Podcasts about rabbi yehuda

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 6 Today’s daf is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman in loving memory of Masha’s grandfather, Jacob Maltz, Yaakov Yitzchak ben Moshe Aaron, ztz”l, on his 65th yahrzeit, which was last Thursday. "Although my Zeidie died when I was still a child, I was inspired by the stories of his sacrifices to stay religious at a time when many were leaving the fold. I still remember his smile, radiant with warmth and love." Today’s daf is sponsored by Cliff and Minna Felig in honor of Michelle and Seth Farber on the occasion of their daughter Chani’s marriage in the throes of our war with Iran. When the Mishna mentions "three days before the holiday," does this include the holiday itself (making three days total), or does it refer to three complete days prior to the holiday (with the holiday being additional)? The Gemara brings four sources attempting to prove that the Mishna means three full days before the holiday. While three proofs are rejected, the final one provides conclusive evidence. What underlies this prohibition? Is it because the idol worshipper will thank their gods for their commercial success, and the Jew will have indirectly caused idol worship, thereby transgressing the verse in Shmot 23:13: "Make no mention of names of other gods, they shall not be heard on your lips"? Or is the concern the prohibition against placing a stumbling block before others, as the Jew causes the idol worshipper to engage in idol worship? What is the practical ramification of these different rationales? If someone transgressed and conducted business with a gentile during the prohibited days before their holiday, is it forbidden to benefit from the money or items received? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this issue. Each raises objections against the other's position, and each resolves the difficulties posed against him. A braita is cited supporting Reish Lakish's view that benefiting from such transactions is permitted. Why does the Mishna forbid all the listed activities both when the Jew benefits the non-Jew and when the non-Jew benefits the Jew? What makes each of these cases unique, making it necessary for the Mishna to list them all? Regarding collecting loans from gentiles three days before their holidays, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree in the Mishna about whether this is forbidden or permitted. The Gemara introduces a third position from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, who distinguishes between oral loans and those documented in writing. Rav Huna ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha's position.

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 6 Today’s daf is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman in loving memory of Masha’s grandfather, Jacob Maltz, Yaakov Yitzchak ben Moshe Aaron, ztz”l, on his 65th yahrzeit, which was last Thursday. "Although my Zeidie died when I was still a child, I was inspired by the stories of his sacrifices to stay religious at a time when many were leaving the fold. I still remember his smile, radiant with warmth and love." Today’s daf is sponsored by Cliff and Minna Felig in honor of Michelle and Seth Farber on the occasion of their daughter Chani’s marriage in the throes of our war with Iran. When the Mishna mentions "three days before the holiday," does this include the holiday itself (making three days total), or does it refer to three complete days prior to the holiday (with the holiday being additional)? The Gemara brings four sources attempting to prove that the Mishna means three full days before the holiday. While three proofs are rejected, the final one provides conclusive evidence. What underlies this prohibition? Is it because the idol worshipper will thank their gods for their commercial success, and the Jew will have indirectly caused idol worship, thereby transgressing the verse in Shmot 23:13: "Make no mention of names of other gods, they shall not be heard on your lips"? Or is the concern the prohibition against placing a stumbling block before others, as the Jew causes the idol worshipper to engage in idol worship? What is the practical ramification of these different rationales? If someone transgressed and conducted business with a gentile during the prohibited days before their holiday, is it forbidden to benefit from the money or items received? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this issue. Each raises objections against the other's position, and each resolves the difficulties posed against him. A braita is cited supporting Reish Lakish's view that benefiting from such transactions is permitted. Why does the Mishna forbid all the listed activities both when the Jew benefits the non-Jew and when the non-Jew benefits the Jew? What makes each of these cases unique, making it necessary for the Mishna to list them all? Regarding collecting loans from gentiles three days before their holidays, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree in the Mishna about whether this is forbidden or permitted. The Gemara introduces a third position from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, who distinguishes between oral loans and those documented in writing. Rav Huna ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha's position.

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Study Guide Shevuot 38 This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Helen Cohen, Henna bat Yitzchak Nechemia.  Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg, in memory of her father Zvi Tyberg on his yahrzeit today. If one takes an oath of deposit to several people at once, in what circumstances will that be required to bring multiple sacrifices? The Mishna listed three different opinions and a braita is brought with two opinions - Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan bring different explanations as to which wording Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about. If one takes an oath that one does not have several items of another, if it was a lie, are they liable also for the general statement that they do not have any item or only on the particular different items? There is a debate between amoraim about this issue. The sixth chapter discusses an oath administered by the judges, more particularly an oath of one who admits to part of a claim. What is the minimum value of the claim and the partial admission required in order to be obligated to take an oath? Another requirement is that the admission be about the same type of item as the claim. However, Rabban Gamliel disagrees about this.

Study Guide Shevuot 38 This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Helen Cohen, Henna bat Yitzchak Nechemia.  Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg, in memory of her father Zvi Tyberg on his yahrzeit today. If one takes an oath of deposit to several people at once, in what circumstances will that be required to bring multiple sacrifices? The Mishna listed three different opinions and a braita is brought with two opinions - Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan bring different explanations as to which wording Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about. If one takes an oath that one does not have several items of another, if it was a lie, are they liable also for the general statement that they do not have any item or only on the particular different items? There is a debate between amoraim about this issue. The sixth chapter discusses an oath administered by the judges, more particularly an oath of one who admits to part of a claim. What is the minimum value of the claim and the partial admission required in order to be obligated to take an oath? Another requirement is that the admission be about the same type of item as the claim. However, Rabban Gamliel disagrees about this.

Rabbi Yehuda Kaploun, nominated by President Trump to become the next US special envoy for combatting antisemitism, joins Sid live in-studio to talk about world leaders like Pope Leo XIV recognizing the plight of the Palestinians without even bringing up the October 7th terrorist attacks on Israel which started this war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in honor of Shira Krebs, our fearless Minneapolis Hadran convener, on yesterday’s frailich wedding of her daughter Yonit to Yaakov Zinberg: Mazal tov!!! Tali Oberman sponsors today's daf in honor of her grandmother, Barbara Oberman, who has contributed greatly to the Jewish people and celebrated her 90th birthday this week. Would one be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one takes an oath of expression to fulfill a mitzva? There is a debate in the Mishna on this issue between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the rabbis. A braita teaches that one who takes an oath not to observe a mitzva or to observe a mitzva is not a valid oath. From where do they derive this? The working assumption is that the topic of the verse in the Torah is optional actions. From where is this derived? The Gemara brings three suggested answers, while the first one is rejected. If one takes an oath that repeats itself without adding on something new, the subsequent oaths are not valid and if one breaks them accidentally, one would be only obligated to bring one sacrifice. However, if the person were to go to a chacham to repeal the oath, the second oath would apply.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in honor of Shira Krebs, our fearless Minneapolis Hadran convener, on yesterday’s frailich wedding of her daughter Yonit to Yaakov Zinberg: Mazal tov!!! Tali Oberman sponsors today's daf in honor of her grandmother, Barbara Oberman, who has contributed greatly to the Jewish people and celebrated her 90th birthday this week. Would one be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one takes an oath of expression to fulfill a mitzva? There is a debate in the Mishna on this issue between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the rabbis. A braita teaches that one who takes an oath not to observe a mitzva or to observe a mitzva is not a valid oath. From where do they derive this? The working assumption is that the topic of the verse in the Torah is optional actions. From where is this derived? The Gemara brings three suggested answers, while the first one is rejected. If one takes an oath that repeats itself without adding on something new, the subsequent oaths are not valid and if one breaks them accidentally, one would be only obligated to bring one sacrifice. However, if the person were to go to a chacham to repeal the oath, the second oath would apply.  

The First Death Camp at Chelmno & Getting the Word Out About Nazi Atrocities - Escapes, Rabbis, & The Underground - Rabbi Yehuda Geberer

This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi to the continued health and good outcome for Chesya Rut bat Chana.  The Mishna explains that Yom Kippur atones for positive commandments. If one has already repented, they receive atonement immediately. Therefore, it is assumed that the Mishna is referring to one who has not yet repented. This accords with the opinion of Rebbi who holds that Yom Kippur atones even for sins for which one has not yet repented. The rabbis disagree and hold that Yom Kippur only atones for sins if one has repented. A difficulty is raised as the next part of the Mishna accords with Rabbi Yehuda's position that the goat sent to Azazel atones for kohanim as well. This issue is resolved - both parts of the Mishna are attributed to Rebbi, and on the issue of the goat to Azazel, he adopts Rabbi Yehuda's position. Abaye asked Rav Yosef if Rabbi Yehuda holds by Rebbi's position regarding one who did not repent before Yom Kippur. Rav Yosef explains that he does not and brings a source from Safra to support his answer, as it is known that an unattributed Safra is assumed to be authored by Rabbi Yehuda. There is a contradiction between two different sources in the Safra - one says that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance and the other says it only atones with repentance. Abaye and Rava each resolve the contradiction differently. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which sacrifices on Yom Kippur atone for all the kohanim's sins - the goat that is sent to Azazel or the bull of the high priest. What is the basis in the verses in the Torah for each of the approaches? A braita is brought regarding which sacrifice atones for the sins of the kohanim. Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the braita's author is Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Yehuda.

This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi to the continued health and good outcome for Chesya Rut bat Chana.  The Mishna explains that Yom Kippur atones for positive commandments. If one has already repented, they receive atonement immediately. Therefore, it is assumed that the Mishna is referring to one who has not yet repented. This accords with the opinion of Rebbi who holds that Yom Kippur atones even for sins for which one has not yet repented. The rabbis disagree and hold that Yom Kippur only atones for sins if one has repented. A difficulty is raised as the next part of the Mishna accords with Rabbi Yehuda's position that the goat sent to Azazel atones for kohanim as well. This issue is resolved - both parts of the Mishna are attributed to Rebbi, and on the issue of the goat to Azazel, he adopts Rabbi Yehuda's position. Abaye asked Rav Yosef if Rabbi Yehuda holds by Rebbi's position regarding one who did not repent before Yom Kippur. Rav Yosef explains that he does not and brings a source from Safra to support his answer, as it is known that an unattributed Safra is assumed to be authored by Rabbi Yehuda. There is a contradiction between two different sources in the Safra - one says that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance and the other says it only atones with repentance. Abaye and Rava each resolve the contradiction differently. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which sacrifices on Yom Kippur atone for all the kohanim's sins - the goat that is sent to Azazel or the bull of the high priest. What is the basis in the verses in the Torah for each of the approaches? A braita is brought regarding which sacrifice atones for the sins of the kohanim. Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the braita's author is Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Yehuda.

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of my uncle, Richard Cohen, Naftali ben Yosef haKohen v'Henna who passed away this week. He was a man who loved and appreciated by every person and was loved and appreciated by everyone who met him. The goat sin offering whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh kodashim on Yom Kippur atones for sins for one who knew they were impure, then forgot and went into the Temple or ate sacrificial items while impure and did not yet remember that they are impure. A braita explains from where this is derived. The different parts of the braita are analyzed. First, the braita suggested that perhaps it atones for the three most grievous sins - idolatry, murder and licentious behavior. The Gemara explains this suggestion - in what manner of performing these transgressions would one have thought this sacrifice could atone for? The first opinion in the braita, Rabbi Yehuda, is that entering the Temple/eating sacrificial items while impure is uniquely distinguished and therefore it is clear that is the one being atoned for by this special offering. The Gemara explains what the braita meant by 'uniquely distinguished' - as it has a sliding scale offering. Several other sacrifices are also uniquely distinguished, such as idol worship as one can only bring a sin offering of a female goat, a woman after childbirth, a leper, and a nazir who became impure who also can bring a sliding scale offering. Why are these not considered 'uniquely distinguished'? Rabbi Shimon derives this from the verse itself describing the offering, as it says "It atones for sanctified items from impurities." Why didn't Rabbi Yehuda accept that understanding - how does he understand the verse? Why doesn't this offering atone for all sins relating to impurity? Why is it only for a person who knew at first they were impure, then forgot, and does not have awareness of the sin? The braita explains that this atones for something not atoned by a sacrifice of an individual, as can be derived from the verse. What is being excluded by this derivation that isn't already obvious? Another derivation in the braita teaches why it specifically atones for a sin that can eventually be atoned for by an individual sin offering (when the person will realize that a sin was committed, and not for one where the person did not know before entering the Temple that one was impure, as that type can never be obligated to bring an individual offering. Why does this case need excluding, if it is already known that the latter is atoned for by the sin offering whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar on Yom Kippur? If the offering does not completely atone for the sin, but simply provides atonement until such time that the sinner realizes their sin and brings an individual offering, what is the purpose of the temporary atonement? Rabbi Zeira and Rava each offer a suggested answer - either to atone for the sin in case the sinner dies before realizing their sin or to protect from suffering. If the type of sin atoned for by the outer sin offering is derived from the inner sin offering, why can't the inner one atone for both types of sins? Or why can't the outer one atone for both?  

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of my uncle, Richard Cohen, Naftali ben Yosef haKohen v'Henna who passed away this week. He was a man who loved and appreciated by every person and was loved and appreciated by everyone who met him. The goat sin offering whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh kodashim on Yom Kippur atones for sins for one who knew they were impure, then forgot and went into the Temple or ate sacrificial items while impure and did not yet remember that they are impure. A braita explains from where this is derived. The different parts of the braita are analyzed. First, the braita suggested that perhaps it atones for the three most grievous sins - idolatry, murder and licentious behavior. The Gemara explains this suggestion - in what manner of performing these transgressions would one have thought this sacrifice could atone for? The first opinion in the braita, Rabbi Yehuda, is that entering the Temple/eating sacrificial items while impure is uniquely distinguished and therefore it is clear that is the one being atoned for by this special offering. The Gemara explains what the braita meant by 'uniquely distinguished' - as it has a sliding scale offering. Several other sacrifices are also uniquely distinguished, such as idol worship as one can only bring a sin offering of a female goat, a woman after childbirth, a leper, and a nazir who became impure who also can bring a sliding scale offering. Why are these not considered 'uniquely distinguished'? Rabbi Shimon derives this from the verse itself describing the offering, as it says "It atones for sanctified items from impurities." Why didn't Rabbi Yehuda accept that understanding - how does he understand the verse? Why doesn't this offering atone for all sins relating to impurity? Why is it only for a person who knew at first they were impure, then forgot, and does not have awareness of the sin? The braita explains that this atones for something not atoned by a sacrifice of an individual, as can be derived from the verse. What is being excluded by this derivation that isn't already obvious? Another derivation in the braita teaches why it specifically atones for a sin that can eventually be atoned for by an individual sin offering (when the person will realize that a sin was committed, and not for one where the person did not know before entering the Temple that one was impure, as that type can never be obligated to bring an individual offering. Why does this case need excluding, if it is already known that the latter is atoned for by the sin offering whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar on Yom Kippur? If the offering does not completely atone for the sin, but simply provides atonement until such time that the sinner realizes their sin and brings an individual offering, what is the purpose of the temporary atonement? Rabbi Zeira and Rava each offer a suggested answer - either to atone for the sin in case the sinner dies before realizing their sin or to protect from suffering. If the type of sin atoned for by the outer sin offering is derived from the inner sin offering, why can't the inner one atone for both types of sins? Or why can't the outer one atone for both?  

Nachum Segal presents Elliot Weiselberg with the YLS Update, an interview with Rabbi Yehuda Seif of Yeshivat Torah V'Avodah (YTVA), great Jewish music, the latest news from Israel and Morning Chizuk with Rabbi Dovid Goldwasser.

This month's learning is sponsored by Bracha Rutner in loving memory of Anna Rutner. "She was a woman who was always curious about life. She came to the US in 1958 and learned English and made an incredible life for herself raising four children and seventeen grandchildren. She will always live on in our hearts and in the number of great-grandchildren named after her."  The Gemara begins with three structural questions regarding the Mishna. Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot? Why did the Mishna list all four cases that have two cases learned from the Torah and two from the rabbis, when in the context of Masechet Shabbat and Masechet Negaim (laws of leprosy), only the relevant case for the masechet is mentioned? Why did the Mishna begin with Shevuot, but when elaborating on the details, the case of impurity came first, and only after that does the Mishna move back to elaborate on laws of oaths? The Gemara explains in each of the four categories, what two cases appear in the Torah and what two are from rabbinic law. Does the Mishna follow Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva? At first glance, it doesn't seem to follow either opinion as in oaths, Rabbi Yishmael holds one does not bring a sacrifice on oaths relating to past actions, and Rabbi Akiva holds that one does not bring a sacrifice if one forgot that the Temple was in that place or that the item was a sacrificial item. The first answer given is that each could fit with the Mishna if we adopt a different understanding of the Mishna. One could explain that the Mishna brings a list of two cases that are four, but not all obligate one in a sacrifice. This explanation is rejected since the Mishna also lists four cases for leprous marks and one is obligated to bring a sacrifice upon becoming purified from all four cases, and the assumption is that all four cases in the Mishna are similar in that way. The second answer given is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael and the Mishna refers to the obligation to receive lashes for an oath of expression that one did not keep intentionally, not a sacrifice for not keeping the oath because one forgot. This accords with Rava's position that one can derive from the verse about false oaths that one receives lashes for an oath of expression about something that happened in the past. To make this explanation fit with the Mishna, Rabbi Yishmael would need to hold that one receives lashes for a negative prohibition that to transgress it, one does not do an action, as the oath, "I will not eat," and one does not eat, does not involve an action on the part of the one who does not fulfill the oath. This raises a difficulty as Rabbi Yochanan holds like all unattributed Mishnayot, such as ours and he also holds that one does not receive lashes if no action is performed. To resolve this difficulty, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds by a different unattributed Mishna and they quote a Mishna in Makkot regarding notar, leftover meat from the Pesach sacrifice. However, this suggestion is rejected, as that Mishna can be understood following Rabbi Yehuda's explanation that it is a negative prohibition that has a positive way to fix it, lav hanitak l'asei, for which one is exempt from lashes.   

This month's learning is sponsored by Bracha Rutner in loving memory of Anna Rutner. "She was a woman who was always curious about life. She came to the US in 1958 and learned English and made an incredible life for herself raising four children and seventeen grandchildren. She will always live on in our hearts and in the number of great-grandchildren named after her."  The Gemara begins with three structural questions regarding the Mishna. Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot? Why did the Mishna list all four cases that have two cases learned from the Torah and two from the rabbis, when in the context of Masechet Shabbat and Masechet Negaim (laws of leprosy), only the relevant case for the masechet is mentioned? Why did the Mishna begin with Shevuot, but when elaborating on the details, the case of impurity came first, and only after that does the Mishna move back to elaborate on laws of oaths? The Gemara explains in each of the four categories, what two cases appear in the Torah and what two are from rabbinic law. Does the Mishna follow Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva? At first glance, it doesn't seem to follow either opinion as in oaths, Rabbi Yishmael holds one does not bring a sacrifice on oaths relating to past actions, and Rabbi Akiva holds that one does not bring a sacrifice if one forgot that the Temple was in that place or that the item was a sacrificial item. The first answer given is that each could fit with the Mishna if we adopt a different understanding of the Mishna. One could explain that the Mishna brings a list of two cases that are four, but not all obligate one in a sacrifice. This explanation is rejected since the Mishna also lists four cases for leprous marks and one is obligated to bring a sacrifice upon becoming purified from all four cases, and the assumption is that all four cases in the Mishna are similar in that way. The second answer given is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael and the Mishna refers to the obligation to receive lashes for an oath of expression that one did not keep intentionally, not a sacrifice for not keeping the oath because one forgot. This accords with Rava's position that one can derive from the verse about false oaths that one receives lashes for an oath of expression about something that happened in the past. To make this explanation fit with the Mishna, Rabbi Yishmael would need to hold that one receives lashes for a negative prohibition that to transgress it, one does not do an action, as the oath, "I will not eat," and one does not eat, does not involve an action on the part of the one who does not fulfill the oath. This raises a difficulty as Rabbi Yochanan holds like all unattributed Mishnayot, such as ours and he also holds that one does not receive lashes if no action is performed. To resolve this difficulty, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds by a different unattributed Mishna and they quote a Mishna in Makkot regarding notar, leftover meat from the Pesach sacrifice. However, this suggestion is rejected, as that Mishna can be understood following Rabbi Yehuda's explanation that it is a negative prohibition that has a positive way to fix it, lav hanitak l'asei, for which one is exempt from lashes.   

Study Guide Makkot 16 Today's daf is dedicated in commemoration of Yom HaShoah, in memory of all those who perished in the Holocaust. Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari in loving memory of her father, Ivor Rhodes, Yisrael ben Meir v'Sara. "Please send me Dad jokes and bad puns--the worse, the better. Dad was a quiet man who cared deeply about doing the right thing. In the words of my sister-in-law to him 15 years and 2 days ago: 'You are a true gentleman... with a wicked sense of humour!' As the years go by, I find myself missing him more and more." Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in memory of her mother-in law, Mrs. Mindy Lamm, on her 5th yahrzeit.  "My mother-in-law was an extraordinary woman and the full partner of her husband, Rabbi Dr. Norman Lamm, zt"l. Together, through 68 years of marriage, they raised a beautiful family while leading the Modern Orthodox world with brilliance, vision, and incredible dignity.  We miss her every day.” The debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether one gets lashes for a doubtful warning (a warning given when it wasn't clear whether the person was going to violate the prohibition) can be found in another case regarding one who takes an oath that they will eat a loaf of bread today. They also disagree about whether or not one gets lashes for a negative prohibition that does not have an action associated with it. Both are derived from the same tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, and the sources they use to support their opinions are brought. At first, they suggest that both derive it from the same statement of Rabbi Yehuda regarding notar, but that suggestion is rejected completely as neither opinion corresponds to that opinion. Two different sources of Rabbi Yehuda are brought - each one corresponding to a different opinion. Rabbi Yochanan says that there are only who mitzvot where one can get lashes for a negative commandment that has a positive commandment intended to fix it, as he holds that one only gets lashes if one nullifies the possibility for fixing it. There are only two cases where it is possible to nullify the possibility for fixing the mitzva. The first is the mitzva of sending the mother bird away, as if one takes the mother bird and her chicks and then kils the mother bird, there is no possibility to send away the mother bird. The other one he leaves to his student to figure out and the student makes various suggestions before arriving at a conclusion that it is peah. leaving over the corner of the field for the poor. The next part of the Mishna is discussed regarding lashes for creepy crawling creatures and it is explained that since there are various negative commandments in the Torah regarding this prohibition, and there are various cases where one could receive multiple sets of lashes. If one eats produce where only the tithe for the poor wasn't taken, one receives lashes. This accords with Rabbi Yosi's opinion. 

Study Guide Makkot 16 Today's daf is dedicated in commemoration of Yom HaShoah, in memory of all those who perished in the Holocaust. Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari in loving memory of her father, Ivor Rhodes, Yisrael ben Meir v'Sara. "Please send me Dad jokes and bad puns--the worse, the better. Dad was a quiet man who cared deeply about doing the right thing. In the words of my sister-in-law to him 15 years and 2 days ago: 'You are a true gentleman... with a wicked sense of humour!' As the years go by, I find myself missing him more and more." Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in memory of her mother-in law, Mrs. Mindy Lamm, on her 5th yahrzeit.  "My mother-in-law was an extraordinary woman and the full partner of her husband, Rabbi Dr. Norman Lamm, zt"l. Together, through 68 years of marriage, they raised a beautiful family while leading the Modern Orthodox world with brilliance, vision, and incredible dignity.  We miss her every day.” The debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether one gets lashes for a doubtful warning (a warning given when it wasn't clear whether the person was going to violate the prohibition) can be found in another case regarding one who takes an oath that they will eat a loaf of bread today. They also disagree about whether or not one gets lashes for a negative prohibition that does not have an action associated with it. Both are derived from the same tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, and the sources they use to support their opinions are brought. At first, they suggest that both derive it from the same statement of Rabbi Yehuda regarding notar, but that suggestion is rejected completely as neither opinion corresponds to that opinion. Two different sources of Rabbi Yehuda are brought - each one corresponding to a different opinion. Rabbi Yochanan says that there are only who mitzvot where one can get lashes for a negative commandment that has a positive commandment intended to fix it, as he holds that one only gets lashes if one nullifies the possibility for fixing it. There are only two cases where it is possible to nullify the possibility for fixing the mitzva. The first is the mitzva of sending the mother bird away, as if one takes the mother bird and her chicks and then kils the mother bird, there is no possibility to send away the mother bird. The other one he leaves to his student to figure out and the student makes various suggestions before arriving at a conclusion that it is peah. leaving over the corner of the field for the poor. The next part of the Mishna is discussed regarding lashes for creepy crawling creatures and it is explained that since there are various negative commandments in the Torah regarding this prohibition, and there are various cases where one could receive multiple sets of lashes. If one eats produce where only the tithe for the poor wasn't taken, one receives lashes. This accords with Rabbi Yosi's opinion. 

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael?  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael?  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

Rabbi Yehuda Halpert takes us 5 years back to the COVID Zoom Seder controversy, contrasts the different rabbinic responsa, and unpacks their significance for the post-pandemic era. Stay tuned for his upcoming book: Speaking to an Empty Shul: Timeless Lessons from Unprecedented Times (Mosaica Press, 2025).

Today's daf is sponsored by Sharona Shuster in loving memory of her father, Elliot Shimoff, Eliyahu Chaim ben Harav Ephraim. "He enjoyed his family, learning Torah, and Israel. He was loved by all and a true talmud chacham. His love of learning encouraged me to learn Daf at a later age and I now see his passion. Yehi zichro baruch."  Today's daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein for a refuah shleima of her grandson Eitan Efraim ben Ayelet. "Tfilot for the success of a long and complicated surgery for Eitan to repair the nervous system from his shoulder to his fingertips from his injury in Gaza. May the operating team be shlichim neamanim B"H." In three separate encounters with either the emperor or a heretic, the question is asked: how could God possibly bring back to life those who have died? In each incident, the Jew offers a different answer. In the third encounter, Geviha ben Pesisa responds. Three additional stories describe when Jews were brought to trial before Alexander of Macedon by other nations. In each case, Geviha argues on behalf of the Jews. The pattern is consistent: the opposing nation uses a verse from the Torah to attack Jewish actions, and Geviha counters with a different verse that refutes their claim. Antoninus raises several questions to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Some questions Rabbi Yehuda resolves, while on others, Antoninus convinces him of a different view. The first question concerns how both body and soul can claim exemption from judgment after death, each blaming the other for causing sin. The second asks why the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. The third explores when the soul enters a person—at conception or during fetal development. The fourth examines when the evil inclination begins to influence a person—during fetal development or at birth. Reish Lakish, Ulla, Rav Chisda, and Rava each present seemingly contradictory verses about life after death, mortality, or resurrection. Each sage then resolves the contradiction he identified. Five additional verses are presented as proof of resurrection from the Torah. Rav Yehuda, citing Rav, teaches that withholding a halakha from a student is equivalent to stealing from their inheritance, since the Torah was given as an inheritance to all Jewish people.

Today's daf is sponsored by Sharona Shuster in loving memory of her father, Elliot Shimoff, Eliyahu Chaim ben Harav Ephraim. "He enjoyed his family, learning Torah, and Israel. He was loved by all and a true talmud chacham. His love of learning encouraged me to learn Daf at a later age and I now see his passion. Yehi zichro baruch."  Today's daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein for a refuah shleima of her grandson Eitan Efraim ben Ayelet. "Tfilot for the success of a long and complicated surgery for Eitan to repair the nervous system from his shoulder to his fingertips from his injury in Gaza. May the operating team be shlichim neamanim B"H." In three separate encounters with either the emperor or a heretic, the question is asked: how could God possibly bring back to life those who have died? In each incident, the Jew offers a different answer. In the third encounter, Geviha ben Pesisa responds. Three additional stories describe when Jews were brought to trial before Alexander of Macedon by other nations. In each case, Geviha argues on behalf of the Jews. The pattern is consistent: the opposing nation uses a verse from the Torah to attack Jewish actions, and Geviha counters with a different verse that refutes their claim. Antoninus raises several questions to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Some questions Rabbi Yehuda resolves, while on others, Antoninus convinces him of a different view. The first question concerns how both body and soul can claim exemption from judgment after death, each blaming the other for causing sin. The second asks why the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. The third explores when the soul enters a person—at conception or during fetal development. The fourth examines when the evil inclination begins to influence a person—during fetal development or at birth. Reish Lakish, Ulla, Rav Chisda, and Rava each present seemingly contradictory verses about life after death, mortality, or resurrection. Each sage then resolves the contradiction he identified. Five additional verses are presented as proof of resurrection from the Torah. Rav Yehuda, citing Rav, teaches that withholding a halakha from a student is equivalent to stealing from their inheritance, since the Torah was given as an inheritance to all Jewish people.

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in loving memory of her father Chaskel Tydor, R. Yechezkel Shraga ben R. Yehuda Leib Halevi and Esther on his 32nd yahrzeit. "A Torah scholar who survived Auschwitz and Buchenwald, founded "Kibbutz Buchenwald" after the war, and merited living in Eretz Yisrael. He would have been amazed and happy to know that his youngest daughter and two granddaughters learn Daf Yomi with Hadran." Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Plunka in loving memory of Moshe ben Amram, "Moshe Rabbenu". Rava challenges the two previous interpretations of the Mishna, citing a contradictory braita. He offers a third explanation with supporting evidence. According to Rava, the two opinions in the Mishna address different scenarios: the tanna kama discusses a case where an arrow was shot from between two people, making it impossible to identify who shot it. Both individuals are exempt from punishment, even if one is known to be righteous. Rabbi Yehuda, however, refers to a case of a bull that killed someone and then was mixed up with other bulls. Since all these bulls are now forbidden for use, they are all placed in a kipa (small enclosure) until they die. A braita is presented that supports Rava's interpretation of the Mishna. The first section discusses a pregnant cow that kills a person and is sentenced to stoning. The status of its unborn calf depends on whether the verdict was issued before or after birth. This appears to be independent of when the cow became pregnant, which doesn't make sense in light of Rava's statement that if the cow was pregnant at the time of killing, the offspring shares responsibility since it is considered part of the cow. The Gemara initially suggests the pregnancy occurred after the verdict, but rejects this solution. The conclusion is that the pregnancy happened after the killing but before the verdict was issued. Does a warning to a potential transgressor need to specify the exact type of death penalty they would face? Rav Yehuda amends his father's version of the Mishna regarding people sentenced to stoning who were mixed up with those sentenced to burning, explaining that without this correction, Rabbi Shimon's language in the Mishna would be implausible. Had the original version been correct, Rabbi Shimon would likely have offered a different explanation altogether.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in loving memory of her father Chaskel Tydor, R. Yechezkel Shraga ben R. Yehuda Leib Halevi and Esther on his 32nd yahrzeit. "A Torah scholar who survived Auschwitz and Buchenwald, founded "Kibbutz Buchenwald" after the war, and merited living in Eretz Yisrael. He would have been amazed and happy to know that his youngest daughter and two granddaughters learn Daf Yomi with Hadran." Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Plunka in loving memory of Moshe ben Amram, "Moshe Rabbenu". Rava challenges the two previous interpretations of the Mishna, citing a contradictory braita. He offers a third explanation with supporting evidence. According to Rava, the two opinions in the Mishna address different scenarios: the tanna kama discusses a case where an arrow was shot from between two people, making it impossible to identify who shot it. Both individuals are exempt from punishment, even if one is known to be righteous. Rabbi Yehuda, however, refers to a case of a bull that killed someone and then was mixed up with other bulls. Since all these bulls are now forbidden for use, they are all placed in a kipa (small enclosure) until they die. A braita is presented that supports Rava's interpretation of the Mishna. The first section discusses a pregnant cow that kills a person and is sentenced to stoning. The status of its unborn calf depends on whether the verdict was issued before or after birth. This appears to be independent of when the cow became pregnant, which doesn't make sense in light of Rava's statement that if the cow was pregnant at the time of killing, the offspring shares responsibility since it is considered part of the cow. The Gemara initially suggests the pregnancy occurred after the verdict, but rejects this solution. The conclusion is that the pregnancy happened after the killing but before the verdict was issued. Does a warning to a potential transgressor need to specify the exact type of death penalty they would face? Rav Yehuda amends his father's version of the Mishna regarding people sentenced to stoning who were mixed up with those sentenced to burning, explaining that without this correction, Rabbi Shimon's language in the Mishna would be implausible. Had the original version been correct, Rabbi Shimon would likely have offered a different explanation altogether.  

Study Guide Sanhedrin 79 Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandfather, Ben Goldstein on his yahrzeit. What type of intent is needed in order for one to receive the death penalty for murder? Rabbi Shimon has a unique approach, that one only gets capital punishment if one intends to kill that particular person. The rabbis disagree but also have their own set of criteria. Rabbi Shimon derives his opinion from the verse in Devraim 19:11, "and he ambushes him and stands up against him and kills him." The rabbis derive a different law from that verse - that if one throws a rock into a group of people and kills one of them, the murderer is not held liable. The Gemara tries to establish the exact case that the rabbis derive and conclude that it must be a case where there were nine Jews in the group and one gentile. The law is lenient here as even though the majority are Jews, if they are fixed, then the doubt is considered 50/50 and we are lenient in cases of capital punishment.  After questioning Rabbi Shimon from a case in Shmot 21:22 when a pregnant woman is accidentally killed and the murderer is killed, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon must hold like Rebbi, that the murderer there is not actually killed, but needs to pay money. A third opinion is brought, of Chizkia, who rules that the murderer is not even obligated to pay, as the laws that we hold by the more severe punishment, and exempt from a less severe punishment apply even in cases where the death penalty could have potentially been there, but is not.  If a murderer gets mixed up with a group of people and there is no way to identify who the murderer is, what can be done? The Mishna brings a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda.  Three different interpretations are brought to explain the case that they are debating.

There is a custom among Sepharadim to sing the Piyut (hymn), "Mi Kamocha Ve'en Kamocha" on the Shabbat before Purim. This song is, essentially, a poetic description of the Purim story. It follows the sequence of the Hebrew alphabet, and each line is taken from a verse in Tanach and concludes with the word "Lo." It is remarkable to consider that it was written without the help of computers, and the author cited these verses from memory. Our custom is to sing the first three and last three stanzas before Musaf in the synagogue, and then to sing the entire Piyut at home after the Shabbat meal. Hacham Ovadia Yosef, in his Hazon Ovadia – Purim (p. 351; listen to audio recording for precise citation), elaborates on the history of this hymn and its author, Rabbi Yehuda Halevi. Rabbi Yehuda Halevi was a renowned Spanish scholar and poet who lived around the year 4500 (approximately 1200 years ago), during the times of Rav Yosef Ibn Migash. Hacham Ovadia writes that it has been said about Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, "Hishamer Lecha Ben Ta'azob Et Ha'levi" – "Beware, not to abandon the Levi" – alluding to the fact that we should read and study his works. He is the author of the famous philosophical work Hakuzari, which tells the story of a Jewish scholar who convinced the king of the Khazars about the truth of the Jewish faith. Hacham Ovadia cites the Radbaz (Rabbi David Ben Zimra, Egypt, 1479-1573) as describing the value of this work, and how it is worthwhile for every Jew to study it and "etch it upon the hearts of his children and students." Furthermore, Hacham Ovadia cites from a number of early sources that the story told in Sefer Hakuzari is true, and the king of the Khazars was indeed moved by the scholar's arguments and ultimately converted to Judaism. Some say that the scholar in the story was the one who actually wrote down the events, and Rabbi Yehuda Halevi simply translated that original account into Arabic. It was later translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Shemuel Ibn Tibbon. Hacham Ovadia further relates that Rabbi Yehuda Halevi was a man of great wealth, and he had an exceptionally beautiful daughter. When she reached adulthood, Rabbi Yehuda Halevi's wife was very anxious to see her married, to the point where Rabbi Yehuda Halevi swore that he would give his daughter in marriage to the next Jewish man who came to their home. The next day, the famous Sage Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra showed up, dressed in tattered garments, as he was impoverished. The girl was horror-stricken upon seeing Ibn Ezra, and her mother approached Rabbi Yehuda Halevi to plead with him not to allow this man to marry their daughter. Rabbi Yehuda Halevi spoke with Ibn Ezra, who, in his great humility, did not reveal his identity. Rabbi Yehuda then went with Ibn Ezra to the Bet Midrash, and he sat down to compose the Mi Kamocha hymn. The hymn, as mentioned earlier, follows the sequence of the Hebrew alphabet, and when Rabbi Yehuda reached the letter "Resh," he had trouble coming up with an appropriate sentence. At that point, his wife came and urged him to come home to eat, and Ibn Ezra stayed in the Bet Midrash. He peered at Rabbi Yehuda Halevi's work, and made some corrections, and also composed an intricate stanza for the letter "Resh." When Rabbi Yehuda returned, he looked at the paper and realized that this man was Ibn Ezra. He warmly embraced and kissed Ibn Ezra, and told him that he will marry his daughter. Ibn Ezra indeed married Rabbi Yehuda Halevi's daughter, and became wealthy. In the end, Rabbi Yehuda composed his own stanza for "Resh," but in deference to Ibn Ezra, he incorporated his stanza, as well. Hacham Ovadia proceeds to cite Rabbi Shaul Ha'kohen's comment in his work Nochah Ha'shulhan, that the custom in his city, Tunis, was to chant "Mi Kamocha" in the middle of "Az Yashir," just prior to the verse, "Mi Kamocha Be'elim Hashem." It indeed appears that this was Rabbi Yehuda Halevi's intent, as the end of this hymn speaks of the miracle of the Yam Suf, the subject of Az Yashir. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shaul Ha'kohen instituted that it should be recited after the repetition of the Amida, as is customary in most communities, in order not to make an interruption in Pesukeh De'zimra. He notes that the Piyutim recited in the prayer service during the Yamim Nora'im should likewise be recited either before Pesukeh De'zimra of after the repetition of the Amida, and not in the paragraph of Yoser Or, as they are in some communities. The Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1807), in his work Tub Ha'ayin (18), likewise established that the Piyutim should not be recited until after the repetition of the Amida. In any event, everyone should certainly make a point of following this time-honored custom and sing this Piyut, and, G-d-willing, we should be worthy of singing a "Shira Hadasha" – a new song at the time of the final redemption. Rashi comments that when the Gemara establishes the Halacha of "Mishenichnas Adar Marbim Be'simha" (we increase our joy when Adar begins), this is because Adar ushers in the period of Purim and Pesah, which are holidays of redemption. This is the season when we anticipate our final redemption, as the Sages famously comment, "In Nissan they were redeemed, and in the Nissan we will be redeemed in the future." We thus hope and pray that just as we sing the praises of Hashem now, we will have the privilege of singing His praise after the final redemption, Amen.

Study Guide Sanhedrin 79 Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandfather, Ben Goldstein on his yahrzeit. What type of intent is needed in order for one to receive the death penalty for murder? Rabbi Shimon has a unique approach, that one only gets capital punishment if one intends to kill that particular person. The rabbis disagree but also have their own set of criteria. Rabbi Shimon derives his opinion from the verse in Devraim 19:11, "and he ambushes him and stands up against him and kills him." The rabbis derive a different law from that verse - that if one throws a rock into a group of people and kills one of them, the murderer is not held liable. The Gemara tries to establish the exact case that the rabbis derive and conclude that it must be a case where there were nine Jews in the group and one gentile. The law is lenient here as even though the majority are Jews, if they are fixed, then the doubt is considered 50/50 and we are lenient in cases of capital punishment.  After questioning Rabbi Shimon from a case in Shmot 21:22 when a pregnant woman is accidentally killed and the murderer is killed, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon must hold like Rebbi, that the murderer there is not actually killed, but needs to pay money. A third opinion is brought, of Chizkia, who rules that the murderer is not even obligated to pay, as the laws that we hold by the more severe punishment, and exempt from a less severe punishment apply even in cases where the death penalty could have potentially been there, but is not.  If a murderer gets mixed up with a group of people and there is no way to identify who the murderer is, what can be done? The Mishna brings a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda.  Three different interpretations are brought to explain the case that they are debating.

This week's learning is sponsored by Anne Rubin. "I would like to thank two people that have had the greatest influence on my Jewish life and learning in the most recent years. Michelle Farber who has become my study partner through her podcast since I started Daf Yomi in January 2020. I have not missed a day of reading or listening. And to Rabbi Elliot Cosgrove who has inspired me in more ways than I can say in reconnecting with my Jewish soul."  Today's daf is sponsored by Judith Weil in memory of Rabbi Eliahu Chaim Greenberg, z"l on his 50th yahrzeit, this past Monday. "My grandfather was an ilui who grew up in difficult circumstances. He didn’t know how to tell you he loved you in words, so he’d tell you by sitting you down to learn a daf of Gemara together. Yehi zichro baruch." Today's daf is sponsored by Rhona Fink in loving memory of her brother-in-law Michael Desroches who passed away February 26th. "Michael was a self-described Christian Zionist, devoted to Israel and the future of the Jewish people." If a group of people beat up one person to death, none of them receive the death penalty. But if they beat them one after another, there is a debate whether no one receives the death penalty, or the last one does,  as the last person brought the death upon them sooner. How does each interpret the verse in Vayikra 24:17 differently? What are the laws regarding a person who is a treifa - one who is assessed to die within twelve months - what if a person like that is killed, kills, or testifies against another?  If one puts a snake up to another's body to bite, is the person killed or is the snake killed? The rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? On what basis? If one hits another and is assessed to die but then recovers somewhat and then subsequently dies, can the one who hit be killed as punishment for the death or not? Rabbi Nechamia and the rabbis disagree. How does each interpret the verse in Shmot 21: 19 differently?

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in loving memory of Art’s mother Shirley, Sarah bat Avraham v’Ziche Reicha on her 9th yahrzeit. “She was a life-long learner, a striver, she sewed and made mosaics. Once her three children were old enough, she went back to school, earned a master’s degree, created a new career doing social work and counseling, and published four books on raising a family. She lives on in the tallitot and quilts she made. Today's daf is sponsored by Deborah Aschheim Weiss is loving memory of Elsie Muller on her 30th yahrtzeit. "Elsie was a family friend, 50 years my senior. She had no children of her own, so she adopted my family as hers. We were close friends and we confided in each other. She devoted her retirement to Jewish causes and would be very proud of her adopted children and grandchildren in Israel and USA." Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in loving memory of her mother, Peppy Senders, Pesha Rivka bat Gershon HaCohen and Bina, on her yahrzeit. "It has been 21 years, and my mother's wisdom, kindness and patience are still my North Star." Today's daf is sponsored by the Shuster family in loving memory of Ozer's mother Devora bat Yisroel. "May her devotion to Torah and mitzvot be a merit to the entire Jewish people." A rebellious son will only be convicted if he steals money from his father and eats in the domain of others, as only in that situation will it be likely that the son continue to act in this way. Why? Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda rules that he must steal from both parents. Since the wife does not generally own her own property, two explanations are brought to understand his opinion. Both parents have to agree to bring the son to the court. Rabbi Yehuda adds that if the mother is not worthy for the father, the son cannot be convicted. The Gemara establishes the meaning of his statement - they must have the same voice, height, and look alike. This is derived from the verse in the Torah, Devarim 21:20 "he doesn't listen to our voice." The braita that says that a rebellious son never existed, nor will it ever exist, presumably accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is impossible to find a couple who are identical in appearance, voice, and height. Rabbi Shimon also agrees that a rebellious son never happened and never will. Rabbi Yonatan disagrees and says he sat on his grave. There is a similar debate about an ir hanidachat, a city that all worship idols, and a leprous house. The Mishna also excludes any case where one of the parents is lame, mute, blind, etc. as the parents will be unable to complete the process as defined in the Torah. Can we infer from here that when the Torah describes how a process is supposed to happen, it must be done exactly in that way? After the son steals and eats meat and wine in a large quantity, the parents bring the son to a court of three judges and he is flogged. If he continues in his ways, he is brought to a court of twenty-three and judged to be stoned. The obligation to flog is derived by means of a gezeira shava from the word "v'yisru" by the one who slanders his wife (Devarim 22:18)  to that same word in the rebellious son (Devarim 21:18) and from "ben" to "ben" (Devarim 25:2) in the verse regarding lashes. If the son is brought to court but then runs away and by the time they catch him, he is no longer within the age range of one who can be killed for being a rebellious child, can he be executed? It depends on whether he was convicted before he ran away. Rabbi Chanina rules that a ben Noah who curses God and then converts is not convicted as the laws for judging him and the death penalty have changed.  Four sources, including the two parts of our Mishna, regarding a rebellious son who aged out before the ruling/execution, are brought to prove or disprove this ruling, but all comparisons are rejected. A rebellious son is killed because of the concern for where these actions will lead him in the future.

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in loving memory of Honorable Myriam Altman, Myriam Bat Shlomo z”l. “It’s been 20 years without her, and her love and wisdom still guides our every path.” Rabbi Ami held that if one does various forbidden acts of idol worship unwittingly and then realizes one's mistake, one is obligated to bring only one sin offering. Abaye explained the source for Rabbi Ami, "Do not worship them," but he disagreed with Rabbi Ami and held that one would need to offer separate sin offerings for each action. The Mishna rules that one receives the death penalty for saying to an idol, "You are my God." Rav Nachman quoted Rav as having said that also. The Gemara infers that Rav's statement must have referred to obligating one to bring a sacrifice, as the death penalty was already derived from the Mishna. They also explain that his opinion only accords with Rabbi Akiva's position in his disagreement with the rabbis (according to Reish Lakish's understanding of their debate) about whether one who curses God unwittingly can be obligated to bring a sin offering. The rabbis rule that since the person sinned with words only, there is no sin offering, while Rabbi Akiva disagrees. Rav's opinion is derived from a verse relating to the sin of the golden calf. The Gemara continues to bring a different drasha from the words in that verse Shmot 32:8, "heelucha" in plural, mentioning the idol and God, reflecting that the Jews did not reject God completely. However, there is a tannaitic debate regarding the meaning of the word in that context. The Mishna listed various actions for which one does not receive the death penalty. Does one get lashes for them? And if so, for which of the actions? There are two different traditions relating to this and each one is challenged as some fall into the category of a negative commandment that does not have an action (words only) and a negative commandment that includes many different prohibitions, both of which are exempt from lashes. The first version is rejected, but the second is explained according to the position of Rabbi Yehuda, who obligates one to receive lashes even for a negative commandment without an action. One cannot go into a partnership with an idol worshipper as it may cause the idol worshipped to vow in the name of the idol. One cannot mention the name of an idol, unless it is a name mentioned in the Tanach.  Is idol worship something that people have a strong desire to do? 

Study Guide Sanhedrin 54 Today's daf is sponsored by Roslyn Jaffe in loving memory of her mother, Dita Muhlrad, Duba Feiga bat Menachem. "My mom was a true Yiddishe mama who instilled Torah values in her children. She was so proud of all my academic accomplishments and would have gotten much nachat from my Daf Yomi studies." Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Ohad Ben Ami, Or Levy and Eli Sharabi after 491 days in captivity. Wishing them a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages.  Rabbi Yehuda according to the version in our Mishna, holds (against the rabbis) that if one has relations unwittingly with one's mother who is also one's father's wife, he is only obligated one sin offering. How are the verses in Vayikra that relate to the forbidden relations with one's mother/father's wife understood according to Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis? The Mishna then discusses homosexual relations and bestiality and the Gemara proceeds to extrapolate the verses relating to those situations - from where do we learn the punishment and the warning for both the initiator and the one to whom relations were initiated?

This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment? 

What specific transgressions are punished by stoning? For some transgressions, the punishment is explicitly mentioned in the Torah, while for others it is derived from a gezeira shava using the words "demaihem bam" that appear in the context of a necromancer and a sorcerer. Why is the derivation is not made from the words "mot yumatu" instead. According to the version in the Mishna, Rabbi Yehuda holds a different view from the rabbis regarding a specific case: if a man has intercourse with his mother who is also his father's wife, he is only obligated once (in an accidental scenario, he would bring only one sin offering). The Gemara first presents an alternative version of Rabbi Yehuda's position, stating that if the mother was forbidden to marry the father, then the son is only obligated once for relations with his mother, not because she was his father's wife. To properly understand this interpretation, it seems that Rabbi Yehuda follows Rabbi Akiva's opinion that a marriage to someone forbidden by a negative prohibition is invalid. The version of Rabbi Yehuda in the Mishna is subsequently confirmed by Rabbi Yitzchak. Abaye, Rav Acha, and Rava each provide explanations for this version of Rabbi Yehuda. However, both Abaye and Rav Acha's suggestions are ultimately rejected.