Podcasts about rabbi yochanan

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh introduces the subject of the Ben Sorer U'moreh – the "wayward son." This is a delinquent 13-year-old child, whose delinquency manifests itself parituclarly in addictive indulgence. He eats and drinks so compulsively that he steals his parents' money to buy wine and meat. The Torah states that this child should be put to death, and the Gemara explains that this is because this child is set along a path to violent crime. Once he has reached this point, where he steals his parents' money to satisfy his lust for food and wine, we are certain that he will eventually mug people to steal their money, and will end up murdering. He should therefore be killed so he never grows to be a violent criminal. The Gemara further states that there has never been a child that qualified as a Ben Sorer U'moreh, and there never will be such a case. There are so many conditions that must be met for this law to take effect that it can never actually apply as a practical matter. The Torah nevertheless taught us this theoretical Halacha so we can earn reward by studying this subject. The Gemara then cites Rabbi Yochanan as testifying, "I saw him, and I sat on his grave." At first glance, it appears that there are two views in the Gemara as to whether there was a case of a Ben Sorer U'moreh. The first opinion said that it never happened, whereas Rabbi Yochanan said that it did. However, this sounds peculiar. Could the Sages have really been arguing about a historical point? Normally, debates among the Rabbis involve different rationales and different ways of understanding Torah laws. We are not accustomed to Rabbis arguing over historical facts. Perhaps we can advance a novel reading of the Gemara's discussion. We mentioned earlier that the Torah commands executing a Ben Sorer Ve'moreh because it is certain that he will grow to become a violent criminal. We must ask, why are we so certain? Do we not all know of juvenile delinquents who grew to become wonderful adults? Has there never been a child who caused a great deal of trouble as a young teenager but then put his life together and excelled? I know many outstanding Rabbis who were once troubled youths. Why are we so sure that this "wayward son" will turn out to be a criminal? The answer is that we aren't – and this is precisely why the Gemara tells us that there never was and never will be a case of a Ben Sorer U'moreh. The Torah speaks of a theoretical situation of a child who must be put to death because he will otherwise for certain become a violent killer as an adult – and the Sages tell us that this will always remain a theoretical possibility, because in actuality, every single person has the capacity to change, and to change drastically. No matter where a person is, no matter how low he has fallen, he always has the potential to achieve greatness. There are no exceptions. Rabbi Yochanan says that he saw a Ben Sorer U'moreh and went to his grave. Why do people visit graves? Mostly, people visit the graves of righteous Sadikim to pray to Hashem at the site. And this might have been what Rabbi Yohanan was doing at this grave – he was praying, because this wayward child, whom he saw in his state of rebelliousness and unbridled sinfulness, ended up becoming an outstanding Sadik, a pious and holy Jew at whose gravesite people should want to pray. Rabbi Yohanan is proving the point made earlier, that there never was and never will be a child determined to be a Ben Sorer U'moreh who must be put to death – because in reality, every child, no matter where he is currently, has the ability to turn his life around and rise to great spiritual heights. We must never give up on any Jew, because we are all the descendants of Abraham, Yishak and Yaakob, we all contain within our souls a divine spark, and we all have the potential for greatness. And just as we must never give up on another Jew, we must also never give up on ourselves. What we've done in the past does not determine who we are in the present, or who we will be in the future. We need to trust in our ability to change and in our potential to not only improve, but to achieve greatness and be worthy members of Hashem's special nation.

This morning we emphasize the need to prepare now to acknowledge God as HaMelech (the King) on Rosh Hashanah. We show the critical importance of this from a story of Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai and Vespasian. And we describe what this means with a story from Rabbi Biderman about the 402 bus from Bnei Brak to Jerusalem. Michael Whitman is the senior rabbi of ADATH Congregation in Hampstead, Quebec, and an adjunct professor at McGill University Faculty of Law. ADATH is a modern orthodox synagogue community in suburban Montreal, providing Judaism for the next generation. We take great pleasure in welcoming everyone with a warm smile, while sharing inspiration through prayer, study, and friendship. Rabbi Whitman shares his thoughts and inspirations through online lectures and shiurim, which are available on: YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC5FLcsC6xz5TmkirT1qObkA Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/adathmichael/ Podcast - Mining the Riches of the Parsha: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/mining-the-riches-of-the-parsha/id1479615142?fbclid=IwAR1c6YygRR6pvAKFvEmMGCcs0Y6hpmK8tXzPinbum8drqw2zLIo7c9SR-jc Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3hWYhCG5GR8zygw4ZNsSmO Please contact Rabbi Whitman (rabbi@adath.ca) with any questions or feedback, or to receive a daily email, "Study with Rabbi Whitman Today," with current and past insights for that day, video, and audio, all in one short email sent directly to your inbox.

The Mishna discusses the laws of nullification regarding yayin nesech (wine used for idolatry) that becomes mixed with permitted wine. It distinguishes between wine mixed with wine (min b’minu—same substance), which is forbidden in any amount, and wine mixed with water (min b’she’eino mino—different substance), which is prohibited only if it imparts taste. Rav Dimi quotes Rabbi Yochanan as saying that if one pours yayin nesech from a barrel into a pit of kosher wine, each drop is immediately nullified upon contact. The Gemara raises three challenges to Rav Dimi’s interpretation based on the Mishna, and resolves them by reinterpreting the cases in the Mishna. Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef offers a narrower understanding of Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling—limiting it to pouring from a jug into a barrel, but not from a barrel into a pit. Ravin also transmits a halakha in Rabbi Yochanan’s name regarding a mixture that includes a forbidden item combined with both a similar and a different substance. In such a case, the forbidden item is nullified by the different substance (e.g., yayin nesech mixed with wine and water), while the similar substance is viewed as if it is not there. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda also quotes Rabbi Yochanan, but there are two versions of his statement. In one version, he disagrees with Ravin and limits the ruling to cases where the different substance was present first. In the other version, his comment refers to the Mishna, and he actually agrees with Ravin. A debate between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan also concerns a case where a forbidden item is mixed with both a similar and a different substance. What is the underlying basis of their disagreement? Rav and Shmuel dispute the position of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether the distinction between mixtures of the same type and mixtures of different types applies universally to all prohibited items, or only to yayin nesech and tevel (untithed produce). The Gemara explains why the rabbis would have adopted a stricter approach with those two prohibitions.

The Mishna discusses the laws of nullification regarding yayin nesech (wine used for idolatry) that becomes mixed with permitted wine. It distinguishes between wine mixed with wine (min b’minu—same substance), which is forbidden in any amount, and wine mixed with water (min b’she’eino mino—different substance), which is prohibited only if it imparts taste. Rav Dimi quotes Rabbi Yochanan as saying that if one pours yayin nesech from a barrel into a pit of kosher wine, each drop is immediately nullified upon contact. The Gemara raises three challenges to Rav Dimi’s interpretation based on the Mishna, and resolves them by reinterpreting the cases in the Mishna. Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef offers a narrower understanding of Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling—limiting it to pouring from a jug into a barrel, but not from a barrel into a pit. Ravin also transmits a halakha in Rabbi Yochanan’s name regarding a mixture that includes a forbidden item combined with both a similar and a different substance. In such a case, the forbidden item is nullified by the different substance (e.g., yayin nesech mixed with wine and water), while the similar substance is viewed as if it is not there. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda also quotes Rabbi Yochanan, but there are two versions of his statement. In one version, he disagrees with Ravin and limits the ruling to cases where the different substance was present first. In the other version, his comment refers to the Mishna, and he actually agrees with Ravin. A debate between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan also concerns a case where a forbidden item is mixed with both a similar and a different substance. What is the underlying basis of their disagreement? Rav and Shmuel dispute the position of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether the distinction between mixtures of the same type and mixtures of different types applies universally to all prohibited items, or only to yayin nesech and tevel (untithed produce). The Gemara explains why the rabbis would have adopted a stricter approach with those two prohibitions.

Rava ruled that if a Jew is with a non-Jewish prostitute and there is wine present, one can assume that the Jew ensured the prostitute did not come into contact with the wine, and therefore it is permitted. Although he may not be able to control his sexual desires, he is not presumed to be lax in the laws of yayin nesech (forbidden wine). However, in the reverse case—where a Jewish prostitute is with a non-Jew—since the non-Jew holds the dominant position in the relationship, we assume she has no way to prevent him from touching the wine, and thus it is forbidden. There are nine different cases in which a Jew’s wine was left with a non-Jew, and Rava issued rulings on whether the wine was permitted or forbidden in each instance. In many of these cases, he permitted the wine based on his assessment that the non-Jew would likely not have touched it, due to the possibility of being caught by the owner or another Jew. In other cases, there was uncertainty about whether the non-Jew had even come into contact with the wine, or whether the individuals present were Jews or non-Jews. Two additional cases were brought before other rabbis. In the second case, Abaye introduces a comparison to the laws of impurity, and the Gemara addresses this comparison. It notes that the rabbis were stricter regarding impurity laws than they were with wine, citing a debate between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan to support this point. Three challenges are raised against the positions of Rav and Rabbi Yochanan—two against Rav and one against Rabbi Yochanan—and each is resolved.

Rava ruled that if a Jew is with a non-Jewish prostitute and there is wine present, one can assume that the Jew ensured the prostitute did not come into contact with the wine, and therefore it is permitted. Although he may not be able to control his sexual desires, he is not presumed to be lax in the laws of yayin nesech (forbidden wine). However, in the reverse case—where a Jewish prostitute is with a non-Jew—since the non-Jew holds the dominant position in the relationship, we assume she has no way to prevent him from touching the wine, and thus it is forbidden. There are nine different cases in which a Jew’s wine was left with a non-Jew, and Rava issued rulings on whether the wine was permitted or forbidden in each instance. In many of these cases, he permitted the wine based on his assessment that the non-Jew would likely not have touched it, due to the possibility of being caught by the owner or another Jew. In other cases, there was uncertainty about whether the non-Jew had even come into contact with the wine, or whether the individuals present were Jews or non-Jews. Two additional cases were brought before other rabbis. In the second case, Abaye introduces a comparison to the laws of impurity, and the Gemara addresses this comparison. It notes that the rabbis were stricter regarding impurity laws than they were with wine, citing a debate between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan to support this point. Three challenges are raised against the positions of Rav and Rabbi Yochanan—two against Rav and one against Rabbi Yochanan—and each is resolved.

This week's learning is sponsored by Danielle & Jason Friedman in honor of Anabelle Friedman on her siyum of Mashechet Rosh Hashana on the occasion of her Bat Mitzvah, and in honor and appreciation of Rabbanit Michelle for inspiring and enabling multiple generations of women, in our family and around the world, to engage in Talmud study. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in memory of Myer Senders a”h, beloved father of our friend and co-learner Tina Lamm. "May the Torah learned today by all of us be a zechut for his neshama ותהא נשמתו צרורה בצרור החיים." What is the law regarding a mouse that falls into vinegar? Is the mouse nullified, and if so, at what ratio? The Mishna presents three distinct scenarios involving a Jew and a non-Jew, where wine is left in a location accessible to the non-Jew, raising concerns about potential libation (נסך) and thus rendering the wine prohibited. In each case, the Mishna outlines whether there is reason to suspect that the non-Jew offered the wine as a libation. The determining factor is whether the Jew stated they would be gone for a while or whether the Jew is considered to be supervising. The Gemara defines supervision as a situation in which the Jew could return at any moment, even if they are not physically present. The amount of time that must elapse to prohibit the wine (in a case where the Jew leaves for a while) is debated between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The Rabbis hold that the wine becomes prohibited if enough time passes to pierce the stopper, reseal it, and allow it to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that the required time is that needed to break the stopper entirely, fashion a new one, and let it dry. A fourth case involves a non-Jew dining in a Jew’s home, with wine left either on the table or on a side table. If the Jew leaves the room, there is concern that the non-Jew may touch the wine on the table, but not the wine on the side table—unless the Jew instructed the non-Jew to dilute the wine. If the bottle is sealed and enough time has passed for the stopper to be broken, replaced, and dried, the wine is prohibited. Why are all three cases necessary? What is unique about each, and why did the Mishna include them all? Rabbi Yochanan limits the scope of the debate between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to stoppers made of lime plaster, excluding those made of clay. If a non-Jew were to pierce a clay stopper and reseal it, the tampering would be visibly noticeable. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan’s explanation from a braita, but it is ultimately resolved. Rava rules in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as the final case in the Mishna reflects his opinion exclusively, without presenting the view of the Rabbis. The sugya concludes with a practical question: If the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—requiring a longer time to prohibit the wine—and also follows Rabbi Eliezer (Avodah Zarah 31a), who permits leaving a barrel with a single seal in the possession of a non-Jew without concern for tampering, why is the current practice to avoid leaving wine in a non-Jew’s possession? The Gemara answers that the concern lies with the bunghole, which was used to smell the wine. The worry is that the non-Jew might widen the hole to drink from it and offer the wine as a libation. Bungholes were apparently not present in barrels during the time of the Mishna but were commonly used at a later time in Babylonia when the question was asked.

This week's learning is sponsored by Danielle & Jason Friedman in honor of Anabelle Friedman on her siyum of Mashechet Rosh Hashana on the occasion of her Bat Mitzvah, and in honor and appreciation of Rabbanit Michelle for inspiring and enabling multiple generations of women, in our family and around the world, to engage in Talmud study. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in memory of Myer Senders a”h, beloved father of our friend and co-learner Tina Lamm. "May the Torah learned today by all of us be a zechut for his neshama ותהא נשמתו צרורה בצרור החיים." What is the law regarding a mouse that falls into vinegar? Is the mouse nullified, and if so, at what ratio? The Mishna presents three distinct scenarios involving a Jew and a non-Jew, where wine is left in a location accessible to the non-Jew, raising concerns about potential libation (נסך) and thus rendering the wine prohibited. In each case, the Mishna outlines whether there is reason to suspect that the non-Jew offered the wine as a libation. The determining factor is whether the Jew stated they would be gone for a while or whether the Jew is considered to be supervising. The Gemara defines supervision as a situation in which the Jew could return at any moment, even if they are not physically present. The amount of time that must elapse to prohibit the wine (in a case where the Jew leaves for a while) is debated between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The Rabbis hold that the wine becomes prohibited if enough time passes to pierce the stopper, reseal it, and allow it to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that the required time is that needed to break the stopper entirely, fashion a new one, and let it dry. A fourth case involves a non-Jew dining in a Jew’s home, with wine left either on the table or on a side table. If the Jew leaves the room, there is concern that the non-Jew may touch the wine on the table, but not the wine on the side table—unless the Jew instructed the non-Jew to dilute the wine. If the bottle is sealed and enough time has passed for the stopper to be broken, replaced, and dried, the wine is prohibited. Why are all three cases necessary? What is unique about each, and why did the Mishna include them all? Rabbi Yochanan limits the scope of the debate between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to stoppers made of lime plaster, excluding those made of clay. If a non-Jew were to pierce a clay stopper and reseal it, the tampering would be visibly noticeable. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan’s explanation from a braita, but it is ultimately resolved. Rava rules in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as the final case in the Mishna reflects his opinion exclusively, without presenting the view of the Rabbis. The sugya concludes with a practical question: If the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—requiring a longer time to prohibit the wine—and also follows Rabbi Eliezer (Avodah Zarah 31a), who permits leaving a barrel with a single seal in the possession of a non-Jew without concern for tampering, why is the current practice to avoid leaving wine in a non-Jew’s possession? The Gemara answers that the concern lies with the bunghole, which was used to smell the wine. The worry is that the non-Jew might widen the hole to drink from it and offer the wine as a libation. Bungholes were apparently not present in barrels during the time of the Mishna but were commonly used at a later time in Babylonia when the question was asked.

This week's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik and Professor Adi Wyner in honor of the birth of their first Israeli grandson, David Rafael, son of Rivkah & Charlie Gottlieb. Davidi was born at Sheba Medical Center on 26 Tammuz/ July 22. He is named after his great-grandfathers, David Malik z"l and Dr. Donald Stoltz z"l. As we begin the month of Elul with the recitation of Tehillim 27 (“L’David HaShem Ori v’Yishi”), we continue to pray for Davidi’s refuah shleima as he meets the challenges of a cleft palate, including surgery sometime before his first birthday. דוד רפאל בן רבקה אריאנא ואליעזר בנימין Today's daf is sponsored by Terri Krivosha in memory of her mother, חני מנדל בת שימה פיגה וירחמיאל הכהן, on her second yahrzeit. She was an eshet chayil whom we miss and think of every day. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir dispute whether a mixture is prohibited when the forbidden component imparts a bad taste to the permitted food. Ulla and Rabbi Yochanan differ on the scope of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir: Ulla holds that they disagree when the forbidden item initially gives a good taste and only later turns bad, while Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in a case where the bad taste is immediate. A challenge to Ulla’s view is raised and resolved. The Gemara then asks whether Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in both scenarios, but the question remains unresolved. Rav Amram raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan’s view, noting that this debate is absent from the Mishna. After further searching, he identifies what seems to be the same dispute in Mishna Orlah 2:9. Rabbi Zeira, however, rejects the connection, explaining that the prohibition there rests on a different principle. A braita is then brought that directly supports Rabbi Yochanan: it describes a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding two leavening agents — one of truma, one of chullin — each potent enough to leaven dough on its own. Since adding both would cause over-leavening and produce a bad taste, this proves that there is indeed a debate in cases where a prohibited item imparts a bad taste. The braita lists another disputed scenario — when both leavening agents are added simultaneously. Abaye explains the need for this case: it was brought to clarify Rabbi Shimon’s position that even when the prohibited agent initially aids leavening, if it acts in tandem with the permitted agent, it is not considered to have been beneficial to the dough initially, and therefore, the dough is permitted. A case is brought where a mouse fell into a barrel of beer, and Rav prohibited the consumption of the beer. Some assumed Rav ruled like Rabbi Meir, prohibiting mixtures even when the forbidden element imparts bad taste. Rav Sheshet instead interprets Rav’s decision as a special stringency regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures), and two objections to this reading are resolved. Rava rejects Rav Sheshet’s explanation and holds that if a prohibited item imparts bad taste, the mixture is permitted, and suggests either that the halakha is not in accordance with Rav, or that Rav held the mouse imparted a good taste to the beer.

This week's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik and Professor Adi Wyner in honor of the birth of their first Israeli grandson, David Rafael, son of Rivkah & Charlie Gottlieb. Davidi was born at Sheba Medical Center on 26 Tammuz/ July 22. He is named after his great-grandfathers, David Malik z"l and Dr. Donald Stoltz z"l. As we begin the month of Elul with the recitation of Tehillim 27 (“L’David HaShem Ori v’Yishi”), we continue to pray for Davidi’s refuah shleima as he meets the challenges of a cleft palate, including surgery sometime before his first birthday. דוד רפאל בן רבקה אריאנא ואליעזר בנימין Today's daf is sponsored by Terri Krivosha in memory of her mother, חני מנדל בת שימה פיגה וירחמיאל הכהן, on her second yahrzeit. She was an eshet chayil whom we miss and think of every day. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir dispute whether a mixture is prohibited when the forbidden component imparts a bad taste to the permitted food. Ulla and Rabbi Yochanan differ on the scope of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir: Ulla holds that they disagree when the forbidden item initially gives a good taste and only later turns bad, while Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in a case where the bad taste is immediate. A challenge to Ulla’s view is raised and resolved. The Gemara then asks whether Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in both scenarios, but the question remains unresolved. Rav Amram raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan’s view, noting that this debate is absent from the Mishna. After further searching, he identifies what seems to be the same dispute in Mishna Orlah 2:9. Rabbi Zeira, however, rejects the connection, explaining that the prohibition there rests on a different principle. A braita is then brought that directly supports Rabbi Yochanan: it describes a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding two leavening agents — one of truma, one of chullin — each potent enough to leaven dough on its own. Since adding both would cause over-leavening and produce a bad taste, this proves that there is indeed a debate in cases where a prohibited item imparts a bad taste. The braita lists another disputed scenario — when both leavening agents are added simultaneously. Abaye explains the need for this case: it was brought to clarify Rabbi Shimon’s position that even when the prohibited agent initially aids leavening, if it acts in tandem with the permitted agent, it is not considered to have been beneficial to the dough initially, and therefore, the dough is permitted. A case is brought where a mouse fell into a barrel of beer, and Rav prohibited the consumption of the beer. Some assumed Rav ruled like Rabbi Meir, prohibiting mixtures even when the forbidden element imparts bad taste. Rav Sheshet instead interprets Rav’s decision as a special stringency regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures), and two objections to this reading are resolved. Rava rejects Rav Sheshet’s explanation and holds that if a prohibited item imparts bad taste, the mixture is permitted, and suggests either that the halakha is not in accordance with Rav, or that Rav held the mouse imparted a good taste to the beer.

What is the single most important quality a person can hold onto in life? In this episode, we dive into the Mishnah in Pirkei Avot where Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai asks his students: What is the best path a person should cling to? Each student suggests something different—generosity, friendship, foresight, kindness—but Rabbi Elazar says: a good heart.Why did Rabbi Yochanan declare this the most valuable path of all? What does it mean to truly have a “good heart”—and how does that shape the way we see others, ourselves, and even God?Join us as we explore:The different answers the students gave and why each mattersWhy a good heart includes all the other qualitiesThis Mishnah invites us to reframe success—not by what we achieve or acquire, but by the quality of our inner world and how it radiates outward.

Rabbi Hiya bar Aba was in a place called Gavla - which place that is specifically is unclear, though suggestions are made - where he saw Jewish young women who were impregnated by men who were in the process of converting to Judaism. Also re their wine. Likewise, he saw Jews eating from bishul akum. He said nothing, but consulted with Rabbi Yochanan later, and he said that the babies must be proclaimed mamzerim, the wine - yein nesach, and so on. Because this population was just not that knowledgeable. Also, how does someone whose wine has become prohibited via a non-Jew's libation, how can that Jew recoup the loss? Isn't that wine prohibited from benefit? That turns out to be a matter of dispute.

Gefet- Gemara, Perushim, and Tosafot, an in-depth Iyun gemara shiurThe sugya deals with the challenging topic of Etnan Zonah (the payment to a prostitute). Rashi and Tosafot interpret the sugya against the backdrop of a well-known and important dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding acquisition (kinyan). From their words, it appears that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on how acquisition works according to the Torah, and it is clear to both of them that acquisition by a Jew is different from that of the nations of the world.Why should there be a difference between the modes of acquisition for Jews versus other nations?We will study this dispute together and examine a fascinating proposal on this matter by Rabbi Samson Raphael HirschGefet Ep 187 Avodah zarah 63Gefet with Rabbanit Yael Shimoni and Shalhevet Schwartz is in collaboration with Yeshivat Drisha. Learn more on ⁠⁠hadran.org.il

Daf Yomi Avodah Zarah 42Episode 2034For the first part of daf 42 of masechta Avodah Zarah we continue discussing the disagreement between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Laqish regarding an avodah zarah idol that has broken on its own. After this, we come to our next mishnah, about finding different kinds of avodah zarah. I hope you enjoy. Cheers.Sefaria: https://www.sefaria.org/Avodah_Zarah.42a?lang=heEmail: sruli@babbleontalmud.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/babble_on_talmudFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/p/Babble-on-Talmud-100080258961218/Join the community: https://chat.whatsapp.com/LMbsU3a5f4Y3b61DxFRsqf#dafyomi #talmud

Daf Yomi Avodah Zarah 41Episode 2033Today we begin the third perek of masechta Avodah Zarah. The first mishnah of the perek discusses in which scenarios an idol is forbidden. The second mishnah, also on today's daf, discusses the permissibility of broken idols. This leads to a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Laqish about whether a broken idol that has been worshipped continues to be forbidden, even in its broken state. A pretty interesting daf, getting the new perek off to a good start.Sefaria: https://www.sefaria.org/Avodah_Zarah.40a?lang=heEmail: sruli@babbleontalmud.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/babble_on_talmudFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/p/Babble-on-Talmud-100080258961218/Join the community: https://chat.whatsapp.com/LMbsU3a5f4Y3b61DxFRsqf#dafyomi #talmud 00:00 Intro01:27 Which idols are forbidden23:29 Broken idols33:15 Avodah Zarah that broke on its own62:30 Conclusion

The interaction in the Mishna between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yishmael regarding this issue is analyzed and is also brought as proof for the previous sugya about the difference between betrothing a woman with the dung of an ox who killed a person and the dung of an animal that was used for worshipping idols. What are the reasons that the rabbis decreed that cheese from idol worshippers is forbidden to eat, but permitted for benefit? Six possible explanations for the decree against cheese are brought by various amoraim. The Mishna lists other decrees the rabbis instituted regarding items of idol worshippers, such as milk, bread, cooked items, oil, etc. The oil in the end was permitted by Rebbi and his court. Why is their milk forbidden? Rabbi Yochanan said that their bread was not permitted by the court. Why did he need to make this declaration?

The interaction in the Mishna between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yishmael regarding this issue is analyzed and is also brought as proof for the previous sugya about the difference between betrothing a woman with the dung of an ox who killed a person and the dung of an animal that was used for worshipping idols. What are the reasons that the rabbis decreed that cheese from idol worshippers is forbidden to eat, but permitted for benefit? Six possible explanations for the decree against cheese are brought by various amoraim. The Mishna lists other decrees the rabbis instituted regarding items of idol worshippers, such as milk, bread, cooked items, oil, etc. The oil in the end was permitted by Rebbi and his court. Why is their milk forbidden? Rabbi Yochanan said that their bread was not permitted by the court. Why did he need to make this declaration?

Vinegar produced by idol worshippers from beer is prohibited if there is a concern that wine yeast may have been added during its preparation. The Hadrianic earthenware shards are prohibited for any benefit, as they were soaked in wine with the intention that the absorbed wine would later be used to produce more wine. Rav Dimi provides a description of their preparation and use. A question is raised regarding whether one may benefit from the shards when the benefit comes not from the wine but from the shard itself—such as placing them under the legs of a bed for support. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan hold differing views on this issue. A difficulty is posed from a braita that supports the permissive opinion, but it is ultimately resolved. A second, seemingly contradictory braita is introduced to challenge the first, and it too is resolved with two possible explanations. What are the necessary criteria to prohibit a hide of an animal with an incision found near the heart—specifically, when can it be assumed that such an incision was made to remove the heart as part of an idolatrous offering? The Mishna discusses the status of an animal slaughtered and handled by an idol worshipper when carried into or out of a house of idol worship. Under what circumstances is there concern that the animal is being offered as a sacrifice to an idol, thereby rendering it prohibited for Jewish benefit? Which tannaitic authorities does the Mishna align with in this context? Is it permissible to engage in business dealings with idol worshippers as they enter or exit Tarput (either a festival or house of idol worship)? How does this ruling differ from conducting business with a Jew in similar circumstances? What are the reasons for this distinction?

Vinegar produced by idol worshippers from beer is prohibited if there is a concern that wine yeast may have been added during its preparation. The Hadrianic earthenware shards are prohibited for any benefit, as they were soaked in wine with the intention that the absorbed wine would later be used to produce more wine. Rav Dimi provides a description of their preparation and use. A question is raised regarding whether one may benefit from the shards when the benefit comes not from the wine but from the shard itself—such as placing them under the legs of a bed for support. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan hold differing views on this issue. A difficulty is posed from a braita that supports the permissive opinion, but it is ultimately resolved. A second, seemingly contradictory braita is introduced to challenge the first, and it too is resolved with two possible explanations. What are the necessary criteria to prohibit a hide of an animal with an incision found near the heart—specifically, when can it be assumed that such an incision was made to remove the heart as part of an idolatrous offering? The Mishna discusses the status of an animal slaughtered and handled by an idol worshipper when carried into or out of a house of idol worship. Under what circumstances is there concern that the animal is being offered as a sacrifice to an idol, thereby rendering it prohibited for Jewish benefit? Which tannaitic authorities does the Mishna align with in this context? Is it permissible to engage in business dealings with idol worshippers as they enter or exit Tarput (either a festival or house of idol worship)? How does this ruling differ from conducting business with a Jew in similar circumstances? What are the reasons for this distinction?

  Two different opinions are presented regarding if and when one may receive medical treatment from an idol worshipper. Rav Yehuda strictly prohibits it under all circumstances, except when treating one's animals. Rabbi Yochanan, however, permits it if the patient would otherwise die without treatment. Additionally, two versions of a statement by Rabbi Yochanan offer further nuance. In the first, he prohibits receiving treatment from an idol worshipper for an illness severe enough to justify desecrating Shabbat. In the second, he forbids it only in cases of internal injuries. What is the practical difference between these two versions? Rav and Rabbi Yochanan also offer differing criteria for when desecrating Shabbat for medical treatment is permitted. Rav defines this case as a wound requiring assessment to determine whether the person will survive. Rabbi Yochanan, by contrast, permits for internal injuries. This leads to a question: are tooth pains considered internal injuries? Two sources are brought to address this, though neither offers a conclusive answer. The second source recounts a story in which Rabbi Yochanan himself sought medication from an idol worshipper for a tooth ailment and was prepared to desecrate Shabbat for it. This seems to contradict his stated prohibition against seeking such treatment for illnesses that permit desecrating Shabbat. How, then, was his action permissible? Finally, the Gemara offers various remedies suggested by the sages for various ailments, such as a gash from a sword, boils, high fever, hemorrhoids, earaches, and a dislocated jaw or eye.  

  Two different opinions are presented regarding if and when one may receive medical treatment from an idol worshipper. Rav Yehuda strictly prohibits it under all circumstances, except when treating one's animals. Rabbi Yochanan, however, permits it if the patient would otherwise die without treatment. Additionally, two versions of a statement by Rabbi Yochanan offer further nuance. In the first, he prohibits receiving treatment from an idol worshipper for an illness severe enough to justify desecrating Shabbat. In the second, he forbids it only in cases of internal injuries. What is the practical difference between these two versions? Rav and Rabbi Yochanan also offer differing criteria for when desecrating Shabbat for medical treatment is permitted. Rav defines this case as a wound requiring assessment to determine whether the person will survive. Rabbi Yochanan, by contrast, permits for internal injuries. This leads to a question: are tooth pains considered internal injuries? Two sources are brought to address this, though neither offers a conclusive answer. The second source recounts a story in which Rabbi Yochanan himself sought medication from an idol worshipper for a tooth ailment and was prepared to desecrate Shabbat for it. This seems to contradict his stated prohibition against seeking such treatment for illnesses that permit desecrating Shabbat. How, then, was his action permissible? Finally, the Gemara offers various remedies suggested by the sages for various ailments, such as a gash from a sword, boils, high fever, hemorrhoids, earaches, and a dislocated jaw or eye.  

In Tehillim 1:1, the verse begins with "ashrei ha'ish," happy is the man. According to Rabbi Yonantan, the man is Avraham, who did not associate himself with the dor haflaga, the people of Sodom and the Philistines. A similar verse in Tehillim 112:1 employs the same phrase "ashrei ish" who fears God. Why is the masculine form used and not the feminine? Two explanations are offered: happy is the person who repents when still young or happy is the person who can control one's evil inclination like a man, i.e., a warrior overcoming his enemies. The continuation of the verse is, "He delights in God's mitzvot." This is explained as one who does mitzvot for the sake of doing a mitzva and not for receiving a reward. In Tehillim 1:1-2, the verse says that instead of being with evildoers, happy is the person who desires the Torah of God. Rebbi derives from this verse that a person can only learn Torah from the parts of the Torah that one desires to study. Rava extrapolates the verse in the same way and derives other concepts about stages of learning Torah and best practices of learning Torah from these verses and others. What are the rewards received for learning Torah? The Mishna forbids building the area in the bathhouse that was built for an idol. Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that if one got paid, the money is permitted for use. How is this explained? The Mishna does not permit making jewelry for idol worship, but Rabbi Eliezer rules that one could get paid for doing that. Since one cannot sell land to gentiles in Israel, one can also not sell items that are attached to the ground, unless they are already detached. Rabbi Yehuda permits them if they are being sold to be detached after the sale.      

In Tehillim 1:1, the verse begins with "ashrei ha'ish," happy is the man. According to Rabbi Yonantan, the man is Avraham, who did not associate himself with the dor haflaga, the people of Sodom and the Philistines. A similar verse in Tehillim 112:1 employs the same phrase "ashrei ish" who fears God. Why is the masculine form used and not the feminine? Two explanations are offered: happy is the person who repents when still young or happy is the person who can control one's evil inclination like a man, i.e., a warrior overcoming his enemies. The continuation of the verse is, "He delights in God's mitzvot." This is explained as one who does mitzvot for the sake of doing a mitzva and not for receiving a reward. In Tehillim 1:1-2, the verse says that instead of being with evildoers, happy is the person who desires the Torah of God. Rebbi derives from this verse that a person can only learn Torah from the parts of the Torah that one desires to study. Rava extrapolates the verse in the same way and derives other concepts about stages of learning Torah and best practices of learning Torah from these verses and others. What are the rewards received for learning Torah? The Mishna forbids building the area in the bathhouse that was built for an idol. Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that if one got paid, the money is permitted for use. How is this explained? The Mishna does not permit making jewelry for idol worship, but Rabbi Eliezer rules that one could get paid for doing that. Since one cannot sell land to gentiles in Israel, one can also not sell items that are attached to the ground, unless they are already detached. Rabbi Yehuda permits them if they are being sold to be detached after the sale.      

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe continues the discussion from Tractate Berachot 5B, building on the previous episode's exploration of the three divine gifts given to the Jewish people through suffering: the Torah, the Land of Israel, and the World to Come. Rabbi Wolbe emphasizes that these gifts require immense effort and perseverance, using the analogy of running a marathon to illustrate that acquiring Torah, for instance, demands complete immersion and overcoming challenges, not innate talent alone. He shares stories of great sages like Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who achieved greatness through persistent struggle, not effortless brilliance. Addressing the Land of Israel, Rabbi Wolbe firmly asserts its divine allocation to the Jewish people, as promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, citing Rashi's commentary on the Torah's opening to underscore its eternal significance despite historical disputes. The episode delves into the concept of "afflictions of love," exploring Talmudic stories of sages like Rabbi Chia bar Abba, Rabbi Yochanan, and Rabbi Elazar, who faced illness but were revived through mutual support, highlighting the necessity of external help to overcome personal afflictions. A key story involves Rav Huna, who lost 400 barrels of wine to vinegar due to withholding a sharecropper's due, illustrating the principle of midah k'neged midah (measure for measure). After accepting correction, Rav Huna's loss was miraculously reversed, showing divine communication through afflictions. Rabbi Wolbe concludes by stressing that afflictions are purposeful messages from God to redirect and refine us, urging listeners to view challenges as opportunities for growth and connection to Hashem. The episode ends with a Q&A, affirming that God communicates clearly through tailored actions, encouraging introspection to understand and act on these divine messages.This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on June 27, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on July 4, 2025_____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Torah, #Resilience, #Israel, #Struggle, #DivineGifts, #Suffering, #Support_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org ★ Support this podcast ★

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe continues the discussion from Tractate Berachot 5B, building on the previous episode's exploration of the three divine gifts given to the Jewish people through suffering: the Torah, the Land of Israel, and the World to Come. Rabbi Wolbe emphasizes that these gifts require immense effort and perseverance, using the analogy of running a marathon to illustrate that acquiring Torah, for instance, demands complete immersion and overcoming challenges, not innate talent alone. He shares stories of great sages like Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who achieved greatness through persistent struggle, not effortless brilliance. Addressing the Land of Israel, Rabbi Wolbe firmly asserts its divine allocation to the Jewish people, as promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, citing Rashi's commentary on the Torah's opening to underscore its eternal significance despite historical disputes. The episode delves into the concept of "afflictions of love," exploring Talmudic stories of sages like Rabbi Chia bar Abba, Rabbi Yochanan, and Rabbi Elazar, who faced illness but were revived through mutual support, highlighting the necessity of external help to overcome personal afflictions. A key story involves Rav Huna, who lost 400 barrels of wine to vinegar due to withholding a sharecropper's due, illustrating the principle of midah k'neged midah (measure for measure). After accepting correction, Rav Huna's loss was miraculously reversed, showing divine communication through afflictions. Rabbi Wolbe concludes by stressing that afflictions are purposeful messages from God to redirect and refine us, urging listeners to view challenges as opportunities for growth and connection to Hashem. The episode ends with a Q&A, affirming that God communicates clearly through tailored actions, encouraging introspection to understand and act on these divine messages.This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on June 27, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on July 4, 2025_____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Torah, #Resilience, #Israel, #Struggle, #DivineGifts, #Suffering, #Support_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org ★ Support this podcast ★

התוכן כ"ק מו"ח אדמו"ר כותב ברשימת המאסר שבעת ישבו שם "באתי לידי החלטה גמורה להיות עז ותקיף, בלי חת, לדבר בשפה ברה, ולא להתחשב כלל עם האַבסטאנאָווקע (המצב והסביבה) אשר יסובבוני". וכ"ז, אף שידע גודל הסכנה שהוא, וכל מוסדות התורה במדינה ההיא שעמד בראשם, נמצאים וכו'. וי"ל שההוראה להתנהגות כזאת היא ממ"ש בסיום פ' חוקת "ויאמר ה' אל משה אל תירא אותו [את עוג] כי בידך נתתי אותו ואת כל עמו וגו'": והק' בגמ' מדוע פחד משה מעוג יותר מסיחון (שניצח אותו וכו') ותי' "מתשובתו של אותו צדיק אתה יודע מה הי' בלבו, אמר שמא תעמוד לו זכות של אברהם אבינו שנאמר ויבא הפליט ויגד לאברם העברי ואמר רבי יוחנן זה עוג וכו'". וצ"ל מדוע השאיר משה את המורא מעוג "בלבו" ולא הודיע לבנ"י עד"ז? אלא שמשה ידע שאם בנ"י יראו אצלו, נשיא בישראל, ענין של פחד, ואפי' רק על פניו – הי' זה מחליש את בנ"י, וזה גופא הי' יכול להביא שעוג ינצח, ולכן שמר את זה "בלבו". וזוהי ההוראה לנשיא או מנהיג בישראל, שאפי' כשרואה קשיים וכו' אסור שזה יהי' ניכר במעשיו ודיבורו ואפי' לא על פניו! אלא שה' ראה את מה שבלבו והבטיח "אל תירא אותו". [המשך יבוא]משיחת י"ב תמוז ה'תשכ"ה ל"הנחה פרטית" או התרגום ללה"ק של השיחה: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=03-07-2025 Synopsis The Rebbe, my father-in-law, writes in his account of his imprisonment, “I came to a firm decision to be bold and strong, without fear, to speak clearly, not to take into account at all the circumstances and environment around me.” This was despite knowing the great danger he faced, and the danger not only to himself but to all the Torah institutions he led in that country etc. It can be said that he derived a lesson for such conduct from the end of parashas Chukas. The verse says, “Hashem said to Moshe, ‘Do not fear him [Og], for I have delivered him, his people, and his land into your hand….” The Gemara asks, why was Moshe was afraid of Og if he had already defeated Sichon etc.? And it answers, “from the answer given to that tzaddik [Moshe Rabbeinu], you know what was in his heart. He said, perhaps the merit of Avraham Avinu will stand for him, as it is written: ‘And the survivor came and told Avram,' and Rabbi Yochanan said: this refers to Og etc.” But if so, the question is, why did Moshe keep his fear of Og in his heart, and not inform the Jewish people about it? The answer is that Moshe knew that if the Jewish people saw any sign of fear in the Nasi of the Jewish people, even just on his face, it would weaken the Jewish people, and that itself could cause Og to be victorious. Therefore, he kept it “in his heart.” And this is the lesson for a Nasi or leader of the Jewish people: even when facing difficulties, etc., it must not be noticeable in his actions or speech, and not even on his face. Rather, Hashem saw what was in his heart and promised: “Do not fear him.” (To be continued.)Excerpt from sichah of 12 Tammuz 5725 For a transcript in English of the Sicha: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=03-07-2025

Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in memory of Gitta’s father, Yosef ben Menachem Mendel v’Pesha a”h on his tenth yahrzeit. He cherished his family and Torah, and would be so proud of the generations following in his footsteps and adhering to his values and moral compass. וכתר שם טוב עולה על כולם Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in memory of  Moshe Hartman, z’l, on his 6th yahrzeit. He continues to be missed dearly. He would delight in my learning, his children’s and his grandchildren’s learning, which we will honor with a family siyum on his yahrzeit. Today's daf is sponsored by Monica Steiner in honor of Rabbi David Abraham Kaplinsky, who begins his first pulpit in San Antonio, Texas today. May you find joy and strength in your work and community. I am so proud of you, David, and love you with all my heart. In an idolatrous city, one may purchase from stores that are not decorated for idolatry, but not from those that are adorned for such purposes. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about both the reason for this prohibition and its scope. Reish Lakish is concerned with decorations that have beautiful scents, as the Jews will benefit from idol worship. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the issue is because those stores pay tribute to the idols. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position. In resolving the difficulty, the difficulty is moved to Rabbi Yochanan's position, but is resolved as well. Items purchased in a forbidden manner are to be rendered useless. For animals, this means to cut off the hooves. A question is asked why this isn't forbidden on account of tzaar baalei hayim - mistreatment of animals? Why, in another context of sanctified items, is the penalty to close the animal in a room and let it die? What is the difference between the two cases? If an animal purchased from an idol worshipper needs to have its hooves cut off, does something similar need to be done to a gentile slave that is purchased? The Gemara brings a different source to prove that one is not allowed to cause physical damage to a slave. What items can one not sell to an idol worshipper as part of the prohibition to put a stumbling block in front of a blind person?

Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in memory of Gitta’s father, Yosef ben Menachem Mendel v’Pesha a”h on his tenth yahrzeit. He cherished his family and Torah, and would be so proud of the generations following in his footsteps and adhering to his values and moral compass. וכתר שם טוב עולה על כולם Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in memory of  Moshe Hartman, z’l, on his 6th yahrzeit. He continues to be missed dearly. He would delight in my learning, his children’s and his grandchildren’s learning, which we will honor with a family siyum on his yahrzeit. Today's daf is sponsored by Monica Steiner in honor of Rabbi David Abraham Kaplinsky, who begins his first pulpit in San Antonio, Texas today. May you find joy and strength in your work and community. I am so proud of you, David, and love you with all my heart. In an idolatrous city, one may purchase from stores that are not decorated for idolatry, but not from those that are adorned for such purposes. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about both the reason for this prohibition and its scope. Reish Lakish is concerned with decorations that have beautiful scents, as the Jews will benefit from idol worship. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the issue is because those stores pay tribute to the idols. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position. In resolving the difficulty, the difficulty is moved to Rabbi Yochanan's position, but is resolved as well. Items purchased in a forbidden manner are to be rendered useless. For animals, this means to cut off the hooves. A question is asked why this isn't forbidden on account of tzaar baalei hayim - mistreatment of animals? Why, in another context of sanctified items, is the penalty to close the animal in a room and let it die? What is the difference between the two cases? If an animal purchased from an idol worshipper needs to have its hooves cut off, does something similar need to be done to a gentile slave that is purchased? The Gemara brings a different source to prove that one is not allowed to cause physical damage to a slave. What items can one not sell to an idol worshipper as part of the prohibition to put a stumbling block in front of a blind person?

Today's daf is sponsored with gratitude to HKB"H by Tina and Shalom Lamm on the occasion of the brit and naming of their new grandson, Shilo Lavi, born to their children, Bracha and Akiva Berger. When a city contains idol worshippers but the surrounding areas do not, business dealings with those outside the city are permitted even when the city celebrates its holidays. Reish Lakish, citing Rabbi Chanina, defines "outside the city" by referencing the bazaar of Gaza as an example. In an alternative version of this teaching, Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Chanina specifically about shopping in Gaza's bazaar, which was located just outside the city limits. Rabbi Chanina permitted this activity, comparing it to a situation where a Jew and a Gentile cook in separate pots on the same stove—a practice the rabbis allowed. Three sages offer different interpretations of this comparison. Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagree about whether one may walk through an idolatrous city during their holiday celebrations when traveling to reach another destination. The Gemara presents four cases involving someone who bends down to perform an action directly in front of an idol. Even without intending to bow, such behavior is prohibited unless one can act in a way that clearly does not appear to be worship. Why did the rabbis need to mention all four cases? One example involves drinking water from a fountain where water flows from a human statue, since this creates the appearance of kissing the idol. This case leads to another case: one should not drink water directly from a pipe for health reasons, as this might result in swallowing a leech. Swallowing a leech was considered life-threatening, and Rabbi Chanina even permitted boiling water on Shabbat for someone who had swallowed one. Rav Huna also recommended drinking vinegar while waiting for the water to boil. Drinking water at night was also considered dangerous due to the evil spirit called shavrirei, which was believed to cause blindness and could be life threatening. The Gemara offers several possible remedies for those who are thirsty and need to drink water at night. In an idolatrous city, one may purchase from stores that are not decorated for idolatry, but not from those that are adorned for such purposes. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about both the reason for this prohibition and its scope.

Today's daf is sponsored with gratitude to HKB"H by Tina and Shalom Lamm on the occasion of the brit and naming of their new grandson, Shilo Lavi, born to their children, Bracha and Akiva Berger. When a city contains idol worshippers but the surrounding areas do not, business dealings with those outside the city are permitted even when the city celebrates its holidays. Reish Lakish, citing Rabbi Chanina, defines "outside the city" by referencing the bazaar of Gaza as an example. In an alternative version of this teaching, Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Chanina specifically about shopping in Gaza's bazaar, which was located just outside the city limits. Rabbi Chanina permitted this activity, comparing it to a situation where a Jew and a Gentile cook in separate pots on the same stove—a practice the rabbis allowed. Three sages offer different interpretations of this comparison. Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagree about whether one may walk through an idolatrous city during their holiday celebrations when traveling to reach another destination. The Gemara presents four cases involving someone who bends down to perform an action directly in front of an idol. Even without intending to bow, such behavior is prohibited unless one can act in a way that clearly does not appear to be worship. Why did the rabbis need to mention all four cases? One example involves drinking water from a fountain where water flows from a human statue, since this creates the appearance of kissing the idol. This case leads to another case: one should not drink water directly from a pipe for health reasons, as this might result in swallowing a leech. Swallowing a leech was considered life-threatening, and Rabbi Chanina even permitted boiling water on Shabbat for someone who had swallowed one. Rav Huna also recommended drinking vinegar while waiting for the water to boil. Drinking water at night was also considered dangerous due to the evil spirit called shavrirei, which was believed to cause blindness and could be life threatening. The Gemara offers several possible remedies for those who are thirsty and need to drink water at night. In an idolatrous city, one may purchase from stores that are not decorated for idolatry, but not from those that are adorned for such purposes. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about both the reason for this prohibition and its scope.

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 6 Today’s daf is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman in loving memory of Masha’s grandfather, Jacob Maltz, Yaakov Yitzchak ben Moshe Aaron, ztz”l, on his 65th yahrzeit, which was last Thursday. "Although my Zeidie died when I was still a child, I was inspired by the stories of his sacrifices to stay religious at a time when many were leaving the fold. I still remember his smile, radiant with warmth and love." Today’s daf is sponsored by Cliff and Minna Felig in honor of Michelle and Seth Farber on the occasion of their daughter Chani’s marriage in the throes of our war with Iran. When the Mishna mentions "three days before the holiday," does this include the holiday itself (making three days total), or does it refer to three complete days prior to the holiday (with the holiday being additional)? The Gemara brings four sources attempting to prove that the Mishna means three full days before the holiday. While three proofs are rejected, the final one provides conclusive evidence. What underlies this prohibition? Is it because the idol worshipper will thank their gods for their commercial success, and the Jew will have indirectly caused idol worship, thereby transgressing the verse in Shmot 23:13: "Make no mention of names of other gods, they shall not be heard on your lips"? Or is the concern the prohibition against placing a stumbling block before others, as the Jew causes the idol worshipper to engage in idol worship? What is the practical ramification of these different rationales? If someone transgressed and conducted business with a gentile during the prohibited days before their holiday, is it forbidden to benefit from the money or items received? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this issue. Each raises objections against the other's position, and each resolves the difficulties posed against him. A braita is cited supporting Reish Lakish's view that benefiting from such transactions is permitted. Why does the Mishna forbid all the listed activities both when the Jew benefits the non-Jew and when the non-Jew benefits the Jew? What makes each of these cases unique, making it necessary for the Mishna to list them all? Regarding collecting loans from gentiles three days before their holidays, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree in the Mishna about whether this is forbidden or permitted. The Gemara introduces a third position from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, who distinguishes between oral loans and those documented in writing. Rav Huna ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha's position.

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 6 Today’s daf is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman in loving memory of Masha’s grandfather, Jacob Maltz, Yaakov Yitzchak ben Moshe Aaron, ztz”l, on his 65th yahrzeit, which was last Thursday. "Although my Zeidie died when I was still a child, I was inspired by the stories of his sacrifices to stay religious at a time when many were leaving the fold. I still remember his smile, radiant with warmth and love." Today’s daf is sponsored by Cliff and Minna Felig in honor of Michelle and Seth Farber on the occasion of their daughter Chani’s marriage in the throes of our war with Iran. When the Mishna mentions "three days before the holiday," does this include the holiday itself (making three days total), or does it refer to three complete days prior to the holiday (with the holiday being additional)? The Gemara brings four sources attempting to prove that the Mishna means three full days before the holiday. While three proofs are rejected, the final one provides conclusive evidence. What underlies this prohibition? Is it because the idol worshipper will thank their gods for their commercial success, and the Jew will have indirectly caused idol worship, thereby transgressing the verse in Shmot 23:13: "Make no mention of names of other gods, they shall not be heard on your lips"? Or is the concern the prohibition against placing a stumbling block before others, as the Jew causes the idol worshipper to engage in idol worship? What is the practical ramification of these different rationales? If someone transgressed and conducted business with a gentile during the prohibited days before their holiday, is it forbidden to benefit from the money or items received? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this issue. Each raises objections against the other's position, and each resolves the difficulties posed against him. A braita is cited supporting Reish Lakish's view that benefiting from such transactions is permitted. Why does the Mishna forbid all the listed activities both when the Jew benefits the non-Jew and when the non-Jew benefits the Jew? What makes each of these cases unique, making it necessary for the Mishna to list them all? Regarding collecting loans from gentiles three days before their holidays, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree in the Mishna about whether this is forbidden or permitted. The Gemara introduces a third position from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, who distinguishes between oral loans and those documented in writing. Rav Huna ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha's position.

The Sages of yore were absolute Torah giants, of course, but many also balanced their scholastic responsibilities with earning a livelihood. Our particular Mishnah is the brainchild of Rabbi Yochanan HaSandler, Rabbi Yochanan the Shoemaker. In this pithy teaching, he differentiates between assemblies convened for the sake of Heaven and those bound for failure. This […]

Study Guide Shevuot 40 Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to understand the line in the Mishna regarding an oath of a partial admission: "a claim must be two ma'ah of silver" - is it referring to the amount of the claim - meaning what the claimant's side is demanding or is it referring to the defendant's claim - how much is the defendant denying? There are four attempts to support Rav's understanding from the Mishna and other tannaitic sources, however the first three can be explained according to Shmuel as well. Two other rulings of Shmuel are brought, including a basic one that if one claims the other owes two different items and the other admits of having one of the items, the defendant takes an oath of partial admission. Two versions are brought about whether Rabbi Yochanan agreed or disagreed with this opinion. Proofs are brought to prove Shmuel's opinion but are proven to be inconclusive. Likewise, those same proofs are brought to disprove the opinion that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees but are rejected in the same way.  

Study Guide Shevuot 40 Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to understand the line in the Mishna regarding an oath of a partial admission: "a claim must be two ma'ah of silver" - is it referring to the amount of the claim - meaning what the claimant's side is demanding or is it referring to the defendant's claim - how much is the defendant denying? There are four attempts to support Rav's understanding from the Mishna and other tannaitic sources, however the first three can be explained according to Shmuel as well. Two other rulings of Shmuel are brought, including a basic one that if one claims the other owes two different items and the other admits of having one of the items, the defendant takes an oath of partial admission. Two versions are brought about whether Rabbi Yochanan agreed or disagreed with this opinion. Proofs are brought to prove Shmuel's opinion but are proven to be inconclusive. Likewise, those same proofs are brought to disprove the opinion that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees but are rejected in the same way.  

Study Guide Shevuot 38 This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Helen Cohen, Henna bat Yitzchak Nechemia.  Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg, in memory of her father Zvi Tyberg on his yahrzeit today. If one takes an oath of deposit to several people at once, in what circumstances will that be required to bring multiple sacrifices? The Mishna listed three different opinions and a braita is brought with two opinions - Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan bring different explanations as to which wording Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about. If one takes an oath that one does not have several items of another, if it was a lie, are they liable also for the general statement that they do not have any item or only on the particular different items? There is a debate between amoraim about this issue. The sixth chapter discusses an oath administered by the judges, more particularly an oath of one who admits to part of a claim. What is the minimum value of the claim and the partial admission required in order to be obligated to take an oath? Another requirement is that the admission be about the same type of item as the claim. However, Rabban Gamliel disagrees about this.

Study Guide Shevuot 38 This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Helen Cohen, Henna bat Yitzchak Nechemia.  Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg, in memory of her father Zvi Tyberg on his yahrzeit today. If one takes an oath of deposit to several people at once, in what circumstances will that be required to bring multiple sacrifices? The Mishna listed three different opinions and a braita is brought with two opinions - Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan bring different explanations as to which wording Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about. If one takes an oath that one does not have several items of another, if it was a lie, are they liable also for the general statement that they do not have any item or only on the particular different items? There is a debate between amoraim about this issue. The sixth chapter discusses an oath administered by the judges, more particularly an oath of one who admits to part of a claim. What is the minimum value of the claim and the partial admission required in order to be obligated to take an oath? Another requirement is that the admission be about the same type of item as the claim. However, Rabban Gamliel disagrees about this.

Today's daf is sponsored by Batsheva and Daniel Pava. "Eighty-one years ago, on bet Sivan, the deportation of Hungarian Jewry to Auschwitz began. May our learning be dedicated to the memory of my great-grandmother, Raizel, my grandmother, Batsheva bat Yisroel, the Steinmetz and Vegh families of Apsha, and all the Jews of Marmarosh who were murdered in Auschwitz. May their memories be a blessing." Rava rules that one who takes an oath to not eat a loaf of bread, even if they have already eaten most of it, as long as there is still an olive bulk of bread left, the person can go to a chacham to repeal the oath retroactively. How can this case work with both the language of "I will not eat any of it" and "I will not eat it in its entirety"? A source is brought regarding a nazir to raise a contradiction to Rava. However, it is resolved in three possible ways. Ameimar disagrees with Rava and holds that one has even longer to repeal the oath, as long as the punishment has not yet been implemented. Rava explains that if an oath is made with a condition, if the condition is fulfilled without intention, the oath does not take effect. If the person remembers the condition but forgets the oath when eating the forbidden item, one is liable to bring a sacrifice. If the person remembers both the condition and the oath when eating both, and first eats the one fulfilling the condition, they will receive lashes. If the person first eats the forbidden one and then eats the one fulfilling the condition, it is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding a warning given in doubt, hatraat safek. Rava continues with another case where a person said that each item is forbidden on condition that they eat the other item. He discusses four possible permutations of what the person did unintentionally and intentionally and explains the law in each case. Rav Meri brings support from a Mishna and braita for Rava's principle in the above cases that if the condition is fulfilled unintentionally, the oath does not go into effect. Avimi asks his brother Eifa about the ruling in different cases of a double/overlapping oath. Each time Eifa answers, Avimi disagrees with Eifa's ruling.

Today's daf is sponsored by Batsheva and Daniel Pava. "Eighty-one years ago, on bet Sivan, the deportation of Hungarian Jewry to Auschwitz began. May our learning be dedicated to the memory of my great-grandmother, Raizel, my grandmother, Batsheva bat Yisroel, the Steinmetz and Vegh families of Apsha, and all the Jews of Marmarosh who were murdered in Auschwitz. May their memories be a blessing." Rava rules that one who takes an oath to not eat a loaf of bread, even if they have already eaten most of it, as long as there is still an olive bulk of bread left, the person can go to a chacham to repeal the oath retroactively. How can this case work with both the language of "I will not eat any of it" and "I will not eat it in its entirety"? A source is brought regarding a nazir to raise a contradiction to Rava. However, it is resolved in three possible ways. Ameimar disagrees with Rava and holds that one has even longer to repeal the oath, as long as the punishment has not yet been implemented. Rava explains that if an oath is made with a condition, if the condition is fulfilled without intention, the oath does not take effect. If the person remembers the condition but forgets the oath when eating the forbidden item, one is liable to bring a sacrifice. If the person remembers both the condition and the oath when eating both, and first eats the one fulfilling the condition, they will receive lashes. If the person first eats the forbidden one and then eats the one fulfilling the condition, it is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding a warning given in doubt, hatraat safek. Rava continues with another case where a person said that each item is forbidden on condition that they eat the other item. He discusses four possible permutations of what the person did unintentionally and intentionally and explains the law in each case. Rav Meri brings support from a Mishna and braita for Rava's principle in the above cases that if the condition is fulfilled unintentionally, the oath does not go into effect. Avimi asks his brother Eifa about the ruling in different cases of a double/overlapping oath. Each time Eifa answers, Avimi disagrees with Eifa's ruling.

Study Guide Shevuot 21 Today's daf is sponsored by Ruth Leah Kahan, Jessica Shklar, and Emily Michelson in commemoration of the seventh yahrzeit of their mother, Kadimah Freedman Michelson -- קדימה בת הרב אברהם זבי וחיה. We miss her every day. What is the type of oath that is included in the negative commandment - do not swear falsely in my (God's) name? There is a debate regarding Rabbi Yochanan's opinion on this matter  - is it referring to an oath on future actions or on past actions? Difficulties are raised on both approaches and are resolved. When Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna says that one is obligated for not keeping to one's oath by eating a minuscule amount, meaning there is no requisite amount, does he hold this across the board (as per Rabbi Shimon's opinion), or only for oaths? The Gemara proves from other sources that it is a unique ruling only for oaths.  

Rabin brought the Torah of Rabbi Yochanan in Israel to Babylonia to establish the difference between a false oath, not keeping one's word, and swearing in vain (with 3 different verses in the Torah that establish the prohibition). Plus, every negative commandment that has an action - gets lashes. But if there's no action, no lashes -- except for the exceptions, where lashes would be incurred. Also, establishing the views of the sages with regard to the unspecified statements - and what they mean in terms of amounts, and so on. For example: if a minute amount of food is prohibited, does it incur a sacrifice? In part, it's contingent on establishing the definitions - what is the minimum amount for eating to count as eating?

Today's daf is sponsored by Helen Danczak in memory of her beloved mother on her 28th yahrzeit. "Her love of family is a guiding force for me." Today's daf is sponsored by Debbie and Yossi Gevir on the birth of two new grandchildren. "With joy and gratitude to Hashem! Mazal Tov to our beloved children Elazar and Sarah on the birth, two months ago. of their daughter, Shaked Tova. And to our beloved children Eliav and Noya, upon the birth of their son Ofek Shalom, whose Brit was yesterday. שירבו שמחות בישראל! A contradiction is brought between a braita and the Mishna regarding the language "I take an oath that I will eat." This contradiction is resolved in two different ways. A braita explains what "mivta" is and what "isar" is. They are both languages of oaths. But an isar can be liable a sacrifice and also not necessarily. The meaning of this braita is a subject of debate between Abaye and Rava who disagree about whether isar is a language of being matpis on an oath or not. Rav Dimi explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan what negative commandments are transgressed by different types of oath of expression (past and future) and for vows. He explains that oaths about something that one will do in the future are "false oaths" and in the past are "vain oaths." However, there is a braita that says that false and vain oaths are the same. How can this braita be explained in light of Rav Dimi's statement?

Study Guide Shevuot 19 Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about how to extrapolate the verse in Vayikra 5:2. Chizkiya explains the difference of opinion between them, while Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Sheshet hold that they do not disagree, rather each exempts one who forgot the Temple or sacrificial items from bringing a sacrifice, but extrapolates it from different words in the verse. Rava asks Rav Nachman: if forgetting the Temple or sacrificial items does not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, what if one forgot both the Temple and that one was impure? Rav Nachman answers that since the person also forgot they were impure, of course there is an obligation to bring a sacrifice. But Rava retorts that perhaps since one who forgets the Temple is exempt, this person would be exempt as well. Rav Ashi suggests an answer to this deliberation, but Ravina rejects it. A case is brought of one who walked on two paths - one pure and one impure and went into the Temple. Two variations are brought and there is a debate about the halakha in each case. There are three different opinions regarding these three cases. What is the root of their debate? The issues raised here relate to what type of previous knowledge of impurity is necessary to obligate one for a sacrifice. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different interpretations for the first opinion in the cases of the two paths. Their opinions here contradict their opinions in a different place. How are these contradictions reconciled?

No one really knows what happens after we die, and even if we live within a tradition (as Judaism is) that is quite clear that there is a heaven and a hell, who is to say which way you and I are going? Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai was one of the greatest of all time, and he didn't know either. That should give us pause.

Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Idan Alexander after 584 days in captivity. Wishing him a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages.  According to Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether or not animals left over from the previous year that were designated for the Tamid sacrifice can be redeemed without a blemish. The Gemara tries to find a source for Rabbi Yochanan's understanding that the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon, but they are not successful. According to Rabbi Shimon, they cannot - so what does one do with them? If they were designated for communal burnt offerings, they would sacrifice them as voluntary communal offerings on the altar meant to keep the altar busy at all times. If they were designated for communal sin offerings, they could not be used directly as voluntary burnt offerings so they would wait until they were blemished, redeem them, and buy animals with the money to be sacrificed as voluntary burnt offerings. There is a concern that if this were to be permitted, one may think that one can change the destination even at an earlier stage (before the atonement for that sacrifice is achieved.  The rabbis bring three tannaitic sources to support this. Another braita is brought to support the explanation that the extra animals designated for the Tamid sacrifice are used for voluntary burnt offerings. Can one purchase birds for the burnt offerings used to fill the altar? Shmuel also held like Rabbi Yochanan that according to Rabbi Shimon, the extra animals could be used as voluntary burnt offerings. What is the source for the fact that the goat offering brought inside on Yom Kippur atones also for intentional sins of impurity in the Temple?    

Study Guide Shevuot 11 Today's daf is sponsored by the Pittsburgh daf yomi group for a refuah shleima for Rabbi Amy Bardack, haRav Ahuva bat Liba who is having surgery today. "Wishing our organizer and leader a speedy recovery." In support of Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that leftover animals designated for communal offerings can be redeemed at the end of the year, Raba brings an example of incense which has inherent sanctity and can be redeemed at the end of the year. Rav Chisda disagrees with Raba as he holds that incense does not have inherent sanctity until a later stage when it is brought into a sanctified vessel just before being offered on the altar. Raba proves his position that it has inherent sanctity.  The Gemara then returns to Rav Chisda's original question of how can one redeem items with inherent sanctity. Raba answers that the court stipulates at the beginning of the year that any animals not needed will be only sanctified for their value. Abaye raises a difficulty from other communal offerings that cannot be redeemed if lost and replaced and then found. However, Raba answers that the stipulation is for typical, not atypical cases. Why, then, can the red heifer be redeemed in certain circumstances? The Gemara concludes that a stipulation is made because of its high value.  Abaye raises a further difficulty from our Mishna, as Rabbi Shimon answers a question about whether animals designated for one sacrifice that are leftover can be used for another with a particular answer instead of answering that the court stipulated such, as Raba would have said. Raba answers that Rabbi Shimon doesn't agree with the rabbis that the court can stipulate. Rabbi Yochanan and Raba's approach is based only on the rabbis' position.   

Study Guide Shevuot 10 This week's learning is sponsored by Moshe Silver in loving memory of Rebbitzen Miriam Maxine Elkins who passed away on Yom haAtzmaut. "Her love of Torah, the Jewish people, and the land and State of Israel was unsurpassed. Her loving family - Rabbi Dov Pearetz Elkins and her children - bear the lasting imprint of the passion she brought to everything she did, as do all of us who loved her." This week's learning is sponsored by Vicky Harari in loving memory of her father Abraham Eckstein. "He had a smile that could light up the room. He taught me what I know about love. As a Holocaust survivor, he taught me gratitude and resilience something that I have been relying on more today than ever." The Gemara continues to extrapolate verses to explain the basis of the opinions of Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Shimon in the Mishna regarding which sacrifices do each of the communal sin offerings atone for. Ulla explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the extra sheep left at the end of the year that were designated for the Tamid (daily) sacrifice, but were not needed, are redeemed and repurchased with money from that next year's funds. When Raba explained this halakha, Rav Chisda raised a difficulty - how can an item that is sanctified with kedushat haguf  be redeemed? Raba responds by bringing an example from the incense, which is sanctified and can be redeemed. However, this is rejected as the sanctity of the incense is kedushat damim, its value is sanctified, not kedushat haguf.

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

This month's learning is sponsored by Bracha Rutner in loving memory of Anna Rutner. "She was a woman who was always curious about life. She came to the US in 1958 and learned English and made an incredible life for herself raising four children and seventeen grandchildren. She will always live on in our hearts and in the number of great-grandchildren named after her."  The Gemara begins with three structural questions regarding the Mishna. Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot? Why did the Mishna list all four cases that have two cases learned from the Torah and two from the rabbis, when in the context of Masechet Shabbat and Masechet Negaim (laws of leprosy), only the relevant case for the masechet is mentioned? Why did the Mishna begin with Shevuot, but when elaborating on the details, the case of impurity came first, and only after that does the Mishna move back to elaborate on laws of oaths? The Gemara explains in each of the four categories, what two cases appear in the Torah and what two are from rabbinic law. Does the Mishna follow Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva? At first glance, it doesn't seem to follow either opinion as in oaths, Rabbi Yishmael holds one does not bring a sacrifice on oaths relating to past actions, and Rabbi Akiva holds that one does not bring a sacrifice if one forgot that the Temple was in that place or that the item was a sacrificial item. The first answer given is that each could fit with the Mishna if we adopt a different understanding of the Mishna. One could explain that the Mishna brings a list of two cases that are four, but not all obligate one in a sacrifice. This explanation is rejected since the Mishna also lists four cases for leprous marks and one is obligated to bring a sacrifice upon becoming purified from all four cases, and the assumption is that all four cases in the Mishna are similar in that way. The second answer given is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael and the Mishna refers to the obligation to receive lashes for an oath of expression that one did not keep intentionally, not a sacrifice for not keeping the oath because one forgot. This accords with Rava's position that one can derive from the verse about false oaths that one receives lashes for an oath of expression about something that happened in the past. To make this explanation fit with the Mishna, Rabbi Yishmael would need to hold that one receives lashes for a negative prohibition that to transgress it, one does not do an action, as the oath, "I will not eat," and one does not eat, does not involve an action on the part of the one who does not fulfill the oath. This raises a difficulty as Rabbi Yochanan holds like all unattributed Mishnayot, such as ours and he also holds that one does not receive lashes if no action is performed. To resolve this difficulty, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds by a different unattributed Mishna and they quote a Mishna in Makkot regarding notar, leftover meat from the Pesach sacrifice. However, this suggestion is rejected, as that Mishna can be understood following Rabbi Yehuda's explanation that it is a negative prohibition that has a positive way to fix it, lav hanitak l'asei, for which one is exempt from lashes.   

Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters.  How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition.