Podcasts about rabbi yehuda

Shmuel holds that, according to Rabbi Akiva, wine may be brought as a voluntary offering, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, a braita records that Rabbi Akiva maintained the wine was poured into cups at the top of the altar, which raises a difficulty for Shmuel's position. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that Shmuel follows Rabbi Shimon, while the braita reflects Rabbi Yehuda's view regarding whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome (davar sh'aino mitkaven). In this case, pouring wine on the altar partially extinguishes the fire, which is forbidden by Torah law, though the intention is not to extinguish it. A further difficulty is raised: Shmuel himself rules like Rabbi Yehuda in prohibiting extinguishing a wood coal found in the public domain. This is resolved by distinguishing between the two cases. Shmuel aligns with Rabbi Shimon regarding davar she'eino mitkaven (an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibited action), but with Rabbi Yehuda regarding melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa (performing a forbidden action not for its typical purpose). If the blood of a sin offering is sprinkled on a garment before the blood is presented on the altar, that garment requires laundering in the Azara. This applies both to sin offerings brought on the outer altar and those brought on the inner altar, but not to bird sin offerings. This distinction is derived from a drasha on Vayikra 6:18, which both expands and limits the law. Why are bird offerings excluded while inner sin offerings are included? Three answers are given. Two questions were asked about bird sin offerings. The answer to the second was supplied from a braita related to this topic, but ultimately both questions remain unresolved. Levi asked whether blood that transferred from one garment to another also requires laundering. Rebbi answers that it does and explains the reasoning.  

Shmuel holds that, according to Rabbi Akiva, wine may be brought as a voluntary offering, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, a braita records that Rabbi Akiva maintained the wine was poured into cups at the top of the altar, which raises a difficulty for Shmuel's position. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that Shmuel follows Rabbi Shimon, while the braita reflects Rabbi Yehuda's view regarding whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome (davar sh'aino mitkaven). In this case, pouring wine on the altar partially extinguishes the fire, which is forbidden by Torah law, though the intention is not to extinguish it. A further difficulty is raised: Shmuel himself rules like Rabbi Yehuda in prohibiting extinguishing a wood coal found in the public domain. This is resolved by distinguishing between the two cases. Shmuel aligns with Rabbi Shimon regarding davar she'eino mitkaven (an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibited action), but with Rabbi Yehuda regarding melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa (performing a forbidden action not for its typical purpose). If the blood of a sin offering is sprinkled on a garment before the blood is presented on the altar, that garment requires laundering in the Azara. This applies both to sin offerings brought on the outer altar and those brought on the inner altar, but not to bird sin offerings. This distinction is derived from a drasha on Vayikra 6:18, which both expands and limits the law. Why are bird offerings excluded while inner sin offerings are included? Three answers are given. Two questions were asked about bird sin offerings. The answer to the second was supplied from a braita related to this topic, but ultimately both questions remain unresolved. Levi asked whether blood that transferred from one garment to another also requires laundering. Rebbi answers that it does and explains the reasoning.  

If one sacrifice is more frequent (tadir), but another is more sanctified, which takes precedence? Three cases are brought from the first Mishna of the chapter (Zevachim 89) to prove that frequency takes precedence, but each is rejected in the same manner. A Mishna relating to the order of blessings in kiddush and a statement of Rabbi Yochanan are also cited to support the principle of frequency, but these too are rejected. Finally, an inference is drawn from the Mishna in Zevachim 90, which implies that if a peace offering and a guilt or sin offering were before the kohen, and both were from that day, the guilt or sin offering would take precedence - even though peace offerings are more common. To reject this proof, Rava distinguishes between "frequent" and "common." Rav Huna challenges Rava's distinction from a source about brit mila and Pesach, where brit mila is considered tadir. His difficulty, however, is resolved in two possible ways. Another question arises: if a less frequent sacrifice is slaughtered first and then they realize their error, should someone mix the blood (to prevent coagulation) while the more frequent sacrifice is offered first, or should they complete the one already begun? Four sources are brought to address this issue (three of which were also cited earlier), but all attempts are rejected. In the Mishna, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Tarfon disagree about whether oil can be offered in the Temple as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Tarfon, who permits it, only a kmitza (handful) is burned on the altar, while the remainder is given to the kohanim to eat. Rabbi Zeira supports Shmuel's view from the Mishna, while Abaye presents an alternative opinion: that a voluntary oil offering is burned in its entirety, also citing proof from the Mishna. A Tosefta raises a difficulty for Shmuel, but it is resolved. The Gemara then suggests that this is a tannaitic debate; after an attempt to refute the suggestion, it is upheld. Regarding wine, there is likewise a debate about whether it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Akiva, it may be offered, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, this raises the issue of partially extinguishing the altar's fire, which is forbidden by Torah law. Others maintain that the wine is poured into the cups at the top of the altar. The Gemara concludes that this debate parallels the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda (usually in the context of melacha on Shabbat) about whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome.

If one sacrifice is more frequent (tadir), but another is more sanctified, which takes precedence? Three cases are brought from the first Mishna of the chapter (Zevachim 89) to prove that frequency takes precedence, but each is rejected in the same manner. A Mishna relating to the order of blessings in kiddush and a statement of Rabbi Yochanan are also cited to support the principle of frequency, but these too are rejected. Finally, an inference is drawn from the Mishna in Zevachim 90, which implies that if a peace offering and a guilt or sin offering were before the kohen, and both were from that day, the guilt or sin offering would take precedence - even though peace offerings are more common. To reject this proof, Rava distinguishes between "frequent" and "common." Rav Huna challenges Rava's distinction from a source about brit mila and Pesach, where brit mila is considered tadir. His difficulty, however, is resolved in two possible ways. Another question arises: if a less frequent sacrifice is slaughtered first and then they realize their error, should someone mix the blood (to prevent coagulation) while the more frequent sacrifice is offered first, or should they complete the one already begun? Four sources are brought to address this issue (three of which were also cited earlier), but all attempts are rejected. In the Mishna, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Tarfon disagree about whether oil can be offered in the Temple as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Tarfon, who permits it, only a kmitza (handful) is burned on the altar, while the remainder is given to the kohanim to eat. Rabbi Zeira supports Shmuel's view from the Mishna, while Abaye presents an alternative opinion: that a voluntary oil offering is burned in its entirety, also citing proof from the Mishna. A Tosefta raises a difficulty for Shmuel, but it is resolved. The Gemara then suggests that this is a tannaitic debate; after an attempt to refute the suggestion, it is upheld. Regarding wine, there is likewise a debate about whether it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Akiva, it may be offered, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, this raises the issue of partially extinguishing the altar's fire, which is forbidden by Torah law. Others maintain that the wine is poured into the cups at the top of the altar. The Gemara concludes that this debate parallels the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda (usually in the context of melacha on Shabbat) about whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

Study Guide In the dispute among the five Tannaim regarding which items remain on the altar even if they have become invalid, Reish Lakish points out cases where there is a practical halakhic difference between the various opinions. According to the Gemara, his novelty lies in one specific case, where he wanted to emphasize that Rabbi Shimon still maintains his position in a case of libations that accompany the sacrifice but were not brought on the same day the sacrifice was offered. There is also a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda regarding which types of disqualifications fall under the rule of "if they have ascended [the altar], they do not descend." The Gemara cites a braita that explains the textual basis for their respective opinions.

Study Guide In the dispute among the five Tannaim regarding which items remain on the altar even if they have become invalid, Reish Lakish points out cases where there is a practical halakhic difference between the various opinions. According to the Gemara, his novelty lies in one specific case, where he wanted to emphasize that Rabbi Shimon still maintains his position in a case of libations that accompany the sacrifice but were not brought on the same day the sacrifice was offered. There is also a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda regarding which types of disqualifications fall under the rule of "if they have ascended [the altar], they do not descend." The Gemara cites a braita that explains the textual basis for their respective opinions.

Study Guide Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim - is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in? Or taken out and brought to the altar and then back to the parochet?   Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon disagree regarding sacrifices whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary. Is the offering disqualified merely by the act of bringing the blood inside, or only if the blood is actually presented on the altar? The Gemara cites sources for each opinion and explains the underlying basis of their debate. Rabbi Yehuda rules that blood brought into the Sanctuary accidentally is exempt from disqualification. But what would he say if the blood was brought in intentionally, would it be disqualified only if it was presented? Rabbi Yirmia introduces a braita to address this question. Items that are disqualified are not meant to be placed on the altar. Yet if they are placed there, the altar sanctifies them and they must remain. However, there is a tannaitic dispute regarding which types of items are not removed once placed on the altar. Five different opinions are presented, and the Gemara explores the reasoning behind each of these views and why they disagree.

Study Guide Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim - is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in? Or taken out and brought to the altar and then back to the parochet?   Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon disagree regarding sacrifices whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary. Is the offering disqualified merely by the act of bringing the blood inside, or only if the blood is actually presented on the altar? The Gemara cites sources for each opinion and explains the underlying basis of their debate. Rabbi Yehuda rules that blood brought into the Sanctuary accidentally is exempt from disqualification. But what would he say if the blood was brought in intentionally, would it be disqualified only if it was presented? Rabbi Yirmia introduces a braita to address this question. Items that are disqualified are not meant to be placed on the altar. Yet if they are placed there, the altar sanctifies them and they must remain. However, there is a tannaitic dispute regarding which types of items are not removed once placed on the altar. Five different opinions are presented, and the Gemara explores the reasoning behind each of these views and why they disagree.

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

A contradiction between the Mishna in Mikvaot 10:6, which seems to be Rabbi Yehuda's position anrules according to majority, and Rabbi Yehuda in the braita, who follows appearance, is resolved in two ways. Abaye suggests that in the braita, where the position is stricter, Rabbi Yehuda is quoting Rabban Gamliel, who was known for his stringency in cases of nullification, as he did not allow nullification at all in mixtures of the same type (min b'mino). Rava, however, explains that the more lenient opinion in Mikvaot refers to a case where only the outside of the cup was impure. By Torah law, the mikveh waters need only pass over the rim, not fill the cup. Since the requirement to fill the cup is rabbinic, there is room for leniency. Rabbi Elazar disagrees with Reish Lakish regarding pigul and notar that became mixed together. He holds that just as mitzvot do not nullify one another, prohibitions likewise do not nullify each other. This principle is based on Hillel, who would eat matza and maror together on Pesach to fulfill the commandment that they be eaten simultaneously. If mitzvot could nullify one another, the strong taste of the maror would cancel the taste of the matza, preventing fulfillment of the mitzva of eating matza in that manner. Regarding min b'mino, a mixture of the same type, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis as to whether it can be nullified. A similar debate appears in the Tosefta Taharot 5:3 between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the rabbis in a case of a shard that absorbed urine: can it be purified by soaking or rinsing in urine? In the Mishna, there is also a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blood mixed with problematic blood. The question arises: does Rabbi Eliezer disagree in both cases - disqualified blood and dam hatamtzit (the blood that flows from inside the animal) - or only in the latter case? The Mishna explores various scenarios of blood mixtures and clarifies where Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis differ.

A contradiction between the Mishna in Mikvaot 10:6, which seems to be Rabbi Yehuda's position anrules according to majority, and Rabbi Yehuda in the braita, who follows appearance, is resolved in two ways. Abaye suggests that in the braita, where the position is stricter, Rabbi Yehuda is quoting Rabban Gamliel, who was known for his stringency in cases of nullification, as he did not allow nullification at all in mixtures of the same type (min b'mino). Rava, however, explains that the more lenient opinion in Mikvaot refers to a case where only the outside of the cup was impure. By Torah law, the mikveh waters need only pass over the rim, not fill the cup. Since the requirement to fill the cup is rabbinic, there is room for leniency. Rabbi Elazar disagrees with Reish Lakish regarding pigul and notar that became mixed together. He holds that just as mitzvot do not nullify one another, prohibitions likewise do not nullify each other. This principle is based on Hillel, who would eat matza and maror together on Pesach to fulfill the commandment that they be eaten simultaneously. If mitzvot could nullify one another, the strong taste of the maror would cancel the taste of the matza, preventing fulfillment of the mitzva of eating matza in that manner. Regarding min b'mino, a mixture of the same type, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis as to whether it can be nullified. A similar debate appears in the Tosefta Taharot 5:3 between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the rabbis in a case of a shard that absorbed urine: can it be purified by soaking or rinsing in urine? In the Mishna, there is also a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blood mixed with problematic blood. The question arises: does Rabbi Eliezer disagree in both cases - disqualified blood and dam hatamtzit (the blood that flows from inside the animal) - or only in the latter case? The Mishna explores various scenarios of blood mixtures and clarifies where Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis differ.

The Mishna addresses the case of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances: under what circumstances can it still be offered on the altar? If the mixture retains the appearance of blood, it may be brought. If it is mixed with a substance of the same color, such as wine or blood not designated for sacrifice, but had that substance been water the blood would still be recognizable, then the blood is likewise valid for the altar. Rabbi Yehuda, however, rules that blood is not nullified in other blood, since they are of the same essence. Therefore, even if only a minimal amount of sacrificial blood is present in a mixture with other bloods, it may still be sprinkled on the altar. By contrast, if the blood is mixed with disqualified blood, such as the blood that flows after the initial spurt of slaughter, the mixture must be spilled and cannot be used. Rabbi Eliezer permits it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, limits the Mishna's ruling to a case where another substance spilled into the blood. But if blood dripped into water, each drop would be nullified upon contact, immediately rejected from altar service. Once rejected, it cannot later be accepted, even if the majority of the final mixture is blood. This principle of "rejection" applies only to kodashim, not to mitzvot such as the commandment to cover the blood after slaughter. Reish Lakish rules regarding a mixture of pigul and notar: if one eats them together, there is no punishment of lashes. From this, the Gemara derives three principles about mixtures: (1) even forbidden items can nullify one another; (2) the rule that an item imparting taste is considered significant and not nullified is not a Torah law; (3) a warning given in a case of doubt (hatra'at safek) is not considered a valid warning. A difficulty is raised against the second principle. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve it, the derivation is rejected. Reish Lakish was speaking of pigul and notar involving two similar items, i.e. meat and meat, which are nullified by majority since their taste is indistinguishable. Taste is only a factor when dissimilar items are mixed, where the flavor is perceptible. The Gemara then questions: if similar items are nullified by majority, why does the Mishna, in the case of wine and blood, assess whether the wine would be noticeable if it were water? Since both taste and visibility rely on the same concept, it seems the Mishna treats two similar items as if they were different. If so, why not apply the same reasoning to Reish Lakish's case of pigul and notar, viewing them as distinct, and if they impart taste, liability should follow? After one failed attempt to reinterpret the Mishna, the Gemara resolves the difficulty differently: there is a tannaitic dispute. The Mishna reflects Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, while Reish Lakish follows the rabbis. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from a Mishna Mikvaot 10:6. To explain it, one must assume the Mishna is authored by Rabbi Yehuda, since it employs the principle of "we view the item as if…". Yet at the end of the Mishna, purification waters are nullified in a mikveh if the mikveh waters are the majority. This stands in opposition to Rabbi Yehuda's stance that similar items are treated as different and are not nullified based on appearance.  

The Mishna addresses the case of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances: under what circumstances can it still be offered on the altar? If the mixture retains the appearance of blood, it may be brought. If it is mixed with a substance of the same color, such as wine or blood not designated for sacrifice, but had that substance been water the blood would still be recognizable, then the blood is likewise valid for the altar. Rabbi Yehuda, however, rules that blood is not nullified in other blood, since they are of the same essence. Therefore, even if only a minimal amount of sacrificial blood is present in a mixture with other bloods, it may still be sprinkled on the altar. By contrast, if the blood is mixed with disqualified blood, such as the blood that flows after the initial spurt of slaughter, the mixture must be spilled and cannot be used. Rabbi Eliezer permits it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, limits the Mishna's ruling to a case where another substance spilled into the blood. But if blood dripped into water, each drop would be nullified upon contact, immediately rejected from altar service. Once rejected, it cannot later be accepted, even if the majority of the final mixture is blood. This principle of "rejection" applies only to kodashim, not to mitzvot such as the commandment to cover the blood after slaughter. Reish Lakish rules regarding a mixture of pigul and notar: if one eats them together, there is no punishment of lashes. From this, the Gemara derives three principles about mixtures: (1) even forbidden items can nullify one another; (2) the rule that an item imparting taste is considered significant and not nullified is not a Torah law; (3) a warning given in a case of doubt (hatra'at safek) is not considered a valid warning. A difficulty is raised against the second principle. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve it, the derivation is rejected. Reish Lakish was speaking of pigul and notar involving two similar items, i.e. meat and meat, which are nullified by majority since their taste is indistinguishable. Taste is only a factor when dissimilar items are mixed, where the flavor is perceptible. The Gemara then questions: if similar items are nullified by majority, why does the Mishna, in the case of wine and blood, assess whether the wine would be noticeable if it were water? Since both taste and visibility rely on the same concept, it seems the Mishna treats two similar items as if they were different. If so, why not apply the same reasoning to Reish Lakish's case of pigul and notar, viewing them as distinct, and if they impart taste, liability should follow? After one failed attempt to reinterpret the Mishna, the Gemara resolves the difficulty differently: there is a tannaitic dispute. The Mishna reflects Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, while Reish Lakish follows the rabbis. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from a Mishna Mikvaot 10:6. To explain it, one must assume the Mishna is authored by Rabbi Yehuda, since it employs the principle of "we view the item as if…". Yet at the end of the Mishna, purification waters are nullified in a mikveh if the mikveh waters are the majority. This stands in opposition to Rabbi Yehuda's stance that similar items are treated as different and are not nullified based on appearance.  

The Gemara concludes its explanation of how, according to Rabbi Shimon, a safek leper may bring the oil for his purification process as either a possible leper's offering or a possible voluntary oil offering, by resolving the multiple complications inherent in this situation. Rav Rachuma said to Ravina that Rav Huna bar Tachlifa asked why Rabbi Shimon suggested that the safek leper bring an animal as either a guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, when he could have instead proposed bringing it as either a guilt offering or a hanging guilt offering, thus avoiding the issue of disqualifying kodashim. Rav Rachuma explains that one can infer from this that Rabbi Shimon must disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, holding that one cannot voluntarily bring a hanging guilt offering. However, Ravina rejects this reasoning, noting that the guilt offering of a leper comes from a one-year-old sheep, whereas a hanging guilt offering requires a two-year-old sheep, also known as a ram. In the Mishna, there is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a mixture of limbs from sin offerings and burnt offerings: can they be brought on the altar? The Gemara explores the basis of their disagreement, rooted in different interpretations of Vayikra 2:11–12, and then cites a braita quoting Rabbi Yehuda, who preserved a different version of the dispute. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the disagreement applies only to mixtures of limbs from blemished and non-blemished animals. Both sides, however, agree that mixtures of sin and burnt offerings may certainly be brought on the altar, while those from animals that engaged in bestiality may not. Why did Rabbi Eliezer distinguish between blemished animals and those involved in bestiality? Rav Huna explains that the blemish in question is a mild one, following Rabbi Akiva's more lenient position. Yet since Rabbi Akiva permitted such blemishes only post facto, Rav Papa qualifies that the case must involve limbs already placed on the ramp. This explanation is rejected, however, because if that were the case, even without being part of a mixture, the offering would be permitted. A new explanation is therefore introduced, deriving Rabbi Eliezer's permission to sacrifice parts of blemished animals intermingled with regular ones from a drasha on Vayikra 22:25. The Mishna also records a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blemished animals that become intermingled with other animals. Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one is sacrificed inadvertently, the remaining animals are permitted, since we can assume the blemished one was already offered. Rabbi Elazar, however, restricts Rabbi Eliezer's leniency to cases where the other animal parts are sacrificed in pairs. The Mishna discusses the issue of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances, under what circumstances can it still be brought on the altar?

The Gemara concludes its explanation of how, according to Rabbi Shimon, a safek leper may bring the oil for his purification process as either a possible leper's offering or a possible voluntary oil offering, by resolving the multiple complications inherent in this situation. Rav Rachuma said to Ravina that Rav Huna bar Tachlifa asked why Rabbi Shimon suggested that the safek leper bring an animal as either a guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, when he could have instead proposed bringing it as either a guilt offering or a hanging guilt offering, thus avoiding the issue of disqualifying kodashim. Rav Rachuma explains that one can infer from this that Rabbi Shimon must disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, holding that one cannot voluntarily bring a hanging guilt offering. However, Ravina rejects this reasoning, noting that the guilt offering of a leper comes from a one-year-old sheep, whereas a hanging guilt offering requires a two-year-old sheep, also known as a ram. In the Mishna, there is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a mixture of limbs from sin offerings and burnt offerings: can they be brought on the altar? The Gemara explores the basis of their disagreement, rooted in different interpretations of Vayikra 2:11–12, and then cites a braita quoting Rabbi Yehuda, who preserved a different version of the dispute. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the disagreement applies only to mixtures of limbs from blemished and non-blemished animals. Both sides, however, agree that mixtures of sin and burnt offerings may certainly be brought on the altar, while those from animals that engaged in bestiality may not. Why did Rabbi Eliezer distinguish between blemished animals and those involved in bestiality? Rav Huna explains that the blemish in question is a mild one, following Rabbi Akiva's more lenient position. Yet since Rabbi Akiva permitted such blemishes only post facto, Rav Papa qualifies that the case must involve limbs already placed on the ramp. This explanation is rejected, however, because if that were the case, even without being part of a mixture, the offering would be permitted. A new explanation is therefore introduced, deriving Rabbi Eliezer's permission to sacrifice parts of blemished animals intermingled with regular ones from a drasha on Vayikra 22:25. The Mishna also records a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blemished animals that become intermingled with other animals. Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one is sacrificed inadvertently, the remaining animals are permitted, since we can assume the blemished one was already offered. Rabbi Elazar, however, restricts Rabbi Eliezer's leniency to cases where the other animal parts are sacrificed in pairs. The Mishna discusses the issue of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances, under what circumstances can it still be brought on the altar?

Two additional answers are offered to explain why, in the Mishna, the animal is not nullified among the others if one follows Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that only items sold exclusively by unit are not nullified in a mixture. The first answer is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yehoshua according to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of a litra of dried figs, teaching that items sometimes sold individually are not nullified. The second answer is that live animals are considered significant and therefore cannot be nullified. The Gemara continues to ask why animals designated for sacrifices, when intermingled with an animal forbidden for benefit, are all left to die. It suggests resolving the issue through the laws of probability: one could remove an animal at a time and assume each emerged from the majority of permitted animals. The difficulty is that, according to halakhic rules of probability, this only applies once an animal has already been separated, allowing us to presume it came from the majority. But if the animals remain fixed and one is taken directly from the group, the law treats it as either permitted or forbidden (50/50), with no majority to rely upon. The Gemara further proposes creating a situation where the animals scatter from their fixed location, so they are no longer considered fixed, and each could then be assumed to come from the majority. Rava offers three explanations why this solution fails, the first two of which are rejected. The final answer is that, although theoretically possible, it was prohibited by decree, lest people apply the same reasoning in cases where the animals remain fixed. Rava concludes that since the animal is not nullified by rabbinic decree, if any of the animals in the mixture are sacrificed on the altar, they do not achieve atonement, and a new sacrifice must be brought. Rav Huna raises a difficulty with this explanation based on two Mishnayot in Kinnim 1:2 and 3:1. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Rava holds live animals and birds can be rejected from the altar, whereas the Mishna rules that they cannot.  

Two additional answers are offered to explain why, in the Mishna, the animal is not nullified among the others if one follows Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that only items sold exclusively by unit are not nullified in a mixture. The first answer is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yehoshua according to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of a litra of dried figs, teaching that items sometimes sold individually are not nullified. The second answer is that live animals are considered significant and therefore cannot be nullified. The Gemara continues to ask why animals designated for sacrifices, when intermingled with an animal forbidden for benefit, are all left to die. It suggests resolving the issue through the laws of probability: one could remove an animal at a time and assume each emerged from the majority of permitted animals. The difficulty is that, according to halakhic rules of probability, this only applies once an animal has already been separated, allowing us to presume it came from the majority. But if the animals remain fixed and one is taken directly from the group, the law treats it as either permitted or forbidden (50/50), with no majority to rely upon. The Gemara further proposes creating a situation where the animals scatter from their fixed location, so they are no longer considered fixed, and each could then be assumed to come from the majority. Rava offers three explanations why this solution fails, the first two of which are rejected. The final answer is that, although theoretically possible, it was prohibited by decree, lest people apply the same reasoning in cases where the animals remain fixed. Rava concludes that since the animal is not nullified by rabbinic decree, if any of the animals in the mixture are sacrificed on the altar, they do not achieve atonement, and a new sacrifice must be brought. Rav Huna raises a difficulty with this explanation based on two Mishnayot in Kinnim 1:2 and 3:1. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Rava holds live animals and birds can be rejected from the altar, whereas the Mishna rules that they cannot.  

Study Guide How does Rabbi Yehuda counter the difficulties raised by Rav Shizbi? First, the Gemara shows that he derives the rulings of Rav Shizbi (that both the verses on a dead bird and the cheilev of an animal only apply to kosher birds/animals differently. Then, they bring three suggestions on how to explain the meaning of the word treifa in the verse regarding the cheilev. The first two suggestions are rejected.  How does Rabbi Meir explain the three different verses - two for the impurity of a dead bird and the one for cheilev? A braita is brought that derives some of the halakhot previously mentioned from the verses, that the cheilev ruling only applies to kosher animals and not to undomesticated animals.  Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree about whether Rabbi Meir would hold that melika removes a bird from having impurity of a carcass in birds with blemishes or even birds not generally offered on the altar. This leads to Rabbi Yirmia asking if the same would be true if, instead of breaking the neck of a calf in the egla arufa ceremony, they broke the back of a goat?   

Study Guide How does Rabbi Yehuda counter the difficulties raised by Rav Shizbi? First, the Gemara shows that he derives the rulings of Rav Shizbi (that both the verses on a dead bird and the cheilev of an animal only apply to kosher birds/animals differently. Then, they bring three suggestions on how to explain the meaning of the word treifa in the verse regarding the cheilev. The first two suggestions are rejected.  How does Rabbi Meir explain the three different verses - two for the impurity of a dead bird and the one for cheilev? A braita is brought that derives some of the halakhot previously mentioned from the verses, that the cheilev ruling only applies to kosher animals and not to undomesticated animals.  Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree about whether Rabbi Meir would hold that melika removes a bird from having impurity of a carcass in birds with blemishes or even birds not generally offered on the altar. This leads to Rabbi Yirmia asking if the same would be true if, instead of breaking the neck of a calf in the egla arufa ceremony, they broke the back of a goat?   

The Gemara continues its discussion on whether melika performed by a non-kohen renders the bird a neveila, thereby imparting ritual impurity. Chizkiyah presents a ruling: if a non-kohen performs melika and the bird is subsequently placed on the altar, it is not removed. However, in a parallel case involving kmitza performed by a non-kohen, the offering would be removed. This raises the question - why is there a distinction between the two cases? A braita is cited to provide the Torah source for the Mishna's rulings regarding melika performed with the left hand, at night, and in other disqualifying circumstances. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether melika performed on a treifa bird (one with a fatal defect) prevents it from being considered a neveila. The Gemara examines the sources for their respective opinions. A verse concerning the prohibition of consuming the forbidden fats (cheilev) of a neveila or treifa is analyzed, challenging Rabbi Yehuda's proof text.

The Gemara continues its discussion on whether melika performed by a non-kohen renders the bird a neveila, thereby imparting ritual impurity. Chizkiyah presents a ruling: if a non-kohen performs melika and the bird is subsequently placed on the altar, it is not removed. However, in a parallel case involving kmitza performed by a non-kohen, the offering would be removed. This raises the question - why is there a distinction between the two cases? A braita is cited to provide the Torah source for the Mishna's rulings regarding melika performed with the left hand, at night, and in other disqualifying circumstances. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether melika performed on a treifa bird (one with a fatal defect) prevents it from being considered a neveila. The Gemara examines the sources for their respective opinions. A verse concerning the prohibition of consuming the forbidden fats (cheilev) of a neveila or treifa is analyzed, challenging Rabbi Yehuda's proof text.

In this episode of Judaism Demystified, Alan Niku—better known as The Dreamy Kalimi—shares what first pulled him into preserving and spotlighting Persian Jewish history through his Instagram and YouTube work. He gives a clear snapshot of what makes Iranian Jewry so distinct within the broader Jewish world. Alan highlights a core theme in his research: Persian Jewish heritage was never one-dimensional. It included rationalists, mystics, poets, philosophers, halakhists, and community leaders whose voices shaped their communities but were later forgotten or overlooked. He explains why that diversity faded from memory and what is lost when those voices disappear. The conversation then turns to two figures who capture this intellectual range—Rabbi Yehuda ben Elazar (the Riba) and Mollah Siman-Tov Melamed. Alan discusses why these hakhamim resonate with him and what their teachings reveal about the depth of Persian-Jewish thought. Before we wrap up, he gives us a look at the projects he's working on to revive, translate, and reintroduce these texts and ideas to a new generation. You don't want to miss this riveting discussion.---*This episode is dedicated to the refua shelema of Sarah Miriam bat Tamar, Binyamin ben Zilpa, and our dear friend Yaakov ben Haya Sarah Malakh---• Bio: Alan Niku is a filmmaker, writer, and scholar of Mizrahi culture from San Luis Obispo, California, based in Los Angeles. A native speaker of Persian, he spends his time learning related Jewish languages, deciphering Judeo-Persian manuscripts, and interviewing community members about their stories. He is also a musician and an amateur chef, teaches history and Jewish heritage at various levels, and seeks to educate the world about the underrepresented cultures of the Middle East through his writing and films. He is widely known online as “The Dreamy Kalimi,” where he shares and celebrates the richness of Persian Jewish heritage on his highly entertaining and informative Instagram and YouTube channels.---• Check out his channel: https://www.youtube.com/ ⁨@Dreamy-Kalimi⁩ and his Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/the_dreamy_kalimi/---• Welcome to JUDAISM DEMYSTIFIED: A PODCAST FOR THE PERPLEXED | Co-hosted by Benjy & Benzi | Thank you to...Super Patron: Jordan Karmily, Platinum Patron: Craig Gordon, Rod Ilian, Gold Patrons: Dovidchai Abramchayev, Lazer Cohen, Travis Krueger, Vasili Volkoff, Vasya, Silver Patrons: Ellen Fleischer, Daniel M., Rabbi Pinny Rosenthal, Fred & Antonio, Jeffrey Wasserman, and Jacob Winston! Please SUBSCRIBE to this YouTube Channel and hit the BELL so you can get alerted whenever new clips get posted, thank you for your support!

Study Guide The Mishna, as in Chapter 2 (Zevachim 29b), outlines various scenarios in which a thought can, or cannot, render a sacrifice pigul, thereby making consumption of the meat punishable/not punishable by karet. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with one of the rulings and maintains that if melika (the ritual slaughter of a bird) was performed with the intent to offer the blood beyond its designated time, and the blood was then squeezed with the intent to burn the flesh outside the Azara (Temple courtyard), the offering would be considered pigul. This is because, although the sacrifice was already disqualified for other reasons, the disqualification due to improper intent regarding time occurred first. A braita examines the verses concerning the bird burnt offering and derives several halakhot specific to this sacrifice: One who volunteers to bring this type of offering may bring only one bird. Melika must be performed by a kohen. Melika is not performed with a knife. Melika is performed at the top of the altar. Melika is done on the back of the bird's neck. The bird's head must be severed. All the blood must be squeezed out - none may remain. The blood is squeezed onto the upper part of the altar wall. There is a debate whether melika and the squeezing of the blood are performed on the sovev (the ledge surrounding the altar) or at its top. Another braita presents differing opinions regarding which parts of the bird are cast onto the beit hadeshen (the ash heap) and how those parts are removed. The bird is split in half - this is done by hand, as derived from a verse in Judges concerning Shimshon. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the tanna of our Mishna regarding a bird sin offering in which the kohen severs the head: is the offering thereby disqualified or not? Three interpretations are offered to explain the basis of their disagreement.  

Study Guide The Mishna, as in Chapter 2 (Zevachim 29b), outlines various scenarios in which a thought can, or cannot, render a sacrifice pigul, thereby making consumption of the meat punishable/not punishable by karet. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with one of the rulings and maintains that if melika (the ritual slaughter of a bird) was performed with the intent to offer the blood beyond its designated time, and the blood was then squeezed with the intent to burn the flesh outside the Azara (Temple courtyard), the offering would be considered pigul. This is because, although the sacrifice was already disqualified for other reasons, the disqualification due to improper intent regarding time occurred first. A braita examines the verses concerning the bird burnt offering and derives several halakhot specific to this sacrifice: One who volunteers to bring this type of offering may bring only one bird. Melika must be performed by a kohen. Melika is not performed with a knife. Melika is performed at the top of the altar. Melika is done on the back of the bird's neck. The bird's head must be severed. All the blood must be squeezed out - none may remain. The blood is squeezed onto the upper part of the altar wall. There is a debate whether melika and the squeezing of the blood are performed on the sovev (the ledge surrounding the altar) or at its top. Another braita presents differing opinions regarding which parts of the bird are cast onto the beit hadeshen (the ash heap) and how those parts are removed. The bird is split in half - this is done by hand, as derived from a verse in Judges concerning Shimshon. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the tanna of our Mishna regarding a bird sin offering in which the kohen severs the head: is the offering thereby disqualified or not? Three interpretations are offered to explain the basis of their disagreement.  

Rav Yosef offers two additional explanations for why the altar in the Second Temple was constructed larger than the altar in the First Temple. When the Second Temple was built, how did they determine the correct location for the altar? Three explanations are brought. Which components of the altar are essential for carrying out sacrificial rites? The ramp of the altar was positioned on its southern side, measuring sixteen cubits in width and thirty-two cubits in length. Rav Huna cites a source to confirm that the ramp was indeed located in the south. A braita presents an alternative source from a statement by Rabbi Yehuda. There was a space between the altar and the ramp - the origin and function of this gap are clarified. If the ramp was thirty-two cubits long and the altar itself also measured thirty-two cubits in length, how does this align with the Mishna in Midot 5:2, which states that the total length was sixty-two cubits?

Rav Yosef offers two additional explanations for why the altar in the Second Temple was constructed larger than the altar in the First Temple. When the Second Temple was built, how did they determine the correct location for the altar? Three explanations are brought. Which components of the altar are essential for carrying out sacrificial rites? The ramp of the altar was positioned on its southern side, measuring sixteen cubits in width and thirty-two cubits in length. Rav Huna cites a source to confirm that the ramp was indeed located in the south. A braita presents an alternative source from a statement by Rabbi Yehuda. There was a space between the altar and the ramp - the origin and function of this gap are clarified. If the ramp was thirty-two cubits long and the altar itself also measured thirty-two cubits in length, how does this align with the Mishna in Midot 5:2, which states that the total length was sixty-two cubits?

In Zevachim 59, a difficulty was raised against Rav's position that a sacrifice slaughtered while the altar was damaged is disqualified. The contradiction came from a statement of Rav that incense could be burned even when the altar was removed. It was resolved by suggesting that just as Rava explained, Rabbi Yehuda distinguished between blood and burning (and required the altar for blood), so too Rav distinguished between blood and burning the incense (and required the altar to be complete for slaughtering and sprinkling the blood). Where did Rava make that statement? A lengthy argument between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi is brought to provide background. Then a proof is offered for Rava's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda, based on Rabbi Yehuda's suggestion regarding the blood from the Paschal sacrifices that spilled on the floor, but the proof is rejected. Rabbi Elazar brings a source to derive the requirement for the altar to be complete  to permit eating the remains of the meal offerings and other food of kodashim kodashim. Is a complete altar required for eating kodashim kalim? Abaye brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael proving that the second tithe cannot be eaten in Jerusalem when there is no Temple. He first attempts to derive it from the firstborn by logical inference, but then derives it from a juxtaposition (heikesh). Abaye's explanation of Rabbi Yishmael leads to the understanding that kodashim kalim cannot be eaten when there is no altar. Rabbi Yirmia vehemently disagrees with Abaye, calling him a 'stupid Babylonian,' due to a contradiction between two braitot, which he resolves by differentiating between kodshai kodashim and kodashim kalim regarding this law.  

In Zevachim 59, a difficulty was raised against Rav's position that a sacrifice slaughtered while the altar was damaged is disqualified. The contradiction came from a statement of Rav that incense could be burned even when the altar was removed. It was resolved by suggesting that just as Rava explained, Rabbi Yehuda distinguished between blood and burning (and required the altar for blood), so too Rav distinguished between blood and burning the incense (and required the altar to be complete for slaughtering and sprinkling the blood). Where did Rava make that statement? A lengthy argument between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi is brought to provide background. Then a proof is offered for Rava's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda, based on Rabbi Yehuda's suggestion regarding the blood from the Paschal sacrifices that spilled on the floor, but the proof is rejected. Rabbi Elazar brings a source to derive the requirement for the altar to be complete  to permit eating the remains of the meal offerings and other food of kodashim kodashim. Is a complete altar required for eating kodashim kalim? Abaye brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael proving that the second tithe cannot be eaten in Jerusalem when there is no Temple. He first attempts to derive it from the firstborn by logical inference, but then derives it from a juxtaposition (heikesh). Abaye's explanation of Rabbi Yishmael leads to the understanding that kodashim kalim cannot be eaten when there is no altar. Rabbi Yirmia vehemently disagrees with Abaye, calling him a 'stupid Babylonian,' due to a contradiction between two braitot, which he resolves by differentiating between kodshai kodashim and kodashim kalim regarding this law.  

Diagrams Study Guide Rav Shravia raises a second difficulty against Rabbi Zeira's proof for Rabbi Yochanan's statement that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was completely in the north from the Mishna in Tamid 29a. He suggests that perhaps it was not Rabbi Yosi's opinion, but rather Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, who held that the altar was in the north. He cites a different braita relating to the placement of the basin (kiyur) and explains why that proves Rabbi Yosi the Galilean must have held that the altar was completely in the north. Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debate the status of sanctified animals that were designated, and then the altar becomes broken. A verse is brought as the source for Rav's position. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's view—one from a braita and one from a statement Rav himself made—and both are resolved. In resolving the second difficulty, the Gemara mentions a position of Rabbi Yehuda. It then explores this opinion in the context of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding the size and height of the altar in the time of Moshe.

Diagrams Study Guide Rav Shravia raises a second difficulty against Rabbi Zeira's proof for Rabbi Yochanan's statement that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was completely in the north from the Mishna in Tamid 29a. He suggests that perhaps it was not Rabbi Yosi's opinion, but rather Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, who held that the altar was in the north. He cites a different braita relating to the placement of the basin (kiyur) and explains why that proves Rabbi Yosi the Galilean must have held that the altar was completely in the north. Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debate the status of sanctified animals that were designated, and then the altar becomes broken. A verse is brought as the source for Rav's position. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's view—one from a braita and one from a statement Rav himself made—and both are resolved. In resolving the second difficulty, the Gemara mentions a position of Rabbi Yehuda. It then explores this opinion in the context of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding the size and height of the altar in the time of Moshe.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

Diagrams If kodshei kodashim were slaughtered on top of the altar, is that considered a valid slaughter? Rabbi Yosi maintains that it is as if they were slaughtered in the north, and therefore valid. In contrast, Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is only valid if performed on the northern half of the altar. Rav Asi cites Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yosi viewed the altar as entirely situated in the north. Rav Asi assumes that this was derived from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yosi permits slaughtering on the altar. He further clarifies that when Rabbi Yosi stated, "It is as if it is in the north," he meant to emphasize that although the requirement to slaughter kodshei kodashim is "on the side of the altar," slaughtering on top of the altar is also valid. Rabbi Zeira challenges Rav Asi's interpretation by applying the same connection to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda's position, that he must hold the altar is situated half in the north and half in the south, and introducing another statement from Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, which contradicts that. The second statement of Rabbi Yochanan is that, according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda, if one slaughtered on the ground under where the altar stands, it is invalid. Rav Asi responds by explaining that both Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda derived their views from a verse in the Torah, and it does not hinge on the location of the altar. The verse is Shemot 20:21: "And you shall slaughter on it (the altar) your burnt and peace offerings." The debate centers on whether the verse states that both burnt and peace offerings may be slaughtered anywhere on the altar, or that burnt offerings must be slaughtered on one half (the north) and peace offerings on the other. Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina to clarify the meaning of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that slaughtering on the ground where the altar stands is invalid. How can one slaughter on the ground where the altar is standing? Rabbi Zeira returns to the original statement of Rabbi Yochanan—that Rabbi Yosi held the altar was entirely in the north—and seeks a source for this in a Mishna. He cites a Mishna in Tamid 29a, which refers to the location of the ma'aracha hashniya, the second arrangement of wood on the altar, as being in the southwest corner, four cubits toward the north. Rabbi Yosi explained the need for this to be situated opposite the exit of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Zeira argues that the arrangement needed to be opposite the exit of the Sanctuary and four cubits north of the southwest corner, which can only be reconciled with Rabbi Yosi's position that the altar was entirely in the north. However, Rav Ada bar Ahava counters Rabbi Zeira's proof by suggesting that the Mishna can be understood according to Rabbi Yehuda, who held that the altar was situated half in the north and half in the south, centered in the room.

The braita in Zevachim 51 extrapolates from the third mention (by the nasi) of the base of the altar that for all sacrifices on the outer altar the remainder of the blood is poured on the base, the yesod. The braita then raises a question: perhaps the extrapolation should be different — that the sprinkling of sacrificial blood on the outer altar must be performed only on the sides where there is a base, i.e., not on the southeast corner, since the base did not extend there. A difficulty on that suggestion is drawn from the verse's wording. The verse states "to the base of the altar of the olah," which suggests relevance to all sacrifices on the outer altar rather than only to the olah. But the sin offering, which is placed on the outer altar, is positioned on all four corners and not limited to the three corners where there is a base. If the verse had intended the latter ruling, it should have been phrased "to the base of the olah," referring specifically to the burnt offering where that limitation would apply. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the unique inclusion of the word "altar" in the verse: it teaches that when blood is spilled on the base, it must be spilled on the roof of the base (top flat surface) and not on the wall of the base. With this reading, the subsequent lines of the braita, where Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva each say the law could have been derived by a kal va'chomer are reread including mention of the roof of the base. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva appear to assert the same logical argument using slightly different wording. Rav Ada bar Ahava and Rav Papa propose possible distinctions between their positions. Rav Ada argues that because Rabbi Akiva used more extended language about the remainder of the blood, that it "does not atone" and "does not come for atonement purposes," Rabbi Akiva must regard pouring the remainder as nonessential. Rabbi Yishmael, having said only "it doesn't atone," must hold that pouring the remainder is essential. Rav Papa rejects this reading, maintaining that no one posits an obligation to pour the remainder of the blood. He narrows the difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva to the specific case of the bird sin offering: whether mitzui, squeezing out the remainder of the blood and placing it directly on the wall of the altar while squeezing, is essential. Rav Papa understands Rabbi Yishmael to require mitzui, while Rabbi Akiva does not. A braita is then cited to support Rav Papa, showing that Rabbi Yishmael holds pouring the remainder is not essential. A difficulty is raised against Rav Papa's position, but the Gemara resolves it. Rami bar Hama introduces a tana who maintains that for sin offerings whose blood is placed on the inner altar, pouring the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is essential; Rava, however, rejects this understanding of the braita and its conclusion. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi dispute whether Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Akiva actually differ on the question of whether the remainder of the blood for inner sin offerings is essential.    

The braita in Zevachim 51 extrapolates from the third mention (by the nasi) of the base of the altar that for all sacrifices on the outer altar the remainder of the blood is poured on the base, the yesod. The braita then raises a question: perhaps the extrapolation should be different — that the sprinkling of sacrificial blood on the outer altar must be performed only on the sides where there is a base, i.e., not on the southeast corner, since the base did not extend there. A difficulty on that suggestion is drawn from the verse's wording. The verse states "to the base of the altar of the olah," which suggests relevance to all sacrifices on the outer altar rather than only to the olah. But the sin offering, which is placed on the outer altar, is positioned on all four corners and not limited to the three corners where there is a base. If the verse had intended the latter ruling, it should have been phrased "to the base of the olah," referring specifically to the burnt offering where that limitation would apply. The Gemara resolves this difficulty by explaining the unique inclusion of the word "altar" in the verse: it teaches that when blood is spilled on the base, it must be spilled on the roof of the base (top flat surface) and not on the wall of the base. With this reading, the subsequent lines of the braita, where Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva each say the law could have been derived by a kal va'chomer are reread including mention of the roof of the base. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva appear to assert the same logical argument using slightly different wording. Rav Ada bar Ahava and Rav Papa propose possible distinctions between their positions. Rav Ada argues that because Rabbi Akiva used more extended language about the remainder of the blood, that it "does not atone" and "does not come for atonement purposes," Rabbi Akiva must regard pouring the remainder as nonessential. Rabbi Yishmael, having said only "it doesn't atone," must hold that pouring the remainder is essential. Rav Papa rejects this reading, maintaining that no one posits an obligation to pour the remainder of the blood. He narrows the difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva to the specific case of the bird sin offering: whether mitzui, squeezing out the remainder of the blood and placing it directly on the wall of the altar while squeezing, is essential. Rav Papa understands Rabbi Yishmael to require mitzui, while Rabbi Akiva does not. A braita is then cited to support Rav Papa, showing that Rabbi Yishmael holds pouring the remainder is not essential. A difficulty is raised against Rav Papa's position, but the Gemara resolves it. Rami bar Hama introduces a tana who maintains that for sin offerings whose blood is placed on the inner altar, pouring the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is essential; Rava, however, rejects this understanding of the braita and its conclusion. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi dispute whether Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Akiva actually differ on the question of whether the remainder of the blood for inner sin offerings is essential.    

This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. Rabbi Harari was my first Gemara teacher and the one who sparked my love for learning Gemara. Over the course of his distinguished career as an educator, as principal of the Yeshiva of Flatbush, and as community rabbi, he inspired thousands of students with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah. As his wife Vicky beautifully expressed, Rabbi Harari embodied six core values that he cultivated with deep intentionality throughout his life: hard work, gratitude, forgiveness, patience, focusing on families and our priorities, and the inclusion of women in halakhic Judaism. Yehi zichro baruch. The Mishna presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding a thought during the slaughtering of a sacrifice to leave the blood or the parts designated for burning until the next day. Rabbi Yehuda rules that such a thought disqualifies the offering, while the rabbis disagree, arguing that the thought does not pertain to “consumption,” and therefore does not invalidate the sacrifice. The Mishna further clarifies that only specific types of improper intent disqualify a sacrifice: namely, intent involving “outside of time,” “outside of location,” or “not for the sake of the correct sacrifice” and the latter only in the cases of sin offerings and the Paschal offering. It then enumerates several examples of thoughts that do not disqualify the offering, such as intending that an impure or uncircumcised person will eat the meat, or that the blood will be placed on the wrong altar or in the wrong location on the altar. Rabbi Yehuda’s position is initially derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:15, which states “lo yaniach” - “do not leave it” - referring to meat left beyond its designated time. However, the Gemara ultimately rejects this derivation, noting that it cannot be applied to thoughts of “outside of location.” Additionally, a braita clarifies that Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is based on logical inference: if physically leaving the blood beyond its designated time or place disqualifies the sacrifice, then merely intending to do so should also disqualify it. Rabbi Yehuda does not extend his logic to the other cases listed in the Mishna, such as consumption by an impure or uncircumcised person, because even if these acts were actually carried out, the sacrifice itself would not be invalidated. The Gemara analyzes each of the cases mentioned in the Mishna and explains why none of them would disqualify the offering. Rabbi Abba explains that although Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sacrifice when there is intent to leave the blood until the next day, if a pigul thought is later introduced, such as intending that the meat be eaten after its designated time, the sacrifice becomes pigul, despite the earlier disqualifying thought. Rava attempts to support Rabbi Abba’s statement, but his proof is ultimately rejected. Rav Huna raises a challenge to Rabbi Abba’s position, which remains unresolved. Rav Chisda presents two statements, both of which Rava attempts to prove, though each proof is refuted. The first states that if one intends for impure individuals to eat the sacrifice on the following day, the offering becomes pigul and is punishable by karet, even though impure individuals are already prohibited from eating it. The second concerns a Paschal offering that was not roasted, or a thanksgiving offering brought without its accompanying loaves. Although the meat of these offerings is forbidden to be eaten in such cases, if an impure person consumes them, it is still punishable by karet. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the minimum number of blood applications required on the altar for a sin offering. Both agree that for all sacrifices offered on the outer altar, except for the sin offering, if only one blood application is performed, the sacrifice is still valid. However, they differ on the sin offering itself: Beit Shammai maintains that at least two applications are required, while Beit Hillel holds that one suffices. In a case where only one application is required, if the first application is performed properly and a pigul thought (i.e., intent to eat the meat after its designated time) occurs during the second application, the sacrifice is not disqualified. However, if the first application is performed with a pigul thought and the second is done properly, the sacrifice is rendered pigul and is punishable by karet, since the disqualifying thought occurred during the essential act that permits the meat to be eaten. In contrast, for sacrifices offered on the inner altar, all blood applications are essential. Therefore, if a disqualifying thought, such as intending to eat or burn the meat beyond its designated time, occurs during only part of the applications, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, it is not considered pigul and is not punishable by karet, because pigul status only applies when the improper intent accompanies the entire act that permits the consumption of the meat.

This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on the occasion of his first yahrzeit. Rabbi Harari was my first Gemara teacher and the one who sparked my love for learning Gemara. Over the course of his distinguished career as an educator, as principal of the Yeshiva of Flatbush, and as community rabbi, he inspired thousands of students with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah. As his wife Vicky beautifully expressed, Rabbi Harari embodied six core values that he cultivated with deep intentionality throughout his life: hard work, gratitude, forgiveness, patience, focusing on families and our priorities, and the inclusion of women in halakhic Judaism. Yehi zichro baruch. The Mishna presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding a thought during the slaughtering of a sacrifice to leave the blood or the parts designated for burning until the next day. Rabbi Yehuda rules that such a thought disqualifies the offering, while the rabbis disagree, arguing that the thought does not pertain to “consumption,” and therefore does not invalidate the sacrifice. The Mishna further clarifies that only specific types of improper intent disqualify a sacrifice: namely, intent involving “outside of time,” “outside of location,” or “not for the sake of the correct sacrifice” and the latter only in the cases of sin offerings and the Paschal offering. It then enumerates several examples of thoughts that do not disqualify the offering, such as intending that an impure or uncircumcised person will eat the meat, or that the blood will be placed on the wrong altar or in the wrong location on the altar. Rabbi Yehuda’s position is initially derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:15, which states “lo yaniach” - “do not leave it” - referring to meat left beyond its designated time. However, the Gemara ultimately rejects this derivation, noting that it cannot be applied to thoughts of “outside of location.” Additionally, a braita clarifies that Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is based on logical inference: if physically leaving the blood beyond its designated time or place disqualifies the sacrifice, then merely intending to do so should also disqualify it. Rabbi Yehuda does not extend his logic to the other cases listed in the Mishna, such as consumption by an impure or uncircumcised person, because even if these acts were actually carried out, the sacrifice itself would not be invalidated. The Gemara analyzes each of the cases mentioned in the Mishna and explains why none of them would disqualify the offering. Rabbi Abba explains that although Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sacrifice when there is intent to leave the blood until the next day, if a pigul thought is later introduced, such as intending that the meat be eaten after its designated time, the sacrifice becomes pigul, despite the earlier disqualifying thought. Rava attempts to support Rabbi Abba’s statement, but his proof is ultimately rejected. Rav Huna raises a challenge to Rabbi Abba’s position, which remains unresolved. Rav Chisda presents two statements, both of which Rava attempts to prove, though each proof is refuted. The first states that if one intends for impure individuals to eat the sacrifice on the following day, the offering becomes pigul and is punishable by karet, even though impure individuals are already prohibited from eating it. The second concerns a Paschal offering that was not roasted, or a thanksgiving offering brought without its accompanying loaves. Although the meat of these offerings is forbidden to be eaten in such cases, if an impure person consumes them, it is still punishable by karet. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the minimum number of blood applications required on the altar for a sin offering. Both agree that for all sacrifices offered on the outer altar, except for the sin offering, if only one blood application is performed, the sacrifice is still valid. However, they differ on the sin offering itself: Beit Shammai maintains that at least two applications are required, while Beit Hillel holds that one suffices. In a case where only one application is required, if the first application is performed properly and a pigul thought (i.e., intent to eat the meat after its designated time) occurs during the second application, the sacrifice is not disqualified. However, if the first application is performed with a pigul thought and the second is done properly, the sacrifice is rendered pigul and is punishable by karet, since the disqualifying thought occurred during the essential act that permits the meat to be eaten. In contrast, for sacrifices offered on the inner altar, all blood applications are essential. Therefore, if a disqualifying thought, such as intending to eat or burn the meat beyond its designated time, occurs during only part of the applications, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, it is not considered pigul and is not punishable by karet, because pigul status only applies when the improper intent accompanies the entire act that permits the consumption of the meat.

During the Paschal sacrifice, the drain in the floor of the Azara was plugged to ensure that any spilled blood would be collected. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis offer different explanations for this practice. Rabbi Yehuda says the blood was collected and placed on the altar in case some of the blood from the sacrifices had spilled and had not yet been brought to the altar. The rabbis explain that it was to demonstrate the dedication of the kohanim, who stood knee-deep in blood as they performed their service. Each opinion faces challenges. Regarding Rabbi Yehuda, the Gemara asks how the blood could be valid for the altar if it had not been collected in a sanctified vessel. After resolving this, another issue is raised: the dam hatamtzit, the residual internal blood, might nullify the dam hanefesh, the lifeblood that exits during slaughter and is valid for the altar. Regarding the rabbis, the Gemara questions whether the accumulated blood would create a chatzitza, an interposition between the kohanim’s feet and the floor, potentially invalidating their service. It also asks whether the blood-soaked garments would be rendered unfit for priestly service. All these objections are ultimately resolved. The laws of pigul apply only to parts of the animal designated for consumption or burning on the altar. If a priest has a pigul thought, such as intending to eat or burn a part of the sacrifice beyond its permitted time, it only renders the sacrifice pigul if the thought concerns a part meant to be eaten or burned. Non-edible or non-sacrificial parts, such as the hide, tendons, horns, and similar items, are not subject to pigul. In a female animal, a thought regarding the fetus, placenta, or eggs does not render the sacrifice pigul. If a sacrifice becomes pigul, consuming the milk or eggs does not incur karet. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether a pigul thought regarding a non-sacrificial item, such as intending to eat something not meant to be eaten or burn something not meant to be burned, can render the offering pigul. Rabbi Eliezer is more stringent, while the rabbis are lenient. Rabbi Elazar adds that while a thought about a fetus or similar part does not independently render the sacrifice pigul, if the animal itself becomes pigul due to improper intent, then those parts, like the fetus, are also considered pigul. Three sources, including the Mishna under discussion, are brought to support Rabbi Elazar’s position. Attempts to refute his view are made, but ultimately only an inference from our Mishna stands as a conclusive proof in his favor. A Mishna in Zevachim 84a records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis regarding a blemished animal that was mistakenly brought to the altar. Rabbi Akiva holds that if the animal has already been placed on the altar, it is not removed. The rabbis disagree, requiring its removal. The Gemara qualifies Rabbi Akiva’s leniency with three limitations: the ruling applies only to certain types of blemishes; if the blemish was present before the animal was sanctified, it must be removed; and a female animal designated for a burnt offering is also removed. Rabbi Zeira raises a challenge to the third limitation based on a braita previously cited in a discussion concerning Rabbi Eliezer. This challenge is ultimately resolved.  

During the Paschal sacrifice, the drain in the floor of the Azara was plugged to ensure that any spilled blood would be collected. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis offer different explanations for this practice. Rabbi Yehuda says the blood was collected and placed on the altar in case some of the blood from the sacrifices had spilled and had not yet been brought to the altar. The rabbis explain that it was to demonstrate the dedication of the kohanim, who stood knee-deep in blood as they performed their service. Each opinion faces challenges. Regarding Rabbi Yehuda, the Gemara asks how the blood could be valid for the altar if it had not been collected in a sanctified vessel. After resolving this, another issue is raised: the dam hatamtzit, the residual internal blood, might nullify the dam hanefesh, the lifeblood that exits during slaughter and is valid for the altar. Regarding the rabbis, the Gemara questions whether the accumulated blood would create a chatzitza, an interposition between the kohanim’s feet and the floor, potentially invalidating their service. It also asks whether the blood-soaked garments would be rendered unfit for priestly service. All these objections are ultimately resolved. The laws of pigul apply only to parts of the animal designated for consumption or burning on the altar. If a priest has a pigul thought, such as intending to eat or burn a part of the sacrifice beyond its permitted time, it only renders the sacrifice pigul if the thought concerns a part meant to be eaten or burned. Non-edible or non-sacrificial parts, such as the hide, tendons, horns, and similar items, are not subject to pigul. In a female animal, a thought regarding the fetus, placenta, or eggs does not render the sacrifice pigul. If a sacrifice becomes pigul, consuming the milk or eggs does not incur karet. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether a pigul thought regarding a non-sacrificial item, such as intending to eat something not meant to be eaten or burn something not meant to be burned, can render the offering pigul. Rabbi Eliezer is more stringent, while the rabbis are lenient. Rabbi Elazar adds that while a thought about a fetus or similar part does not independently render the sacrifice pigul, if the animal itself becomes pigul due to improper intent, then those parts, like the fetus, are also considered pigul. Three sources, including the Mishna under discussion, are brought to support Rabbi Elazar’s position. Attempts to refute his view are made, but ultimately only an inference from our Mishna stands as a conclusive proof in his favor. A Mishna in Zevachim 84a records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis regarding a blemished animal that was mistakenly brought to the altar. Rabbi Akiva holds that if the animal has already been placed on the altar, it is not removed. The rabbis disagree, requiring its removal. The Gemara qualifies Rabbi Akiva’s leniency with three limitations: the ruling applies only to certain types of blemishes; if the blemish was present before the animal was sanctified, it must be removed; and a female animal designated for a burnt offering is also removed. Rabbi Zeira raises a challenge to the third limitation based on a braita previously cited in a discussion concerning Rabbi Eliezer. This challenge is ultimately resolved.  

LISTEN!!!

Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.  

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.  

Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved. A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna. There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?

Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree.   Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body.  Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A  braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?

Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree.   Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body.  Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A  braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?

Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l’chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch." A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted. Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn’t answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir’s teachings were transmitted as “acherim” (“others”), and Rabbi Natan’s as “yesh omrim” (“some say”). Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile. A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as “acherim omrim.” When his son asked why he didn’t cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family’s honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying “They say in the name of Rabbi Meir.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can “uproot mountains”? Rav Yosef was a sinai, while Raba was an oker Harim. Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba’s tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect. In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others. The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku.

A braita explains that the words “מעם הארץ” — “from one of the land” — mentioned in the section about the individual’s sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon’s view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis’ position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon’s position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person’s change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved. A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored. There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad. A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya. The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position. A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising. If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo’s anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers.