Podcasts about mishna

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

The Mishna rules that one who offers the leper's guilt offering outside the Azara before the proper time for the owner to bring it (i.e., before the eighth day of purification) is exempt from liability. Rav Chilkiya bar Tuvi limits this exemption to a case where the offering was brought for its own sake. If, however, it was offered not for its own sake, one would be liable for offering it outside, since such an offering could theoretically be valid if brought inside. Rav Huna disagrees with Rav Chilkiya. He maintains that if an offering cannot be brought for its own sake - because its proper time has not yet arrived - it also cannot be accepted when brought for the sake of a different sacrifice. A challenge is raised against Rav Huna from the case of the Pesach offering, which, when brought at a time other than Pesach, is offered as a peace offering even though it cannot be brought as a Pesach. This challenge is rejected, as the Pesach offering is unique: an animal designated as a Pesach automatically assumes the status of a peace offering on all other days of the year. Three sources are cited in support of Rav Chilkiya's position. The first two are dismissed as inconclusive, but the third appears to confirm his view, both according to Rav Dimi and Rav Ashi. An interpretation is brought that reconciles even this final source with Rav Huna's position. A braita derives scriptural sources for the Mishna's rulings that one is exempt from liability for offering outside items that are meant to be eaten, as well as for performing actions that do not constitute the final stage of the sacrificial service. The Mishna further states that the firstborns served as priests until the construction of the Tabernacle, at which point the kohanim replaced them. Rav Huna, however, asserts that the kohanim began their service earlier - at the time the Torah was given, nearly ten months before the Tabernacle was erected. This apparent contradiction is resolved by noting that the matter is the subject of a tannaitic dispute.

Mishna Yomi - Erchin 2:3-4L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJan 6, 2026Tue17 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 9:5-6L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJan 1, 2026Thu12 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Erchin 1:1-2L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJan 3, 2026Shab14 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 9:7-8L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJan 2, 2026Fri13 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Erchin 1:3-4L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJan 4, 2026Sun15 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Erchin 2:1-2L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovJan 5, 2026Mon16 Teves 5786

The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Rabbi Nechemia's opinion regarding the status of the remainder of the blood. Why did the Mishna compare the case of two cups of blood to a sin offering that was lost and replaced with another? The Gemara explains that this comparison was introduced in order to teach the law regarding a case that can be derived from the Mishna. It clarifies the distinction between an animal designated to replace a lost offering and a situation in which a person designates two animals from the outset so that one will serve as a backup. The Mishna presents numerous cases in which the laws of offering sacrifices outside the Temple do not apply - either because of the type of offering (one that is not brought inside the Temple) or because of the animal itself (a disqualified animal), or because the item is not meant to be offered at all (such as edible portion of a sacrifice). Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the rabbis in three cases where the item will eventually be permitted to be placed on the altar.  The Mishna also provides a historical overview: When were sacrifices permitted to be offered outside the Temple (on bamot), and when were they prohibited? What were the laws governing each period - both when bamot were allowed and when they were forbidden? And during the time when bamot were permitted, which sacrifices could be offered anywhere?  

The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Rabbi Nechemia's opinion regarding the status of the remainder of the blood. Why did the Mishna compare the case of two cups of blood to a sin offering that was lost and replaced with another? The Gemara explains that this comparison was introduced in order to teach the law regarding a case that can be derived from the Mishna. It clarifies the distinction between an animal designated to replace a lost offering and a situation in which a person designates two animals from the outset so that one will serve as a backup. The Mishna presents numerous cases in which the laws of offering sacrifices outside the Temple do not apply - either because of the type of offering (one that is not brought inside the Temple) or because of the animal itself (a disqualified animal), or because the item is not meant to be offered at all (such as edible portion of a sacrifice). Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the rabbis in three cases where the item will eventually be permitted to be placed on the altar.  The Mishna also provides a historical overview: When were sacrifices permitted to be offered outside the Temple (on bamot), and when were they prohibited? What were the laws governing each period - both when bamot were allowed and when they were forbidden? And during the time when bamot were permitted, which sacrifices could be offered anywhere?  

Study Guide A third answer is introduced to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Elazar's ruling in the Mishna concerning the incense and Rav's statement about Rabbi Elazar's position in a braita. The second answer,Abaye's, had been rejected earlier, but Rav Ashi reinstates it by resolving the difficulty raised against it. The Gemara asks: If part of a sacrificial item is missing after it has already been taken out of the Temple courtyard, is one liable for offering the remainder outside? Three sources are brought to address this question, but each is ultimately rejected. If the fatty portions of a peace offering are burned outside together with the meat, one is liable, even though the meat should theoretically constitute a barrier (chatzitza). The Gemara offers three explanations for why it is not considered a chatzitza in this case. If the kometz was never taken from a meal offering, one is not liable for offering the entire mixture outside, since such an act would not fulfill the mitzvah of offering a mincha even inside the Temple. However, if the kometz was taken and then returned to the rest of the mincha, one would be liable for burning the entire mixture outside. The Gemara asks: why is the kometz not nullified in the remainder? A meal offering is brought through the burning of both the kometz and the frankincense. If only one of these is burned outside, the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar again disagree about liability, since the act is only partial. Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha asks whether burning the kometz permits half of the remainder to be eaten by the priest, or whether it merely weakens the prohibition on the remainder. The Gemara first analyzes according to whose view the question is posed, and then leaves the matter unresolved. One who sprinkles part of the blood outside is liable, even according to Rabbi Elazar, consistent with his position regarding the Yom Kippur goat in a case where the blood spills midway through the sprinklings of blood. Rabbi Elazar also rules that one who pours the water libation outside the Temple on Sukkot is liable. Rabbi Yochanan cites Rabbi Menachem Yodafa, who explains that Rabbi Elazar must follow the view of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the water libation on Sukkot is a Torah obligation derived from the laws of wine libations. However, Reish Lakish raises three objections to this explanation.

  The rabbis and Rabbi Elazar disagree about a case involving liability for performing water libations outside the Temple. Three amoraim debate the precise scenario in which they disagree and the underlying basis of their dispute. According to Rav Papa, their disagreement stems from a debate - found in other sources as well - regarding whether libations accompanied sacrifices during the Israelites' time in the desert. This question has practical implications for whether libations were ever offered on private bamot, and whether such libations required sanctified vessels. That, in turn, affects whether one would be liable for performing a libation outside the Temple when it was not placed in a sanctified vessel. Rabbi Nechemia maintains that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside. Rabbi Yochanan explains that this view is rooted in Rabbi Nechemia's position that the pouring of the leftover blood is an essential component of the sacrificial rite. A challenge is raised from a baraita in which Rabbi Nechemia debates Rabbi Akiva on this very issue, but the contradiction is ultimately resolved. The sugya then analyzes liability for offering a bird sacrifice outside the Temple: does liability depend on whether the bird was slaughtered (shechita) or melika was performed inside or outside? All four possible combinations are examined. Rabbi Shimon disputes one of the rabbis' rulings, but it is initially unclear what aspect of their position he rejects. After systematically eliminating all possibilities, the Gemara proposes three explanations - either expanding the Mishna to include another case or revising the formulation of Rabbi Shimon's statement as it appears there.  

Study Guide A third answer is introduced to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Elazar's ruling in the Mishna concerning the incense and Rav's statement about Rabbi Elazar's position in a braita. The second answer,Abaye's, had been rejected earlier, but Rav Ashi reinstates it by resolving the difficulty raised against it. The Gemara asks: If part of a sacrificial item is missing after it has already been taken out of the Temple courtyard, is one liable for offering the remainder outside? Three sources are brought to address this question, but each is ultimately rejected. If the fatty portions of a peace offering are burned outside together with the meat, one is liable, even though the meat should theoretically constitute a barrier (chatzitza). The Gemara offers three explanations for why it is not considered a chatzitza in this case. If the kometz was never taken from a meal offering, one is not liable for offering the entire mixture outside, since such an act would not fulfill the mitzvah of offering a mincha even inside the Temple. However, if the kometz was taken and then returned to the rest of the mincha, one would be liable for burning the entire mixture outside. The Gemara asks: why is the kometz not nullified in the remainder? A meal offering is brought through the burning of both the kometz and the frankincense. If only one of these is burned outside, the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar again disagree about liability, since the act is only partial. Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha asks whether burning the kometz permits half of the remainder to be eaten by the priest, or whether it merely weakens the prohibition on the remainder. The Gemara first analyzes according to whose view the question is posed, and then leaves the matter unresolved. One who sprinkles part of the blood outside is liable, even according to Rabbi Elazar, consistent with his position regarding the Yom Kippur goat in a case where the blood spills midway through the sprinklings of blood. Rabbi Elazar also rules that one who pours the water libation outside the Temple on Sukkot is liable. Rabbi Yochanan cites Rabbi Menachem Yodafa, who explains that Rabbi Elazar must follow the view of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the water libation on Sukkot is a Torah obligation derived from the laws of wine libations. However, Reish Lakish raises three objections to this explanation.

  The rabbis and Rabbi Elazar disagree about a case involving liability for performing water libations outside the Temple. Three amoraim debate the precise scenario in which they disagree and the underlying basis of their dispute. According to Rav Papa, their disagreement stems from a debate - found in other sources as well - regarding whether libations accompanied sacrifices during the Israelites' time in the desert. This question has practical implications for whether libations were ever offered on private bamot, and whether such libations required sanctified vessels. That, in turn, affects whether one would be liable for performing a libation outside the Temple when it was not placed in a sanctified vessel. Rabbi Nechemia maintains that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside. Rabbi Yochanan explains that this view is rooted in Rabbi Nechemia's position that the pouring of the leftover blood is an essential component of the sacrificial rite. A challenge is raised from a baraita in which Rabbi Nechemia debates Rabbi Akiva on this very issue, but the contradiction is ultimately resolved. The sugya then analyzes liability for offering a bird sacrifice outside the Temple: does liability depend on whether the bird was slaughtered (shechita) or melika was performed inside or outside? All four possible combinations are examined. Rabbi Shimon disputes one of the rabbis' rulings, but it is initially unclear what aspect of their position he rejects. After systematically eliminating all possibilities, the Gemara proposes three explanations - either expanding the Mishna to include another case or revising the formulation of Rabbi Shimon's statement as it appears there.  

It is forbidden to offer any sacrificial item outside the Azara. This prohibition applies both to valid offerings and to offerings that became invalid in the kodesh—meaning either after they were brought into the Azara or after they were slaughtered. A braita derives the various valid and invalid items for which one is liable if offered outside the Azara from derashot on the verses in Vayikra 19:8–9. The Mishna rules that if one offers outside the Temple an olive‑bulk composed of a combination of meat and imurim (the fatty portions burned on the altar) of a burnt offering, one is liable. This implies that in the case of a peace offering, the two would not combine, since the meat is designated for consumption while the imurim are designated for burning. Although this inference is supported by Tosefta Meila 1:15, that Tosefta appears to contradict a Mishna in Meila 15b. The Tosefta states that in a burnt offering, the meat and imurim combine for pigul, notar, and impurity, whereas the Mishna states that they combine for pigul and notar in all types of offerings, not only burnt offerings. The Gemara resolves these contradictions by explaining that the terms pigul and notar refer to different cases in each source. The distinction regarding pigul is between (1) eating pigul and (2) having a pigul thought concerning eating or burning the combined olive‑bulk. The distinction regarding notar is between (1) eating leftover meat and imurim after their designated time and (2) a case where parts of an animal (a combined olive‑bulk of meat and imurim) remained from an animal that had been lost before the blood was sprinkled. Since in a peace offering the meat and imurim are destined for different places - human consumption and the altar - they cannot combine in situations where the law depends on their being in the same place (such as pigul thought or leftover parts from before the sprinkling of the blood). However, they can combine in a case involving the eating of disqualified parts. This interpretation of the Tosefta aligns with the view of Rabbi Yehoshua, who discusses a case in which only an olive‑bulk of the animal remains before the sprinkling of the blood. Items that are entirely burned on the altar - such as the kometz, frankincense, the mincha of the priests, and similar offerings - also incur liability if offered outside. However, there is a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar regarding whether liability applies for offering merely an olive‑bulk or only when the entire item is burned outside. A braita is then cited concerning the requisite amounts for liability when offering a incense outside and for burning incense inside. Initially, a question is raised about the incense and the meaning of the braita. After Rabbi Zeira resolves the question, he raises a further difficulty based on a statement of Rav regarding Rabbi Elazar's opinion about the required amount for liability when offering incense outside the Temple. Rava and Abaye each propose solutions, but both are ultimately rejected.

It is forbidden to offer any sacrificial item outside the Azara. This prohibition applies both to valid offerings and to offerings that became invalid in the kodesh—meaning either after they were brought into the Azara or after they were slaughtered. A braita derives the various valid and invalid items for which one is liable if offered outside the Azara from derashot on the verses in Vayikra 19:8–9. The Mishna rules that if one offers outside the Temple an olive‑bulk composed of a combination of meat and imurim (the fatty portions burned on the altar) of a burnt offering, one is liable. This implies that in the case of a peace offering, the two would not combine, since the meat is designated for consumption while the imurim are designated for burning. Although this inference is supported by Tosefta Meila 1:15, that Tosefta appears to contradict a Mishna in Meila 15b. The Tosefta states that in a burnt offering, the meat and imurim combine for pigul, notar, and impurity, whereas the Mishna states that they combine for pigul and notar in all types of offerings, not only burnt offerings. The Gemara resolves these contradictions by explaining that the terms pigul and notar refer to different cases in each source. The distinction regarding pigul is between (1) eating pigul and (2) having a pigul thought concerning eating or burning the combined olive‑bulk. The distinction regarding notar is between (1) eating leftover meat and imurim after their designated time and (2) a case where parts of an animal (a combined olive‑bulk of meat and imurim) remained from an animal that had been lost before the blood was sprinkled. Since in a peace offering the meat and imurim are destined for different places - human consumption and the altar - they cannot combine in situations where the law depends on their being in the same place (such as pigul thought or leftover parts from before the sprinkling of the blood). However, they can combine in a case involving the eating of disqualified parts. This interpretation of the Tosefta aligns with the view of Rabbi Yehoshua, who discusses a case in which only an olive‑bulk of the animal remains before the sprinkling of the blood. Items that are entirely burned on the altar - such as the kometz, frankincense, the mincha of the priests, and similar offerings - also incur liability if offered outside. However, there is a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar regarding whether liability applies for offering merely an olive‑bulk or only when the entire item is burned outside. A braita is then cited concerning the requisite amounts for liability when offering a incense outside and for burning incense inside. Initially, a question is raised about the incense and the meaning of the braita. After Rabbi Zeira resolves the question, he raises a further difficulty based on a statement of Rav regarding Rabbi Elazar's opinion about the required amount for liability when offering incense outside the Temple. Rava and Abaye each propose solutions, but both are ultimately rejected.

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 9:3-4L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 31, 2025Wed11 Teves 5786

What is the source for the opinion of the rabbis in the Mishna that one who slaughters outside and then offers it outside is liable? Three possible derivations are presented, and the Gemara raises difficulties with the different possibilities. What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one who sprinkles the blood outside the Temple is liable? Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael each derive it from different verses. The Gemara then asks: what does each of them learn from the verse that the other used for this prohibition? What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one who takes a kometz (a handful of a meal offering) or one who accepts the blood outside is not liable? The Gemara demonstrates that there is no basis to assume liability and explicitly rejects a suggestion that there might be reason to think otherwise. The verse forbidding slaughter outside includes three distinct phrases that specify where the prohibition applies and where it does not. What is derived from the use of all three? Ulla and Rava disagree about whether one is liable if they slaughter on the roof of the Heichal, which is dependent on how these phrases are understood. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish dispute whether one is liable nowadays if one slaughters outside the area where the Azara once stood. Their debate hinges on whether the sanctity of the First Temple remains in effect or whether it was nullified with the Temple's destruction.

The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (5:25) teaches, "Ben Shelosh Esreh Le'misvot" – a youngster becomes obligated in Misvot upon reaching the age of thirteen. At this point, he may be counted toward a Minyan and may serve as Hazzan. The source for this rule is "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" – an oral tradition taught to Moshe at Mount Sinai. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (5b) teaches that all Shiurim – halachic measurements – were taught as a "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai," and this includes the "measurement" of adulthood, when a boy becomes obligated in Misvot. Rashi, however, in his commentary to Abot, finds a Biblical source for this rule. The Torah uses the word "Ish" ("man") in reference to Shimon and Levi when they waged war on the city of Shechem ("Ish Harbo" – Bereshit 34:25), and, as Rashi shows, Levi – the younger of these two brothers – was thirteen years old at this time. This establishes that a boy attains the status of "Ish" – a man – at the age of thirteen. The Maharil (Rav Yaakov Moelin, Germany, d. 1427) refutes this proof, noting that the use of the word "Ish" in this context does not necessarily mean that this word would not be used if Levi was younger. Therefore, the Maharil concludes that there is no textual basis for this rule, and it was transmitted through oral tradition. Some suggested an allusion to this Halacha in a verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (43:21) in which Hashem pronounces, "Am Zu Yasarti Li, Tehilati Yesaperu" – "I have created this nation for Me, that they tell My praise." The word "Zu" in Gematria equals 13 (7+6), thus hinting to the fact that it is at this age when Hashem wants us to praise Him and perform Misvot. There is a debate among the early authorities as to when precisely a boy is considered a Bar-Misva. The She'iltot (Rav Ahai Gaon, d. 752) writes that a boy becomes a Bar-Misva the moment he fully completes his thirteenth year – meaning, at the time of day when he was born thirteen years earlier. Thus, for example, according to this opinion, a boy who was born at 2pm cannot be counted for a Minyan or serve as Hazan on his thirteenth birthday until 2pm, the point at which he has completed thirteen full years. The consensus among the Poskim, however, is that a boy becomes Bar-Misva once the date of his thirteenth birthday arrives, in the evening. This is, indeed, the Halacha. Therefore, regardless of the time of day of a child's birth, he may serve as Hazan already at Arbit on the night of his thirteenth birthday. The Yalkut Yosef writes that the thirteen years are counted from the child's birth even if he was born prematurely and needed to spend a significant amount of time in an incubator. In addition to the requirement of completing thirteen years, a boy must also have reached a certain point of physical maturity to be considered a Halachic adult. Specifically, he must have grown two pubic hairs. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), based on a ruling of Rav Yosef Kolon (1426-1490), writes that a child who has turned thirteen may be allowed to serve as Hazzan on the assumption that he has reached the point of physical maturity. This assumption may be relied upon with respect to matters instituted by the Sages (as opposed to Torah obligations), and thus, since praying with a Minyan is a Misva ordained by Sages, a child who reached Bar Misva age may lead the service. The Ribash (Rav Yishak Bar Sheshet, Algiers, 1326-1408) went even further, allowing relying on this assumption even with respect to Torah obligations. According to his view, a full-fledged adult may fulfill his Torah obligation of Kiddush on Friday night by listening to Kiddush recited by a boy who has just turned thirteen, on the assumption that he has reached physical maturity. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that those who wish to rely on this position may be allowed to do so. However, Hacham Ovadia's son, Hacham David Yosef, writes in Halacha Berura that one must not assume a boy's physical maturity with respect to Torah obligations such as the Friday night Kiddush, and this assumption may be made only with respect to Rabbinic obligations. All opinions agree that a thirteen-year-old boy may read the Megilla in the synagogue on Purim, since the obligation of Megilla reading was instituted by the Rabbis. If it is known that a young man has not yet reached this stage of physical development, then he is not considered a Bar-Misva even though his thirteenth birthday has passed. In fact, even if he is older than thirteen, he is not considered a Bar-Misva if it has been determined that he does not have the physical properties required to establish halachic adulthood. If, Heaven forbid, a man does not physically develop until the age of 35, at that point he is considered a "Saris" – an adult man who will never experience physical maturity, and he may thus be counted toward a Minyan. Until then, however, he cannot be considered an adult and may thus not be counted toward a Minyan.

The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (5:25) teaches, "Ben Shelosh Esreh Le'misvot" – a youngster becomes obligated in Misvot upon reaching the age of thirteen. At this point, he may be counted toward a Minyan and may serve as Hazzan. The source for this rule is "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" – an oral tradition taught to Moshe at Mount Sinai. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (5b) teaches that all Shiurim – halachic measurements – were taught as a "Halacha Le'Moshe Mi'Sinai," and this includes the "measurement" of adulthood, when a boy becomes obligated in Misvot. Rashi, however, in his commentary to Abot, finds a Biblical source for this rule. The Torah uses the word "Ish" ("man") in reference to Shimon and Levi when they waged war on the city of Shechem ("Ish Harbo" – Bereshit 34:25), and, as Rashi shows, Levi – the younger of these two brothers – was thirteen years old at this time. This establishes that a boy attains the status of "Ish" – a man – at the age of thirteen. The Maharil (Rav Yaakov Moelin, Germany, d. 1427) refutes this proof, noting that the use of the word "Ish" in this context does not necessarily mean that this word would not be used if Levi was younger. Therefore, the Maharil concludes that there is no textual basis for this rule, and it was transmitted through oral tradition. Some suggested an allusion to this Halacha in a verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (43:21) in which Hashem pronounces, "Am Zu Yasarti Li, Tehilati Yesaperu" – "I have created this nation for Me, that they tell My praise." The word "Zu" in Gematria equals 13 (7+6), thus hinting to the fact that it is at this age when Hashem wants us to praise Him and perform Misvot. There is a debate among the early authorities as to when precisely a boy is considered a Bar-Misva. The She'iltot (Rav Ahai Gaon, d. 752) writes that a boy becomes a Bar-Misva the moment he fully completes his thirteenth year – meaning, at the time of day when he was born thirteen years earlier. Thus, for example, according to this opinion, a boy who was born at 2pm cannot be counted for a Minyan or serve as Hazan on his thirteenth birthday until 2pm, the point at which he has completed thirteen full years. The consensus among the Poskim, however, is that a boy becomes Bar-Misva once the date of his thirteenth birthday arrives, in the evening. This is, indeed, the Halacha. Therefore, regardless of the time of day of a child's birth, he may serve as Hazan already at Arbit on the night of his thirteenth birthday. The Yalkut Yosef writes that the thirteen years are counted from the child's birth even if he was born prematurely and needed to spend a significant amount of time in an incubator. In addition to the requirement of completing thirteen years, a boy must also have reached a certain point of physical maturity to be considered a Halachic adult. Specifically, he must have grown two pubic hairs. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), based on a ruling of Rav Yosef Kolon (1426-1490), writes that a child who has turned thirteen may be allowed to serve as Hazzan on the assumption that he has reached the point of physical maturity. This assumption may be relied upon with respect to matters instituted by the Sages (as opposed to Torah obligations), and thus, since praying with a Minyan is a Misva ordained by Sages, a child who reached Bar Misva age may lead the service. The Ribash (Rav Yishak Bar Sheshet, Algiers, 1326-1408) went even further, allowing relying on this assumption even with respect to Torah obligations. According to his view, a full-fledged adult may fulfill his Torah obligation of Kiddush on Friday night by listening to Kiddush recited by a boy who has just turned thirteen, on the assumption that he has reached physical maturity. Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled that those who wish to rely on this position may be allowed to do so. However, Hacham Ovadia's son, Hacham David Yosef, writes in Halacha Berura that one must not assume a boy's physical maturity with respect to Torah obligations such as the Friday night Kiddush, and this assumption may be made only with respect to Rabbinic obligations. All opinions agree that a thirteen-year-old boy may read the Megilla in the synagogue on Purim, since the obligation of Megilla reading was instituted by the Rabbis.

What is the source for the opinion of the rabbis in the Mishna that one who slaughters outside and then offers it outside is liable? Three possible derivations are presented, and the Gemara raises difficulties with the different possibilities. What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one who sprinkles the blood outside the Temple is liable? Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael each derive it from different verses. The Gemara then asks: what does each of them learn from the verse that the other used for this prohibition? What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one who takes a kometz (a handful of a meal offering) or one who accepts the blood outside is not liable? The Gemara demonstrates that there is no basis to assume liability and explicitly rejects a suggestion that there might be reason to think otherwise. The verse forbidding slaughter outside includes three distinct phrases that specify where the prohibition applies and where it does not. What is derived from the use of all three? Ulla and Rava disagree about whether one is liable if they slaughter on the roof of the Heichal, which is dependent on how these phrases are understood. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish dispute whether one is liable nowadays if one slaughters outside the area where the Azara once stood. Their debate hinges on whether the sanctity of the First Temple remains in effect or whether it was nullified with the Temple's destruction.

Since Rabbi Shimon holds that one becomes impure only through direct involvement in the burning of the bulls and goats, the Gemara asks how he interprets the verse "outside the camp" in the context of the Yom Kippur offerings. He applies it to a gezeira shava linking these offerings to the para aduma, establishing that they must be burned outside all three camps and specifically east of Jerusalem. The rabbis, however, reject this comparison and distinguish between the two burning sites: the para aduma was burned to the east, whereas the sin offerings of Yom Kippur were burned to the north of Jerusalem. The Mishna then turns to the laws of slaughtering and offering sacrifices outside the Temple. The tanna kama rules that one who both slaughters and offers outside is liable for each act, while Rabbi Yosei HaGelili exempts a case in which both actions occur outside, since the offering was already invalidated by the improper slaughter and the subsequent offering does not constitute a transgression. The rabbis respond that even an offering slaughtered properly inside becomes invalid once taken outside, yet the prohibition of offering it outside still applies. The Mishna continues with the laws of eating sacrificial meat while impure: an impure person is liable whether he eats pure or impure sacrificial meat, though Rabbi Yosei HaGelili again exempts an impure person who eats impure meat, arguing that he consumed something already disqualified. The rabbis counter that even pure meat becomes impure upon contact with the impure person before it is eaten. The Gemara seeks the scriptural sources for both the punishment and the warning associated with slaughtering and offering outside. The punishment for both acts is explicit, and the warning for offering outsideis derived from Devarim 12:13, "Beware lest you offer your burnt offerings." The warning for slaughtering outside, however, is not clearly stated, and the Gemara explores four possible verses as its source, rejecting the first two and concluding with two possibilities.

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 9:1-2L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 30, 2025Tue10 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 8:9-10L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 29, 2025Mon9 Teves 5786

Since Rabbi Shimon holds that one becomes impure only through direct involvement in the burning of the bulls and goats, the Gemara asks how he interprets the verse "outside the camp" in the context of the Yom Kippur offerings. He applies it to a gezeira shava linking these offerings to the para aduma, establishing that they must be burned outside all three camps and specifically east of Jerusalem. The rabbis, however, reject this comparison and distinguish between the two burning sites: the para aduma was burned to the east, whereas the sin offerings of Yom Kippur were burned to the north of Jerusalem. The Mishna then turns to the laws of slaughtering and offering sacrifices outside the Temple. The tanna kama rules that one who both slaughters and offers outside is liable for each act, while Rabbi Yosei HaGelili exempts a case in which both actions occur outside, since the offering was already invalidated by the improper slaughter and the subsequent offering does not constitute a transgression. The rabbis respond that even an offering slaughtered properly inside becomes invalid once taken outside, yet the prohibition of offering it outside still applies. The Mishna continues with the laws of eating sacrificial meat while impure: an impure person is liable whether he eats pure or impure sacrificial meat, though Rabbi Yosei HaGelili again exempts an impure person who eats impure meat, arguing that he consumed something already disqualified. The rabbis counter that even pure meat becomes impure upon contact with the impure person before it is eaten. The Gemara seeks the scriptural sources for both the punishment and the warning associated with slaughtering and offering outside. The punishment for both acts is explicit, and the warning for offering outsideis derived from Devarim 12:13, "Beware lest you offer your burnt offerings." The warning for slaughtering outside, however, is not clearly stated, and the Gemara explores four possible verses as its source, rejecting the first two and concluding with two possibilities.

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 8:7-8L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 28, 2025Sun8 Teves 5786

The hide of burnt offerings is given to the kohanim, as stated in Vayikra 7:8. However, the Mishna explains that if the offering became disqualified before the blood was sprinkled, the kohanim do not receive the hide. If it was sacrificed for the sake of a different type of offering, since the sacrifice remains valid, the hide is given to the kohanim. In addition to burnt offerings, the kohanim also receive the hides of all kodshei kodashim, such as guilt and sin offerings. This is derived through a kal va'chomer argument in the Mishna, but later a braita brings different opinions of how to derive this. A braita records a debate between two tannaim regarding the phrase "the burnt offering of a man" in the verse that grants the kohen rights to the hide. One opinion says it excludes a burnt offering of hekdesh, property belonging to the Temple, while the other says it excludes the burnt offering of a convert. Three explanations are offered for what is meant by a burnt offering of hekdesh, and one explanation is given for the case of a convert, since a convert is certainly considered a "person." The three explanations of hekdesh are: a burnt offering brought from leftover funds of an offering; one who consecrates an offering for bedek habayit, the maintenance of the Temple; and one who consecrates all of their property, among which there were animals. The exemption regarding a convert refers to a case where the convert designated a burnt offering and then died without heirs. Since the sacrifice is ownerless, it does not qualify as a "burnt offering of a man." A braita is cited to explain the derivation of the laws in the Mishna. Although the verse says "man," the offerings of women and slaves are included as well, as is derived from a phrase in the verse. It also records a debate about how kodshei kodashim are included and kodashim kalim excluded from this law - whether it is learned from a kal va'chomer, from a verse, or whether no derivation is needed at all, since the hide always follows the meat, and the meat of other kodshei kodashim goes to the kohen. The Mishna concludes that the determining factor for whether the hide goes to the kohen in a case where the meat was disqualified is whether the hide was still attached at the moment of disqualification.

We follow the custom to recite the Mishna of "Rabbi Hananya Ben Akashya" just before the recitation of Kaddish that precedes Baruch She'amar in the morning. The reason for this practice is that sometimes, the prayer service begins before a Minyan has arrived, and the tenth man comes in right after La'menase'ah, before the Kaddish that precedes Baruch She'amar. In order to allow the recitation of Kaddish, a Minyan must have been present for the reading of words of Torah. We therefore recite "Rabbi Hananya Ben Akashya" to allow the recitation of Kaddish if the tenth men arrived right at that point, before Kaddish. If fewer than ten men are present in the synagogue when it is time to begin Minha, the congregation may begin reciting the sections of the Tamid and the Ketoret, but they should not begin Ashreh before the tenth man arrives. According to some opinions, the half-Kaddish following Ashreh can be recited only if a Minyan was present for Ashreh, and so the congregation should wait for a Minyan to arrive before beginning Ashreh. However, if they recited Ashreh without a Minyan, and the tenth man then arrived, then, according to some Poskim, Kaddish may nevertheless be recited, because our custom is for the Hazzan to recite two verses – "Tikon Tefilati Lefanecha" (Tehillim 141:2) and "Hakshiba Le'kol Shav'i" (Tehillim 5:3) – just before the half-Kaddish preceding the Amida at Minha. The Kaf Ha'haim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939) writes that the custom in his time was to recite Ashreh while waiting for the tenth man, and to then rely on the recitation of these two verses before Kaddish once the tenth man arrives. However, the Mishna Berura ruled that at least three verses must be read to allow the recitation of Kaddish. Moreover, the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909), in Od Yosef Hai (Parashat Vayakhel), indicates that an entire chapter of Tehillim should be recited with a Minyan before Kaddish. Therefore, it is preferable to wait for a Minyan before reciting Ashreh, though if Ashreh was recited without a Minyan, and the tenth man arrived after Ashreh, the congregation may rely on the two verses of "Tikon Tefilati" and "Hakshiba." If the entire morning Pesukeh De'zimra service was recited without a Minyan, and the tenth man arrived after Yishtabah at the conclusion of Pesukeh De'zimra, the Hazzan may recite at that point the half-Kaddish preceding Barechu. Likewise, if, during Arbit, the tenth man arrived only after the reading of Shema and all its blessings, the Hazzan may recite the half-Kaddish before the Amida.

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 8:3-4L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 26, 2025Fri6 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 8:1-2 L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 25, 2025Thu5 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 8:5-6L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 27, 2025Shab7 Teves 5786

The hide of burnt offerings is given to the kohanim, as stated in Vayikra 7:8. However, the Mishna explains that if the offering became disqualified before the blood was sprinkled, the kohanim do not receive the hide. If it was sacrificed for the sake of a different type of offering, since the sacrifice remains valid, the hide is given to the kohanim. In addition to burnt offerings, the kohanim also receive the hides of all kodshei kodashim, such as guilt and sin offerings. This is derived through a kal va'chomer argument in the Mishna, but later a braita brings different opinions of how to derive this. A braita records a debate between two tannaim regarding the phrase "the burnt offering of a man" in the verse that grants the kohen rights to the hide. One opinion says it excludes a burnt offering of hekdesh, property belonging to the Temple, while the other says it excludes the burnt offering of a convert. Three explanations are offered for what is meant by a burnt offering of hekdesh, and one explanation is given for the case of a convert, since a convert is certainly considered a "person." The three explanations of hekdesh are: a burnt offering brought from leftover funds of an offering; one who consecrates an offering for bedek habayit, the maintenance of the Temple; and one who consecrates all of their property, among which there were animals. The exemption regarding a convert refers to a case where the convert designated a burnt offering and then died without heirs. Since the sacrifice is ownerless, it does not qualify as a "burnt offering of a man." A braita is cited to explain the derivation of the laws in the Mishna. Although the verse says "man," the offerings of women and slaves are included as well, as is derived from a phrase in the verse. It also records a debate about how kodshei kodashim are included and kodashim kalim excluded from this law - whether it is learned from a kal va'chomer, from a verse, or whether no derivation is needed at all, since the hide always follows the meat, and the meat of other kodshei kodashim goes to the kohen. The Mishna concludes that the determining factor for whether the hide goes to the kohen in a case where the meat was disqualified is whether the hide was still attached at the moment of disqualification.

Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute. One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af,  anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this by saying that Moshe slapped Pharaoh in the face. This explanation is challenged by another statement of Reish Lakish, in which he says that Moshe showed respect toward Pharaoh. Two answers are offered to reconcile these conflicting statements. Two verses are then brought to support the principle that one must show respect to a king, even a wicked king, one verse concerning Pharaoh and another concerning Ahab. Earlier, a source had referred to Moshe as a king. However, Ulla stated that Moshe desired to be king but was not granted that status. Rava resolves this by qualifying Ulla's statement: Moshe wished for his sons to inherit kingship, and that request was denied, but Moshe himself was indeed considered a king. The Gemara then asks: from where do we derive that kohanim with any type of blemish are entitled to receive portions of the priestly gifts? Four braitot are cited, each offering a drasha that builds upon the previous one. The Mishna states that those who cannot serve in the Temple do not receive a portion, which seems to contradict the ruling regarding blemished kohanim. Furthermore, the implication that those who do serve may eat is difficult in the case of impure kohanim during communal offerings, where they may serve, yet do not receive a portion. The Gemara explains how this contradiction is resolved. Rav relates that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon was once in the bathroom and devised various arguments that a tevul yom might use to claim a share of sacrificial portions. Yet for every argument he proposed, a pure kohen could cite a verse proving that a tevul yom is excluded, since he cannot perform the Temple service. The Gemara then asks: how was Rabbi Elazar able to think Torah thoughts in the bathroom, something that is normally forbidden?  

It is customary for Kaddish to be recited after a group reads Tehillim or learns Torah. If only verses from Tanach were read, then Kaddish Yeheh Shelama Rabba is recited. If the learning included Torah She'be'al Peh, then Kaddish Al Yisrael – which includes a prayer for the Sages of Israel, who developed the Torah She'be'al Peh – is recited. Of course, the recitation of Kaddish requires the presence of a Minyan. Sometimes, when fewer than ten men were learning, and one wishes to recite Kaddish, they will bring in men to complete the Minyan to allow for the recitation of Kaddish. May Kaddish be recited immediately in such a case, or must another verse be read, or some more material learned, so that the newcomers read or learn something before Kaddish is recited? This issue is subject to a debate among the Poskim. The Taz (Rav David Segal, Poland, d. 1667) maintained that the newcomers do not need to participate in the learning, and so Kaddish may be recited immediately upon their arrival. The Lebush (Rav Mordechai Yoffe, Prague, d. 1612), by contrast, maintained that the men who are brought in must, in fact, learn something before Kaddish may be recited. He reached this conclusion on the basis of the ruling of the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, d. 1572) that at Minha, the congregation should not recite Ashreh without a Minyan. The Lebush understood that if a Minyan is not present for Ashreh, then even if the tenth man arrives immediately afterward, the half-Kaddish cannot then be recited, since there was no Minyan during the recitation of Ashreh. This indicates that a Minyan must be present not only for Kaddish, but for the learning or reading preceding the Kaddish. The Taz disagrees with this understanding of the Rama's ruling, and explains that Kaddish must be recited immediately after Ashreh, without any interruption, and so the congregation should not recite Ashreh without a Minyan, as they might then need to wait after Ashreh for a Minyan to arrive before saying Kaddish. The Magen Abraham (Rav Abraham Gombiner, Poland, 1633-1682) concurred with the ruling of the Lebush, explaining that Kaddish is recited after Torah learning because public Torah study, in the presence of ten men or more, creates a Kiddush Hashem (a glorification of Hashem's Name). After creating such a Kiddush Hashem, we declare, "Yitgadal Ve'yitkadash Shemeh Rabba" – that G-d's great name shall continue to be honored and glorified. As this is the reason for reciting Kaddish after learning, it follows that Kaddish is recited only if a Minyan was present during the learning. The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) concludes that it is proper to abide by the stringent opinion, and thus if a tenth man arrives after the reading of Tehillim or Torah study, another chapter should be read, or another piece of Torah She'ba'al Peh should be learned, before the recitation of Kaddish. It is for this reason that the custom developed to recite the Mishna of "Rabbi Hananya Ben Akashya" before the recitation of Kaddish Al Yisrael following the study of Torah. In principle, this is not necessary, as the learning itself suffices to warrant the recitation of Kaddish. However, since sometimes the tenth man arrives only after the learning, it became customary to always add this brief Mishna just before Kaddish to ensure that a Minyan is present for the learning and not only for Kaddish. There is some discussion in the Poskim as to how many people must read a passage before Kaddish once the tenth man arrives. The general consensus seems to be that it suffices for just one person to read a passage, and this is, indeed, the common practice. Even someone who did not actually learn or read any verses may then recite Kaddish. Summary: If a group consisting of fewer than ten men read Tehillim or learned Torah, and then a Minyan arrived for Kaddish, someone must read another passage in the presence of the Minyan before the recitation of Kaddish. It is for this reason that the custom developed to recite the Mishna of "Rabbi Hananya Ben Akashya" before the recitation of Kaddish Al Yisrael after Torah study.

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 8:1-2L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 25, 2025Thu5 Teves 5786

Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute. One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af,  anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this by saying that Moshe slapped Pharaoh in the face. This explanation is challenged by another statement of Reish Lakish, in which he says that Moshe showed respect toward Pharaoh. Two answers are offered to reconcile these conflicting statements. Two verses are then brought to support the principle that one must show respect to a king, even a wicked king, one verse concerning Pharaoh and another concerning Ahab. Earlier, a source had referred to Moshe as a king. However, Ulla stated that Moshe desired to be king but was not granted that status. Rava resolves this by qualifying Ulla's statement: Moshe wished for his sons to inherit kingship, and that request was denied, but Moshe himself was indeed considered a king. The Gemara then asks: from where do we derive that kohanim with any type of blemish are entitled to receive portions of the priestly gifts? Four braitot are cited, each offering a drasha that builds upon the previous one. The Mishna states that those who cannot serve in the Temple do not receive a portion, which seems to contradict the ruling regarding blemished kohanim. Furthermore, the implication that those who do serve may eat is difficult in the case of impure kohanim during communal offerings, where they may serve, yet do not receive a portion. The Gemara explains how this contradiction is resolved. Rav relates that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon was once in the bathroom and devised various arguments that a tevul yom might use to claim a share of sacrificial portions. Yet for every argument he proposed, a pure kohen could cite a verse proving that a tevul yom is excluded, since he cannot perform the Temple service. The Gemara then asks: how was Rabbi Elazar able to think Torah thoughts in the bathroom, something that is normally forbidden?  

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 7:2-3L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 22, 2025Mon2 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 7:4-5 L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 23, 2025Tue3 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 7:6-7L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 24, 2025Wed4 Teves 5786

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 6:8-9L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 19, 2025Fri29 Kislev 5786

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 6:6-7L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 18, 2025Thu28 Kislev 5786

After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse "the kohen who offers it shall eat it" that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim. The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those "fit for service" may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in eating. This raises a difficulty regarding blemished priests, who are unfit for offering yet still receive a share. To resolve this, the verse "all male kohanim" is understood to include them, and the Gemara analyzes why a tvul yom is excluded while a blemished priest is included. Reish Lakish further asks whether a blemished kohen who is also impure may receive a portion. Raba cites the case of the kohen gadol who, while an onen (mourner on the day of a relative's death), works in the Temple but cannot eat, and does not receive a share to eat later - showing that eligibility requires fitness for eating. Rav Oshaya raises a similar question about a kohen who is impure in a situation where impurity is permitted for communal offerings, and Ravina responds with the same proof from the kohen gadol, again affirming that fitness for eating is required. The Mishna states that an onen may touch sacred items, which contradicts a Mishna in Chagiga 21a requiring immersion for sacrificial items (kodashim). Three resolutions are offered: first, that our Mishna refers to before immersion, though this is rejected since immersion does not remove aninut; second, distinguishing between one who was careful to avoid impurity that conveys tumah but not impurity that disqualifies, versus one who was careful in all respects; and third, that our Mishna refers to touching, while Chagiga refers to eating. A source is brought to prove that there could be situations where one is careful about one type of impurity and not another, a distinction that carries halakhic consequences. Since the Mishna rules that an onen does not receive a share, it seems to imply that he may nevertheless eat sacrificial meat. Yet this conflicts with Pesachim 91b, which teaches that an onen may immerse and eat the Passover sacrifice at night but not other offerings. The resolution distinguishes between Passover, where eating is permitted due to its unique requirements, and other sacrifices throughout the year. This leads to mention of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over whether nighttime aninut is biblical or rabbinic, since the permission for the onen to eat the Passover sacrifice rests on Rabbi Shimon's view that it is rabbinic. However, a braita suggests that Rabbi Shimon holds aninut at night to be a Torah law. Two possible resolutions are offered to reconcile this apparent contradiction.  

If mixtures of an offering are cooked together with those of another offering of a different status, or with non-sacred food, the resulting food assumes the status of the more stringent offering, as stated in Vayikra 6:20. Although this law is presented in the context of the sin offering, a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 7:37 which juxtaposes various types of offerings, teaches that this principle applies to all sacrifices. Each offering mentioned in that verse serves to transmit a particular law to the others. A braita quoted in the name of Rabbi Akiva derives the law of foods cooked together from the word 'mincha' in that verse, since the same rule appears in the context of the meal offerings in Vayikra 6:11. The sin offering in the verse, however, is used to teach other laws. While the braita derives three laws from the sin offering - that it cannot be purchased with second tithe money, must be offered during the day, and that all actions must be performed with the right hand - the Gemara limits this to two, and possibly even to one, since the other laws are taught explicitly regarding different offerings. Rava raises two questions concerning blood on a garment: one about the Temple laws of laundering blood from a sin offering, and the other about chatzitza (interposition) in the mikveh. He resolves the first question, but the second remains unanswered. The Mishna lists cases where kohanim do not receive a portion of the meat. If they are unable to perform the sacrifice due to impurity or similar disqualifications, they cannot receive a share. However, blemished kohanim, though not permitted to sacrifice the sacrifices, but are nevertheless entitled to receive a portion of the meat.