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Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.
How can the verse “do not touch kodesh” be used by Reish Lakish to teach that one cannot eat sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, when that verse is needed to derive the prohibition for an impure person to eat sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled? To resolve the difficulty, the Gemara explains how both can be derived from the same verse. There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding an impure person who eats sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled – is it punishable by lashes or not? Abaye and Rava disagree about the scope of the debate. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether one who brings parts of the body of a non-kosher animal onto the altar receives lashes or not. However, after raising a difficulty with this, they explain that all agree it is forbidden, but not punishable by lashes, as it is a negative commandment that is not written explicitly, but derived from a positive commandment. The debate is regarding a different, but similar issue - bringing a non-domesticated animal – is it a violation of a positive commandment, or is it only forbidden ab initio? Three versions of a question are brought regarding shirayim. If a disqualified person accepted and sprinkled the blood, does it render the animal disqualified from being used for a sacrifice, e.g. can one take more blood from the animal and sprinkle it on the altar? Or, if a cup with the blood was taken out of the Azara, can one get more blood from the animal? Or, if multiple cups were used to get blood from the animal and one was used for the altar, does the blood from the other cups also get poured on the base of the altar (as shirayim)? How does the Mishna allow for some mistakes to be rectified? Why are there three different cases like this mentioned in the Mishna – what is unique about each case?
In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Baba Metzia 84a, focusing on a Talmudic discussion about Rabbi Yochanan's exceptional beauty and its spiritual implications. The episode delves into the concept of the evil eye, the influence of parental thoughts on conception, and the responsibility to use one's gifts thoughtfully. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan's Beauty: Rabbi Yochanan claims to be the last of Jerusalem's beautiful people, described vividly: a silver goblet filled with pomegranate seeds, crowned with roses, and placed between sun and shade reflects a fraction of his radiance. The Talmud questions this, noting Rav Kahana's beauty resembled Rav Avohu's, which resembled Yaakov's, which resembled Adam's. Rabbi Yochanan's distinction was his beardless face, enhancing his radiant appearance.Mikvah Practice: Rabbi Yochanan sat at the women's mikvah entrance so that women, emerging from ritual immersion, would see him and retain his image, influencing their conception to produce beautiful, Torah-learned children. This mirrors Yaakov's use of streaked rods to influence sheep traits. Rabbi Wolbe defends this as a responsible use of his gift, not arrogance, citing his grandfather's teaching that knowing and using one's virtues is an obligation, akin to knowing one's wealth to give charity.Evil Eye Concerns: The sages question if Rabbi Yochanan feared the evil eye from displaying his beauty. He responds that, as a descendant of Yosef, he is immune, per Genesis 49:22 (“Yosef is a charming son, above the eye”) and 49:24 (likening Yosef's progeny to fish, hidden from the evil eye). Rabbi Wolbe explains the evil eye's real impact: flaunting wealth or beauty can cause jealousy, stress, or harm in others, affecting their relationships or finances.Practical Lessons: Rabbi Wolbe shares anecdotes to illustrate avoiding the evil eye: his father's choice of a modest Toyota Camry over a Lincoln Town Car to avoid neighbors' jealousy, and leaving a broken blinker light to deter envy. He recounts Marvy Finger's mentor, a wealthy man flying coach to avoid wasteful display, emphasizing humility and consideration for others' feelings.Broader Message: The episode underscores the responsibility to use God-given gifts (beauty, wealth) for positive impact while avoiding harm through jealousy. Rabbi Yochanan's actions aimed to inspire righteousness, not pride. Rabbi Wolbe urges mindfulness of how one's actions affect others, promoting sensitivity in a world prone to envy and comparison.The episode concludes with a blessing for a wonderful Shabbos and a call to share Torah content._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on August 29, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 17, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content. _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life. To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Beauty, #Yochanan, #Gemara, #Radiant, #Responsibility, #Humility, #Mentor, #Practicality, #Luxury, #Mindfulness ★ Support this podcast ★
Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?
Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.
Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.
Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?
Study Guide Three distinct explanations—by Shmuel, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Yochanan—are presented to clarify the Mishna that disqualifies a sacrifice if its blood was sprinkled either in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar entirely. Each interpretation is examined in depth, with challenges and questions raised based on other sources and halakhic principles.
Study Guide Three distinct explanations—by Shmuel, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Yochanan—are presented to clarify the Mishna that disqualifies a sacrifice if its blood was sprinkled either in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar entirely. Each interpretation is examined in depth, with challenges and questions raised based on other sources and halakhic principles.
In the Torah verse regarding the purification of the leper (Vayikra 14:17), the word “right” appears three times - once in reference to the hand, once to the foot, and once to the ear. Rava explains that each mention teaches the requirement to use the right hand in a different ritual: one for kemitza (taking a handful of flour) in meal offerings, one for chalitza (the release ceremony of levirate marriage), and one for piercing the ear of a Jewish slave. According to Rabba bar bar Hanna, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, wherever the Torah uses the term “kohen,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Based on this, Rava’s drasha regarding kemitza teaches that not only the taking of the kometz (handful) must be done with the right hand, but also its placement into the kli sharet (sanctified vessel). Rabbi Shimon, who either does not require this part of the process or does not require it to be done with the right hand, agrees that the kemitza itself must be performed with the right hand, as derived from Vayikra 6:10, which compares the meal offering to the sin offering. Therefore, Rava’s interpretation applies specifically to the meal offering of a sinner, brought as part of a sliding scale offering. The Mishna rules that if the blood spills directly onto the floor from the animal, without first being collected in a sanctified vessel, the blood is disqualified. A braita teaches that the blood to be collected must be the spurting blood from the act of slaughter - not blood from a cut, nor residual blood that flows after most of the blood has exited the animal. The blood must flow directly from the animal into the kli sharet, from which it will be sprinkled on the altar. These laws are derived from Vayikra 4:5, in the context of the sin offering of the Kohen Gadol. Rav rules that all of the blood must be collected, based on Vayikra 4:7. According to Shmuel, the knife must be lifted immediately after slaughter to prevent blood from dripping off the knife into the vessel, since the blood must come directly from the animal. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explain that the animal’s throat must be held directly over the vessel to ensure the blood flows straight into it. Rabbi Asi posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding the airspace above a vessel. The Gemara brings three versions of the question and Rabbi Yochanan’s response: If the bottom of the vessel broke before the blood reached it, but the blood had already entered the vessel’s airspace, does this count as if the blood had reached the vessel? If so, the blood could be collected from the floor and used on the altar. To answer the question, Rabbi Yochanan cited a braita regarding a barrel into which fresh water streamed into its airspace, disqualifying it for use in the red heifer purification waters, as it is considered as though the water entered the vessel. However, this comparison is problematic, since the red heifer case does not involve a broken vessel. To justify the citation, the Gemara reframes the question as a two-pronged inquiry. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was drawn from the aforementioned braita. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was derived from the laws of sacrificial blood, which must reach the vessel directly. Since the blood passes through the airspace first, this implies that the airspace is treated as part of the vessel. If the animal becomes blemished after slaughter but before the blood is collected, brought to the altar, or poured, the blood is disqualified. A source is cited from the laws of the sin offering to support this. The Gemara attempts to extend this ruling to offerings of lesser sanctity, such as the Paschal sacrifice, but the proof is ultimately rejected.
In the Torah verse regarding the purification of the leper (Vayikra 14:17), the word “right” appears three times - once in reference to the hand, once to the foot, and once to the ear. Rava explains that each mention teaches the requirement to use the right hand in a different ritual: one for kemitza (taking a handful of flour) in meal offerings, one for chalitza (the release ceremony of levirate marriage), and one for piercing the ear of a Jewish slave. According to Rabba bar bar Hanna, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, wherever the Torah uses the term “kohen,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Based on this, Rava’s drasha regarding kemitza teaches that not only the taking of the kometz (handful) must be done with the right hand, but also its placement into the kli sharet (sanctified vessel). Rabbi Shimon, who either does not require this part of the process or does not require it to be done with the right hand, agrees that the kemitza itself must be performed with the right hand, as derived from Vayikra 6:10, which compares the meal offering to the sin offering. Therefore, Rava’s interpretation applies specifically to the meal offering of a sinner, brought as part of a sliding scale offering. The Mishna rules that if the blood spills directly onto the floor from the animal, without first being collected in a sanctified vessel, the blood is disqualified. A braita teaches that the blood to be collected must be the spurting blood from the act of slaughter - not blood from a cut, nor residual blood that flows after most of the blood has exited the animal. The blood must flow directly from the animal into the kli sharet, from which it will be sprinkled on the altar. These laws are derived from Vayikra 4:5, in the context of the sin offering of the Kohen Gadol. Rav rules that all of the blood must be collected, based on Vayikra 4:7. According to Shmuel, the knife must be lifted immediately after slaughter to prevent blood from dripping off the knife into the vessel, since the blood must come directly from the animal. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explain that the animal’s throat must be held directly over the vessel to ensure the blood flows straight into it. Rabbi Asi posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding the airspace above a vessel. The Gemara brings three versions of the question and Rabbi Yochanan’s response: If the bottom of the vessel broke before the blood reached it, but the blood had already entered the vessel’s airspace, does this count as if the blood had reached the vessel? If so, the blood could be collected from the floor and used on the altar. To answer the question, Rabbi Yochanan cited a braita regarding a barrel into which fresh water streamed into its airspace, disqualifying it for use in the red heifer purification waters, as it is considered as though the water entered the vessel. However, this comparison is problematic, since the red heifer case does not involve a broken vessel. To justify the citation, the Gemara reframes the question as a two-pronged inquiry. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was drawn from the aforementioned braita. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was derived from the laws of sacrificial blood, which must reach the vessel directly. Since the blood passes through the airspace first, this implies that the airspace is treated as part of the vessel. If the animal becomes blemished after slaughter but before the blood is collected, brought to the altar, or poured, the blood is disqualified. A source is cited from the laws of the sin offering to support this. The Gemara attempts to extend this ruling to offerings of lesser sanctity, such as the Paschal sacrifice, but the proof is ultimately rejected.
Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza—an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both “kohen” and “finger,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either “finger” appears alone or “kohen” together with “finger”. According to Rabbi Yochanan’s rule that the mention of “kohen” implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava—a textual analogy—from the three mentions of “right” in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word “kohen”? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.
Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza—an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both “kohen” and “finger,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either “finger” appears alone or “kohen” together with “finger”. According to Rabbi Yochanan’s rule that the mention of “kohen” implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava—a textual analogy—from the three mentions of “right” in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word “kohen”? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.
Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Joanna Rom in loving memory of her mother, Rose Rom, Sura Razel, on her seventeenth yahrzeit. "She is still with me every day, my inner teacher." If one becomes impure, must one repeat the washing of hands and feet? A source is brought from Mishna Para 3:7 regarding the para aduma (red heifer) to suggest that re-washing is not required. However, this proof is rejected, as the laws concerning the para aduma are considered more lenient. Can a kohen immerse his hands and feet directly in the water of the basin, or must the water be poured over them? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak cites a source to support the permissibility of immersion, but the inference is ultimately rejected. Regarding the timing for sinking the water into its pit to prevent disqualification for the following day, three opinions are presented: Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef distinguishes between rites performed during the day and those at night. For daytime rites, the water must be sunk at sunset; for nighttime rites, at dawn. Rav Chisda maintains that for all rites, the water must be sunk at dawn. Rabbi Yochanan holds that once the water is sunk at the beginning of the night, it may not be raised again until morning. Rabbi Yochanan’s position is examined in light of other statements he made that appear contradictory. The analysis also ensures his view is clearly differentiated from those of Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef, with whom he disagrees. A challenge is raised against Rav Chisda’s opinion, but it is resolved.
Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Joanna Rom in loving memory of her mother, Rose Rom, Sura Razel, on her seventeenth yahrzeit. "She is still with me every day, my inner teacher." If one becomes impure, must one repeat the washing of hands and feet? A source is brought from Mishna Para 3:7 regarding the para aduma (red heifer) to suggest that re-washing is not required. However, this proof is rejected, as the laws concerning the para aduma are considered more lenient. Can a kohen immerse his hands and feet directly in the water of the basin, or must the water be poured over them? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak cites a source to support the permissibility of immersion, but the inference is ultimately rejected. Regarding the timing for sinking the water into its pit to prevent disqualification for the following day, three opinions are presented: Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef distinguishes between rites performed during the day and those at night. For daytime rites, the water must be sunk at sunset; for nighttime rites, at dawn. Rav Chisda maintains that for all rites, the water must be sunk at dawn. Rabbi Yochanan holds that once the water is sunk at the beginning of the night, it may not be raised again until morning. Rabbi Yochanan’s position is examined in light of other statements he made that appear contradictory. The analysis also ensures his view is clearly differentiated from those of Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef, with whom he disagrees. A challenge is raised against Rav Chisda’s opinion, but it is resolved.
Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree. Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body. Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?
Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.
Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree. Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body. Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?
Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.
Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.
Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.
In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.
In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.
Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.
Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.
Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.
Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.
Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering. A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them. Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s view, while Rabbi Ilai supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia’s proof is based on a kal va’chomer, which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ilai’s proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved. In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma—with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.
Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering. A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them. Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s view, while Rabbi Ilai supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia’s proof is based on a kal va’chomer, which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ilai’s proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved. In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma—with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh introduces the subject of the Ben Sorer U'moreh – the "wayward son." This is a delinquent 13-year-old child, whose delinquency manifests itself parituclarly in addictive indulgence. He eats and drinks so compulsively that he steals his parents' money to buy wine and meat. The Torah states that this child should be put to death, and the Gemara explains that this is because this child is set along a path to violent crime. Once he has reached this point, where he steals his parents' money to satisfy his lust for food and wine, we are certain that he will eventually mug people to steal their money, and will end up murdering. He should therefore be killed so he never grows to be a violent criminal. The Gemara further states that there has never been a child that qualified as a Ben Sorer U'moreh, and there never will be such a case. There are so many conditions that must be met for this law to take effect that it can never actually apply as a practical matter. The Torah nevertheless taught us this theoretical Halacha so we can earn reward by studying this subject. The Gemara then cites Rabbi Yochanan as testifying, "I saw him, and I sat on his grave." At first glance, it appears that there are two views in the Gemara as to whether there was a case of a Ben Sorer U'moreh. The first opinion said that it never happened, whereas Rabbi Yochanan said that it did. However, this sounds peculiar. Could the Sages have really been arguing about a historical point? Normally, debates among the Rabbis involve different rationales and different ways of understanding Torah laws. We are not accustomed to Rabbis arguing over historical facts. Perhaps we can advance a novel reading of the Gemara's discussion. We mentioned earlier that the Torah commands executing a Ben Sorer Ve'moreh because it is certain that he will grow to become a violent criminal. We must ask, why are we so certain? Do we not all know of juvenile delinquents who grew to become wonderful adults? Has there never been a child who caused a great deal of trouble as a young teenager but then put his life together and excelled? I know many outstanding Rabbis who were once troubled youths. Why are we so sure that this "wayward son" will turn out to be a criminal? The answer is that we aren't – and this is precisely why the Gemara tells us that there never was and never will be a case of a Ben Sorer U'moreh. The Torah speaks of a theoretical situation of a child who must be put to death because he will otherwise for certain become a violent killer as an adult – and the Sages tell us that this will always remain a theoretical possibility, because in actuality, every single person has the capacity to change, and to change drastically. No matter where a person is, no matter how low he has fallen, he always has the potential to achieve greatness. There are no exceptions. Rabbi Yochanan says that he saw a Ben Sorer U'moreh and went to his grave. Why do people visit graves? Mostly, people visit the graves of righteous Sadikim to pray to Hashem at the site. And this might have been what Rabbi Yohanan was doing at this grave – he was praying, because this wayward child, whom he saw in his state of rebelliousness and unbridled sinfulness, ended up becoming an outstanding Sadik, a pious and holy Jew at whose gravesite people should want to pray. Rabbi Yohanan is proving the point made earlier, that there never was and never will be a child determined to be a Ben Sorer U'moreh who must be put to death – because in reality, every child, no matter where he is currently, has the ability to turn his life around and rise to great spiritual heights. We must never give up on any Jew, because we are all the descendants of Abraham, Yishak and Yaakob, we all contain within our souls a divine spark, and we all have the potential for greatness. And just as we must never give up on another Jew, we must also never give up on ourselves. What we've done in the past does not determine who we are in the present, or who we will be in the future. We need to trust in our ability to change and in our potential to not only improve, but to achieve greatness and be worthy members of Hashem's special nation.
This morning we emphasize the need to prepare now to acknowledge God as HaMelech (the King) on Rosh Hashanah. We show the critical importance of this from a story of Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai and Vespasian. And we describe what this means with a story from Rabbi Biderman about the 402 bus from Bnei Brak to Jerusalem. Michael Whitman is the senior rabbi of ADATH Congregation in Hampstead, Quebec, and an adjunct professor at McGill University Faculty of Law. ADATH is a modern orthodox synagogue community in suburban Montreal, providing Judaism for the next generation. We take great pleasure in welcoming everyone with a warm smile, while sharing inspiration through prayer, study, and friendship. Rabbi Whitman shares his thoughts and inspirations through online lectures and shiurim, which are available on: YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC5FLcsC6xz5TmkirT1qObkA Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/adathmichael/ Podcast - Mining the Riches of the Parsha: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/mining-the-riches-of-the-parsha/id1479615142?fbclid=IwAR1c6YygRR6pvAKFvEmMGCcs0Y6hpmK8tXzPinbum8drqw2zLIo7c9SR-jc Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3hWYhCG5GR8zygw4ZNsSmO Please contact Rabbi Whitman (rabbi@adath.ca) with any questions or feedback, or to receive a daily email, "Study with Rabbi Whitman Today," with current and past insights for that day, video, and audio, all in one short email sent directly to your inbox.
The Mishna discusses the laws of nullification regarding yayin nesech (wine used for idolatry) that becomes mixed with permitted wine. It distinguishes between wine mixed with wine (min b’minu—same substance), which is forbidden in any amount, and wine mixed with water (min b’she’eino mino—different substance), which is prohibited only if it imparts taste. Rav Dimi quotes Rabbi Yochanan as saying that if one pours yayin nesech from a barrel into a pit of kosher wine, each drop is immediately nullified upon contact. The Gemara raises three challenges to Rav Dimi’s interpretation based on the Mishna, and resolves them by reinterpreting the cases in the Mishna. Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef offers a narrower understanding of Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling—limiting it to pouring from a jug into a barrel, but not from a barrel into a pit. Ravin also transmits a halakha in Rabbi Yochanan’s name regarding a mixture that includes a forbidden item combined with both a similar and a different substance. In such a case, the forbidden item is nullified by the different substance (e.g., yayin nesech mixed with wine and water), while the similar substance is viewed as if it is not there. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda also quotes Rabbi Yochanan, but there are two versions of his statement. In one version, he disagrees with Ravin and limits the ruling to cases where the different substance was present first. In the other version, his comment refers to the Mishna, and he actually agrees with Ravin. A debate between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan also concerns a case where a forbidden item is mixed with both a similar and a different substance. What is the underlying basis of their disagreement? Rav and Shmuel dispute the position of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether the distinction between mixtures of the same type and mixtures of different types applies universally to all prohibited items, or only to yayin nesech and tevel (untithed produce). The Gemara explains why the rabbis would have adopted a stricter approach with those two prohibitions.
The Mishna discusses the laws of nullification regarding yayin nesech (wine used for idolatry) that becomes mixed with permitted wine. It distinguishes between wine mixed with wine (min b’minu—same substance), which is forbidden in any amount, and wine mixed with water (min b’she’eino mino—different substance), which is prohibited only if it imparts taste. Rav Dimi quotes Rabbi Yochanan as saying that if one pours yayin nesech from a barrel into a pit of kosher wine, each drop is immediately nullified upon contact. The Gemara raises three challenges to Rav Dimi’s interpretation based on the Mishna, and resolves them by reinterpreting the cases in the Mishna. Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef offers a narrower understanding of Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling—limiting it to pouring from a jug into a barrel, but not from a barrel into a pit. Ravin also transmits a halakha in Rabbi Yochanan’s name regarding a mixture that includes a forbidden item combined with both a similar and a different substance. In such a case, the forbidden item is nullified by the different substance (e.g., yayin nesech mixed with wine and water), while the similar substance is viewed as if it is not there. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda also quotes Rabbi Yochanan, but there are two versions of his statement. In one version, he disagrees with Ravin and limits the ruling to cases where the different substance was present first. In the other version, his comment refers to the Mishna, and he actually agrees with Ravin. A debate between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan also concerns a case where a forbidden item is mixed with both a similar and a different substance. What is the underlying basis of their disagreement? Rav and Shmuel dispute the position of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether the distinction between mixtures of the same type and mixtures of different types applies universally to all prohibited items, or only to yayin nesech and tevel (untithed produce). The Gemara explains why the rabbis would have adopted a stricter approach with those two prohibitions.
Rava ruled that if a Jew is with a non-Jewish prostitute and there is wine present, one can assume that the Jew ensured the prostitute did not come into contact with the wine, and therefore it is permitted. Although he may not be able to control his sexual desires, he is not presumed to be lax in the laws of yayin nesech (forbidden wine). However, in the reverse case—where a Jewish prostitute is with a non-Jew—since the non-Jew holds the dominant position in the relationship, we assume she has no way to prevent him from touching the wine, and thus it is forbidden. There are nine different cases in which a Jew’s wine was left with a non-Jew, and Rava issued rulings on whether the wine was permitted or forbidden in each instance. In many of these cases, he permitted the wine based on his assessment that the non-Jew would likely not have touched it, due to the possibility of being caught by the owner or another Jew. In other cases, there was uncertainty about whether the non-Jew had even come into contact with the wine, or whether the individuals present were Jews or non-Jews. Two additional cases were brought before other rabbis. In the second case, Abaye introduces a comparison to the laws of impurity, and the Gemara addresses this comparison. It notes that the rabbis were stricter regarding impurity laws than they were with wine, citing a debate between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan to support this point. Three challenges are raised against the positions of Rav and Rabbi Yochanan—two against Rav and one against Rabbi Yochanan—and each is resolved.
Rava ruled that if a Jew is with a non-Jewish prostitute and there is wine present, one can assume that the Jew ensured the prostitute did not come into contact with the wine, and therefore it is permitted. Although he may not be able to control his sexual desires, he is not presumed to be lax in the laws of yayin nesech (forbidden wine). However, in the reverse case—where a Jewish prostitute is with a non-Jew—since the non-Jew holds the dominant position in the relationship, we assume she has no way to prevent him from touching the wine, and thus it is forbidden. There are nine different cases in which a Jew’s wine was left with a non-Jew, and Rava issued rulings on whether the wine was permitted or forbidden in each instance. In many of these cases, he permitted the wine based on his assessment that the non-Jew would likely not have touched it, due to the possibility of being caught by the owner or another Jew. In other cases, there was uncertainty about whether the non-Jew had even come into contact with the wine, or whether the individuals present were Jews or non-Jews. Two additional cases were brought before other rabbis. In the second case, Abaye introduces a comparison to the laws of impurity, and the Gemara addresses this comparison. It notes that the rabbis were stricter regarding impurity laws than they were with wine, citing a debate between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan to support this point. Three challenges are raised against the positions of Rav and Rabbi Yochanan—two against Rav and one against Rabbi Yochanan—and each is resolved.
This week's learning is sponsored by Danielle & Jason Friedman in honor of Anabelle Friedman on her siyum of Mashechet Rosh Hashana on the occasion of her Bat Mitzvah, and in honor and appreciation of Rabbanit Michelle for inspiring and enabling multiple generations of women, in our family and around the world, to engage in Talmud study. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in memory of Myer Senders a”h, beloved father of our friend and co-learner Tina Lamm. "May the Torah learned today by all of us be a zechut for his neshama ותהא נשמתו צרורה בצרור החיים." What is the law regarding a mouse that falls into vinegar? Is the mouse nullified, and if so, at what ratio? The Mishna presents three distinct scenarios involving a Jew and a non-Jew, where wine is left in a location accessible to the non-Jew, raising concerns about potential libation (נסך) and thus rendering the wine prohibited. In each case, the Mishna outlines whether there is reason to suspect that the non-Jew offered the wine as a libation. The determining factor is whether the Jew stated they would be gone for a while or whether the Jew is considered to be supervising. The Gemara defines supervision as a situation in which the Jew could return at any moment, even if they are not physically present. The amount of time that must elapse to prohibit the wine (in a case where the Jew leaves for a while) is debated between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The Rabbis hold that the wine becomes prohibited if enough time passes to pierce the stopper, reseal it, and allow it to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that the required time is that needed to break the stopper entirely, fashion a new one, and let it dry. A fourth case involves a non-Jew dining in a Jew’s home, with wine left either on the table or on a side table. If the Jew leaves the room, there is concern that the non-Jew may touch the wine on the table, but not the wine on the side table—unless the Jew instructed the non-Jew to dilute the wine. If the bottle is sealed and enough time has passed for the stopper to be broken, replaced, and dried, the wine is prohibited. Why are all three cases necessary? What is unique about each, and why did the Mishna include them all? Rabbi Yochanan limits the scope of the debate between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to stoppers made of lime plaster, excluding those made of clay. If a non-Jew were to pierce a clay stopper and reseal it, the tampering would be visibly noticeable. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan’s explanation from a braita, but it is ultimately resolved. Rava rules in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as the final case in the Mishna reflects his opinion exclusively, without presenting the view of the Rabbis. The sugya concludes with a practical question: If the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—requiring a longer time to prohibit the wine—and also follows Rabbi Eliezer (Avodah Zarah 31a), who permits leaving a barrel with a single seal in the possession of a non-Jew without concern for tampering, why is the current practice to avoid leaving wine in a non-Jew’s possession? The Gemara answers that the concern lies with the bunghole, which was used to smell the wine. The worry is that the non-Jew might widen the hole to drink from it and offer the wine as a libation. Bungholes were apparently not present in barrels during the time of the Mishna but were commonly used at a later time in Babylonia when the question was asked.
This week's learning is sponsored by Danielle & Jason Friedman in honor of Anabelle Friedman on her siyum of Mashechet Rosh Hashana on the occasion of her Bat Mitzvah, and in honor and appreciation of Rabbanit Michelle for inspiring and enabling multiple generations of women, in our family and around the world, to engage in Talmud study. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in memory of Myer Senders a”h, beloved father of our friend and co-learner Tina Lamm. "May the Torah learned today by all of us be a zechut for his neshama ותהא נשמתו צרורה בצרור החיים." What is the law regarding a mouse that falls into vinegar? Is the mouse nullified, and if so, at what ratio? The Mishna presents three distinct scenarios involving a Jew and a non-Jew, where wine is left in a location accessible to the non-Jew, raising concerns about potential libation (נסך) and thus rendering the wine prohibited. In each case, the Mishna outlines whether there is reason to suspect that the non-Jew offered the wine as a libation. The determining factor is whether the Jew stated they would be gone for a while or whether the Jew is considered to be supervising. The Gemara defines supervision as a situation in which the Jew could return at any moment, even if they are not physically present. The amount of time that must elapse to prohibit the wine (in a case where the Jew leaves for a while) is debated between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The Rabbis hold that the wine becomes prohibited if enough time passes to pierce the stopper, reseal it, and allow it to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that the required time is that needed to break the stopper entirely, fashion a new one, and let it dry. A fourth case involves a non-Jew dining in a Jew’s home, with wine left either on the table or on a side table. If the Jew leaves the room, there is concern that the non-Jew may touch the wine on the table, but not the wine on the side table—unless the Jew instructed the non-Jew to dilute the wine. If the bottle is sealed and enough time has passed for the stopper to be broken, replaced, and dried, the wine is prohibited. Why are all three cases necessary? What is unique about each, and why did the Mishna include them all? Rabbi Yochanan limits the scope of the debate between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to stoppers made of lime plaster, excluding those made of clay. If a non-Jew were to pierce a clay stopper and reseal it, the tampering would be visibly noticeable. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan’s explanation from a braita, but it is ultimately resolved. Rava rules in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as the final case in the Mishna reflects his opinion exclusively, without presenting the view of the Rabbis. The sugya concludes with a practical question: If the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—requiring a longer time to prohibit the wine—and also follows Rabbi Eliezer (Avodah Zarah 31a), who permits leaving a barrel with a single seal in the possession of a non-Jew without concern for tampering, why is the current practice to avoid leaving wine in a non-Jew’s possession? The Gemara answers that the concern lies with the bunghole, which was used to smell the wine. The worry is that the non-Jew might widen the hole to drink from it and offer the wine as a libation. Bungholes were apparently not present in barrels during the time of the Mishna but were commonly used at a later time in Babylonia when the question was asked.
This week's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik and Professor Adi Wyner in honor of the birth of their first Israeli grandson, David Rafael, son of Rivkah & Charlie Gottlieb. Davidi was born at Sheba Medical Center on 26 Tammuz/ July 22. He is named after his great-grandfathers, David Malik z"l and Dr. Donald Stoltz z"l. As we begin the month of Elul with the recitation of Tehillim 27 (“L’David HaShem Ori v’Yishi”), we continue to pray for Davidi’s refuah shleima as he meets the challenges of a cleft palate, including surgery sometime before his first birthday. דוד רפאל בן רבקה אריאנא ואליעזר בנימין Today's daf is sponsored by Terri Krivosha in memory of her mother, חני מנדל בת שימה פיגה וירחמיאל הכהן, on her second yahrzeit. She was an eshet chayil whom we miss and think of every day. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir dispute whether a mixture is prohibited when the forbidden component imparts a bad taste to the permitted food. Ulla and Rabbi Yochanan differ on the scope of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir: Ulla holds that they disagree when the forbidden item initially gives a good taste and only later turns bad, while Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in a case where the bad taste is immediate. A challenge to Ulla’s view is raised and resolved. The Gemara then asks whether Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in both scenarios, but the question remains unresolved. Rav Amram raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan’s view, noting that this debate is absent from the Mishna. After further searching, he identifies what seems to be the same dispute in Mishna Orlah 2:9. Rabbi Zeira, however, rejects the connection, explaining that the prohibition there rests on a different principle. A braita is then brought that directly supports Rabbi Yochanan: it describes a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding two leavening agents — one of truma, one of chullin — each potent enough to leaven dough on its own. Since adding both would cause over-leavening and produce a bad taste, this proves that there is indeed a debate in cases where a prohibited item imparts a bad taste. The braita lists another disputed scenario — when both leavening agents are added simultaneously. Abaye explains the need for this case: it was brought to clarify Rabbi Shimon’s position that even when the prohibited agent initially aids leavening, if it acts in tandem with the permitted agent, it is not considered to have been beneficial to the dough initially, and therefore, the dough is permitted. A case is brought where a mouse fell into a barrel of beer, and Rav prohibited the consumption of the beer. Some assumed Rav ruled like Rabbi Meir, prohibiting mixtures even when the forbidden element imparts bad taste. Rav Sheshet instead interprets Rav’s decision as a special stringency regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures), and two objections to this reading are resolved. Rava rejects Rav Sheshet’s explanation and holds that if a prohibited item imparts bad taste, the mixture is permitted, and suggests either that the halakha is not in accordance with Rav, or that Rav held the mouse imparted a good taste to the beer.
This week's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik and Professor Adi Wyner in honor of the birth of their first Israeli grandson, David Rafael, son of Rivkah & Charlie Gottlieb. Davidi was born at Sheba Medical Center on 26 Tammuz/ July 22. He is named after his great-grandfathers, David Malik z"l and Dr. Donald Stoltz z"l. As we begin the month of Elul with the recitation of Tehillim 27 (“L’David HaShem Ori v’Yishi”), we continue to pray for Davidi’s refuah shleima as he meets the challenges of a cleft palate, including surgery sometime before his first birthday. דוד רפאל בן רבקה אריאנא ואליעזר בנימין Today's daf is sponsored by Terri Krivosha in memory of her mother, חני מנדל בת שימה פיגה וירחמיאל הכהן, on her second yahrzeit. She was an eshet chayil whom we miss and think of every day. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir dispute whether a mixture is prohibited when the forbidden component imparts a bad taste to the permitted food. Ulla and Rabbi Yochanan differ on the scope of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir: Ulla holds that they disagree when the forbidden item initially gives a good taste and only later turns bad, while Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in a case where the bad taste is immediate. A challenge to Ulla’s view is raised and resolved. The Gemara then asks whether Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in both scenarios, but the question remains unresolved. Rav Amram raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan’s view, noting that this debate is absent from the Mishna. After further searching, he identifies what seems to be the same dispute in Mishna Orlah 2:9. Rabbi Zeira, however, rejects the connection, explaining that the prohibition there rests on a different principle. A braita is then brought that directly supports Rabbi Yochanan: it describes a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding two leavening agents — one of truma, one of chullin — each potent enough to leaven dough on its own. Since adding both would cause over-leavening and produce a bad taste, this proves that there is indeed a debate in cases where a prohibited item imparts a bad taste. The braita lists another disputed scenario — when both leavening agents are added simultaneously. Abaye explains the need for this case: it was brought to clarify Rabbi Shimon’s position that even when the prohibited agent initially aids leavening, if it acts in tandem with the permitted agent, it is not considered to have been beneficial to the dough initially, and therefore, the dough is permitted. A case is brought where a mouse fell into a barrel of beer, and Rav prohibited the consumption of the beer. Some assumed Rav ruled like Rabbi Meir, prohibiting mixtures even when the forbidden element imparts bad taste. Rav Sheshet instead interprets Rav’s decision as a special stringency regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures), and two objections to this reading are resolved. Rava rejects Rav Sheshet’s explanation and holds that if a prohibited item imparts bad taste, the mixture is permitted, and suggests either that the halakha is not in accordance with Rav, or that Rav held the mouse imparted a good taste to the beer.
What is the single most important quality a person can hold onto in life? In this episode, we dive into the Mishnah in Pirkei Avot where Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai asks his students: What is the best path a person should cling to? Each student suggests something different—generosity, friendship, foresight, kindness—but Rabbi Elazar says: a good heart.Why did Rabbi Yochanan declare this the most valuable path of all? What does it mean to truly have a “good heart”—and how does that shape the way we see others, ourselves, and even God?Join us as we explore:The different answers the students gave and why each mattersWhy a good heart includes all the other qualitiesThis Mishnah invites us to reframe success—not by what we achieve or acquire, but by the quality of our inner world and how it radiates outward.
Rabbi Hiya bar Aba was in a place called Gavla - which place that is specifically is unclear, though suggestions are made - where he saw Jewish young women who were impregnated by men who were in the process of converting to Judaism. Also re their wine. Likewise, he saw Jews eating from bishul akum. He said nothing, but consulted with Rabbi Yochanan later, and he said that the babies must be proclaimed mamzerim, the wine - yein nesach, and so on. Because this population was just not that knowledgeable. Also, how does someone whose wine has become prohibited via a non-Jew's libation, how can that Jew recoup the loss? Isn't that wine prohibited from benefit? That turns out to be a matter of dispute.
Daf Yomi Avodah Zarah 42Episode 2034For the first part of daf 42 of masechta Avodah Zarah we continue discussing the disagreement between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Laqish regarding an avodah zarah idol that has broken on its own. After this, we come to our next mishnah, about finding different kinds of avodah zarah. I hope you enjoy. Cheers.Sefaria: https://www.sefaria.org/Avodah_Zarah.42a?lang=heEmail: sruli@babbleontalmud.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/babble_on_talmudFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/p/Babble-on-Talmud-100080258961218/Join the community: https://chat.whatsapp.com/LMbsU3a5f4Y3b61DxFRsqf#dafyomi #talmud
Daf Yomi Avodah Zarah 41Episode 2033Today we begin the third perek of masechta Avodah Zarah. The first mishnah of the perek discusses in which scenarios an idol is forbidden. The second mishnah, also on today's daf, discusses the permissibility of broken idols. This leads to a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Laqish about whether a broken idol that has been worshipped continues to be forbidden, even in its broken state. A pretty interesting daf, getting the new perek off to a good start.Sefaria: https://www.sefaria.org/Avodah_Zarah.40a?lang=heEmail: sruli@babbleontalmud.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/babble_on_talmudFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/p/Babble-on-Talmud-100080258961218/Join the community: https://chat.whatsapp.com/LMbsU3a5f4Y3b61DxFRsqf#dafyomi #talmud 00:00 Intro01:27 Which idols are forbidden23:29 Broken idols33:15 Avodah Zarah that broke on its own62:30 Conclusion
The interaction in the Mishna between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yishmael regarding this issue is analyzed and is also brought as proof for the previous sugya about the difference between betrothing a woman with the dung of an ox who killed a person and the dung of an animal that was used for worshipping idols. What are the reasons that the rabbis decreed that cheese from idol worshippers is forbidden to eat, but permitted for benefit? Six possible explanations for the decree against cheese are brought by various amoraim. The Mishna lists other decrees the rabbis instituted regarding items of idol worshippers, such as milk, bread, cooked items, oil, etc. The oil in the end was permitted by Rebbi and his court. Why is their milk forbidden? Rabbi Yochanan said that their bread was not permitted by the court. Why did he need to make this declaration?
The interaction in the Mishna between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yishmael regarding this issue is analyzed and is also brought as proof for the previous sugya about the difference between betrothing a woman with the dung of an ox who killed a person and the dung of an animal that was used for worshipping idols. What are the reasons that the rabbis decreed that cheese from idol worshippers is forbidden to eat, but permitted for benefit? Six possible explanations for the decree against cheese are brought by various amoraim. The Mishna lists other decrees the rabbis instituted regarding items of idol worshippers, such as milk, bread, cooked items, oil, etc. The oil in the end was permitted by Rebbi and his court. Why is their milk forbidden? Rabbi Yochanan said that their bread was not permitted by the court. Why did he need to make this declaration?
Vinegar produced by idol worshippers from beer is prohibited if there is a concern that wine yeast may have been added during its preparation. The Hadrianic earthenware shards are prohibited for any benefit, as they were soaked in wine with the intention that the absorbed wine would later be used to produce more wine. Rav Dimi provides a description of their preparation and use. A question is raised regarding whether one may benefit from the shards when the benefit comes not from the wine but from the shard itself—such as placing them under the legs of a bed for support. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan hold differing views on this issue. A difficulty is posed from a braita that supports the permissive opinion, but it is ultimately resolved. A second, seemingly contradictory braita is introduced to challenge the first, and it too is resolved with two possible explanations. What are the necessary criteria to prohibit a hide of an animal with an incision found near the heart—specifically, when can it be assumed that such an incision was made to remove the heart as part of an idolatrous offering? The Mishna discusses the status of an animal slaughtered and handled by an idol worshipper when carried into or out of a house of idol worship. Under what circumstances is there concern that the animal is being offered as a sacrifice to an idol, thereby rendering it prohibited for Jewish benefit? Which tannaitic authorities does the Mishna align with in this context? Is it permissible to engage in business dealings with idol worshippers as they enter or exit Tarput (either a festival or house of idol worship)? How does this ruling differ from conducting business with a Jew in similar circumstances? What are the reasons for this distinction?
Two different opinions are presented regarding if and when one may receive medical treatment from an idol worshipper. Rav Yehuda strictly prohibits it under all circumstances, except when treating one's animals. Rabbi Yochanan, however, permits it if the patient would otherwise die without treatment. Additionally, two versions of a statement by Rabbi Yochanan offer further nuance. In the first, he prohibits receiving treatment from an idol worshipper for an illness severe enough to justify desecrating Shabbat. In the second, he forbids it only in cases of internal injuries. What is the practical difference between these two versions? Rav and Rabbi Yochanan also offer differing criteria for when desecrating Shabbat for medical treatment is permitted. Rav defines this case as a wound requiring assessment to determine whether the person will survive. Rabbi Yochanan, by contrast, permits for internal injuries. This leads to a question: are tooth pains considered internal injuries? Two sources are brought to address this, though neither offers a conclusive answer. The second source recounts a story in which Rabbi Yochanan himself sought medication from an idol worshipper for a tooth ailment and was prepared to desecrate Shabbat for it. This seems to contradict his stated prohibition against seeking such treatment for illnesses that permit desecrating Shabbat. How, then, was his action permissible? Finally, the Gemara offers various remedies suggested by the sages for various ailments, such as a gash from a sword, boils, high fever, hemorrhoids, earaches, and a dislocated jaw or eye.
In Tehillim 1:1, the verse begins with "ashrei ha'ish," happy is the man. According to Rabbi Yonantan, the man is Avraham, who did not associate himself with the dor haflaga, the people of Sodom and the Philistines. A similar verse in Tehillim 112:1 employs the same phrase "ashrei ish" who fears God. Why is the masculine form used and not the feminine? Two explanations are offered: happy is the person who repents when still young or happy is the person who can control one's evil inclination like a man, i.e., a warrior overcoming his enemies. The continuation of the verse is, "He delights in God's mitzvot." This is explained as one who does mitzvot for the sake of doing a mitzva and not for receiving a reward. In Tehillim 1:1-2, the verse says that instead of being with evildoers, happy is the person who desires the Torah of God. Rebbi derives from this verse that a person can only learn Torah from the parts of the Torah that one desires to study. Rava extrapolates the verse in the same way and derives other concepts about stages of learning Torah and best practices of learning Torah from these verses and others. What are the rewards received for learning Torah? The Mishna forbids building the area in the bathhouse that was built for an idol. Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that if one got paid, the money is permitted for use. How is this explained? The Mishna does not permit making jewelry for idol worship, but Rabbi Eliezer rules that one could get paid for doing that. Since one cannot sell land to gentiles in Israel, one can also not sell items that are attached to the ground, unless they are already detached. Rabbi Yehuda permits them if they are being sold to be detached after the sale.
Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in memory of Gitta’s father, Yosef ben Menachem Mendel v’Pesha a”h on his tenth yahrzeit. He cherished his family and Torah, and would be so proud of the generations following in his footsteps and adhering to his values and moral compass. וכתר שם טוב עולה על כולם Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in memory of Moshe Hartman, z’l, on his 6th yahrzeit. He continues to be missed dearly. He would delight in my learning, his children’s and his grandchildren’s learning, which we will honor with a family siyum on his yahrzeit. Today's daf is sponsored by Monica Steiner in honor of Rabbi David Abraham Kaplinsky, who begins his first pulpit in San Antonio, Texas today. May you find joy and strength in your work and community. I am so proud of you, David, and love you with all my heart. In an idolatrous city, one may purchase from stores that are not decorated for idolatry, but not from those that are adorned for such purposes. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about both the reason for this prohibition and its scope. Reish Lakish is concerned with decorations that have beautiful scents, as the Jews will benefit from idol worship. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the issue is because those stores pay tribute to the idols. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position. In resolving the difficulty, the difficulty is moved to Rabbi Yochanan's position, but is resolved as well. Items purchased in a forbidden manner are to be rendered useless. For animals, this means to cut off the hooves. A question is asked why this isn't forbidden on account of tzaar baalei hayim - mistreatment of animals? Why, in another context of sanctified items, is the penalty to close the animal in a room and let it die? What is the difference between the two cases? If an animal purchased from an idol worshipper needs to have its hooves cut off, does something similar need to be done to a gentile slave that is purchased? The Gemara brings a different source to prove that one is not allowed to cause physical damage to a slave. What items can one not sell to an idol worshipper as part of the prohibition to put a stumbling block in front of a blind person?
Today's daf is sponsored with gratitude to HKB"H by Tina and Shalom Lamm on the occasion of the brit and naming of their new grandson, Shilo Lavi, born to their children, Bracha and Akiva Berger. When a city contains idol worshippers but the surrounding areas do not, business dealings with those outside the city are permitted even when the city celebrates its holidays. Reish Lakish, citing Rabbi Chanina, defines "outside the city" by referencing the bazaar of Gaza as an example. In an alternative version of this teaching, Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Chanina specifically about shopping in Gaza's bazaar, which was located just outside the city limits. Rabbi Chanina permitted this activity, comparing it to a situation where a Jew and a Gentile cook in separate pots on the same stove—a practice the rabbis allowed. Three sages offer different interpretations of this comparison. Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagree about whether one may walk through an idolatrous city during their holiday celebrations when traveling to reach another destination. The Gemara presents four cases involving someone who bends down to perform an action directly in front of an idol. Even without intending to bow, such behavior is prohibited unless one can act in a way that clearly does not appear to be worship. Why did the rabbis need to mention all four cases? One example involves drinking water from a fountain where water flows from a human statue, since this creates the appearance of kissing the idol. This case leads to another case: one should not drink water directly from a pipe for health reasons, as this might result in swallowing a leech. Swallowing a leech was considered life-threatening, and Rabbi Chanina even permitted boiling water on Shabbat for someone who had swallowed one. Rav Huna also recommended drinking vinegar while waiting for the water to boil. Drinking water at night was also considered dangerous due to the evil spirit called shavrirei, which was believed to cause blindness and could be life threatening. The Gemara offers several possible remedies for those who are thirsty and need to drink water at night. In an idolatrous city, one may purchase from stores that are not decorated for idolatry, but not from those that are adorned for such purposes. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about both the reason for this prohibition and its scope.