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Today's daf is dedicated in memory of my uncle, Richard Cohen, Naftali ben Yosef haKohen v'Henna who passed away this week. He was a man who loved and appreciated by every person and was loved and appreciated by everyone who met him. The goat sin offering whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh kodashim on Yom Kippur atones for sins for one who knew they were impure, then forgot and went into the Temple or ate sacrificial items while impure and did not yet remember that they are impure. A braita explains from where this is derived. The different parts of the braita are analyzed. First, the braita suggested that perhaps it atones for the three most grievous sins - idolatry, murder and licentious behavior. The Gemara explains this suggestion - in what manner of performing these transgressions would one have thought this sacrifice could atone for? The first opinion in the braita, Rabbi Yehuda, is that entering the Temple/eating sacrificial items while impure is uniquely distinguished and therefore it is clear that is the one being atoned for by this special offering. The Gemara explains what the braita meant by 'uniquely distinguished' - as it has a sliding scale offering. Several other sacrifices are also uniquely distinguished, such as idol worship as one can only bring a sin offering of a female goat, a woman after childbirth, a leper, and a nazir who became impure who also can bring a sliding scale offering. Why are these not considered 'uniquely distinguished'? Rabbi Shimon derives this from the verse itself describing the offering, as it says "It atones for sanctified items from impurities." Why didn't Rabbi Yehuda accept that understanding - how does he understand the verse? Why doesn't this offering atone for all sins relating to impurity? Why is it only for a person who knew at first they were impure, then forgot, and does not have awareness of the sin? The braita explains that this atones for something not atoned by a sacrifice of an individual, as can be derived from the verse. What is being excluded by this derivation that isn't already obvious? Another derivation in the braita teaches why it specifically atones for a sin that can eventually be atoned for by an individual sin offering (when the person will realize that a sin was committed, and not for one where the person did not know before entering the Temple that one was impure, as that type can never be obligated to bring an individual offering. Why does this case need excluding, if it is already known that the latter is atoned for by the sin offering whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar on Yom Kippur? If the offering does not completely atone for the sin, but simply provides atonement until such time that the sinner realizes their sin and brings an individual offering, what is the purpose of the temporary atonement? Rabbi Zeira and Rava each offer a suggested answer - either to atone for the sin in case the sinner dies before realizing their sin or to protect from suffering. If the type of sin atoned for by the outer sin offering is derived from the inner sin offering, why can't the inner one atone for both types of sins? Or why can't the outer one atone for both?  

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of my uncle, Richard Cohen, Naftali ben Yosef haKohen v'Henna who passed away this week. He was a man who loved and appreciated by every person and was loved and appreciated by everyone who met him. The goat sin offering whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh kodashim on Yom Kippur atones for sins for one who knew they were impure, then forgot and went into the Temple or ate sacrificial items while impure and did not yet remember that they are impure. A braita explains from where this is derived. The different parts of the braita are analyzed. First, the braita suggested that perhaps it atones for the three most grievous sins - idolatry, murder and licentious behavior. The Gemara explains this suggestion - in what manner of performing these transgressions would one have thought this sacrifice could atone for? The first opinion in the braita, Rabbi Yehuda, is that entering the Temple/eating sacrificial items while impure is uniquely distinguished and therefore it is clear that is the one being atoned for by this special offering. The Gemara explains what the braita meant by 'uniquely distinguished' - as it has a sliding scale offering. Several other sacrifices are also uniquely distinguished, such as idol worship as one can only bring a sin offering of a female goat, a woman after childbirth, a leper, and a nazir who became impure who also can bring a sliding scale offering. Why are these not considered 'uniquely distinguished'? Rabbi Shimon derives this from the verse itself describing the offering, as it says "It atones for sanctified items from impurities." Why didn't Rabbi Yehuda accept that understanding - how does he understand the verse? Why doesn't this offering atone for all sins relating to impurity? Why is it only for a person who knew at first they were impure, then forgot, and does not have awareness of the sin? The braita explains that this atones for something not atoned by a sacrifice of an individual, as can be derived from the verse. What is being excluded by this derivation that isn't already obvious? Another derivation in the braita teaches why it specifically atones for a sin that can eventually be atoned for by an individual sin offering (when the person will realize that a sin was committed, and not for one where the person did not know before entering the Temple that one was impure, as that type can never be obligated to bring an individual offering. Why does this case need excluding, if it is already known that the latter is atoned for by the sin offering whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar on Yom Kippur? If the offering does not completely atone for the sin, but simply provides atonement until such time that the sinner realizes their sin and brings an individual offering, what is the purpose of the temporary atonement? Rabbi Zeira and Rava each offer a suggested answer - either to atone for the sin in case the sinner dies before realizing their sin or to protect from suffering. If the type of sin atoned for by the outer sin offering is derived from the inner sin offering, why can't the inner one atone for both types of sins? Or why can't the outer one atone for both?  

This month's learning is sponsored by Bracha Rutner in loving memory of Anna Rutner. "She was a woman who was always curious about life. She came to the US in 1958 and learned English and made an incredible life for herself raising four children and seventeen grandchildren. She will always live on in our hearts and in the number of great-grandchildren named after her."  The Gemara begins with three structural questions regarding the Mishna. Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot? Why did the Mishna list all four cases that have two cases learned from the Torah and two from the rabbis, when in the context of Masechet Shabbat and Masechet Negaim (laws of leprosy), only the relevant case for the masechet is mentioned? Why did the Mishna begin with Shevuot, but when elaborating on the details, the case of impurity came first, and only after that does the Mishna move back to elaborate on laws of oaths? The Gemara explains in each of the four categories, what two cases appear in the Torah and what two are from rabbinic law. Does the Mishna follow Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva? At first glance, it doesn't seem to follow either opinion as in oaths, Rabbi Yishmael holds one does not bring a sacrifice on oaths relating to past actions, and Rabbi Akiva holds that one does not bring a sacrifice if one forgot that the Temple was in that place or that the item was a sacrificial item. The first answer given is that each could fit with the Mishna if we adopt a different understanding of the Mishna. One could explain that the Mishna brings a list of two cases that are four, but not all obligate one in a sacrifice. This explanation is rejected since the Mishna also lists four cases for leprous marks and one is obligated to bring a sacrifice upon becoming purified from all four cases, and the assumption is that all four cases in the Mishna are similar in that way. The second answer given is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael and the Mishna refers to the obligation to receive lashes for an oath of expression that one did not keep intentionally, not a sacrifice for not keeping the oath because one forgot. This accords with Rava's position that one can derive from the verse about false oaths that one receives lashes for an oath of expression about something that happened in the past. To make this explanation fit with the Mishna, Rabbi Yishmael would need to hold that one receives lashes for a negative prohibition that to transgress it, one does not do an action, as the oath, "I will not eat," and one does not eat, does not involve an action on the part of the one who does not fulfill the oath. This raises a difficulty as Rabbi Yochanan holds like all unattributed Mishnayot, such as ours and he also holds that one does not receive lashes if no action is performed. To resolve this difficulty, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds by a different unattributed Mishna and they quote a Mishna in Makkot regarding notar, leftover meat from the Pesach sacrifice. However, this suggestion is rejected, as that Mishna can be understood following Rabbi Yehuda's explanation that it is a negative prohibition that has a positive way to fix it, lav hanitak l'asei, for which one is exempt from lashes.   

This month's learning is sponsored by Bracha Rutner in loving memory of Anna Rutner. "She was a woman who was always curious about life. She came to the US in 1958 and learned English and made an incredible life for herself raising four children and seventeen grandchildren. She will always live on in our hearts and in the number of great-grandchildren named after her."  The Gemara begins with three structural questions regarding the Mishna. Why is Shevuot written right after Makkot? Why did the Mishna list all four cases that have two cases learned from the Torah and two from the rabbis, when in the context of Masechet Shabbat and Masechet Negaim (laws of leprosy), only the relevant case for the masechet is mentioned? Why did the Mishna begin with Shevuot, but when elaborating on the details, the case of impurity came first, and only after that does the Mishna move back to elaborate on laws of oaths? The Gemara explains in each of the four categories, what two cases appear in the Torah and what two are from rabbinic law. Does the Mishna follow Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva? At first glance, it doesn't seem to follow either opinion as in oaths, Rabbi Yishmael holds one does not bring a sacrifice on oaths relating to past actions, and Rabbi Akiva holds that one does not bring a sacrifice if one forgot that the Temple was in that place or that the item was a sacrificial item. The first answer given is that each could fit with the Mishna if we adopt a different understanding of the Mishna. One could explain that the Mishna brings a list of two cases that are four, but not all obligate one in a sacrifice. This explanation is rejected since the Mishna also lists four cases for leprous marks and one is obligated to bring a sacrifice upon becoming purified from all four cases, and the assumption is that all four cases in the Mishna are similar in that way. The second answer given is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yishmael and the Mishna refers to the obligation to receive lashes for an oath of expression that one did not keep intentionally, not a sacrifice for not keeping the oath because one forgot. This accords with Rava's position that one can derive from the verse about false oaths that one receives lashes for an oath of expression about something that happened in the past. To make this explanation fit with the Mishna, Rabbi Yishmael would need to hold that one receives lashes for a negative prohibition that to transgress it, one does not do an action, as the oath, "I will not eat," and one does not eat, does not involve an action on the part of the one who does not fulfill the oath. This raises a difficulty as Rabbi Yochanan holds like all unattributed Mishnayot, such as ours and he also holds that one does not receive lashes if no action is performed. To resolve this difficulty, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan holds by a different unattributed Mishna and they quote a Mishna in Makkot regarding notar, leftover meat from the Pesach sacrifice. However, this suggestion is rejected, as that Mishna can be understood following Rabbi Yehuda's explanation that it is a negative prohibition that has a positive way to fix it, lav hanitak l'asei, for which one is exempt from lashes.   

Study Guide Makkot 16 Today's daf is dedicated in commemoration of Yom HaShoah, in memory of all those who perished in the Holocaust. Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari in loving memory of her father, Ivor Rhodes, Yisrael ben Meir v'Sara. "Please send me Dad jokes and bad puns--the worse, the better. Dad was a quiet man who cared deeply about doing the right thing. In the words of my sister-in-law to him 15 years and 2 days ago: 'You are a true gentleman... with a wicked sense of humour!' As the years go by, I find myself missing him more and more." Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in memory of her mother-in law, Mrs. Mindy Lamm, on her 5th yahrzeit.  "My mother-in-law was an extraordinary woman and the full partner of her husband, Rabbi Dr. Norman Lamm, zt"l. Together, through 68 years of marriage, they raised a beautiful family while leading the Modern Orthodox world with brilliance, vision, and incredible dignity.  We miss her every day.” The debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether one gets lashes for a doubtful warning (a warning given when it wasn't clear whether the person was going to violate the prohibition) can be found in another case regarding one who takes an oath that they will eat a loaf of bread today. They also disagree about whether or not one gets lashes for a negative prohibition that does not have an action associated with it. Both are derived from the same tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, and the sources they use to support their opinions are brought. At first, they suggest that both derive it from the same statement of Rabbi Yehuda regarding notar, but that suggestion is rejected completely as neither opinion corresponds to that opinion. Two different sources of Rabbi Yehuda are brought - each one corresponding to a different opinion. Rabbi Yochanan says that there are only who mitzvot where one can get lashes for a negative commandment that has a positive commandment intended to fix it, as he holds that one only gets lashes if one nullifies the possibility for fixing it. There are only two cases where it is possible to nullify the possibility for fixing the mitzva. The first is the mitzva of sending the mother bird away, as if one takes the mother bird and her chicks and then kils the mother bird, there is no possibility to send away the mother bird. The other one he leaves to his student to figure out and the student makes various suggestions before arriving at a conclusion that it is peah. leaving over the corner of the field for the poor. The next part of the Mishna is discussed regarding lashes for creepy crawling creatures and it is explained that since there are various negative commandments in the Torah regarding this prohibition, and there are various cases where one could receive multiple sets of lashes. If one eats produce where only the tithe for the poor wasn't taken, one receives lashes. This accords with Rabbi Yosi's opinion. 

Study Guide Makkot 16 Today's daf is dedicated in commemoration of Yom HaShoah, in memory of all those who perished in the Holocaust. Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari in loving memory of her father, Ivor Rhodes, Yisrael ben Meir v'Sara. "Please send me Dad jokes and bad puns--the worse, the better. Dad was a quiet man who cared deeply about doing the right thing. In the words of my sister-in-law to him 15 years and 2 days ago: 'You are a true gentleman... with a wicked sense of humour!' As the years go by, I find myself missing him more and more." Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in memory of her mother-in law, Mrs. Mindy Lamm, on her 5th yahrzeit.  "My mother-in-law was an extraordinary woman and the full partner of her husband, Rabbi Dr. Norman Lamm, zt"l. Together, through 68 years of marriage, they raised a beautiful family while leading the Modern Orthodox world with brilliance, vision, and incredible dignity.  We miss her every day.” The debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether one gets lashes for a doubtful warning (a warning given when it wasn't clear whether the person was going to violate the prohibition) can be found in another case regarding one who takes an oath that they will eat a loaf of bread today. They also disagree about whether or not one gets lashes for a negative prohibition that does not have an action associated with it. Both are derived from the same tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, and the sources they use to support their opinions are brought. At first, they suggest that both derive it from the same statement of Rabbi Yehuda regarding notar, but that suggestion is rejected completely as neither opinion corresponds to that opinion. Two different sources of Rabbi Yehuda are brought - each one corresponding to a different opinion. Rabbi Yochanan says that there are only who mitzvot where one can get lashes for a negative commandment that has a positive commandment intended to fix it, as he holds that one only gets lashes if one nullifies the possibility for fixing it. There are only two cases where it is possible to nullify the possibility for fixing the mitzva. The first is the mitzva of sending the mother bird away, as if one takes the mother bird and her chicks and then kils the mother bird, there is no possibility to send away the mother bird. The other one he leaves to his student to figure out and the student makes various suggestions before arriving at a conclusion that it is peah. leaving over the corner of the field for the poor. The next part of the Mishna is discussed regarding lashes for creepy crawling creatures and it is explained that since there are various negative commandments in the Torah regarding this prohibition, and there are various cases where one could receive multiple sets of lashes. If one eats produce where only the tithe for the poor wasn't taken, one receives lashes. This accords with Rabbi Yosi's opinion. 

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael?  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael?  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

Rabbi Yehuda Halpert takes us 5 years back to the COVID Zoom Seder controversy, contrasts the different rabbinic responsa, and unpacks their significance for the post-pandemic era. Stay tuned for his upcoming book: Speaking to an Empty Shul: Timeless Lessons from Unprecedented Times (Mosaica Press, 2025).

Today's daf is sponsored by Sharona Shuster in loving memory of her father, Elliot Shimoff, Eliyahu Chaim ben Harav Ephraim. "He enjoyed his family, learning Torah, and Israel. He was loved by all and a true talmud chacham. His love of learning encouraged me to learn Daf at a later age and I now see his passion. Yehi zichro baruch."  Today's daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein for a refuah shleima of her grandson Eitan Efraim ben Ayelet. "Tfilot for the success of a long and complicated surgery for Eitan to repair the nervous system from his shoulder to his fingertips from his injury in Gaza. May the operating team be shlichim neamanim B"H." In three separate encounters with either the emperor or a heretic, the question is asked: how could God possibly bring back to life those who have died? In each incident, the Jew offers a different answer. In the third encounter, Geviha ben Pesisa responds. Three additional stories describe when Jews were brought to trial before Alexander of Macedon by other nations. In each case, Geviha argues on behalf of the Jews. The pattern is consistent: the opposing nation uses a verse from the Torah to attack Jewish actions, and Geviha counters with a different verse that refutes their claim. Antoninus raises several questions to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Some questions Rabbi Yehuda resolves, while on others, Antoninus convinces him of a different view. The first question concerns how both body and soul can claim exemption from judgment after death, each blaming the other for causing sin. The second asks why the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. The third explores when the soul enters a person—at conception or during fetal development. The fourth examines when the evil inclination begins to influence a person—during fetal development or at birth. Reish Lakish, Ulla, Rav Chisda, and Rava each present seemingly contradictory verses about life after death, mortality, or resurrection. Each sage then resolves the contradiction he identified. Five additional verses are presented as proof of resurrection from the Torah. Rav Yehuda, citing Rav, teaches that withholding a halakha from a student is equivalent to stealing from their inheritance, since the Torah was given as an inheritance to all Jewish people.

Today's daf is sponsored by Sharona Shuster in loving memory of her father, Elliot Shimoff, Eliyahu Chaim ben Harav Ephraim. "He enjoyed his family, learning Torah, and Israel. He was loved by all and a true talmud chacham. His love of learning encouraged me to learn Daf at a later age and I now see his passion. Yehi zichro baruch."  Today's daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein for a refuah shleima of her grandson Eitan Efraim ben Ayelet. "Tfilot for the success of a long and complicated surgery for Eitan to repair the nervous system from his shoulder to his fingertips from his injury in Gaza. May the operating team be shlichim neamanim B"H." In three separate encounters with either the emperor or a heretic, the question is asked: how could God possibly bring back to life those who have died? In each incident, the Jew offers a different answer. In the third encounter, Geviha ben Pesisa responds. Three additional stories describe when Jews were brought to trial before Alexander of Macedon by other nations. In each case, Geviha argues on behalf of the Jews. The pattern is consistent: the opposing nation uses a verse from the Torah to attack Jewish actions, and Geviha counters with a different verse that refutes their claim. Antoninus raises several questions to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Some questions Rabbi Yehuda resolves, while on others, Antoninus convinces him of a different view. The first question concerns how both body and soul can claim exemption from judgment after death, each blaming the other for causing sin. The second asks why the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. The third explores when the soul enters a person—at conception or during fetal development. The fourth examines when the evil inclination begins to influence a person—during fetal development or at birth. Reish Lakish, Ulla, Rav Chisda, and Rava each present seemingly contradictory verses about life after death, mortality, or resurrection. Each sage then resolves the contradiction he identified. Five additional verses are presented as proof of resurrection from the Torah. Rav Yehuda, citing Rav, teaches that withholding a halakha from a student is equivalent to stealing from their inheritance, since the Torah was given as an inheritance to all Jewish people.

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in loving memory of her father Chaskel Tydor, R. Yechezkel Shraga ben R. Yehuda Leib Halevi and Esther on his 32nd yahrzeit. "A Torah scholar who survived Auschwitz and Buchenwald, founded "Kibbutz Buchenwald" after the war, and merited living in Eretz Yisrael. He would have been amazed and happy to know that his youngest daughter and two granddaughters learn Daf Yomi with Hadran." Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Plunka in loving memory of Moshe ben Amram, "Moshe Rabbenu". Rava challenges the two previous interpretations of the Mishna, citing a contradictory braita. He offers a third explanation with supporting evidence. According to Rava, the two opinions in the Mishna address different scenarios: the tanna kama discusses a case where an arrow was shot from between two people, making it impossible to identify who shot it. Both individuals are exempt from punishment, even if one is known to be righteous. Rabbi Yehuda, however, refers to a case of a bull that killed someone and then was mixed up with other bulls. Since all these bulls are now forbidden for use, they are all placed in a kipa (small enclosure) until they die. A braita is presented that supports Rava's interpretation of the Mishna. The first section discusses a pregnant cow that kills a person and is sentenced to stoning. The status of its unborn calf depends on whether the verdict was issued before or after birth. This appears to be independent of when the cow became pregnant, which doesn't make sense in light of Rava's statement that if the cow was pregnant at the time of killing, the offspring shares responsibility since it is considered part of the cow. The Gemara initially suggests the pregnancy occurred after the verdict, but rejects this solution. The conclusion is that the pregnancy happened after the killing but before the verdict was issued. Does a warning to a potential transgressor need to specify the exact type of death penalty they would face? Rav Yehuda amends his father's version of the Mishna regarding people sentenced to stoning who were mixed up with those sentenced to burning, explaining that without this correction, Rabbi Shimon's language in the Mishna would be implausible. Had the original version been correct, Rabbi Shimon would likely have offered a different explanation altogether.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in loving memory of her father Chaskel Tydor, R. Yechezkel Shraga ben R. Yehuda Leib Halevi and Esther on his 32nd yahrzeit. "A Torah scholar who survived Auschwitz and Buchenwald, founded "Kibbutz Buchenwald" after the war, and merited living in Eretz Yisrael. He would have been amazed and happy to know that his youngest daughter and two granddaughters learn Daf Yomi with Hadran." Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Plunka in loving memory of Moshe ben Amram, "Moshe Rabbenu". Rava challenges the two previous interpretations of the Mishna, citing a contradictory braita. He offers a third explanation with supporting evidence. According to Rava, the two opinions in the Mishna address different scenarios: the tanna kama discusses a case where an arrow was shot from between two people, making it impossible to identify who shot it. Both individuals are exempt from punishment, even if one is known to be righteous. Rabbi Yehuda, however, refers to a case of a bull that killed someone and then was mixed up with other bulls. Since all these bulls are now forbidden for use, they are all placed in a kipa (small enclosure) until they die. A braita is presented that supports Rava's interpretation of the Mishna. The first section discusses a pregnant cow that kills a person and is sentenced to stoning. The status of its unborn calf depends on whether the verdict was issued before or after birth. This appears to be independent of when the cow became pregnant, which doesn't make sense in light of Rava's statement that if the cow was pregnant at the time of killing, the offspring shares responsibility since it is considered part of the cow. The Gemara initially suggests the pregnancy occurred after the verdict, but rejects this solution. The conclusion is that the pregnancy happened after the killing but before the verdict was issued. Does a warning to a potential transgressor need to specify the exact type of death penalty they would face? Rav Yehuda amends his father's version of the Mishna regarding people sentenced to stoning who were mixed up with those sentenced to burning, explaining that without this correction, Rabbi Shimon's language in the Mishna would be implausible. Had the original version been correct, Rabbi Shimon would likely have offered a different explanation altogether.  

Study Guide Sanhedrin 79 Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandfather, Ben Goldstein on his yahrzeit. What type of intent is needed in order for one to receive the death penalty for murder? Rabbi Shimon has a unique approach, that one only gets capital punishment if one intends to kill that particular person. The rabbis disagree but also have their own set of criteria. Rabbi Shimon derives his opinion from the verse in Devraim 19:11, "and he ambushes him and stands up against him and kills him." The rabbis derive a different law from that verse - that if one throws a rock into a group of people and kills one of them, the murderer is not held liable. The Gemara tries to establish the exact case that the rabbis derive and conclude that it must be a case where there were nine Jews in the group and one gentile. The law is lenient here as even though the majority are Jews, if they are fixed, then the doubt is considered 50/50 and we are lenient in cases of capital punishment.  After questioning Rabbi Shimon from a case in Shmot 21:22 when a pregnant woman is accidentally killed and the murderer is killed, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon must hold like Rebbi, that the murderer there is not actually killed, but needs to pay money. A third opinion is brought, of Chizkia, who rules that the murderer is not even obligated to pay, as the laws that we hold by the more severe punishment, and exempt from a less severe punishment apply even in cases where the death penalty could have potentially been there, but is not.  If a murderer gets mixed up with a group of people and there is no way to identify who the murderer is, what can be done? The Mishna brings a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda.  Three different interpretations are brought to explain the case that they are debating.

There is a custom among Sepharadim to sing the Piyut (hymn), "Mi Kamocha Ve'en Kamocha" on the Shabbat before Purim. This song is, essentially, a poetic description of the Purim story. It follows the sequence of the Hebrew alphabet, and each line is taken from a verse in Tanach and concludes with the word "Lo." It is remarkable to consider that it was written without the help of computers, and the author cited these verses from memory. Our custom is to sing the first three and last three stanzas before Musaf in the synagogue, and then to sing the entire Piyut at home after the Shabbat meal. Hacham Ovadia Yosef, in his Hazon Ovadia – Purim (p. 351; listen to audio recording for precise citation), elaborates on the history of this hymn and its author, Rabbi Yehuda Halevi. Rabbi Yehuda Halevi was a renowned Spanish scholar and poet who lived around the year 4500 (approximately 1200 years ago), during the times of Rav Yosef Ibn Migash. Hacham Ovadia writes that it has been said about Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, "Hishamer Lecha Ben Ta'azob Et Ha'levi" – "Beware, not to abandon the Levi" – alluding to the fact that we should read and study his works. He is the author of the famous philosophical work Hakuzari, which tells the story of a Jewish scholar who convinced the king of the Khazars about the truth of the Jewish faith. Hacham Ovadia cites the Radbaz (Rabbi David Ben Zimra, Egypt, 1479-1573) as describing the value of this work, and how it is worthwhile for every Jew to study it and "etch it upon the hearts of his children and students." Furthermore, Hacham Ovadia cites from a number of early sources that the story told in Sefer Hakuzari is true, and the king of the Khazars was indeed moved by the scholar's arguments and ultimately converted to Judaism. Some say that the scholar in the story was the one who actually wrote down the events, and Rabbi Yehuda Halevi simply translated that original account into Arabic. It was later translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Shemuel Ibn Tibbon. Hacham Ovadia further relates that Rabbi Yehuda Halevi was a man of great wealth, and he had an exceptionally beautiful daughter. When she reached adulthood, Rabbi Yehuda Halevi's wife was very anxious to see her married, to the point where Rabbi Yehuda Halevi swore that he would give his daughter in marriage to the next Jewish man who came to their home. The next day, the famous Sage Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra showed up, dressed in tattered garments, as he was impoverished. The girl was horror-stricken upon seeing Ibn Ezra, and her mother approached Rabbi Yehuda Halevi to plead with him not to allow this man to marry their daughter. Rabbi Yehuda Halevi spoke with Ibn Ezra, who, in his great humility, did not reveal his identity. Rabbi Yehuda then went with Ibn Ezra to the Bet Midrash, and he sat down to compose the Mi Kamocha hymn. The hymn, as mentioned earlier, follows the sequence of the Hebrew alphabet, and when Rabbi Yehuda reached the letter "Resh," he had trouble coming up with an appropriate sentence. At that point, his wife came and urged him to come home to eat, and Ibn Ezra stayed in the Bet Midrash. He peered at Rabbi Yehuda Halevi's work, and made some corrections, and also composed an intricate stanza for the letter "Resh." When Rabbi Yehuda returned, he looked at the paper and realized that this man was Ibn Ezra. He warmly embraced and kissed Ibn Ezra, and told him that he will marry his daughter. Ibn Ezra indeed married Rabbi Yehuda Halevi's daughter, and became wealthy. In the end, Rabbi Yehuda composed his own stanza for "Resh," but in deference to Ibn Ezra, he incorporated his stanza, as well. Hacham Ovadia proceeds to cite Rabbi Shaul Ha'kohen's comment in his work Nochah Ha'shulhan, that the custom in his city, Tunis, was to chant "Mi Kamocha" in the middle of "Az Yashir," just prior to the verse, "Mi Kamocha Be'elim Hashem." It indeed appears that this was Rabbi Yehuda Halevi's intent, as the end of this hymn speaks of the miracle of the Yam Suf, the subject of Az Yashir. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shaul Ha'kohen instituted that it should be recited after the repetition of the Amida, as is customary in most communities, in order not to make an interruption in Pesukeh De'zimra. He notes that the Piyutim recited in the prayer service during the Yamim Nora'im should likewise be recited either before Pesukeh De'zimra of after the repetition of the Amida, and not in the paragraph of Yoser Or, as they are in some communities. The Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1807), in his work Tub Ha'ayin (18), likewise established that the Piyutim should not be recited until after the repetition of the Amida. In any event, everyone should certainly make a point of following this time-honored custom and sing this Piyut, and, G-d-willing, we should be worthy of singing a "Shira Hadasha" – a new song at the time of the final redemption. Rashi comments that when the Gemara establishes the Halacha of "Mishenichnas Adar Marbim Be'simha" (we increase our joy when Adar begins), this is because Adar ushers in the period of Purim and Pesah, which are holidays of redemption. This is the season when we anticipate our final redemption, as the Sages famously comment, "In Nissan they were redeemed, and in the Nissan we will be redeemed in the future." We thus hope and pray that just as we sing the praises of Hashem now, we will have the privilege of singing His praise after the final redemption, Amen.

Study Guide Sanhedrin 79 Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandfather, Ben Goldstein on his yahrzeit. What type of intent is needed in order for one to receive the death penalty for murder? Rabbi Shimon has a unique approach, that one only gets capital punishment if one intends to kill that particular person. The rabbis disagree but also have their own set of criteria. Rabbi Shimon derives his opinion from the verse in Devraim 19:11, "and he ambushes him and stands up against him and kills him." The rabbis derive a different law from that verse - that if one throws a rock into a group of people and kills one of them, the murderer is not held liable. The Gemara tries to establish the exact case that the rabbis derive and conclude that it must be a case where there were nine Jews in the group and one gentile. The law is lenient here as even though the majority are Jews, if they are fixed, then the doubt is considered 50/50 and we are lenient in cases of capital punishment.  After questioning Rabbi Shimon from a case in Shmot 21:22 when a pregnant woman is accidentally killed and the murderer is killed, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon must hold like Rebbi, that the murderer there is not actually killed, but needs to pay money. A third opinion is brought, of Chizkia, who rules that the murderer is not even obligated to pay, as the laws that we hold by the more severe punishment, and exempt from a less severe punishment apply even in cases where the death penalty could have potentially been there, but is not.  If a murderer gets mixed up with a group of people and there is no way to identify who the murderer is, what can be done? The Mishna brings a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda.  Three different interpretations are brought to explain the case that they are debating.

This week's learning is sponsored by Anne Rubin. "I would like to thank two people that have had the greatest influence on my Jewish life and learning in the most recent years. Michelle Farber who has become my study partner through her podcast since I started Daf Yomi in January 2020. I have not missed a day of reading or listening. And to Rabbi Elliot Cosgrove who has inspired me in more ways than I can say in reconnecting with my Jewish soul."  Today's daf is sponsored by Judith Weil in memory of Rabbi Eliahu Chaim Greenberg, z"l on his 50th yahrzeit, this past Monday. "My grandfather was an ilui who grew up in difficult circumstances. He didn’t know how to tell you he loved you in words, so he’d tell you by sitting you down to learn a daf of Gemara together. Yehi zichro baruch." Today's daf is sponsored by Rhona Fink in loving memory of her brother-in-law Michael Desroches who passed away February 26th. "Michael was a self-described Christian Zionist, devoted to Israel and the future of the Jewish people." If a group of people beat up one person to death, none of them receive the death penalty. But if they beat them one after another, there is a debate whether no one receives the death penalty, or the last one does,  as the last person brought the death upon them sooner. How does each interpret the verse in Vayikra 24:17 differently? What are the laws regarding a person who is a treifa - one who is assessed to die within twelve months - what if a person like that is killed, kills, or testifies against another?  If one puts a snake up to another's body to bite, is the person killed or is the snake killed? The rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? On what basis? If one hits another and is assessed to die but then recovers somewhat and then subsequently dies, can the one who hit be killed as punishment for the death or not? Rabbi Nechamia and the rabbis disagree. How does each interpret the verse in Shmot 21: 19 differently?

This week's learning is sponsored by Anne Rubin. "I would like to thank two people that have had the greatest influence on my Jewish life and learning in the most recent years. Michelle Farber who has become my study partner through her podcast since I started Daf Yomi in January 2020. I have not missed a day of reading or listening. And to Rabbi Elliot Cosgrove who has inspired me in more ways than I can say in reconnecting with my Jewish soul."  Today's daf is sponsored by Judith Weil in memory of Rabbi Eliahu Chaim Greenberg, z"l on his 50th yahrzeit, this past Monday. "My grandfather was an ilui who grew up in difficult circumstances. He didn’t know how to tell you he loved you in words, so he’d tell you by sitting you down to learn a daf of Gemara together. Yehi zichro baruch." Today's daf is sponsored by Rhona Fink in loving memory of her brother-in-law Michael Desroches who passed away February 26th. "Michael was a self-described Christian Zionist, devoted to Israel and the future of the Jewish people." If a group of people beat up one person to death, none of them receive the death penalty. But if they beat them one after another, there is a debate whether no one receives the death penalty, or the last one does,  as the last person brought the death upon them sooner. How does each interpret the verse in Vayikra 24:17 differently? What are the laws regarding a person who is a treifa - one who is assessed to die within twelve months - what if a person like that is killed, kills, or testifies against another?  If one puts a snake up to another's body to bite, is the person killed or is the snake killed? The rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? On what basis? If one hits another and is assessed to die but then recovers somewhat and then subsequently dies, can the one who hit be killed as punishment for the death or not? Rabbi Nechamia and the rabbis disagree. How does each interpret the verse in Shmot 21: 19 differently?

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in loving memory of Art’s mother Shirley, Sarah bat Avraham v’Ziche Reicha on her 9th yahrzeit. “She was a life-long learner, a striver, she sewed and made mosaics. Once her three children were old enough, she went back to school, earned a master’s degree, created a new career doing social work and counseling, and published four books on raising a family. She lives on in the tallitot and quilts she made. Today's daf is sponsored by Deborah Aschheim Weiss is loving memory of Elsie Muller on her 30th yahrtzeit. "Elsie was a family friend, 50 years my senior. She had no children of her own, so she adopted my family as hers. We were close friends and we confided in each other. She devoted her retirement to Jewish causes and would be very proud of her adopted children and grandchildren in Israel and USA." Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in loving memory of her mother, Peppy Senders, Pesha Rivka bat Gershon HaCohen and Bina, on her yahrzeit. "It has been 21 years, and my mother's wisdom, kindness and patience are still my North Star." Today's daf is sponsored by the Shuster family in loving memory of Ozer's mother Devora bat Yisroel. "May her devotion to Torah and mitzvot be a merit to the entire Jewish people." A rebellious son will only be convicted if he steals money from his father and eats in the domain of others, as only in that situation will it be likely that the son continue to act in this way. Why? Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda rules that he must steal from both parents. Since the wife does not generally own her own property, two explanations are brought to understand his opinion. Both parents have to agree to bring the son to the court. Rabbi Yehuda adds that if the mother is not worthy for the father, the son cannot be convicted. The Gemara establishes the meaning of his statement - they must have the same voice, height, and look alike. This is derived from the verse in the Torah, Devarim 21:20 "he doesn't listen to our voice." The braita that says that a rebellious son never existed, nor will it ever exist, presumably accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is impossible to find a couple who are identical in appearance, voice, and height. Rabbi Shimon also agrees that a rebellious son never happened and never will. Rabbi Yonatan disagrees and says he sat on his grave. There is a similar debate about an ir hanidachat, a city that all worship idols, and a leprous house. The Mishna also excludes any case where one of the parents is lame, mute, blind, etc. as the parents will be unable to complete the process as defined in the Torah. Can we infer from here that when the Torah describes how a process is supposed to happen, it must be done exactly in that way? After the son steals and eats meat and wine in a large quantity, the parents bring the son to a court of three judges and he is flogged. If he continues in his ways, he is brought to a court of twenty-three and judged to be stoned. The obligation to flog is derived by means of a gezeira shava from the word "v'yisru" by the one who slanders his wife (Devarim 22:18)  to that same word in the rebellious son (Devarim 21:18) and from "ben" to "ben" (Devarim 25:2) in the verse regarding lashes. If the son is brought to court but then runs away and by the time they catch him, he is no longer within the age range of one who can be killed for being a rebellious child, can he be executed? It depends on whether he was convicted before he ran away. Rabbi Chanina rules that a ben Noah who curses God and then converts is not convicted as the laws for judging him and the death penalty have changed.  Four sources, including the two parts of our Mishna, regarding a rebellious son who aged out before the ruling/execution, are brought to prove or disprove this ruling, but all comparisons are rejected. A rebellious son is killed because of the concern for where these actions will lead him in the future.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in loving memory of Art’s mother Shirley, Sarah bat Avraham v’Ziche Reicha on her 9th yahrzeit. “She was a life-long learner, a striver, she sewed and made mosaics. Once her three children were old enough, she went back to school, earned a master’s degree, created a new career doing social work and counseling, and published four books on raising a family. She lives on in the tallitot and quilts she made. Today's daf is sponsored by Deborah Aschheim Weiss is loving memory of Elsie Muller on her 30th yahrtzeit. "Elsie was a family friend, 50 years my senior. She had no children of her own, so she adopted my family as hers. We were close friends and we confided in each other. She devoted her retirement to Jewish causes and would be very proud of her adopted children and grandchildren in Israel and USA." Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in loving memory of her mother, Peppy Senders, Pesha Rivka bat Gershon HaCohen and Bina, on her yahrzeit. "It has been 21 years, and my mother's wisdom, kindness and patience are still my North Star." Today's daf is sponsored by the Shuster family in loving memory of Ozer's mother Devora bat Yisroel. "May her devotion to Torah and mitzvot be a merit to the entire Jewish people." A rebellious son will only be convicted if he steals money from his father and eats in the domain of others, as only in that situation will it be likely that the son continue to act in this way. Why? Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda rules that he must steal from both parents. Since the wife does not generally own her own property, two explanations are brought to understand his opinion. Both parents have to agree to bring the son to the court. Rabbi Yehuda adds that if the mother is not worthy for the father, the son cannot be convicted. The Gemara establishes the meaning of his statement - they must have the same voice, height, and look alike. This is derived from the verse in the Torah, Devarim 21:20 "he doesn't listen to our voice." The braita that says that a rebellious son never existed, nor will it ever exist, presumably accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is impossible to find a couple who are identical in appearance, voice, and height. Rabbi Shimon also agrees that a rebellious son never happened and never will. Rabbi Yonatan disagrees and says he sat on his grave. There is a similar debate about an ir hanidachat, a city that all worship idols, and a leprous house. The Mishna also excludes any case where one of the parents is lame, mute, blind, etc. as the parents will be unable to complete the process as defined in the Torah. Can we infer from here that when the Torah describes how a process is supposed to happen, it must be done exactly in that way? After the son steals and eats meat and wine in a large quantity, the parents bring the son to a court of three judges and he is flogged. If he continues in his ways, he is brought to a court of twenty-three and judged to be stoned. The obligation to flog is derived by means of a gezeira shava from the word "v'yisru" by the one who slanders his wife (Devarim 22:18)  to that same word in the rebellious son (Devarim 21:18) and from "ben" to "ben" (Devarim 25:2) in the verse regarding lashes. If the son is brought to court but then runs away and by the time they catch him, he is no longer within the age range of one who can be killed for being a rebellious child, can he be executed? It depends on whether he was convicted before he ran away. Rabbi Chanina rules that a ben Noah who curses God and then converts is not convicted as the laws for judging him and the death penalty have changed.  Four sources, including the two parts of our Mishna, regarding a rebellious son who aged out before the ruling/execution, are brought to prove or disprove this ruling, but all comparisons are rejected. A rebellious son is killed because of the concern for where these actions will lead him in the future.

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in loving memory of Honorable Myriam Altman, Myriam Bat Shlomo z”l. “It’s been 20 years without her, and her love and wisdom still guides our every path.” Rabbi Ami held that if one does various forbidden acts of idol worship unwittingly and then realizes one's mistake, one is obligated to bring only one sin offering. Abaye explained the source for Rabbi Ami, "Do not worship them," but he disagreed with Rabbi Ami and held that one would need to offer separate sin offerings for each action. The Mishna rules that one receives the death penalty for saying to an idol, "You are my God." Rav Nachman quoted Rav as having said that also. The Gemara infers that Rav's statement must have referred to obligating one to bring a sacrifice, as the death penalty was already derived from the Mishna. They also explain that his opinion only accords with Rabbi Akiva's position in his disagreement with the rabbis (according to Reish Lakish's understanding of their debate) about whether one who curses God unwittingly can be obligated to bring a sin offering. The rabbis rule that since the person sinned with words only, there is no sin offering, while Rabbi Akiva disagrees. Rav's opinion is derived from a verse relating to the sin of the golden calf. The Gemara continues to bring a different drasha from the words in that verse Shmot 32:8, "heelucha" in plural, mentioning the idol and God, reflecting that the Jews did not reject God completely. However, there is a tannaitic debate regarding the meaning of the word in that context. The Mishna listed various actions for which one does not receive the death penalty. Does one get lashes for them? And if so, for which of the actions? There are two different traditions relating to this and each one is challenged as some fall into the category of a negative commandment that does not have an action (words only) and a negative commandment that includes many different prohibitions, both of which are exempt from lashes. The first version is rejected, but the second is explained according to the position of Rabbi Yehuda, who obligates one to receive lashes even for a negative commandment without an action. One cannot go into a partnership with an idol worshipper as it may cause the idol worshipped to vow in the name of the idol. One cannot mention the name of an idol, unless it is a name mentioned in the Tanach.  Is idol worship something that people have a strong desire to do? 

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in loving memory of Honorable Myriam Altman, Myriam Bat Shlomo z”l. “It’s been 20 years without her, and her love and wisdom still guides our every path.” Rabbi Ami held that if one does various forbidden acts of idol worship unwittingly and then realizes one's mistake, one is obligated to bring only one sin offering. Abaye explained the source for Rabbi Ami, "Do not worship them," but he disagreed with Rabbi Ami and held that one would need to offer separate sin offerings for each action. The Mishna rules that one receives the death penalty for saying to an idol, "You are my God." Rav Nachman quoted Rav as having said that also. The Gemara infers that Rav's statement must have referred to obligating one to bring a sacrifice, as the death penalty was already derived from the Mishna. They also explain that his opinion only accords with Rabbi Akiva's position in his disagreement with the rabbis (according to Reish Lakish's understanding of their debate) about whether one who curses God unwittingly can be obligated to bring a sin offering. The rabbis rule that since the person sinned with words only, there is no sin offering, while Rabbi Akiva disagrees. Rav's opinion is derived from a verse relating to the sin of the golden calf. The Gemara continues to bring a different drasha from the words in that verse Shmot 32:8, "heelucha" in plural, mentioning the idol and God, reflecting that the Jews did not reject God completely. However, there is a tannaitic debate regarding the meaning of the word in that context. The Mishna listed various actions for which one does not receive the death penalty. Does one get lashes for them? And if so, for which of the actions? There are two different traditions relating to this and each one is challenged as some fall into the category of a negative commandment that does not have an action (words only) and a negative commandment that includes many different prohibitions, both of which are exempt from lashes. The first version is rejected, but the second is explained according to the position of Rabbi Yehuda, who obligates one to receive lashes even for a negative commandment without an action. One cannot go into a partnership with an idol worshipper as it may cause the idol worshipped to vow in the name of the idol. One cannot mention the name of an idol, unless it is a name mentioned in the Tanach.  Is idol worship something that people have a strong desire to do? 

Study Guide Sanhedrin 54 Today's daf is sponsored by Roslyn Jaffe in loving memory of her mother, Dita Muhlrad, Duba Feiga bat Menachem. "My mom was a true Yiddishe mama who instilled Torah values in her children. She was so proud of all my academic accomplishments and would have gotten much nachat from my Daf Yomi studies." Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Ohad Ben Ami, Or Levy and Eli Sharabi after 491 days in captivity. Wishing them a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages.  Rabbi Yehuda according to the version in our Mishna, holds (against the rabbis) that if one has relations unwittingly with one's mother who is also one's father's wife, he is only obligated one sin offering. How are the verses in Vayikra that relate to the forbidden relations with one's mother/father's wife understood according to Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis? The Mishna then discusses homosexual relations and bestiality and the Gemara proceeds to extrapolate the verses relating to those situations - from where do we learn the punishment and the warning for both the initiator and the one to whom relations were initiated?

Study Guide Sanhedrin 54 Today's daf is sponsored by Roslyn Jaffe in loving memory of her mother, Dita Muhlrad, Duba Feiga bat Menachem. "My mom was a true Yiddishe mama who instilled Torah values in her children. She was so proud of all my academic accomplishments and would have gotten much nachat from my Daf Yomi studies." Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Ohad Ben Ami, Or Levy and Eli Sharabi after 491 days in captivity. Wishing them a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages.  Rabbi Yehuda according to the version in our Mishna, holds (against the rabbis) that if one has relations unwittingly with one's mother who is also one's father's wife, he is only obligated one sin offering. How are the verses in Vayikra that relate to the forbidden relations with one's mother/father's wife understood according to Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis? The Mishna then discusses homosexual relations and bestiality and the Gemara proceeds to extrapolate the verses relating to those situations - from where do we learn the punishment and the warning for both the initiator and the one to whom relations were initiated?

This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment? 

What specific transgressions are punished by stoning? For some transgressions, the punishment is explicitly mentioned in the Torah, while for others it is derived from a gezeira shava using the words "demaihem bam" that appear in the context of a necromancer and a sorcerer. Why is the derivation is not made from the words "mot yumatu" instead. According to the version in the Mishna, Rabbi Yehuda holds a different view from the rabbis regarding a specific case: if a man has intercourse with his mother who is also his father's wife, he is only obligated once (in an accidental scenario, he would bring only one sin offering). The Gemara first presents an alternative version of Rabbi Yehuda's position, stating that if the mother was forbidden to marry the father, then the son is only obligated once for relations with his mother, not because she was his father's wife. To properly understand this interpretation, it seems that Rabbi Yehuda follows Rabbi Akiva's opinion that a marriage to someone forbidden by a negative prohibition is invalid. The version of Rabbi Yehuda in the Mishna is subsequently confirmed by Rabbi Yitzchak. Abaye, Rav Acha, and Rava each provide explanations for this version of Rabbi Yehuda. However, both Abaye and Rav Acha's suggestions are ultimately rejected.

This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment? 

What specific transgressions are punished by stoning? For some transgressions, the punishment is explicitly mentioned in the Torah, while for others it is derived from a gezeira shava using the words "demaihem bam" that appear in the context of a necromancer and a sorcerer. Why is the derivation is not made from the words "mot yumatu" instead. According to the version in the Mishna, Rabbi Yehuda holds a different view from the rabbis regarding a specific case: if a man has intercourse with his mother who is also his father's wife, he is only obligated once (in an accidental scenario, he would bring only one sin offering). The Gemara first presents an alternative version of Rabbi Yehuda's position, stating that if the mother was forbidden to marry the father, then the son is only obligated once for relations with his mother, not because she was his father's wife. To properly understand this interpretation, it seems that Rabbi Yehuda follows Rabbi Akiva's opinion that a marriage to someone forbidden by a negative prohibition is invalid. The version of Rabbi Yehuda in the Mishna is subsequently confirmed by Rabbi Yitzchak. Abaye, Rav Acha, and Rava each provide explanations for this version of Rabbi Yehuda. However, both Abaye and Rav Acha's suggestions are ultimately rejected.

Study Guide Sanhedrin 45 This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Galasko in loving memory of her mother-in-law, Carol Galasko, Chaya bat Avraham Michael v'Feyga Liba. "I wish everybody could be blessed with as wonderful a mother-in-law as I have. Baruch Dayan Emet."  Today's daf is dedicated in honor of the release of Agam Berger, Arbel Yehud, Gadi Mozes, and five Thai hostages after 482 days in captivity. May we see the speedy release of all the rest of the hostages! Today's daf is dedicated in memory of the 67 victims of the tragic aircraft collision in Washington.  The stoning ceremony required stripping the condemned person of their clothing and then covering just their private parts. For a male, this was undisputed. However, there was a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the other rabbis regarding whether a woman should also be stripped (and then covered). This seemed to contradict a Mishna in Sotah where their positions were reversed. Rabba and Rava offered resolutions to reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions within their respective interpretations. The execution itself followed a specific procedure: First, one of the witnesses would push the condemned person from a designated height. Then, another witness would throw a large stone upon them. These roles were specifically assigned to the witnesses who had testified against the condemned. The Gemara explores the textual sources for these procedural details. Throughout these laws, there is a guiding principle that the execution should be carried out as swiftly as possible to minimize the suffering of the condemned person. Shmuel taught that if one of the witnesses lost a hand, the condemned person would be freed, as it would be impossible to fulfill the biblical requirement that "the witnesses' hand should be the first to kill him." This position faced several challenges: two related directly to the stoning procedure, and another drawn from a case involving a murderer where literal fulfillment of the biblical verse was not necessary. While these challenges were ultimately resolved, those who questioned Shmuel's position were questioned based on the laws of the wayward child, which demand precise fulfillment of biblical verses. This too was resolved. Additional support for Shmuel's position came from the laws of a city that collectively practiced idolatry (ir hanidachat). However, the Gemara notes that Shmuel's interpretation aligns with only one side of a debate among tannaim regarding the purification process of a leper. Does post-execution hanging applies to all who are stoned, or only to those specifically stoned for cursing God or worshiping idols? https://youtu.be/F5TGe47r9m8

Study Guide Sanhedrin 45 This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Galasko in loving memory of her mother-in-law, Carol Galasko, Chaya bat Avraham Michael v'Feyga Liba. "I wish everybody could be blessed with as wonderful a mother-in-law as I have. Baruch Dayan Emet."  Today's daf is dedicated in honor of the release of Agam Berger, Arbel Yehud, Gadi Mozes, and five Thai hostages after 482 days in captivity. May we see the speedy release of all the rest of the hostages! Today's daf is dedicated in memory of the 67 victims of the tragic aircraft collision in Washington.  The stoning ceremony required stripping the condemned person of their clothing and then covering just their private parts. For a male, this was undisputed. However, there was a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the other rabbis regarding whether a woman should also be stripped (and then covered). This seemed to contradict a Mishna in Sotah where their positions were reversed. Rabba and Rava offered resolutions to reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions within their respective interpretations. The execution itself followed a specific procedure: First, one of the witnesses would push the condemned person from a designated height. Then, another witness would throw a large stone upon them. These roles were specifically assigned to the witnesses who had testified against the condemned. The Gemara explores the textual sources for these procedural details. Throughout these laws, there is a guiding principle that the execution should be carried out as swiftly as possible to minimize the suffering of the condemned person. Shmuel taught that if one of the witnesses lost a hand, the condemned person would be freed, as it would be impossible to fulfill the biblical requirement that "the witnesses' hand should be the first to kill him." This position faced several challenges: two related directly to the stoning procedure, and another drawn from a case involving a murderer where literal fulfillment of the biblical verse was not necessary. While these challenges were ultimately resolved, those who questioned Shmuel's position were questioned based on the laws of the wayward child, which demand precise fulfillment of biblical verses. This too was resolved. Additional support for Shmuel's position came from the laws of a city that collectively practiced idolatry (ir hanidachat). However, the Gemara notes that Shmuel's interpretation aligns with only one side of a debate among tannaim regarding the purification process of a leper. Does post-execution hanging applies to all who are stoned, or only to those specifically stoned for cursing God or worshiping idols? https://youtu.be/F5TGe47r9m8

Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in honor of the first birthday of her granddaughter, Hallel Ruth bat Shai Zvi and Esther Shifra Goldman. Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in loving memory of her grandson, Ephraim ben Liat and Shmuel (Jackman) H’YD, on his first yahrzeit. "He fell in Gaza one year ago. He was a faithful daf yomi learner, even in his “namer” tank, and an inspiration to us all for his dedication to Torah, his beautiful “middot,” his maturity and humility, and the love he shared with his family." Today's daf is sponsored by Michelle Feiglin in loving memory of her father, Natan ben Devorah v'Shlomo Elimelech on his 9th yahrzeit and in loving memory of their grandson, Neriya Yosef Hoshea ben Gidon v'Avital. "My father was liberated from Buchenwald and rebuilt his life in Melbourne, Australia. He inspired my love of learning Torah and every lunchtime in the middle of his working day could be found in front of his Gemara. He had great success in business, but he always said that his biggest success was his family."  Rabbi Yehuda ruled in the Mishna that if two people were related by marriage and the marriage ended, but there were children from that marriage, they are still considered relatives. Do we follow Rabbi Yehuda's ruling? Rabbi Yehuda also ruled that a close friend is disqualified from being a witness. However, the rabbis clarify that this only applies to a friend from the wedding party, and only during the week of the wedding or perhaps only on the wedding day itself. Rabbi Yehuda's ruling that a close friend or enemy is disqualified from testifying is derived from Numbers 35:23. The Mishna outlines court procedures: First, witnesses are warned to tell the truth, then they are questioned separately. In monetary cases, only designated witnesses can testify. After a majority decision is reached, it is forbidden for a judge to leave court and reveal that they disagreed with the ruling, wanting to acquit when others voted to convict, as this constitutes rechilut (gossip), a form of lashon hara (harmful speech). What warning is given to witnesses to ensure truthful testimony? Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Rav Ashi each propose different warnings, with each successive suggestion addressing perceived flaws in the previous ones. The Mishna supports Rav Yehuda's position that borrowers must formally designate witnesses. If undesignated witnesses hear a borrower's admission of debt, the borrower can claim it was said in jest. However, if the borrower denies making any admission and witnesses testify otherwise, Abaye rules that the admission is valid and the debt must be repaid. Rav Papa son of Rav Acha bar Ada quoting Rava disagrees, arguing that the borrower might have been joking and forgotten about it, since people typically don't remember trivial interactions. Another way to invalidate an admission is to claim it was made only to appear less wealthy. Can this argument be applied to deathbed statements? Do we assume that someone on their deathbed would want their children to appear less wealthy, or does this concern only apply to protecting oneself? Under what circumstances can witnesses document an admission? For loans, documenting creates a lien on the borrower's property. Therefore, documentation is permissible only when this was clearly the creditor's intention.

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Today's daf is sponsored by the Greenstone family in honor of Adina Haggege and Amy Fredj’s birthdays!  The Gemara discusses the rights and obligations of kings: A king has the right to take half of all war spoils, which is derived from the kohen gadol's portion of the showbread. Regarding the number of wives permitted to a king, Tanna Kama rules a maximum of 18 wives. Rabbi Yehuda says there is no numerical limit, only restricted if the wives turn his heart from God. Rabbi Shimon holds that even one wife is forbidden if she turns his heart from God, and even if they are righteous, the king is still limited to 18. This creates an apparent contradiction in their approaches to deriving laws from reasoning, as here Rabbi Yehuda follows reasoning behind the commandment while Rabbi Shimon doesn't, while in other places, Rabbi Shimon typically follows reasoning while Rabbi Yehuda doesn't. The number 18 comes from verses about King David (Samuel II 3:2-5), though some sources derive 24 or 48. The Gemara identifies Egla as Michal, creating a difficulty since Michal is known to have been childless while Egla is mentioned with a child. King David had 400 children from captive women who served as warriors in his army. His daughter Tamar, who was from a captive woman, was tragically assaulted by Amnon, which led to the institution of new protective laws. The Gemara discusses Amnon's tactics and his subsequent hatred of Tamar, followed by the laws that were established to protect women from such assaults. The king may only keep horses, gold, and silver needed for royal and military duties. The Torah generally avoids giving reasons for commandments because when reasons were given for royal laws, King Solomon misinterpreted them, thinking he could circumvent the commandments while adhering to their reasoning. The king requires specially written Torah scrolls for his use, which must be prepared specifically for him. How many? for what purpose?

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the birth of a grandson to our friend and co-learner Suri Davis. "May she and her family enjoy much nachat from the new arrival as he grows l'Torah (& daf), l'chupa and l'maasim tovim, and may his birth be the harbinger of smachot for all." Palti ben Layish is praised for refraining from relations with Michal, his wife, as she was still married to King David. His self-restraint is considered greater than Joseph and Boaz, who also overcame their desires. Regarding unique laws pertaining to kings: Their mourning practices are distinct. A king does not leave his palace to attend burials. However, Rabbi Yehuda challenges this, citing that King David accompanied Avner ben Ner's body. The rabbis explain that David did this specifically to prove to the people that he had not ordered Avner's death. During the seudat havra'a (mourner's meal), while the people sit on the floor, the king sits on a dargash. The Gemara presents two interpretations of what constitutes a dargash. The first interpretation is rejected. Concerning funeral processions, there is a question about whether women should follow or precede the bier. The rabbis defer to local custom, while Rabbi Yehuda cites King David's example to prove that women should walk in front. The rabbis' response to his proof is discussed. For what action was Avner punished? Rav explains that Avner could have protested King Saul's decision to kill the inhabitants of Nov (or King Saul's many attempts to kill David) but failed to do so. Rabbi Yitzchak contends that Avner did protest, but Saul did not listen. According to this interpretation, his sin was crowning Ish Boshet as king, which delayed David's reign over all of Israel by two and a half years. The requirement that a king must obtain permission from the Great Sanhedrin before engaging in optional warfare is restated here, despite being mentioned in the first chapter of Sanhedrin. A king has the right to create a path through private property. During wartime, when spoils are collected, the king claims his portion first, before the people may take their share. Shmuel and Rav debate whether a king is permitted to exercise all the powers that the prophet Shmuel warned about when the people requested a king (taking their sons, cattle, etc.). Was this a genuine description of royal prerogatives, or merely a warning to instill fear of the monarchy? This discussion parallels a debate between the tannaim Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Nehorai offers a third view: Shmuel's words were meant to discourage the request for a king. Rabbi Eliezer takes a middle ground, suggesting that while the elders' request for a king was appropriate, the amei haaretz sought one for improper reasons—to emulate other nations. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi explain that upon entering the land, the Jews received three commandments: to establish a king, to destroy Amalek, and to build the Beit haMikdash. Rabbi Yosi derives this sequence from verses in the Tanach. King Solomon initially ruled over both the celestial and terrestrial realms, but his marriage to non-Jewish wives diminished his authority in both spheres. There is disagreement about whether he regained his full authority after his downfall.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of Yovel MorYosef and Yossi Cohen who were killed in a terror attack (ה טבת תשע"ט/ December 13, 2018) at Givat Assaf, on their 6th yahrzeit, and for the continued refuah shleima of her son, Netanel Ilan ben Shayna Tzipora, who was critically injured in the attack. Today's daf is sponsored by Aimee Kahan and Rabbi Joshua Waxman in loving memory of Alex Kahan, Eliyahu ben Shlomo ha-Kohen v'Aliza, on his first yahrzeit. "May his gentleness and wisdom continue to guide us all."  Today's daf is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie, who continues to learn with her each day on the fifth anniversary of starting daf yomi.  A kohen gadol cannot perform yibum - why doesn't the positive commandment to fulfill yibum override the negative commandment to not marry a widow? Rabbis Meir and Yehuda disagree about whether a kohen gadol can escort a close relative's dead body until the city limits (at a distance) or is he not allowed to escort the body at all. This debate centers on a verse in the Torah, "And he shall not leave the Temple." How can this verse be explained according to both positions? When the kohen gadol would go to comfort mourners in a shura (line meant to comfort mourners), where would he stand and where was everyone else positioned? What about when a shura was created to comfort the kohen gadol? How does a shura work? Originally the people walked in a line and the mourners stood in one place. Later it was changed to be the reverse due to a fight that ensued between people who each wanted to walk first. In Tzipori, Rabbi Yosi reinstated the original custom. He also instituted that a mother should never walk in the marketplace with her child behind her, as a child was once kidnapped from behind her and when she went and screamed for the child, someone showed her where the kidnappers were and she was raped. A third takana of Rabbi Yosi was that women should always talk when going to the bathroom in an outhouse so that a man who may approach will know she is there and will not accidentally be secluded with her (yichud). Rabbi Yoshiya ruled that to have a shura, there is a minimum requirement of ten people, in addition to the mourners. Rav Yosef narrows the law in the Mishna that a king cannot be a judge or be judged to the Israelite kings, not from the Davidic dynasty, as kings from the Davidic dynasty were commanded to judge. This law limiting other kings from being judged was created as a reaction to a story where Shimon ben Shatach demanded that King Yannai (his brother-in-law) appear in court regarding one of his slaves who had murdered someone. Yannai challenged Shimon's decision to judge him and beseeched the other judges to side with him. When they did not get up to defend Shimon's position, they were struck down by Gabriel (the angel) and killed. At that moment they realized the dangers of judging a king. If a king is not allowed to relinquish the honor due to him, how can Rabbi Yehuda permit a king to do yibum? For the sake of a mitzva, this can be overridden. The student of Rabbi Yosi asked him how David was able to marry two sisters, Meirav and Michal? Rabbi Yosi answered that he married Michal after Meirav had died. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha brings a different answer - the betrothal to Meriav was never effective. The details of the story and how to explain certain complicated verses are explained according to both commentaries. One who raises someone else's children, those children are considered their own. This is proved by several verses in the Tanach. 

This week's learning is sponsored by Elisheva Gray. "With much appreciation to Rabbanit Michelle, Maggie and all the Hadran teachers and staff, along with the rich abundance of learning resources they provide. And special thanks to the Hadran Zoom family. It is a comfort, a privilege and a blessing to be part of this wonderful learning community. You are all an inspiration, and I learn from all of you." Today's daf is sponsored in loving memory of Bubbie Molly Andelman by her granddaughters. "She was a dearly loved wife, mother, grandmother and great-grandmother, who was an inspiration to all her descendants, a woman wise in the ways of the world, who taught us the importance of family and tradition." There is a debate in the Mishna between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the number of judges in the Great Sanhedrin - seventy or seventy-one. Initially, the Gemara suggests this debate stems from interpreting the phrase "with you" in Bamidbar 11:16, where God instructs Moshe to gather seventy elders to "stand there with you." This interpretation is rejected. The Gemara then considers Bamidbar 11:17, "and they shall bear with you the burden of the people," but this too is rejected. Finally, the source is identified as Shmot 18:22, "and they shall bear with you." Although this verse originally refers to the small Sanhedrin, the principle is applied to derive the composition of the Great Sanhedrin. The mention of selecting elders in the desert leads to a braita discussing Eldad and Meidad. The Sages and Rabbi Shimon offer differing explanations for why these two remained in the camp rather than joining the other elders. The core question is whether they stayed behind out of fear of not being chosen or out of genuine humility. This raises several questions: How did events actually unfold? What was the content of their prophecy?  The Mishna stipulates that conviction requires a majority of two judges. This raises the question: How does this requirement align with the total number of judges needed? The law states that if all judges unanimously vote to convict, the verdict is invalid. This is because courts must delay conviction verdicts until the following day to allow time to find grounds for acquittal. A unanimous conviction would preclude this possibility. What qualifications must one meet to serve as a judge? The Gemara uses various phrases to refer to different rabbis - which phrases correspond to which scholars? Why does one opinion require a minimum population of one hundred and twenty people to establish a court of twenty-three in a city?

Study Guide Sanhedrin 15 Today's daf is sponsored by Duli and Nehemia Sasson in loving memory of their father, Solomon ben Leah. The Gemara gives three different explanations for the case in the Mishna ‘valuations of moveable items’.   Why does Rabbi Yehuda require one kohen? Why in land valuations does it need to be nine Israelites and one kohen?   What is the case of a person that requires ten to evaluate as one cannot consecrate a human being?   What is the status of a person's hair ready to be cut - is it like moveable items or is it considered part of the person's body and therefore needs ten people or is it considered detached and therefore like movable items that require three?   What cases are included in the nirba and rovea?   An ox who gores a person - from where do we derive this halacha of twenty-three? Abaye questions Rava about his derivation and Rava brings three potential answers (two are rejected).   Wild animals are judged by twenty-three, but Rabbi Eliezer holds that anyone can take the law into their own hands and kill the animal. Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan disagree about whether or not Rabbi Eliezer is only referring to a case where the animal already killed a person.

Today's Talmud page, Sanhedrin 14, tells the story of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, a Talmudic superhero who sacrificed his own life to keep the Jewish tradition alive. What can we learn from his inspiring story? Listen and find out.

Due to the brave actions of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who defied the Roman decree forbidding semicha (ordination), the tradition of rabbinic ordination continued. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was killed for this act, but not before he ordained Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamoa. Rav Avia added that Rabbi Nechemia was also ordained at this time. While the story appears to suggest that one person alone could perform ordination, this contradicts a braita requiring three judges. The Gemara resolves this contradiction by explaining that two others must have been present with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled that rabbinic ordination cannot occur outside of Israel. The Gemara explores whether someone in Israel could ordain someone in Babylonia through written authorization or a messenger. The conclusion is that ordination requires the physical presence of both parties - the ordainer and the one being ordained must be together in person, as demonstrated by several stories of failed attempts at ordination on account of the distance. Rabbi Zeira initially hid to avoid ordination, believing it better to remain humble and avoid positions of power. However, upon hearing that one's sins are forgiven when rising to a position of authority, he agreed to be ordained. Regarding the egla arufa ceremony, Rabbi Shimon holds it requires three judges, while Rabbi Yehuda requires five. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov presents a third position not mentioned in the Mishna - that the king and High Priest must also participate. Rav Yosef concludes that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov requires the entire Great Sanhedrin to attend, supporting this with a tannatic source. While Abaye interprets this source differently, a braita is brought supporting Rav Yosef's reading. Maaser sheni whose value is unclear must be evaluated by three people. What Is meant by the term "whose value is unclear"? What kind of people can do the evaluation? The Mishna also states that evaluation of consecrated movable items requires three judges. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's position requiring ten, which he derives from the word 'kohen' appearing ten times in Vayikra 27 in the section about consecrated items. The Gemara leaves unanswered the question of how the rabbis derive their requirement of three judges.