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A debate exists between a braita and Rav regarding communal peace offerings brought on Shavuot for the sake of rams instead of sheep; the braita deems the sacrifice ineffective, while Rav holds it is. Rav Chisda and Raba disagree on the specific nature of this case. Their dispute centers on whether the laws of "intent for the wrong sacrifice" apply when a kohen mistakenly misidentifies the animal's original purpose. Two objections, one from Mishna Gittin 54a and one from a braita, are raised against Raba's position that a sacrifice offered for the wrong purpose by mistake remains valid. In both instances, the Gemara resolves the objections. The Mishna explains that the daily tamid and the special mussaf sacrifices of Shabbat and festivals do not preclude one another. However, the precise meaning of the Mishna is initially unclear. The Gemara introduces a question posed by Rabbi Chiya bar Avin to Rav Chisda: if only one animal is available, should it be used for today's mussaf or saved for tomorrow's tamid? Initially, our Mishna is cited to prove that there is no specific preference between the two, but this proof is rejected as inconclusive. A different source is brought to resolve the question, but it is also dismissed, as the Gemara determines it refers to a case irrelevant to the current discussion.
A debate exists between a braita and Rav regarding communal peace offerings brought on Shavuot for the sake of rams instead of sheep; the braita deems the sacrifice ineffective, while Rav holds it is. Rav Chisda and Raba disagree on the specific nature of this case. Their dispute centers on whether the laws of "intent for the wrong sacrifice" apply when a kohen mistakenly misidentifies the animal's original purpose. Two objections, one from Mishna Gittin 54a and one from a braita, are raised against Raba's position that a sacrifice offered for the wrong purpose by mistake remains valid. In both instances, the Gemara resolves the objections. The Mishna explains that the daily tamid and the special mussaf sacrifices of Shabbat and festivals do not preclude one another. However, the precise meaning of the Mishna is initially unclear. The Gemara introduces a question posed by Rabbi Chiya bar Avin to Rav Chisda: if only one animal is available, should it be used for today's mussaf or saved for tomorrow's tamid? Initially, our Mishna is cited to prove that there is no specific preference between the two, but this proof is rejected as inconclusive. A different source is brought to resolve the question, but it is also dismissed, as the Gemara determines it refers to a case irrelevant to the current discussion.
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Mishna Baba Metsia 04-12 by Shiour Yomi
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Link to Ptil Techelet website. The Gemara brings two different versions of the incident involving Mar bar Rav Ashi, whose tzitzit were torn on Shabbat while he was walking home. This raises the subject of "kevod haberiyot" (human dignity), which overrides a "lo ta'aseh" (negative commandment) in the Torah. Both versions bring the explanation of Rav bar Shaba, who explained that this law refers specifically to the negative commandment of "lo tasur" (do not stray from the words of the Sages), meaning that it only overrides Rabbinic prohibitions. For tzitzit, one must place two strings of techelet and two white strings. The Mishna rules, however, that this is not essential – one can have only white or only techelet. Also regarding the tefillin of the hand and the tefillin of the head - they are two independent mitzvot and do not hinder one another; someone who has only one of them puts it on and recites the blessing over it. The Gemara suggests that the Mishna does not follow the view of Rebbi, who holds that the techelet and the white do hinder one another. He learns this from the verse "And you shall see him" (u're-item oto), which teaches that both must be together, while the rabbis learn that it is possible to see each kind separately. However, two other suggestion were brought to explain the Mishna according to the view of Rebbi: Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav: The law in the Mishna (that they do not hinder) was stated regarding the order of precedence. It is a mitzva to first place the white (since the white is the color of the "corner" of the garment, which appears in the verse first), but if one placed techelet before white, one has fulfilled the obligation, though the mitzva has not been performed in the most ideal way. Rava: The Mishna is speaking about gerdumin (remnants) of one of the colors - strings that were torn after they were already placed in the garment - the tzitzit remains valid. His words rely on the words of the sons of Rabbi Chiya, who said that remnants of techelet are valid. The minimum measure that must remain in a string to maintain its validity is "enough to tie them" (kedei le'anvan), meaning a length sufficient to make a slipknot. From the statement of the sons of Rabbi Chiya, Rava concludes that one must tie a knot on each and every "chulya" (group of windings) in the tzitzit. The reason for this is that if one does not tie a knot at every chulya, if just a short strand is permitted, the moment the string is severed above the first knot, all the windings will unravel and disappear. The knots between the chulyot ensure that even if part of the string is cut off, the structure of the rest of the tzitzit will be preserved and it will remain valid under the law of gerdumin. However, Rava's assumption is rejected as the sons of Rabbi Chiya may only permit gardumim when there are knots at every chulya.
Link to Ptil Techelet website. The Gemara brings two different versions of the incident involving Mar bar Rav Ashi, whose tzitzit were torn on Shabbat while he was walking home. This raises the subject of "kevod haberiyot" (human dignity), which overrides a "lo ta'aseh" (negative commandment) in the Torah. Both versions bring the explanation of Rav bar Shaba, who explained that this law refers specifically to the negative commandment of "lo tasur" (do not stray from the words of the Sages), meaning that it only overrides Rabbinic prohibitions. For tzitzit, one must place two strings of techelet and two white strings. The Mishna rules, however, that this is not essential – one can have only white or only techelet. Also regarding the tefillin of the hand and the tefillin of the head - they are two independent mitzvot and do not hinder one another; someone who has only one of them puts it on and recites the blessing over it. The Gemara suggests that the Mishna does not follow the view of Rebbi, who holds that the techelet and the white do hinder one another. He learns this from the verse "And you shall see him" (u're-item oto), which teaches that both must be together, while the rabbis learn that it is possible to see each kind separately. However, two other suggestion were brought to explain the Mishna according to the view of Rebbi: Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav: The law in the Mishna (that they do not hinder) was stated regarding the order of precedence. It is a mitzva to first place the white (since the white is the color of the "corner" of the garment, which appears in the verse first), but if one placed techelet before white, one has fulfilled the obligation, though the mitzva has not been performed in the most ideal way. Rava: The Mishna is speaking about gerdumin (remnants) of one of the colors - strings that were torn after they were already placed in the garment - the tzitzit remains valid. His words rely on the words of the sons of Rabbi Chiya, who said that remnants of techelet are valid. The minimum measure that must remain in a string to maintain its validity is "enough to tie them" (kedei le'anvan), meaning a length sufficient to make a slipknot. From the statement of the sons of Rabbi Chiya, Rava concludes that one must tie a knot on each and every "chulya" (group of windings) in the tzitzit. The reason for this is that if one does not tie a knot at every chulya, if just a short strand is permitted, the moment the string is severed above the first knot, all the windings will unravel and disappear. The knots between the chulyot ensure that even if part of the string is cut off, the structure of the rest of the tzitzit will be preserved and it will remain valid under the law of gerdumin. However, Rava's assumption is rejected as the sons of Rabbi Chiya may only permit gardumim when there are knots at every chulya.
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The Menora in the Temple featured various decorative parts, including goblets, knobs, and flowers. The Gemara details the quantity of each and their specific placement on the Menora. Rav explained that the Menora's height was nine handbreadths from the point where the lowest branches met. The text describes the gold used for the Menora as "michlot zahav." Rabbi Ami interpreted this phrase to mean that all the refined gold from King Solomon's era was used for its construction. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani explained that the Menora is called "tehora" (pure) because it was shown to Moshe as a heavenly image. The Gemara explores why this same explanation is not applied to the "shulchan hatehora" (the pure table) used for the showbread; in that case, the phrase indicates that the table could potentially become impure. There were other items as well that God had to show Moshe, as they were difficult for him to grasp. The Mishna explains that the two parshiot (sections) in the mezuza are essential. Initially, it is assumed this refers to the small tip of the letter yud (kotzo shel yud), but this is rejected as being obvious. Instead, the Gemara suggests it serves to disqualify a mezuza if its letters are touching one another. Various rabbis discuss different issues regarding the letters hey and yud and whether or not certain formations disqualify them. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that when Moshe went to receive the Torah, he found God attaching crowns to the letters. When Moshe asked why, God showed him Rabbi Akiva, who was extrapolating heaps of laws from every crown. Moshe was taken aback, as he did not understand Rabbi Akiva's teachings. However, once he heard Rabbi Akiva answer a student that a certain law was "a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai," Moshe was relieved. Yet, when he asked God what the reward would be for such a great scholar, God showed him Rabbi Akiva's tragic death, and Moshe was once again disturbed. In both instances, God told Moshe, "Be silent, for this is My decree." Seven specific letters are adorned with three crowns. There were also special requirements for writing the letters yud and chet, with explanations provided for each. The rabbis discuss in which situations mistakes in a Sefer Torah can be corrected and in which situations they cannot.
Mishna Yomi - Temurah 6:1-2 L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovFeb 9, 2026Mon22 Shevat 5786
The Menora in the Temple featured various decorative parts, including goblets, knobs, and flowers. The Gemara details the quantity of each and their specific placement on the Menora. Rav explained that the Menora's height was nine handbreadths from the point where the lowest branches met. The text describes the gold used for the Menora as "michlot zahav." Rabbi Ami interpreted this phrase to mean that all the refined gold from King Solomon's era was used for its construction. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani explained that the Menora is called "tehora" (pure) because it was shown to Moshe as a heavenly image. The Gemara explores why this same explanation is not applied to the "shulchan hatehora" (the pure table) used for the showbread; in that case, the phrase indicates that the table could potentially become impure. There were other items as well that God had to show Moshe, as they were difficult for him to grasp. The Mishna explains that the two parshiot (sections) in the mezuza are essential. Initially, it is assumed this refers to the small tip of the letter yud (kotzo shel yud), but this is rejected as being obvious. Instead, the Gemara suggests it serves to disqualify a mezuza if its letters are touching one another. Various rabbis discuss different issues regarding the letters hey and yud and whether or not certain formations disqualify them. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that when Moshe went to receive the Torah, he found God attaching crowns to the letters. When Moshe asked why, God showed him Rabbi Akiva, who was extrapolating heaps of laws from every crown. Moshe was taken aback, as he did not understand Rabbi Akiva's teachings. However, once he heard Rabbi Akiva answer a student that a certain law was "a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai," Moshe was relieved. Yet, when he asked God what the reward would be for such a great scholar, God showed him Rabbi Akiva's tragic death, and Moshe was once again disturbed. In both instances, God told Moshe, "Be silent, for this is My decree." Seven specific letters are adorned with three crowns. There were also special requirements for writing the letters yud and chet, with explanations provided for each. The rabbis discuss in which situations mistakes in a Sefer Torah can be corrected and in which situations they cannot.
Study Guide There are two contradictory braitot regarding the oil of the leper that was sprinkled for the sake of the wrong sacrifice. One rules that it is disqualified, and the other rules that it is valid. At first, it was suggested that one matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer - who disqualifies a guilt offering (which the oil of the leper is brought with) that is brought with the wrong intent - but this suggestion is rejected. They conclude by saying that each relates to a different issue: the one that permits is referring to permitting the remainder of the oil to be eaten, while the one that disqualifies relates to the owner receiving purification. The Mishna discusses elements of the Menora, mezuza, tefillin, and tzitzit that are essential. In the Menora, the seven branches are essential. The Gemara brings a braita that explains other elements of the Menora that are essential. It must be made from one chunk of gold; however, while the "chunk" is essential, it could be made from metals other than gold if gold is unavailable. How is this derived from the verses? How does this differ from the trumpets? Rav Papa, son of Rav Chanin, brought a braita with a debate between two Tannaim about whether all other metals could be used or only silver. However, Rav Yosef brings an alternative braita stating that the debate was about wood, but all agree that all other metals can be used. Rav Yosef further proves from two other braitot that his version is correct. Shmuel quotes an elder who described the height of the Menora and what could be found at every level. He also listed how many of the decorative elements were to be found on the Menora and ruled that each one is an essential part of the Menora.
Mishna Yomi - Temurah 5:5-6L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovFeb 8, 2026Sun21 Shevat 5786
Study Guide There are two contradictory braitot regarding the oil of the leper that was sprinkled for the sake of the wrong sacrifice. One rules that it is disqualified, and the other rules that it is valid. At first, it was suggested that one matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer - who disqualifies a guilt offering (which the oil of the leper is brought with) that is brought with the wrong intent - but this suggestion is rejected. They conclude by saying that each relates to a different issue: the one that permits is referring to permitting the remainder of the oil to be eaten, while the one that disqualifies relates to the owner receiving purification. The Mishna discusses elements of the Menora, mezuza, tefillin, and tzitzit that are essential. In the Menora, the seven branches are essential. The Gemara brings a braita that explains other elements of the Menora that are essential. It must be made from one chunk of gold; however, while the "chunk" is essential, it could be made from metals other than gold if gold is unavailable. How is this derived from the verses? How does this differ from the trumpets? Rav Papa, son of Rav Chanin, brought a braita with a debate between two Tannaim about whether all other metals could be used or only silver. However, Rav Yosef brings an alternative braita stating that the debate was about wood, but all agree that all other metals can be used. Rav Yosef further proves from two other braitot that his version is correct. Shmuel quotes an elder who described the height of the Menora and what could be found at every level. He also listed how many of the decorative elements were to be found on the Menora and ruled that each one is an essential part of the Menora.
The Mishna lists different elements of the mincha and other offerings that are essential. The Gemara delves into the derivations for each of these. Some elements are repeated Torah, and this repetition serves as an indicator that the act must be performed in that specific way. Others are deemed essential due to a specific formulation in the verse - a word that indicates a particular detail is necessary. The Gemara delves into two specific issues related to items on the list. One involves the four species of the lulav. A statement of Rav Chanan bar Rava is brought—that the essential element of the four species is that they be present, but they do not all need to be taken at once. A difficulty is raised against him from a braita that makes clear that the species need to be bound together. This is resolved by explaining that there are two different Tannaitic positions on this, based on whether or not the species are required to be bound. The second issue is the sprinkling of the blood of the Red Heifer, which must be performed while facing the Sanctuary. There are two contradictory braitot: one holds that if the blood is not sprinkled while facing the Sanctuary, it is disqualified, while another holds that it is not. Two resolutions are brought - either each source reflects a different Tannaitic position, or each is addressing a different situation.
If the remainder of the mincha offering becomes impure, lost, or burned before the kometz is offered, according to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua's approaches regarding sacrifices, one can explain what they would each hold on whether the kometz may still be burned. In the case of animal sacrifices, Rabbi Eliezer permits the sprinkling of the blood even if there is no meat left, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua forbids it. Rav explains that Rabbi Yehoshua's restriction only applies if the entire remainder is lost; however, if even a portion remains, the kometz may be burned. This aligns with his view on animal sacrifices - that if even an olive-bulk of meat or sacrificial fats remains, the blood may be sprinkled. Does the kometz require a sacred vessel after being taken from the meal offering, or can it be brought by hand to the altar? Rabbi Shimon and the Sages differ on this requirement, with Rabbi Shimon ruling that a vessel is not required at this stage. The Gemara explores three different approaches to explain the underlying logic of Rabbi Shimon's lenient view, bringing braitot to challenge the different opinions. If the kometz is split into two parts, the Mishna rules that it can be burned in two separate actions. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about whether it can be split into more than two parts. What is the basis of their debate? Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Chanina disagree about the exact point at which the burning of the kometz renders the remainder permitted for consumption.
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A Mishna in Chagigah 20b explains that sanctified items placed in the same sanctified vessel are considered combined for purposes of impurity; for example, if a tvul yom touched one, everything else in the vessel would become impure. However, this is only if they are all touching. The sons of Rabbi Chiya asked Rav Kahana if that would hold true even if they weren't touching. Rav Kahana derived from the word "tzeiruf" used in the Mishna there that they would combine. They ask two more related questions and Rav Kahana answers them. Then, Rav Kahana asks them a question about whether combining two items in a bowl, when not touching, would be valid for taking a kemitza (if the dough of the mincha was split into two parts). They attempted to make a comparison between the case in question and the case in our Mishna regarding the two minchas that got mixed together. However, Rava rejects the comparison as it is likely they were touching. Rabbi Yirmia asks a follow-up question about items being connected regarding impurity—in a case where the item is attached through water (in a pipe) to something outside of the vessel. Would the impurity extend to there as well? Or what if the outside piece became impure, would it extend to the other piece in the bowl as well? If a mincha offering was divided and one part became impure and was then added to a bowl with its other half, if a tvul yom then comes and touches the impure half while it is in the bowl with the other, is the other piece impure as well? This is in essence asking whether once something is impure, can impurity be added again? Rava asked this question and Abaye tried to answer it from a Mishna in Keilim 27:9, explaining that there is no such concept that once something is impure it cannot become impure again, but Rava rejects his proof as the cases aren't comparable. The Gemara further tries to prove Abaye's point from the continuation of that Mishna, but that is rejected as well. Rava and Abaye disagree about a case where there are three pieces—two from the original, one of which was lost temporarily, and a third that came to replace the lost half. What is the relationship between the three for laws of impurity and laws of kemitza?
Study Guide Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about a case where oil was placed on the kometz of a mincha of a sinner, which is not meant to be mixed with oil. Rabbi Yochanan disqualifies it, but Reish Lakish does not, as he holds that the oil should not be mixed with the mincha before the kometz is taken, but the kometz can (and ideally should) be mixed with a little bit of oil. Rabbi Yochanan brings a tannaitic source to raise a difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved. Rava asks a question about a kometz whose oil (some of it) was absorbed onto a piece of wood. Can both be burned together to ensure that all the oil of the kometz is burned, or would this not be effective as the wood is completely separate from the kometz? Ravina questions Rava as the issue is already known as a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. But they explain why the question can be asked according to each. The Mishna explains what to do in three different cases of mixtures of meal offerings that were at various stages - either two minchas before the kometz was taken, or a kometz with a different mincha where the kometz was not yet taken, or a kometz mixed with the remainder. Rav Chisda and Rabbi Chanina disagree within Rabbi Yehuda's position of min b'mino (items of the same type) is not nullified, as understood by Rabbi Chiya, that items are considered the same if the status of one can change to be like the other. Rav Chisda says it is determined by the item trying to nullify, and Rabbi Chanina by the item being nullified. The three cases in our Mishna and a fourth source regarding matza are brought as difficulties to one or both of the opinions, but all are resolved.
Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.
The braita initially listed two items offered on the altar that do not require salting: wood and blood. However, the Gemara notes a difficulty: this braita appears to follow the position of Rebbi, yet Rebbi himself maintains that blood does require salting. Consequently, the Gemara emends the text, removing "wood" and replacing it with libations (wine). To support this, a second braita is cited which lists wine, blood, wood, and incense as exempt from salting. Yet, this proof-text presents its own challenge, as it aligns neither with Rebbi (who requires salting for blood) nor with the Rabbis (who require it for incense). Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that this braita follows Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, who uses a different categorization based on the characteristics of a mincha (meal offering) to determine which items require salt. A further challenge on the braita quoted in Menachot 20a is raised. The braita implies that blood is excluded from salting only because of a specific scriptural derivation (drasha). However, according to Zeiri, if blood is salted, it becomes disqualified for use on the altar regardless; if so, why is a drasha necessary to exclude it? To resolve this, the Gemara distinguishes between two levels of salting: a small amount of salt, which might not disqualify the blood but is still excluded by the verse, and a large amount, which renders the blood physically unfit for the altar. This leads to a discussion regarding the status of salted or coagulated blood: is it still considered "blood" enough to be valid for the altar, and conversely, does the prohibition against eating blood still apply to it? A braita is then introduced expounding on the biblical verses regarding salting to derive various procedural laws. These include the type of salt required, the quantity ushttps://five.libsyn.com/showed, and the specific method of application. Another braita clarifies the legal status of salt found in the sanctuary: if salt is found directly on a sacrificial limb, it is considered sanctified and subject to the laws of meila (misappropriation of sacred property). However, if the salt is found on the altar's ramp or on the roof of the altar itself, it does not carry this sanctity. A Mishna in Shekalim states that the rabbis allowed the kohanim to benefit from the salt of the Temple. Shmuel explains that this permission applies only to the kohanim's offerings and not for eating. The Gemara analyzes whether Shmuel meant that salt is permitted only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbidden for the meat the kohanim eat, or if it is permitted for seasoning their sacrificial meat but forbidden for use with non-sacred food. The Gemara initially concludes that since the kohanim were even permitted to use Temple salt for tanning animal hides, they must certainly be allowed to use it to season the holy meat they consume. Under this view, Shmuel's restriction only excludes using the salt for personal, non-sacred food. This is further supported by the logic that if even an Israelite's sacrifice is salted with Temple salt, a kohen's sacrifice surely would be as well, meaning the court's special decree must have addressed something else. However, Rav Mordechai suggests an alternative reading that could reinstate the first possibility: that the court permitted salt only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbade it for the meat the kohanim eat. He explains that the Mishna's decree was specifically necessary to account for the position of Ben Buchri, as will be explained further on.