather as part of the ceremony. These kinds of witnesses may be paid just like anyone who provides a service. People who are brought to sign a Get may thus receive payment as compensation for their time and the inconvenience of coming to Bet Din. (Generally, either the husband and wife split the costs of the witnesses, or one party agrees to accept the expense.) Likewise, if a couple wants to bring special witnesses for the Kiddushin, they may pay them and compensate for their airfare, hotel stay and other expenses. Since their service is ceremonial in nature, and they are not brought to give testimony about something they saw, they are not disqualified as a result of their receiving payment.Summary: Witnesses who were paid to give testimony in Bet Din about an event they witnessed – such as a loan – are disqualified, and their testimony is not valid, even if they subsequently return the money. However, when witnesses are required for a ceremonial purpose, such as to sign on a Get or to witness Kiddushin at a wedding, they may be paid for their service.

Would you like to sponsor an episode? A series? We'd love to hear from you : podcasts@ohr.edu https://podcasts.ohr.edu/ Visit us @ ohr.edu    00:00 is it considered Avoda Zara to believe in multiple gods but only serve one?   03:16 Why wasn't the Torah given at Creation?   09:36 Can I be mekabel maisa rishon giving to a Cohen or can I give it to a Levi?   16:53 Does the rav have any tips for remembering what we've learned?   23:40 Is Kol Isha applied to new music styles and recorded music?   38:50 Is it consistent with Jewish Hashkafa to support the death penalty in secular courts?   46:20 How were the Ruvnitzer rabbi and others able to “break the rules” of Torah?   48:08 Is a single person able to work on a kiruv trip with mixed activities, assuming all laws of yichud and shomer negiah being observed?   52:53 Are Muslim prayer techniques based on Jewish bows, etc.?   1:00:44 How do we know how to navigate which Aggadic stories to take literally in the Gemara and Midrash?   1:00:06 Is it permissible to drink coffee, tea, or anything during Pesukei HaZimra?   1:07:27 According to Gemara in Succah, why can we consider STAM land in the hands of non-Jews as stolen? How can I rely on the produce right of non-Jewish land?   1:12:07 How does one train himself that Mashiach could come at any second?    1:14:21 Does the rav believe there are 36 hidden tzaddikim holding up the world?    1:16:47 Are there different ways to fulfill the Mitzvah of Shnayim Mikra V'echad Targum?   1:20:57 Why is there such a significance put on wine in Judaism?   1:22:17 What should one's outlook be on Jewish or Christian archaeologists who try to prove or disprove biblical events?   1:24:56 Why is the word for acts of loving-kindness “GOMEL,” which entails something that is earned or deserved?    1:26:21 What are the prerequisites to being a Kabbalist?   1:28:37 What should someone consider when choosing a posek?   1:30:30 Can someone have relations with one's wife while she is pregnant?   1:32:00 Does the chiyuv to read Targum Onkelos make it the primary or superior translation/interpretation?    1:33:48 Is a tallit katan less yotzi than one of cotton or the like?   1:36:14 Why are some fruits not bound by the laws of Shmitta?    1:39:00 How can one wholeheartedly daven for mashiach to come if there will be no more chance for Teshuva?   1:41:00 As a parent / teacher, what could the rav advise to help prevent kids going off the Derech?    1:44:29 How do we reconcile exhuming bodies for archaeology of holy gravesites?   1:47:30 Which did Rashi work on first, Talmud or Chumash, and why does Rashi sometimes switch from Aramaic and Hebrew in his commentaries?   1:49:19 Were most of the gedolim nonconformists and what does that say for a system that relies on conformity?   Produced by: Cedar Media Studios

A person who is, God forbid, involved in certain kinds of sinful behavior is disqualified from serving as a witness. These Halachot are especially important in the context of a wedding, when valid witnesses are required both for the signing of the Ketuba contract, and to witness the act of Kiddushin (when the groom gives the bride an object of value for betrothal). Care must be taken when choosing the witnesses, as appointing invalid witnesses could invalidate the Kiddushin.We list here several examples of people who are disqualified from serving as a witness:1) A person who is suspected of having an illicit relationship. The man is disqualified from serving as a witness even though there are no witnesses to the offense, but rumors have spread about his involvement in a forbidden relationship.2) The Bet Shemuel (Rav Shemuel Feivush, Poland, 17th century), in Siman 42, rules that a man who hugs and kisses women who are forbidden to him is also disqualified from serving as a witness, on the level of Torah law. 3) One who is "married" to a non-Jewish woman. Even though a Jew cannot be Halachically considered married to a gentile, a man who lives with a non-Jewish woman as husband and wife is disqualified from serving as a witness, on the level of Torah law. According to the Kenesset Hagedola (Rav Haim Banbenishti, Turkey, 1603-1673), one is disqualified if he has relations with a non-Jewish woman even if they do not live together as a married couple.4) One who eats the cheese of non-Jews or drinks the wine of non-Jews is disqualified from serving as a witness. 5) One who lends or borrows money on interest may not serve as a witness. Since it is forbidden by Torah law to accept interest or to pay interest, both the lender and borrower are disqualified.6) A person who raises his hand to strike his fellow is disqualified from serving as a witness by force of Rabbinic enactment, whereas somebody who actually strikes a fellow Jew is disqualified on the level of Torah law.7) It goes without saying that a "Moser" (somebody who cooperates with non-Jewish authorities in their persecution of Jews) is disqualified from serving as a witness on the level of Torah law. 8) A heretic who does not accept the authority of the oral tradition – the Mishna, Talmud, etc. – is disqualified from serving as a witness on the level of Torah law. In light of these guidelines, it is imperative to choose people of the highest caliber to serve as witnesses at a wedding. Witnesses should not be chosen simply because of their close relationship to the bride or groom, or to their families; they should be chosen based upon their level of Torah observance, to ensure that they are valid. Discretion is far more critical when it comes to the witnesses than with regard to the Berachot recited under the Hupa. A wedding ceremony is perfectly valid even if the Berachot are not recited at all, and the personal religious stature of the people who recite the Berachot will have no effect upon the legal validity of the marriage. But if the witnesses are unsuitable, they undermine the validity of the Kiddushin. It therefore cannot be emphasized enough how important it is to ensure to choose men of a high religious caliber to serve as witnesses.

As MLK Day and Tu B'Shvat overlap this coming week, April and Tracie unpack the lessons we can learn from trees and their growth in our racial justice journeys. They get into the nuances and differences between treating the symptoms of oppression and injustice – often addressed through “service” – and diagnosing and healing the root causes. And, they think about what we can do to genuinely honor Dr. King's legacy. Check out our discussion/reflection questions for this episode:  https://joyousjustice.com/blog/jews-talk-racial-justice-ep-71Find April and Tracie's full bios and submit topic suggestions for the show at www.JewsTalkRacialJustice.comLearn more about Joyous Justice where April is the founding and fabulous (!) director, and Tracie is a senior partner: https://joyousjustice.com/Support the work our Jewish Black & Native woman-led vision for collective liberation here: https://joyousjustice.com/support-our-workRead more of Tracie's thoughts at her blog: https://www.bmoreincremental.com/Learn more about Racial Justice Launch Pad and join the waitlist: https://joyousjustice.com/racial-justice-launch-padLearn more about Tu B'Shvat https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/tu-bishvat-ideas-beliefs/Read Dr. King's “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” here: https://www.csuchico.edu/iege/_assets/documents/susi-letter-from-birmingham-jail.pdfLearn more about or register for the MLK event Tracie is moderating: https://jufj.org/event/mlk-22/ Learn more about Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel: https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/abraham-joshua-heschel-a-prophets-prophet/

Halacha disqualifies women from serving as witnesses in court, and this disqualification applies on the level of Torah law. At first glance, this disqualification might appear unfair, discriminatory, or degrading to women. Some might "accuse" the Torah of relegating women to "second class" status, or of assuming that they have less intelligence or integrity than men, as reflected by their disqualification for rendering testimony.This assumption is very far from the truth. The Aruch Ha'shulhan (Rabbi Yechiel Michel Epstein of Nevahrduk, 1829-1908) writes explicitly (Hoshen Mishpat 34:19) that we cannot know the reason for women's disqualification, and it is simply a divine decree. This Halacha falls under the category of "Hukim," Torah laws whose underlying rationale eludes us and cannot be explained by human reasoning, like the ritual of the Para Aduma (red heifer). As such, one cannot reach any conclusions whatsoever regarding the Torah's general attitude toward women, or regarding anything else, on the basis of this Halacha. This is simply an expression of the divine will whose reason we do not understand. In fact, Halacha also disqualifies a Jewish king from serving as a witness. This means that when Mashiah arrives and becomes king, he will not be accepted as a witness in a Jewish court. Mashiah will be one of the most brilliant and pious men who ever lived, near the stature of Moshe Rabbenu, and, according to some, even more brilliant than King Shelomo. Clearly, his disqualification has nothing at all to do with questionable intelligence or integrity. These are laws which we should not even attempt to understand, and which we should simply accept as part of God's will as expressed through the Torah.The Torah in Parashat Korah (Bamidbar, chapter 16) tells of the revolt mounted by Korah against the authority of Moshe Rabbenu. The Sages teach that Korah's mistake was his insistence on understanding the rationale behind all the Torah's laws. He took a Tallit made entirely from Techelet, and asked Moshe whether it requires Sisit, with a Techelet string. Moshe answered that it indeed requires Sisit, whereupon Korah began ridiculing Moshe and challenging his authority. If a single thread of Techelet suffices for an entire garment, Korah said, then it makes no sense for a garment made entirely of Techelet to require an additional thread. Similarly, he asked Moshe whether a house filled with Sifreh Torah requires a Mezuza, and Moshe replied that it does. Once again, Korah ridiculed Moshe, claiming that there is no reason for a house filled with Torah scrolls to require a small Mezuza on the doorpost.Korah demanded a sound, logical explanation for every Halachic detail. He refused to accept a Torah law that was not comprehensible to the logical, human mind, and this led him to reject Moshe's authority. We believe in the Torah's laws and accept the fact that there are certain Halachot whose underlying reasoning is not within our grasp. And we believe that even these laws are an expression of the divine will, no less than those laws whose rationale we can understand.

Generally speaking, a person who commits certain kinds of Torah violations is disqualified from serving as a witness. This applies to Torah violations that are punishable by Malkot (lashes) or execution, and also to violations involving money. If a person disregards the Torah's code of monetary law, then there is reason to suspect that he will not speak truthfully in court, and he is therefore disqualified as a witness.An exception to this rule is somebody who committed a Torah violation under the mistaken assumption that he was committing a noble act. The classic example of such a situation, as discussed in the Gemara, is the case of Hebra Kadisha members who perform burials on the first day of Yom Tob. Burying on the first day of Yom Tob is certainly forbidden, but Hebra Kadisha members might assume that given the importance which the Torah affords to the immediate burial of a deceased person, they actually perform a Misva by burying on Yom Tob. Therefore, even though this assumption is wrong and misguided, they are nevertheless qualified to serve as witnesses, since they mistakenly perceive their sinful conduct as noble conduct. This Halacha applies even if they continue this wrongful practice after the local Bet Din had placed them under Nidui (excommunication). One might have assumed that once Bet Din condemned their practice of burying on Yom Tob, to the point of issuing a writ of excommunication, subsequent violations would be considered willful, intentional sins that disqualify them from testimony. In truth, however, the Hebra Kadisha members are still qualified as witnesses, because they figure that the Nidui is necessary as atonement, but not an indication that they act wrongly. They might compare their situation to one of a person who experiences a frightening dream on Friday night, who is allowed to fast on Shabbat, but must then observe another fast to atone for having fasted on Shabbat. Similarly, the Hebra Kadisha members might view their Nidui as a means of atonement that they must endure for burying on Yom Tob, even though the burial is warranted. Therefore, they are qualified to serve as witnesses despite the violation they commit.Another example is a person entrusted with the funds inherited by young orphans, and lends some of the money on interest. Generally, lending on interest renders one disqualified from giving testimony, because, as mentioned earlier, one who commits Torah violations involving money is disqualified as a witness. However, in the case of the administrator entrusted with orphans' accounts, he mistakenly thinks he performs a Misva by lending the funds on interest and thereby earning money for the young orphans under his charge. Therefore, even though he acts wrongly and commits a Torah violation, he is nevertheless allowed to serve as a witness, since his violations were committed under the assumption that he performs an important Misva.Summary: A person who commits a Torah violation thinking that he performs a Misva – such as an administrator of young orphans' funds who lends their money on interest – is allowed to serve as a witness, even if the violation he commits generally renders one disqualified for giving testimony.

Today's Daf Yomi page, Megillah 30, brings up one of the thorniest questions in all of Talmud, the question of the dreaded Amalek. Rabbi Dovid Bashevkin joins us to explain why this enemy is so terrible, and why we're still commanded to do war with Amalek's memory. Shall we remember what Amalek did to us, or forget these evil-doers altogether? Listen and find out. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Among the groups of people whom Halacha disqualifies from serving as witnesses is that of "Bezuyim," meaning, people who act in a self-degrading, shameless manner. Such people are disqualified from serving as witnesses "Mi'de'rabbanan" (by force of Rabbinic enactment).An example of this kind of character is somebody who regularly eats full meals while walking through the street. Eating meals – such as a sandwich, or pizza – while walking through the street is considered undignified, and reflects a lack of self-respect. Therefore, somebody who conducts himself in this manner on a regular basis may not serve as a witness. This also applies to people who do not wear proper clothing outdoors, while they work or conduct their personal affairs. Such people who show no concern for their personal dignity are looked upon not as people, but as animals. As such, we cannot trust them to speak truthfully in court, and they are therefore disqualified from serving as witnesses.This reminds us of the importance of selecting as witnesses (such as at weddings and the like) people who maintain high standards of ethical and refined conduct. Even those who do not commit specific Torah violations are unsuitable for this role if they regularly act in an unbecoming and undignified manner.

The Shulhan Aruch, in Hoshen Mishpat (Siman 34), discusses the qualifications required by Halacha for somebody to be eligible to serve as an "Ed," a witness. These guidelines are critically important in several different contexts, including testimony before a Bet Din that the defendant owes the plaintiff money, and the required witnesses who sign on a Ketuba or are present at the Kiddushin in a wedding ceremony. A person is not valid for these purposes if he does not meet certain qualifications.The Shulhan Aruch writes that a person who has the formal status of a "Rasha" ("wicked person") is not qualified to serve as a witness. He defines the term "Rasha" for the purposes of this Halacha as somebody who intentionally transgressed a Torah violation that is punishable by either Malkot (lashes), death, or Karet (eternal spiritual excision). A violator obtains this status regardless of whether he transgressed "Le'hach'is" – with the specific intent to anger the Almighty – or "Le'te'abon" – because he could not restrain his evil inclination. This Halacha is inferred from the Torah's use of the term "Rasha" in the context of a person liable to Malkot ("Ve'haya Im Bin Hakot Ha'rasha" – Debarim 25:2). If a violator of a prohibition punishable by Malkot is considered a "Rasha," then certainly violators of capital offenses obtain this status. Hence, one who willfully violates a prohibition that is punishable by Malkot, death or Karet has the formal Halachic status of a "Rasha" and is thus disqualified from serving as a witness.This does not apply to a person who willfully neglected a Misvat Aseh (an affirmative command), such as if somebody did not take a Lulab or eat in the Sukka on Sukkot. Neglecting a Misvat Aseh is not punishable by Bet Din, and therefore it does not render a violator a "Rasha."The Aruch Ha'shulhan (Rabbi Yechiel Michel Epstein, (1829-1908), in his Aruch Ha'shulhan (Hoshen Mishpat 34:5), writes that a person is also disqualified from serving as a witness if he strikes his fellow. We read in the Book of Shemot (2:13) that when Moshe confronted the two quarreling Israelite slaves, he approached the "Rasha" to reprimand him for striking the other. This demonstrates that striking another person also places one under the category of "Rasha." As such, one who commits such a crime is ineligible to serve as a witness.However, the Aruch Ha'shulhan claims that this disqualification applies only Mi'de'rabbanan – meaning, on the level of Rabbinic enactment. According to Torah law, one who commits the offense of striking his fellow is nevertheless eligible to serve as a witness, but the Sages enacted a provision disqualifying such a person. The reason the person remains eligible according to Torah law, the Aruch Ha'shulhan explains, is that he is not liable to Malkot for such an offense. There is a Halachic principle exempting a violator from Malkot if his violation makes him liable to pay money, and one who causes physical damage to his fellow must pay monetary compensation and therefore does not receive Malkot. As such, if not for the Rabbinic enactment, such a violator would not be disqualified from serving as a witness. Others disagree, and claim that this disqualification applies even on the level of Torah law. In a case where a person causes his fellow less than a "Peruta"-worth of damage by striking him, he is indeed liable to Malkot, since there is no payment involved. Therefore, the crime of striking another person is considered a Malkot-level violation, even though in most cases Malkot are not actually administered. As such, according to this view, the violator is disqualified from serving as a witness on the level of Torah law.In any event, this discussion alerts us to the importance of carefully choosing one's witnesses whenever witnesses are required, such as at a wedding. One should ensure to choose as his witnesses the most righteous and pious men available, in order to guarantee their eligibility.Summary: A person who willfully committed a Torah prohibition that is punishable by corporal or capital punishment, or who intentionally beat his fellow, is disqualified from serving as a witness, such as at a wedding, for the signing of a Ketuba, or in a hearing of Bet Din.

The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909), in Parashat Ki-Tabo (listen to audio recording for precise citation), writes that if one finds a book that belongs to another person, and the book bears the person's name, stamp, or other identifying feature, the finder may not use the book. He is obligated to return the book to its owner, and until it can be returned, he must care for the book properly, and may not make personal use of it.If a person finds a lost item and cannot return it to its owner immediately, he may give it to somebody he trusts to watch it in the interim. For example, if the finder is leaving on a trip and does not want to take the article with him, he may entrust it to somebody he deems reliable. Lost items differ in this regard from a "Pikadon" – an object that was specifically entrusted to somebody to watch. If a person gives an article to his fellow to watch it for him, and the friend accepts responsibility, he is not allowed to hand the object over to somebody else to watch it in his stead, since the owner specifically entrusted him with the object. If the person is leaving on a trip and does not want to take the article with him, he may bring it to the Bet Din, and the Bet Din will appoint a reliable person to watch the item.Summary: If a person finds a lost item that could be identified by the owner, he must watch the item in the interim until it is returned, and may not use it. He may, however, entrust it to somebody whom he deems trustworthy and reliable. This is in contrast to the case of an article whose owner assigned a particular person to watch it, in which case it may not be entrusted to somebody else.

The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1839-1933) addresses the case of a person who makes a wedding in his backyard (which was common in those days), to which many guests are invited, and somebody finds on the ground money that was apparently lost. Assuming the money was not stacked in a unique and distinctive way, and was not in a wallet or other personal item, the finder may keep the money. Even though the wedding is held in a person's private property, the setting is considered a public domain with respect to this Halacha, since large numbers of people are present. It can be assumed that the individual who dropped the money immediately despaired from retrieving it since there were so many people in the area. If, however, the money had a distinctive feature, such as if it was found in a wallet or bag that could be identified by the owner, then the finder must announce the find so that the owner could come forward to describe the item and then retrieve his lost money. Since there are Simanim (distinctive features), and the people in the area are Jews, the obligation of "Hashabat Abeda" (returning lost objects) applies. Otherwise, however, if a bill is found lying on the ground, the finder may keep the bill.The Ben Ish Hai then adds that this applies only if the money is found at a public event. It goes without saying that ordinarily, if a person finds money scattered about on somebody's private property, such as in his yard or on his porch, and it clearly belongs to the owner of the property, he cannot claim rights to the money that he finds. Even if it is clear that the money was misplaced, the owner did not despair from finding it, since it was lost on his property, where it would eventually be found. Therefore, the money must be returned to the owner.The Ben Ish Hai rules that a store, where customers are coming in and out, has the status of a public domain with respect to this Halacha. If somebody finds money lying on the ground in the store, he may keep the money, and the storekeeper cannot claim that the money belongs to him. Even though he owns the property, the finder may keep the money, because the store is considered a public area.Summary: If a person finds money on somebody else's private property, then generally speaking, he must give it to the property owner. If, however, this occurs when a public event takes place on the property, such as if a wedding is held in somebody's backyard, the finder may keep the money. If the money had some distinctive feature, such as if it was in a wallet or a particular kind of bag, the finder must announce his find. A person who finds money in a store that has customers coming in and out may keep the money.

If a person finds an object that somebody had lost, and the object has Simanim – distinguishing features whereby it can be identified by the owner – he must announce in the synagogue that he found the item. He must specify what the object is, and announce that the owner can retrieve it after naming the Simanim. It is not sufficient to announce that he found an object, without specifying what kind of object, and invite the owner to name the item. For example, if somebody found a wallet, he should not announce that he found something, and then give the wallet to somebody who comes forward and says that he lost a wallet. Rather, he should announce that he found a wallet, and then the one who lost his wallet should come and name the color, the size, and other distinguishing features, such as if it is torn in a certain place, or had specific contents, and so on. Similarly, if a bag containing several items was lost, the owner can specify how many items were in the bag, and this qualifies as a valid Siman.If the lost item was found in a place where the majority of people are gentiles, the finder is not required to announce the find. In such a case, he may assume that the object was lost by a non-Jew, in which case the obligation to announce the find does not apply. Thus, for example, if a person found something in Penn Station in midtown Manhattan, he may assume it was lost by a gentile and keep the item, even if it has Simanim. If the owner comes along and identifies the object based on its Simanim, then, in certain circumstances, the finder will still be entitled to keep the item. Namely, if the item is something that a person notices immediately when it is lost – such as money, since people regularly check their pockets when carrying money to make sure it is still there – then the finder may keep the money. In such a case, we may reasonably assume that the owner despaired immediately after the money was lost, since it was dropped in a public place, and thus the finder legally acquired the money. It would then be too late for the owner to demand that the money be returned. Since he despaired as soon as the money was lost, the finder acquired ownership when he found it, and may therefore keep it for himself.(Based on Ben Ish Hai, Parashat Ki-Tabo)Summary: If a person finds a lost object with unique features, such that it could be identified by its owner, he must make an announcement in the synagogue. He must specify the kind of object that he found, and the owner should then identify its unique characteristics, such as size, weight, color, and other distinctive features. If a person finds a lost item in a place where most of the people are non-Jews, he may keep the item.

In this episode we continue our discussion about Jewish lifecycles with a spotlight on the Bris Millah.Episode transcript:Hey everybody, I'm Menachem Lehrfield. Welcome back to Zero Percent. We're in the middle of talking about how we see the growth mindsets and the way Judaism marks lifecycle events. So the first stop on our Jewish lifecycle journey is probably the bris milah or the brit milah. This is the oldest Jewish ritual dating all the way back to our patriarch, Abraham, Abraham Avinu, and in the words of the mohel from the famous Seinfeld episode.This is a bris, a sacred ancient ceremony, symbolizing the covenant between God and Abraham, or something.Today, I want to talk about that something. What is the bris and why do we do it? If man was meant to be circumcised, wouldn't God just make us that way? Why create us in a way that we need this procedure done in order to fix what seems like God's mistake? We know that He can make a creature without requiring circumcision, he made women.I just got back maybe two weeks ago from the bris of my nephew and my brother-in-law was telling me that a few weeks before the baby was born, my niece, the older sister of the baby who had the bris, didn't know if the baby was going to be a boy or a girl. She said to her father, she said to my brother-in-law, "Are we going to have a bris when the baby's born?" So my brother-in-law said, "Well, it depends. If it's a boy, then we'll have a bris. If it's a girl, then we won't."She looked at him, stunned and said, "Well, why won't you have a bris for a girl?" And he began going through a complicated anatomy lesson for a seven year old, which I think went way over her head and freaked her out just a little bit. Leaving the anatomy aside, why don't girls need a bris? Why would God have created us in a way that boys do need a bris but girls don't?The Talmud records dialogue between the evil Roman general Turnus Rufus and the great sage Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva by the way, was eventually killed brutally by the Romans for teaching and studying the Torah, we'll probably get to that story in a future episode. But here he comes to Rabbi Akiva and he asks him, "Whose deeds are more beautiful, God's or man's?"He was obviously expecting that Rabbi Akiva, who's a rabbi and a God-fearing Jew, would say, "Obviously what God does is better than what man does." To which he was trying to catch Rabbi Akiva in a trap and say, "Well, if God's actions are greater than man's, so then why wouldn't you leave baby boys the way they are, the way God made them? Why would you change them?" Which reminds me of a line from Duante Culpepper. He was explaining to somebody why he smokes weed. And again, this is not in any way an endorsement of doing drugs or drinking alcohol, but someone asked him why he smokes weed. And he said, "Well, it's quite simple, man made booze, God made weed. Who do you trust?" One would think that if God made it, it must be perfect.So the evil Roman general, asked Rabbi Akiva, "Whose deeds are better, whose deeds are more beautiful, God's or Man's?" Rabbi Akiva obviously understood where Turnus Rufus was going with this and in response, he brought him bread, rolls of bread, and he brought him some stalk of wheat. He said to him, "The stalks of wheat are the work of God. But these baked rolls, this bread, this is the work of people. Aren't the rolls better than the wheat?" As if to say, "Well, obviously God made the wheat, but God didn't make the wheat for us to eat plain wheat." He made the wheat, but he also gave us the intellect and the ability to take that wheat and transform it into delicious bread. I don't know about you, but there is nothing I would rather eat than to delicious, warm bread. I've never really tried chewing on raw wheat.The ritual of circumcision represents the idea and the awareness that God made the world perfectly imperfect. He didn't create a perfect world. Even better, he created an imperfect world and he allowed mankind to partner with him in perfecting that world. And so, God creates at least some of us, the males among us, imperfect. He makes us in a way that we are not physically perfect, we're not complete, so that we can work to perfect ourselves.We work to perfect our physical bodies that are created imperfect, but on a deeper level, we work to perfect ourselves. We don't strive to leave this world the way we came in. We were created imperfect in an imperfect world and our job is to work hard to perfect ourselves and to perfect the world and make it a better place.We do believe that women who are given the ability to create life themselves are more in God's image than men are and because they are on a higher spiritual level, they come into the world more physically perfect, just like they are more spiritually perfect as well. But the concept of the bris milah, the concept of working and striving to perfect ourselves is true both with men and women, all of us are created in a way that we are perfectly imperfect so that we can work drive to perfect ourselves.Throughout the entire creation dialogue, every step of the way, every day of creation, the verse says, "[Hebrew 00:05:55] and God saw that it was good." Which is really strange, what's going on? Is God patting himself in the back and saying, "Ooh, I had a great day at work today. Look, I did a great job." We're talking about God over here. He doesn't need to pat himself on the back. He doesn't need to say, "Oh, look what a great job I did." That's first of all.Second of all, really? "And God saw all that he did, and it was good." Have you seen the manatee? Have you seen the platypus? What does this mean, "And God saw that it was good?" And why is the very first time we find the expression, [Hebrew 00:06:31], that something is not good, with the creation of man? Why by the creation of man do we find for the very first time, [Hebrew 00:06:41], it's not good?So to understand this, let's take a detour and travel to the garden of Eden. God says to Adam and Eve essentially, "You can eat from all the trees of the garden, just not this one tree." Where does he put that tree? Right in the middle of the garden. I don't know about you, but if I don't want my kids to play with something, I'm not going to stick it in the middle of the living room and say, "Don't play with this." If I put it in the middle of the living room, it's going to get broken. If God didn't want them to eat from that tree, why not put it somewhere else? Why not put in a completely different place? God puts it in the middle of the garden and He gives them the commandment not to eat from it, to remind Adam and Eve that they were guests in the garden. They were not the creators of the world. They were not in charge, they were just guests.Only the creator can choose if something is [Hebrew 00:07:50] or not [Hebrew 00:07:51]. The word [Hebrew 00:07:52] doesn't really mean good, it means it's finished. It's good in its current state. So when God looks at creation, there are three options. Something that is [Hebrew 00:08:04] is good the way it is. On the flip side, we have something that is [Hebrew 00:08:09], something that is bad. In the middle, we have something that is [Hebrew 00:08:15], doesn't mean it's not good. [Hebrew 00:08:19] means it's not good yet.When an artist is painting on a canvas, they get to a point where the art is perfect the way it is. One more brushstroke and you're ruining it. When the art is [Hebrew 00:08:37], when it's good, it goes in the wall, it gets framed. If the artwork is [Hebrew 00:08:43], it's bad, that means there's no way it's going to reach the purpose for which it was created. There's no way this is ever going to look like it's supposed to look and the response is it gets destroyed. The art gets ripped up and thrown in the garbage.In fact, the very first time we find the word [Hebrew 00:09:01], bad, used in the Torah as by the flood. When something is [Hebrew 00:09:07] it needs to be destroyed, needs to get rid of, but then we have something in the middle and that's [Hebrew 00:09:14], means it's not good yet, it means it needs improvement.When Adam and Eve eat from the tree, what they really wanted to do is they wanted to be the decider of good and evil. They wanted to choose what is [Hebrew 00:09:33], what is good? And what is [Hebrew 00:09:35], what is bad? And God says, "You are the created." The piece of art on the canvas can never make that determination. Only the creator, only the artist can make that determination. You see, as human beings, God says, "You are rationalizing beings." And what that means is you confuse [Hebrew 00:09:55] and [Hebrew 00:09:57]. You confuse good and bad because instead of defining good by that which is actually good, you define good by what you desire, what you want.So, I look at ice cream and I say, "That is good." And I look at broccoli and I say, "That's bad." That's not true, that's not reality. When as a human being, I say that ice cream is good. I don't mean it's actually good. What I mean is I like it, I desire it. It makes me feel good, it tastes good. But that's not good. The human being is always capable of saying that if I want something, I convince myself that it is the right thing.For the full transcript visit www.joidenver.com/zeropercent/15--the-gift-of-childhood

If one sees an item that belongs to another Jew and was lost, he is obligated to take that object and return it to its owner. One who sees a lost object and ignores it violates a Misvat Lo Ta'aseh (Torah prohibition) that forbids ignoring a lost object, and also neglects a Misvat Aseh (affirmative Biblical command) to return lost objects to their owner, as the Torah commands, "Do not see your fellow's ox or sheep wandering astray and ignore them; you shall return them to your fellow" (Debarim 22:1). If a person takes the item with the intention of keeping it, rather than returning it to its owner, he also violates the Torah prohibition against theft ("Lo Tigzol" – Vayikra 19:13). If, however, the finder then decides to return the object to its owner, he has corrected his mistake and is no longer in violation of these prohibitions, assuming the owner had not despaired from retrieving the item. If the owner despaired after the finder took the object for himself, the finder is guilty of a these violations even if he then returns the object.This obligation does not apply to possessions that have no Siman – meaning, a distinguishing feature by which it can be identified as a person's possession. Money, for example, has no Siman; there is nothing on a coin or dollar bill whereby it can be definitively identified as belonging to a particular person. Therefore, if a person dropped money in a public place, one who finds the money is allowed, strictly speaking, to keep the money. People generally feel their pockets regularly to ensure their money is still with them, and it can therefore be assumed that the money's owner realizes he has lost the money and has despaired, since the money has no Siman and was left in a public place. According to the strict Halacha, then, one who finds money that was lost in a public area may keep the money for himself, even if he knows whom it belonged to, since the owner has presumably despaired.Of course, this applies only if the money is indeed unidentifiable as a particular person's property. If the money was found in a wallet, or it was stacked in some particular way whereby it can be identified as belonging to somebody, then the finder must return the money to its owner.Although this is the strict Halacha, one who finds lost money fulfills a Midat Hasidut (measure of piety) if he returns it to its owner. He is allowed to keep the money, but it is worthwhile as a Midat Hasidut to return it.The question arises as to why the Torah allows one to keep money that is found in a public area, even if he knows who lost it. Why shouldn't the finder be required to return the money to its rightful owner? The answer, as mentioned in several works, is that Hashem "settles all accounts" and we can rest assured that the finder rightfully deserves the money. It is possible, for example, that in a previous Gilgul (incarnation) the owner owed the finder money but never paid him, and for this reason Hashem arranged that this money would be lost and then found. We never know for sure the precise reasons why these situations occur, but we do know that God precisely calculates people's assets, and that there is a reason why He saw to it that a person would lose money and it would be found by somebody else.(Based on Ben Ish Hai, Parashat Ki-Tabo)Summary: It is forbidden to ignore an item that was lost by a fellow Jew and one finds, and it is certainly forbidden to keep it for oneself. However, if the item has no distinguishable feature, such as in the case of lost money, the finder may, strictly speaking, keep it for himself, though as an extra measure of piety he may wish to return it.

In this episode of the 18Forty Podcast, we talk to Ari Bergmann - PhD and financier - about the benefits of shemittah.The current Hebrew year, 5782, is a shemittah year, a year when the land rests. This has extensive economic effects on Israel's agricultural community, as farmers are not allowed to work on or profit from their land. Ari, as an expert in both Talmud and finances, weighs in on some important questions.- What are the laws and logistics of shemittah?- What is the Torah's motivation for introducing shemittah?- How do the laws of shemittah affect power differences created by wealth?Tune in to hear a conversation about the shemittah year.For more, visit https://18forty.org/wealth/.Ari Bergmann is the founder and managing principal/CIO of Penso Advisors LLC, A New York-based manager and advisory boutique specializing in derivatives structuring/trading and systemic risk management. Ari attended Ner Yisrael, holds an MA and PhD in comparative religion from Columbia University, and has taught at Yeshiva University, Columbia University, and the University of Pennsylvania. Ari lectures widely on the topics of finance, Talmud, and Jewish thought, and is beloved for his knowledge and depth.

Sometimes, no matter how much want them to endure, friendships come and go. The Talmud has stuff to say about this, and today we're digging it up! Visit our website to ask us questions at xaihowareyou.com and call or Text the Talmud Hotline at 401-484-1619 and leave us a voicemail! Support us on patreon at patreon.com/xaihowareyou. Follow us on twitter @xaihowareyou and @miss_figured. Music by Ben Schreiber.

The Shulhan Aruch (Orah Haim 146, and again in 285) writes that it is permissible, strictly speaking, to read "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" during the Torah reading. This refers to the obligation to read the weekly Parsha twice and its translation once. Although Halacha generally forbids speaking or learning during the Torah reading, one is permitted to read "Shenayim Mikra" during the Torah reading, since it is relevant to the reading. Nevertheless, the Shulhan Aruch adds (in Siman 146) that it is preferable only to read along with the reader to complete one of the two readings of "Shenayim Mikra," rather than read the Parsha twice and the translation during the congregational reading. Accordingly, Hacham Ovadia Yosef (in Yehaveh Da'at) and Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (in Or Le'sion, vol. 2) write that one should not read "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" during the Torah reading, but one may read along with the reader to fulfill one required reading, and conduct the other readings at some other point. The most preferred way to fulfill this obligation, as Hacham Ovadia writes in his Halichot Olam, is to read each verse twice followed by its translation. If time is short, one may read once along with the reader, and then read the Parsha again followed by the translation, as discussed.Preferably, one should complete the reading of "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" before he prays Minha on Shabbat afternoon. If one did not complete the reading by that time, then he can complete it until the reading of Parashat Bereshit on Simhat Torah.Although there are some opinions that one should not study Targum (the translation of the Torah) at night, Hacham Ovadia rules that one is allowed to read "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" at night.Rav Haim Palachi (Turkey, 1788-1869) warns that one should not read "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" as though it is a heavy burden of which he seeks to relieve himself. Rather, one should read the material slowly and carefully, in an attempt to enhance his understanding of the Torah text.If a teacher teaches the weekly Torah portion in school, and during the course of his work he reads the Parasha twice, this suffices for the two readings required for "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum," and he must then read only the Targum to fulfill his obligation.The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909), in Parashat Lech-Lecha, writes that it is preferable to read "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" on Friday, as this is part of one's preparations for Shabbat. Nevertheless, as Hacham Ovadia notes, one who does not have time to do the entire "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" reading on Friday may do so earlier in the week. The Ben Ish Hai also writes that it is preferable to conduct the entire "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" reading all at once, in a single sitting, without any interruption. Nevertheless, one may get a drink and recite "She'hakol" during the reading if he feels thirsty. Likewise, if a Rabbi is reading "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" and he is approached with a Halachic question, or is asked to deliver a class, he may certainly interrupt his reading. Otherwise, however, it is preferable to conduct the entire reading without any interruptions. The Kaf Ha'hayim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Israel, 1867-1939) writes that we create angels by reading "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum," and by interrupting in the middle of the reading, we cause these angels to be blemished.Reading "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" is a "Segula" for long life. However, as with all Misvot, we should perform this Misva in order to fulfill G-d's will, and to learn and acquire Torah knowledge, and not for the rewards.The Ben Ish Hai writes that it customary to read the final verse of the Parasha an additional two times after completing "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum." Some also have the custom of reciting "Mizmor Shir Le'yom Ha'Shabbat" and "Hacham Malach" after the reading.The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles of Cracow, 1525-1572) writes that it is customary to also read each week's Haftara. Unlike the Parasha, however, the Haftara is read only once, and not twice, and not with the Targum. In a week before a Shabbat when a special Maftir and Haftara are read, such as Shabbat Rosh Hodesh, Parashat Shekalim and Parashat Zachor, one does not have to read the Maftir for "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum," since those Pesukim are read on the week of the Parasha in which they appear. However, the Ben Ish Hai writes that in such a week one should read the Haftara of that week's Parasha, even though that Haftara will not be read in the synagogue.The Ben Ish Hai writes that one should read "Shenayim Mikra Ve'ehad Targum" for Parashat Vezot Ha'beracha on Hoshana Rabba.