Podcasts about mishna

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 2:7-8L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 4, 2025Thu14 Kislev 5786

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

Study Guide When different bloods are mixed together, how are they brought on the altar? If both sacrifices require the same number of placements, that number is performed, with the assumption that the blood placed on the altar represents a combination of both offerings. However, if the mixture includes blood from a sacrifice requiring one placement and another requiring four, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree on the proper procedure. Why does the Mishna introduce the case of blood from blemished animals mixed with valid blood, when it has already discussed a similar case regarding limbs of blemished animals mixed with valid limbs? The Gemara then cites a Mishna in Parah 9:1, which deals with waters of the red heifer that became mixed with ordinary water. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis dispute whether such water can be used, and if so, in what manner. Three possible explanations are offered to clarify Rabbi Eliezer's position. The Gemara proceeds to challenge these explanations: first, a difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's interpretation, which remains unresolved. Then, five difficulties are posed against Rav Ashi's explanation, drawn from various braitot and our Mishna. Each of these is resolved through the method of ukimta, limiting the ruling to specific circumstances. Finally, one additional difficulty is raised later in the sugya, which remains unresolved.

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 2:5-6L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 3, 2025Wed13 Kislev 5786

Study Guide When different bloods are mixed together, how are they brought on the altar? If both sacrifices require the same number of placements, that number is performed, with the assumption that the blood placed on the altar represents a combination of both offerings. However, if the mixture includes blood from a sacrifice requiring one placement and another requiring four, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree on the proper procedure. Why does the Mishna introduce the case of blood from blemished animals mixed with valid blood, when it has already discussed a similar case regarding limbs of blemished animals mixed with valid limbs? The Gemara then cites a Mishna in Parah 9:1, which deals with waters of the red heifer that became mixed with ordinary water. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis dispute whether such water can be used, and if so, in what manner. Three possible explanations are offered to clarify Rabbi Eliezer's position. The Gemara proceeds to challenge these explanations: first, a difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's interpretation, which remains unresolved. Then, five difficulties are posed against Rav Ashi's explanation, drawn from various braitot and our Mishna. Each of these is resolved through the method of ukimta, limiting the ruling to specific circumstances. Finally, one additional difficulty is raised later in the sugya, which remains unresolved.

A contradiction between the Mishna in Mikvaot 10:6, which seems to be Rabbi Yehuda's position anrules according to majority, and Rabbi Yehuda in the braita, who follows appearance, is resolved in two ways. Abaye suggests that in the braita, where the position is stricter, Rabbi Yehuda is quoting Rabban Gamliel, who was known for his stringency in cases of nullification, as he did not allow nullification at all in mixtures of the same type (min b'mino). Rava, however, explains that the more lenient opinion in Mikvaot refers to a case where only the outside of the cup was impure. By Torah law, the mikveh waters need only pass over the rim, not fill the cup. Since the requirement to fill the cup is rabbinic, there is room for leniency. Rabbi Elazar disagrees with Reish Lakish regarding pigul and notar that became mixed together. He holds that just as mitzvot do not nullify one another, prohibitions likewise do not nullify each other. This principle is based on Hillel, who would eat matza and maror together on Pesach to fulfill the commandment that they be eaten simultaneously. If mitzvot could nullify one another, the strong taste of the maror would cancel the taste of the matza, preventing fulfillment of the mitzva of eating matza in that manner. Regarding min b'mino, a mixture of the same type, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis as to whether it can be nullified. A similar debate appears in the Tosefta Taharot 5:3 between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the rabbis in a case of a shard that absorbed urine: can it be purified by soaking or rinsing in urine? In the Mishna, there is also a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blood mixed with problematic blood. The question arises: does Rabbi Eliezer disagree in both cases - disqualified blood and dam hatamtzit (the blood that flows from inside the animal) - or only in the latter case? The Mishna explores various scenarios of blood mixtures and clarifies where Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis differ.

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 2:3-4L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 2, 2025Tue12 Kislev 5786

A contradiction between the Mishna in Mikvaot 10:6, which seems to be Rabbi Yehuda's position anrules according to majority, and Rabbi Yehuda in the braita, who follows appearance, is resolved in two ways. Abaye suggests that in the braita, where the position is stricter, Rabbi Yehuda is quoting Rabban Gamliel, who was known for his stringency in cases of nullification, as he did not allow nullification at all in mixtures of the same type (min b'mino). Rava, however, explains that the more lenient opinion in Mikvaot refers to a case where only the outside of the cup was impure. By Torah law, the mikveh waters need only pass over the rim, not fill the cup. Since the requirement to fill the cup is rabbinic, there is room for leniency. Rabbi Elazar disagrees with Reish Lakish regarding pigul and notar that became mixed together. He holds that just as mitzvot do not nullify one another, prohibitions likewise do not nullify each other. This principle is based on Hillel, who would eat matza and maror together on Pesach to fulfill the commandment that they be eaten simultaneously. If mitzvot could nullify one another, the strong taste of the maror would cancel the taste of the matza, preventing fulfillment of the mitzva of eating matza in that manner. Regarding min b'mino, a mixture of the same type, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis as to whether it can be nullified. A similar debate appears in the Tosefta Taharot 5:3 between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the rabbis in a case of a shard that absorbed urine: can it be purified by soaking or rinsing in urine? In the Mishna, there is also a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blood mixed with problematic blood. The question arises: does Rabbi Eliezer disagree in both cases - disqualified blood and dam hatamtzit (the blood that flows from inside the animal) - or only in the latter case? The Mishna explores various scenarios of blood mixtures and clarifies where Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis differ.

The Mishna addresses the case of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances: under what circumstances can it still be offered on the altar? If the mixture retains the appearance of blood, it may be brought. If it is mixed with a substance of the same color, such as wine or blood not designated for sacrifice, but had that substance been water the blood would still be recognizable, then the blood is likewise valid for the altar. Rabbi Yehuda, however, rules that blood is not nullified in other blood, since they are of the same essence. Therefore, even if only a minimal amount of sacrificial blood is present in a mixture with other bloods, it may still be sprinkled on the altar. By contrast, if the blood is mixed with disqualified blood, such as the blood that flows after the initial spurt of slaughter, the mixture must be spilled and cannot be used. Rabbi Eliezer permits it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, limits the Mishna's ruling to a case where another substance spilled into the blood. But if blood dripped into water, each drop would be nullified upon contact, immediately rejected from altar service. Once rejected, it cannot later be accepted, even if the majority of the final mixture is blood. This principle of "rejection" applies only to kodashim, not to mitzvot such as the commandment to cover the blood after slaughter. Reish Lakish rules regarding a mixture of pigul and notar: if one eats them together, there is no punishment of lashes. From this, the Gemara derives three principles about mixtures: (1) even forbidden items can nullify one another; (2) the rule that an item imparting taste is considered significant and not nullified is not a Torah law; (3) a warning given in a case of doubt (hatra'at safek) is not considered a valid warning. A difficulty is raised against the second principle. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve it, the derivation is rejected. Reish Lakish was speaking of pigul and notar involving two similar items, i.e. meat and meat, which are nullified by majority since their taste is indistinguishable. Taste is only a factor when dissimilar items are mixed, where the flavor is perceptible. The Gemara then questions: if similar items are nullified by majority, why does the Mishna, in the case of wine and blood, assess whether the wine would be noticeable if it were water? Since both taste and visibility rely on the same concept, it seems the Mishna treats two similar items as if they were different. If so, why not apply the same reasoning to Reish Lakish's case of pigul and notar, viewing them as distinct, and if they impart taste, liability should follow? After one failed attempt to reinterpret the Mishna, the Gemara resolves the difficulty differently: there is a tannaitic dispute. The Mishna reflects Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, while Reish Lakish follows the rabbis. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from a Mishna Mikvaot 10:6. To explain it, one must assume the Mishna is authored by Rabbi Yehuda, since it employs the principle of "we view the item as if…". Yet at the end of the Mishna, purification waters are nullified in a mikveh if the mikveh waters are the majority. This stands in opposition to Rabbi Yehuda's stance that similar items are treated as different and are not nullified based on appearance.  

The Mishna addresses the case of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances: under what circumstances can it still be offered on the altar? If the mixture retains the appearance of blood, it may be brought. If it is mixed with a substance of the same color, such as wine or blood not designated for sacrifice, but had that substance been water the blood would still be recognizable, then the blood is likewise valid for the altar. Rabbi Yehuda, however, rules that blood is not nullified in other blood, since they are of the same essence. Therefore, even if only a minimal amount of sacrificial blood is present in a mixture with other bloods, it may still be sprinkled on the altar. By contrast, if the blood is mixed with disqualified blood, such as the blood that flows after the initial spurt of slaughter, the mixture must be spilled and cannot be used. Rabbi Eliezer permits it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, limits the Mishna's ruling to a case where another substance spilled into the blood. But if blood dripped into water, each drop would be nullified upon contact, immediately rejected from altar service. Once rejected, it cannot later be accepted, even if the majority of the final mixture is blood. This principle of "rejection" applies only to kodashim, not to mitzvot such as the commandment to cover the blood after slaughter. Reish Lakish rules regarding a mixture of pigul and notar: if one eats them together, there is no punishment of lashes. From this, the Gemara derives three principles about mixtures: (1) even forbidden items can nullify one another; (2) the rule that an item imparting taste is considered significant and not nullified is not a Torah law; (3) a warning given in a case of doubt (hatra'at safek) is not considered a valid warning. A difficulty is raised against the second principle. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve it, the derivation is rejected. Reish Lakish was speaking of pigul and notar involving two similar items, i.e. meat and meat, which are nullified by majority since their taste is indistinguishable. Taste is only a factor when dissimilar items are mixed, where the flavor is perceptible. The Gemara then questions: if similar items are nullified by majority, why does the Mishna, in the case of wine and blood, assess whether the wine would be noticeable if it were water? Since both taste and visibility rely on the same concept, it seems the Mishna treats two similar items as if they were different. If so, why not apply the same reasoning to Reish Lakish's case of pigul and notar, viewing them as distinct, and if they impart taste, liability should follow? After one failed attempt to reinterpret the Mishna, the Gemara resolves the difficulty differently: there is a tannaitic dispute. The Mishna reflects Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, while Reish Lakish follows the rabbis. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from a Mishna Mikvaot 10:6. To explain it, one must assume the Mishna is authored by Rabbi Yehuda, since it employs the principle of "we view the item as if…". Yet at the end of the Mishna, purification waters are nullified in a mikveh if the mikveh waters are the majority. This stands in opposition to Rabbi Yehuda's stance that similar items are treated as different and are not nullified based on appearance.  

The Gemara concludes its explanation of how, according to Rabbi Shimon, a safek leper may bring the oil for his purification process as either a possible leper's offering or a possible voluntary oil offering, by resolving the multiple complications inherent in this situation. Rav Rachuma said to Ravina that Rav Huna bar Tachlifa asked why Rabbi Shimon suggested that the safek leper bring an animal as either a guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, when he could have instead proposed bringing it as either a guilt offering or a hanging guilt offering, thus avoiding the issue of disqualifying kodashim. Rav Rachuma explains that one can infer from this that Rabbi Shimon must disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, holding that one cannot voluntarily bring a hanging guilt offering. However, Ravina rejects this reasoning, noting that the guilt offering of a leper comes from a one-year-old sheep, whereas a hanging guilt offering requires a two-year-old sheep, also known as a ram. In the Mishna, there is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a mixture of limbs from sin offerings and burnt offerings: can they be brought on the altar? The Gemara explores the basis of their disagreement, rooted in different interpretations of Vayikra 2:11–12, and then cites a braita quoting Rabbi Yehuda, who preserved a different version of the dispute. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the disagreement applies only to mixtures of limbs from blemished and non-blemished animals. Both sides, however, agree that mixtures of sin and burnt offerings may certainly be brought on the altar, while those from animals that engaged in bestiality may not. Why did Rabbi Eliezer distinguish between blemished animals and those involved in bestiality? Rav Huna explains that the blemish in question is a mild one, following Rabbi Akiva's more lenient position. Yet since Rabbi Akiva permitted such blemishes only post facto, Rav Papa qualifies that the case must involve limbs already placed on the ramp. This explanation is rejected, however, because if that were the case, even without being part of a mixture, the offering would be permitted. A new explanation is therefore introduced, deriving Rabbi Eliezer's permission to sacrifice parts of blemished animals intermingled with regular ones from a drasha on Vayikra 22:25. The Mishna also records a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blemished animals that become intermingled with other animals. Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one is sacrificed inadvertently, the remaining animals are permitted, since we can assume the blemished one was already offered. Rabbi Elazar, however, restricts Rabbi Eliezer's leniency to cases where the other animal parts are sacrificed in pairs. The Mishna discusses the issue of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances, under what circumstances can it still be brought on the altar?

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 2:1-2L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovDec 1, 2025Mon11 Kislev 5786

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 1:6-7L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovNov 30, 2025Sun10 Kislev 5786

The Gemara concludes its explanation of how, according to Rabbi Shimon, a safek leper may bring the oil for his purification process as either a possible leper's offering or a possible voluntary oil offering, by resolving the multiple complications inherent in this situation. Rav Rachuma said to Ravina that Rav Huna bar Tachlifa asked why Rabbi Shimon suggested that the safek leper bring an animal as either a guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, when he could have instead proposed bringing it as either a guilt offering or a hanging guilt offering, thus avoiding the issue of disqualifying kodashim. Rav Rachuma explains that one can infer from this that Rabbi Shimon must disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, holding that one cannot voluntarily bring a hanging guilt offering. However, Ravina rejects this reasoning, noting that the guilt offering of a leper comes from a one-year-old sheep, whereas a hanging guilt offering requires a two-year-old sheep, also known as a ram. In the Mishna, there is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a mixture of limbs from sin offerings and burnt offerings: can they be brought on the altar? The Gemara explores the basis of their disagreement, rooted in different interpretations of Vayikra 2:11–12, and then cites a braita quoting Rabbi Yehuda, who preserved a different version of the dispute. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the disagreement applies only to mixtures of limbs from blemished and non-blemished animals. Both sides, however, agree that mixtures of sin and burnt offerings may certainly be brought on the altar, while those from animals that engaged in bestiality may not. Why did Rabbi Eliezer distinguish between blemished animals and those involved in bestiality? Rav Huna explains that the blemish in question is a mild one, following Rabbi Akiva's more lenient position. Yet since Rabbi Akiva permitted such blemishes only post facto, Rav Papa qualifies that the case must involve limbs already placed on the ramp. This explanation is rejected, however, because if that were the case, even without being part of a mixture, the offering would be permitted. A new explanation is therefore introduced, deriving Rabbi Eliezer's permission to sacrifice parts of blemished animals intermingled with regular ones from a drasha on Vayikra 22:25. The Mishna also records a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blemished animals that become intermingled with other animals. Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one is sacrificed inadvertently, the remaining animals are permitted, since we can assume the blemished one was already offered. Rabbi Elazar, however, restricts Rabbi Eliezer's leniency to cases where the other animal parts are sacrificed in pairs. The Mishna discusses the issue of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances, under what circumstances can it still be brought on the altar?

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 1:4-5L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovNov 29, 2025Shab9 Kislev 5786

If sacrifices of the same type become intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are offered for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in cases where smicha is required, how can the sacrifice be brought, since one cannot perform smicha on another's offering? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha. Men's sacrifices, by contrast, would not be offered; instead, they would be left to graze until they developed a blemish and then sold, with new animals purchased for the altar. Abaye raises a difficulty from a braita that discusses public and individual sacrifices that became mixed both before and after slaughter and were nevertheless offered. Since public sacrifices are brought by men, the braita must also be referring to individual sacrifices brought by men. Rava resolves this by reinterpreting the braita, noting a difficulty in its plain reading. He explains that it refers only to a case where the blood of the animals was mixed after slaughter, and not to intermingling of live animals. In the braita cited by Abaye, Rebbi rules that if the blood of two animals was mixed in one cup, the kohen may combine the sprinkling for both sacrifices, but only if there is enough blood for each. A difficulty is raised against Rebbi from another braita in which he quotes Rabbi Eliezer regarding the red heifer purification waters, where no minimum amount is required for sprinkling. The same should apply to blood. Two answers are offered: either the purification waters differ from blood, or Rebbi was not stating his own view but merely quoting Rabbi Eliezer. Rami bar Hama poses two questions concerning a firstborn animal that became blemished. Rabbi Yosi bar Zevida attempts to answer from the Mishna about firstborns intermingled with other sacrifices, but his answer is rejected. The Mishna states that only sin and guilt offerings cannot be intermingled, since their differences are identifiable. The Gemara considers whether other offerings might also fall into this category, but all such suggestions are rejected. If a guilt offering becomes mixed with a peace offering, they are offered according to the stricter requirements of the two. This could potentially cause sanctified items to be disqualified. Rabbi Shimon does not have an issue with this, but the rabbis disagree and do not allow it. Rava limits Rabbi Shimon's ruling to a post facto situation and does not permit it ab initio.

Mishna Yomi - Bechoros 1:2-3L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovNov 28, 2025Fri8 Kislev 5786

If sacrifices of the same type become intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are offered for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in cases where smicha is required, how can the sacrifice be brought, since one cannot perform smicha on another's offering? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha. Men's sacrifices, by contrast, would not be offered; instead, they would be left to graze until they developed a blemish and then sold, with new animals purchased for the altar. Abaye raises a difficulty from a braita that discusses public and individual sacrifices that became mixed both before and after slaughter and were nevertheless offered. Since public sacrifices are brought by men, the braita must also be referring to individual sacrifices brought by men. Rava resolves this by reinterpreting the braita, noting a difficulty in its plain reading. He explains that it refers only to a case where the blood of the animals was mixed after slaughter, and not to intermingling of live animals. In the braita cited by Abaye, Rebbi rules that if the blood of two animals was mixed in one cup, the kohen may combine the sprinkling for both sacrifices, but only if there is enough blood for each. A difficulty is raised against Rebbi from another braita in which he quotes Rabbi Eliezer regarding the red heifer purification waters, where no minimum amount is required for sprinkling. The same should apply to blood. Two answers are offered: either the purification waters differ from blood, or Rebbi was not stating his own view but merely quoting Rabbi Eliezer. Rami bar Hama poses two questions concerning a firstborn animal that became blemished. Rabbi Yosi bar Zevida attempts to answer from the Mishna about firstborns intermingled with other sacrifices, but his answer is rejected. The Mishna states that only sin and guilt offerings cannot be intermingled, since their differences are identifiable. The Gemara considers whether other offerings might also fall into this category, but all such suggestions are rejected. If a guilt offering becomes mixed with a peace offering, they are offered according to the stricter requirements of the two. This could potentially cause sanctified items to be disqualified. Rabbi Shimon does not have an issue with this, but the rabbis disagree and do not allow it. Rava limits Rabbi Shimon's ruling to a post facto situation and does not permit it ab initio.

In a set of intermingled parts of sacrifices, including from a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one was sacrificed, we can "assume" that the one sacrificed was the blemished one and all the others are permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer follows a unique opinion, that of Chanan the Egyptian, who holds that animals, even after slaughter, are not considered "rejected," and if they are brought on the altar, they can be accepted. Similarly, Rav Nachman cites a ruling of Rav that if one ring of idol worship was mixed in with many other rings, and one fell into the sea, all the rest are permitted. After Rava raised a difficulty on this from the Mishna—that all the animals are left to die, so why wouldn't we permit them after the first one dies—the Gemara concludes that Rav holds like Rabbi Eliezer. It is then established that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rav would permit the others only if they are sacrificed or sold in pairs, since one of the pair will certainly be a permitted item. Rav also ruled in a case where there were one hundred rings with one being of idol worship. If they were separated into sixty and forty, and then one from each section was mixed into separate sets of rings, the one that came from the forty is permitted based on a safek sefeika—two doubts: likely it was in the sixty, and even if it was in the forty, likely it remained in the original forty. Shmuel disagreed and did not permit safek sefeika in idol worship. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position from a braita that permits it, but it is established that there is a tannaitic debate. Reish Lakish brings a similar ruling to Rav Nachman regarding a barrel of wine of truma. The Gemara explains why both his case and Rav Nachman's case needed to be ruled on separately, as one would not necessarily be able to infer one from the other. Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about the extent to which Reish Lakish's leniency applies. Rabbi Elazar rules leniently in a case of a barrel of truma, but his ruling is modified after Rav Nachman raised a difficulty against it. Rabbi Oshaya rules about a similar case, adding another potential issue. The Mishna discusses a situation in which a treifa is mixed in with other animals. As a treifa should be recognizable, the Gemara asks how such a situation could occur. Three possible answers are given. If sacrifices of the same type are intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are sacrificed for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in sacrifices where smicha is necessary, how can the sacrifice be brought—since one cannot perform smicha on someone else's sacrifice? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha.

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In a set of intermingled parts of sacrifices, including from a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one was sacrificed, we can "assume" that the one sacrificed was the blemished one and all the others are permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer follows a unique opinion, that of Chanan the Egyptian, who holds that animals, even after slaughter, are not considered "rejected," and if they are brought on the altar, they can be accepted. Similarly, Rav Nachman cites a ruling of Rav that if one ring of idol worship was mixed in with many other rings, and one fell into the sea, all the rest are permitted. After Rava raised a difficulty on this from the Mishna—that all the animals are left to die, so why wouldn't we permit them after the first one dies—the Gemara concludes that Rav holds like Rabbi Eliezer. It is then established that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rav would permit the others only if they are sacrificed or sold in pairs, since one of the pair will certainly be a permitted item. Rav also ruled in a case where there were one hundred rings with one being of idol worship. If they were separated into sixty and forty, and then one from each section was mixed into separate sets of rings, the one that came from the forty is permitted based on a safek sefeika—two doubts: likely it was in the sixty, and even if it was in the forty, likely it remained in the original forty. Shmuel disagreed and did not permit safek sefeika in idol worship. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position from a braita that permits it, but it is established that there is a tannaitic debate. Reish Lakish brings a similar ruling to Rav Nachman regarding a barrel of wine of truma. The Gemara explains why both his case and Rav Nachman's case needed to be ruled on separately, as one would not necessarily be able to infer one from the other. Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about the extent to which Reish Lakish's leniency applies. Rabbi Elazar rules leniently in a case of a barrel of truma, but his ruling is modified after Rav Nachman raised a difficulty against it. Rabbi Oshaya rules about a similar case, adding another potential issue. The Mishna discusses a situation in which a treifa is mixed in with other animals. As a treifa should be recognizable, the Gemara asks how such a situation could occur. Three possible answers are given. If sacrifices of the same type are intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are sacrificed for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in sacrifices where smicha is necessary, how can the sacrifice be brought—since one cannot perform smicha on someone else's sacrifice? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha.

Two additional answers are offered to explain why, in the Mishna, the animal is not nullified among the others if one follows Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that only items sold exclusively by unit are not nullified in a mixture. The first answer is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yehoshua according to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of a litra of dried figs, teaching that items sometimes sold individually are not nullified. The second answer is that live animals are considered significant and therefore cannot be nullified. The Gemara continues to ask why animals designated for sacrifices, when intermingled with an animal forbidden for benefit, are all left to die. It suggests resolving the issue through the laws of probability: one could remove an animal at a time and assume each emerged from the majority of permitted animals. The difficulty is that, according to halakhic rules of probability, this only applies once an animal has already been separated, allowing us to presume it came from the majority. But if the animals remain fixed and one is taken directly from the group, the law treats it as either permitted or forbidden (50/50), with no majority to rely upon. The Gemara further proposes creating a situation where the animals scatter from their fixed location, so they are no longer considered fixed, and each could then be assumed to come from the majority. Rava offers three explanations why this solution fails, the first two of which are rejected. The final answer is that, although theoretically possible, it was prohibited by decree, lest people apply the same reasoning in cases where the animals remain fixed. Rava concludes that since the animal is not nullified by rabbinic decree, if any of the animals in the mixture are sacrificed on the altar, they do not achieve atonement, and a new sacrifice must be brought. Rav Huna raises a difficulty with this explanation based on two Mishnayot in Kinnim 1:2 and 3:1. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Rava holds live animals and birds can be rejected from the altar, whereas the Mishna rules that they cannot.  

Two additional answers are offered to explain why, in the Mishna, the animal is not nullified among the others if one follows Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that only items sold exclusively by unit are not nullified in a mixture. The first answer is that the Mishna follows Rabbi Yehoshua according to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of a litra of dried figs, teaching that items sometimes sold individually are not nullified. The second answer is that live animals are considered significant and therefore cannot be nullified. The Gemara continues to ask why animals designated for sacrifices, when intermingled with an animal forbidden for benefit, are all left to die. It suggests resolving the issue through the laws of probability: one could remove an animal at a time and assume each emerged from the majority of permitted animals. The difficulty is that, according to halakhic rules of probability, this only applies once an animal has already been separated, allowing us to presume it came from the majority. But if the animals remain fixed and one is taken directly from the group, the law treats it as either permitted or forbidden (50/50), with no majority to rely upon. The Gemara further proposes creating a situation where the animals scatter from their fixed location, so they are no longer considered fixed, and each could then be assumed to come from the majority. Rava offers three explanations why this solution fails, the first two of which are rejected. The final answer is that, although theoretically possible, it was prohibited by decree, lest people apply the same reasoning in cases where the animals remain fixed. Rava concludes that since the animal is not nullified by rabbinic decree, if any of the animals in the mixture are sacrificed on the altar, they do not achieve atonement, and a new sacrifice must be brought. Rav Huna raises a difficulty with this explanation based on two Mishnayot in Kinnim 1:2 and 3:1. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Rava holds live animals and birds can be rejected from the altar, whereas the Mishna rules that they cannot.  

Study Guide After comparing the Mishna in Zevachim with a parallel Mishna in Temurah, the Gemara explains that the Mishna in Zevachim was included to emphasize that even an item prohibited outside the Temple — since it is forbidden for benefit altogether — will not be nullified and must be left to die. This, however, raises a difficulty, as such a principle could seemingly be derived from a Mishna in Avodah Zarah. The resolution is that the Mishna in Avodah Zarah does not deal with items designated for the altar. Therefore, if only that Mishna existed, one might assume that for sacrificial purposes, the laws of nullification would apply, so as not to destroy offerings. Conversely, if only the Mishna in Zevachim were taught, one might think the stringency applies specifically because these items are inherently despicable and unfit for the altar, whereas in non-Temple contexts, nullification might still be valid. According to Torah law, when permitted and forbidden items are intermingled, the forbidden items are nullified if the permitted ones form the majority. Yet there are exceptions to this rule. Why, then, is an animal not nullified in the majority here? The Gemara first suggests that animals fall into the category of items sold individually, which are not nullified according to Rabbi Meir. This explanation aligns with Reish Lakish's reading of Rabbi Meir's position in Mishna Orlah 3:6–7, which includes items usually sold individually but occasionally sold otherwise. However, it does not fit Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation of Rabbi Meir, which applies only to items sold exclusively as individuals — a category that does not include animals, since they are sometimes sold in flocks.  

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Study Guide After comparing the Mishna in Zevachim with a parallel Mishna in Temurah, the Gemara explains that the Mishna in Zevachim was included to emphasize that even an item prohibited outside the Temple — since it is forbidden for benefit altogether — will not be nullified and must be left to die. This, however, raises a difficulty, as such a principle could seemingly be derived from a Mishna in Avodah Zarah. The resolution is that the Mishna in Avodah Zarah does not deal with items designated for the altar. Therefore, if only that Mishna existed, one might assume that for sacrificial purposes, the laws of nullification would apply, so as not to destroy offerings. Conversely, if only the Mishna in Zevachim were taught, one might think the stringency applies specifically because these items are inherently despicable and unfit for the altar, whereas in non-Temple contexts, nullification might still be valid. According to Torah law, when permitted and forbidden items are intermingled, the forbidden items are nullified if the permitted ones form the majority. Yet there are exceptions to this rule. Why, then, is an animal not nullified in the majority here? The Gemara first suggests that animals fall into the category of items sold individually, which are not nullified according to Rabbi Meir. This explanation aligns with Reish Lakish's reading of Rabbi Meir's position in Mishna Orlah 3:6–7, which includes items usually sold individually but occasionally sold otherwise. However, it does not fit Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation of Rabbi Meir, which applies only to items sold exclusively as individuals — a category that does not include animals, since they are sometimes sold in flocks.  

This chapter addresses cases where different items become mixed together - sacrificial animals with other sacrificial animals, sacrificial animals with non-sacrificial ones, or valid offerings with disqualified ones. Each type of mixture is governed by distinct rules. If sacrificial animals are mixed with animals that are forbidden for benefit, such as an ox sentenced to death for goring, or a sin offering left to die because its owner passed away, for example,  then all the animals in the mixture must be left to die. In these cases, the usual laws of nullification do not apply. If a sacrifice becomes mixed with animals that are prohibited for the altar but permitted for benefit, the animals are left to graze, then sold. The proceeds from the most valuable animal are used to purchase a replacement sacrifice. If a sacrifice is mixed with animals that were never designated as offerings, all the animals are sold for sacrifices of that type and offered on the altar with the intent of "whoever their owner is." If sacrifices of the same type are mixed, they are all offered on the altar with the same designation. However, if different types of sacrifices are mixed, for example, burnt offerings with peace offerings, the animals are left to graze until they develop blemishes. At that point, new animals of each type are purchased, equal in value to the most expensive animal in the group, at the expense of the owners. In cases where an animal is mixed with others designated for sacrifice that cannot be sold, such as firstborns or animal tithes, they are left to graze until blemished. The owner then redeems the sanctity of one animal (for the sacrifice) in the amount of the most expensive animal and uses that money to buy a new sacrifice. Once blemished, the original animals may be slaughtered and eaten like ordinary firstborns or tithes. The Mishna also notes a case where the laws of mixtures do not apply: sin offerings and guilt offerings cannot be brought from the same animals. Thus, if animals designated for sin offerings are mixed with those for guilt offerings, this is not considered a mixture, as it is clear which animal goes with which offering. The Gemara questions the Mishna's phrasing of "even one in ten thousand," clarifying that the case refers to a single ox that gored, becoming mixed with many sacrificial animals. The Gemara compares this Mishna with a parallel Mishna in Temurah and then another in Avodah Zarah, questioning why each is needed. It concludes that every text contributes a distinct detail that cannot be fully derived from the others.

This chapter addresses cases where different items become mixed together - sacrificial animals with other sacrificial animals, sacrificial animals with non-sacrificial ones, or valid offerings with disqualified ones. Each type of mixture is governed by distinct rules. If sacrificial animals are mixed with animals that are forbidden for benefit, such as an ox sentenced to death for goring, or a sin offering left to die because its owner passed away, for example,  then all the animals in the mixture must be left to die. In these cases, the usual laws of nullification do not apply. If a sacrifice becomes mixed with animals that are prohibited for the altar but permitted for benefit, the animals are left to graze, then sold. The proceeds from the most valuable animal are used to purchase a replacement sacrifice. If a sacrifice is mixed with animals that were never designated as offerings, all the animals are sold for sacrifices of that type and offered on the altar with the intent of "whoever their owner is." If sacrifices of the same type are mixed, they are all offered on the altar with the same designation. However, if different types of sacrifices are mixed, for example, burnt offerings with peace offerings, the animals are left to graze until they develop blemishes. At that point, new animals of each type are purchased, equal in value to the most expensive animal in the group, at the expense of the owners. In cases where an animal is mixed with others designated for sacrifice that cannot be sold, such as firstborns or animal tithes, they are left to graze until blemished. The owner then redeems the sanctity of one animal (for the sacrifice) in the amount of the most expensive animal and uses that money to buy a new sacrifice. Once blemished, the original animals may be slaughtered and eaten like ordinary firstborns or tithes. The Mishna also notes a case where the laws of mixtures do not apply: sin offerings and guilt offerings cannot be brought from the same animals. Thus, if animals designated for sin offerings are mixed with those for guilt offerings, this is not considered a mixture, as it is clear which animal goes with which offering. The Gemara questions the Mishna's phrasing of "even one in ten thousand," clarifying that the case refers to a single ox that gored, becoming mixed with many sacrificial animals. The Gemara compares this Mishna with a parallel Mishna in Temurah and then another in Avodah Zarah, questioning why each is needed. It concludes that every text contributes a distinct detail that cannot be fully derived from the others.

The Gemara continues its discussion on whether melika performed by a non-kohen renders the bird a neveila, thereby imparting ritual impurity. Chizkiyah presents a ruling: if a non-kohen performs melika and the bird is subsequently placed on the altar, it is not removed. However, in a parallel case involving kmitza performed by a non-kohen, the offering would be removed. This raises the question - why is there a distinction between the two cases? A braita is cited to provide the Torah source for the Mishna's rulings regarding melika performed with the left hand, at night, and in other disqualifying circumstances. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether melika performed on a treifa bird (one with a fatal defect) prevents it from being considered a neveila. The Gemara examines the sources for their respective opinions. A verse concerning the prohibition of consuming the forbidden fats (cheilev) of a neveila or treifa is analyzed, challenging Rabbi Yehuda's proof text.

Mishna Yomi - Chulin 9:7-8L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovNov 21, 2025Fri1 Kislev 5786

The Gemara continues its discussion on whether melika performed by a non-kohen renders the bird a neveila, thereby imparting ritual impurity. Chizkiyah presents a ruling: if a non-kohen performs melika and the bird is subsequently placed on the altar, it is not removed. However, in a parallel case involving kmitza performed by a non-kohen, the offering would be removed. This raises the question - why is there a distinction between the two cases? A braita is cited to provide the Torah source for the Mishna's rulings regarding melika performed with the left hand, at night, and in other disqualifying circumstances. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether melika performed on a treifa bird (one with a fatal defect) prevents it from being considered a neveila. The Gemara examines the sources for their respective opinions. A verse concerning the prohibition of consuming the forbidden fats (cheilev) of a neveila or treifa is analyzed, challenging Rabbi Yehuda's proof text.

Study Guide The Mishna, as in Chapter 2 (Zevachim 29b), outlines various scenarios in which a thought can, or cannot, render a sacrifice pigul, thereby making consumption of the meat punishable/not punishable by karet. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with one of the rulings and maintains that if melika (the ritual slaughter of a bird) was performed with the intent to offer the blood beyond its designated time, and the blood was then squeezed with the intent to burn the flesh outside the Azara (Temple courtyard), the offering would be considered pigul. This is because, although the sacrifice was already disqualified for other reasons, the disqualification due to improper intent regarding time occurred first. A braita examines the verses concerning the bird burnt offering and derives several halakhot specific to this sacrifice: One who volunteers to bring this type of offering may bring only one bird. Melika must be performed by a kohen. Melika is not performed with a knife. Melika is performed at the top of the altar. Melika is done on the back of the bird's neck. The bird's head must be severed. All the blood must be squeezed out - none may remain. The blood is squeezed onto the upper part of the altar wall. There is a debate whether melika and the squeezing of the blood are performed on the sovev (the ledge surrounding the altar) or at its top. Another braita presents differing opinions regarding which parts of the bird are cast onto the beit hadeshen (the ash heap) and how those parts are removed. The bird is split in half - this is done by hand, as derived from a verse in Judges concerning Shimshon. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the tanna of our Mishna regarding a bird sin offering in which the kohen severs the head: is the offering thereby disqualified or not? Three interpretations are offered to explain the basis of their disagreement.  

Three actions were performed at the bottom of the altar on the southwest side, as derived from verses in the Torah. The bird burnt offering was usually brought on the southeast side so that the kohen could be close to the beit hadeshen, where parts of the bird were discarded. Three actions were performed at the top of the altar on the southwest side, and the kohen performing the action would go directly there instead of walking around the altar entirely. The reason was to avoid damaging the items from the smoke rising at the top of the altar. The Mishna describes in detail how the bird sin offering was performed. A braita provides a source explaining why the blood of this offering was placed on the lower part of the altar and not the upper part, as is done with the animal sin offering and the bird burnt offering. Two different versions of how to perform melika are presented—one in the name of Rav and one from a braita. It was known to be one of the more difficult actions the kohen had to perform. Performing the kmitza on the meal offering and the chafina with the incense on Yom Kippur were also known to be challenging. The Mishna describes in detail how the bird burnt offering was performed. Some elements were similar to the sin offering, yet many differed. For example, the head was not severed in the sin offering, but was in the burnt offering. The entire bird was eaten by the kohanim in the sin offering, whereas the burnt offering was completely burned, aside from the parts tossed into the beit hadeshen (crop, feathers, and innards). Other differences include the laws regarding sacrificing with intent for the wrong type of offering. The sin offering is disqualified, as with animal offerings, while the burnt offering is not. Regular laws of pigul apply to both.