Podcasts about rabbi yochanan

Rav Bibi bar Abaye rules that although a standard hole in the windpipe requires the size of an issar (a coin), its clawing measurement (of redness) is a minimal amount, because the predator's venom burns and consumes the tissue continuously. Regarding the scope of the inspection required due to concern for venom, Rav Nachman testifies in the name of Rav that one must inspect from the base of the brain to the thigh, and not only adjacent to the intestines (as some hold). In an interesting story, Rabbi Yochanan defends the supreme authority of Rav against the queries of Reish Lakish, and consequently, Reish Lakish praises a different tradition of Rav, according to which an animal whose organs (simanim) were dislocated and was subsequently slaughtered is kosher. It was established that new cases of treifot may not be added beyond those enumerated by the Sages, even if these injuries cause the death of the animal. The Mishna enumerates structural defects that leave the animal kosher, including a windpipe that was perforated less than the size of an Italian issar, a brain membrane that was not punctured, and a liver of which a remains. This list gives rise to a fundamental dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the scope of the lists in this chapter, which affects their approach to the ruling of Rav Matna, who rules that a femur bone that dislocated is a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan declares the animal kosher because the case was omitted from the exclusive list of treifot, while Reish Lakish rules it a treifa because it is absent from the exclusive list of kosher defects. For the Babylonians, they defined that the size of the isser is similar to a Kurdish dinar, and the Gemara brings a story following this involving Rabbi Yochanan who went to a moneychanger looking for this coin,and told the moneychanger that craftsmen engaged in their work are legally exempt from standing before Torah scholars. How does this differ from craftsmen who would stand up and greet those Jews who were bringing their first fruits to the Temple? Rav Nachman said that "up to an issar" it is not a treifa means up to but not including that size. Rava brings a series of difficulties against his view, but Rav Nachman answers them.

Investigating (final?) details about what makes an animal a treyfa - in terms of injuries. Is there a rule of thumb, or is the list of what makes an animal a treyfa complete, in terms of listing all the possibilities? But then the Gemara walks back the question... Also, a new mishnah! On how much damage can be done to the trachea (and other body parts), and the animal remains kosher. Plus, a comparison between two mishnayot that seem to contradict each other in methodology. Also, more on the perforation of a trachea -- and how the measure that keeps the animal kosher is less than an Italian issar - but that wasn't helpful in Babylonia, where they weren't familiar with the coin. Plus, the job of the money-changer who tried to stand up in honor of Rabbi Yochanan, who declined the honor because of the job at hand. Plus, the time the tradesmen stood up to honor those bringing their first fruits (bikkurim) to Jerusalem.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye rules that although a standard hole in the windpipe requires the size of an issar (a coin), its clawing measurement (of redness) is a minimal amount, because the predator's venom burns and consumes the tissue continuously. Regarding the scope of the inspection required due to concern for venom, Rav Nachman testifies in the name of Rav that one must inspect from the base of the brain to the thigh, and not only adjacent to the intestines (as some hold). In an interesting story, Rabbi Yochanan defends the supreme authority of Rav against the queries of Reish Lakish, and consequently, Reish Lakish praises a different tradition of Rav, according to which an animal whose organs (simanim) were dislocated and was subsequently slaughtered is kosher. It was established that new cases of treifot may not be added beyond those enumerated by the Sages, even if these injuries cause the death of the animal. The Mishna enumerates structural defects that leave the animal kosher, including a windpipe that was perforated less than the size of an Italian issar, a brain membrane that was not punctured, and a liver of which a remains. This list gives rise to a fundamental dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the scope of the lists in this chapter, which affects their approach to the ruling of Rav Matna, who rules that a femur bone that dislocated is a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan declares the animal kosher because the case was omitted from the exclusive list of treifot, while Reish Lakish rules it a treifa because it is absent from the exclusive list of kosher defects. For the Babylonians, they defined that the size of the isser is similar to a Kurdish dinar, and the Gemara brings a story following this involving Rabbi Yochanan who went to a moneychanger looking for this coin,and told the moneychanger that craftsmen engaged in their work are legally exempt from standing before Torah scholars. How does this differ from craftsmen who would stand up and greet those Jews who were bringing their first fruits to the Temple? Rav Nachman said that "up to an issar" it is not a treifa means up to but not including that size. Rava brings a series of difficulties against his view, but Rav Nachman answers them.

Rav Nachman identifies two types of fat on the stomach: bar chimtza, which can effectively seal a perforation, and chimtza, which cannot. To clarify which specific fat constitutes bar chimtza, the Gemara cites an independent statement by Rav Nachman regarding a halakhic dispute between the Sages of the Land of Israel and those of the Diaspora. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that if internal mucus seals a perforation in the intestines, the animal is not a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan is cited as ruling in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on this issue and on an unrelated matter regarding mourning - that if a mourner returns home toward the end of shiva, they may conclude their mourning period alongside the other family members, provided they were not far away when the death occured. A discussion follows regarding whether the final halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on one or both of these issues. To determine whether a perforation occurred before or after the shechita, a practical test can be performed by creating a comparable post-mortem puncture to observe and compare the tissue's reaction. Different sages note that this testing method is applicable to the intestines, lung, and windpipe; however, some outline specific limitations to this procedure. The Mishna distinguishes between the laws of the keres hapnimi (inner stomach), where a perforation of any size renders the animal a treifa, and the keres hachitzona (outer stomach), which requires a rupture across the majority of its area to disqualify the animal. The Gemara presents seven distinct interpretations to identify precisely which anatomical section constitutes the inner stomach. Rabbi Yehuda's dissenting opinion regarding the outer stomach is explained to mean that a perforation of either a tefach (handbreadth) or a majority of the area will render the animal a treifa.

Rav Nachman identifies two types of fat on the stomach: bar chimtza, which can effectively seal a perforation, and chimtza, which cannot. To clarify which specific fat constitutes bar chimtza, the Gemara cites an independent statement by Rav Nachman regarding a halakhic dispute between the Sages of the Land of Israel and those of the Diaspora. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that if internal mucus seals a perforation in the intestines, the animal is not a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan is cited as ruling in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on this issue and on an unrelated matter regarding mourning - that if a mourner returns home toward the end of shiva, they may conclude their mourning period alongside the other family members, provided they were not far away when the death occured. A discussion follows regarding whether the final halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on one or both of these issues. To determine whether a perforation occurred before or after the shechita, a practical test can be performed by creating a comparable post-mortem puncture to observe and compare the tissue's reaction. Different sages note that this testing method is applicable to the intestines, lung, and windpipe; however, some outline specific limitations to this procedure. The Mishna distinguishes between the laws of the keres hapnimi (inner stomach), where a perforation of any size renders the animal a treifa, and the keres hachitzona (outer stomach), which requires a rupture across the majority of its area to disqualify the animal. The Gemara presents seven distinct interpretations to identify precisely which anatomical section constitutes the inner stomach. Rabbi Yehuda's dissenting opinion regarding the outer stomach is explained to mean that a perforation of either a tefach (handbreadth) or a majority of the area will render the animal a treifa.

The Gemara discusses additional cases of treifot, alongside several real-life incidents brought before the Sages, detailing how they ruled - or, in certain instances, declined to render a definitive decision. The first issue concerns a lung that has become attached to the ribs. Because the lesion causing the adhesion might have originated in the chest wall rather than the lung itself, the animal might not be a treifa. The Sages dispute whether this condition is permissible and outline diagnostic methods to determine the source of the underlying wound. Regarding cysts or fluid-filled blisters on the lung, the majority of the Sages permit the animal, whereas Rabbi Yochanan forbids it. The Sages divide over a case where a needle is discovered inside the lung. One opinion holds that the needle likely traveled through the gullet into the stomach, perforating internal organs on its way to the lung, which renders the animal a treifa. The opposing view permits the animal, operating under the assumption that the needle took a direct path down the windpipe into the bronchi without causing a disqualifying perforation.

The Gemara discusses additional cases of treifot, alongside several real-life incidents brought before the Sages, detailing how they ruled - or, in certain instances, declined to render a definitive decision. The first issue concerns a lung that has become attached to the ribs. Because the lesion causing the adhesion might have originated in the chest wall rather than the lung itself, the animal might not be a treifa. The Sages dispute whether this condition is permissible and outline diagnostic methods to determine the source of the underlying wound. Regarding cysts or fluid-filled blisters on the lung, the majority of the Sages permit the animal, whereas Rabbi Yochanan forbids it. The Sages divide over a case where a needle is discovered inside the lung. One opinion holds that the needle likely traveled through the gullet into the stomach, perforating internal organs on its way to the lung, which renders the animal a treifa. The opposing view permits the animal, operating under the assumption that the needle took a direct path down the windpipe into the bronchi without causing a disqualifying perforation.

What are the primary categories of treifot? Ulla states that eight categories that were transmitted as halakha to Moshe from Sinai: perforated (nekuva), severed (pesuka), removed (netula), deficient (chasura), torn (kru'a), clawed (drusa), fallen (nefula), and broken (shevura). Chiya bar Rav said there are eight cases in the category of perforated, and this excludes the gall bladder, which is considered a treifa only by Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the ruling is like Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. He brings a proof for Rabbi Yosi's position from a verse in Iyov 16:13, in which Iyov explains that his gall bladder was poured on the ground, and yet, he still lived. The rabbis' retort to that is that Iyov's situation was miraculous and we cannot derive halakha from a miracle. Another ruling of Rabbi Yochanan was brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef regarding the liver – if the liver is reduced to less than an olive bulk, the animal is a treifa. If, according to Rabba bar bar Hanna, Rabbi Yochanan holds like an unattributed Mishna, there is a contradiction as our Mishna rules it is a treifa only if the liver is completely removed. This is resolved by explaining there is a debate between the two amoraim what Rabbi Yochanan held. Two other rulings are brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef in the name of Rabbi Yochanan regarding treifot. A gall bladder that was perforated but the liver covered up the hole, or a bird's gizzard that was perforated, but the inner lining was not, both are kosher. Raba notes that the gullet consists of two distinct linings - an outer red membrane and an inner white membrane. If only one layer is punctured while the other remains intact, the animal remains kosher. What happens if both layers of an organ are punctured, but the holes do not align? Rav Ashi rules that in a stationary organ like the gizzard, non-aligned punctures are kosher because the layers do not shift. However, in a dynamic organ like the gullet, which constantly expands, contracts, and moves during feeding, the holes are liable to realign; therefore, non-aligned punctures render the animal a treifa. In one version, Mar Zutra quotes Rav Papa saying the opposite; in another, he agrees. Raba notes that the gullet cannot be evaluated for predatory clawing (safek drusa) from the outside, as the outside is red and blood would not be noticeable. It must be inverted and inspected from the inside. If a thorn is found lodged inside the gullet with a perforation on the inside, but no noticeable perforation on the outside, Ulla rules that we do not fear it caused a perforation which healed, as free-roaming livestock regularly consume thorny vegetation without injury. Is the turbatz haveshet, the uppermost part of the gullet, legally treated as part of the gullet? Rav and Shmuel disagree on its status. Rav maintains it is a valid location for slaughter; thus, any extraneous puncture of even a minimal size renders it a treifa. Shmuel argues it is not a valid location for slaughter, meaning it is only rendered a treifa if the majority of it is severed. This dispute culminated in a practical case involving an ox belonging to the sons of Rav Ukva, where the slaughter began in the turbatz haveshet and finished in the gullet. Rava applied the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, declaring the animal a treifa. Rabbi Abba reversed Rava's decision, demonstrating that the ox was completely kosher under either authority individually. If one followed Rav, the slaughter location was valid; if one followed Shmuel, the minor cut in the turbatz haveshet did not render it a treifa before the slaughter was completed. Because Rava's logically contradictory ruling caused an impermissible destruction of kosher property, Rabbi Abba ordered Rava to financially compensate the owner of the ox.

What are the primary categories of treifot? Ulla states that eight categories that were transmitted as halakha to Moshe from Sinai: perforated (nekuva), severed (pesuka), removed (netula), deficient (chasura), torn (kru'a), clawed (drusa), fallen (nefula), and broken (shevura). Chiya bar Rav said there are eight cases in the category of perforated, and this excludes the gall bladder, which is considered a treifa only by Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the ruling is like Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. He brings a proof for Rabbi Yosi's position from a verse in Iyov 16:13, in which Iyov explains that his gall bladder was poured on the ground, and yet, he still lived. The rabbis' retort to that is that Iyov's situation was miraculous and we cannot derive halakha from a miracle. Another ruling of Rabbi Yochanan was brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef regarding the liver – if the liver is reduced to less than an olive bulk, the animal is a treifa. If, according to Rabba bar bar Hanna, Rabbi Yochanan holds like an unattributed Mishna, there is a contradiction as our Mishna rules it is a treifa only if the liver is completely removed. This is resolved by explaining there is a debate between the two amoraim what Rabbi Yochanan held. Two other rulings are brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef in the name of Rabbi Yochanan regarding treifot. A gall bladder that was perforated but the liver covered up the hole, or a bird's gizzard that was perforated, but the inner lining was not, both are kosher. Raba notes that the gullet consists of two distinct linings - an outer red membrane and an inner white membrane. If only one layer is punctured while the other remains intact, the animal remains kosher. What happens if both layers of an organ are punctured, but the holes do not align? Rav Ashi rules that in a stationary organ like the gizzard, non-aligned punctures are kosher because the layers do not shift. However, in a dynamic organ like the gullet, which constantly expands, contracts, and moves during feeding, the holes are liable to realign; therefore, non-aligned punctures render the animal a treifa. In one version, Mar Zutra quotes Rav Papa saying the opposite; in another, he agrees. Raba notes that the gullet cannot be evaluated for predatory clawing (safek drusa) from the outside, as the outside is red and blood would not be noticeable. It must be inverted and inspected from the inside. If a thorn is found lodged inside the gullet with a perforation on the inside, but no noticeable perforation on the outside, Ulla rules that we do not fear it caused a perforation which healed, as free-roaming livestock regularly consume thorny vegetation without injury. Is the turbatz haveshet, the uppermost part of the gullet, legally treated as part of the gullet? Rav and Shmuel disagree on its status. Rav maintains it is a valid location for slaughter; thus, any extraneous puncture of even a minimal size renders it a treifa. Shmuel argues it is not a valid location for slaughter, meaning it is only rendered a treifa if the majority of it is severed. This dispute culminated in a practical case involving an ox belonging to the sons of Rav Ukva, where the slaughter began in the turbatz haveshet and finished in the gullet. Rava applied the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, declaring the animal a treifa. Rabbi Abba reversed Rava's decision, demonstrating that the ox was completely kosher under either authority individually. If one followed Rav, the slaughter location was valid; if one followed Shmuel, the minor cut in the turbatz haveshet did not render it a treifa before the slaughter was completed. Because Rava's logically contradictory ruling caused an impermissible destruction of kosher property, Rabbi Abba ordered Rava to financially compensate the owner of the ox.

What is the default assumption regarding a gentile's intent when an animal is slaughtered? The rabbis hold that we do not automatically assume a gentile intends it for idol worship unless he explicitly says so, while Rabbi Eliezer holds a gentile's default intent is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosi argues that even if he does intend it for idol worship, we do not say that one person's intent affects another person's act of slaughter. The Gemara presents two ways to explain this dispute and whether the principle of one person intending and another performing the action applies outside the Temple just as it does inside. What is the status of an animal if the slaughter was performed with the intent to perform a later part of the service, like throwing the blood or burning the fat, for idol worship? Rabbi Yochanan rules that the animal is disqualified because we can transfer intent from one action to another, and we learn the laws outside the Temple from the laws inside. Reish Lakish rules that it is permitted because we do not transfer intent from one action to another outside the Temple. The Gemara notes they hold the same argument regarding internal Temple sacrifices and l'shma intent, and then explains why it was necessary to state that they argue in both cases. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yosi's position in the Mishna, but is resolved. A braita is then brought to support Rabbi Yochanan's position. What is the law if someone performs shechita and only thinks about sprinkling the blood for idol worship after the slaughter is finished? The Gemara cites a case in Caesarea where the Sages did not rule whether it was forbidden or permitted. The issue is whether or not a later action or statement retroactively proves the initial intent. After attempting to connect their ruling with the rabbis' and Rabbi Eliezer's positions, that suggestion is rejected and they say it connects with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's ruling. However, the Gemara tries to figure out which ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it connects to. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosi, meaning the gentile's intent does not disqualify the Jew's shechita. The Gemara brings a story where gentiles gave animals to a Jewish butcher and stated the blood and fat were for them, and it was permitted. Rav Ashi qualifies that if a gentile gives money to a Jewish butcher under Rabbi Eliezer's view, it is only forbidden if the gentile is powerful enough that the butcher cannot refuse his intent.

What is the default assumption regarding a gentile's intent when an animal is slaughtered? The rabbis hold that we do not automatically assume a gentile intends it for idol worship unless he explicitly says so, while Rabbi Eliezer holds a gentile's default intent is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosi argues that even if he does intend it for idol worship, we do not say that one person's intent affects another person's act of slaughter. The Gemara presents two ways to explain this dispute and whether the principle of one person intending and another performing the action applies outside the Temple just as it does inside. What is the status of an animal if the slaughter was performed with the intent to perform a later part of the service, like throwing the blood or burning the fat, for idol worship? Rabbi Yochanan rules that the animal is disqualified because we can transfer intent from one action to another, and we learn the laws outside the Temple from the laws inside. Reish Lakish rules that it is permitted because we do not transfer intent from one action to another outside the Temple. The Gemara notes they hold the same argument regarding internal Temple sacrifices and l'shma intent, and then explains why it was necessary to state that they argue in both cases. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yosi's position in the Mishna, but is resolved. A braita is then brought to support Rabbi Yochanan's position. What is the law if someone performs shechita and only thinks about sprinkling the blood for idol worship after the slaughter is finished? The Gemara cites a case in Caesarea where the Sages did not rule whether it was forbidden or permitted. The issue is whether or not a later action or statement retroactively proves the initial intent. After attempting to connect their ruling with the rabbis' and Rabbi Eliezer's positions, that suggestion is rejected and they say it connects with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's ruling. However, the Gemara tries to figure out which ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it connects to. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosi, meaning the gentile's intent does not disqualify the Jew's shechita. The Gemara brings a story where gentiles gave animals to a Jewish butcher and stated the blood and fat were for them, and it was permitted. Rav Ashi qualifies that if a gentile gives money to a Jewish butcher under Rabbi Eliezer's view, it is only forbidden if the gentile is powerful enough that the butcher cannot refuse his intent.

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

Study Guide The Gemara clarifies which Tanna the Mishna follows regarding temed (grape-seed water). Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avahu explains that the dispute in the Mishna in Ma'asrot between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages applies after it ferments, so our Mishna can align with the view of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabba bar Avahu that if a person bought temed with second tithe funds before it fermented, and it ultimately fermented, it is treated as wine. His words pose a difficulty for our Mishna, which did not present such an option. Rabba establishes the Mishna in a case where it is clear that it will not ferment later, while Rava suggests that the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that everything follows the visual appearance (chazuta) at the time of the sale. Rabbi Elazar disputes Rav Nachman's understanding of the Mishna in Ma'asrot, holding that the dispute applies when it has not fermented, but once it ferments, everyone agrees it is considered wine. A braita brings the laws of purifying temed that has not yet fermented by connecting it to water (haska). Rava limits this rule, explaining that this applies only when the water of the temed was pure from the beginning and became impure after it became temed, but if it was impure from the outset, it does not. However, Rav Ashi rejects his ruling and argues that there is no logic to distinguish between the cases. The Mishna states that anywhere there is a sale (a minor girl, ketana), there is no fine for rape (whose law only applies to a young woman, na'ara), and anywhere there is a fine, there is no sale. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav explains that this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that a fine applies even to a ketana. A Mishna states that anywhere there is refusal (miun, for a ketana), there is no chalitza (for a na'ara), and anywhere there is chalitza, there is no miun. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says that this is also the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that miun applies even to a na'ara. A Mishna states that anywhere there is a shofar blast (tekiya), there is no havdala, and anywhere there is havdala, there is no tekiya. If a Festival falls on the eve of the Sabbath, you blow the shofar and do not say havdala. If it falls on the conclusion of the Sabbath, you say havdala and do not blow. The Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute the exact wording of the havdala.

Study Guide The Gemara clarifies which Tanna the Mishna follows regarding temed (grape-seed water). Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avahu explains that the dispute in the Mishna in Ma'asrot between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages applies after it ferments, so our Mishna can align with the view of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabba bar Avahu that if a person bought temed with second tithe funds before it fermented, and it ultimately fermented, it is treated as wine. His words pose a difficulty for our Mishna, which did not present such an option. Rabba establishes the Mishna in a case where it is clear that it will not ferment later, while Rava suggests that the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that everything follows the visual appearance (chazuta) at the time of the sale. Rabbi Elazar disputes Rav Nachman's understanding of the Mishna in Ma'asrot, holding that the dispute applies when it has not fermented, but once it ferments, everyone agrees it is considered wine. A braita brings the laws of purifying temed that has not yet fermented by connecting it to water (haska). Rava limits this rule, explaining that this applies only when the water of the temed was pure from the beginning and became impure after it became temed, but if it was impure from the outset, it does not. However, Rav Ashi rejects his ruling and argues that there is no logic to distinguish between the cases. The Mishna states that anywhere there is a sale (a minor girl, ketana), there is no fine for rape (whose law only applies to a young woman, na'ara), and anywhere there is a fine, there is no sale. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav explains that this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that a fine applies even to a ketana. A Mishna states that anywhere there is refusal (miun, for a ketana), there is no chalitza (for a na'ara), and anywhere there is chalitza, there is no miun. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says that this is also the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that miun applies even to a na'ara. A Mishna states that anywhere there is a shofar blast (tekiya), there is no havdala, and anywhere there is havdala, there is no tekiya. If a Festival falls on the eve of the Sabbath, you blow the shofar and do not say havdala. If it falls on the conclusion of the Sabbath, you say havdala and do not blow. The Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute the exact wording of the havdala.

The braita continues with the analysis of the unique laws governing earthenware vessels. Through a series of suggested logical kal v'chomer arguments, they demonstrate how scriptural verses restrict the ways these vessels contract and protect against ritual impurity, each in their own unique manner. Specifically, the verses dictate that an earthenware vessel can only contract impurity through its interior airspace (me'aviro) and never from its outer surface (miggabbo). Conversely, other types of vessels cannot contract impurity from their airspace but do contract it from their outer surface. The Mishna sets forth an additional rule of contrasting halakhic status: a state that renders a wooden vessel ritually pure leaves a metal vessel impure, and vice versa. A braita clarifies that unfinished wooden vessels are susceptible to impurity while flat wooden vessels are pure. For metal, the law is reversed: unfinished metal vessels are pure while flat metal vessels are susceptible to impurity. The braita explains what is defined as an unfinished vessel in this context. The Gemara presents a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Nachman regarding the underlying reason for the distinction between unfinished wood vessels and unfinished metal vessels - whether it is because these vessels are made for honor, or because they are expensive and therefore their crafting is not considered complete as long as any detail is missing. There is a practical ramification between these two opinions regarding vessels made of bone. The scriptural source establishing that bone vessels can contract ritual impurity is subsequently derived. The Mishna introduces contrasting rules regarding the tithing obligations of bitter and sweet almonds. A braita explains that bitter almonds are subject to tithing only when they are young and small, since they are unfit for consumption when they are mature and large, whereas sweet almonds are subject to tithing only when they are large. Rabbi Yishmael b'Rabbi Yosi quotes an opinion that either both stages are completely exempt or both are completely obligated. The Gemara explains the opinion that both are obligated by explaining that mature bitter almonds can be sweetened by roasting them over a fire. The Mishna outlines the changing legal status of grape-seed water (temed). Prior to fermentation, it does not possess the status of wine and cannot be purchased using second tithe funds, yet it disqualifies a mikveh if three logs of it fall inside a mikveh that does not have the requisite amount of water (forty se'ah). Once it ferments, its status changes to wine, meaning it can be purchased with second tithe funds and no longer disqualifies a mikveh. The Mishna also introduces a contrasting rule regarding brothers who are partners in an estate or partners after already dividing their estate, balancing their obligations toward the Temple half-shekel surcharge (kalbon) against their obligations toward the cattle tithe. The Gemara analyzes which tanna this Mishna follows regarding the status of temed, since on the surface, it does not appear to align with any opinion appearing in the Mishna in Masechet Maasrot (Chapter 5, Mishna 6).

The braita continues with the analysis of the unique laws governing earthenware vessels. Through a series of suggested logical kal v'chomer arguments, they demonstrate how scriptural verses restrict the ways these vessels contract and protect against ritual impurity, each in their own unique manner. Specifically, the verses dictate that an earthenware vessel can only contract impurity through its interior airspace (me'aviro) and never from its outer surface (miggabbo). Conversely, other types of vessels cannot contract impurity from their airspace but do contract it from their outer surface. The Mishna sets forth an additional rule of contrasting halakhic status: a state that renders a wooden vessel ritually pure leaves a metal vessel impure, and vice versa. A braita clarifies that unfinished wooden vessels are susceptible to impurity while flat wooden vessels are pure. For metal, the law is reversed: unfinished metal vessels are pure while flat metal vessels are susceptible to impurity. The braita explains what is defined as an unfinished vessel in this context. The Gemara presents a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Nachman regarding the underlying reason for the distinction between unfinished wood vessels and unfinished metal vessels - whether it is because these vessels are made for honor, or because they are expensive and therefore their crafting is not considered complete as long as any detail is missing. There is a practical ramification between these two opinions regarding vessels made of bone. The scriptural source establishing that bone vessels can contract ritual impurity is subsequently derived. The Mishna introduces contrasting rules regarding the tithing obligations of bitter and sweet almonds. A braita explains that bitter almonds are subject to tithing only when they are young and small, since they are unfit for consumption when they are mature and large, whereas sweet almonds are subject to tithing only when they are large. Rabbi Yishmael b'Rabbi Yosi quotes an opinion that either both stages are completely exempt or both are completely obligated. The Gemara explains the opinion that both are obligated by explaining that mature bitter almonds can be sweetened by roasting them over a fire. The Mishna outlines the changing legal status of grape-seed water (temed). Prior to fermentation, it does not possess the status of wine and cannot be purchased using second tithe funds, yet it disqualifies a mikveh if three logs of it fall inside a mikveh that does not have the requisite amount of water (forty se'ah). Once it ferments, its status changes to wine, meaning it can be purchased with second tithe funds and no longer disqualifies a mikveh. The Mishna also introduces a contrasting rule regarding brothers who are partners in an estate or partners after already dividing their estate, balancing their obligations toward the Temple half-shekel surcharge (kalbon) against their obligations toward the cattle tithe. The Gemara analyzes which tanna this Mishna follows regarding the status of temed, since on the surface, it does not appear to align with any opinion appearing in the Mishna in Masechet Maasrot (Chapter 5, Mishna 6).

Study Guide Zeiri rules that if an animal or bird's neck bone is broken and the majority of the surrounding flesh is severed, it immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if it is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if this state constitutes a neveila, how can melika be validly performed on a sacrificial bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? Rava answers that in melika, the kohen breaks the neck bone and spinal column without simultaneously severing the majority of the surrounding flesh. Rabbi Ami answers the challenge in the same manner, and his and Rava's answers are supported by a braita. The braita notes that in a bird burnt offering (olat ha'of), either the majority of both simanim or both simanim in their entirety must be cut. Because the Sages and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon dispute whether both simanim must be completely severed or if cutting the majority suffices, the Gemara suggests two interpretations to align the braita with one or both of these respective opinions. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel applies Zeiri's principle to humans, ruling that if a person's backbone and the majority of the surrounding flesh are severed, they immediately impart ritual impurity in a tent (tumat ohel) like a corpse, even if the body is still convulsing. Rabbi Yochanan introduces an additional case where the legal moment of death is determined immediately despite lingering convulsions. A parallel case regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures) is brought from a Mishna, prompting a debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Ami over whether "cutting off the head" means a complete detachment or a partial one, similar to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon concerning a bird burnt offering. The Gemara introduces a braita to show the source for the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon in a bird burnt offering. The braita presents three distinct opinions on the biblical term "k'mishpat"  regarding a bird burnt offering. The Sages debate whether this term compares it to an animal sin offering or a bird sin offering, detailing the exact procedural laws they share. This very debate serves as the foundation for the conflicting views of the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon regarding whether the two simanim must be severed completely.

Study Guide Zeiri rules that if an animal or bird's neck bone is broken and the majority of the surrounding flesh is severed, it immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if it is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if this state constitutes a neveila, how can melika be validly performed on a sacrificial bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? Rava answers that in melika, the kohen breaks the neck bone and spinal column without simultaneously severing the majority of the surrounding flesh. Rabbi Ami answers the challenge in the same manner, and his and Rava's answers are supported by a braita. The braita notes that in a bird burnt offering (olat ha'of), either the majority of both simanim or both simanim in their entirety must be cut. Because the Sages and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon dispute whether both simanim must be completely severed or if cutting the majority suffices, the Gemara suggests two interpretations to align the braita with one or both of these respective opinions. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel applies Zeiri's principle to humans, ruling that if a person's backbone and the majority of the surrounding flesh are severed, they immediately impart ritual impurity in a tent (tumat ohel) like a corpse, even if the body is still convulsing. Rabbi Yochanan introduces an additional case where the legal moment of death is determined immediately despite lingering convulsions. A parallel case regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures) is brought from a Mishna, prompting a debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Ami over whether "cutting off the head" means a complete detachment or a partial one, similar to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon concerning a bird burnt offering. The Gemara introduces a braita to show the source for the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon in a bird burnt offering. The braita presents three distinct opinions on the biblical term "k'mishpat"  regarding a bird burnt offering. The Sages debate whether this term compares it to an animal sin offering or a bird sin offering, detailing the exact procedural laws they share. This very debate serves as the foundation for the conflicting views of the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon regarding whether the two simanim must be severed completely.

Slaughterers who failed to show their knives to a Chacham (Sage) for inspection were penalized, though the severity of the penalty differed depending on whether the knife was subsequently found to be smooth or notched. The teeth of a harvest sickle incline in one direction; therefore, if one used it to slaughter in the direction that cuts cleanly without tearing, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute its validity. However, Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that both agree the slaughter is invalid, and their actual debate is whether the animal is classified as a neveila (a carcass, which imparts impurity) or a treifa. The windpipe features a large ring at the top that encircles it entirely, unlike the lower rings which are C-shaped and do not completely cover it. The Mishna presents two opinions regarding the highest anatomical point where slaughter can be performed without being disqualified by hagrama (slanting outside the designated slaughter area). The Tanna Kama rules that the large ring must be completely severed while leaving a width of a thread of the top ring untouched. Conversely, Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda rules that as long as the majority of the windpipe is cut in the valid area, the slaughter is kosher, even if the slaughterer subsequently cuts above it into the area known as "the hat" (kova) - since the act was legally complete once the majority was cut. Rav and Shmuel explain that Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda also forbade slaughtering directly on the smaller rings, permitting it only between them since they do not encircle the entire windpipe. However, after challenging this with a contradictory braita where Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda explicitly permits slaughtering on the smaller rings, the Gemara concludes that Rav and Shmuel agreed with his view regarding the large ring but ruled against his lenient stance on the smaller rings. When Rabbi Zeira moved from Babylonia to Israel and permitted slaughtering on these rings, the Sages questioned why he did not maintain the stringencies of Rav and Shmuel, given the halakhic rule that a traveler must observe the stringencies of both their place of origin and their destination. Two resolutions are suggested, each presenting different exceptions to the rules of local custom. Ultimately, the Gemara notes that customs varied across different regions of Babylonia, and not all areas adopted this stringency. There is a dispute between Rav Papi and Rav Papa regarding the exact anatomical boundary for the highest point of the windpipe where shechita remains valid.

Slaughterers who failed to show their knives to a Chacham (Sage) for inspection were penalized, though the severity of the penalty differed depending on whether the knife was subsequently found to be smooth or notched. The teeth of a harvest sickle incline in one direction; therefore, if one used it to slaughter in the direction that cuts cleanly without tearing, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute its validity. However, Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that both agree the slaughter is invalid, and their actual debate is whether the animal is classified as a neveila (a carcass, which imparts impurity) or a treifa. The windpipe features a large ring at the top that encircles it entirely, unlike the lower rings which are C-shaped and do not completely cover it. The Mishna presents two opinions regarding the highest anatomical point where slaughter can be performed without being disqualified by hagrama (slanting outside the designated slaughter area). The Tanna Kama rules that the large ring must be completely severed while leaving a width of a thread of the top ring untouched. Conversely, Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda rules that as long as the majority of the windpipe is cut in the valid area, the slaughter is kosher, even if the slaughterer subsequently cuts above it into the area known as "the hat" (kova) - since the act was legally complete once the majority was cut. Rav and Shmuel explain that Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda also forbade slaughtering directly on the smaller rings, permitting it only between them since they do not encircle the entire windpipe. However, after challenging this with a contradictory braita where Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda explicitly permits slaughtering on the smaller rings, the Gemara concludes that Rav and Shmuel agreed with his view regarding the large ring but ruled against his lenient stance on the smaller rings. When Rabbi Zeira moved from Babylonia to Israel and permitted slaughtering on these rings, the Sages questioned why he did not maintain the stringencies of Rav and Shmuel, given the halakhic rule that a traveler must observe the stringencies of both their place of origin and their destination. Two resolutions are suggested, each presenting different exceptions to the rules of local custom. Ultimately, the Gemara notes that customs varied across different regions of Babylonia, and not all areas adopted this stringency. There is a dispute between Rav Papi and Rav Papa regarding the exact anatomical boundary for the highest point of the windpipe where shechita remains valid.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba recounts a discussion between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the legal weight of a minor's intent. In the first version, the question is whether a minor's thoughts alone are significant. Rabbi Ami argues it is obvious they are not, citing a Mishna in Kelim 17:15. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that the doubt applies when a minor's action reasonably demonstrates their intent, but not completely - such as moving an animal to the northern part of the Temple courtyard, the specific area for slaughtering burnt offerings. Rabbi Ami challenges this, noting that Rabbi Yochanan himself previously ruled in the context of ritual impurity that a minor's action is significant when the minor's intent is reasonably clear from the action. Rabbi Yochanan responds that his question was whether such actions are valid by Torah law or only by Rabbinic decree; the matter remains unresolved. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers a different version of the discussion, focusing on whether a minor's actions are effective. This version concludes with Rabbi Yochanan distinguishing between three categories: actions with clear intent, actions with reasonably clear, but not completely clear intent, and intent without any accompanying action. Shmuel asks Rav Huna for the biblical source disqualifying sacrifices that were slaughtered without the specific intent to perform a slaughter (mitasek). The Mishna rules that meat slaughtered by a non-Jew is considered neveila (a carcass) and imparts impurity by carrying (masa). Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Ami draw different inferences from this. Rabbi Yochanan suggests the Mishna follows the Sages (against Rabbi Eliezer) in assuming that gentiles do not automatically slaughter for idolatrous purposes; if they did, the meat would be forbidden even for benefit. Rabbi Ami infers that the slaughter of a heretic (min), one who is a devout idol worshipped is strictly forbidden for any benefit, a position supported by a braita. The Gemara explains that we generally do not fear a gentile will slaughter for idolatry because they are typically not devout in their practice. However, a min is considered deeply dedicated to their worship, and their slaughter is presumed to be for an idol. Rav Nachman distinguishes between Jewish heretics and gentile heretics, showing more leniency toward the latter, though the Gemara clarifies this applies specifically to accepting their sacrifices. The shechita of one who slaughters in the dark or a blind person is accepted.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba recounts a discussion between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the legal weight of a minor's intent. In the first version, the question is whether a minor's thoughts alone are significant. Rabbi Ami argues it is obvious they are not, citing a Mishna in Kelim 17:15. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that the doubt applies when a minor's action reasonably demonstrates their intent, but not completely - such as moving an animal to the northern part of the Temple courtyard, the specific area for slaughtering burnt offerings. Rabbi Ami challenges this, noting that Rabbi Yochanan himself previously ruled in the context of ritual impurity that a minor's action is significant when the minor's intent is reasonably clear from the action. Rabbi Yochanan responds that his question was whether such actions are valid by Torah law or only by Rabbinic decree; the matter remains unresolved. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers a different version of the discussion, focusing on whether a minor's actions are effective. This version concludes with Rabbi Yochanan distinguishing between three categories: actions with clear intent, actions with reasonably clear, but not completely clear intent, and intent without any accompanying action. Shmuel asks Rav Huna for the biblical source disqualifying sacrifices that were slaughtered without the specific intent to perform a slaughter (mitasek). The Mishna rules that meat slaughtered by a non-Jew is considered neveila (a carcass) and imparts impurity by carrying (masa). Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Ami draw different inferences from this. Rabbi Yochanan suggests the Mishna follows the Sages (against Rabbi Eliezer) in assuming that gentiles do not automatically slaughter for idolatrous purposes; if they did, the meat would be forbidden even for benefit. Rabbi Ami infers that the slaughter of a heretic (min), one who is a devout idol worshipped is strictly forbidden for any benefit, a position supported by a braita. The Gemara explains that we generally do not fear a gentile will slaughter for idolatry because they are typically not devout in their practice. However, a min is considered deeply dedicated to their worship, and their slaughter is presumed to be for an idol. Rav Nachman distinguishes between Jewish heretics and gentile heretics, showing more leniency toward the latter, though the Gemara clarifies this applies specifically to accepting their sacrifices. The shechita of one who slaughters in the dark or a blind person is accepted.

When Rabbi Zeira heard that Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Asi were eating meat slaughtered by a Cuti, he assumed they must have been aware of a prior decree permitting it. He reasoned that had it been forbidden, they would have inadvertently consumed non-kosher meat - a mistake God would not allow to befall the righteous. This principle is derived from the story where God protected the animal of a righteous person from sin; how much more so would He protect the righteous individuals themselves! From this incident, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Zeira eventually conceded to Rabbi Yaakov that the shechita of a Cuti had been forbidden by the decree of Rabban Gamliel, even if a Jew was present to supervise the process. The Gemara explains that although Rabban Gamliel and his court originally decreed that the shechita of Cutim was unacceptable, the restriction expanded over time. A story is told of Rabbi Meir, who forbade their wine after discovering that a minority of the Cutim worshipped idols. Later, a subsequent generation of Amoraim in Israel - Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi - were informed that the Cutim had ceased to be "Torah worshippers" entirely. Consequently, they accorded them the status of gentiles regarding all halakhic matters. The Gemara clarifies that while their shechita and wine had been forbidden by Rabbi Meir and Rabban Gamliel previously, the ruling was only universally accepted and finalized in the time of Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi. The Gemara presents two other instances where the concept of God protecting the righteous from accidental transgression is applied. The first involves Rabbi Zeira regarding the laws of demai (produce from an am haaretz which tithes may not have been separated). When produce purchased from an am haaretz is mixed with other ingredients, its status is debated. Seeing Rav Asi eating such a mixture without tithing it, Rabbi Zeira inferred that it must be permitted, as God would not allow a righteous person to eat untithed food. The Gemara challenges this conclusion based on a braita that appears to forbid such mixtures. However, the Gemara resolves this in two possible ways by explaining that the case in the braita involved a unique type of "mixture." While the initial difficulty was raised from the second half of the braita, the Gemara also questions the first part, which permits returning food to a neighbor who is an am haaretz without re-tithing it (as we do not suspect the neighbor of swapping the food). Although three other Tannaitic sources suggest we should fear a swap, the Gemara distinguishes each case as unique. A third situation is mentioned where Rabbi Zeira applied the principle of divine protection. It concerns Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the footsteps of Rabbi Meir permitting produce in Beit Shean to be eaten without tithing, on the basis that Beit Shean was not considered to be within the halakhic borders of the Land of Israel.

When Rabbi Zeira heard that Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Asi were eating meat slaughtered by a Cuti, he assumed they must have been aware of a prior decree permitting it. He reasoned that had it been forbidden, they would have inadvertently consumed non-kosher meat - a mistake God would not allow to befall the righteous. This principle is derived from the story where God protected the animal of a righteous person from sin; how much more so would He protect the righteous individuals themselves! From this incident, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Zeira eventually conceded to Rabbi Yaakov that the shechita of a Cuti had been forbidden by the decree of Rabban Gamliel, even if a Jew was present to supervise the process. The Gemara explains that although Rabban Gamliel and his court originally decreed that the shechita of Cutim was unacceptable, the restriction expanded over time. A story is told of Rabbi Meir, who forbade their wine after discovering that a minority of the Cutim worshipped idols. Later, a subsequent generation of Amoraim in Israel - Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi - were informed that the Cutim had ceased to be "Torah worshippers" entirely. Consequently, they accorded them the status of gentiles regarding all halakhic matters. The Gemara clarifies that while their shechita and wine had been forbidden by Rabbi Meir and Rabban Gamliel previously, the ruling was only universally accepted and finalized in the time of Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi. The Gemara presents two other instances where the concept of God protecting the righteous from accidental transgression is applied. The first involves Rabbi Zeira regarding the laws of demai (produce from an am haaretz which tithes may not have been separated). When produce purchased from an am haaretz is mixed with other ingredients, its status is debated. Seeing Rav Asi eating such a mixture without tithing it, Rabbi Zeira inferred that it must be permitted, as God would not allow a righteous person to eat untithed food. The Gemara challenges this conclusion based on a braita that appears to forbid such mixtures. However, the Gemara resolves this in two possible ways by explaining that the case in the braita involved a unique type of "mixture." While the initial difficulty was raised from the second half of the braita, the Gemara also questions the first part, which permits returning food to a neighbor who is an am haaretz without re-tithing it (as we do not suspect the neighbor of swapping the food). Although three other Tannaitic sources suggest we should fear a swap, the Gemara distinguishes each case as unique. A third situation is mentioned where Rabbi Zeira applied the principle of divine protection. It concerns Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the footsteps of Rabbi Meir permitting produce in Beit Shean to be eaten without tithing, on the basis that Beit Shean was not considered to be within the halakhic borders of the Land of Israel.

There is a dispute regarding a case where someone vowed to bring a mincha of barley. The Tana Kama says that because such a thing does not exist, we obligate them to bring a mincha of wheat. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that what was said is nothing, as there is no voluntary mincha of barley. Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan attempt to understand the Tana Kama's position. For Chizkiya, it is based on the view of Beit Shammai who hold that we seize the first expression - the statement "I take upon myself a mincha" already creates an obligation to bring a wheat offering, and what one said afterward (where perhaps it was a retraction) is not accepted at all because it is too late. According to Rabbi Yochanan, who establishes an ukimta for the Mishna, it refers to a case where, when told there is no mincha of barley, the person says that they did not know, and had they known, they would have vowed wheat. There is another dispute in our Mishna between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan that appears to present opinions opposite to what they said previously, but the Gemara explains the matter. Chizkiya retracted and agreed with Rabbi Yochanan, while Rabbi Yochanan challenged his retraction and explained how Chizkiya could have explained the words of the Mishna according to his original logic. Zeiri limits the words of the Mishna to a case where one said "I take upon myself a mincha...", but if one did not say "mincha" but rather "I take upon myself barley" or "I take upon myself a barley mincha," we do not apply the principle of seizing the first expression. Rava challenges Rav Nachman regarding Zeiri's words based on our Mishna, but Rav Nachman resolves his challenges. One who volunteers to bring more than sixty issaron must bring sixty in one vessel and the remainder in another vessel. Why is sixty established as the maximum amount for a single vessel? The Tana Kama explains this based on the day that has the most libations in the Temple - the first day of Sukkot that falls on Shabbat, when they bring libations in the amount of sixty-one issaron. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says it is based on what can be mixed in one vessel; more than sixty is impossible. The Sages challenge him as to why specifically this number was chosen. Rabbi Shimon responds that this is the case with all measurements established by the Sages. The Gemara challenges Rabbi Shimon, noting that a mincha is valid even if it was not actually mixed, so why is the potential for mixing so important? They answer based on the words of Rabbi Zeira, that it must be eligible for mixing (anything eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything not eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it).

There is a dispute regarding a case where someone vowed to bring a mincha of barley. The Tana Kama says that because such a thing does not exist, we obligate them to bring a mincha of wheat. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that what was said is nothing, as there is no voluntary mincha of barley. Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan attempt to understand the Tana Kama's position. For Chizkiya, it is based on the view of Beit Shammai who hold that we seize the first expression - the statement "I take upon myself a mincha" already creates an obligation to bring a wheat offering, and what one said afterward (where perhaps it was a retraction) is not accepted at all because it is too late. According to Rabbi Yochanan, who establishes an ukimta for the Mishna, it refers to a case where, when told there is no mincha of barley, the person says that they did not know, and had they known, they would have vowed wheat. There is another dispute in our Mishna between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan that appears to present opinions opposite to what they said previously, but the Gemara explains the matter. Chizkiya retracted and agreed with Rabbi Yochanan, while Rabbi Yochanan challenged his retraction and explained how Chizkiya could have explained the words of the Mishna according to his original logic. Zeiri limits the words of the Mishna to a case where one said "I take upon myself a mincha...", but if one did not say "mincha" but rather "I take upon myself barley" or "I take upon myself a barley mincha," we do not apply the principle of seizing the first expression. Rava challenges Rav Nachman regarding Zeiri's words based on our Mishna, but Rav Nachman resolves his challenges. One who volunteers to bring more than sixty issaron must bring sixty in one vessel and the remainder in another vessel. Why is sixty established as the maximum amount for a single vessel? The Tana Kama explains this based on the day that has the most libations in the Temple - the first day of Sukkot that falls on Shabbat, when they bring libations in the amount of sixty-one issaron. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says it is based on what can be mixed in one vessel; more than sixty is impossible. The Sages challenge him as to why specifically this number was chosen. Rabbi Shimon responds that this is the case with all measurements established by the Sages. The Gemara challenges Rabbi Shimon, noting that a mincha is valid even if it was not actually mixed, so why is the potential for mixing so important? They answer based on the words of Rabbi Zeira, that it must be eligible for mixing (anything eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything not eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it).

The Mishna states that when Yom Kippur fell on a Friday, preventing the meat from being cooked, the Babylonians would eat the goat sin offering raw. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that these people were actually Alexandrians, but they were called Babylonians due to a general dislike of the Babylonians. The Mishna discusses various errors that can occur while setting up the showbread and the frankincense, such as placing one or both on the wrong day or burning the frankincense at the incorrect time. For each scenario, the text explores the resulting legal status and the solution, if there is one. A Mishna from Tractate Yoma mentions a case where the Tamid offering was brought too early and had to be burned because it was disqualified. A braita applies this same rule to a mincha offering where the kemitza was taken at night. This raises a question: if sanctified vessels do not normally sanctify their contents at night when offerings cannot be brought, why is the mincha disqualified? To resolve this, it is explained that the offering is sanctified enough to be disqualified even if it is not sanctified for the altar. However, Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from our Mishna, noting that when the bread is placed too early, it is not sanctified enough to be disqualified and can remain on the table for extra days. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between an act performed the night before it is due and an act performed several days early. Yet, this distinction still faces issues with the Mishna's case, as the bread should theoretically become sanctified on Friday night and be disqualified by the next Shabbat morning. Ultimately, two resolutions are offered to address this difficulty. The Mishna outlines how many days after baking the two loaves and the showbread may be eaten. Different scenarios are presented based on whether festivals fall before or after Shabbat, since these loaves cannot typically be baked on Shabbat or a festival. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this, permitting the baking on a festival though not on Shabbat. Items whose value is sanctified can be redeemed whether they are ritually pure or impure. However, items sanctified within a sacred vessel possess inherent sanctity and cannot be redeemed even if they become impure. The only exception to this rule is a blemished animal, which retains the possibility of being redeemed despite its status.

The Mishna states that when Yom Kippur fell on a Friday, preventing the meat from being cooked, the Babylonians would eat the goat sin offering raw. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that these people were actually Alexandrians, but they were called Babylonians due to a general dislike of the Babylonians. The Mishna discusses various errors that can occur while setting up the showbread and the frankincense, such as placing one or both on the wrong day or burning the frankincense at the incorrect time. For each scenario, the text explores the resulting legal status and the solution, if there is one. A Mishna from Tractate Yoma mentions a case where the Tamid offering was brought too early and had to be burned because it was disqualified. A braita applies this same rule to a mincha offering where the kemitza was taken at night. This raises a question: if sanctified vessels do not normally sanctify their contents at night when offerings cannot be brought, why is the mincha disqualified? To resolve this, it is explained that the offering is sanctified enough to be disqualified even if it is not sanctified for the altar. However, Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from our Mishna, noting that when the bread is placed too early, it is not sanctified enough to be disqualified and can remain on the table for extra days. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between an act performed the night before it is due and an act performed several days early. Yet, this distinction still faces issues with the Mishna's case, as the bread should theoretically become sanctified on Friday night and be disqualified by the next Shabbat morning. Ultimately, two resolutions are offered to address this difficulty. The Mishna outlines how many days after baking the two loaves and the showbread may be eaten. Different scenarios are presented based on whether festivals fall before or after Shabbat, since these loaves cannot typically be baked on Shabbat or a festival. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this, permitting the baking on a festival though not on Shabbat. Items whose value is sanctified can be redeemed whether they are ritually pure or impure. However, items sanctified within a sacred vessel possess inherent sanctity and cannot be redeemed even if they become impure. The only exception to this rule is a blemished animal, which retains the possibility of being redeemed despite its status.

The Gemara raises a difficulty regarding the opinion that the Table (Shulchan) was positioned in an east-west orientation. It resolves this by explaining that the Table crafted by Moses was not placed centrally between the other rows of tables, but rather stood on the western side, close to the Parochet, not in between the others. Regarding the ten Tables and ten Menoras added by King Solomon, there is a Tannaic dispute: were they purely decorative - with only the one from Moshe's time being used for the service - or were the lamps lit and the bread arranged on all of them? In addition to the main Table, two other tables stood in the Ulam (the Entrance Hall) to serve as transition stations for the showbread. One was made of marble (or silver), where the bread was placed before being brought into the Sanctuary, and the other was made of gold, where the bread was placed upon its removal. This distinction is based on the halakhic principle "ma'alin b'kodesh v'lo moridin" (one ascends in holiness but does not descend). Since the bread had already been on a golden table inside the Sanctuary, it could not be placed on a table of lesser value when being taken out. The Gemara finds support for this concept in the fact that the broken Tablets were placed in the Ark also. This leads to a discussion on the importance of preserving one's Torah learning and the gravity of forgetting it, while emphasizing that one must still honor a Torah scholar who has forgotten his learning due to circumstances beyond his control. The Mishna brings a tannaitic debate about how the bread was replaced each week, based on how each opinion understands the word "tamid" (continually) regarding the showbread. This triggers a fundamental debate regarding the mitzvah of Torah study and the verse, "This book of the Torah shall not depart (lo yamush) from your mouth." While some view this as a mandate to toil in Torah at every available moment, Rabbi Yochanan suggests that even a person who recites the Shema in the morning and evening has fulfilled "lo yamush." For such an individual, it is considered as if they had occupied themselves with Torah day and night.

The Gemara raises a difficulty regarding the opinion that the Table (Shulchan) was positioned in an east-west orientation. It resolves this by explaining that the Table crafted by Moses was not placed centrally between the other rows of tables, but rather stood on the western side, close to the Parochet, not in between the others. Regarding the ten Tables and ten Menoras added by King Solomon, there is a Tannaic dispute: were they purely decorative - with only the one from Moshe's time being used for the service - or were the lamps lit and the bread arranged on all of them? In addition to the main Table, two other tables stood in the Ulam (the Entrance Hall) to serve as transition stations for the showbread. One was made of marble (or silver), where the bread was placed before being brought into the Sanctuary, and the other was made of gold, where the bread was placed upon its removal. This distinction is based on the halakhic principle "ma'alin b'kodesh v'lo moridin" (one ascends in holiness but does not descend). Since the bread had already been on a golden table inside the Sanctuary, it could not be placed on a table of lesser value when being taken out. The Gemara finds support for this concept in the fact that the broken Tablets were placed in the Ark also. This leads to a discussion on the importance of preserving one's Torah learning and the gravity of forgetting it, while emphasizing that one must still honor a Torah scholar who has forgotten his learning due to circumstances beyond his control. The Mishna brings a tannaitic debate about how the bread was replaced each week, based on how each opinion understands the word "tamid" (continually) regarding the showbread. This triggers a fundamental debate regarding the mitzvah of Torah study and the verse, "This book of the Torah shall not depart (lo yamush) from your mouth." While some view this as a mandate to toil in Torah at every available moment, Rabbi Yochanan suggests that even a person who recites the Shema in the morning and evening has fulfilled "lo yamush." For such an individual, it is considered as if they had occupied themselves with Torah day and night.

Rabbi Yochanan explains that a "medium-sized cubit" consists of six handbreadths. This terminology implies the existence of a larger cubit. A Mishna in Middot (1:3) is brought to explain that there were two measuring sticks kept in a room at the entrance to the Temple Mount (where a depiction of Shushan the capital was displayed). Both were larger than the medium cubit used by Moshe for the Tabernacle: one was a fingerbreadth longer, and the other was two fingerbreadths longer. The purpose of this was to prevent craftsmen from accidentally misusing consecrated property (Me'ilah). Since they received payment based on exact measurements, if they had erred and made an item slightly too small, they would have personally benefited from the Temple treasury. The shorter one was used for gold and silver, and the longer one for other materials. The verses in Vayikra (24:5-6) describe exactly how many loaves of showbread there were, how many arrangements were on the Table, and how many loaves were in each arrangement. Why were all those descriptions necessary? In what directions did the Ark, Menorah, and Table face in the room, and in which part of the room were they placed?

Rabbi Yochanan explains that a "medium-sized cubit" consists of six handbreadths. This terminology implies the existence of a larger cubit. A Mishna in Middot (1:3) is brought to explain that there were two measuring sticks kept in a room at the entrance to the Temple Mount (where a depiction of Shushan the capital was displayed). Both were larger than the medium cubit used by Moshe for the Tabernacle: one was a fingerbreadth longer, and the other was two fingerbreadths longer. The purpose of this was to prevent craftsmen from accidentally misusing consecrated property (Me'ilah). Since they received payment based on exact measurements, if they had erred and made an item slightly too small, they would have personally benefited from the Temple treasury. The shorter one was used for gold and silver, and the longer one for other materials. The verses in Vayikra (24:5-6) describe exactly how many loaves of showbread there were, how many arrangements were on the Table, and how many loaves were in each arrangement. Why were all those descriptions necessary? In what directions did the Ark, Menorah, and Table face in the room, and in which part of the room were they placed?

Diagram Unlike the showbread (lechem hapanim) and the two loaves (shtei halechem), for which there is a debate about when they are sanctified the minchat chavitin of the Kohen Gadol and regular meal offerings are sanctified the moment they are placed into a service vessel (kli sharet). From that point forward, they are considered holy and can be disqualified by factors such as being left overnight (linah) or leaving the Sanctuary. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding the dimensions of the Table (Shulchan) and the measurements of the individual loaves that made up the showbread. The Mishna explains how the loaves were arranged on the Table according to these two opinions. Rabbi Yochanan calculated the maximum height at which the Table could sanctify the bread, based on the total height of the stacked loaves according to the respective views of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raised several difficulties with his statement but ultimately resolved them. Following this discussion, a dispute arose regarding the frame (misgeret) of the Table—whether it was fixed above the tabletop or beneath it. From there, Rabbi Yochanan linked these different opinions to a question regarding the ritual impurity of a "reversible table" (tavla hamit'pachet). What is clear from his words is that the Table was susceptible to ritual impurity. However, if it was a wooden vessel, a "wooden vessel made to rest in a fixed place" (kli etz ha'asui lenachat) should not be susceptible to impurity. The Gemara resolves this by Reish Lakish's explanation that the Table was moved and lifted to be shown to the festival pilgrims, thus categorizing it as a mobile vessel.

Diagram Unlike the showbread (lechem hapanim) and the two loaves (shtei halechem), for which there is a debate about when they are sanctified the minchat chavitin of the Kohen Gadol and regular meal offerings are sanctified the moment they are placed into a service vessel (kli sharet). From that point forward, they are considered holy and can be disqualified by factors such as being left overnight (linah) or leaving the Sanctuary. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding the dimensions of the Table (Shulchan) and the measurements of the individual loaves that made up the showbread. The Mishna explains how the loaves were arranged on the Table according to these two opinions. Rabbi Yochanan calculated the maximum height at which the Table could sanctify the bread, based on the total height of the stacked loaves according to the respective views of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raised several difficulties with his statement but ultimately resolved them. Following this discussion, a dispute arose regarding the frame (misgeret) of the Table—whether it was fixed above the tabletop or beneath it. From there, Rabbi Yochanan linked these different opinions to a question regarding the ritual impurity of a "reversible table" (tavla hamit'pachet). What is clear from his words is that the Table was susceptible to ritual impurity. However, if it was a wooden vessel, a "wooden vessel made to rest in a fixed place" (kli etz ha'asui lenachat) should not be susceptible to impurity. The Gemara resolves this by Reish Lakish's explanation that the Table was moved and lifted to be shown to the festival pilgrims, thus categorizing it as a mobile vessel.

Study Guide Did the lechem hapanim become disqualified in the desert whenever the Tabernacle was dismantled for travel? Furthermore, does this status depend on whether the bread remained on the Table (Shulchan) or had already been removed? There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, which the Gemara interprets in three ways. In the final explanation, Ravin explains that there is actually no disagreement; rather, each Sage was referring to a different scenario - one discussed bread still on the Table, while the other addressed bread that had been removed. The Mishna presents a three-way Tannaitic debate regarding the preparation of the loaves: Can the kneading, shaping, and baking be performed outside the Temple courtyard, or must they occur within? Additionally, could these tasks be performed on Shabbat? This debate centers on the moment the loaves become sanctified. The three positions - held by the Tana Kamma, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon - differ on the catalyst for sanctification: When the flour is first placed into a sacred vessel. When the bread is baked in the oven. When the loaves are formally arranged on the Table. A challenge is raised against the Tanna Kamma's position that remains unresolved. Rabbi Abbahu attempts to derive the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon from a verse, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara explains that their positions are rooted in the specific traditions they each received.

Study Guide Did the lechem hapanim become disqualified in the desert whenever the Tabernacle was dismantled for travel? Furthermore, does this status depend on whether the bread remained on the Table (Shulchan) or had already been removed? There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, which the Gemara interprets in three ways. In the final explanation, Ravin explains that there is actually no disagreement; rather, each Sage was referring to a different scenario - one discussed bread still on the Table, while the other addressed bread that had been removed. The Mishna presents a three-way Tannaitic debate regarding the preparation of the loaves: Can the kneading, shaping, and baking be performed outside the Temple courtyard, or must they occur within? Additionally, could these tasks be performed on Shabbat? This debate centers on the moment the loaves become sanctified. The three positions - held by the Tana Kamma, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon - differ on the catalyst for sanctification: When the flour is first placed into a sacred vessel. When the bread is baked in the oven. When the loaves are formally arranged on the Table. A challenge is raised against the Tanna Kamma's position that remains unresolved. Rabbi Abbahu attempts to derive the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon from a verse, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara explains that their positions are rooted in the specific traditions they each received.

Pictures The Mishna compares the details regarding the laws of semicha (leaning) and tenufa (waving). Semicha has a stringency in that all owners of the sacrifice are obligated to perform it, while the same does not hold true for tenufa. However, waving applies to both individual and communal sacrifices, to animals that are both alive and slaughtered, and to both animals and non-living items, such as breads. These do not apply to semicha, which is only performed on live animals and primarily for individual sacrifices. The Gemara brings a scriptural source for the ruling that semicha is obligatory for all owners of the sacrifice, while only one person performs tenufa on behalf of the others. A difficulty is raised against the fact that semicha is limited only to live animals based on a Mishna in Tamid 33b, which describes a process of semicha performed by a Kohen Gadol on a slaughtered animal. However, Abaye explains that this specific semicha is performed merely out of respect for the Kohen Gadol and is not a formal requirement of the sacrificial service. The loaves of the lechem hapanim (showbread) and the loaves of the shtei halechem (two loaves) were kneaded separately. The shtei halechem were baked separately, while the lechem hapanim - twelve in total - were baked two at a time. The Gemara brings the scriptural source for these details. What shape were the lechem hapanim? Rabbi Chanina and Rabbi Yochanan each describe a different shape: either like an "open box" or like a "rocking boat." The Gemara analyzes these different opinions based on other known details regarding the various components of the table (shulchan) upon which the bread sat.

Pictures The Mishna compares the details regarding the laws of semicha (leaning) and tenufa (waving). Semicha has a stringency in that all owners of the sacrifice are obligated to perform it, while the same does not hold true for tenufa. However, waving applies to both individual and communal sacrifices, to animals that are both alive and slaughtered, and to both animals and non-living items, such as breads. These do not apply to semicha, which is only performed on live animals and primarily for individual sacrifices. The Gemara brings a scriptural source for the ruling that semicha is obligatory for all owners of the sacrifice, while only one person performs tenufa on behalf of the others. A difficulty is raised against the fact that semicha is limited only to live animals based on a Mishna in Tamid 33b, which describes a process of semicha performed by a Kohen Gadol on a slaughtered animal. However, Abaye explains that this specific semicha is performed merely out of respect for the Kohen Gadol and is not a formal requirement of the sacrificial service. The loaves of the lechem hapanim (showbread) and the loaves of the shtei halechem (two loaves) were kneaded separately. The shtei halechem were baked separately, while the lechem hapanim - twelve in total - were baked two at a time. The Gemara brings the scriptural source for these details. What shape were the lechem hapanim? Rabbi Chanina and Rabbi Yochanan each describe a different shape: either like an "open box" or like a "rocking boat." The Gemara analyzes these different opinions based on other known details regarding the various components of the table (shulchan) upon which the bread sat.

The verse in Vayikra 2:12 regarding the unique case where one can bring leaven and honey to the Temple on Shavuot uses the phrase "As an offering of the first produce you can offer them." Rabbi Elazar derived that the word "them" is exclusionary. It means that only regarding the two loaves and the bikkurim the ramp of the altar is considered like the altar (as derived from the words following that phrase). Items that came from an item that was burned on the altar are forbidden to be burned on the altar, but can be brought onto the ramp. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with him and forbids even those items to be brought on the ramp. He must have a different drasha on the word "them." To explain his reading of the verse, the Gemara quotes a braita which derives from "them" that even the community cannot bring two loaves as a voluntary sacrifice. The Gemara brings a contradictory braita that seems to say that the two loaves can be brought as a voluntary offering, but this understanding is ultimately rejected. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Chisda whether the words "you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire" (Vayikra 2:11) only excludes items from which part of it was burned on the altar, or does it exclude any item that is considered a korban (offering) but was not meant to be burned on the altar, such as a bird sin offering or the oil of the leper. Rav Chisda responded that this is a tannaitic debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva. A drasha on the words "because all leaven and all honey" teaches that one is liable for offering even a small amount and even in a mixture. Rava and Abaye disagree about what is meant by a "small amount." Abaye says it is half an olive-bulk, while Rava holds it is half a handful. Their difference of opinion derives from whether they hold a handful needs to be at least the size of two olives and is it only considered a halakhically significant burning on the altar if the item burned is the size of an olive (Rava), or if the handful can be less than two olives and burning less than one olive is considered halakhically significant (Abaye). If one offered leavened dough and honey together on the altar, how many sets of lashes (if any) would one receive? Rava holds that one would receive four sets - one for leaven, one for honey, one for a mixture with leaven, and one for a mixture with honey. Abaye explains that this is a "lav shebikhlalot" - a negative prohibition including many prohibitions - and one does not receive lashes for this type of negative prohibition. Some explain Abaye to be saying that there would be no sets of lashes for this action, while others explain that one would receive lashes for the leaven and the honey but not for the mixture.

The verse in Vayikra 2:12 regarding the unique case where one can bring leaven and honey to the Temple on Shavuot uses the phrase "As an offering of the first produce you can offer them." Rabbi Elazar derived that the word "them" is exclusionary. It means that only regarding the two loaves and the bikkurim the ramp of the altar is considered like the altar (as derived from the words following that phrase). Items that came from an item that was burned on the altar are forbidden to be burned on the altar, but can be brought onto the ramp. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with him and forbids even those items to be brought on the ramp. He must have a different drasha on the word "them." To explain his reading of the verse, the Gemara quotes a braita which derives from "them" that even the community cannot bring two loaves as a voluntary sacrifice. The Gemara brings a contradictory braita that seems to say that the two loaves can be brought as a voluntary offering, but this understanding is ultimately rejected. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Chisda whether the words "you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire" (Vayikra 2:11) only excludes items from which part of it was burned on the altar, or does it exclude any item that is considered a korban (offering) but was not meant to be burned on the altar, such as a bird sin offering or the oil of the leper. Rav Chisda responded that this is a tannaitic debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva. A drasha on the words "because all leaven and all honey" teaches that one is liable for offering even a small amount and even in a mixture. Rava and Abaye disagree about what is meant by a "small amount." Abaye says it is half an olive-bulk, while Rava holds it is half a handful. Their difference of opinion derives from whether they hold a handful needs to be at least the size of two olives and is it only considered a halakhically significant burning on the altar if the item burned is the size of an olive (Rava), or if the handful can be less than two olives and burning less than one olive is considered halakhically significant (Abaye). If one offered leavened dough and honey together on the altar, how many sets of lashes (if any) would one receive? Rava holds that one would receive four sets - one for leaven, one for honey, one for a mixture with leaven, and one for a mixture with honey. Abaye explains that this is a "lav shebikhlalot" - a negative prohibition including many prohibitions - and one does not receive lashes for this type of negative prohibition. Some explain Abaye to be saying that there would be no sets of lashes for this action, while others explain that one would receive lashes for the leaven and the honey but not for the mixture.

Rabbi Ami rules that one is liable for placing a leavening agent onto a meal offering dough and leaving it to leaven on its own, just as one is liable on Shabbat for an act of cooking in the same manner. The Gemara questions this, noting Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that on Shabbat, one who places meat on coals is generally only liable if they actively turn the meat. Rava explains that Rabbi Ami's comparison means one is liable for the result even without active intervention, provided the leavening reaches a certain minimum level. The Gemara delves into Rabbi Yochanan's statement regarding turning the meat and establishes the case as one where the meat would not cook on both sides to the minimum level of ben Drosai (1/3 cooked) if not turned. Rava adds that if a portion the size of a fig-bulk were cooked fully on one side, in one place, one would be liable. A Mishna regarding building on Shabbat is brought as a difficulty for Rava's statement, but the challenge is ultimately rejected. Some have a version where Rava said that even if not in one place, and the Mishna is brought to support, but the support is rejected. A braita derives from Vayikra 2:11 that the leavening prohibition applies to the entire mincha, not just the kometz burned on the altar. However, it also derives that this applies only to a valid offering, not a disqualified one. This leads to two unresolved inquiries. Rav Papa asks: if one leavened a dough, took it outside the Temple courtyard, and then leavened it further, is there liability for the second stage? Or, is removing it not considered a disqualification since it was already leavened and invalid? Rav Meri asks if one is liable for leavening an offering already on top of the altar, or if the act of "bringing" is considered complete at that point. The Gemara discusses which additional offerings are included in the prohibition. According to a corrected version, Rabbi Yosi haGelili includes the showbread, while Rabbi Akiva includes the mincha libation accompanying sacrifices. This dispute hinges on whether dry-measure vessels possess the inherent sanctity to disqualify an offering if it leavens within them. This is linked to a debate between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan regarding the sanctification of liquid versus dry-measure vessels in the Temple. The Torah prohibits offering leaven or honey as a fire-offering, and Vayikra 2:11 further teaches that leftovers of various offerings cannot be offered on the altar if a portion has already been burned. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree on whether one is liable for offering these prohibited substances on the ramp (kevesh) of the altar.

Rabbi Ami rules that one is liable for placing a leavening agent onto a meal offering dough and leaving it to leaven on its own, just as one is liable on Shabbat for an act of cooking in the same manner. The Gemara questions this, noting Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that on Shabbat, one who places meat on coals is generally only liable if they actively turn the meat. Rava explains that Rabbi Ami's comparison means one is liable for the result even without active intervention, provided the leavening reaches a certain minimum level. The Gemara delves into Rabbi Yochanan's statement regarding turning the meat and establishes the case as one where the meat would not cook on both sides to the minimum level of ben Drosai (1/3 cooked) if not turned. Rava adds that if a portion the size of a fig-bulk were cooked fully on one side, in one place, one would be liable. A Mishna regarding building on Shabbat is brought as a difficulty for Rava's statement, but the challenge is ultimately rejected. Some have a version where Rava said that even if not in one place, and the Mishna is brought to support, but the support is rejected. A braita derives from Vayikra 2:11 that the leavening prohibition applies to the entire mincha, not just the kometz burned on the altar. However, it also derives that this applies only to a valid offering, not a disqualified one. This leads to two unresolved inquiries. Rav Papa asks: if one leavened a dough, took it outside the Temple courtyard, and then leavened it further, is there liability for the second stage? Or, is removing it not considered a disqualification since it was already leavened and invalid? Rav Meri asks if one is liable for leavening an offering already on top of the altar, or if the act of "bringing" is considered complete at that point. The Gemara discusses which additional offerings are included in the prohibition. According to a corrected version, Rabbi Yosi haGelili includes the showbread, while Rabbi Akiva includes the mincha libation accompanying sacrifices. This dispute hinges on whether dry-measure vessels possess the inherent sanctity to disqualify an offering if it leavens within them. This is linked to a debate between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan regarding the sanctification of liquid versus dry-measure vessels in the Temple. The Torah prohibits offering leaven or honey as a fire-offering, and Vayikra 2:11 further teaches that leftovers of various offerings cannot be offered on the altar if a portion has already been burned. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree on whether one is liable for offering these prohibited substances on the ramp (kevesh) of the altar.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether the communal sin offering is paid for by the Temple treasury or if there is a new dedicated collection from the people. Two different versions are brought regarding who held which position, and the Gemara assumes that they switched their positions at some point and concludes that Rabbi Shimon holds it is paid for by the Temple treasury, and Rabbi Yehuda by a new collection. Rabbi Yochanan asked about the situation described in the Mishna that the kohen gadol died and there is no one yet appointed and a full issaron is brought. Is this brought twice daily in both the morning and afternoon, or only once a day? Rava brings a proof that it is brought twice daily, which is mentioned to Rabbi Yirmia, and he scoffs at it, insulting Rava as a "Bavlai tipshai" (stupid Babylonian). Rava then brings a different proof from a verse in the Torah that calls it tamid, comparing it to the tamid sacrifice which is brought twice daily. The Gemara concludes that Rava is correct, as can be seen from a braita that says so explicitly. In a regular case where a kohen gadol brings one issaron and divides it between the morning and afternoon, there is a debate between Abba Yosi ben Dostai and the rabbis about whether two handfuls of frankincense are brought or only one. Rabbi Yochanan asks whether the frankincense would be doubled according to the rabbis in a case when the community or heirs bring it (if the kohen gadol had died) and whether the oil would be doubled according to both opinions. A braita is brought from which they understand that neither is doubled, according to both opinions. Most mincha offerings are matza, other than the special sacrifice brought on Shavuot and ten of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering which are chametz. How was the leavening agent measured in the measuring of the flour for the offering?  

Rav Chisda explains that if one speaks between placing the tefillin shel yad and the tefillin shel rosh, an additional blessing must be recited upon the shel rosh. From this, one can infer that if no interruption occurs, only one blessing is required. However, this poses a difficulty in light of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that there are separate blessings for the shel yad and shel rosh. Abaye and Rava resolve this conflict, yet their resolution is interpreted differently by Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam, resulting in two distinct customs. The tefillin shel yad is placed first, followed by the shel rosh. When removing them, the order is reversed: the shel rosh is removed first, then the shel yad. This specific sequence is derived from the verse in Devarim 6:8. If one dons tefillin early in the morning before the proper time has arrived, the blessing is recited the moment the obligation begins. As stated in Berakhot 9b, this occurs when it becomes light enough to recognize an acquaintance from a distance of four cubits. There are three opinions regarding how late one may wear tefillin: until sunset, until the last people leave the market, or until one goes to sleep. Two versions of Rav Nachman's ruling exist - either supporting or opposing the middle position. This ruling either aligns with or contradicts the practice of Rav Chisda and Raba bar Rav Huna, who would pray Maariv while still wearing tefillin. A challenge is raised against Raba bar Rav Huna's practice based on his own statement implying that tefillin must be removed as darkness falls. This is resolved by explaining that his statement referred specifically to Shabbat. There are two different derivations for the exemption of tefillin on Shabbat: one links it to the exemption of wearing tefillin at night, while the other does not. Is it forbidden to don tefillin at night? If so, does one transgress a positive commandment or a negative one? One should touch the tefillin while wearing them to maintain constant awareness of them. This is derived via a kal v'chomer (a fortiori argument) from the tzitz (the Kohen Gadol's forehead plate). Tefillin are worn on the left hand, as derived from various verses indicating that the word "yad" refers specifically to the left hand.

Rav Huna states that a closed-in staircase opening (lul) between a house and an upper story requires one mezuza if it has one entrance and two mezuzot if it has two. Rav Papa infers from this that a room (indrona) with four doors requires four mezuzot, even if the resident typically utilizes only one of them. Amemar rules that a doorway situated at a corner is obligated in a mezuza; though Rav Ashi questions this due to the lack of formal doorposts (patzim), Amemar maintains that the edges of the walls themselves serve as the post. Rav Papa observes a doorway in Mar Shmuel's house that had only a left-side post yet was fitted with a mezuza. He questions this practice, as it seems to follow Rabbi Meir, who obligates a mezuza for a house with only one post—but even Rabbi Meir only holds that a mezuza is placed on the right side. The source for the right-side placement is derived from the word "beitecha" (your house), which is interpreted as "biatcha" (your entry). The connection between entry and the right side is either because a person begins their entry by leading with the right foot, or it is derived from the verse regarding Jehoiada the kohen, who placed a chest for donations to the right of the altar as people "came in." The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding a single doorpost centers on the plural phrasing of "mezuzot." The Rabbis hold this implies a minimum of two posts, while Rabbi Meir explains how the term can signify a single post, based on the interpretations of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva who utilize various exegetical principles. A braita derives the obligation to write the mezuza on parchment and then affix it to the wall, rather than writing it directly on the stones of the doorpost as might be understood from a simple reading of the verse. Regarding tefillin, the four paragraphs are all essential (me'akvot); even the omission of a single letter, or the "tip" of the letter yud, renders them invalid. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav adds that every letter must be surrounded by blank parchment on all four sides. The Gemara discusses the source for the four compartments of the head tefillin (shel rosh). Rabbi Yishmael derives the number four from the number of mentions and spelling variations of the word "totafot," while Rabbi Akiva explains that the word is a compound of "tat" (two in the Katpi language) and "pat" (two in the Afriki language). A braita clarifies that while the tefillin shel rosh contain four separate scrolls in four compartments, the arm tefillin (shel yad) consist of all four paragraphs written on a single scroll. If one wrote the tefillin shel rosh on one scroll, it is valid, as long as it is put into four separate compartments. If one wrote the tefillin shel yad on four separate scrolls and placed them in one compartment, it is valid, though Rabbi Yehuda requires them to be glued together to appear as one. Rabbi Yosi rules that a tefillin shel rosh can be used on the arm if it is covering by one piece of leather. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yosi as Rabbi Yochanan ruled that this is not possible as one cannot lower an item in sanctity, i.e. from the head to the arm. The order of the paragraphs to be placed in the four compartments of the tefillin shel rosh is established as: kadesh and v'haya ki yeviacha on the right, followed by shema and v'haya im shamoa on the left. To resolve a contradiction with another source that reverses this, Abaye clarifies that each source refers to a different perspective of "right" and "left," depending on whether one is looking from the perspective of the reader or the wearer. Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam (among others) disagree about how to understand the specific order of the tefillin described in the Gemara. Rav concludes that if a scribe switches the order of the paragraphs, the tefillin are invalid.

Rav Chelbo relates that he saw Rav Huna roll the mezuza from the word "echad" toward the word "shema" and format the paragraphs as setumot (closed). This practice is questioned by a braita where Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar notes that Rabbi Meir wrote mezuzot on duchsustos with margins at the top and bottom and formatted the paragraphs as petuchot (open). Rabbi Meir's reasoning was that the paragraphs are not adjacent in the Torah text itself. Since Rav (Rav Huna's teacher) rules in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, that raises a difficulty on Rav Huna's practice. To resolve the difficulty, it is suggested that Rav only ruled like Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar regarding the margins. Abaye further supports this resolution by showing that Rav gives weight to local custom, and the established custom is to write them setumot. The Gemara brings an example to show that Rav gave weight to the established custom from a statement he made regarding use of a sandal for chalitzah, noting that even the testimony of the prophet Eliyahu would not overturn a practice the people have already adopted to use a sandal. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers an alternative explanation for the difficulty on Rav Huna. He explains Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's position as being that while it is a mitzva (ideal) to make them setumot, if they were written petuchot, it would be valid; he reads the words in the braita as "even petuchot." Support for Rav Nachman is brought from a braita stating that a worn-out Sefer Torah or tefillin cannot be repurposed into a mezuza because one does not "lower" an object from a higher level of sanctity to a lower one. From the reason given in the braita, one can infer that if it were not a matter of "lowering" in sanctity, it could be repurposed. This would prove that setumot could be used, as those sections are setumot in a Sefer Torah. However, this suggested proof is rejected. The Gemara raises two other difficulties on the inference that, but for the issue of "lowering" sanctity, a Sefer Torah or tefillin could be repurposed for a mezuza. The first is that tefillin are written on klaf on the side facing the flesh, while a mezuza is written on duchsustos on the side facing the hair. The second difficulty is that a mezuza requires lines (sirtut), while tefillin do not. Both difficulties are resolved. Rav Chelbo further observes that Rav Huna would not sit on a bed while a Sefer Torah was resting upon it, opting instead to place the Torah on an inverted vessel on the ground. However, Rabba bar bar Hana, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, permits sitting on the same bed as a Torah. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel states that a mezuza written in a "letter" (iggeret) format is invalid, as it requires the formal writing style of a Sefer. He also rules that hanging a mezuza on a stick or placing it behind a door is invalid and even "dangerous," as it must be fixed "on your gates." Shmuel specifies that the mezuza must be placed within the hollow of the doorway.

If the remainder of the mincha offering becomes impure, lost, or burned before the kometz is offered, according to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua's approaches regarding sacrifices, one can explain what they would each hold on whether the kometz may still be burned. In the case of animal sacrifices, Rabbi Eliezer permits the sprinkling of the blood even if there is no meat left, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua forbids it. Rav explains that Rabbi Yehoshua's restriction only applies if the entire remainder is lost; however, if even a portion remains, the kometz may be burned. This aligns with his view on animal sacrifices - that if even an olive-bulk of meat or sacrificial fats remains, the blood may be sprinkled. Does the kometz require a sacred vessel after being taken from the meal offering, or can it be brought by hand to the altar? Rabbi Shimon and the Sages differ on this requirement, with Rabbi Shimon ruling that a vessel is not required at this stage. The Gemara explores three different approaches to explain the underlying logic of Rabbi Shimon's lenient view, bringing braitot to challenge the different opinions. If the kometz is split into two parts, the Mishna rules that it can be burned in two separate actions. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about whether it can be split into more than two parts. What is the basis of their debate? Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Chanina disagree about the exact point at which the burning of the kometz renders the remainder permitted for consumption.  

Study Guide Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about a case where oil was placed on the kometz of a mincha of a sinner, which is not meant to be mixed with oil. Rabbi Yochanan disqualifies it, but Reish Lakish does not, as he holds that the oil should not be mixed with the mincha before the kometz is taken, but the kometz can (and ideally should) be mixed with a little bit of oil. Rabbi Yochanan brings a tannaitic source to raise a difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved. Rava asks a question about a kometz whose oil (some of it) was absorbed onto a piece of wood. Can both be burned together to ensure that all the oil of the kometz is burned, or would this not be effective as the wood is completely separate from the kometz? Ravina questions Rava as the issue is already known as a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. But they explain why the question can be asked according to each. The Mishna explains what to do in three different cases of mixtures of meal offerings that were at various stages - either two minchas before the kometz was taken, or a kometz with a different mincha where the kometz was not yet taken, or a kometz mixed with the remainder. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chanina disagree within Rabbi Yehuda's position of min b'mino (items of the same type) is not nullified, as understood by Rabbi Chiya, that items are considered the same if the status of one can change to be like the other. Rav Chisda says it is determined by the item trying to nullify, and Rabbi Chanina by the item being nullified. The three cases in our Mishna and a fourth source regarding matza are brought as difficulties to one or both of the opinions, but all are resolved.  

Professor Barry Strauss. Three Jewish factions fought for control of Jerusalem, destroying their own grain supplies and exacerbating the famine. While rebels used guerrilla tactics against Rome, Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai escaped in a coffin to preserve Judaism at Yavneh, and Christians reportedly fled to Pella for safety. 1492