Podcasts about mishna

Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree.   Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body.  Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A  braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?

Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 9:7-8L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovOct 3, 2025Fri11 Tishrei 5786

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 9:5-6L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovOct 2, 2025Thu10 Tishrei 5786

A verse from Vayikra 21:6 is cited to demonstrate that if a tvul yom - someone who has immersed in a mikveh but must wait until sunset to complete their purification - performs one of the essential sacrificial rites, the sacrifice is invalidated. The discussion explores how this verse specifically refers to a tvul yom and not another form of impurity. The Mishna lists three distinct categories: an impure person, a tvul yom, and a mechusar kaparah - someone who has completed immersion and sunset but still needs to bring a sacrificial offering (e.g., a zav on the eighth day of his purification). The necessity of listing all three is examined, highlighting the unique halachic implications of each status. Sources are brought to prove that if a kohen performs sacrificial rites without wearing all the required priestly garments, the sacrifice is disqualified.

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 9:3-4L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovOct 1, 2025Wed9 Tishrei 5786

A verse from Vayikra 21:6 is cited to demonstrate that if a tvul yom - someone who has immersed in a mikveh but must wait until sunset to complete their purification - performs one of the essential sacrificial rites, the sacrifice is invalidated. The discussion explores how this verse specifically refers to a tvul yom and not another form of impurity. The Mishna lists three distinct categories: an impure person, a tvul yom, and a mechusar kaparah - someone who has completed immersion and sunset but still needs to bring a sacrificial offering (e.g., a zav on the eighth day of his purification). The necessity of listing all three is examined, highlighting the unique halachic implications of each status. Sources are brought to prove that if a kohen performs sacrificial rites without wearing all the required priestly garments, the sacrifice is disqualified.

The Mishna in Yomah 85b tells us how fortunate we are: Before Whom do we purify ourselves and Who purifies us? Our Father in Heaven. This episode discusses the uniqueness of Teshuva during the days leading up to Yom HaKippurim.

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 9:1-2L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 30, 2025Tue8 Tishrei 5786

Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.

1 section- final clarification in machloket Tannaim (RY and RS) and debate in Amoraim (RAbY and Rava) who is the author of the Mishna (and related debate in understanding the position of RY)

1 section- conversation between Reish Lakish and R' Eliezer regarding the halachic dichotomy of our Mishna that the wrong intention allows for the korban's continuum, but renders the owners responsibility unfulfilled

1 section- final clarification in machloket Tannaim (RY and RS) and debate in Amoraim (RAbY and Rava) who is the author of the Mishna

1 section- conversation between Reish Lakish and R' Eliezer regarding the halachic dichotomy of our Mishna that the wrong intention allows for the korban's continuum, but renders the owners responsibility unfulfilled

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 8:6-7L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 29, 2025Mon7 Tishrei 5786

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 8:4-5L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 28, 2025Sun6 Tishrei 5786

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 8:2-3L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 27, 2025Shab5 Tishrei 5786

Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.

The Mishna teaches that improper intent (lo lishma) during a sin offering or a Pesach offering disqualifies the sacrifice if the intent occurs during one of the key rituals: collecting the blood, walking it to the altar, or applying it to the altar. Rabbi Shimon disagrees regarding the act of carrying the blood, arguing that it is non-essential since the slaughtering can be performed adjacent to the altar, rendering the walking unnecessary. The Gemara challenges the notion that intent during the collection of the blood can disqualify the offering, citing a braita that appears to contradict this. The resolution distinguishes between two types of improper intent: pigul (intent to consume the offering at an invalid time) and lo lishma (intent for the wrong type of offering). The braita addresses pigul, while the Mishna discusses lo lishma. However, this distinction is also questioned based on another braita concerning pigul. The issue is ultimately resolved by differentiating between the action to which the thought pertains and the action during which the thought occurs. A further question is raised regarding the sin offering, whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary and applied to the altar: does pigul apply during the kohen’s act of dipping his finger into the blood in preparation for placing it?

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 7:6-8:1L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 26, 2025Fri4 Tishrei 5786

The Mishna teaches that improper intent (lo lishma) during a sin offering or a Pesach offering disqualifies the sacrifice if the intent occurs during one of the key rituals: collecting the blood, walking it to the altar, or applying it to the altar. Rabbi Shimon disagrees regarding the act of carrying the blood, arguing that it is non-essential since the slaughtering can be performed adjacent to the altar, rendering the walking unnecessary. The Gemara challenges the notion that intent during the collection of the blood can disqualify the offering, citing a braita that appears to contradict this. The resolution distinguishes between two types of improper intent: pigul (intent to consume the offering at an invalid time) and lo lishma (intent for the wrong type of offering). The braita addresses pigul, while the Mishna discusses lo lishma. However, this distinction is also questioned based on another braita concerning pigul. The issue is ultimately resolved by differentiating between the action to which the thought pertains and the action during which the thought occurs. A further question is raised regarding the sin offering, whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary and applied to the altar: does pigul apply during the kohen’s act of dipping his finger into the blood in preparation for placing it?

Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 7:4-5L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 25, 2025Thu3 Tishrei 5786

Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 7:2-3L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 24, 2025Wed2 Tishrei 5786

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 6:7-7:1L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 23, 2025Tue1 Tishrei 5786

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering. A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them. Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s view, while Rabbi Ilai supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia’s proof is based on a kal va’chomer, which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ilai’s proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved. In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma—with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 6:5-6L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 22, 2025Mon29 Elul 5785

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate whether a Pesach offering or a sin offering becomes disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood for the sake of a different sacrifice. Their disagreement centers on whether the laws of lishma (proper intent) can be derived from the laws of pigul (disqualifying intent regarding timing), which would imply that a thought during one sacrificial action about a different action could invalidate the offering. A parallel debate arises regarding idol worship: if one slaughters an animal with the intent to offer its blood to an idol later, does that render the animal prohibited for benefit? The question is raised why both cases need to be stated—why not derive one from the other? This leads to a deeper exploration of the distinctions between them. Rav Dimi reports that Rav Yirmia brought a proof supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s view, while Rabbi Ilai supported Reish Lakish. Rav Yirmia’s proof is based on a kal va’chomer, which undergoes two revisions after difficulties are raised. Rav Papa challenges Rabbi Ilai’s proof, but the challenge is ultimately resolved. In the Mishna, Rabbi Eliezer adds the case of a guilt offering that is disqualified if brought not lishma—with intent for a different sacrifice. A braita presents a dialogue in which Rabbi Yehoshua repeatedly rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s proposed reasons. After three attempts, Rabbi Eliezer finally offers an explanation that holds. The Gemara then revisits various lines in the braita for further analysis.

In trying to answer whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments neglected after the animal was designated (between designation and slaughter) or only for those neglected before designation, the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon. He explains that the reason two goats are offered on Shavuot is that the second goat atones for impurities in the Temple that occurred after the first goat was offered. If both goats were designated at the same time, this would support the view that an offering can atone for sins committed after designation. A difficulty is raised with that proof because it assumes simultaneous designation; perhaps the second goat needs to be designated only after the first was offered. That possibility is hard to accept because the verse does not indicate a later designation. Rav Papa also rejects the proof, suggesting instead that the court could stipulate from the outset that the second goat will only become sanctified after the blood of the first goat is offered. Two objections are raised to Rav Papa’s reply. First, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the court's stipulations—he therefore would not recognize a court’s postponement of consecration, as shown by his ruling that animals reserved for one year cannot serve as the Tamid in the following year. Second, Rabbi Yirmeya’s question about whether the second goat can cover impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the first goat’s blood and the second’s implies it was understood that the goat covers from the time of designation. That second difficulty is, however, resolved, and the original question remains unanswered. There is a dispute between Raba and Rav Chisda about a toda (thanksgiving offering) brought on behalf of another who needs to bring a toda. Each presents his reasoning; Raba cites a baraita in support, but his proof is rejected. Rava gives six rulings about issues of incorrect intention during the sacrificial rites and adds a seventh about the nature of the olah (burnt offering). He teaches that the olah does not itself provide atonement; rather, it is a gift to God offered after a person has repented for not fulfilling a positive commandment. If the person has not yet repented, the offering provides no atonement, for the sacrifices of the wicked are despicable. The Mishna states that both a sin offering and a Pesach sacrifice brought for the sake of the wrong sacrifice or for the wrong person are disqualified. The Gemara first adduces the source for this rule for Pesach and then for the sin offering.  

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 6:1-2L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 20, 2025Shab27 Elul 5785

Mishna Yomi - Menachos 6:3-4L'uli Nishmas Etta Ahuva bas YaakovSep 21, 2025Sun28 Elul 5785

In trying to answer whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments neglected after the animal was designated (between designation and slaughter) or only for those neglected before designation, the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon. He explains that the reason two goats are offered on Shavuot is that the second goat atones for impurities in the Temple that occurred after the first goat was offered. If both goats were designated at the same time, this would support the view that an offering can atone for sins committed after designation. A difficulty is raised with that proof because it assumes simultaneous designation; perhaps the second goat needs to be designated only after the first was offered. That possibility is hard to accept because the verse does not indicate a later designation. Rav Papa also rejects the proof, suggesting instead that the court could stipulate from the outset that the second goat will only become sanctified after the blood of the first goat is offered. Two objections are raised to Rav Papa’s reply. First, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the court's stipulations—he therefore would not recognize a court’s postponement of consecration, as shown by his ruling that animals reserved for one year cannot serve as the Tamid in the following year. Second, Rabbi Yirmeya’s question about whether the second goat can cover impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the first goat’s blood and the second’s implies it was understood that the goat covers from the time of designation. That second difficulty is, however, resolved, and the original question remains unanswered. There is a dispute between Raba and Rav Chisda about a toda (thanksgiving offering) brought on behalf of another who needs to bring a toda. Each presents his reasoning; Raba cites a baraita in support, but his proof is rejected. Rava gives six rulings about issues of incorrect intention during the sacrificial rites and adds a seventh about the nature of the olah (burnt offering). He teaches that the olah does not itself provide atonement; rather, it is a gift to God offered after a person has repented for not fulfilling a positive commandment. If the person has not yet repented, the offering provides no atonement, for the sacrifices of the wicked are despicable. The Mishna states that both a sin offering and a Pesach sacrifice brought for the sake of the wrong sacrifice or for the wrong person are disqualified. The Gemara first adduces the source for this rule for Pesach and then for the sin offering.  

Who was the first שְׁלִיחַ צִבּוּר in Jewish History?

Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering (lo lishma). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner's obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all? Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs. Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish’s view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer’s position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well. Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma. Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: “And he slaughtered it as a sin offering” (Vayikra 4:33). From the word “it,” we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma. The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner's obligation. Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v’chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone (“And he slaughtered it as a sin offering”). Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn’t Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn’t Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother’s burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?  

The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (1:6) famously instructs, "Aseh Lecha Rav U'kneh Lecha Haber" – literally, "Make for yourself a Rabbi, and 'purchase' for yourself a friend." This is commonly understood to mean that that as important as it is to have a Rabbi, it is even more important to have a friend, and one should therefore go so far as to "purchase" a friend if necessary. The Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1806), however, added a different interpretation, explaining "U'kneh Lecha Haber" to mean that the quill – "Kaneh" – should be one's "friend." One should make sure to learn from a knowledgeable Rabbi – and he should also grow accustomed to writing the Torah he learns as much as possible. There is immense value in writing the Torah that one studies, as this helps him retain the material and also preserves it. The question arises as to whether one who wishes to write words of Torah in the morning must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. Halacha requires reciting Birkot Ha'Torah before learning Torah in the morning, but (as we saw in a previous installment) a distinction exists between silently thinking about Torah and speaking words of Torah. Birkot Ha'Torah is required in the morning before verbally speaking words of Torah, but not – according to the consensus opinion – before silently thinking words of Torah. At first glance, we would assume that silently writing Torah material is no different from silently thinking about Torah, and thus this may be done before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. Interestingly, however, the Shulhan Aruch distinguishes between thinking about Torah in one's mind and writing Torah. When it comes to thinking about Torah, the Shulhan Aruch follows the view of the Agur (Rav Yaakob Landau, 1410-1493) that silent Torah thoughts do not require Birkot Ha'Torah. However, the Shulhan Aruch rules that writing Torah indeed requires the recitation of the Birkot Ha'Torah. This is based on the position of the Abudarham (Rav David Abudarham, Spain, 14 th century) which Rav Yosef Karo – author of the Shulhan Aruch – brings in his Bet Yosef. Importantly, however, Rav Yosef Karo wrote a collection of notes to the Bet Yosef called Bedek Ha'bayit, in which he corrects or amends certain passages in the Bet Yosef. And in the Bedek Ha'bayit, commenting on his citation of the Abudarham's ruling concerning one who writes Torah, Rav Yosef Karo remarks: "See the words of the Agur" – a clear reference to the aforementioned ruling of the Agur that Birkot Ha'Torah is not required before thinking about Torah. It thus appears that the Bet Yosef retracted his opinion, and concluded that one does not, in fact, need to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before writing Torah. The question then becomes, what was Rav Yosef Karo's final ruling? In the Bet Yosef, he seems to have concluded that writing Torah does not require Birkot Ha'Torah, but in the Shulhan Aruch, he wrote that it does. The Poskim dispute the question of whether the Rav Yosef Karo wrote the Shulhan Aruch before or after he wrote his emendations to the Bet Yosef. Therefore, it is unclear which ruling reflects his final position – his ruling in Bedek Ha'bayit, or his ruling in the Shulhan Aruch. If we follow the Shulhan Aruch's ruling, which distinguishes between thinking about Torah and writing Torah, what's the rationale behind this distinction? Why would thinking about Torah not require Birkot Ha'Torah, but writing Torah would? Later commentators offered several explanations. One approach is that the obligation of Torah study is inherently linked to the obligation to teach Torah. Therefore, Birkot Ha'Torah – the blessing over the Misva to learn Torah – is recited only upon a kind of learning which could also facilitate the teaching of Torah. As Torah can be taught through speech and through the written word, these two forms of Torah learning require Birkot Ha'Torah, whereas silently thinking about Torah, which of course is not a way in which Torah can be disseminated, does not. Others explain that one must learn Torah with the goal of remembering the material. Therefore, the Beracha is recited only when one speaks or writes Torah, as one is more likely to remember material which he verbalizes or writes than material which he simply thinks in his mind. The Lebush (Rav Mordechai Yoffe, 1530-1612) answers, very simply, that writing, as opposed to thinking, is an action, and a Beracha is recited only before a Misva act. Finally, the Hayeh Adam (Rav Abraham Danzig, Vilna, 1748-1820) explains that people often tend to say the words as they write, and therefore Halacha requires reciting Birkot Ha'Torah before writing, given the likelihood that he will end up speaking words of Torah. As for the final Halacha, the Mishna Berura cites several Poskim who rule that due to the uncertainty surrounding this question, one who wishes to write Torah must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah and then recite verses from the Torah before proceeding to write. This is the ruling of Hacham Ovadia Yosef, as well. Verbally reading verses before writing satisfies all opinions and thus avoids this Halachic uncertainty. (Rabbi Yisrael Bitan notes that in one work, Hacham Ovadia is cited as ruling that a person in this situation must recite Birkot Ha'Torah and should then "preferably" recite verses before writing – indicating that this is a preference, but not a requirement. However, Rabbi Bitan shows that this is an inaccurate representation of Hacham Ovadia's position, as in truth he maintained that one must first verbally read verses in order to satisfy all opinions.) This Halacha applies also to a Sofer who wishes to do some work – writing a Sefer Torah, Tefillin or Mezuza – in the morning. Some Poskim maintained that since a Sofer merely copies the Torah text, and is not actually learning Torah, Birkot Ha'Torah is not required before such work. However, due to the different opinions that exist, a Sofer should ensure to recite Birkot Ha'Torah and then verbally read verses before writing. This applies also to somebody who is typing Torah material from a handwritten text, without any intention to learn as he types. Although one could argue that this does not qualify as Torah learning, nevertheless, given the uncertainty, the typist should first recite Birkot Ha'Torah, verbally read some verses, and then proceed to the typing. Summary: One who wishes to write Torah insights, commentaries, etc. in the morning should first recite Birkot Ha'Torah and then verbally read some Torah text before writing, in order to satisfy all opinions. This applies also to a Sofer – he should recite Birkot Ha'Torah and then verbally read some verses before writing in the morning.

What is the source for the Mishna’s ruling that if one intends a different sacrifice than the one designated, the offering is no longer valid to fulfill the obligation of the original owner? The Gemara investigates the derivation of this principle across each of the four sacrificial rites: slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar. Why is it not sufficient to derive the law from just one of these rites? The Gemara then poses a similar question regarding a change in ownership—specifically, if the sacrifice was offered on behalf of someone other than its designated owner. Again, it seeks a source for each of the four rites. If these requirements are mandated by Torah law, why do they not render the sacrifice invalid?

Study Guide Zevachim 3 This week's learning is sponsored by Tina Lamm in loving memory of her father, Mr. Mike Senders, A"H, Yitzchak Meir ben HaRav Tzvi Aryeh v'Esther Bayla, on his shloshim. "Reaching the age of 101 was not only a personal milestone for my father, but also a testament to the fullness of his life. He used those years well - building Torah institutions, nurturing family and living in intimacy with Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Today’s daf is sponsored by Lisa Malik & Adi Wyner in loving memory of Lisa’s grandmother, Regina Post z”l. "Babi Gina was the one who insisted on her grandchildren going to the Yeshivah Flatbush and who was especially proud of her 2 granddaughters who were Hebrew valedictorians. She would also be so proud to know that one of her namesakes, Rivkah Gottlieb, made aliyah and that she now has 6 Israeli grandchildren and 3 Israeli great-grandchildren. May the memory of Rivkah bat Shmuel v’Chavah be for a blessing." From where do we know for certain that a get that is written without any specific intent for the woman is disqualified (the basis of a contradiction in Zevachim 2)? After four failed attempts, they eventually find a fifth case in the Mishna in Gittin that clearly proves this. Four contradictions are raised against statements brought in the name of Rav relating to cases in which sacrifices are/are not disqualified when offered for a similar but different intent or for a completely different intent. Comparisons are made to divorce documents, impurities in utensils (what things are considered a barrier that the impurity cannot pass through), and laws within the topic itself (various cases where wrong intentions disqualify/don't disqualify the sacrifices). Each contradiction is resolved. How do we know with certainty that a get (divorce document) written without specific intent for the woman is invalid? This question arises as part of a contradiction discussed in Zevachim 2. After four unsuccessful attempts to find the source, the Gemara ultimately finds a definitive proof in a Mishna in Gittin, which clearly establishes that a get must be written lishmah—with specific intent for the woman receiving it. The sugya presents four challenges to statements attributed to Rav regarding when sacrificial offerings are disqualified due to improper intent. These challenges explore cases where the intent is slightly off (e.g., for a different type of offering) or entirely unrelated. The contradictions are from: The laws of gittin (divorce documents) The laws of tumah in utensils (what constitutes a barrier to impurity) Internal comparisons within the sacrificial laws themselves Each contradiction is carefully analyzed and ultimately resolved, reinforcing the nuanced understanding of how intent affects the validity of offerings—and by extension, other halachic domains.

Many people have the custom each morning to read "Hok Le'Yisrael" – a collection of texts that includes passages from the Tanach, Mishna, Halachic works, Zohar, and other sources. "Hok Le'Yisrael" follows a regimented schedule, with different pieces of texts being recited each day. Often, the people who read "Hok Le'Yisrael" do not understand the material they read. The question arises whether a person may read "Hok Le'Yisrael" in the morning before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah. Halacha requires reciting Birkot Ha'Torah before learning Torah for the first time in the morning, but does this apply even if one reads Torah literature without understanding the text? Does this qualify as "learning" with respect to the obligation of Birkot Ha'Torah? Rav Schneur Zalman of Liadi (first Rebbe of Lubavitch, 1745-1812), in his Shulhan Aruch Ha'Rav, distinguishes in this regard between the Tanach and other texts. When one reads verses from the Torah, Nebi'im or Ketubim, this constitutes Torah learning regardless of whether or not he understands what he reads. When it comes to all other texts, however, reading them qualifies as Torah study only if one understands the material he reads. Similarly, the Mishna Berura cites the Magen Abraham (Rav Abraham Gombiner, Poland, 1635-1683) as stating that if one reads "Ezehu Mekoman" – the chapter of Mishna which is customarily read during the "Korbanot" section each morning – without understanding the text, this is not considered Torah study. This is true also of "Rabbi Yishmael Omer," the paragraph which is customarily read in the morning, listing the thirteen methods by which the Sages extracted Halachot from the Biblical text. If a person does not understand this passage, reading it does not qualify as Torah learning. This rule has ramifications with regard to Ereb Pesach, when it is customary for firstborns to participate in a Siyum celebration in order to be absolved from the "fast of the firstborn" (Ta'anit Bechorot) on this day. Hacham Ovadia Yosef writes that a Siyum is effective in absolving the firstborns of their obligation only if the person making the Siyum truly understood all the material in the Masechet (tractate of Talmud) which he completes. Simply reading the words does not suffice. The exception to this rule is the Zohar, the reading of which qualifies as Torah learning even if one does not understand what he reads – and even if he does not read the words correctly. This is the ruling of the Hida (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1806) and of Rav Haim Palachi (Turkey, 1788-1868). The words of the Zohar have such power and potency that reading them has the effect of absorbing the content into one's being even if he does not understand what he reads. It is told that the Arizal (Rav Yishak Luria, 1534-1572) once advised somebody to read five pages of Zohar each day as a Tikkun (rectification) for his soul. And many have the custom to read from the Zohar Hadash each day during the month of Elul, until Yom Kippur, because the reading itself brings great spiritual benefits, even if one does not understand the text. Therefore, one who reads Zohar in the morning must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. This exception is unique to the Zohar. Other Kabbalistic works – such as Sha'ar Ha'kavanot and the teachings of the Rashash (Rav Shalom Sharabi, 1720-1777) – elucidate and expound upon the teachings of the Zohar, and thus simply reading them without understanding what they say does not qualify as Torah learning. Returning the case of those who read "Hok Le'Yisrael," since this reading includes passages from the Tanach, one must recite Birkot Ha'Torah before reading this text in the morning, even if he does not understand anything he reads. This applies also to somebody who wishes to read Tehillim in the morning – he must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah, even though he does not understand the verses he recites, because Tehillim is part of the Tanach. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that although reading Tanach and Zohar without understanding the text qualifies as Torah study, we should always aspire to understand to the best of our ability. The sin of "Bittul Torah" (neglecting Torah) is normally defined as wasting time which could have been used for Torah, but it includes also wasting one's capabilities which could have been used to understand Torah. G-d gave us intellectual skills, the ability to comprehend, and we must utilize these powers to understand as much Torah as we can to the greatest extent possible. Today, when virtually every Torah text is available with translations and commentaries, there is really no excuse for reading any part of Torah literature without understanding the material. Summary: If one wishes to read verses from the Torah – such as Tehillim – in the morning, he must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah, even if he will not understand the text he will be reciting. This applies also to someone who wishes to read passages from the Zohar which he does not understand. Reading any other Torah text, however, does not qualify as Torah study unless one understands what he reads, and thus one who reads in the morning other Torah texts without understanding does not need to first recite Birkot Ha'Torah.