Podcasts about rabbi yehuda

MK Rabbi Yehuda Glick, Interviewed in his Knesset office in Jerusalem, Israel, Feb. 21, 2018 All programs: https://rumble.com/c/WarningTVJonathanHansen  Website: https://www.worldministries.org/  Dr. Jonathan Hansen World Ministries International  Eagles Saving Nations  Dr. Jonathan Hansen - Founder & President  Rev. Adalia Hansen  Contact:  WMI  P.O. Box 277  Stanwood, WA 98292  (360) 629-5248  warning@worldministries.org  Subscribe to Eagle Saving Nations https://www.worldministries.org/eagles-saving-nations-membership.aspx  Sign up for Dr. Hansen's FREE newsletters http://www.worldministries.org/newsletter-signup.html  Order Dr. Hansen's book “The Science of Judgment” https://www.store-worldministries.org/the-science-of-judgment.html

Rav Nachman identifies two types of fat on the stomach: bar chimtza, which can effectively seal a perforation, and chimtza, which cannot. To clarify which specific fat constitutes bar chimtza, the Gemara cites an independent statement by Rav Nachman regarding a halakhic dispute between the Sages of the Land of Israel and those of the Diaspora. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that if internal mucus seals a perforation in the intestines, the animal is not a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan is cited as ruling in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on this issue and on an unrelated matter regarding mourning - that if a mourner returns home toward the end of shiva, they may conclude their mourning period alongside the other family members, provided they were not far away when the death occured. A discussion follows regarding whether the final halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on one or both of these issues. To determine whether a perforation occurred before or after the shechita, a practical test can be performed by creating a comparable post-mortem puncture to observe and compare the tissue's reaction. Different sages note that this testing method is applicable to the intestines, lung, and windpipe; however, some outline specific limitations to this procedure. The Mishna distinguishes between the laws of the keres hapnimi (inner stomach), where a perforation of any size renders the animal a treifa, and the keres hachitzona (outer stomach), which requires a rupture across the majority of its area to disqualify the animal. The Gemara presents seven distinct interpretations to identify precisely which anatomical section constitutes the inner stomach. Rabbi Yehuda's dissenting opinion regarding the outer stomach is explained to mean that a perforation of either a tefach (handbreadth) or a majority of the area will render the animal a treifa.

Rav Nachman identifies two types of fat on the stomach: bar chimtza, which can effectively seal a perforation, and chimtza, which cannot. To clarify which specific fat constitutes bar chimtza, the Gemara cites an independent statement by Rav Nachman regarding a halakhic dispute between the Sages of the Land of Israel and those of the Diaspora. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that if internal mucus seals a perforation in the intestines, the animal is not a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan is cited as ruling in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on this issue and on an unrelated matter regarding mourning - that if a mourner returns home toward the end of shiva, they may conclude their mourning period alongside the other family members, provided they were not far away when the death occured. A discussion follows regarding whether the final halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on one or both of these issues. To determine whether a perforation occurred before or after the shechita, a practical test can be performed by creating a comparable post-mortem puncture to observe and compare the tissue's reaction. Different sages note that this testing method is applicable to the intestines, lung, and windpipe; however, some outline specific limitations to this procedure. The Mishna distinguishes between the laws of the keres hapnimi (inner stomach), where a perforation of any size renders the animal a treifa, and the keres hachitzona (outer stomach), which requires a rupture across the majority of its area to disqualify the animal. The Gemara presents seven distinct interpretations to identify precisely which anatomical section constitutes the inner stomach. Rabbi Yehuda's dissenting opinion regarding the outer stomach is explained to mean that a perforation of either a tefach (handbreadth) or a majority of the area will render the animal a treifa.

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The Gemara asks whether the requirement to slaughter birds is a Torah law or a rabbinic law. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Pinchas rules that it is only a rabbinic law. The Gemara raises three difficulties against his position but resolves them. The final difficulty is resolved by pointing out that this matter is subject to a Tannaitic debate, and the Gemara brings both positions. Although only one siman needs to be slaughtered in a bird, the Gemara asks if it can be any siman or specifically the gullet. Rav Nachman and Rav Ada bar Ahava disagree on this point, and difficulties are raised against both positions. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that cutting either siman is valid. Rabbi Yehuda requires that the veins in the neck (veridin) must also be cut during slaughter. Rav Chisda explains that this rule applies specifically to birds, and its purpose is to drain out the extra blood so people will not come to eat it, but it is not an essential part of the shechita obligation. The Gemara raises three difficulties against this explanation, but they are all resolved. If exactly half of a siman was slaughtered, there is a debate between Rav and Rav Kahana - do we say that since the majority is not unslaughtered, the shechita is valid, or do we say that since the majority has not been slaughtered, the shechita is invalid? The Gemara begins by raising difficulties against Rav's position that half of a siman is considered as if the majority is slaughtered and the bird is permitted.

The Gemara asks whether the requirement to slaughter birds is a Torah law or a rabbinic law. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Pinchas rules that it is only a rabbinic law. The Gemara raises three difficulties against his position but resolves them. The final difficulty is resolved by pointing out that this matter is subject to a Tannaitic debate, and the Gemara brings both positions. Although only one siman needs to be slaughtered in a bird, the Gemara asks if it can be any siman or specifically the gullet. Rav Nachman and Rav Ada bar Ahava disagree on this point, and difficulties are raised against both positions. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that cutting either siman is valid. Rabbi Yehuda requires that the veins in the neck (veridin) must also be cut during slaughter. Rav Chisda explains that this rule applies specifically to birds, and its purpose is to drain out the extra blood so people will not come to eat it, but it is not an essential part of the shechita obligation. The Gemara raises three difficulties against this explanation, but they are all resolved. If exactly half of a siman was slaughtered, there is a debate between Rav and Rav Kahana - do we say that since the majority is not unslaughtered, the shechita is valid, or do we say that since the majority has not been slaughtered, the shechita is invalid? The Gemara begins by raising difficulties against Rav's position that half of a siman is considered as if the majority is slaughtered and the bird is permitted.

Rabbi Yehuda Winder, previously a Rebbi at the Bais Medrash Chofetz Chaim in Israel, returned to America and found himself presented with an opportunity at Yeshiva Tiferes Moshe: a position as a first-grade Rebbi. He learned that the curriculum being used was one in which students memorized phrases and repeated what their Rebbe said. He believed that there must be a different way, one that focused on fostering skills and comprehension regarding the origins of words, and this is how Lshon Hatorah was born. Rabbi Winder's method invovled students learning the “shoresh” or root of a word separately and then understand how prefixes and suffixes could modify its meaning. Each of the words came directly from the Torah which provided students with a solid foundation of language skills. Gradually, students progressed with learning Hebrew more easily through each grade level. Rabbi Winder's method has become standard in many Jewish schools. The primary objective of the Lshon Hatorah series is to empower students with the proficiency needed to translate Hebrew text with precision and ease.Gems:Give students the ability  to learn by themselves.Develop independent learners.Help students figure out what the words in Hebrew mean.The basic skills children learn will carry them throughout their lives.Encourage students to figure things out by giving them the tools they'll need and as a result, they'll want to learn more.Teach as much as you can through song. Wellnesse Natural Personal Care ProductsWellnesse was founded by a mom who wanted healthier options for families. Check out my unique link!TikvahTikvah focuses on Classical Jewish Education.Parenting On PurposeThis course will help you better understand your child and build a deeper connection.Disclaimer: This post contains affiliate links. If you make a purchase, I may receive a commission at no extra cost to you.Support the show

Study Guide The Gemara clarifies which Tanna the Mishna follows regarding temed (grape-seed water). Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avahu explains that the dispute in the Mishna in Ma'asrot between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages applies after it ferments, so our Mishna can align with the view of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabba bar Avahu that if a person bought temed with second tithe funds before it fermented, and it ultimately fermented, it is treated as wine. His words pose a difficulty for our Mishna, which did not present such an option. Rabba establishes the Mishna in a case where it is clear that it will not ferment later, while Rava suggests that the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that everything follows the visual appearance (chazuta) at the time of the sale. Rabbi Elazar disputes Rav Nachman's understanding of the Mishna in Ma'asrot, holding that the dispute applies when it has not fermented, but once it ferments, everyone agrees it is considered wine. A braita brings the laws of purifying temed that has not yet fermented by connecting it to water (haska). Rava limits this rule, explaining that this applies only when the water of the temed was pure from the beginning and became impure after it became temed, but if it was impure from the outset, it does not. However, Rav Ashi rejects his ruling and argues that there is no logic to distinguish between the cases. The Mishna states that anywhere there is a sale (a minor girl, ketana), there is no fine for rape (whose law only applies to a young woman, na'ara), and anywhere there is a fine, there is no sale. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav explains that this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that a fine applies even to a ketana. A Mishna states that anywhere there is refusal (miun, for a ketana), there is no chalitza (for a na'ara), and anywhere there is chalitza, there is no miun. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says that this is also the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that miun applies even to a na'ara. A Mishna states that anywhere there is a shofar blast (tekiya), there is no havdala, and anywhere there is havdala, there is no tekiya. If a Festival falls on the eve of the Sabbath, you blow the shofar and do not say havdala. If it falls on the conclusion of the Sabbath, you say havdala and do not blow. The Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute the exact wording of the havdala.

Study Guide The Gemara clarifies which Tanna the Mishna follows regarding temed (grape-seed water). Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avahu explains that the dispute in the Mishna in Ma'asrot between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages applies after it ferments, so our Mishna can align with the view of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabba bar Avahu that if a person bought temed with second tithe funds before it fermented, and it ultimately fermented, it is treated as wine. His words pose a difficulty for our Mishna, which did not present such an option. Rabba establishes the Mishna in a case where it is clear that it will not ferment later, while Rava suggests that the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that everything follows the visual appearance (chazuta) at the time of the sale. Rabbi Elazar disputes Rav Nachman's understanding of the Mishna in Ma'asrot, holding that the dispute applies when it has not fermented, but once it ferments, everyone agrees it is considered wine. A braita brings the laws of purifying temed that has not yet fermented by connecting it to water (haska). Rava limits this rule, explaining that this applies only when the water of the temed was pure from the beginning and became impure after it became temed, but if it was impure from the outset, it does not. However, Rav Ashi rejects his ruling and argues that there is no logic to distinguish between the cases. The Mishna states that anywhere there is a sale (a minor girl, ketana), there is no fine for rape (whose law only applies to a young woman, na'ara), and anywhere there is a fine, there is no sale. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav explains that this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that a fine applies even to a ketana. A Mishna states that anywhere there is refusal (miun, for a ketana), there is no chalitza (for a na'ara), and anywhere there is chalitza, there is no miun. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says that this is also the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that miun applies even to a na'ara. A Mishna states that anywhere there is a shofar blast (tekiya), there is no havdala, and anywhere there is havdala, there is no tekiya. If a Festival falls on the eve of the Sabbath, you blow the shofar and do not say havdala. If it falls on the conclusion of the Sabbath, you say havdala and do not blow. The Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute the exact wording of the havdala.

Why does the Temple Mount still matter? In this powerful conversation, Rabbi Yehuda Glick shares his lifelong mission to restore the Temple Mount as a place of prayer, worship, and unity for all nations.  Drawing from Scripture, history, and personal experience, he explains why Zion is more than a location - it's a calling. Rabbi Glick also opens up about surviving an assassination attempt because of his advocacy for Jewish prayer rights on the mountain, and why he believes courage and clarity are needed now more than ever. This episode explores Jerusalem, kingdom theology, biblical values, and the deeper spiritual significance of Zion in today's world. Key Takeaways Zion and Jerusalem carry distinct biblical meanings The Temple Mount is meant to be a house of prayer for all nations Jewish prayer rights on the mountain remain highly contested The restoration of Israel is connected to kingdom purpose Biblical values like family, Shabbat, and care for widows matter deeply Harmony does not erase uniqueness—it brings it into alignment The nations have a role to play in God's vision for Jerusalem Chapter Markers 00:00 – Introduction and Rabbi Glick's background 03:00 – Zion versus Jerusalem explained 06:00 – Turning the Temple Mount into a house of prayer 10:00 – Opposition, courage, and surviving assassination 15:00 – The legacy of 1967 and Moshe Dayan's decision 20:00 – Ezekiel, kingdom, and future vision 25:00 – Harmony, nations, and God's kingdom 30:00 – Biblical values and caring for widows and orphans 34:00 – The Church, Israel, and eternal covenant 39:00 – Final challenge and invitation to the mountain Visit https://thejewishroad.com for more conversations exploring Israel, Zion, Scripture, and the Jewish roots of faith. To learn more about Rabbi Yehuda Glick and opportunities to visit and pray on the Temple Mount, visit: https://shalomjerusalem.org To support Amitsim and their work serving widows and orphans in Israel, visit: https://amitsim.com Listening is a beginning. Prayer, presence, and action are the next steps.

The Mishna rules that if one slaughters an animal on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, the slaughter is valid. However, Rav asserts that the meat may not be eaten on that Shabbat, even raw. The Sages in the Yeshiva explained that Rav's position accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the laws of Shabbat, and the Gemara attempts to identify which specific ruling of Rabbi Yehuda serves as the basis for this. Rabbi Abba suggests it refers to Rabbi Yehuda's view on hachana -the requirement that an item be designated for use before Shabbat - citing the example of Rabbi Yehuda's prohibition against cutting up an animal that died on Shabbat to feed to one's dogs.  Abaye rejects this, arguing that animals intended for food are considered inherently designated for slaughter for human consumption (but not for animal consumption) even while alive, citing laws of Yom Tov as proof. Although Rabbi Abba attempts to resolve the difficulty by employing the principle of breira (retroactive designation) to understand the Yom Tov law, this is rejected as Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the concept of breira. The Gemara attempts to find the source for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold by breira. Initially, it attempts to prove this from a case involving the separation of teruma from wine, but after rejecting that proof, the Gemara derives it from Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding eruv techumim. Rav Yosef suggests the source is Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding broken vessels that were not broken before Shabbat; these are forbidden by Rabbi Yehuda  if they cannot be used for their original function. However, this comparison is rejected because an animal can be considered "food" even before it is slaughtered. This discussion aligns with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion regarding liquids that seep out of fruits. The Gemara offers a third suggestion based on Shmuel's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda's view on liquids leaking from olives and grapes. Shmuel posits that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with the Sages that such liquids are forbidden to prevent one from intentionally squeezing the fruit; likewise, permitting meat from a Shabbat slaughter might lead one to intentionally slaughter an animal on Shabbat. This is rejected because Rav disagrees with Shmuel's interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda's position on grapes and olives; since the goal is to clarify Rav's own ruling, it cannot be based on a premise that Rav himself does not accept. Rabbi Sheshet suggests a fourth possibility based on Rabbi Yehuda's ruling on lamps. Rabbi Yehuda deems used lamps muktze because they are repulsive (mi'us); similarly, a living animal would be muktze because it cannot be eaten in its current state. This is also rejected, as the Gemara distinguishes between muktze due to repulsion and muktze resulting from a prohibition.

The Mishna rules that if one slaughters an animal on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, the slaughter is valid. However, Rav asserts that the meat may not be eaten on that Shabbat, even raw. The Sages in the Yeshiva explained that Rav's position accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the laws of Shabbat, and the Gemara attempts to identify which specific ruling of Rabbi Yehuda serves as the basis for this. Rabbi Abba suggests it refers to Rabbi Yehuda's view on hachana -the requirement that an item be designated for use before Shabbat - citing the example of Rabbi Yehuda's prohibition against cutting up an animal that died on Shabbat to feed to one's dogs.  Abaye rejects this, arguing that animals intended for food are considered inherently designated for slaughter for human consumption (but not for animal consumption) even while alive, citing laws of Yom Tov as proof. Although Rabbi Abba attempts to resolve the difficulty by employing the principle of breira (retroactive designation) to understand the Yom Tov law, this is rejected as Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the concept of breira. The Gemara attempts to find the source for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold by breira. Initially, it attempts to prove this from a case involving the separation of teruma from wine, but after rejecting that proof, the Gemara derives it from Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding eruv techumim. Rav Yosef suggests the source is Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding broken vessels that were not broken before Shabbat; these are forbidden by Rabbi Yehuda  if they cannot be used for their original function. However, this comparison is rejected because an animal can be considered "food" even before it is slaughtered. This discussion aligns with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion regarding liquids that seep out of fruits. The Gemara offers a third suggestion based on Shmuel's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda's view on liquids leaking from olives and grapes. Shmuel posits that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with the Sages that such liquids are forbidden to prevent one from intentionally squeezing the fruit; likewise, permitting meat from a Shabbat slaughter might lead one to intentionally slaughter an animal on Shabbat. This is rejected because Rav disagrees with Shmuel's interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda's position on grapes and olives; since the goal is to clarify Rav's own ruling, it cannot be based on a premise that Rav himself does not accept. Rabbi Sheshet suggests a fourth possibility based on Rabbi Yehuda's ruling on lamps. Rabbi Yehuda deems used lamps muktze because they are repulsive (mi'us); similarly, a living animal would be muktze because it cannot be eaten in its current state. This is also rejected, as the Gemara distinguishes between muktze due to repulsion and muktze resulting from a prohibition.

A third challenge is brought against the ruling of Raba bar Avuha, which posits that one who vows to bring "an ox from my oxen" must provide his best ox. The difficulty arises from a comparison to commercial law: if a person sells "a house among my houses," they are not legally obligated to provide the buyer with their finest property. This discrepancy is resolved by distinguishing between the laws of hekdesh (consecration to the Temple), where the Sanctuary maintains the "upper hand," and the laws of sales, where the seller retains the "upper hand." If an individual vows to bring an offering to the Temple of Onias in Egypt, the fulfillment of that vow depends on its specific phrasing. Generally, if the vow was intended for a Temple for God, the offering must be brought to the Temple in Jerusalem; however, if the vow was specific to the Temple of Onias, there is a dispute as to whether the offering is considered a sacrifice and would be punished by karet or if the person has merely committed a "meaningless" act. A kohen who served at the Temple of Onias and subsequently repents is barred from performing service in the Temple in Jerusalem. This was a penalty to such priests, categorizing them as equivalent to a blemished kohen; while they are disqualified from performing the sacrificial service, they are still permitted to eat and share in the distribution of the sacrificial foods (kodashim) with their fellow priests. Likewise, a kohen who served in idolatrous worship is disqualified from serving in the Temple. Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet debate four specific scenarios to determine if they constitute "serving" an idol and whether a priest who performed them can return to Temple service. These four cases are: slaughtering an animal to an idol intentionally, sprinkling the blood unwittingly, bowing down to the idol, and accepting the idol as a god by verbal declaration. A fundamental debate exists between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the nature of the Temple of Onias itself - specifically, whether it was established for worship of God or for idolatry. Each Sage cites a different historical tradition regarding the political and family disputes that led Onias to flee to Egypt and build his Temple.

A third challenge is brought against the ruling of Raba bar Avuha, which posits that one who vows to bring "an ox from my oxen" must provide his best ox. The difficulty arises from a comparison to commercial law: if a person sells "a house among my houses," they are not legally obligated to provide the buyer with their finest property. This discrepancy is resolved by distinguishing between the laws of hekdesh (consecration to the Temple), where the Sanctuary maintains the "upper hand," and the laws of sales, where the seller retains the "upper hand." If an individual vows to bring an offering to the Temple of Onias in Egypt, the fulfillment of that vow depends on its specific phrasing. Generally, if the vow was intended for a Temple for God, the offering must be brought to the Temple in Jerusalem; however, if the vow was specific to the Temple of Onias, there is a dispute as to whether the offering is considered a sacrifice and would be punished by karet or if the person has merely committed a "meaningless" act. A kohen who served at the Temple of Onias and subsequently repents is barred from performing service in the Temple in Jerusalem. This was a penalty to such priests, categorizing them as equivalent to a blemished kohen; while they are disqualified from performing the sacrificial service, they are still permitted to eat and share in the distribution of the sacrificial foods (kodashim) with their fellow priests. Likewise, a kohen who served in idolatrous worship is disqualified from serving in the Temple. Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet debate four specific scenarios to determine if they constitute "serving" an idol and whether a priest who performed them can return to Temple service. These four cases are: slaughtering an animal to an idol intentionally, sprinkling the blood unwittingly, bowing down to the idol, and accepting the idol as a god by verbal declaration. A fundamental debate exists between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the nature of the Temple of Onias itself - specifically, whether it was established for worship of God or for idolatry. Each Sage cites a different historical tradition regarding the political and family disputes that led Onias to flee to Egypt and build his Temple.

Diagram Unlike the showbread (lechem hapanim) and the two loaves (shtei halechem), for which there is a debate about when they are sanctified the minchat chavitin of the Kohen Gadol and regular meal offerings are sanctified the moment they are placed into a service vessel (kli sharet). From that point forward, they are considered holy and can be disqualified by factors such as being left overnight (linah) or leaving the Sanctuary. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding the dimensions of the Table (Shulchan) and the measurements of the individual loaves that made up the showbread. The Mishna explains how the loaves were arranged on the Table according to these two opinions. Rabbi Yochanan calculated the maximum height at which the Table could sanctify the bread, based on the total height of the stacked loaves according to the respective views of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raised several difficulties with his statement but ultimately resolved them. Following this discussion, a dispute arose regarding the frame (misgeret) of the Table—whether it was fixed above the tabletop or beneath it. From there, Rabbi Yochanan linked these different opinions to a question regarding the ritual impurity of a "reversible table" (tavla hamit'pachet). What is clear from his words is that the Table was susceptible to ritual impurity. However, if it was a wooden vessel, a "wooden vessel made to rest in a fixed place" (kli etz ha'asui lenachat) should not be susceptible to impurity. The Gemara resolves this by Reish Lakish's explanation that the Table was moved and lifted to be shown to the festival pilgrims, thus categorizing it as a mobile vessel.

Study Guide The Gemara offers three suggestions for why the Shulchan, which was made of wood and covered in gold, was treated as a wooden vessel regarding the laws of impurity. After rejecting the first two possibilities, they conclude that the status is derived from a verse in Yechezkel, which describes the structure as "wood." This establishes that despite the gold plating, the table's essence is wood. Relating to the debate in the Mishna of the length and width of the Shulchan in handbreadths, there is a tannaitic debate regarding the two types of cubit measurements used in the Temple: some measuring five handbreadths and others measuring six. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree over which items followed which measurement, though both derive their positions from the same verse in Yechezkel 43:13. The verse specifically identifies four items - the yesod (base), the sovev (ledge), the keren (horns), and the Golden Altar - as using the five-handbreadth measurement. The core of their debate is whether this smaller measurement was restricted to these items or extended to all other vessels, including the Shulchan. In analyzing how these measurements were applied to the yesod and sovev, the Gemara initially assumes the five-handbreadth cubit referred to their height. When this is rejected, the Sages suggest it referred to their width. However, this second suggestion is also dismissed as the math does not align with the traditional dimensions of the Altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that a uniform rule cannot be applied across all four items. Instead, it determines that for certain components, the five-handbreadth measurement applied to the height, while for others, it applied to the width.

Diagram Unlike the showbread (lechem hapanim) and the two loaves (shtei halechem), for which there is a debate about when they are sanctified the minchat chavitin of the Kohen Gadol and regular meal offerings are sanctified the moment they are placed into a service vessel (kli sharet). From that point forward, they are considered holy and can be disqualified by factors such as being left overnight (linah) or leaving the Sanctuary. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding the dimensions of the Table (Shulchan) and the measurements of the individual loaves that made up the showbread. The Mishna explains how the loaves were arranged on the Table according to these two opinions. Rabbi Yochanan calculated the maximum height at which the Table could sanctify the bread, based on the total height of the stacked loaves according to the respective views of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raised several difficulties with his statement but ultimately resolved them. Following this discussion, a dispute arose regarding the frame (misgeret) of the Table—whether it was fixed above the tabletop or beneath it. From there, Rabbi Yochanan linked these different opinions to a question regarding the ritual impurity of a "reversible table" (tavla hamit'pachet). What is clear from his words is that the Table was susceptible to ritual impurity. However, if it was a wooden vessel, a "wooden vessel made to rest in a fixed place" (kli etz ha'asui lenachat) should not be susceptible to impurity. The Gemara resolves this by Reish Lakish's explanation that the Table was moved and lifted to be shown to the festival pilgrims, thus categorizing it as a mobile vessel.

Study Guide The Gemara offers three suggestions for why the Shulchan, which was made of wood and covered in gold, was treated as a wooden vessel regarding the laws of impurity. After rejecting the first two possibilities, they conclude that the status is derived from a verse in Yechezkel, which describes the structure as "wood." This establishes that despite the gold plating, the table's essence is wood. Relating to the debate in the Mishna of the length and width of the Shulchan in handbreadths, there is a tannaitic debate regarding the two types of cubit measurements used in the Temple: some measuring five handbreadths and others measuring six. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree over which items followed which measurement, though both derive their positions from the same verse in Yechezkel 43:13. The verse specifically identifies four items - the yesod (base), the sovev (ledge), the keren (horns), and the Golden Altar - as using the five-handbreadth measurement. The core of their debate is whether this smaller measurement was restricted to these items or extended to all other vessels, including the Shulchan. In analyzing how these measurements were applied to the yesod and sovev, the Gemara initially assumes the five-handbreadth cubit referred to their height. When this is rejected, the Sages suggest it referred to their width. However, this second suggestion is also dismissed as the math does not align with the traditional dimensions of the Altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that a uniform rule cannot be applied across all four items. Instead, it determines that for certain components, the five-handbreadth measurement applied to the height, while for others, it applied to the width.

Study Guide Did the lechem hapanim become disqualified in the desert whenever the Tabernacle was dismantled for travel? Furthermore, does this status depend on whether the bread remained on the Table (Shulchan) or had already been removed? There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, which the Gemara interprets in three ways. In the final explanation, Ravin explains that there is actually no disagreement; rather, each Sage was referring to a different scenario - one discussed bread still on the Table, while the other addressed bread that had been removed. The Mishna presents a three-way Tannaitic debate regarding the preparation of the loaves: Can the kneading, shaping, and baking be performed outside the Temple courtyard, or must they occur within? Additionally, could these tasks be performed on Shabbat? This debate centers on the moment the loaves become sanctified. The three positions - held by the Tana Kamma, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon - differ on the catalyst for sanctification: When the flour is first placed into a sacred vessel. When the bread is baked in the oven. When the loaves are formally arranged on the Table. A challenge is raised against the Tanna Kamma's position that remains unresolved. Rabbi Abbahu attempts to derive the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon from a verse, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara explains that their positions are rooted in the specific traditions they each received.

Study Guide Did the lechem hapanim become disqualified in the desert whenever the Tabernacle was dismantled for travel? Furthermore, does this status depend on whether the bread remained on the Table (Shulchan) or had already been removed? There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, which the Gemara interprets in three ways. In the final explanation, Ravin explains that there is actually no disagreement; rather, each Sage was referring to a different scenario - one discussed bread still on the Table, while the other addressed bread that had been removed. The Mishna presents a three-way Tannaitic debate regarding the preparation of the loaves: Can the kneading, shaping, and baking be performed outside the Temple courtyard, or must they occur within? Additionally, could these tasks be performed on Shabbat? This debate centers on the moment the loaves become sanctified. The three positions - held by the Tana Kamma, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon - differ on the catalyst for sanctification: When the flour is first placed into a sacred vessel. When the bread is baked in the oven. When the loaves are formally arranged on the Table. A challenge is raised against the Tanna Kamma's position that remains unresolved. Rabbi Abbahu attempts to derive the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon from a verse, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara explains that their positions are rooted in the specific traditions they each received.

There is a tradition that there are two communal offerings that require semicha. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which two they are. They both agree that the communal bull offering (brought for an unintentional sin of the congregation) requires semicha by the elders, but they disagree about the identity of the second one. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is the scapegoat on Yom Kippur, noting that according to the verse in the Torah, the Kohen Gadol performs semicha on it. Rabbi Shimon disagrees because he holds that semicha must be performed by the owner, and he argues the Kohen Gadol is not the owner of that sacrifice; the scapegoat atones only for the sins of the Israelites, while the kohanim receive their atonement from the confession of the Kohen Gadol on his own bull offering. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon's position, holding instead that the scapegoat atones for the sins of the kohanim as well, which makes the Kohen Gadol an owner of that sacrifice. Rabbi Shimon includes the communal goat offering for idolatry as the second sacrifice requiring semicha, deriving this from the word "goat" written in the context of the semicha of the nasi's (leader's) sin offering (Vayikra 4:24); the extra word implies that another goat - the communal one - is included in the requirement. Rabbi Yehuda, however, uses the verse in Vayikra 4:15, which specifies "the bull," to exclude the goat and limit the requirement to the bull alone. The Gemara questions why each sage needs a specific verse to prove his opinion when they could have simply relied on the established tradition that only two communal offerings require semicha. All individual offerings require semicha, with the exception of the firstborn animal, animal tithes, and the Pesach offering. The exclusion of these three is derived from the verse regarding peace offerings, "his offering," which implies an offering that is designated as "his" by choice.

There is a tradition that there are two communal offerings that require semicha. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which two they are. They both agree that the communal bull offering (brought for an unintentional sin of the congregation) requires semicha by the elders, but they disagree about the identity of the second one. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is the scapegoat on Yom Kippur, noting that according to the verse in the Torah, the Kohen Gadol performs semicha on it. Rabbi Shimon disagrees because he holds that semicha must be performed by the owner, and he argues the Kohen Gadol is not the owner of that sacrifice; the scapegoat atones only for the sins of the Israelites, while the kohanim receive their atonement from the confession of the Kohen Gadol on his own bull offering. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon's position, holding instead that the scapegoat atones for the sins of the kohanim as well, which makes the Kohen Gadol an owner of that sacrifice. Rabbi Shimon includes the communal goat offering for idolatry as the second sacrifice requiring semicha, deriving this from the word "goat" written in the context of the semicha of the nasi's (leader's) sin offering (Vayikra 4:24); the extra word implies that another goat - the communal one - is included in the requirement. Rabbi Yehuda, however, uses the verse in Vayikra 4:15, which specifies "the bull," to exclude the goat and limit the requirement to the bull alone. The Gemara questions why each sage needs a specific verse to prove his opinion when they could have simply relied on the established tradition that only two communal offerings require semicha. All individual offerings require semicha, with the exception of the firstborn animal, animal tithes, and the Pesach offering. The exclusion of these three is derived from the verse regarding peace offerings, "his offering," which implies an offering that is designated as "his" by choice.

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Rabbi Shimon derives from the words "et hamincha" that many additional menachot require hagasha (bringing the offering to the altar). However, he uses three other specific exclusions from the verse to exempt certain offerings: The two loaves and showbread: Excluded from the word "m'eleh" (from these), as these are not burned on the altar. The mincha of libations: Excluded from "v'hikriva" (and he shall bring it), as these offerings accompany animal sacrifices. Voluntary offerings of kohanim and the kohen gadol's griddle cakes: Excluded from "v'higisha" (and he shall bring it near), as these are burned entirely and no portion is given to the priests. The Mishna continues by categorizing sacrifices: those that require waving (tenufa) but not hagasha, those that require both, and those that require neither. The Gemara brings the biblical sources for the various sacrifices that require waving. Notably, waving can be performed even on the east side of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara questions why this differs from hagasha, which must be performed specifically at the southwest corner of the altar. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and Rabbi Yehuda each utilize a different verse to derive the source for the waving of the bikkurim. Why was only Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov mentioned in the Mishna? Two answers are suggested. Waving is a collaborative act performed by both the kohen and the owner of the sacrifice. The Gemara identifies the source for this joint action. However, an exception exists: if the owner is a woman, waving is still required, but the woman herself does not perform the act. The Gemara derives the source for this specific exemption. Converts are freed Caananite slaves are obligated in waving, as is derived from "hamakriv," the one who offers the sacrifice.

Rabbi Shimon derives from the words "et hamincha" that many additional menachot require hagasha (bringing the offering to the altar). However, he uses three other specific exclusions from the verse to exempt certain offerings: The two loaves and showbread: Excluded from the word "m'eleh" (from these), as these are not burned on the altar. The mincha of libations: Excluded from "v'hikriva" (and he shall bring it), as these offerings accompany animal sacrifices. Voluntary offerings of kohanim and the kohen gadol's griddle cakes: Excluded from "v'higisha" (and he shall bring it near), as these are burned entirely and no portion is given to the priests. The Mishna continues by categorizing sacrifices: those that require waving (tenufa) but not hagasha, those that require both, and those that require neither. The Gemara brings the biblical sources for the various sacrifices that require waving. Notably, waving can be performed even on the east side of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara questions why this differs from hagasha, which must be performed specifically at the southwest corner of the altar. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and Rabbi Yehuda each utilize a different verse to derive the source for the waving of the bikkurim. Why was only Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov mentioned in the Mishna? Two answers are suggested. Waving is a collaborative act performed by both the kohen and the owner of the sacrifice. The Gemara identifies the source for this joint action. However, an exception exists: if the owner is a woman, waving is still required, but the woman herself does not perform the act. The Gemara derives the source for this specific exemption. Converts are freed Caananite slaves are obligated in waving, as is derived from "hamakriv," the one who offers the sacrifice.

The word "oto" (it) in the verse describing the sin offering of the Nasi, "and he slaughters it in the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered" (Vayikra 4:24), is seemingly redundant. The Gemara offers four possible suggestions for what this word is intended to teach. The first suggestion is that the word excludes a different goat sin offering from the requirement of being slaughtered in the north - specifically, the goat offerings brought by the tribal leaders during the consecration of the Tabernacle. This is rejected because there is no logical reason to assume those goats would have required slaughter in the north, making an exclusionary verse unnecessary. The second suggestion is that the word teaches that while the animal must be in the north during slaughter, the slaughterer does not. However, this is initially rejected because Rabbi Achiya derives this law from a different source. The third suggestion is that only animals require slaughter in the north, excluding bird offerings. This is also rejected because birds do not require a knife for their preparation; since their procedure is entirely different, there is no reason to think they would have been subject to the northern requirement. The final suggestion is that the Pesach offering does not need to be performed in the north. This is rejected because one would not logically derive rules for lower-level sanctity offerings, such as the Pesach, from higher-level sanctity offerings that require the north. In conclusion, the Gemara returns to the second answer and explains Rabbi Achiya's source differently. Regarding leavening, one is obligated if one continues any part of the leavening process of a meal offering, even if the dough had already leavened. An example of this is baking a dough that was already leavened during the kneading stage. Rav Papa adds that a person who bakes such dough is liable for two sets of lashes because the act of baking also serves as the final stage of shaping the dough. Although a difficulty is raised from a braita, the Gemara provides a resolution. For the sake of comparison, a braita is brought regarding a firstborn animal that has a blood-related ailment requiring bloodletting. Since this animal is already considered blemished, the question arises whether it is permitted to inflict a further blemish during the procedure. Rabbi Meir, the rabbis, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yehuda each hold different positions on this issue. The Gemara focuses specifically on the first two opinions regarding whether this is legally defined as inflicting a blemish on an already blemished animal. This topic is compared to the obligation for continuing the leavening process through a new action or to the prohibition of castrating an animal that is already castrated. In those instances, there is no debate because the biblical verses indicate liability for each individual action. However, regarding a blemished animal, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis each derive their opinions from different words in the verse, leading them to their respective conclusions.

The word "oto" (it) in the verse describing the sin offering of the Nasi, "and he slaughters it in the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered" (Vayikra 4:24), is seemingly redundant. The Gemara offers four possible suggestions for what this word is intended to teach. The first suggestion is that the word excludes a different goat sin offering from the requirement of being slaughtered in the north - specifically, the goat offerings brought by the tribal leaders during the consecration of the Tabernacle. This is rejected because there is no logical reason to assume those goats would have required slaughter in the north, making an exclusionary verse unnecessary. The second suggestion is that the word teaches that while the animal must be in the north during slaughter, the slaughterer does not. However, this is initially rejected because Rabbi Achiya derives this law from a different source. The third suggestion is that only animals require slaughter in the north, excluding bird offerings. This is also rejected because birds do not require a knife for their preparation; since their procedure is entirely different, there is no reason to think they would have been subject to the northern requirement. The final suggestion is that the Pesach offering does not need to be performed in the north. This is rejected because one would not logically derive rules for lower-level sanctity offerings, such as the Pesach, from higher-level sanctity offerings that require the north. In conclusion, the Gemara returns to the second answer and explains Rabbi Achiya's source differently. Regarding leavening, one is obligated if one continues any part of the leavening process of a meal offering, even if the dough had already leavened. An example of this is baking a dough that was already leavened during the kneading stage. Rav Papa adds that a person who bakes such dough is liable for two sets of lashes because the act of baking also serves as the final stage of shaping the dough. Although a difficulty is raised from a braita, the Gemara provides a resolution. For the sake of comparison, a braita is brought regarding a firstborn animal that has a blood-related ailment requiring bloodletting. Since this animal is already considered blemished, the question arises whether it is permitted to inflict a further blemish during the procedure. Rabbi Meir, the rabbis, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yehuda each hold different positions on this issue. The Gemara focuses specifically on the first two opinions regarding whether this is legally defined as inflicting a blemish on an already blemished animal. This topic is compared to the obligation for continuing the leavening process through a new action or to the prohibition of castrating an animal that is already castrated. In those instances, there is no debate because the biblical verses indicate liability for each individual action. However, regarding a blemished animal, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis each derive their opinions from different words in the verse, leading them to their respective conclusions.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether the communal sin offering is paid for by the Temple treasury or if there is a new dedicated collection from the people. Two different versions are brought regarding who held which position, and the Gemara assumes that they switched their positions at some point and concludes that Rabbi Shimon holds it is paid for by the Temple treasury, and Rabbi Yehuda by a new collection. Rabbi Yochanan asked about the situation described in the Mishna that the kohen gadol died and there is no one yet appointed and a full issaron is brought. Is this brought twice daily in both the morning and afternoon, or only once a day? Rava brings a proof that it is brought twice daily, which is mentioned to Rabbi Yirmia, and he scoffs at it, insulting Rava as a "Bavlai tipshai" (stupid Babylonian). Rava then brings a different proof from a verse in the Torah that calls it tamid, comparing it to the tamid sacrifice which is brought twice daily. The Gemara concludes that Rava is correct, as can be seen from a braita that says so explicitly. In a regular case where a kohen gadol brings one issaron and divides it between the morning and afternoon, there is a debate between Abba Yosi ben Dostai and the rabbis about whether two handfuls of frankincense are brought or only one. Rabbi Yochanan asks whether the frankincense would be doubled according to the rabbis in a case when the community or heirs bring it (if the kohen gadol had died) and whether the oil would be doubled according to both opinions. A braita is brought from which they understand that neither is doubled, according to both opinions. Most mincha offerings are matza, other than the special sacrifice brought on Shavuot and ten of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering which are chametz. How was the leavening agent measured in the measuring of the flour for the offering?  

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether the communal sin offering is paid for by the Temple treasury or if there is a new dedicated collection from the people. Two different versions are brought regarding who held which position, and the Gemara assumes that they switched their positions at some point and concludes that Rabbi Shimon holds it is paid for by the Temple treasury, and Rabbi Yehuda by a new collection. Rabbi Yochanan asked about the situation described in the Mishna that the kohen gadol died and there is no one yet appointed and a full issaron is brought. Is this brought twice daily in both the morning and afternoon, or only once a day? Rava brings a proof that it is brought twice daily, which is mentioned to Rabbi Yirmia, and he scoffs at it, insulting Rava as a "Bavlai tipshai" (stupid Babylonian). Rava then brings a different proof from a verse in the Torah that calls it tamid, comparing it to the tamid sacrifice which is brought twice daily. The Gemara concludes that Rava is correct, as can be seen from a braita that says so explicitly. In a regular case where a kohen gadol brings one issaron and divides it between the morning and afternoon, there is a debate between Abba Yosi ben Dostai and the rabbis about whether two handfuls of frankincense are brought or only one. Rabbi Yochanan asks whether the frankincense would be doubled according to the rabbis in a case when the community or heirs bring it (if the kohen gadol had died) and whether the oil would be doubled according to both opinions. A braita is brought from which they understand that neither is doubled, according to both opinions. Most mincha offerings are matza, other than the special sacrifice brought on Shavuot and ten of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering which are chametz. How was the leavening agent measured in the measuring of the flour for the offering?  

On today's page, Menachot 51, the rabbis ask a practical yet profound question: If a high priest dies before his daily griddle cake offering is brought, who is responsible for the cost? This technical debate between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda touches on the very heart of leadership—is a leader merely an ordinary person, or are they sanctified and transformed by their office? Explore how we can view our leaders as both fallible mortals and as something much greater. Listen and find out.

Rav Huna states that a closed-in staircase opening (lul) between a house and an upper story requires one mezuza if it has one entrance and two mezuzot if it has two. Rav Papa infers from this that a room (indrona) with four doors requires four mezuzot, even if the resident typically utilizes only one of them. Amemar rules that a doorway situated at a corner is obligated in a mezuza; though Rav Ashi questions this due to the lack of formal doorposts (patzim), Amemar maintains that the edges of the walls themselves serve as the post. Rav Papa observes a doorway in Mar Shmuel's house that had only a left-side post yet was fitted with a mezuza. He questions this practice, as it seems to follow Rabbi Meir, who obligates a mezuza for a house with only one post—but even Rabbi Meir only holds that a mezuza is placed on the right side. The source for the right-side placement is derived from the word "beitecha" (your house), which is interpreted as "biatcha" (your entry). The connection between entry and the right side is either because a person begins their entry by leading with the right foot, or it is derived from the verse regarding Jehoiada the kohen, who placed a chest for donations to the right of the altar as people "came in." The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding a single doorpost centers on the plural phrasing of "mezuzot." The Rabbis hold this implies a minimum of two posts, while Rabbi Meir explains how the term can signify a single post, based on the interpretations of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva who utilize various exegetical principles. A braita derives the obligation to write the mezuza on parchment and then affix it to the wall, rather than writing it directly on the stones of the doorpost as might be understood from a simple reading of the verse. Regarding tefillin, the four paragraphs are all essential (me'akvot); even the omission of a single letter, or the "tip" of the letter yud, renders them invalid. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav adds that every letter must be surrounded by blank parchment on all four sides. The Gemara discusses the source for the four compartments of the head tefillin (shel rosh). Rabbi Yishmael derives the number four from the number of mentions and spelling variations of the word "totafot," while Rabbi Akiva explains that the word is a compound of "tat" (two in the Katpi language) and "pat" (two in the Afriki language). A braita clarifies that while the tefillin shel rosh contain four separate scrolls in four compartments, the arm tefillin (shel yad) consist of all four paragraphs written on a single scroll. If one wrote the tefillin shel rosh on one scroll, it is valid, as long as it is put into four separate compartments. If one wrote the tefillin shel yad on four separate scrolls and placed them in one compartment, it is valid, though Rabbi Yehuda requires them to be glued together to appear as one. Rabbi Yosi rules that a tefillin shel rosh can be used on the arm if it is covering by one piece of leather. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yosi as Rabbi Yochanan ruled that this is not possible as one cannot lower an item in sanctity, i.e. from the head to the arm. The order of the paragraphs to be placed in the four compartments of the tefillin shel rosh is established as: kadesh and v'haya ki yeviacha on the right, followed by shema and v'haya im shamoa on the left. To resolve a contradiction with another source that reverses this, Abaye clarifies that each source refers to a different perspective of "right" and "left," depending on whether one is looking from the perspective of the reader or the wearer. Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam (among others) disagree about how to understand the specific order of the tefillin described in the Gemara. Rav concludes that if a scribe switches the order of the paragraphs, the tefillin are invalid.

Rav Huna states that a closed-in staircase opening (lul) between a house and an upper story requires one mezuza if it has one entrance and two mezuzot if it has two. Rav Papa infers from this that a room (indrona) with four doors requires four mezuzot, even if the resident typically utilizes only one of them. Amemar rules that a doorway situated at a corner is obligated in a mezuza; though Rav Ashi questions this due to the lack of formal doorposts (patzim), Amemar maintains that the edges of the walls themselves serve as the post. Rav Papa observes a doorway in Mar Shmuel's house that had only a left-side post yet was fitted with a mezuza. He questions this practice, as it seems to follow Rabbi Meir, who obligates a mezuza for a house with only one post—but even Rabbi Meir only holds that a mezuza is placed on the right side. The source for the right-side placement is derived from the word "beitecha" (your house), which is interpreted as "biatcha" (your entry). The connection between entry and the right side is either because a person begins their entry by leading with the right foot, or it is derived from the verse regarding Jehoiada the kohen, who placed a chest for donations to the right of the altar as people "came in." The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding a single doorpost centers on the plural phrasing of "mezuzot." The Rabbis hold this implies a minimum of two posts, while Rabbi Meir explains how the term can signify a single post, based on the interpretations of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva who utilize various exegetical principles. A braita derives the obligation to write the mezuza on parchment and then affix it to the wall, rather than writing it directly on the stones of the doorpost as might be understood from a simple reading of the verse. Regarding tefillin, the four paragraphs are all essential (me'akvot); even the omission of a single letter, or the "tip" of the letter yud, renders them invalid. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav adds that every letter must be surrounded by blank parchment on all four sides. The Gemara discusses the source for the four compartments of the head tefillin (shel rosh). Rabbi Yishmael derives the number four from the number of mentions and spelling variations of the word "totafot," while Rabbi Akiva explains that the word is a compound of "tat" (two in the Katpi language) and "pat" (two in the Afriki language). A braita clarifies that while the tefillin shel rosh contain four separate scrolls in four compartments, the arm tefillin (shel yad) consist of all four paragraphs written on a single scroll. If one wrote the tefillin shel rosh on one scroll, it is valid, as long as it is put into four separate compartments. If one wrote the tefillin shel yad on four separate scrolls and placed them in one compartment, it is valid, though Rabbi Yehuda requires them to be glued together to appear as one. Rabbi Yosi rules that a tefillin shel rosh can be used on the arm if it is covering by one piece of leather. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yosi as Rabbi Yochanan ruled that this is not possible as one cannot lower an item in sanctity, i.e. from the head to the arm. The order of the paragraphs to be placed in the four compartments of the tefillin shel rosh is established as: kadesh and v'haya ki yeviacha on the right, followed by shema and v'haya im shamoa on the left. To resolve a contradiction with another source that reverses this, Abaye clarifies that each source refers to a different perspective of "right" and "left," depending on whether one is looking from the perspective of the reader or the wearer. Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam (among others) disagree about how to understand the specific order of the tefillin described in the Gemara. Rav concludes that if a scribe switches the order of the paragraphs, the tefillin are invalid.

Study Guide Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about a case where oil was placed on the kometz of a mincha of a sinner, which is not meant to be mixed with oil. Rabbi Yochanan disqualifies it, but Reish Lakish does not, as he holds that the oil should not be mixed with the mincha before the kometz is taken, but the kometz can (and ideally should) be mixed with a little bit of oil. Rabbi Yochanan brings a tannaitic source to raise a difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved. Rava asks a question about a kometz whose oil (some of it) was absorbed onto a piece of wood. Can both be burned together to ensure that all the oil of the kometz is burned, or would this not be effective as the wood is completely separate from the kometz? Ravina questions Rava as the issue is already known as a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. But they explain why the question can be asked according to each. The Mishna explains what to do in three different cases of mixtures of meal offerings that were at various stages - either two minchas before the kometz was taken, or a kometz with a different mincha where the kometz was not yet taken, or a kometz mixed with the remainder. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chanina disagree within Rabbi Yehuda's position of min b'mino (items of the same type) is not nullified, as understood by Rabbi Chiya, that items are considered the same if the status of one can change to be like the other. Rav Chisda says it is determined by the item trying to nullify, and Rabbi Chanina by the item being nullified. The three cases in our Mishna and a fourth source regarding matza are brought as difficulties to one or both of the opinions, but all are resolved.  

Study Guide Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about a case where oil was placed on the kometz of a mincha of a sinner, which is not meant to be mixed with oil. Rabbi Yochanan disqualifies it, but Reish Lakish does not, as he holds that the oil should not be mixed with the mincha before the kometz is taken, but the kometz can (and ideally should) be mixed with a little bit of oil. Rabbi Yochanan brings a tannaitic source to raise a difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved. Rava asks a question about a kometz whose oil (some of it) was absorbed onto a piece of wood. Can both be burned together to ensure that all the oil of the kometz is burned, or would this not be effective as the wood is completely separate from the kometz? Ravina questions Rava as the issue is already known as a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. But they explain why the question can be asked according to each. The Mishna explains what to do in three different cases of mixtures of meal offerings that were at various stages - either two minchas before the kometz was taken, or a kometz with a different mincha where the kometz was not yet taken, or a kometz mixed with the remainder. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chanina disagree within Rabbi Yehuda's position of min b'mino (items of the same type) is not nullified, as understood by Rabbi Chiya, that items are considered the same if the status of one can change to be like the other. Rav Chisda says it is determined by the item trying to nullify, and Rabbi Chanina by the item being nullified. The three cases in our Mishna and a fourth source regarding matza are brought as difficulties to one or both of the opinions, but all are resolved.  

Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.

Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved. The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance. The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed. The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi  Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion.

The sharp scholars (charifei) of Pumbedita argue that one burning can create pigul for another. Specifically, if one burns the kometz (handful) with the intention to burn the levona (frankincense) outside its designated time, it becomes pigul. They explain that even the Rabbis - who generally hold that a pigul thought during only half of a permitting act (matir) is ineffective - would agree here, because the levona was included in the person's thoughts. Rava supports this from the general rule in the Mishna, however, his proof is rejected as it is inconclusive. Rav Hisda, however, cites Rav to argue that one burning cannot create pigul for another. He reasons that since the kometz is not the permitting agent (matir) for the levona, an intention concerning burning the levona during the burning of the kometz is irrelevant. A proof is brought for this from a case involving the two lambs of Shavuot, but it is countered by distinguishing between items in separate vessels versus items in the same vessel. Rav Hamnuna presents a unique case that he considers of immense value, where the pigul thought "spreads" through the entire process. If one burns the kometz with intent to burn the levona tomorrow, and with intent to eat the shirayim (remnants) tomorrow, the offering is pigul. This is because the thoughts combined eventually cover both the completion of the permitting acts and the consumption of the remnants. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a braita regarding a case that all agree on. At first it seems they all agree that there is pigul even if the pigul thought is only in one matir. However, since it is clear that is not the case, they edit the braita to read "pasul" instead of "pigul," as all agree that it is disqualified, even if it is not necessarily pigul. The third chapter begins with a Mishna discussing intentions regarding items not normally meant for that specific use. If one has intent during the kometz service to eat something not usually eaten (like the kometz itself) or to burn something not usually burned (like the remnants), the rabbis rule the offering valid, while Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it. Additionally, if the intention involves a quantity less than an olive-bulk, or if it combines half an olive-bulk of eating and half an olive-bulk of burning, it remains valid because eating and burning do not combine to reach the required measure for pigul. Rabbi Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the double expression in the verse: "ve'im he'achol ye'achel" (and if it should surely be eaten). He understands this to include two types of "eating": human consumption and the consumption of the altar (burning). Therefore, an intention to switch these roles - intending to eat what is meant for the fire - is a valid disqualifying thought. The rabbis who disagree extrapolate that verse in a different manner, either to include a case of one who uses the language of eating instead of burning when having a pigul intent, or to derive the requisite amount of burning from the requisite amount for eating - an olive-bulk - meaning one who has a thought to burn less than an olive-bulk beyond its given time will not render the offering pigul. Rabbi Zeira questions Rav Asi that if Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the Torah, it should carry the penalty of karet, and yet Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that is does not. Rav Asi answer that there is a Tannaitic dispute regarding the nature of Rabbi Eliezer's disqualification: one view holds it is a Torah-level disqualification punishable by karet, while another suggests it is a Rabbinic disqualification and he brings a braita to support this. The braita discusses one who slaughters a sacrifice with the intent to drink the blood tomorrow or to burn the meat tomorrow. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies these cases, while the rabbis validate them. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar disagree in a case where one's intent was to leave the blood for tomorrow. Rabbi Yehuda says it is disqualified while Rabbi Elazar says that the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree about this as well. In trying to assess the point of disagreement between Rabbis Yehuda and Elazar, they suggest that it is on their understanding of Rabbi Eliezer's position and whether he views these cases as disqualified (rabbinic) or as pigul (Torah law, with karet). However, this understanding of the braita is rejected.

If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is effective to permit the other (pure) bread to be eaten. But if it does not atone for food items, the blood can be sprinkled, but since the bread was not complete at the time, it is forbidden to eat, as per Rabbi Yochanan's opinion in Menachot 9b. However, Rav Papa's explanation is rejected on three counts. First, Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis also disagree in a case where the item that was to be offered on the altar becomes impure. Second, Rabbi Yehuda's position by the Paschal sacrifice, as appears in the braita, demonstrates that the phrase "the communal offerings are not divided" has no connection at all to the tzitz atoning. Third, the Mishna states explicitly the reason for Rabbi Yehuda's position and it is because the communal offerings are not divided and not on account of the tzitz. In a thanksgiving (toda) offering, if there is a pigul thought about the meat, the breads are disqualified, but a pigul thought about the bread only disqualifies the bread, but not the meat. The same holds true for the two sheep regarding the accompanying breads. After attempting one explanation, which is rejected, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind the law – the bread comes on account of the animal offering, but the animal offering does not come on account of the bread. Both cases were necessary to bring, as one may have thought that the sheep and the accompanying breads are waved together and therefore might be considered completely one unit, but they are not. There are three different versions of a question Rabbi Elazar asked Rav. The first version: if one slaughters the animal for the toda offering with a thought to eat a half an olive-bulk of the meat and half an olive-bulk of the bread, do they combine to make the bread pigul? Rav answers that it is. The Gemara asks why a kal v'chomer reasoning isn't employed to lead us to say that the bread wouldn't be pigul, as it cannot even make the meat pigul. A difficulty is raised against that suggestion as in a similar situation regarding mixed breeds in a vineyard, that kind of kal v'chomer isn't used. But they distinguish between the two cases, resolving the difficulty. The second version has the same type question asked but regarding the two sheep offering and the accompanying breads. The third version of the question is about the meaning of someone's language if they slaughtered the sheep to "eat an olive-bulk of its friend tomorrow." Does "its friend" refer to the other sheep (it would not be pigul, as the sheep is a "permitter") or to the bread (it would be pigul as bread is not a "permitter")? Rav brings a tannaitic source which makes it clear that the meaning was the other sheep. The Gemara rejects this proof of Rav. What is the relationship between the sacrifice and its libations regarding pigul? Rabbi Meir holds that if the libations were already placed in a sanctified vessel and the sacrifice is brought with a pigul intent, the libations are disqualified as well. But a pigul thought regarding the libations only disqualifies the libation, not the sacrifice. In the Tosefta Zevachim 5:1, the rabbis bring counter arguments to Rabbi Meir. First, they view the libations as completely separate and do not agree with Rabbi Meir that they become disqualified if the sacrifice becomes pigul, as they can be brought up to ten days later. When Rabbi Meir qualifies his ruling to a case where the libations are brought together with the offering, the rabbis continue with another claim. Since the libations can be designated to a different sacrifice, that proves that they are not inherently connected. Rava explains that Rabbi Meir must have held that the libations cannot be designated for a different sacrifice. In the Tosefta, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree as well regarding the oil of the leper – if the guilt offering becomes pigul, does the oil become pigul as well, and the same discussion ensues.

When a Kohen performs the kemitza, the presence of a pebble, a grain of salt, or a shard of frankincense within the handful renders the offering invalid. This is because the Torah requires a precise "handful," and these foreign objects either displace the necessary flour (making it "missing"). The Gemara explains the need for the Mishna to bring all these examples. Rava explains that kemitza is performed with all five fingers. Abaye questions this from a braita that explains the need for all five fingers, as can be seen from the name of each of the fingers. The fourth finger is called kemitza, implying that only the three middle fingers are used for kemitza. To resolve this Rava explains that all five fingers are used but not all for the scooping. The kohen extends his three middle fingers over his palm to gather the dough, while simultaneously using his thumb and pinky to level the scoop by wiping away any excess flour protruding from the edges. This ensures the volume is exactly the capacity of his palm. This is one of the most difficult actions to be performed in the Temple, among them melika and chafina. Rav Papa questions whether non-traditional methods - such as scooping with the fingertips facing down, or in other atypical ways, are valid, ultimately leaving these queries unresolved. He also questions different methods of chafina of the incense that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur. Rav Papa and Mar bar Rav Ashi question atypical ways of placing the kometz in the sanctified vessel. All these questions are left unresolved. If there is too much oil or too little added to the mincha offering it is disqualified. There is a discussion about how much is too much and in what cases does it disqualify. Regarding the frankincense (levona), there is a dispute regarding the minimum amount required for the offering to remain valid. Rabbi Meir holds that a full handful must be present, while Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon allow for a reduction to two granules or even a single granule, respectively. There is a debate about whether these three opinions are only relevant in frankincense brought as a supplement to a meal offering or also when the frankincense is brought as its own offering. The validity of the meal offering is also tied to the kohen's mental intent (machshava). If the kohen intends, while taking the kometz (parallel to the act of slaughtering an animal) to eat the remains or burn the handful of the meal offering or the frankincense outside the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified but does not carry the penalty of karet. However, if he intends to consume or burn the offering outside its designated timeframe (the following day), the offering becomes pigul. This status not only invalidates the sacrifice but also makes anyone who eats it liable for the punishment of karet.

According to Yosi ben Yasiyan and Rabbi Yehuda the Baker, ben Beteira permits returning a kometz taken in a disqualified manner to the original dough, provided it has not yet been placed in a sanctified vessel. Rav Nachman challenges this ruling: if taking the kometz is a significant ritual, the act should be irreversible; if it is not, placing it in a sanctified vessel should be meaningless. Rav Nachman resolves this by explaining that while taking the kometz is indeed a ritual act, it is not complete until the kometz is placed in the vessel. If so, the Gemara objects, returning the kometz to the original dough - which is also held in a sanctified vessel - should complete the act and permanently disqualify it. This difficulty is answered in two ways. Rabbi Yochanan answers that one can derive a principle from here: sanctified vessels only sanctify items if they are placed inside with intent to sanctify. The Gemara questions this assumption, noting that it implies one could intentionally sanctify disqualified items; yet, Rabbi Yochanan previously answered Reish Lakish that disqualified items cannot be sanctified for the altar by being placed in a sanctified vessel. This contradiction is resolved by distinguishing between sanctifying an item to permit it to be offered on the altar (which is not effective) and sanctifying an item merely to disqualify it (which is effective). Rav Amram answers the original question by qualifying the case to when the kometz is returned to a heaping bowl. As a sanctified vessel only sanctifies what is within the walls of the vessel, the kometz is not sanctified to be disqualified when placed back in the original vessel. After raising a difficulty regarding the reality of this case, his answer is partially modified to a level bowl, not heaping. Rabbi Yirmia tells Rabbi Zeira that he derives from the fact that they did not suggest returning it to the vessel when it was on the ground, that the actions of kemitza do not need to be performed while a kohen is holding the vessel in his hands. Rabbi Zeira points out that this was an issue raised by Rav Nachman to Avimi, who explained that the kohen indeed needs to be holding the vessel. Rav Sheshet disagrees, holding that the Kohen does not need to be holding the vessel for all the actions of kemitza. He derives this from the laws of the Showbread, as he understands from a Mishna that the kohanim did not hold up the Table when the Showbread and bowls of frankincense was switched at the end of each week. Rav brings a third position: The first two actions - placing the dough in the bowl and taking the kemitza - do not require the kohen to be holding the vessel, but the kometz must be placed in a vessel held by a kohen, as it is parallel to accepting the blood of a sacrifice.

What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon's words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon's position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their obligation): the sinner's meal offering (minchat choteh) and the jealousy offering  of a Sotah (minchat kenaot) are completely disqualified if perfomed for the wrong purpose (shelo lishmah). What is the source for this? The Gemara initially presents a derivation for each of them from the sin offering (chatat), but after rejecting these derivations due to a difficulty regarding the guilt offering (asham), it brings a different exposition based on a gezeirah shava (verbal analogy) to both of these meal offerings. Rav adds the Omer meal offering to this list, stating that if it was performed for the wrong purpose, it is disqualified because it is intended to permit the consumption of the "new grain" (chadash), and if brought for the wrong purpose, it fails to permit it and is useless. He says the same regarding the nazirite's guilt offering (asham nazir) and the leper's guilt offering (asham metzora). If so, why are this meal offering and these sacrifices not mentioned in the Mishnayot in Menachot and Zevachim that list those disqualified if they were brought for the wrong purpose? The Gemara answers this question and settles the difficulty. The Gemara further challenges Rav: if the asham nazir and asham metzora are meant to "enable" (le'hachshir) a status change and fail to do so when brought for the wrong purpose, then the guilt offering for misappropriation (asham me'ilot) and the guilt offering for theft (asham gezeilot) - which are meant to "atone" (le'chaper) - likewise fail to atone; why then are they valid if brought for the wrong purpose? Rabbi Yirmiya makes a distinction between offerings that "enable" status (machshirim) and those that "atone" (mechaperim). He brings proof from the laws of sacrifices brought after the death of the owner, specifically citing a Mishna regarding a woman after childbirth (yoledet). Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, challenges this distinction (regarding the laws after death) from a Mishna in Nazir, where an enabling sacrifice is indeed brought after death.  

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai held that during the period of the Temple there were four distinct "camps," since the Ezrat Nashim constituted its own camp. However, in the period of Shilo there were only two camps. The Gemara struggles to identify which camp, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, did not exist in Shilo, since the Torah clearly assigns separate zones for each category of impurity - one who is impure from contact with a corpse, a zav, and a leper - implying the need for three distinct camps. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon's statement refers to an entirely different issue: during the period of Shilo, the Levite area did not function as a place of refuge for someone who killed unintentionally. This implies that in the wilderness the Levite camp did serve as a refuge zone, a point further supported by derashot on Shemot 21:13. A braita presents five different rabbinic opinions regarding which sacrifices were offered during the fourteen years after entering the Land, when the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal. Some maintain that only voluntary offerings brought by individuals were permitted. Rabbi Meir holds that meal offerings and Nazirite offerings were also brought. Rabbi Yehuda adds that even obligatory offerings could be brought in the Tabernacle (bama gedola), distinguishing between the central sanctuary and other locations. Rabbi Shimon limits which public offerings were brought. The Gemara then cites the scriptural basis for Rabbi Meir's position. Shmuel restricts the dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Meir specifically to the obligatory offerings of a Nazirite. However, after Rava introduces a contradictory braita, the Gemara revises Shmuel's statement, concluding that the dispute concerns specifically the voluntary offerings of a Nazirite. The Gemara brings a source from the Torah for the opinion of the rabbis (the second view) in the braita.

The Gemara explains the basis of the disagreement in the braita between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and how the second position of the Rabbis differs from the first position in the name of the rabbis in that same braita. Rabbi Shimon's source in the Torah for his view limiting the communal offerings brought in Gilgal is a verse in Yehoshua 5:10, which describes the Jews bringing the Paschal offering just a few days after crossing the Jordan River into the Land of Israel.  The reason the structure of Shilo was built with stone walls while its ceiling was only a curtain is derived from seemingly contradictory verses - some referring to Shilo as a "house" and others as a "tent." Four rabbis each cite a different verse to explain the law that during the period when the Tabernacle stood in Shilo, kodshim kalim and maaser sheni could be eaten anywhere within sight of Shilo. There is also a debate about whether the Tabernacle in Shilo was located in the territory of Yosef or Binyamin.  A braita discusses how many years the Tabernacle remained in each location and explains the calculations: thirty-nine years in the desert, fourteen in Gilgal, fifty-seven in Nov and Givon, and three hundred sixty-nine in Shilo.

Study Guide There is a dispute between Rabbi Nechemia and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding the reason Aaron burned the sin‑offering goat on the eighth day of the inauguration (miluim). Rabbi Nehemiah holds that the reason was aninut (the status of a mourner on the day of death), whereas Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda argue that the goat was burned because it had become impure. They raise three objections to Rabbi Nechemia's position - how can these objections be resolved, and how does each of them interpret the verses in the passage? When did Pinchas become a kohen? According to Rav, Moshe served as the kohen gadol. The Gemara raises objections to his statement.

After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse "the kohen who offers it shall eat it" that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim. The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those "fit for service" may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in eating. This raises a difficulty regarding blemished priests, who are unfit for offering yet still receive a share. To resolve this, the verse "all male kohanim" is understood to include them, and the Gemara analyzes why a tvul yom is excluded while a blemished priest is included. Reish Lakish further asks whether a blemished kohen who is also impure may receive a portion. Raba cites the case of the kohen gadol who, while an onen (mourner on the day of a relative's death), works in the Temple but cannot eat, and does not receive a share to eat later - showing that eligibility requires fitness for eating. Rav Oshaya raises a similar question about a kohen who is impure in a situation where impurity is permitted for communal offerings, and Ravina responds with the same proof from the kohen gadol, again affirming that fitness for eating is required. The Mishna states that an onen may touch sacred items, which contradicts a Mishna in Chagiga 21a requiring immersion for sacrificial items (kodashim). Three resolutions are offered: first, that our Mishna refers to before immersion, though this is rejected since immersion does not remove aninut; second, distinguishing between one who was careful to avoid impurity that conveys tumah but not impurity that disqualifies, versus one who was careful in all respects; and third, that our Mishna refers to touching, while Chagiga refers to eating. A source is brought to prove that there could be situations where one is careful about one type of impurity and not another, a distinction that carries halakhic consequences. Since the Mishna rules that an onen does not receive a share, it seems to imply that he may nevertheless eat sacrificial meat. Yet this conflicts with Pesachim 91b, which teaches that an onen may immerse and eat the Passover sacrifice at night but not other offerings. The resolution distinguishes between Passover, where eating is permitted due to its unique requirements, and other sacrifices throughout the year. This leads to mention of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over whether nighttime aninut is biblical or rabbinic, since the permission for the onen to eat the Passover sacrifice rests on Rabbi Shimon's view that it is rabbinic. However, a braita suggests that Rabbi Shimon holds aninut at night to be a Torah law. Two possible resolutions are offered to reconcile this apparent contradiction.  

The Gemara raises two difficulties with the conclusion that earthenware vessels can be koshered by placing fire inside them. First, why does the Torah command that earthenware vessels in which sanctified meat was cooked must be broken, if they could simply be put into a kiln? The answer given is that kilns could not be used in Jerusalem, as they would blacken the walls and mar the beauty of the city. Second, why were the Temple ovens made of metal if earthenware ovens could have been used and koshered? The assumption behind this question is flawed, since the ovens needed to serve as a sanctified vessel in certain cases (such as the two loaves on Shavuot and the showbread), and sanctified vessels cannot be made of earthenware. Rav Yitzchak bar Yehuda left the study hall of Rami bar Hama and joined that of Rav Sheshet. Rami bar Hama was offended, assuming Rav Yitzchak sought greater honor. Rav Yitzchak explained that he had not received satisfactory answers from Rami bar Hama, who relied on logical reasoning rather than tannaitic sources. Rami bar Hama challenged Rav Yitzchak to send him a question, promising to answer with a tannaitic source. Rav Yitzchak asked about merika and shtifa (scouring and rinsing) of a vessel in which only part was used for cooking sacrificial items: does the entire vessel require cleansing, or only the part that was used? Rami bar Hama answered logically that only the part used requires cleansing, as in the case of blood on clothing. Rav Yitzchak rejected this reasoning and cited a braita proving the opposite, thereby refuting Rami bar Hama completely. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the requirement of merika and shtifa applies to both kodshei kodashim and kodashim kalim, or only to kodshei kodashim. From where do they derive this distinction? They both agree that merika and shtifa do not apply to truma. The Gemara raises a challenge to this from a braita, and three answers are offered.