Podcasts about rabbi yochanan

Diagrams Study Guide Rav Shravia raises a second difficulty against Rabbi Zeira's proof for Rabbi Yochanan's statement that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was completely in the north from the Mishna in Tamid 29a. He suggests that perhaps it was not Rabbi Yosi's opinion, but rather Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, who held that the altar was in the north. He cites a different braita relating to the placement of the basin (kiyur) and explains why that proves Rabbi Yosi the Galilean must have held that the altar was completely in the north. Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debate the status of sanctified animals that were designated, and then the altar becomes broken. A verse is brought as the source for Rav's position. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's view—one from a braita and one from a statement Rav himself made—and both are resolved. In resolving the second difficulty, the Gemara mentions a position of Rabbi Yehuda. It then explores this opinion in the context of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding the size and height of the altar in the time of Moshe.

Diagrams Study Guide Rav Shravia raises a second difficulty against Rabbi Zeira's proof for Rabbi Yochanan's statement that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was completely in the north from the Mishna in Tamid 29a. He suggests that perhaps it was not Rabbi Yosi's opinion, but rather Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, who held that the altar was in the north. He cites a different braita relating to the placement of the basin (kiyur) and explains why that proves Rabbi Yosi the Galilean must have held that the altar was completely in the north. Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debate the status of sanctified animals that were designated, and then the altar becomes broken. A verse is brought as the source for Rav's position. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's view—one from a braita and one from a statement Rav himself made—and both are resolved. In resolving the second difficulty, the Gemara mentions a position of Rabbi Yehuda. It then explores this opinion in the context of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding the size and height of the altar in the time of Moshe.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Judy and Jerel Shapiro for the marriage today of their son Oren Shapiro to Fay Gamliel of Toronto. "Mazal tov and may they build a Bayit Ne'eman b'Yisrael, and a bayit filled with love and peace!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff in loving memory of the 11 precious souls killed on the 18 of Cheshvan at Dor Hadash, New Light and Tree of Life in Pittsburgh. Joyce Fienberg, Dr Richard Gottfried, Rose Mallinger, Dr. Jerry Rabinowitz, Cecil Rosenthal, David Rosenthal, Bernice Simon, Sylvan Simon, Daniel Stein, Melvin Wax, and Irving Younger. And in honor of the Daf Yomi Pittsburgh group under the leadership of Rabbi Amy Bardack and Eric Lidji. What is the size of the Temple courtyard, the Azara? These boundaries are important for three laws that are specifically done in the azara only - kohanim eat kodshai kodashim, slaughtering kodshim kalim takes place there, and one is punished by karet for entering while impure. Rav Nachman's father specified the boundaries. There was an assumption that he was trying to exclude a particular space by demarcating the exact size. They explain that he must have been excluding the chambers that open into the Azara but are partially outside the Azara boundaries. A difficulty is raised from a Mishna that designates them as sanctified. But it is resolved by explaining that the Mishna was referring to a rabbinic definition, but by Torah law, they are not considered the Azara. Two other sources seem to contradict this explanation, but are resolved.   Rav Avudimi explained the source that the blood is disqualified if not brought on the altar before sunset of the day of the slaughtering. Rabbi Yochanan and Chizkiya disagree about the status of the meat of a peace offering on the night after the second day, both for laws of pigul and notar. Comparisons are made between the meat of the sacrifices that can be eaten for one day and those that can be eaten for two days – explaining the source of the differences between the two regarding the night of the second day. A firstborn, maaser and Pesach are kodshai kalim and have similar laws. However, certain issues surrounding eating them are different – who can eat them, how the meat is prepared, and for how long they can be eaten.   

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Judy and Jerel Shapiro for the marriage today of their son Oren Shapiro to Fay Gamliel of Toronto. "Mazal tov and may they build a Bayit Ne'eman b'Yisrael, and a bayit filled with love and peace!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff in loving memory of the 11 precious souls killed on the 18 of Cheshvan at Dor Hadash, New Light and Tree of Life in Pittsburgh. Joyce Fienberg, Dr Richard Gottfried, Rose Mallinger, Dr. Jerry Rabinowitz, Cecil Rosenthal, David Rosenthal, Bernice Simon, Sylvan Simon, Daniel Stein, Melvin Wax, and Irving Younger. And in honor of the Daf Yomi Pittsburgh group under the leadership of Rabbi Amy Bardack and Eric Lidji. What is the size of the Temple courtyard, the Azara? These boundaries are important for three laws that are specifically done in the azara only - kohanim eat kodshai kodashim, slaughtering kodshim kalim takes place there, and one is punished by karet for entering while impure. Rav Nachman's father specified the boundaries. There was an assumption that he was trying to exclude a particular space by demarcating the exact size. They explain that he must have been excluding the chambers that open into the Azara but are partially outside the Azara boundaries. A difficulty is raised from a Mishna that designates them as sanctified. But it is resolved by explaining that the Mishna was referring to a rabbinic definition, but by Torah law, they are not considered the Azara. Two other sources seem to contradict this explanation, but are resolved.   Rav Avudimi explained the source that the blood is disqualified if not brought on the altar before sunset of the day of the slaughtering. Rabbi Yochanan and Chizkiya disagree about the status of the meat of a peace offering on the night after the second day, both for laws of pigul and notar. Comparisons are made between the meat of the sacrifices that can be eaten for one day and those that can be eaten for two days – explaining the source of the differences between the two regarding the night of the second day. A firstborn, maaser and Pesach are kodshai kalim and have similar laws. However, certain issues surrounding eating them are different – who can eat them, how the meat is prepared, and for how long they can be eaten.   

Public and individual sin offerings are categorized as kodshei kodashim. Public offerings include the goat offerings on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays. They are slaughtered and blood is accepted in the North of the Azara. The blood is sprinkled on the top of the altar. The kohen goes onto the sovev, a ledge of the altar, one cubit wide and five cubits off the ground that extends across the length of the altar. From there, he walks around the altar, placing the blood, using his finger, at the top of the altar near the horns. The remainder of the blood is then spilled at the base of the altar, and the meat can be prepared in all manners, and is eaten by male kohanim for that day and night, until midnight. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood was placed on the horns, while Rebbi holds that the blood just needs to be placed above the red line at the mid-height of the altar (chut hasikra). Within Rebbi's opinion, there is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar whether it needs to be placed on the edge of the corner or can it be up to a cubit away from the corner. Even though a braita clearly states "the edge of the corner," it is possible that is only ideally, but a cubit away would be sufficient as well. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rebbi regarding the blood of a bird burnt offering, which can be done anywhere above the red line, but distinguishes between that and the sin offering of an animal as the Torah specified kranot, horns. The Gemara brings a source for Rebbi's opinion from Yechezkel 43:15 and a source for the red line from Shmot 27:5. There is a debate regarding the placement of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar – some say both were on the Western part of the base, some say both were on the Southern part and some say the inner ones were poured on the Western part, while the outer ones were placed on the Southern part. What is the basis for the different opinions? The burnt offering is slaughtered in the North and blood is collected in the North. The blood is placed on two corners, but covers all four sides. Rav and Shmuel, based on a tannaitic debate, disagree about whether the kohen throws the blood twice in each corner to get on both sides or in one throw reaching both sides. The blood was placed only from two corners, as one of the corners does not have a yesod, base, underneath and the blood of the burnt offering needs to be placed on the altar where there is a base underneath, as derived from verses earlier in the Gemara. Why was there no base on the East and South sides? Since that area was specifically part of Yehuda's territory, and the rest of the altar was in Binyamin's territory, they did not extend the base there, as Binyamin was promised that the altar would be in his territory.  

Public and individual sin offerings are categorized as kodshei kodashim. Public offerings include the goat offerings on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays. They are slaughtered and blood is accepted in the North of the Azara. The blood is sprinkled on the top of the altar. The kohen goes onto the sovev, a ledge of the altar, one cubit wide and five cubits off the ground that extends across the length of the altar. From there, he walks around the altar, placing the blood, using his finger, at the top of the altar near the horns. The remainder of the blood is then spilled at the base of the altar, and the meat can be prepared in all manners, and is eaten by male kohanim for that day and night, until midnight. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood was placed on the horns, while Rebbi holds that the blood just needs to be placed above the red line at the mid-height of the altar (chut hasikra). Within Rebbi's opinion, there is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar whether it needs to be placed on the edge of the corner or can it be up to a cubit away from the corner. Even though a braita clearly states "the edge of the corner," it is possible that is only ideally, but a cubit away would be sufficient as well. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rebbi regarding the blood of a bird burnt offering, which can be done anywhere above the red line, but distinguishes between that and the sin offering of an animal as the Torah specified kranot, horns. The Gemara brings a source for Rebbi's opinion from Yechezkel 43:15 and a source for the red line from Shmot 27:5. There is a debate regarding the placement of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar – some say both were on the Western part of the base, some say both were on the Southern part and some say the inner ones were poured on the Western part, while the outer ones were placed on the Southern part. What is the basis for the different opinions? The burnt offering is slaughtered in the North and blood is collected in the North. The blood is placed on two corners, but covers all four sides. Rav and Shmuel, based on a tannaitic debate, disagree about whether the kohen throws the blood twice in each corner to get on both sides or in one throw reaching both sides. The blood was placed only from two corners, as one of the corners does not have a yesod, base, underneath and the blood of the burnt offering needs to be placed on the altar where there is a base underneath, as derived from verses earlier in the Gemara. Why was there no base on the East and South sides? Since that area was specifically part of Yehuda's territory, and the rest of the altar was in Binyamin's territory, they did not extend the base there, as Binyamin was promised that the altar would be in his territory.  

The braita in Zevachim 51 extrapolates from the third mention (by the nasi) of the base of the altar that for all sacrifices on the outer altar the remainder of the blood is poured on the base, the yesod. The braita then raises a question: perhaps the extrapolation should be different — that the sprinkling of sacrificial blood on the outer altar must be performed only on the sides where there is a base, i.e., not on the southeast corner, since the base did not extend there. A difficulty on that suggestion is drawn from the verse's wording. The verse states "to the base of the altar of the olah," which suggests relevance to all sacrifices on the outer altar rather than only to the olah. But the sin offering, which is placed on the outer altar, is positioned on all four corners and not limited to the three corners where there is a base. If the verse had intended the latter ruling, it should have been phrased "to the base of the olah," referring specifically to the burnt offering where that limitation would apply. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the unique inclusion of the word "altar" in the verse: it teaches that when blood is spilled on the base, it must be spilled on the roof of the base (top flat surface) and not on the wall of the base. With this reading, the subsequent lines of the braita, where Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva each say the law could have been derived by a kal va'chomer are reread including mention of the roof of the base. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva appear to assert the same logical argument using slightly different wording. Rav Ada bar Ahava and Rav Papa propose possible distinctions between their positions. Rav Ada argues that because Rabbi Akiva used more extended language about the remainder of the blood, that it "does not atone" and "does not come for atonement purposes," Rabbi Akiva must regard pouring the remainder as nonessential. Rabbi Yishmael, having said only "it doesn't atone," must hold that pouring the remainder is essential. Rav Papa rejects this reading, maintaining that no one posits an obligation to pour the remainder of the blood. He narrows the difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva to the specific case of the bird sin offering: whether mitzui, squeezing out the remainder of the blood and placing it directly on the wall of the altar while squeezing, is essential. Rav Papa understands Rabbi Yishmael to require mitzui, while Rabbi Akiva does not. A braita is then cited to support Rav Papa, showing that Rabbi Yishmael holds pouring the remainder is not essential. A difficulty is raised against Rav Papa's position, but the Gemara resolves it. Rami bar Hama introduces a tana who maintains that for sin offerings whose blood is placed on the inner altar, pouring the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is essential; Rava, however, rejects this understanding of the braita and its conclusion. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi dispute whether Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Akiva actually differ on the question of whether the remainder of the blood for inner sin offerings is essential.    

The braita in Zevachim 51 extrapolates from the third mention (by the nasi) of the base of the altar that for all sacrifices on the outer altar the remainder of the blood is poured on the base, the yesod. The braita then raises a question: perhaps the extrapolation should be different — that the sprinkling of sacrificial blood on the outer altar must be performed only on the sides where there is a base, i.e., not on the southeast corner, since the base did not extend there. A difficulty on that suggestion is drawn from the verse's wording. The verse states "to the base of the altar of the olah," which suggests relevance to all sacrifices on the outer altar rather than only to the olah. But the sin offering, which is placed on the outer altar, is positioned on all four corners and not limited to the three corners where there is a base. If the verse had intended the latter ruling, it should have been phrased "to the base of the olah," referring specifically to the burnt offering where that limitation would apply. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the unique inclusion of the word "altar" in the verse: it teaches that when blood is spilled on the base, it must be spilled on the roof of the base (top flat surface) and not on the wall of the base. With this reading, the subsequent lines of the braita, where Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva each say the law could have been derived by a kal va'chomer are reread including mention of the roof of the base. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva appear to assert the same logical argument using slightly different wording. Rav Ada bar Ahava and Rav Papa propose possible distinctions between their positions. Rav Ada argues that because Rabbi Akiva used more extended language about the remainder of the blood, that it "does not atone" and "does not come for atonement purposes," Rabbi Akiva must regard pouring the remainder as nonessential. Rabbi Yishmael, having said only "it doesn't atone," must hold that pouring the remainder is essential. Rav Papa rejects this reading, maintaining that no one posits an obligation to pour the remainder of the blood. He narrows the difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva to the specific case of the bird sin offering: whether mitzui, squeezing out the remainder of the blood and placing it directly on the wall of the altar while squeezing, is essential. Rav Papa understands Rabbi Yishmael to require mitzui, while Rabbi Akiva does not. A braita is then cited to support Rav Papa, showing that Rabbi Yishmael holds pouring the remainder is not essential. A difficulty is raised against Rav Papa's position, but the Gemara resolves it. Rami bar Hama introduces a tana who maintains that for sin offerings whose blood is placed on the inner altar, pouring the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is essential; Rava, however, rejects this understanding of the braita and its conclusion. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi dispute whether Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Akiva actually differ on the question of whether the remainder of the blood for inner sin offerings is essential.    

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.  

From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24. The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved. The verse concerning the leper's sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10. Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not - precisely for this reason.  

How is sacrificial blood excluded from the prohibition against "notar" and impurity? As derived from verses, that is. Likewise, how is blood not subject to me'ilah, after atonement (or even before atonement). Also, how these details are derived from verses that seem indirect or insufficient, when we might have wanted more. Also, why does the Torah mention "karet," the punishment of being cut off, three disctinct times? Each teaches another factor - with a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Shimon.

Study Guide The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet. This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned. Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul, just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul. Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul, as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim. Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar. Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul. The Gemara explores Ulla’s intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet, but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz, where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar. Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul, notar, and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan’s statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina. The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.  

Study Guide The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet. This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned. Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul, just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul. Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul, as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim. Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar. Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul. The Gemara explores Ulla’s intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet, but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz, where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar. Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul, notar, and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan’s statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina. The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.  

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Bava Metzia 84a, focusing on the profound relationship between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, their transformative encounter, and the tragic fallout of their dispute. The episode delves into themes of Torah's transformative power, respect for teachers, self-sufficiency, and the Jewish people's global mission. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's Encounter: Rabbi Yochanan, swimming in the Jordan River, is pursued by Reish Lakish, a highway robber. Rabbi Wolbe digresses to note the Jordan's flow from the sweet Sea of Galilee (a “giver”) to the bitter Dead Sea (a “taker”), symbolizing the sweetness of giving. Rabbi Yochanan praises Reish Lakish's strength, suggesting he redirect it to Torah study, while Reish Lakish retorts that Rabbi Yochanan's beauty suits women. Rabbi Yochanan offers his sister in marriage if Reish Lakish repents, leading to his transformation. Reish Lakish weakens physically upon accepting Torah, as Torah shifts focus from physical to spiritual pursuits, consuming one's energy (6:11–9:54).Torah's Transformative Power: Rabbi Wolbe explains that Torah is not just a subject but a “sam hachaim” (elixir of life), weakening physical desires to strengthen spiritual ones. Reish Lakish's sudden weakness reflects Torah's overwhelming influence, countering the Yetzer Hara (evil inclination), which distracts from study (e.g., causing sleepiness or daydreaming, per Psalms 20). This underscores the incompatibility of material and spiritual pursuits, critiquing modern attempts to “have it all” (e.g., 2008 mortgage crisis).Their Dispute and Tragedy: Years later, as scholars, they debate when a vessel becomes susceptible to tumah (ritual impurity): Rabbi Yochanan says when metals are fused; Reish Lakish says when polished. Rabbi Yochanan's comment, “A thief knows the tools of thievery,” is meant constructively but offends Reish Lakish, who retorts, “How have you benefited me?” Rabbi Yochanan responds that he brought him under the Divine Presence. Reish Lakish's disrespect causes divine retribution, leading to his illness and death. Rabbi Yochanan's sister pleads for mercy, but he cites verses (Jeremiah 49:11) to prioritize divine justice, as Reish Lakish's contempt endangered their bond and the nation's spiritual integrity (29:34–32:14).Rabbi Yochanan's Grief: Rabbi Yochanan is heartbroken, grieving Reish Lakish's loss. A new student, Rabbi Elazar ben Pedas, merely affirms Rabbi Yochanan's teachings, unlike Reish Lakish's challenging 24 questions and answers, which clarified Torah through debate. Rabbi Yochanan's anguish drives him to madness, and the rabbis pray for his death, as his bond with Reish Lakish was central to his existence (50:30–54:38)._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on September 5, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 24, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Yochanan, #ReishLakish, #BavaMitzia, #mentorship, #parenting, #marriage, #authority, #respect, #leadership, #reverence ★ Support this podcast ★

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Bava Metzia 84a, focusing on the profound relationship between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, their transformative encounter, and the tragic fallout of their dispute. The episode delves into themes of Torah's transformative power, respect for teachers, self-sufficiency, and the Jewish people's global mission. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's Encounter: Rabbi Yochanan, swimming in the Jordan River, is pursued by Reish Lakish, a highway robber. Rabbi Wolbe digresses to note the Jordan's flow from the sweet Sea of Galilee (a “giver”) to the bitter Dead Sea (a “taker”), symbolizing the sweetness of giving. Rabbi Yochanan praises Reish Lakish's strength, suggesting he redirect it to Torah study, while Reish Lakish retorts that Rabbi Yochanan's beauty suits women. Rabbi Yochanan offers his sister in marriage if Reish Lakish repents, leading to his transformation. Reish Lakish weakens physically upon accepting Torah, as Torah shifts focus from physical to spiritual pursuits, consuming one's energy (6:11–9:54).Torah's Transformative Power: Rabbi Wolbe explains that Torah is not just a subject but a “sam hachaim” (elixir of life), weakening physical desires to strengthen spiritual ones. Reish Lakish's sudden weakness reflects Torah's overwhelming influence, countering the Yetzer Hara (evil inclination), which distracts from study (e.g., causing sleepiness or daydreaming, per Psalms 20). This underscores the incompatibility of material and spiritual pursuits, critiquing modern attempts to “have it all” (e.g., 2008 mortgage crisis).Their Dispute and Tragedy: Years later, as scholars, they debate when a vessel becomes susceptible to tumah (ritual impurity): Rabbi Yochanan says when metals are fused; Reish Lakish says when polished. Rabbi Yochanan's comment, “A thief knows the tools of thievery,” is meant constructively but offends Reish Lakish, who retorts, “How have you benefited me?” Rabbi Yochanan responds that he brought him under the Divine Presence. Reish Lakish's disrespect causes divine retribution, leading to his illness and death. Rabbi Yochanan's sister pleads for mercy, but he cites verses (Jeremiah 49:11) to prioritize divine justice, as Reish Lakish's contempt endangered their bond and the nation's spiritual integrity (29:34–32:14).Rabbi Yochanan's Grief: Rabbi Yochanan is heartbroken, grieving Reish Lakish's loss. A new student, Rabbi Elazar ben Pedas, merely affirms Rabbi Yochanan's teachings, unlike Reish Lakish's challenging 24 questions and answers, which clarified Torah through debate. Rabbi Yochanan's anguish drives him to madness, and the rabbis pray for his death, as his bond with Reish Lakish was central to his existence (50:30–54:38)._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on September 5, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 24, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Yochanan, #ReishLakish, #BavaMitzia, #mentorship, #parenting, #marriage, #authority, #respect, #leadership, #reverence ★ Support this podcast ★

The Gemara brings a braita in which a Tanna offers an alternative interpretation to explain Beit Hillel’s reasoning - that one application of blood in the sin offering is sufficient to fulfill the obligation, rather than two. Two objections are raised against this interpretation, and in the second objection, an alternative drasha is proposed. However, both objections are ultimately resolved. If, according to Beit Shammai, pigul applies only when the improper intent occurs during two applications of blood (in a sin offering), whereas according to Beit Hillel even one is sufficient, the question arises: why is this ruling not listed among the leniencies of Beit Shammai? Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Pappa enumerate various laws in which the three non-essential applications of blood are similar to or different from the one essential application.

The Gemara brings a braita in which a Tanna offers an alternative interpretation to explain Beit Hillel’s reasoning - that one application of blood in the sin offering is sufficient to fulfill the obligation, rather than two. Two objections are raised against this interpretation, and in the second objection, an alternative drasha is proposed. However, both objections are ultimately resolved. If, according to Beit Shammai, pigul applies only when the improper intent occurs during two applications of blood (in a sin offering), whereas according to Beit Hillel even one is sufficient, the question arises: why is this ruling not listed among the leniencies of Beit Shammai? Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Pappa enumerate various laws in which the three non-essential applications of blood are similar to or different from the one essential application.

How can the verse “do not touch kodesh” be used by Reish Lakish to teach that one cannot eat sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, when that verse is needed to derive the prohibition for an impure person to eat sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled? To resolve the difficulty, the Gemara explains how both can be derived from the same verse.  There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding an impure person who eats sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled – is it punishable by lashes or not? Abaye and Rava disagree about the scope of the debate. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether one who brings parts of the body of a non-kosher animal onto the altar receives lashes or not. However, after raising a difficulty with this, they explain that all agree it is forbidden, but not punishable by lashes, as it is a negative commandment that is not written explicitly, but derived from a positive commandment. The debate is regarding a different, but similar issue - bringing a non-domesticated animal – is it a violation of a positive commandment, or is it only forbidden ab initio? Three versions of a question are brought regarding shirayim. If a disqualified person accepted and sprinkled the blood, does it render the animal disqualified from being used for a sacrifice, e.g. can one take more blood from the animal and sprinkle it on the altar? Or, if a cup with the blood was taken out of the Azara, can one get more blood from the animal? Or, if multiple cups were used to get blood from the animal and one was used for the altar, does the blood from the other cups also get poured on the base of the altar (as shirayim)? How does the Mishna allow for some mistakes to be rectified? Why are there three different cases like this mentioned in the Mishna – what is unique about each case?

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Baba Metzia 84a, focusing on a Talmudic discussion about Rabbi Yochanan's exceptional beauty and its spiritual implications. The episode delves into the concept of the evil eye, the influence of parental thoughts on conception, and the responsibility to use one's gifts thoughtfully. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan's Beauty: Rabbi Yochanan claims to be the last of Jerusalem's beautiful people, described vividly: a silver goblet filled with pomegranate seeds, crowned with roses, and placed between sun and shade reflects a fraction of his radiance. The Talmud questions this, noting Rav Kahana's beauty resembled Rav Avohu's, which resembled Yaakov's, which resembled Adam's. Rabbi Yochanan's distinction was his beardless face, enhancing his radiant appearance.Mikvah Practice: Rabbi Yochanan sat at the women's mikvah entrance so that women, emerging from ritual immersion, would see him and retain his image, influencing their conception to produce beautiful, Torah-learned children. This mirrors Yaakov's use of streaked rods to influence sheep traits. Rabbi Wolbe defends this as a responsible use of his gift, not arrogance, citing his grandfather's teaching that knowing and using one's virtues is an obligation, akin to knowing one's wealth to give charity.Evil Eye Concerns: The sages question if Rabbi Yochanan feared the evil eye from displaying his beauty. He responds that, as a descendant of Yosef, he is immune, per Genesis 49:22 (“Yosef is a charming son, above the eye”) and 49:24 (likening Yosef's progeny to fish, hidden from the evil eye). Rabbi Wolbe explains the evil eye's real impact: flaunting wealth or beauty can cause jealousy, stress, or harm in others, affecting their relationships or finances.Practical Lessons: Rabbi Wolbe shares anecdotes to illustrate avoiding the evil eye: his father's choice of a modest Toyota Camry over a Lincoln Town Car to avoid neighbors' jealousy, and leaving a broken blinker light to deter envy. He recounts Marvy Finger's mentor, a wealthy man flying coach to avoid wasteful display, emphasizing humility and consideration for others' feelings.Broader Message: The episode underscores the responsibility to use God-given gifts (beauty, wealth) for positive impact while avoiding harm through jealousy. Rabbi Yochanan's actions aimed to inspire righteousness, not pride. Rabbi Wolbe urges mindfulness of how one's actions affect others, promoting sensitivity in a world prone to envy and comparison.The episode concludes with a blessing for a wonderful Shabbos and a call to share Torah content._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on August 29, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 17, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Beauty, #Yochanan, #Gemara, #Radiant, #Responsibility, #Humility, #Mentor, #Practicality, #Luxury, #Mindfulness ★ Support this podcast ★

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Baba Metzia 84a, focusing on a Talmudic discussion about Rabbi Yochanan's exceptional beauty and its spiritual implications. The episode delves into the concept of the evil eye, the influence of parental thoughts on conception, and the responsibility to use one's gifts thoughtfully. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan's Beauty: Rabbi Yochanan claims to be the last of Jerusalem's beautiful people, described vividly: a silver goblet filled with pomegranate seeds, crowned with roses, and placed between sun and shade reflects a fraction of his radiance. The Talmud questions this, noting Rav Kahana's beauty resembled Rav Avohu's, which resembled Yaakov's, which resembled Adam's. Rabbi Yochanan's distinction was his beardless face, enhancing his radiant appearance.Mikvah Practice: Rabbi Yochanan sat at the women's mikvah entrance so that women, emerging from ritual immersion, would see him and retain his image, influencing their conception to produce beautiful, Torah-learned children. This mirrors Yaakov's use of streaked rods to influence sheep traits. Rabbi Wolbe defends this as a responsible use of his gift, not arrogance, citing his grandfather's teaching that knowing and using one's virtues is an obligation, akin to knowing one's wealth to give charity.Evil Eye Concerns: The sages question if Rabbi Yochanan feared the evil eye from displaying his beauty. He responds that, as a descendant of Yosef, he is immune, per Genesis 49:22 (“Yosef is a charming son, above the eye”) and 49:24 (likening Yosef's progeny to fish, hidden from the evil eye). Rabbi Wolbe explains the evil eye's real impact: flaunting wealth or beauty can cause jealousy, stress, or harm in others, affecting their relationships or finances.Practical Lessons: Rabbi Wolbe shares anecdotes to illustrate avoiding the evil eye: his father's choice of a modest Toyota Camry over a Lincoln Town Car to avoid neighbors' jealousy, and leaving a broken blinker light to deter envy. He recounts Marvy Finger's mentor, a wealthy man flying coach to avoid wasteful display, emphasizing humility and consideration for others' feelings.Broader Message: The episode underscores the responsibility to use God-given gifts (beauty, wealth) for positive impact while avoiding harm through jealousy. Rabbi Yochanan's actions aimed to inspire righteousness, not pride. Rabbi Wolbe urges mindfulness of how one's actions affect others, promoting sensitivity in a world prone to envy and comparison.The episode concludes with a blessing for a wonderful Shabbos and a call to share Torah content._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on August 29, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 17, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Beauty, #Yochanan, #Gemara, #Radiant, #Responsibility, #Humility, #Mentor, #Practicality, #Luxury, #Mindfulness ★ Support this podcast ★

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

How can the verse “do not touch kodesh” be used by Reish Lakish to teach that one cannot eat sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, when that verse is needed to derive the prohibition for an impure person to eat sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled? To resolve the difficulty, the Gemara explains how both can be derived from the same verse.  There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding an impure person who eats sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled – is it punishable by lashes or not? Abaye and Rava disagree about the scope of the debate. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether one who brings parts of the body of a non-kosher animal onto the altar receives lashes or not. However, after raising a difficulty with this, they explain that all agree it is forbidden, but not punishable by lashes, as it is a negative commandment that is not written explicitly, but derived from a positive commandment. The debate is regarding a different, but similar issue - bringing a non-domesticated animal – is it a violation of a positive commandment, or is it only forbidden ab initio? Three versions of a question are brought regarding shirayim. If a disqualified person accepted and sprinkled the blood, does it render the animal disqualified from being used for a sacrifice, e.g. can one take more blood from the animal and sprinkle it on the altar? Or, if a cup with the blood was taken out of the Azara, can one get more blood from the animal? Or, if multiple cups were used to get blood from the animal and one was used for the altar, does the blood from the other cups also get poured on the base of the altar (as shirayim)? How does the Mishna allow for some mistakes to be rectified? Why are there three different cases like this mentioned in the Mishna – what is unique about each case?

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.  

Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.  

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Study Guide Three distinct explanations—by Shmuel, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Yochanan—are presented to clarify the Mishna that disqualifies a sacrifice if its blood was sprinkled either in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar entirely. Each interpretation is examined in depth, with challenges and questions raised based on other sources and halakhic principles.

Study Guide Three distinct explanations—by Shmuel, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Yochanan—are presented to clarify the Mishna that disqualifies a sacrifice if its blood was sprinkled either in the wrong location on the altar or on the wrong altar entirely. Each interpretation is examined in depth, with challenges and questions raised based on other sources and halakhic principles.

In the Torah verse regarding the purification of the leper (Vayikra 14:17), the word “right” appears three times - once in reference to the hand, once to the foot, and once to the ear. Rava explains that each mention teaches the requirement to use the right hand in a different ritual: one for kemitza (taking a handful of flour) in meal offerings, one for chalitza (the release ceremony of levirate marriage), and one for piercing the ear of a Jewish slave. According to Rabba bar bar Hanna, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, wherever the Torah uses the term “kohen,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Based on this, Rava’s drasha regarding kemitza teaches that not only the taking of the kometz (handful) must be done with the right hand, but also its placement into the kli sharet (sanctified vessel). Rabbi Shimon, who either does not require this part of the process or does not require it to be done with the right hand, agrees that the kemitza itself must be performed with the right hand, as derived from Vayikra 6:10, which compares the meal offering to the sin offering. Therefore, Rava’s interpretation applies specifically to the meal offering of a sinner, brought as part of a sliding scale offering. The Mishna rules that if the blood spills directly onto the floor from the animal, without first being collected in a sanctified vessel, the blood is disqualified. A braita teaches that the blood to be collected must be the spurting blood from the act of slaughter - not blood from a cut, nor residual blood that flows after most of the blood has exited the animal. The blood must flow directly from the animal into the kli sharet, from which it will be sprinkled on the altar. These laws are derived from Vayikra 4:5, in the context of the sin offering of the Kohen Gadol. Rav rules that all of the blood must be collected, based on Vayikra 4:7. According to Shmuel, the knife must be lifted immediately after slaughter to prevent blood from dripping off the knife into the vessel, since the blood must come directly from the animal. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explain that the animal’s throat must be held directly over the vessel to ensure the blood flows straight into it. Rabbi Asi posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding the airspace above a vessel. The Gemara brings three versions of the question and Rabbi Yochanan’s response: If the bottom of the vessel broke before the blood reached it, but the blood had already entered the vessel’s airspace, does this count as if the blood had reached the vessel? If so, the blood could be collected from the floor and used on the altar. To answer the question, Rabbi Yochanan cited a braita regarding a barrel into which fresh water streamed into its airspace, disqualifying it for use in the red heifer purification waters, as it is considered as though the water entered the vessel. However, this comparison is problematic, since the red heifer case does not involve a broken vessel. To justify the citation, the Gemara reframes the question as a two-pronged inquiry. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was drawn from the aforementioned braita. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was derived from the laws of sacrificial blood, which must reach the vessel directly. Since the blood passes through the airspace first, this implies that the airspace is treated as part of the vessel. If the animal becomes blemished after slaughter but before the blood is collected, brought to the altar, or poured, the blood is disqualified. A source is cited from the laws of the sin offering to support this. The Gemara attempts to extend this ruling to offerings of lesser sanctity, such as the Paschal sacrifice, but the proof is ultimately rejected.  

In the Torah verse regarding the purification of the leper (Vayikra 14:17), the word “right” appears three times - once in reference to the hand, once to the foot, and once to the ear. Rava explains that each mention teaches the requirement to use the right hand in a different ritual: one for kemitza (taking a handful of flour) in meal offerings, one for chalitza (the release ceremony of levirate marriage), and one for piercing the ear of a Jewish slave. According to Rabba bar bar Hanna, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, wherever the Torah uses the term “kohen,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Based on this, Rava’s drasha regarding kemitza teaches that not only the taking of the kometz (handful) must be done with the right hand, but also its placement into the kli sharet (sanctified vessel). Rabbi Shimon, who either does not require this part of the process or does not require it to be done with the right hand, agrees that the kemitza itself must be performed with the right hand, as derived from Vayikra 6:10, which compares the meal offering to the sin offering. Therefore, Rava’s interpretation applies specifically to the meal offering of a sinner, brought as part of a sliding scale offering. The Mishna rules that if the blood spills directly onto the floor from the animal, without first being collected in a sanctified vessel, the blood is disqualified. A braita teaches that the blood to be collected must be the spurting blood from the act of slaughter - not blood from a cut, nor residual blood that flows after most of the blood has exited the animal. The blood must flow directly from the animal into the kli sharet, from which it will be sprinkled on the altar. These laws are derived from Vayikra 4:5, in the context of the sin offering of the Kohen Gadol. Rav rules that all of the blood must be collected, based on Vayikra 4:7. According to Shmuel, the knife must be lifted immediately after slaughter to prevent blood from dripping off the knife into the vessel, since the blood must come directly from the animal. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explain that the animal’s throat must be held directly over the vessel to ensure the blood flows straight into it. Rabbi Asi posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding the airspace above a vessel. The Gemara brings three versions of the question and Rabbi Yochanan’s response: If the bottom of the vessel broke before the blood reached it, but the blood had already entered the vessel’s airspace, does this count as if the blood had reached the vessel? If so, the blood could be collected from the floor and used on the altar. To answer the question, Rabbi Yochanan cited a braita regarding a barrel into which fresh water streamed into its airspace, disqualifying it for use in the red heifer purification waters, as it is considered as though the water entered the vessel. However, this comparison is problematic, since the red heifer case does not involve a broken vessel. To justify the citation, the Gemara reframes the question as a two-pronged inquiry. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was drawn from the aforementioned braita. The question was about the barrel, and the answer was derived from the laws of sacrificial blood, which must reach the vessel directly. Since the blood passes through the airspace first, this implies that the airspace is treated as part of the vessel. If the animal becomes blemished after slaughter but before the blood is collected, brought to the altar, or poured, the blood is disqualified. A source is cited from the laws of the sin offering to support this. The Gemara attempts to extend this ruling to offerings of lesser sanctity, such as the Paschal sacrifice, but the proof is ultimately rejected.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza—an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both “kohen” and “finger,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either “finger” appears alone or “kohen” together with “finger”. According to Rabbi Yochanan’s rule that the mention of “kohen” implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava—a textual analogy—from the three mentions of “right” in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word “kohen”? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza—an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both “kohen” and “finger,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either “finger” appears alone or “kohen” together with “finger”. According to Rabbi Yochanan’s rule that the mention of “kohen” implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava—a textual analogy—from the three mentions of “right” in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word “kohen”? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Joanna Rom in loving memory of her mother, Rose Rom, Sura Razel, on her seventeenth yahrzeit. "She is still with me every day, my inner teacher." If one becomes impure, must one repeat the washing of hands and feet? A source is brought from Mishna Para 3:7 regarding the para aduma (red heifer) to suggest that re-washing is not required. However, this proof is rejected, as the laws concerning the para aduma are considered more lenient. Can a kohen immerse his hands and feet directly in the water of the basin, or must the water be poured over them? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak cites a source to support the permissibility of immersion, but the inference is ultimately rejected. Regarding the timing for sinking the water into its pit to prevent disqualification for the following day, three opinions are presented: Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef distinguishes between rites performed during the day and those at night. For daytime rites, the water must be sunk at sunset; for nighttime rites, at dawn. Rav Chisda maintains that for all rites, the water must be sunk at dawn. Rabbi Yochanan holds that once the water is sunk at the beginning of the night, it may not be raised again until morning. Rabbi Yochanan’s position is examined in light of other statements he made that appear contradictory. The analysis also ensures his view is clearly differentiated from those of Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef, with whom he disagrees. A challenge is raised against Rav Chisda’s opinion, but it is resolved.

Study Guide Today's daf is sponsored by Joanna Rom in loving memory of her mother, Rose Rom, Sura Razel, on her seventeenth yahrzeit. "She is still with me every day, my inner teacher." If one becomes impure, must one repeat the washing of hands and feet? A source is brought from Mishna Para 3:7 regarding the para aduma (red heifer) to suggest that re-washing is not required. However, this proof is rejected, as the laws concerning the para aduma are considered more lenient. Can a kohen immerse his hands and feet directly in the water of the basin, or must the water be poured over them? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak cites a source to support the permissibility of immersion, but the inference is ultimately rejected. Regarding the timing for sinking the water into its pit to prevent disqualification for the following day, three opinions are presented: Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef distinguishes between rites performed during the day and those at night. For daytime rites, the water must be sunk at sunset; for nighttime rites, at dawn. Rav Chisda maintains that for all rites, the water must be sunk at dawn. Rabbi Yochanan holds that once the water is sunk at the beginning of the night, it may not be raised again until morning. Rabbi Yochanan’s position is examined in light of other statements he made that appear contradictory. The analysis also ensures his view is clearly differentiated from those of Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef, with whom he disagrees. A challenge is raised against Rav Chisda’s opinion, but it is resolved.

Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.

Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree.   Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body.  Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A  braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?

Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree.   Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body.  Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A  braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?

Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.

Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.

Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.

In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.

In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.

Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.

Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.

Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.

Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering. A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them. Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s view, while Rabbi Ilai supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia’s proof is based on a kal va’chomer, which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ilai’s proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved. In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma—with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.