Podcasts about rabbi yochanan

If one sacrifice is more frequent (tadir), but another is more sanctified, which takes precedence? Three cases are brought from the first Mishna of the chapter (Zevachim 89) to prove that frequency takes precedence, but each is rejected in the same manner. A Mishna relating to the order of blessings in kiddush and a statement of Rabbi Yochanan are also cited to support the principle of frequency, but these too are rejected. Finally, an inference is drawn from the Mishna in Zevachim 90, which implies that if a peace offering and a guilt or sin offering were before the kohen, and both were from that day, the guilt or sin offering would take precedence - even though peace offerings are more common. To reject this proof, Rava distinguishes between "frequent" and "common." Rav Huna challenges Rava's distinction from a source about brit mila and Pesach, where brit mila is considered tadir. His difficulty, however, is resolved in two possible ways. Another question arises: if a less frequent sacrifice is slaughtered first and then they realize their error, should someone mix the blood (to prevent coagulation) while the more frequent sacrifice is offered first, or should they complete the one already begun? Four sources are brought to address this issue (three of which were also cited earlier), but all attempts are rejected. In the Mishna, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Tarfon disagree about whether oil can be offered in the Temple as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Tarfon, who permits it, only a kmitza (handful) is burned on the altar, while the remainder is given to the kohanim to eat. Rabbi Zeira supports Shmuel's view from the Mishna, while Abaye presents an alternative opinion: that a voluntary oil offering is burned in its entirety, also citing proof from the Mishna. A Tosefta raises a difficulty for Shmuel, but it is resolved. The Gemara then suggests that this is a tannaitic debate; after an attempt to refute the suggestion, it is upheld. Regarding wine, there is likewise a debate about whether it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Akiva, it may be offered, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, this raises the issue of partially extinguishing the altar's fire, which is forbidden by Torah law. Others maintain that the wine is poured into the cups at the top of the altar. The Gemara concludes that this debate parallels the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda (usually in the context of melacha on Shabbat) about whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome.

If one sacrifice is more frequent (tadir), but another is more sanctified, which takes precedence? Three cases are brought from the first Mishna of the chapter (Zevachim 89) to prove that frequency takes precedence, but each is rejected in the same manner. A Mishna relating to the order of blessings in kiddush and a statement of Rabbi Yochanan are also cited to support the principle of frequency, but these too are rejected. Finally, an inference is drawn from the Mishna in Zevachim 90, which implies that if a peace offering and a guilt or sin offering were before the kohen, and both were from that day, the guilt or sin offering would take precedence - even though peace offerings are more common. To reject this proof, Rava distinguishes between "frequent" and "common." Rav Huna challenges Rava's distinction from a source about brit mila and Pesach, where brit mila is considered tadir. His difficulty, however, is resolved in two possible ways. Another question arises: if a less frequent sacrifice is slaughtered first and then they realize their error, should someone mix the blood (to prevent coagulation) while the more frequent sacrifice is offered first, or should they complete the one already begun? Four sources are brought to address this issue (three of which were also cited earlier), but all attempts are rejected. In the Mishna, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Tarfon disagree about whether oil can be offered in the Temple as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Tarfon, who permits it, only a kmitza (handful) is burned on the altar, while the remainder is given to the kohanim to eat. Rabbi Zeira supports Shmuel's view from the Mishna, while Abaye presents an alternative opinion: that a voluntary oil offering is burned in its entirety, also citing proof from the Mishna. A Tosefta raises a difficulty for Shmuel, but it is resolved. The Gemara then suggests that this is a tannaitic debate; after an attempt to refute the suggestion, it is upheld. Regarding wine, there is likewise a debate about whether it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Akiva, it may be offered, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, this raises the issue of partially extinguishing the altar's fire, which is forbidden by Torah law. Others maintain that the wine is poured into the cups at the top of the altar. The Gemara concludes that this debate parallels the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda (usually in the context of melacha on Shabbat) about whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome.

  Raba and Rav Chisda disagree on two issues. If items were not completely consumed on the altar, removed before midnight, and returned after midnight, at what point are they considered "consumed" such that they no longer need to be put back on the altar if removed again (assuming they have not yet turned to ash, in which case they would not need to be returned)? Raba rules that they are considered consumed at midnight of the following night, while Rav Chisda holds that the cutoff is dawn. If the items were not returned until after dawn, Raba still maintains that midnight of the next night renders them consumed, whereas Rav Chisda insists they can never be rendered consumed. Rav Yosef challenges the premise of both opinions, which assume that items not on the altar at midnight cannot be rendered consumed. He argues instead that midnight itself renders all items consumed, even if they were removed before midnight and not yet returned to the altar. Rava asked Raba: If items remain at the top of the altar all night, does that prevent them from becoming disqualified through lina (remaining overnight)? Raba answered that they are not disqualified, but Rava did not accept this response. A braita is cited, providing a source in the Torah that the ramp and sanctified vessels also sanctify disqualified items. If such items are placed on the ramp or the altar, they do not need to be removed. Reish Lakish posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding disqualified items placed in sanctified vessels. Initially, Rabbi Yochanan thought the question was whether they were sanctified to the extent that they could not be redeemed. Reish Lakish clarified that he was asking whether items placed in sanctified vessels could be brought ab initio on the altar. Rabbi Yochanan answered yes, based on the Mishna, but this answer was rejected since the Mishna could be read differently. The Gemara then asks: Does the airspace of the altar sanctify items? At first, it attempts to prove that the airspace does sanctify from the Mishna's statement: "Just as the altar sanctifies, so does the ramp." Items sanctified by the ramp must be carried through the altar's airspace to reach it. If the airspace does not sanctify, then carrying them would be akin to removing them, and once removed, they could not be returned. However, this proof is rejected, since it is possible to bring them to the altar by dragging rather than lifting. Rava bar Rav Chanan then attempts to prove the opposite from the case of a bird burnt offering brought at the top of the altar. If the airspace sanctifies, then there could be no case of pigul (disqualification due to improper intent), because as long as the offering remains on the altar, it could be sacrificed even the next day. Thus, a thought to offer it the next day would not constitute pigul. Rav Shimi rejects this argument, explaining that one could still have a pigul thought to remove the offering and then put it back on the altar the next day, which would indeed be disqualifying.

  Raba and Rav Chisda disagree on two issues. If items were not completely consumed on the altar, removed before midnight, and returned after midnight, at what point are they considered "consumed" such that they no longer need to be put back on the altar if removed again (assuming they have not yet turned to ash, in which case they would not need to be returned)? Raba rules that they are considered consumed at midnight of the following night, while Rav Chisda holds that the cutoff is dawn. If the items were not returned until after dawn, Raba still maintains that midnight of the next night renders them consumed, whereas Rav Chisda insists they can never be rendered consumed. Rav Yosef challenges the premise of both opinions, which assume that items not on the altar at midnight cannot be rendered consumed. He argues instead that midnight itself renders all items consumed, even if they were removed before midnight and not yet returned to the altar. Rava asked Raba: If items remain at the top of the altar all night, does that prevent them from becoming disqualified through lina (remaining overnight)? Raba answered that they are not disqualified, but Rava did not accept this response. A braita is cited, providing a source in the Torah that the ramp and sanctified vessels also sanctify disqualified items. If such items are placed on the ramp or the altar, they do not need to be removed. Reish Lakish posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding disqualified items placed in sanctified vessels. Initially, Rabbi Yochanan thought the question was whether they were sanctified to the extent that they could not be redeemed. Reish Lakish clarified that he was asking whether items placed in sanctified vessels could be brought ab initio on the altar. Rabbi Yochanan answered yes, based on the Mishna, but this answer was rejected since the Mishna could be read differently. The Gemara then asks: Does the airspace of the altar sanctify items? At first, it attempts to prove that the airspace does sanctify from the Mishna's statement: "Just as the altar sanctifies, so does the ramp." Items sanctified by the ramp must be carried through the altar's airspace to reach it. If the airspace does not sanctify, then carrying them would be akin to removing them, and once removed, they could not be returned. However, this proof is rejected, since it is possible to bring them to the altar by dragging rather than lifting. Rava bar Rav Chanan then attempts to prove the opposite from the case of a bird burnt offering brought at the top of the altar. If the airspace sanctifies, then there could be no case of pigul (disqualification due to improper intent), because as long as the offering remains on the altar, it could be sacrificed even the next day. Thus, a thought to offer it the next day would not constitute pigul. Rav Shimi rejects this argument, explaining that one could still have a pigul thought to remove the offering and then put it back on the altar the next day, which would indeed be disqualifying.

  According to the Mishna, in a burnt offering, items that are connected to the meat but not the meat itself—such as bones, hooves, horns, and sinews—are left on the altar if they remain attached to the meat. However, if they are detached, they must be removed from the altar. This ruling is derived from two different verses in the Torah: in Vayikra 1:9 it says that everything is burned on the altar, while in Devarim 12:27 it specifies that in burnt offerings, meat and blood are brought on the altar. This opinion in the Mishna is attributed to Rebbi, while another tannaitic view interprets "everything" more broadly to include these parts, with the limiting verse excluding bones, sinews, etc. only once they have already been consumed by the fire and separated from it. Rabbi Zeira qualifies Rebbi's opinion, explaining that if these parts became separated from the meat but moved closer to the pyre, they are to remain on the altar. The Gemara rejects this explanation, and Rabba offers a different interpretation of Rabbi Zeira's qualification. He explains that the qualification was not on Rebbi's words themselves but on an inference drawn from them—that if they separate, they must be removed from the altar, though they still retain sanctity and cannot be used for personal benefit. Rabba then distinguishes between items that separated before the blood was placed on the altar and those that separated afterward. If they were still attached at the time of the blood sprinkling and later separated, they are considered sanctified items that became disqualified, which are forbidden for benefit. But if they were already detached at the time of sprinkling, they were never destined for the altar and are therefore permitted for the kohanim's use, as derived from a gezeira shava from the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar takes the opposite approach. If they were still attached when the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling permits them, so there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, though they remain prohibited by rabbinic law. However, if they were already detached, the sprinkling has no effect on them, and they remain in their original consecrated state, making one liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Mishna further explains that if any of the disqualified offerings that are meant to remain on the altar (as mentioned in Zevachim 84a) fall off the altar, or if an ember of wood falls off, they do not need to be returned. The Mishna also rules that if parts of the sacrifice that are to be burned on the altar fall off, they must be put back on if this occurs before midnight. After midnight, however, they do not need to be returned. The Gemara limits this ruling to items that have hardened but not yet reduced to ash. Items not yet consumed to that state must be returned regardless of the time, while items already reduced to ash do not need to be returned. Rav brings a source for the significance of midnight in this law from a drasha on the verses in Vayikra 6:2–3. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on this braita from a Mishna in Yoma 20a, and Rabbi Yochanan brings a different drasha to explain the Mishna.

  According to the Mishna, in a burnt offering, items that are connected to the meat but not the meat itself—such as bones, hooves, horns, and sinews—are left on the altar if they remain attached to the meat. However, if they are detached, they must be removed from the altar. This ruling is derived from two different verses in the Torah: in Vayikra 1:9 it says that everything is burned on the altar, while in Devarim 12:27 it specifies that in burnt offerings, meat and blood are brought on the altar. This opinion in the Mishna is attributed to Rebbi, while another tannaitic view interprets "everything" more broadly to include these parts, with the limiting verse excluding bones, sinews, etc. only once they have already been consumed by the fire and separated from it. Rabbi Zeira qualifies Rebbi's opinion, explaining that if these parts became separated from the meat but moved closer to the pyre, they are to remain on the altar. The Gemara rejects this explanation, and Rabba offers a different interpretation of Rabbi Zeira's qualification. He explains that the qualification was not on Rebbi's words themselves but on an inference drawn from them—that if they separate, they must be removed from the altar, though they still retain sanctity and cannot be used for personal benefit. Rabba then distinguishes between items that separated before the blood was placed on the altar and those that separated afterward. If they were still attached at the time of the blood sprinkling and later separated, they are considered sanctified items that became disqualified, which are forbidden for benefit. But if they were already detached at the time of sprinkling, they were never destined for the altar and are therefore permitted for the kohanim's use, as derived from a gezeira shava from the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar takes the opposite approach. If they were still attached when the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling permits them, so there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, though they remain prohibited by rabbinic law. However, if they were already detached, the sprinkling has no effect on them, and they remain in their original consecrated state, making one liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Mishna further explains that if any of the disqualified offerings that are meant to remain on the altar (as mentioned in Zevachim 84a) fall off the altar, or if an ember of wood falls off, they do not need to be returned. The Mishna also rules that if parts of the sacrifice that are to be burned on the altar fall off, they must be put back on if this occurs before midnight. After midnight, however, they do not need to be returned. The Gemara limits this ruling to items that have hardened but not yet reduced to ash. Items not yet consumed to that state must be returned regardless of the time, while items already reduced to ash do not need to be returned. Rav brings a source for the significance of midnight in this law from a drasha on the verses in Vayikra 6:2–3. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on this braita from a Mishna in Yoma 20a, and Rabbi Yochanan brings a different drasha to explain the Mishna.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

The Mishna addresses the case of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances: under what circumstances can it still be offered on the altar? If the mixture retains the appearance of blood, it may be brought. If it is mixed with a substance of the same color, such as wine or blood not designated for sacrifice, but had that substance been water the blood would still be recognizable, then the blood is likewise valid for the altar. Rabbi Yehuda, however, rules that blood is not nullified in other blood, since they are of the same essence. Therefore, even if only a minimal amount of sacrificial blood is present in a mixture with other bloods, it may still be sprinkled on the altar. By contrast, if the blood is mixed with disqualified blood, such as the blood that flows after the initial spurt of slaughter, the mixture must be spilled and cannot be used. Rabbi Eliezer permits it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, limits the Mishna's ruling to a case where another substance spilled into the blood. But if blood dripped into water, each drop would be nullified upon contact, immediately rejected from altar service. Once rejected, it cannot later be accepted, even if the majority of the final mixture is blood. This principle of "rejection" applies only to kodashim, not to mitzvot such as the commandment to cover the blood after slaughter. Reish Lakish rules regarding a mixture of pigul and notar: if one eats them together, there is no punishment of lashes. From this, the Gemara derives three principles about mixtures: (1) even forbidden items can nullify one another; (2) the rule that an item imparting taste is considered significant and not nullified is not a Torah law; (3) a warning given in a case of doubt (hatra'at safek) is not considered a valid warning. A difficulty is raised against the second principle. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve it, the derivation is rejected. Reish Lakish was speaking of pigul and notar involving two similar items, i.e. meat and meat, which are nullified by majority since their taste is indistinguishable. Taste is only a factor when dissimilar items are mixed, where the flavor is perceptible. The Gemara then questions: if similar items are nullified by majority, why does the Mishna, in the case of wine and blood, assess whether the wine would be noticeable if it were water? Since both taste and visibility rely on the same concept, it seems the Mishna treats two similar items as if they were different. If so, why not apply the same reasoning to Reish Lakish's case of pigul and notar, viewing them as distinct, and if they impart taste, liability should follow? After one failed attempt to reinterpret the Mishna, the Gemara resolves the difficulty differently: there is a tannaitic dispute. The Mishna reflects Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, while Reish Lakish follows the rabbis. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from a Mishna Mikvaot 10:6. To explain it, one must assume the Mishna is authored by Rabbi Yehuda, since it employs the principle of "we view the item as if…". Yet at the end of the Mishna, purification waters are nullified in a mikveh if the mikveh waters are the majority. This stands in opposition to Rabbi Yehuda's stance that similar items are treated as different and are not nullified based on appearance.  

The Mishna addresses the case of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances: under what circumstances can it still be offered on the altar? If the mixture retains the appearance of blood, it may be brought. If it is mixed with a substance of the same color, such as wine or blood not designated for sacrifice, but had that substance been water the blood would still be recognizable, then the blood is likewise valid for the altar. Rabbi Yehuda, however, rules that blood is not nullified in other blood, since they are of the same essence. Therefore, even if only a minimal amount of sacrificial blood is present in a mixture with other bloods, it may still be sprinkled on the altar. By contrast, if the blood is mixed with disqualified blood, such as the blood that flows after the initial spurt of slaughter, the mixture must be spilled and cannot be used. Rabbi Eliezer permits it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, limits the Mishna's ruling to a case where another substance spilled into the blood. But if blood dripped into water, each drop would be nullified upon contact, immediately rejected from altar service. Once rejected, it cannot later be accepted, even if the majority of the final mixture is blood. This principle of "rejection" applies only to kodashim, not to mitzvot such as the commandment to cover the blood after slaughter. Reish Lakish rules regarding a mixture of pigul and notar: if one eats them together, there is no punishment of lashes. From this, the Gemara derives three principles about mixtures: (1) even forbidden items can nullify one another; (2) the rule that an item imparting taste is considered significant and not nullified is not a Torah law; (3) a warning given in a case of doubt (hatra'at safek) is not considered a valid warning. A difficulty is raised against the second principle. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve it, the derivation is rejected. Reish Lakish was speaking of pigul and notar involving two similar items, i.e. meat and meat, which are nullified by majority since their taste is indistinguishable. Taste is only a factor when dissimilar items are mixed, where the flavor is perceptible. The Gemara then questions: if similar items are nullified by majority, why does the Mishna, in the case of wine and blood, assess whether the wine would be noticeable if it were water? Since both taste and visibility rely on the same concept, it seems the Mishna treats two similar items as if they were different. If so, why not apply the same reasoning to Reish Lakish's case of pigul and notar, viewing them as distinct, and if they impart taste, liability should follow? After one failed attempt to reinterpret the Mishna, the Gemara resolves the difficulty differently: there is a tannaitic dispute. The Mishna reflects Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, while Reish Lakish follows the rabbis. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from a Mishna Mikvaot 10:6. To explain it, one must assume the Mishna is authored by Rabbi Yehuda, since it employs the principle of "we view the item as if…". Yet at the end of the Mishna, purification waters are nullified in a mikveh if the mikveh waters are the majority. This stands in opposition to Rabbi Yehuda's stance that similar items are treated as different and are not nullified based on appearance.  

The Talmud, Bava Metzia 84A, has an emotional story about a love gone bad. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish are drawn towards one another. They become mentor-disciple and then colleagues. They bring out the best in one another. Reish Lakish marries Rabbi Yochanan's sister, and the couple has children. And the text hints, strongly, that in an age before gay was okay, they were attracted to one another. And then, it all falls apart. They say mean things to one another. Why they do so is not clear. The words are freighted and hurtful, though the reader does not quite get what the hurt is all about. They have a falling out. They each die of heartbreak over their broken relationship. Why this story of love gone bad now, on the Shabbat of Thanksgiving? On Thanksgiving family and friends come together from near and far. We see each other again after having not seen each other in our day to day lives. We like to assume that family and friends will always remain family and friends. We like to assume that if we were close and connected, we will always be close and connected. But this Talmudic love story offers us a cautionary tale that it ain't necessarily so. What do we learn from the deep but broken love of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about what not to do, and what to do, to keep the loves of our lives alive?

Two additional answers are offered to explain why, in the Mishna, the animal is not nullified among the others if one follows Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that only items sold exclusively by unit are not nullified in a mixture. The first answer is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yehoshua according to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of a litra of dried figs, teaching that items sometimes sold individually are not nullified. The second answer is that live animals are considered significant and therefore cannot be nullified. The Gemara continues to ask why animals designated for sacrifices, when intermingled with an animal forbidden for benefit, are all left to die. It suggests resolving the issue through the laws of probability: one could remove an animal at a time and assume each emerged from the majority of permitted animals. The difficulty is that, according to halakhic rules of probability, this only applies once an animal has already been separated, allowing us to presume it came from the majority. But if the animals remain fixed and one is taken directly from the group, the law treats it as either permitted or forbidden (50/50), with no majority to rely upon. The Gemara further proposes creating a situation where the animals scatter from their fixed location, so they are no longer considered fixed, and each could then be assumed to come from the majority. Rava offers three explanations why this solution fails, the first two of which are rejected. The final answer is that, although theoretically possible, it was prohibited by decree, lest people apply the same reasoning in cases where the animals remain fixed. Rava concludes that since the animal is not nullified by rabbinic decree, if any of the animals in the mixture are sacrificed on the altar, they do not achieve atonement, and a new sacrifice must be brought. Rav Huna raises a difficulty with this explanation based on two Mishnayot in Kinnim 1:2 and 3:1. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Rava holds live animals and birds can be rejected from the altar, whereas the Mishna rules that they cannot.  

Two additional answers are offered to explain why, in the Mishna, the animal is not nullified among the others if one follows Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that only items sold exclusively by unit are not nullified in a mixture. The first answer is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yehoshua according to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of a litra of dried figs, teaching that items sometimes sold individually are not nullified. The second answer is that live animals are considered significant and therefore cannot be nullified. The Gemara continues to ask why animals designated for sacrifices, when intermingled with an animal forbidden for benefit, are all left to die. It suggests resolving the issue through the laws of probability: one could remove an animal at a time and assume each emerged from the majority of permitted animals. The difficulty is that, according to halakhic rules of probability, this only applies once an animal has already been separated, allowing us to presume it came from the majority. But if the animals remain fixed and one is taken directly from the group, the law treats it as either permitted or forbidden (50/50), with no majority to rely upon. The Gemara further proposes creating a situation where the animals scatter from their fixed location, so they are no longer considered fixed, and each could then be assumed to come from the majority. Rava offers three explanations why this solution fails, the first two of which are rejected. The final answer is that, although theoretically possible, it was prohibited by decree, lest people apply the same reasoning in cases where the animals remain fixed. Rava concludes that since the animal is not nullified by rabbinic decree, if any of the animals in the mixture are sacrificed on the altar, they do not achieve atonement, and a new sacrifice must be brought. Rav Huna raises a difficulty with this explanation based on two Mishnayot in Kinnim 1:2 and 3:1. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Rava holds live animals and birds can be rejected from the altar, whereas the Mishna rules that they cannot.  

Study Guide After comparing the Mishna in Zevachim with a parallel Mishna in Temurah, the Gemara explains that the Mishna in Zevachim was included to emphasize that even an item prohibited outside the Temple — since it is forbidden for benefit altogether — will not be nullified and must be left to die. This, however, raises a difficulty, as such a principle could seemingly be derived from a Mishna in Avodah Zarah. The resolution is that the Mishna in Avodah Zarah does not deal with items designated for the altar. Therefore, if only that Mishna existed, one might assume that for sacrificial purposes, the laws of nullification would apply, so as not to destroy offerings. Conversely, if only the Mishna in Zevachim were taught, one might think the stringency applies specifically because these items are inherently despicable and unfit for the altar, whereas in non-Temple contexts, nullification might still be valid. According to Torah law, when permitted and forbidden items are intermingled, the forbidden items are nullified if the permitted ones form the majority. Yet there are exceptions to this rule. Why, then, is an animal not nullified in the majority here? The Gemara first suggests that animals fall into the category of items sold individually, which are not nullified according to Rabbi Meir. This explanation aligns with Reish Lakish's reading of Rabbi Meir's position in Mishna Orlah 3:6–7, which includes items usually sold individually but occasionally sold otherwise. However, it does not fit Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation of Rabbi Meir, which applies only to items sold exclusively as individuals — a category that does not include animals, since they are sometimes sold in flocks.  

Study Guide After comparing the Mishna in Zevachim with a parallel Mishna in Temurah, the Gemara explains that the Mishna in Zevachim was included to emphasize that even an item prohibited outside the Temple — since it is forbidden for benefit altogether — will not be nullified and must be left to die. This, however, raises a difficulty, as such a principle could seemingly be derived from a Mishna in Avodah Zarah. The resolution is that the Mishna in Avodah Zarah does not deal with items designated for the altar. Therefore, if only that Mishna existed, one might assume that for sacrificial purposes, the laws of nullification would apply, so as not to destroy offerings. Conversely, if only the Mishna in Zevachim were taught, one might think the stringency applies specifically because these items are inherently despicable and unfit for the altar, whereas in non-Temple contexts, nullification might still be valid. According to Torah law, when permitted and forbidden items are intermingled, the forbidden items are nullified if the permitted ones form the majority. Yet there are exceptions to this rule. Why, then, is an animal not nullified in the majority here? The Gemara first suggests that animals fall into the category of items sold individually, which are not nullified according to Rabbi Meir. This explanation aligns with Reish Lakish's reading of Rabbi Meir's position in Mishna Orlah 3:6–7, which includes items usually sold individually but occasionally sold otherwise. However, it does not fit Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation of Rabbi Meir, which applies only to items sold exclusively as individuals — a category that does not include animals, since they are sometimes sold in flocks.  

Send us a textA California Rabbi's Mission Behind Prison Walls: Rabbi Yochanan FriedmanTo inquire about dedicating an episode - please email podcast@lubavitch.comDid you enjoy listening to this episode? Leave us a five-star review on the podcast platform and/or email us at Podcast@Lubavitch.com - we truly value your feedback!“What we found here was that it's an incredibly challenging shlichus environment. There's a lot of spiritual complacency here. Not that people aren't spiritual, but that they feel that they already have what they're looking for spiritually. And it's not what we were selling, so to speak. ”  - Rabbi Yochanan Friedman"I was sitting on a park bench with a woman who had a lot of piercings. And she looked at me and she said, "What's going to happen first? Am I going to become religious, or you're going to get the piercings?" - Rebbetzin Baily FriedmanProduced by: Gary Waleik & Shneur Brook for Lubavitch International/Lubavitch.com - A Project of Machne IsraelAvailable on all major podcast platforms - and online at Lubavitch.com/podcastSupport the show

Study Guide How does Rabbi Yehuda counter the difficulties raised by Rav Shizbi? First, the Gemara shows that he derives the rulings of Rav Shizbi (that both the verses on a dead bird and the cheilev of an animal only apply to kosher birds/animals differently. Then, they bring three suggestions on how to explain the meaning of the word treifa in the verse regarding the cheilev. The first two suggestions are rejected.  How does Rabbi Meir explain the three different verses - two for the impurity of a dead bird and the one for cheilev? A braita is brought that derives some of the halakhot previously mentioned from the verses, that the cheilev ruling only applies to kosher animals and not to undomesticated animals.  Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree about whether Rabbi Meir would hold that melika removes a bird from having impurity of a carcass in birds with blemishes or even birds not generally offered on the altar. This leads to Rabbi Yirmia asking if the same would be true if, instead of breaking the neck of a calf in the egla arufa ceremony, they broke the back of a goat?   

Study Guide How does Rabbi Yehuda counter the difficulties raised by Rav Shizbi? First, the Gemara shows that he derives the rulings of Rav Shizbi (that both the verses on a dead bird and the cheilev of an animal only apply to kosher birds/animals differently. Then, they bring three suggestions on how to explain the meaning of the word treifa in the verse regarding the cheilev. The first two suggestions are rejected.  How does Rabbi Meir explain the three different verses - two for the impurity of a dead bird and the one for cheilev? A braita is brought that derives some of the halakhot previously mentioned from the verses, that the cheilev ruling only applies to kosher animals and not to undomesticated animals.  Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree about whether Rabbi Meir would hold that melika removes a bird from having impurity of a carcass in birds with blemishes or even birds not generally offered on the altar. This leads to Rabbi Yirmia asking if the same would be true if, instead of breaking the neck of a calf in the egla arufa ceremony, they broke the back of a goat?   

All ramps in the Temple had a slope of three cubits in length for every one cubit of height, except for the ramp of the altar, which had a gentler incline of three and five-ninths cubits. This was to accommodate the kohanim, who had to carry the animal body parts up to the top of the altar. The kmitza—a handful taken from the meal offering—could be performed anywhere within the Azara (Temple courtyard). The remainder of the offering was eaten by male kohanim, could be prepared in any manner, and was permitted to be eaten only on that day and the following night until midnight. Rabbi Elazar taught that if the kmitza was taken in the Heichal (Sanctuary), it was still valid. He compared it to the bowls of frankincense, since both are referred to with the term azkarata, and the frankincense is brought from inside the Sanctuary and burned outside. Rabbi Yirmia raised a challenge from a braita that seemed to imply the kmitza must be performed where the owner presents the offering—i.e., not in the Sanctuary, which is restricted to kohanim. However, two interpretations of that braita are offered, the first of which is rejected. Both explanations ultimately show that the braita was not intended to restrict the location of the kmitza, but rather to broaden it. Rabbi Yochanan ruled that peace offerings may be slaughtered in the Sanctuary. His reasoning was that since slaughtering may be done outside the Ohel Moed, it stands to reason that it may also be done inside. If the secondary location is valid, then certainly the primary one should be. A difficulty is raised from a braita concerning eating in the Sanctuary, which is prohibited, if not for a verse permitting it in unique circumstances. To resolve this, a distinction is made: slaughtering is a sacrificial rite, whereas eating is not. The bird sin offering is ideally performed on the lower half of the altar at the southwest corner, though it may be offered anywhere on the altar. Six actions were performed at the southwest corner—three on the lower half and three on the upper half of the altar. On the lower half: the bird sin offering, bringing the meal offering to the altar for kmitza, and pouring the remainder of the blood into the yesod (base). On the upper half: pouring the wine and water libations, and offering the bird burnt offering. When ascending the altar, people would typically go up the ramp on the right side, turn right at the top, begin at the southeast corner, and circle counter-clockwise around the altar before descending via the left side of the ramp. However, for the three actions performed on the upper southwest corner, they would ascend via the left side of the ramp to reach that spot directly, then turn around and descend from there after completing the task. The bird sin offering is brought at the southwest corner, a location derived from the placement of the meal offering. The meal offering's placement is itself derived from the verse in Vayikra 6:7.  

All ramps in the Temple had a slope of three cubits in length for every one cubit of height, except for the ramp of the altar, which had a gentler incline of three and five-ninths cubits. This was to accommodate the kohanim, who had to carry the animal body parts up to the top of the altar. The kmitza—a handful taken from the meal offering—could be performed anywhere within the Azara (Temple courtyard). The remainder of the offering was eaten by male kohanim, could be prepared in any manner, and was permitted to be eaten only on that day and the following night until midnight. Rabbi Elazar taught that if the kmitza was taken in the Heichal (Sanctuary), it was still valid. He compared it to the bowls of frankincense, since both are referred to with the term azkarata, and the frankincense is brought from inside the Sanctuary and burned outside. Rabbi Yirmia raised a challenge from a braita that seemed to imply the kmitza must be performed where the owner presents the offering—i.e., not in the Sanctuary, which is restricted to kohanim. However, two interpretations of that braita are offered, the first of which is rejected. Both explanations ultimately show that the braita was not intended to restrict the location of the kmitza, but rather to broaden it. Rabbi Yochanan ruled that peace offerings may be slaughtered in the Sanctuary. His reasoning was that since slaughtering may be done outside the Ohel Moed, it stands to reason that it may also be done inside. If the secondary location is valid, then certainly the primary one should be. A difficulty is raised from a braita concerning eating in the Sanctuary, which is prohibited, if not for a verse permitting it in unique circumstances. To resolve this, a distinction is made: slaughtering is a sacrificial rite, whereas eating is not. The bird sin offering is ideally performed on the lower half of the altar at the southwest corner, though it may be offered anywhere on the altar. Six actions were performed at the southwest corner—three on the lower half and three on the upper half of the altar. On the lower half: the bird sin offering, bringing the meal offering to the altar for kmitza, and pouring the remainder of the blood into the yesod (base). On the upper half: pouring the wine and water libations, and offering the bird burnt offering. When ascending the altar, people would typically go up the ramp on the right side, turn right at the top, begin at the southeast corner, and circle counter-clockwise around the altar before descending via the left side of the ramp. However, for the three actions performed on the upper southwest corner, they would ascend via the left side of the ramp to reach that spot directly, then turn around and descend from there after completing the task. The bird sin offering is brought at the southwest corner, a location derived from the placement of the meal offering. The meal offering's placement is itself derived from the verse in Vayikra 6:7.  

Diagrams Study Guide Rav Shravia raises a second difficulty against Rabbi Zeira's proof for Rabbi Yochanan's statement that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was completely in the north from the Mishna in Tamid 29a. He suggests that perhaps it was not Rabbi Yosi's opinion, but rather Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, who held that the altar was in the north. He cites a different braita relating to the placement of the basin (kiyur) and explains why that proves Rabbi Yosi the Galilean must have held that the altar was completely in the north. Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debate the status of sanctified animals that were designated, and then the altar becomes broken. A verse is brought as the source for Rav's position. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's view—one from a braita and one from a statement Rav himself made—and both are resolved. In resolving the second difficulty, the Gemara mentions a position of Rabbi Yehuda. It then explores this opinion in the context of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding the size and height of the altar in the time of Moshe.

Diagrams Study Guide Rav Shravia raises a second difficulty against Rabbi Zeira's proof for Rabbi Yochanan's statement that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was completely in the north from the Mishna in Tamid 29a. He suggests that perhaps it was not Rabbi Yosi's opinion, but rather Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, who held that the altar was in the north. He cites a different braita relating to the placement of the basin (kiyur) and explains why that proves Rabbi Yosi the Galilean must have held that the altar was completely in the north. Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debate the status of sanctified animals that were designated, and then the altar becomes broken. A verse is brought as the source for Rav's position. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's view—one from a braita and one from a statement Rav himself made—and both are resolved. In resolving the second difficulty, the Gemara mentions a position of Rabbi Yehuda. It then explores this opinion in the context of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding the size and height of the altar in the time of Moshe.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Judy and Jerel Shapiro for the marriage today of their son Oren Shapiro to Fay Gamliel of Toronto. "Mazal tov and may they build a Bayit Ne'eman b'Yisrael, and a bayit filled with love and peace!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff in loving memory of the 11 precious souls killed on the 18 of Cheshvan at Dor Hadash, New Light and Tree of Life in Pittsburgh. Joyce Fienberg, Dr Richard Gottfried, Rose Mallinger, Dr. Jerry Rabinowitz, Cecil Rosenthal, David Rosenthal, Bernice Simon, Sylvan Simon, Daniel Stein, Melvin Wax, and Irving Younger. And in honor of the Daf Yomi Pittsburgh group under the leadership of Rabbi Amy Bardack and Eric Lidji. What is the size of the Temple courtyard, the Azara? These boundaries are important for three laws that are specifically done in the azara only - kohanim eat kodshai kodashim, slaughtering kodshim kalim takes place there, and one is punished by karet for entering while impure. Rav Nachman's father specified the boundaries. There was an assumption that he was trying to exclude a particular space by demarcating the exact size. They explain that he must have been excluding the chambers that open into the Azara but are partially outside the Azara boundaries. A difficulty is raised from a Mishna that designates them as sanctified. But it is resolved by explaining that the Mishna was referring to a rabbinic definition, but by Torah law, they are not considered the Azara. Two other sources seem to contradict this explanation, but are resolved.   Rav Avudimi explained the source that the blood is disqualified if not brought on the altar before sunset of the day of the slaughtering. Rabbi Yochanan and Chizkiya disagree about the status of the meat of a peace offering on the night after the second day, both for laws of pigul and notar. Comparisons are made between the meat of the sacrifices that can be eaten for one day and those that can be eaten for two days – explaining the source of the differences between the two regarding the night of the second day. A firstborn, maaser and Pesach are kodshai kalim and have similar laws. However, certain issues surrounding eating them are different – who can eat them, how the meat is prepared, and for how long they can be eaten.   

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Judy and Jerel Shapiro for the marriage today of their son Oren Shapiro to Fay Gamliel of Toronto. "Mazal tov and may they build a Bayit Ne'eman b'Yisrael, and a bayit filled with love and peace!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff in loving memory of the 11 precious souls killed on the 18 of Cheshvan at Dor Hadash, New Light and Tree of Life in Pittsburgh. Joyce Fienberg, Dr Richard Gottfried, Rose Mallinger, Dr. Jerry Rabinowitz, Cecil Rosenthal, David Rosenthal, Bernice Simon, Sylvan Simon, Daniel Stein, Melvin Wax, and Irving Younger. And in honor of the Daf Yomi Pittsburgh group under the leadership of Rabbi Amy Bardack and Eric Lidji. What is the size of the Temple courtyard, the Azara? These boundaries are important for three laws that are specifically done in the azara only - kohanim eat kodshai kodashim, slaughtering kodshim kalim takes place there, and one is punished by karet for entering while impure. Rav Nachman's father specified the boundaries. There was an assumption that he was trying to exclude a particular space by demarcating the exact size. They explain that he must have been excluding the chambers that open into the Azara but are partially outside the Azara boundaries. A difficulty is raised from a Mishna that designates them as sanctified. But it is resolved by explaining that the Mishna was referring to a rabbinic definition, but by Torah law, they are not considered the Azara. Two other sources seem to contradict this explanation, but are resolved.   Rav Avudimi explained the source that the blood is disqualified if not brought on the altar before sunset of the day of the slaughtering. Rabbi Yochanan and Chizkiya disagree about the status of the meat of a peace offering on the night after the second day, both for laws of pigul and notar. Comparisons are made between the meat of the sacrifices that can be eaten for one day and those that can be eaten for two days – explaining the source of the differences between the two regarding the night of the second day. A firstborn, maaser and Pesach are kodshai kalim and have similar laws. However, certain issues surrounding eating them are different – who can eat them, how the meat is prepared, and for how long they can be eaten.   

Public and individual sin offerings are categorized as kodshei kodashim. Public offerings include the goat offerings on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays. They are slaughtered and blood is accepted in the North of the Azara. The blood is sprinkled on the top of the altar. The kohen goes onto the sovev, a ledge of the altar, one cubit wide and five cubits off the ground that extends across the length of the altar. From there, he walks around the altar, placing the blood, using his finger, at the top of the altar near the horns. The remainder of the blood is then spilled at the base of the altar, and the meat can be prepared in all manners, and is eaten by male kohanim for that day and night, until midnight. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood was placed on the horns, while Rebbi holds that the blood just needs to be placed above the red line at the mid-height of the altar (chut hasikra). Within Rebbi's opinion, there is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar whether it needs to be placed on the edge of the corner or can it be up to a cubit away from the corner. Even though a braita clearly states "the edge of the corner," it is possible that is only ideally, but a cubit away would be sufficient as well. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rebbi regarding the blood of a bird burnt offering, which can be done anywhere above the red line, but distinguishes between that and the sin offering of an animal as the Torah specified kranot, horns. The Gemara brings a source for Rebbi's opinion from Yechezkel 43:15 and a source for the red line from Shmot 27:5. There is a debate regarding the placement of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar – some say both were on the Western part of the base, some say both were on the Southern part and some say the inner ones were poured on the Western part, while the outer ones were placed on the Southern part. What is the basis for the different opinions? The burnt offering is slaughtered in the North and blood is collected in the North. The blood is placed on two corners, but covers all four sides. Rav and Shmuel, based on a tannaitic debate, disagree about whether the kohen throws the blood twice in each corner to get on both sides or in one throw reaching both sides. The blood was placed only from two corners, as one of the corners does not have a yesod, base, underneath and the blood of the burnt offering needs to be placed on the altar where there is a base underneath, as derived from verses earlier in the Gemara. Why was there no base on the East and South sides? Since that area was specifically part of Yehuda's territory, and the rest of the altar was in Binyamin's territory, they did not extend the base there, as Binyamin was promised that the altar would be in his territory.  

Public and individual sin offerings are categorized as kodshei kodashim. Public offerings include the goat offerings on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays. They are slaughtered and blood is accepted in the North of the Azara. The blood is sprinkled on the top of the altar. The kohen goes onto the sovev, a ledge of the altar, one cubit wide and five cubits off the ground that extends across the length of the altar. From there, he walks around the altar, placing the blood, using his finger, at the top of the altar near the horns. The remainder of the blood is then spilled at the base of the altar, and the meat can be prepared in all manners, and is eaten by male kohanim for that day and night, until midnight. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood was placed on the horns, while Rebbi holds that the blood just needs to be placed above the red line at the mid-height of the altar (chut hasikra). Within Rebbi's opinion, there is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar whether it needs to be placed on the edge of the corner or can it be up to a cubit away from the corner. Even though a braita clearly states "the edge of the corner," it is possible that is only ideally, but a cubit away would be sufficient as well. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rebbi regarding the blood of a bird burnt offering, which can be done anywhere above the red line, but distinguishes between that and the sin offering of an animal as the Torah specified kranot, horns. The Gemara brings a source for Rebbi's opinion from Yechezkel 43:15 and a source for the red line from Shmot 27:5. There is a debate regarding the placement of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar – some say both were on the Western part of the base, some say both were on the Southern part and some say the inner ones were poured on the Western part, while the outer ones were placed on the Southern part. What is the basis for the different opinions? The burnt offering is slaughtered in the North and blood is collected in the North. The blood is placed on two corners, but covers all four sides. Rav and Shmuel, based on a tannaitic debate, disagree about whether the kohen throws the blood twice in each corner to get on both sides or in one throw reaching both sides. The blood was placed only from two corners, as one of the corners does not have a yesod, base, underneath and the blood of the burnt offering needs to be placed on the altar where there is a base underneath, as derived from verses earlier in the Gemara. Why was there no base on the East and South sides? Since that area was specifically part of Yehuda's territory, and the rest of the altar was in Binyamin's territory, they did not extend the base there, as Binyamin was promised that the altar would be in his territory.  

The braita in Zevachim 51 extrapolates from the third mention (by the nasi) of the base of the altar that for all sacrifices on the outer altar the remainder of the blood is poured on the base, the yesod. The braita then raises a question: perhaps the extrapolation should be different — that the sprinkling of sacrificial blood on the outer altar must be performed only on the sides where there is a base, i.e., not on the southeast corner, since the base did not extend there. A difficulty on that suggestion is drawn from the verse's wording. The verse states "to the base of the altar of the olah," which suggests relevance to all sacrifices on the outer altar rather than only to the olah. But the sin offering, which is placed on the outer altar, is positioned on all four corners and not limited to the three corners where there is a base. If the verse had intended the latter ruling, it should have been phrased "to the base of the olah," referring specifically to the burnt offering where that limitation would apply. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the unique inclusion of the word "altar" in the verse: it teaches that when blood is spilled on the base, it must be spilled on the roof of the base (top flat surface) and not on the wall of the base. With this reading, the subsequent lines of the braita, where Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva each say the law could have been derived by a kal va'chomer are reread including mention of the roof of the base. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva appear to assert the same logical argument using slightly different wording. Rav Ada bar Ahava and Rav Papa propose possible distinctions between their positions. Rav Ada argues that because Rabbi Akiva used more extended language about the remainder of the blood, that it "does not atone" and "does not come for atonement purposes," Rabbi Akiva must regard pouring the remainder as nonessential. Rabbi Yishmael, having said only "it doesn't atone," must hold that pouring the remainder is essential. Rav Papa rejects this reading, maintaining that no one posits an obligation to pour the remainder of the blood. He narrows the difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva to the specific case of the bird sin offering: whether mitzui, squeezing out the remainder of the blood and placing it directly on the wall of the altar while squeezing, is essential. Rav Papa understands Rabbi Yishmael to require mitzui, while Rabbi Akiva does not. A braita is then cited to support Rav Papa, showing that Rabbi Yishmael holds pouring the remainder is not essential. A difficulty is raised against Rav Papa's position, but the Gemara resolves it. Rami bar Hama introduces a tana who maintains that for sin offerings whose blood is placed on the inner altar, pouring the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is essential; Rava, however, rejects this understanding of the braita and its conclusion. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi dispute whether Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Akiva actually differ on the question of whether the remainder of the blood for inner sin offerings is essential.    

The braita in Zevachim 51 extrapolates from the third mention (by the nasi) of the base of the altar that for all sacrifices on the outer altar the remainder of the blood is poured on the base, the yesod. The braita then raises a question: perhaps the extrapolation should be different — that the sprinkling of sacrificial blood on the outer altar must be performed only on the sides where there is a base, i.e., not on the southeast corner, since the base did not extend there. A difficulty on that suggestion is drawn from the verse's wording. The verse states "to the base of the altar of the olah," which suggests relevance to all sacrifices on the outer altar rather than only to the olah. But the sin offering, which is placed on the outer altar, is positioned on all four corners and not limited to the three corners where there is a base. If the verse had intended the latter ruling, it should have been phrased "to the base of the olah," referring specifically to the burnt offering where that limitation would apply. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the unique inclusion of the word "altar" in the verse: it teaches that when blood is spilled on the base, it must be spilled on the roof of the base (top flat surface) and not on the wall of the base. With this reading, the subsequent lines of the braita, where Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva each say the law could have been derived by a kal va'chomer are reread including mention of the roof of the base. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva appear to assert the same logical argument using slightly different wording. Rav Ada bar Ahava and Rav Papa propose possible distinctions between their positions. Rav Ada argues that because Rabbi Akiva used more extended language about the remainder of the blood, that it "does not atone" and "does not come for atonement purposes," Rabbi Akiva must regard pouring the remainder as nonessential. Rabbi Yishmael, having said only "it doesn't atone," must hold that pouring the remainder is essential. Rav Papa rejects this reading, maintaining that no one posits an obligation to pour the remainder of the blood. He narrows the difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva to the specific case of the bird sin offering: whether mitzui, squeezing out the remainder of the blood and placing it directly on the wall of the altar while squeezing, is essential. Rav Papa understands Rabbi Yishmael to require mitzui, while Rabbi Akiva does not. A braita is then cited to support Rav Papa, showing that Rabbi Yishmael holds pouring the remainder is not essential. A difficulty is raised against Rav Papa's position, but the Gemara resolves it. Rami bar Hama introduces a tana who maintains that for sin offerings whose blood is placed on the inner altar, pouring the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is essential; Rava, however, rejects this understanding of the braita and its conclusion. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi dispute whether Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Akiva actually differ on the question of whether the remainder of the blood for inner sin offerings is essential.    

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.  

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.  

How is sacrificial blood excluded from the prohibition against "notar" and impurity? As derived from verses, that is. Likewise, how is blood not subject to me'ilah, after atonement (or even before atonement). Also, how these details are derived from verses that seem indirect or insufficient, when we might have wanted more. Also, why does the Torah mention "karet," the punishment of being cut off, three disctinct times? Each teaches another factor - with a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Shimon.

Study Guide The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet. This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned. Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul, just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul. Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul, as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim. Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar. Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul. The Gemara explores Ulla’s intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet, but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz, where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar. Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul, notar, and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan’s statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina. The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.  

Study Guide The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet. This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned. Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul, just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul. Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul, as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim. Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar. Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul. The Gemara explores Ulla’s intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet, but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz, where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar. Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul, notar, and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan’s statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina. The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.  

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Bava Metzia 84a, focusing on the profound relationship between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, their transformative encounter, and the tragic fallout of their dispute. The episode delves into themes of Torah's transformative power, respect for teachers, self-sufficiency, and the Jewish people's global mission. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's Encounter: Rabbi Yochanan, swimming in the Jordan River, is pursued by Reish Lakish, a highway robber. Rabbi Wolbe digresses to note the Jordan's flow from the sweet Sea of Galilee (a “giver”) to the bitter Dead Sea (a “taker”), symbolizing the sweetness of giving. Rabbi Yochanan praises Reish Lakish's strength, suggesting he redirect it to Torah study, while Reish Lakish retorts that Rabbi Yochanan's beauty suits women. Rabbi Yochanan offers his sister in marriage if Reish Lakish repents, leading to his transformation. Reish Lakish weakens physically upon accepting Torah, as Torah shifts focus from physical to spiritual pursuits, consuming one's energy (6:11–9:54).Torah's Transformative Power: Rabbi Wolbe explains that Torah is not just a subject but a “sam hachaim” (elixir of life), weakening physical desires to strengthen spiritual ones. Reish Lakish's sudden weakness reflects Torah's overwhelming influence, countering the Yetzer Hara (evil inclination), which distracts from study (e.g., causing sleepiness or daydreaming, per Psalms 20). This underscores the incompatibility of material and spiritual pursuits, critiquing modern attempts to “have it all” (e.g., 2008 mortgage crisis).Their Dispute and Tragedy: Years later, as scholars, they debate when a vessel becomes susceptible to tumah (ritual impurity): Rabbi Yochanan says when metals are fused; Reish Lakish says when polished. Rabbi Yochanan's comment, “A thief knows the tools of thievery,” is meant constructively but offends Reish Lakish, who retorts, “How have you benefited me?” Rabbi Yochanan responds that he brought him under the Divine Presence. Reish Lakish's disrespect causes divine retribution, leading to his illness and death. Rabbi Yochanan's sister pleads for mercy, but he cites verses (Jeremiah 49:11) to prioritize divine justice, as Reish Lakish's contempt endangered their bond and the nation's spiritual integrity (29:34–32:14).Rabbi Yochanan's Grief: Rabbi Yochanan is heartbroken, grieving Reish Lakish's loss. A new student, Rabbi Elazar ben Pedas, merely affirms Rabbi Yochanan's teachings, unlike Reish Lakish's challenging 24 questions and answers, which clarified Torah through debate. Rabbi Yochanan's anguish drives him to madness, and the rabbis pray for his death, as his bond with Reish Lakish was central to his existence (50:30–54:38)._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on September 5, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 24, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Yochanan, #ReishLakish, #BavaMitzia, #mentorship, #parenting, #marriage, #authority, #respect, #leadership, #reverence ★ Support this podcast ★

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Bava Metzia 84a, focusing on the profound relationship between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, their transformative encounter, and the tragic fallout of their dispute. The episode delves into themes of Torah's transformative power, respect for teachers, self-sufficiency, and the Jewish people's global mission. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's Encounter: Rabbi Yochanan, swimming in the Jordan River, is pursued by Reish Lakish, a highway robber. Rabbi Wolbe digresses to note the Jordan's flow from the sweet Sea of Galilee (a “giver”) to the bitter Dead Sea (a “taker”), symbolizing the sweetness of giving. Rabbi Yochanan praises Reish Lakish's strength, suggesting he redirect it to Torah study, while Reish Lakish retorts that Rabbi Yochanan's beauty suits women. Rabbi Yochanan offers his sister in marriage if Reish Lakish repents, leading to his transformation. Reish Lakish weakens physically upon accepting Torah, as Torah shifts focus from physical to spiritual pursuits, consuming one's energy (6:11–9:54).Torah's Transformative Power: Rabbi Wolbe explains that Torah is not just a subject but a “sam hachaim” (elixir of life), weakening physical desires to strengthen spiritual ones. Reish Lakish's sudden weakness reflects Torah's overwhelming influence, countering the Yetzer Hara (evil inclination), which distracts from study (e.g., causing sleepiness or daydreaming, per Psalms 20). This underscores the incompatibility of material and spiritual pursuits, critiquing modern attempts to “have it all” (e.g., 2008 mortgage crisis).Their Dispute and Tragedy: Years later, as scholars, they debate when a vessel becomes susceptible to tumah (ritual impurity): Rabbi Yochanan says when metals are fused; Reish Lakish says when polished. Rabbi Yochanan's comment, “A thief knows the tools of thievery,” is meant constructively but offends Reish Lakish, who retorts, “How have you benefited me?” Rabbi Yochanan responds that he brought him under the Divine Presence. Reish Lakish's disrespect causes divine retribution, leading to his illness and death. Rabbi Yochanan's sister pleads for mercy, but he cites verses (Jeremiah 49:11) to prioritize divine justice, as Reish Lakish's contempt endangered their bond and the nation's spiritual integrity (29:34–32:14).Rabbi Yochanan's Grief: Rabbi Yochanan is heartbroken, grieving Reish Lakish's loss. A new student, Rabbi Elazar ben Pedas, merely affirms Rabbi Yochanan's teachings, unlike Reish Lakish's challenging 24 questions and answers, which clarified Torah through debate. Rabbi Yochanan's anguish drives him to madness, and the rabbis pray for his death, as his bond with Reish Lakish was central to his existence (50:30–54:38)._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on September 5, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 24, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Yochanan, #ReishLakish, #BavaMitzia, #mentorship, #parenting, #marriage, #authority, #respect, #leadership, #reverence ★ Support this podcast ★

The Gemara brings a braita in which a Tanna offers an alternative interpretation to explain Beit Hillel’s reasoning - that one application of blood in the sin offering is sufficient to fulfill the obligation, rather than two. Two objections are raised against this interpretation, and in the second objection, an alternative drasha is proposed. However, both objections are ultimately resolved. If, according to Beit Shammai, pigul applies only when the improper intent occurs during two applications of blood (in a sin offering), whereas according to Beit Hillel even one is sufficient, the question arises: why is this ruling not listed among the leniencies of Beit Shammai? Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Pappa enumerate various laws in which the three non-essential applications of blood are similar to or different from the one essential application.

The Gemara brings a braita in which a Tanna offers an alternative interpretation to explain Beit Hillel’s reasoning - that one application of blood in the sin offering is sufficient to fulfill the obligation, rather than two. Two objections are raised against this interpretation, and in the second objection, an alternative drasha is proposed. However, both objections are ultimately resolved. If, according to Beit Shammai, pigul applies only when the improper intent occurs during two applications of blood (in a sin offering), whereas according to Beit Hillel even one is sufficient, the question arises: why is this ruling not listed among the leniencies of Beit Shammai? Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Pappa enumerate various laws in which the three non-essential applications of blood are similar to or different from the one essential application.

How can the verse “do not touch kodesh” be used by Reish Lakish to teach that one cannot eat sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, when that verse is needed to derive the prohibition for an impure person to eat sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled? To resolve the difficulty, the Gemara explains how both can be derived from the same verse.  There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding an impure person who eats sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled – is it punishable by lashes or not? Abaye and Rava disagree about the scope of the debate. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether one who brings parts of the body of a non-kosher animal onto the altar receives lashes or not. However, after raising a difficulty with this, they explain that all agree it is forbidden, but not punishable by lashes, as it is a negative commandment that is not written explicitly, but derived from a positive commandment. The debate is regarding a different, but similar issue - bringing a non-domesticated animal – is it a violation of a positive commandment, or is it only forbidden ab initio? Three versions of a question are brought regarding shirayim. If a disqualified person accepted and sprinkled the blood, does it render the animal disqualified from being used for a sacrifice, e.g. can one take more blood from the animal and sprinkle it on the altar? Or, if a cup with the blood was taken out of the Azara, can one get more blood from the animal? Or, if multiple cups were used to get blood from the animal and one was used for the altar, does the blood from the other cups also get poured on the base of the altar (as shirayim)? How does the Mishna allow for some mistakes to be rectified? Why are there three different cases like this mentioned in the Mishna – what is unique about each case?

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Baba Metzia 84a, focusing on a Talmudic discussion about Rabbi Yochanan's exceptional beauty and its spiritual implications. The episode delves into the concept of the evil eye, the influence of parental thoughts on conception, and the responsibility to use one's gifts thoughtfully. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan's Beauty: Rabbi Yochanan claims to be the last of Jerusalem's beautiful people, described vividly: a silver goblet filled with pomegranate seeds, crowned with roses, and placed between sun and shade reflects a fraction of his radiance. The Talmud questions this, noting Rav Kahana's beauty resembled Rav Avohu's, which resembled Yaakov's, which resembled Adam's. Rabbi Yochanan's distinction was his beardless face, enhancing his radiant appearance.Mikvah Practice: Rabbi Yochanan sat at the women's mikvah entrance so that women, emerging from ritual immersion, would see him and retain his image, influencing their conception to produce beautiful, Torah-learned children. This mirrors Yaakov's use of streaked rods to influence sheep traits. Rabbi Wolbe defends this as a responsible use of his gift, not arrogance, citing his grandfather's teaching that knowing and using one's virtues is an obligation, akin to knowing one's wealth to give charity.Evil Eye Concerns: The sages question if Rabbi Yochanan feared the evil eye from displaying his beauty. He responds that, as a descendant of Yosef, he is immune, per Genesis 49:22 (“Yosef is a charming son, above the eye”) and 49:24 (likening Yosef's progeny to fish, hidden from the evil eye). Rabbi Wolbe explains the evil eye's real impact: flaunting wealth or beauty can cause jealousy, stress, or harm in others, affecting their relationships or finances.Practical Lessons: Rabbi Wolbe shares anecdotes to illustrate avoiding the evil eye: his father's choice of a modest Toyota Camry over a Lincoln Town Car to avoid neighbors' jealousy, and leaving a broken blinker light to deter envy. He recounts Marvy Finger's mentor, a wealthy man flying coach to avoid wasteful display, emphasizing humility and consideration for others' feelings.Broader Message: The episode underscores the responsibility to use God-given gifts (beauty, wealth) for positive impact while avoiding harm through jealousy. Rabbi Yochanan's actions aimed to inspire righteousness, not pride. Rabbi Wolbe urges mindfulness of how one's actions affect others, promoting sensitivity in a world prone to envy and comparison.The episode concludes with a blessing for a wonderful Shabbos and a call to share Torah content._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on August 29, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 17, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Beauty, #Yochanan, #Gemara, #Radiant, #Responsibility, #Humility, #Mentor, #Practicality, #Luxury, #Mindfulness ★ Support this podcast ★

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Baba Metzia 84a, focusing on a Talmudic discussion about Rabbi Yochanan's exceptional beauty and its spiritual implications. The episode delves into the concept of the evil eye, the influence of parental thoughts on conception, and the responsibility to use one's gifts thoughtfully. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan's Beauty: Rabbi Yochanan claims to be the last of Jerusalem's beautiful people, described vividly: a silver goblet filled with pomegranate seeds, crowned with roses, and placed between sun and shade reflects a fraction of his radiance. The Talmud questions this, noting Rav Kahana's beauty resembled Rav Avohu's, which resembled Yaakov's, which resembled Adam's. Rabbi Yochanan's distinction was his beardless face, enhancing his radiant appearance.Mikvah Practice: Rabbi Yochanan sat at the women's mikvah entrance so that women, emerging from ritual immersion, would see him and retain his image, influencing their conception to produce beautiful, Torah-learned children. This mirrors Yaakov's use of streaked rods to influence sheep traits. Rabbi Wolbe defends this as a responsible use of his gift, not arrogance, citing his grandfather's teaching that knowing and using one's virtues is an obligation, akin to knowing one's wealth to give charity.Evil Eye Concerns: The sages question if Rabbi Yochanan feared the evil eye from displaying his beauty. He responds that, as a descendant of Yosef, he is immune, per Genesis 49:22 (“Yosef is a charming son, above the eye”) and 49:24 (likening Yosef's progeny to fish, hidden from the evil eye). Rabbi Wolbe explains the evil eye's real impact: flaunting wealth or beauty can cause jealousy, stress, or harm in others, affecting their relationships or finances.Practical Lessons: Rabbi Wolbe shares anecdotes to illustrate avoiding the evil eye: his father's choice of a modest Toyota Camry over a Lincoln Town Car to avoid neighbors' jealousy, and leaving a broken blinker light to deter envy. He recounts Marvy Finger's mentor, a wealthy man flying coach to avoid wasteful display, emphasizing humility and consideration for others' feelings.Broader Message: The episode underscores the responsibility to use God-given gifts (beauty, wealth) for positive impact while avoiding harm through jealousy. Rabbi Yochanan's actions aimed to inspire righteousness, not pride. Rabbi Wolbe urges mindfulness of how one's actions affect others, promoting sensitivity in a world prone to envy and comparison.The episode concludes with a blessing for a wonderful Shabbos and a call to share Torah content._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on August 29, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 17, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Beauty, #Yochanan, #Gemara, #Radiant, #Responsibility, #Humility, #Mentor, #Practicality, #Luxury, #Mindfulness ★ Support this podcast ★

Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.  

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Study Guide Three distinct explanations—by Shmuel, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Yochanan—are presented to clarify the Mishna that disqualifies a sacrifice if its blood was sprinkled either in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar entirely. Each interpretation is examined in depth, with challenges and questions raised based on other sources and halakhic principles.

In the Torah verse regarding the purification of the leper (Vayikra 14:17), the word “right” appears three times - once in reference to the hand, once to the foot, and once to the ear. Rava explains that each mention teaches the requirement to use the right hand in a different ritual: one for kemitza (taking a handful of flour) in meal offerings, one for chalitza (the release ceremony of levirate marriage), and one for piercing the ear of a Jewish slave. According to Rabba bar bar Hanna, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, wherever the Torah uses the term “kohen,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Based on this, Rava’s drasha regarding kemitza teaches that not only the taking of the kometz (handful) must be done with the right hand, but also its placement into the kli sharet (sanctified vessel). Rabbi Shimon, who either does not require this part of the process or does not require it to be done with the right hand, agrees that the kemitza itself must be performed with the right hand, as derived from Vayikra 6:10, which compares the meal offering to the sin offering. Therefore, Rava’s interpretation applies specifically to the meal offering of a sinner, brought as part of a sliding scale offering. The Mishna rules that if the blood spills directly onto the floor from the animal, without first being collected in a sanctified vessel, the blood is disqualified. A braita teaches that the blood to be collected must be the spurting blood from the act of slaughter - not blood from a cut, nor residual blood that flows after most of the blood has exited the animal. The blood must flow directly from the animal into the kli sharet, from which it will be sprinkled on the altar. These laws are derived from Vayikra 4:5, in the context of the sin offering of the Kohen Gadol. Rav rules that all of the blood must be collected, based on Vayikra 4:7. According to Shmuel, the knife must be lifted immediately after slaughter to prevent blood from dripping off the knife into the vessel, since the blood must come directly from the animal. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explain that the animal’s throat must be held directly over the vessel to ensure the blood flows straight into it. Rabbi Asi posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding the airspace above a vessel. The Gemara brings three versions of the question and Rabbi Yochanan’s response: If the bottom of the vessel broke before the blood reached it, but the blood had already entered the vessel’s airspace, does this count as if the blood had reached the vessel? If so, the blood could be collected from the floor and used on the altar. To answer the question, Rabbi Yochanan cited a braita regarding a barrel into which fresh water streamed into its airspace, disqualifying it for use in the red heifer purification waters, as it is considered as though the water entered the vessel. However, this comparison is problematic, since the red heifer case does not involve a broken vessel. To justify the citation, the Gemara reframes the question as a two-pronged inquiry. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was drawn from the aforementioned braita. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was derived from the laws of sacrificial blood, which must reach the vessel directly. Since the blood passes through the airspace first, this implies that the airspace is treated as part of the vessel. If the animal becomes blemished after slaughter but before the blood is collected, brought to the altar, or poured, the blood is disqualified. A source is cited from the laws of the sin offering to support this. The Gemara attempts to extend this ruling to offerings of lesser sanctity, such as the Paschal sacrifice, but the proof is ultimately rejected.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza—an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both “kohen” and “finger,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either “finger” appears alone or “kohen” together with “finger”. According to Rabbi Yochanan’s rule that the mention of “kohen” implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava—a textual analogy—from the three mentions of “right” in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word “kohen”? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.