Podcasts about mishna

Rav Hamnuna states in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the prohibition of oto v'et beno does not apply to consecrated animals (kodashim). This is based on Rabbi Shimon's principle that an invalid slaughter is not halakhically considered a slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya lo shema shechita), and since the meat of a sacrifice is not permitted for consumption until its blood is sprinkled, the slaughter itself is initially unfit. Rava challenges this using a text discussing various combinations of slaughtering consecutive sacrifices inside or outside the Temple courtyard (bifnim or bachutz), tracing the respective liabilities of karet and negative prohibitions under the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. To resolve the contradiction, Rava explains that Rabbi Shimon does acknowledge the prohibition for kodashim, but holds that one does not receive lashes for it because the warning given at the time of slaughter is a doubtful warning (hatra'at safek), as the validity of the slaughter depends on the future sprinkling of the blood, and a doubtful warning is legally invalid. The Mishna states that if one slaughters an animal and it is found to be a treifa, or slaughters it for idolatry, as a Red Heifer, an ox convicted to be stoned, or a broken-necked heifer, Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the prohibition of oto v'et beno because the slaughter is invalid since the animal is not permitted for consumption, while the Rabbis declare him liable. However, if the slaughter itself is physically disqualified, such as if the animal becomes a carcass during the shechita process or if one stabbed the animal, all agree he is exempt. Reish Lakish establishes the Mishna's liability (according to the Rabbis' position) for idolatry only when the first animal was slaughtered for idolatry and the second for consumption. If the second was for idolatry, the rule of kim lei b'draba minei applies (one incurs the capital punishment for idolatry and is exempt from the lashes of oto v'et beno) as one only receives the harsher of the two punishments. Rabbi Yochanan counters that even if the second animal was for idolatry, one can still be liable for lashes for oto v'et beno if one was warned specifically for that prohibition and not for idolatry. Reish Lakish maintains that since one would be exempt if properly warned for the capital crime, one remains exempt even without that warning, and even without receiving the harsher punishment. They have the same dispute regarding the rule of kim lei b'draba minei even in cases of death/lashes and monetary liability when one was not warned for the death/lashes.

Rav Hamnuna states in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the prohibition of oto v'et beno does not apply to consecrated animals (kodashim). This is based on Rabbi Shimon's principle that an invalid slaughter is not halakhically considered a slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya lo shema shechita), and since the meat of a sacrifice is not permitted for consumption until its blood is sprinkled, the slaughter itself is initially unfit. Rava challenges this using a text discussing various combinations of slaughtering consecutive sacrifices inside or outside the Temple courtyard (bifnim or bachutz), tracing the respective liabilities of karet and negative prohibitions under the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. To resolve the contradiction, Rava explains that Rabbi Shimon does acknowledge the prohibition for kodashim, but holds that one does not receive lashes for it because the warning given at the time of slaughter is a doubtful warning (hatra'at safek), as the validity of the slaughter depends on the future sprinkling of the blood, and a doubtful warning is legally invalid. The Mishna states that if one slaughters an animal and it is found to be a treifa, or slaughters it for idolatry, as a Red Heifer, an ox convicted to be stoned, or a broken-necked heifer, Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the prohibition of oto v'et beno because the slaughter is invalid since the animal is not permitted for consumption, while the Rabbis declare him liable. However, if the slaughter itself is physically disqualified, such as if the animal becomes a carcass during the shechita process or if one stabbed the animal, all agree he is exempt. Reish Lakish establishes the Mishna's liability (according to the Rabbis' position) for idolatry only when the first animal was slaughtered for idolatry and the second for consumption. If the second was for idolatry, the rule of kim lei b'draba minei applies (one incurs the capital punishment for idolatry and is exempt from the lashes of oto v'et beno) as one only receives the harsher of the two punishments. Rabbi Yochanan counters that even if the second animal was for idolatry, one can still be liable for lashes for oto v'et beno if one was warned specifically for that prohibition and not for idolatry. Reish Lakish maintains that since one would be exempt if properly warned for the capital crime, one remains exempt even without that warning, and even without receiving the harsher punishment. They have the same dispute regarding the rule of kim lei b'draba minei even in cases of death/lashes and monetary liability when one was not warned for the death/lashes.

Mishna Baba Batra 03-03 by Shiour Yomi

Study Guide After the Gemara establishes the root of the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding a koy, Rav Papa clarifies the specific type of koy they dispute concerning the prohibition of slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno) and the distribution of priestly gifts (matnot kehuna). He also explains that the Mishna's ruling—which prohibits slaughtering a koy on Yom Tov due to the uncertainty of whether its blood requires covering (kisuy hadam)—aligns specifically with the Rabbis' position. The Gemara then introduces three other opinions regarding the exact definition of a koy. Rabbi Oshaya notes that the Mishna does not align with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who views any slaughter that is not fit for consumption—including the slaughter of sacrifices in general, since it does not permit the meat until the blood is sprinkled—as an invalid slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya). Consequently, under his view, one who slaughters an animal in the Temple and its offspring on the same day does not violate the prohibition of "you shall not slaughter it and its offspring on the same day" (oto v'et beno lo tishchatu b'yom echad). The Gemara questions why the Mishna omits the rule that one receives lashes for slaughtering an animal in the Temple courtyard whose time has not yet come (mechusar zman—because its mother was already slaughtered today) on account of slaughtering an unfit animal in the Temple, and offers two answers to resolve this.

Study Guide After the Gemara establishes the root of the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding a koy, Rav Papa clarifies the specific type of koy they dispute concerning the prohibition of slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno) and the distribution of priestly gifts (matnot kehuna). He also explains that the Mishna's ruling—which prohibits slaughtering a koy on Yom Tov due to the uncertainty of whether its blood requires covering (kisuy hadam)—aligns specifically with the Rabbis' position. The Gemara then introduces three other opinions regarding the exact definition of a koy. Rabbi Oshaya notes that the Mishna does not align with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who views any slaughter that is not fit for consumption—including the slaughter of sacrifices in general, since it does not permit the meat until the blood is sprinkled—as an invalid slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya). Consequently, under his view, one who slaughters an animal in the Temple and its offspring on the same day does not violate the prohibition of "you shall not slaughter it and its offspring on the same day" (oto v'et beno lo tishchatu b'yom echad). The Gemara questions why the Mishna omits the rule that one receives lashes for slaughtering an animal in the Temple courtyard whose time has not yet come (mechusar zman—because its mother was already slaughtered today) on account of slaughtering an unfit animal in the Temple, and offers two answers to resolve this.

Mishna Baba Batra 03-02 by Shiour Yomi

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 18:3-4L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 18, 2026Shab4 Av 5786

The Gemara discusses the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno). The Mishna presents various permutations of non-sacred animals (chullin) and consecrated sacrifices slaughtered either inside or outside the Temple courtyard, outlining the respective punishments incurred and the halakhic status of the meat. A braita derives from biblical verses that this prohibition applies to consecrated animals, and the Gemara subsequently demonstrates that it applies to non-consecrated animals as well. Since the laws of oto v'et beno are learned from consecrated animals, the Gemara questions why the prohibition also applies to crossbreeds (kilayim), which are unfit for the Altar. This is resolved by explaining that the word "or" (o) in the verse serves to include crossbreeds. This explanation raises a difficulty, as the word "or" should be needed to teach that one is liable for slaughtering either an ox or a sheep with its offspring, rather than needing to slaughter both to violate the prohibition. The Gemara resolves this by pointing to the singular word "its" (oto), which teaches individual liability. Alternatively, according to Chananya - who uses the word "its" to include male parents in the prohibition - it is already self-evident that one is liable for either animal individually, in accordance with Rabbi Yonatan's interpretive principle regarding the biblical prohibition of cursing one's parents. This discussion leads to a discussion about the  dispute between Chananya and the Rabbis r regarding whether the prohibition of oto v'et beno applies to both the father and mother, or exclusively to the mother.

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 18:1-2L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 17, 2026Fri3 Av 5786

The Gemara discusses the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno). The Mishna presents various permutations of non-sacred animals (chullin) and consecrated sacrifices slaughtered either inside or outside the Temple courtyard, outlining the respective punishments incurred and the halakhic status of the meat. A braita derives from biblical verses that this prohibition applies to consecrated animals, and the Gemara subsequently demonstrates that it applies to non-consecrated animals as well. Since the laws of oto v'et beno are learned from consecrated animals, the Gemara questions why the prohibition also applies to crossbreeds (kilayim), which are unfit for the Altar. This is resolved by explaining that the word "or" (o) in the verse serves to include crossbreeds. This explanation raises a difficulty, as the word "or" should be needed to teach that one is liable for slaughtering either an ox or a sheep with its offspring, rather than needing to slaughter both to violate the prohibition. The Gemara resolves this by pointing to the singular word "its" (oto), which teaches individual liability. Alternatively, according to Chananya - who uses the word "its" to include male parents in the prohibition - it is already self-evident that one is liable for either animal individually, in accordance with Rabbi Yonatan's interpretive principle regarding the biblical prohibition of cursing one's parents. This discussion leads to a discussion about the  dispute between Chananya and the Rabbis r regarding whether the prohibition of oto v'et beno applies to both the father and mother, or exclusively to the mother.

Chart/Explanation of Mother/Child Cases in Mishna - Document for Daf 78 by Simon Wolf

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 17:16-17L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 16, 2026Thu2 Av 5786

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 17:14-15L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 15, 2026Wed1 Av 5786

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 17:12-13L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 14, 2026Tue29 Tamuz 5786

התוכן 1) בנוגע לכמה ענינים נחשב ר"ח ליום-טוב, ובמיוחד ר"ח של "חודש החמישי" שבו "צום החמישי" עפמ"ש "צום החמישי .. יהי' .. לששון ולשמחה ולמועדים טובים". וכיון שהירידה ד"צום החמישי" היא ירידה הכי גדולה מבין כל הד' צומות שנזכרו בפסוק זה, מובן שגם העלי' שעי"ז היא עלי' הכי גדולה‏ – ‏העלי' דבנין בהמ"ק השלישי. וכדי למהר א"ז יש להוסיף ב"מעשינו ועבודתינו" ובפרט בענינים הקשורים לט' הימים. 2) ר"ח מנ"א הוא יום ההסתלקות של אהרן הכהן שהאריך ימים יותר מ-120 שנה, ועפמ"ש "הוי מתלמידיו של אהרן"‏ – ‏יומשך לכאו"א אריכות ימים ושנים טובות כפשוטו, נשמות בגופים וכו', ויה"ר שע"י ההחלטות בענינים אלו תבוא הגאולה תיכף ומיד ממש! ועוד‏.‏ב' חלקים משיחת אור ליום ד' דפ' דברים, ר"ח מנחם-אב ה'תשמ"ט ל"הנחה פרטית" או התרגום ללה"ק של השיחה: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=14-07-2026 Synopsis (1) In a number of ways, Rosh Chodesh is considered like a Yom Tov, especially Rosh Chodesh of the fifth month, which contains the “Fast of the Fifth Month,” which will be transformed “into joy and gladness and happy festivals.” Since the descent associated with the Fast of the Fifth Month is the greatest descent among the four fasts mentioned in the verse, it is understood that the ascent resulting from it is likewise the greatest ascent – namely, the building of the third Beis Hamikdash. In order to hasten it, one should increase in “our deeds and our service,” especially in matters pertaining to the Nine Days. (2) Rosh Chodesh Menachem-Av is the day of yom hilula of Aharon HaKohen, who lived more than 120 years. Since the Mishna says, “Be among the disciples of Aharon,” this should bring long life and good years for every Jew in the literal sense, as souls in bodies etc. May it be Hashem's will that the positive resolutions taken in these matters bring the Redemption immediately, literally right now!2 excerpts from sichah of Tuesday night, parashas Devarim, Rosh Chodesh Menachem-Av 5749 For a transcript in English of the Sicha: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=14-07-2026 לזכות פרימא בת פריידא שתחי' ליום ההולדת שלה כ"ט תמוז - לשנת ברכה והצלחה, ואריכות ימים ושנים טובות*לזכות מושקא תחי' יוניק ליום ההולדת שלה כ"ט תמוז - לשנת ברכה והצלחה, ואריכות ימים ושנים טובותנדבת הורי' ר' דוד וזוגתו מרת חנה שיחיו יוניק

The Gemara cites two conflicting statements of Rav regarding a hanging limb of an animal. In one statement, Rav rules that eating this limb incurs lashes, while in the other, he rules it does not. Rav Yosef resolves this contradiction: if the animal dies naturally, death causes legal detachment (oseh nipul), retroactively defining the hanging limb as ever min hachai (a limb from a living animal) which incurs lashes for one who eats it. Conversely, if the animal is slaughtered, slaughter does not cause legal detachment (eino oseh nipul), meaning the limb is not treated as a separate forbidden entity and the eater does not receive lashes. Rava brings a biblical source for this differentiation between death and slaughter, and the Gemara raises two difficulties against his proof but resolves them both. Rav Chisda and Rabba dispute whether the debate between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis - regarding whether slaughter causes legal detachment for an emerged fetal limb - applies only when the fetus is alive, or even when the fetus is dead. Rav Chisda holds that when the fetus is dead, the emerged limb is definitely considered detached and carries impurity. In the course of a back-and-forth argument between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, it was mentioned that slaughtering would not remove impurity from an eight-month fetus, as it is not viable, and there is no type of eight-month fetus that can be validly slaughtered. However, a braita states that there are eight-month fetuses that can be permitted by slaughter. Rav Kahana reconciles this by differentiating between slaughtering the fetus itself and permitting the animal via its mother's slaughter (ben pekua). Rav Hoshaya inquires whether a live nine-month-old fetus can be validly slaughtered while still in utero. This question is evaluated under the views of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Chananya attempts to resolve this inquiry from a braita, but his answer is ultimately rejected by Rava. The Mishna introduces a dispute regarding the laws of ben pekua and whether they apply to a fully formed, nine-month-old fetus found inside its slaughtered mother. Rabbi Meir rules that the laws of ben pekua do not apply here, and the fetus requires its own independent slaughter. Conversely, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that as long as the fetus is still inside the womb, it is covered by the laws of ben pekua and is permitted by the slaughter of the mother. Operating under the Rabbis' position, Rabbi Eleazar states in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the mother's slaughter only covers the animal born from this womb regarding the laws of eating. In other halakhot, this animal is considered a distinct entity and standard animal laws apply to it. The Gemara presents two versions of what Rabbi Oshaya's statement was coming to exclude: the first version suggests it excludes the animal's fat, sciatic nerve, and blood from the mother's exemption, while the second version suggests it excludes using the animal for work or illicit cross-breeding. The first version is ultimately rejected based on other sources, leaving the second version as the preferred explanation. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the blood of a ben pekua (a nine-month fetus) is permitted as well. Rabbi Yochanan raises one difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, which the Gemara subsequently resolves. According to the position of the Rabbis, a question is asked whether one can redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi disagree. A second question is asked whether a ben pekua that is still in utero can be considered a separate unit for the laws of ritual impurity. This is a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and each one raises a difficulty against the other's position.

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 17:10-11L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 13, 2026Mon28 Tamuz 5786

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 17:8-9L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 12, 2026Sun27 Tamuz 5786

The Gemara cites two conflicting statements of Rav regarding a hanging limb of an animal. In one statement, Rav rules that eating this limb incurs lashes, while in the other, he rules it does not. Rav Yosef resolves this contradiction: if the animal dies naturally, death causes legal detachment (oseh nipul), retroactively defining the hanging limb as ever min hachai (a limb from a living animal) which incurs lashes for one who eats it. Conversely, if the animal is slaughtered, slaughter does not cause legal detachment (eino oseh nipul), meaning the limb is not treated as a separate forbidden entity and the eater does not receive lashes. Rava brings a biblical source for this differentiation between death and slaughter, and the Gemara raises two difficulties against his proof but resolves them both. Rav Chisda and Rabba dispute whether the debate between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis - regarding whether slaughter causes legal detachment for an emerged fetal limb - applies only when the fetus is alive, or even when the fetus is dead. Rav Chisda holds that when the fetus is dead, the emerged limb is definitely considered detached and carries impurity. In the course of a back-and-forth argument between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, it was mentioned that slaughtering would not remove impurity from an eight-month fetus, as it is not viable, and there is no type of eight-month fetus that can be validly slaughtered. However, a braita states that there are eight-month fetuses that can be permitted by slaughter. Rav Kahana reconciles this by differentiating between slaughtering the fetus itself and permitting the animal via its mother's slaughter (ben pekua). Rav Hoshaya inquires whether a live nine-month-old fetus can be validly slaughtered while still in utero. This question is evaluated under the views of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Chananya attempts to resolve this inquiry from a braita, but his answer is ultimately rejected by Rava. The Mishna introduces a dispute regarding the laws of ben pekua and whether they apply to a fully formed, nine-month-old fetus found inside its slaughtered mother. Rabbi Meir rules that the laws of ben pekua do not apply here, and the fetus requires its own independent slaughter. Conversely, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that as long as the fetus is still inside the womb, it is covered by the laws of ben pekua and is permitted by the slaughter of the mother. Operating under the Rabbis' position, Rabbi Eleazar states in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the mother's slaughter only covers the animal born from this womb regarding the laws of eating. In other halakhot, this animal is considered a distinct entity and standard animal laws apply to it. The Gemara presents two versions of what Rabbi Oshaya's statement was coming to exclude: the first version suggests it excludes the animal's fat, sciatic nerve, and blood from the mother's exemption, while the second version suggests it excludes using the animal for work or illicit cross-breeding. The first version is ultimately rejected based on other sources, leaving the second version as the preferred explanation. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the blood of a ben pekua (a nine-month fetus) is permitted as well. Rabbi Yochanan raises one difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, which the Gemara subsequently resolves. According to the position of the Rabbis, a question is asked whether one can redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi disagree. A second question is asked whether a ben pekua that is still in utero can be considered a separate unit for the laws of ritual impurity. This is a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and each one raises a difficulty against the other's position.

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 17:6-7L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 11, 2026Shab26 Tamuz 5786

The Gemara presents biblical derivations establishing that undomesticated animals (chaya) are included in the legal category of domesticated animals (behema) and vice versa. This crossover applies to kosher signs, crossbreeding laws, sacrificial impurities, and miscarriages. The Mishna rules that if a fetus dies in utero and a midwife reaches inside and touches it, the midwife contracts seven-day corpse impurity, while the mother remains pure until the fetus emerges. Rabba establishes that just as absorbed impurity (tuma belua) does not pass on impurity, absorbed purity (tahara beluah cannot become impure. The Gemara seeks biblical and logical sources for these principles, evaluating various kal va-chomer (a fortiori) arguments, including extending this law to animals. Rava notes that both laws are already stated in Mishnayot concerning a swallowed ring, prompting the Gemara to clarify that Rabba's unique ruling applies to a case where someone swallows two rings simultaneously - one pure and one impure - and the impure ring does not make the pure one impure.

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 17:4-5L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 10, 2026Fri25 Tamuz 5786

The Gemara presents biblical derivations establishing that undomesticated animals (chaya) are included in the legal category of domesticated animals (behema) and vice versa. This crossover applies to kosher signs, crossbreeding laws, sacrificial impurities, and miscarriages. The Mishna rules that if a fetus dies in utero and a midwife reaches inside and touches it, the midwife contracts seven-day corpse impurity, while the mother remains pure until the fetus emerges. Rabba establishes that just as absorbed impurity (tuma belua) does not pass on impurity, absorbed purity (tahara beluah cannot become impure. The Gemara seeks biblical and logical sources for these principles, evaluating various kal va-chomer (a fortiori) arguments, including extending this law to animals. Rava notes that both laws are already stated in Mishnayot concerning a swallowed ring, prompting the Gemara to clarify that Rabba's unique ruling applies to a case where someone swallows two rings simultaneously - one pure and one impure - and the impure ring does not make the pure one impure.

The Mishna explains at what stage a delivery is considered a birth (even for a stillborn animal) to determine whether it exempts subsequent offspring from firstborn status, particularly in the case of a difficult birth where the fetus is extracted in pieces. Rav Huna and Raba disagree regarding when the majority of the animal emerges: does the sanctity of the firstborn apply retroactively or only from that moment onward? The Gemara presents two cases demonstrating the practical ramifications of this dispute. A difficulty is raised against Rav Huna's position from our Mishna, but it is ultimately resolved through a reinterpretation of the Mishna. A series of unanswered questions are then raised regarding whether a newborn is considered a firstborn if there is some type of chatzitza (interposition) between the fetus and the womb. The Mishna explains that touching a dead fetus while it is in utero does not convey the impurity of a carcass. However, the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosi haGelili debate whether this exemption applies to all animals - both kosher and non-kosher- or only to kosher animals, and the Gemara presents explanations for each position.

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 17:2-3L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 9, 2026Thu24 Tamuz 5786

The Mishna explains at what stage a delivery is considered a birth (even for a stillborn animal) to determine whether it exempts subsequent offspring from firstborn status, particularly in the case of a difficult birth where the fetus is extracted in pieces. Rav Huna and Raba disagree regarding when the majority of the animal emerges: does the sanctity of the firstborn apply retroactively or only from that moment onward? The Gemara presents two cases demonstrating the practical ramifications of this dispute. A difficulty is raised against Rav Huna's position from our Mishna, but it is ultimately resolved through a reinterpretation of the Mishna. A series of unanswered questions are then raised regarding whether a newborn is considered a firstborn if there is some type of chatzitza (interposition) between the fetus and the womb. The Mishna explains that touching a dead fetus while it is in utero does not convey the impurity of a carcass. However, the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosi haGelili debate whether this exemption applies to all animals - both kosher and non-kosher- or only to kosher animals, and the Gemara presents explanations for each position.

Different rabbis raise a total of four questions regarding various scenarios in which a ben pekua (a fetus of an animal whose mother was slaughtered) previously had a limb or limbs leave the womb. The Gemara investigates the biblical source for the Mishna's ruling that parts of a fetus that were severed but remained inside the mother at the time of slaughter are permitted to be eaten, offering two different suggested sources.

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 16:8-17:1L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 8, 2026Wed23 Tamuz 5786

Different rabbis raise a total of four questions regarding various scenarios in which a ben pekua (a fetus of an animal whose mother was slaughtered) previously had a limb or limbs leave the womb. The Gemara investigates the biblical source for the Mishna's ruling that parts of a fetus that were severed but remained inside the mother at the time of slaughter are permitted to be eaten, offering two different suggested sources.

Study Guide A fetus that is inside the mother at the time of her slaughter is permitted without needing its own slaughter. If a limb of the fetus emerges before the mother is slaughtered, that limb is forbidden. However, if the limb is pulled back inside before the mother's slaughter, its status is subject to a dispute: Rav holds that the limb remains forbidden, while Rabbi Yochanan rules that it is permitted. Three difficulties are raised against Rav's position—one from our Mishna and two from other tannaitic sources—and all are ultimately resolved in the same manner. A difficulty raised against Rabbi Yochanan's position remains unresolved.

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 16:6-7L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 7, 2026Tue22 Tamuz 5786

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 16:4-5L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 6, 2026Mon21 Tamuz 5786

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 16:2-3L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 5, 2026Sun20 Tamuz 5786

Study Guide A fetus that is inside the mother at the time of her slaughter is permitted without needing its own slaughter. If a limb of the fetus emerges before the mother is slaughtered, that limb is forbidden. However, if the limb is pulled back inside before the mother's slaughter, its status is subject to a dispute: Rav holds that the limb remains forbidden, while Rabbi Yochanan rules that it is permitted. Three difficulties are raised against Rav's position—one from our Mishna and two from other tannaitic sources—and all are ultimately resolved in the same manner. A difficulty raised against Rabbi Yochanan's position remains unresolved.

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 15:6-16:1L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 4, 2026Shab19 Tamuz 5786

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 15:4-5L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 3, 2026Fri18 Tamuz 5786

The Gemara (Horiyot 13b) warns that sleeping with one's garment under his head can cause him to forget his Torah knowledge. In airports, for example, when flights are delayed, people sometimes place their jacket beneath their head so they can rest. One should avoid doing so, as this could cause him to forget his Torah knowledge. However, this applies only if one places his head directly on the garment. If there is something in between, then there is no concern. Hence, one may lay his head on a piece of luggage even though it contains clothing. According to one opinion, the Gemara refers specifically to a person who lays his head on his own article of clothing. If one lays his head on somebody else's garment, then there is no danger. This is the view of Rav Haim Palachi (Turkey, 1788-1868), and of the Salmat Haim (Rav Yosef Haim Sonenfeld, 1849-1932), who explains on this basis the Mishna's description (Tamid 1:1) of the Kohanim sleeping on their garments in the Bet Ha'mikdash. This was allowed, the Salmat Haim suggests, because the priestly garments were not the Kohanim's personal property, but were rather owned collectively by the entire nation. Hacham Ovadia refutes this proof, noting that perhaps the Kohanim were allowed to sleep on their garments because of the sanctity of the Bet Ha'mikdash. The Kelipot (forces of impurity) had no power in the Bet Ha'mikdash, and so there was no danger involved when sleeping there with one's clothing under his head. Hacham Ovadia concluded that as we have no definitive proof to the lenient position, it is preferable to act stringently in this regard due to the serious risk that's at stake, and refrain from sleeping directly on any garment, even one which belongs to somebody else. One who wishes to lie on a garment should ensure to place something in between his head and the garment.

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 14:6-7L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJun 30, 2026Tue15 Tamuz 5786

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 14:4-5L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJun 29, 2026Mon14 Tamuz 5786

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 14:8-15:1L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJul 1, 2026Wed16 Tamuz 5786

Mishna Yomi - Kelim 13:8-14:1L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJun 27, 2026Shab12 Tamuz 5786

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The Mishna states that the four physiological signs of a kosher bird are not explicitly detailed in the Torah, but are instead established by the Sages. The Gemara challenges this assertion based on a braita, which indicates that these kosher indicators are actually derived through a comparison of the anatomical details of each type of bird—specifically evaluating the characteristics of the nesher (griffin vulture), which is listed as non-kosher, against those of the tor (turtledove), which is known to be kosher due to its role in sacrificial offerings. Abaye resolves this difficulty by explaining that the analytical comparison of the physical details between the tor and the nesher outlined in the braita is precisely the methodology employed by the Sages to formulate and define these diagnostic signs. Rabbi Chiya introduces a braita asserting that a bird possessing even a single kosher sign is permitted, based on the premise that only a bird structurally identical to the nesher—which lacks all four signs—is fundamentally excluded, along with the other non-kosher species explicitly enumerated in the Torah. The Gemara raises a difficulty, noting that one could argue the exact inverse: using the tor as the absolute paradigm, one could deduce that a bird is kosher only if it possesses all four signs. Since the other non-kosher birds listed in the Torah possess either one, two, or three kosher signs, the Gemara resolves the difficulty by explaining that if all four signs were universally required to render a bird kosher, there would be no logical necessity for the Torah to detail the other twenty-three non-kosher species, as their status as non-kosher would already be self-evident. The Gemara then proceeds with a series of analytical queries, asking why the halakhic paradigm should not be derived from those forbidden birds that possess three signs, two signs, or one sign, respectively. In each instance, the Gemara answers using a redundant-case logic: if any of those categories served as the baseline paradigm, the Torah would have had no need to explicitly list the remaining forbidden species that possess fewer kosher signs (simanim). The premise of the final query assumes that the peres and ozniyah (birds possessing a single kosher sign) could have established a binding paradigm were it not for the counter-example of the nesher. The Gemara immediately questions this, invoking the hermeneutical rule that two biblical verses teaching the same law cannot serve as a general paradigm (shnei ketuvim haba'im k'echad). Since both the peres and ozniyah share the same baseline characteristics, how could it be suggested that they form a general rule? The Gemara answers that they represent two distinct halakhic categories; one of them is completely unique because, within the entire biblical list of non-kosher birds, it is the sole species that possesses a specific, distinct kosher sign not found in any of the others. In conclusion, the ultimate paradigm is the nesher (representing the principle that a bird is kosher unless it shares all the forbidden traits of the listed species), and we do not derive the rule from the tor. The tor (with all four kosher signs) is explicitly mentioned in the Torah solely to indicate its validity for sacrifices, rather than to serve as a universal archetype for kosher birds.

Rav Yehuda discusses the physical dangers of consuming chiltit (asafoetida), particularly on an empty stomach, which Rav Yosef expands upon by listing other hazardous foods consumed on an empty stomach. The Gemara notes that Rav initially permitted an animal whose legs had been severed because he verified that the convergence of sinews (tzumat hagidim) remained intact. Shmuel, however, cautioned him that the severing might have been caused by a venomous snakebite, rendering the animal forbidden due to mortal danger. Shmuel proposed a specific diagnostic test to detect the presence of venom; upon execution, the test confirmed Shmuel's suspicion that the injury was indeed the result of a snakebite. The Mishna enumerates the physiological kosher signs for animals, birds, grasshoppers, and fish. A kosher mammal must possess fully split hooves and chew its cud. While explicit kosher signs for birds are absent from the Torah, the Sages established four indicators: a bird must not be predatory (dores), and it must possess an extra digit, a crop, and a gizzard with an easily peelable inner lining. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Tzadok adds another sign, noting that a bird that evenly splits its digits when perched on a rope is definitively non-kosher. For fish, the required signs are fins and scales, though the Sages debate whether multiple scales are required or if a single scale suffices. Kosher grasshoppers must exhibit four specific traits: four legs, four wings, two extra jumping legs (kartzulayim), and wings that cover the majority of their body. A braita asserts that any animal that chews its cud lacks upper front teeth. After addressing a series of difficulties regarding this rule, the Gemara clarifies that the absence of upper front teeth serves as a reliable indicator that an animal chews its cud and is kosher, with the sole exception of the camel (namely, a young camel). This anatomical indicator is practically valuable in cases where an animal's hooves have been severed, leaving no other means to determine its kosher status. To differentiate between domesticated animals (behema) and wild animals (chaya) - a distinction crucial for determining the prohibition of forbidden fats (chelev), which applies exclusively to domesticated species - a braita states that a wild animal is identified by its horns and cloven hooves. The Sages debate whether the horn alone is a clear sign or if both criteria must be checked. To resolve the anomaly of the goat and an ox, which possess both traits yet are classified as domesticated, the Gemara explains that the horns of a wild animal must be either branched, or layered, grooved, and rounded. The braita further notes that a single-horned animal, known as the keresh, is classified as a wild animal. This introduces a discussion regarding legendary creatures, specifically the keresh and the tigris. The Gemara recounts an incident where a Roman emperor requested that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hananya show him the tigris. However, the creature's immense power caused widespread destruction from a distance, prompting the terrified emperor to beg Rabbi Yehoshua to return the beast to its place.

The Mishna enumerates all the physical defects that cause a bird to be rendered a treifa, as well as those that leave it kosher. If a weasel (chulda) attacks a bird in an area where the brain membrane could have been perforated, the bird is considered a treifa. There are, however, different tests one can perform to ascertain whether the membrane was actually punctured, and the Gemara suggests various methods for this inspection. Conversely, in the case of birds that live in the water, a broken skull creates an absolute presumption that the brain membrane was punctured, meaning that no subsequent test will be effective in permitting the bird. If a bird was caught in a fire and burned, the Gemara outlines specific ways to determine whether its internal organs were affected to the point of rendering the bird a treifa. This diagnostic procedure relies on checking for a change in color - either from red to green, or from green to red, depending on the specific internal organ being evaluated. Following the Mishnaic list of kosher conditions in a bird that do not render it a treifa, the Amoraim introduce specific qualifications and limitations to restrict the scope of some of these permitted cases.