Podcasts about rav yosef

A cat or a weasel (chulda) renders a bird a treifa through clawing (derisa), whereas only a cat can do so for small cattle such as young goats and lambs. Other predatory birds besides those explicitly listed in the Mishna can also render other birds a treifa by clawing, but only when targeting birds smaller than themselves, while a hawk (netz) can do so even to birds of its own size. According to an alternate version, ordinary predatory birds can claw birds of their own size or smaller, whereas the hawk can even render birds larger than itself a treifa. Furthermore, two conflicting versions are presented regarding Rav Kahana's ruling in the name of Rav Shimi bar Ashi concerning foxes, debating whether or not they possess the capacity to render animals a treifa through clawing. Abaye limits the laws of derisa to the predator's front legs, specifying that it must be executed specifically with a claw and not with teeth, must be done with intent, and must occur while the prey is still alive. In a case where a lion was found among oxen and a dislodged claw was subsequently discovered on the back of one of the oxen, Rabba bar Rav Huna ruled in the name of Rav that there is no concern for derisa. He reasoned that while most lions do claw, their claws do not generally detach in the process; thus, it is more probable that the ox rubbed against a wall and accidentally picked up a nail embedded there. The Gemara initially rejects this argument, countering that while oxen frequently rub against walls, nails rarely stick to their backs in this manner, and since the lion remains a viable source, one should rule stringently. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that because the logic can support either side, the ox retains its presumptive status of permissibility; as a matter of pure doubt, Rav remains consistent with his opinion stated elsewhere that we rule leniently in cases of uncertain clawing. Abaye restricts this leniency, clarifying that it only applies when an actual claw is found embedded rather than a mere mark, when the claw is moist rather than dry, and when there are only one, two, or three claws scattered at random rather than two or three found in a distinct row. Rav and Shmuel disagree on whether to rule leniently or stringently in cases of doubt regarding derisa. While both agree to rule leniently in certain scenarios, they dispute a case where a lion entered among oxen and the lion remained silent while the oxen were found bellowing in distress. Ameimar ruled stringently in accordance with Shmuel, either because he rejected Rav's view or because he believed Rav ultimately retracted his opinion, a shift suggested by a practical incident that occurred. Although several difficulties are raised regarding the specific details of that incident, they are successfully resolved. Rav Ashi similarly ruled leniently in a case of doubt. If there is a doubt as to whether an animal was clawed, the Gemara rules that one may inspect the internal areas of the carcass to see if redness has formed from the venom; if no redness is present, the animal is permitted. This testing method was originally stated by the sons of Rabbi Chiya, though Rav Yosef pointed out that Shmuel himself had already articulated this principle. This discussion leads the Gemara to a series of inquiries - some regarding the laws of clawing and others concerning unrelated laws of treifot - all of which were concisely resolved by an authority who declared that each question had already been answered by a prior Rabbinic statement.

A cat or a weasel (chulda) renders a bird a treifa through clawing (derisa), whereas only a cat can do so for small cattle such as young goats and lambs. Other predatory birds besides those explicitly listed in the Mishna can also render other birds a treifa by clawing, but only when targeting birds smaller than themselves, while a hawk (netz) can do so even to birds of its own size. According to an alternate version, ordinary predatory birds can claw birds of their own size or smaller, whereas the hawk can even render birds larger than itself a treifa. Furthermore, two conflicting versions are presented regarding Rav Kahana's ruling in the name of Rav Shimi bar Ashi concerning foxes, debating whether or not they possess the capacity to render animals a treifa through clawing. Abaye limits the laws of derisa to the predator's front legs, specifying that it must be executed specifically with a claw and not with teeth, must be done with intent, and must occur while the prey is still alive. In a case where a lion was found among oxen and a dislodged claw was subsequently discovered on the back of one of the oxen, Rabba bar Rav Huna ruled in the name of Rav that there is no concern for derisa. He reasoned that while most lions do claw, their claws do not generally detach in the process; thus, it is more probable that the ox rubbed against a wall and accidentally picked up a nail embedded there. The Gemara initially rejects this argument, countering that while oxen frequently rub against walls, nails rarely stick to their backs in this manner, and since the lion remains a viable source, one should rule stringently. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that because the logic can support either side, the ox retains its presumptive status of permissibility; as a matter of pure doubt, Rav remains consistent with his opinion stated elsewhere that we rule leniently in cases of uncertain clawing. Abaye restricts this leniency, clarifying that it only applies when an actual claw is found embedded rather than a mere mark, when the claw is moist rather than dry, and when there are only one, two, or three claws scattered at random rather than two or three found in a distinct row. Rav and Shmuel disagree on whether to rule leniently or stringently in cases of doubt regarding derisa. While both agree to rule leniently in certain scenarios, they dispute a case where a lion entered among oxen and the lion remained silent while the oxen were found bellowing in distress. Ameimar ruled stringently in accordance with Shmuel, either because he rejected Rav's view or because he believed Rav ultimately retracted his opinion, a shift suggested by a practical incident that occurred. Although several difficulties are raised regarding the specific details of that incident, they are successfully resolved. Rav Ashi similarly ruled leniently in a case of doubt. If there is a doubt as to whether an animal was clawed, the Gemara rules that one may inspect the internal areas of the carcass to see if redness has formed from the venom; if no redness is present, the animal is permitted. This testing method was originally stated by the sons of Rabbi Chiya, though Rav Yosef pointed out that Shmuel himself had already articulated this principle. This discussion leads the Gemara to a series of inquiries - some regarding the laws of clawing and others concerning unrelated laws of treifot - all of which were concisely resolved by an authority who declared that each question had already been answered by a prior Rabbinic statement.

What is the minimal remnant required to remain of the liver to keep the animal kosher when it is damaged or partially missing? Although our Mishna implies that any minimal amount is sufficient, another Mishna explicitly requires an olive-bulk. Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction by explaining that each Mishna reflects a different Tannaitic position. The established halakha dictates that a size of an olive-bulk is required, and the Amoraim dispute whether this piece must remain specifically where the gallbladder is located, or where the liver attaches to its lifelines; Rav Papa rules that an olive-bulk is required in both locations. Regarding perforations of the lung, the Gemara explains that the lung is surrounded by two membranes, an outer membrane and an inner membrane. If only one membrane is punctured, the second membrane that remains intact protects it, and the lung remains kosher. To diagnose a lung that is suspected of leaking air, Rav Yosef suggests one test involving a feather and a second involving water. In the water test, the lung is placed inside a bowl of lukewarm water and inflated. If the water bubbles, this proves that it contains a disqualifying perforation; if no bubbling appears, the sound is attributed only to air trapped between the membranes, and the lung remains kosher. Rava establishes rules regarding various changes in the appearance and structure of the lung. External peelings, multiple changes in color, or spots of different shades generally do not disqualify the animal. Conversely, if a part of the lung is dry to the extent that it crumbles under a fingernail, the animal is disqualified as a treifa. The Gemara discusses the laws of lung adhesions (sirchot). An adhesion between two lobes that occurs out of their natural anatomical order constitutes an absolute defect that cannot be tested, while an adhesion occurring in their normal order is considered a natural growth and remains kosher.

What is the minimal remnant required to remain of the liver to keep the animal kosher when it is damaged or partially missing? Although our Mishna implies that any minimal amount is sufficient, another Mishna explicitly requires an olive-bulk. Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction by explaining that each Mishna reflects a different Tannaitic position. The established halakha dictates that a size of an olive-bulk is required, and the Amoraim dispute whether this piece must remain specifically where the gallbladder is located, or where the liver attaches to its lifelines; Rav Papa rules that an olive-bulk is required in both locations. Regarding perforations of the lung, the Gemara explains that the lung is surrounded by two membranes, an outer membrane and an inner membrane. If only one membrane is punctured, the second membrane that remains intact protects it, and the lung remains kosher. To diagnose a lung that is suspected of leaking air, Rav Yosef suggests one test involving a feather and a second involving water. In the water test, the lung is placed inside a bowl of lukewarm water and inflated. If the water bubbles, this proves that it contains a disqualifying perforation; if no bubbling appears, the sound is attributed only to air trapped between the membranes, and the lung remains kosher. Rava establishes rules regarding various changes in the appearance and structure of the lung. External peelings, multiple changes in color, or spots of different shades generally do not disqualify the animal. Conversely, if a part of the lung is dry to the extent that it crumbles under a fingernail, the animal is disqualified as a treifa. The Gemara discusses the laws of lung adhesions (sirchot). An adhesion between two lobes that occurs out of their natural anatomical order constitutes an absolute defect that cannot be tested, while an adhesion occurring in their normal order is considered a natural growth and remains kosher.

A braita states that if blood spurts onto a gourd during slaughter, Rebbi holds it is susceptible to impurity, while Rabbi Chiya holds we suspend judgment (tolin). Rabbi Oshaya says that since they argue, we should rely on Rabbi Shimon's view that shechita makes an animal susceptible, not blood. Two different explanations are brought by Rav Papa and Rav Ashi to explain Rabbi Chiya's position, the point on which he disagrees with Rebbi, and how Rabbi Shimon's view helps determine that the halakha follows Rabbi Chiya. Rav Papa explains that both Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya agree that blood makes items susceptible if it remains from the beginning to the end of the slaughter, and they only argue if the blood was wiped away between cutting the two simanim. Rebbi holds slaughter is continuous from beginning to end, so it is considered slaughter blood. Rabbi Chiya holds slaughter only occurs at the very end, so the earlier blood is just wound blood, and tolin means we wait to see if blood remains at the end of the slaughter. Rav Ashi argues that for Rabbi Chiya, it is a doubt whether or not slaughter is continuous, so tolin means we neither eat it nor burn it. Both explanations show that Rabbi Oshaya aligned Rabbi Chiya with Rabbi Shimon to make Rebbi a minority opinion of one against two; even though he did not agree with Rabbi Chiya in theory, in practice, they hold the same position. Reish Lakish asks whether the endearment of sacred items (chibat hakodesh) allows the dry crumbs of a meal offering to pass on impurity to other items, or if it only functions to disqualify the item itself. Rabbi Eleazar attempts to prove from a verse that water is always required for susceptibility to pass on impurity to other items, and therefore it is clear that chibat hakodesh would not be able to pass on impurity, but the Gemara rejects his suggestion as it is inconclusive. Rav Yosef challenges Rabbi Elazar's position from Rabbi Shimon's statement that shechita makes an animal susceptible to impurity even to pass on impurity, and Rabbi Zeira brings a similar challenge from a different case. Abaye resolves both challenges by explaining that in those particular cases, the rabbis rabbinically treated them like a regular susceptibility by water, but by Torah law they are not susceptible to impurity at all. The Gemara then proves that chibat hakodesh operates on a Torah level, and therefore Reish Lakish's question is still in place. What is the source in the Torah for chibat hakodesh being a Torah law? The first attempted answer is rejected, but they bring a second answer, which is accepted. Reish Lakish's question regarding whether it can pass on impurity remains unresolved (teiku).

A braita states that if blood spurts onto a gourd during slaughter, Rebbi holds it is susceptible to impurity, while Rabbi Chiya holds we suspend judgment (tolin). Rabbi Oshaya says that since they argue, we should rely on Rabbi Shimon's view that shechita makes an animal susceptible, not blood. Two different explanations are brought by Rav Papa and Rav Ashi to explain Rabbi Chiya's position, the point on which he disagrees with Rebbi, and how Rabbi Shimon's view helps determine that the halakha follows Rabbi Chiya. Rav Papa explains that both Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya agree that blood makes items susceptible if it remains from the beginning to the end of the slaughter, and they only argue if the blood was wiped away between cutting the two simanim. Rebbi holds slaughter is continuous from beginning to end, so it is considered slaughter blood. Rabbi Chiya holds slaughter only occurs at the very end, so the earlier blood is just wound blood, and tolin means we wait to see if blood remains at the end of the slaughter. Rav Ashi argues that for Rabbi Chiya, it is a doubt whether or not slaughter is continuous, so tolin means we neither eat it nor burn it. Both explanations show that Rabbi Oshaya aligned Rabbi Chiya with Rabbi Shimon to make Rebbi a minority opinion of one against two; even though he did not agree with Rabbi Chiya in theory, in practice, they hold the same position. Reish Lakish asks whether the endearment of sacred items (chibat hakodesh) allows the dry crumbs of a meal offering to pass on impurity to other items, or if it only functions to disqualify the item itself. Rabbi Eleazar attempts to prove from a verse that water is always required for susceptibility to pass on impurity to other items, and therefore it is clear that chibat hakodesh would not be able to pass on impurity, but the Gemara rejects his suggestion as it is inconclusive. Rav Yosef challenges Rabbi Elazar's position from Rabbi Shimon's statement that shechita makes an animal susceptible to impurity even to pass on impurity, and Rabbi Zeira brings a similar challenge from a different case. Abaye resolves both challenges by explaining that in those particular cases, the rabbis rabbinically treated them like a regular susceptibility by water, but by Torah law they are not susceptible to impurity at all. The Gemara then proves that chibat hakodesh operates on a Torah level, and therefore Reish Lakish's question is still in place. What is the source in the Torah for chibat hakodesh being a Torah law? The first attempted answer is rejected, but they bring a second answer, which is accepted. Reish Lakish's question regarding whether it can pass on impurity remains unresolved (teiku).

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

#477Rav Yosef Karo and Sefer HaMaggid: Episode 3. > Episode sponsored by Ari Elias-Bachrach with thanks to hakadosh baruch hu for answering our prayers and returning our brothers and sisters to us> Rabbi Moshe Kravetz is now publishing a new annotated edition of Sforno on Iyov, republishing Amar HaGaon, and planning  a new annotated edition of Sforno on Tehilim. If you wish to support his work, please contact him by email sforno.mk@gmail.com or donate through the link below [please specify: "for Sforno"]. Dedications are available. https://thedonorsfund.org/donate/american-friends-of-dvar-avraham-inc/113727415 > To purchase the new Ahavat Shalom edition of Sefer HaMaggid: https://judaicaplaza.com/products/8494326> To purchase Mor Altshuler's bio of Rav Yosef Karo: https://taupress.co.il/shop/all_published/%d7%97%d7%99%d7%99-%d7%9e%d7%a8%d7%9f-%d7%99%d7%95%d7%a1%d7%a3-%d7%a7%d7%90%d7%a8%d7%95/> To purchase the Shazar bio of Rav Yosef Karo: https://www.shazar.org.il/product/%D7%A8-%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%A3-%D7%A7%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%95/> To purchase "Lawyer and Mystic": https://amzn.to/4dw66Ts> To join the SeforimChatter WhatsApp community: https://chat.whatsapp.com/DZ3C2CjUeD9AGJvXeEODtK> To join the SeforimChatter WhatsApp status: https://wa.me/message/TI343XQHHMHPN1>  To support the podcast or to sponsor an episode follow this link: https://seforimchatter.com/support-seforimchatter/or email seforimchatter@gmail.com (Zelle/QP this email address)Support the show

Rav Yosef celebrates Shavuos with a third-born calf and declares: “If not for this day, how many Yosefs would there be in the marketplace?”At first glance, it sounds like Rav Yosef is simply thanking Hashem that Torah made him into someone more than an average man in the street. But beneath the surface, Chazal are revealing something much deeper.Without Torah, a person can be pulled apart by the many voices inside of him — desire, fear, ego, insecurity, ambition, pain, approval, and instinct. Each one claims to be the real “I.” That is the inner marketplace.Matan Torah revealed that the world has an inner Cause, that Heaven and Earth are not separate realities, but expressions of one Divine truth. And once the world discovers its inner Cause, a person can discover his own inner center.In this shiur, delivered in Ba'er Miriam, Rav Burg explores the deeper meaning of Rav Yosef's calf, the power of “three,” the hidden formation of the self, and how Torah transforms the animal soul from a force of fragmentation into a partner in becoming whole.

Pictures Rav Nachman permitted slaughtering above the large ring, at the point where the "hat" begins to slope inward, provided that the chitim (wheat-shaped glands) are at least partially left intact below the cut. This ruling matches neither the rabbis nor Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda, but appears to follow the position of Rabbi Chanina ben Antignus. Rav Huna and Rav Nachman dispute the exact parameters of the disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda. One view posits that they disagree in a case where the slaughterer cut the first third too high up, and the remaining two-thirds in the correct place - whereas if one cut two-thirds in the correct place and then veered upward for the last third, all agree it is valid (as the majority was already severed properly). An alternative version shifts the opinions between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. Both versions include a difficulty and resolution exchanged between either Rav Chisda, Rav Yosef, and Abaye. Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda further disagree on cases of alternating validity - such as when one slaughters the first third in the wrong place, the next third in the right place, and the final third in the wrong place (or the reverse scenario). Rav Yehuda follows the absolute majority; if the total sum of the valid cuts constitutes a majority, the slaughter is kosher. Rav Huna, however, evaluates the chronological moment the majority is achieved, requiring the majority to be made continuously in a valid manner. Rav Kahana asked Rav Yehuda for the ruling on the cases of alternating thirds. He then raised several subsequent queries regarding the validity of shechita performed over a pre-existing perforation (nekev) in the windpipe. The Mishna notes that the location for shechita is the exact opposite of the location for melika (the sacrificial pinching of a bird's neck). Melika must be performed from the back of the neck (oref), whereas shechita must be performed from the front or the sides of the neck.

Pictures Rav Nachman permitted slaughtering above the large ring, at the point where the "hat" begins to slope inward, provided that the chitim (wheat-shaped glands) are at least partially left intact below the cut. This ruling matches neither the rabbis nor Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda, but appears to follow the position of Rabbi Chanina ben Antignus. Rav Huna and Rav Nachman dispute the exact parameters of the disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda. One view posits that they disagree in a case where the slaughterer cut the first third too high up, and the remaining two-thirds in the correct place - whereas if one cut two-thirds in the correct place and then veered upward for the last third, all agree it is valid (as the majority was already severed properly). An alternative version shifts the opinions between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. Both versions include a difficulty and resolution exchanged between either Rav Chisda, Rav Yosef, and Abaye. Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda further disagree on cases of alternating validity - such as when one slaughters the first third in the wrong place, the next third in the right place, and the final third in the wrong place (or the reverse scenario). Rav Yehuda follows the absolute majority; if the total sum of the valid cuts constitutes a majority, the slaughter is kosher. Rav Huna, however, evaluates the chronological moment the majority is achieved, requiring the majority to be made continuously in a valid manner. Rav Kahana asked Rav Yehuda for the ruling on the cases of alternating thirds. He then raised several subsequent queries regarding the validity of shechita performed over a pre-existing perforation (nekev) in the windpipe. The Mishna notes that the location for shechita is the exact opposite of the location for melika (the sacrificial pinching of a bird's neck). Melika must be performed from the back of the neck (oref), whereas shechita must be performed from the front or the sides of the neck.

#476> Rav Yosef Karo and Sefer HaMaggid: Episode 2. We discuss Rav Yosef Karo's angelic visitor, what form it takes, what it tells him, and more. > Episode sponsored in honor of R' Sruly Bornstein's Daf Yomi Shiur. To listen: https://app.lakewooddafyomi.com/browse/shiurim or Apple https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/lakewood-daf-yomi/id1397135616 24Six https://24six.app/preview/podcast/collection/8005/lakewood-daf-yomi AllDaf https://alldaf.org/series/4045/> To purchase the new Ahavat Shalom edition of Sefer HaMaggid: https://judaicaplaza.com/products/8494326> To purchase Mor Altshuler's bio of Rav Yosef Karo: https://taupress.co.il/shop/all_published/%d7%97%d7%99%d7%99-%d7%9e%d7%a8%d7%9f-%d7%99%d7%95%d7%a1%d7%a3-%d7%a7%d7%90%d7%a8%d7%95/> To purchase the Shazar bio of Rav Yosef Karo: https://www.shazar.org.il/product/%D7%A8-%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%A3-%D7%A7%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%95/> To purchase "Lawyer and Mystic": https://amzn.to/4dw66Ts> To join the SeforimChatter WhatsApp community: https://chat.whatsapp.com/DZ3C2CjUeD9AGJvXeEODtK> To join the SeforimChatter WhatsApp status: https://wa.me/message/TI343XQHHMHPN1>  To support the podcast or to sponsor an episode follow this link: https://seforimchatter.com/support-seforimchatter/or email seforimchatter@gmail.com (Zelle/QP this email address)Support the show

Rav Yosef Zvi Rimon - Q & A Session - The Hand of Hashem in the War Since Oct 7 by Shapell's Rabbeim

#475> To purchase the new Ahavat Shalom edition of Sefer HaMaggid:Support the show

The Mishna rules that "one may always slaughter." Raba and Rav Yosef both understand this to refer to the period of Exile, but each explains it according to a different Tannaitic view - either Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva. These Sages disagreed over whether the Jewsl in the desert were forbidden to eat meat unless it was brought as a sacrifice, or whether they were permitted to eat meat even without formal ritual slaughter (shechita). After delving into the debate between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva and resolving various difficulties raised against each position, the Gemara challenges the explanations of both Raba and Rav Yosef based on the textual context of the Mishna. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the phrase "one may always slaughter" includes even a Jew who eats non-kosher meat l'teavon (out of appetite). The Gemara then analyzes which specific types of nicks in a knife disqualify a slaughter and render the animal a treifa, and which do not. The Gemara outlines various customs regarding the method used to check the knife, alongside a debate concerning which parts of the blade must be examined.

The Mishna rules that "one may always slaughter." Raba and Rav Yosef both understand this to refer to the period of Exile, but each explains it according to a different Tannaitic view - either Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva. These Sages disagreed over whether the Jewsl in the desert were forbidden to eat meat unless it was brought as a sacrifice, or whether they were permitted to eat meat even without formal ritual slaughter (shechita). After delving into the debate between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva and resolving various difficulties raised against each position, the Gemara challenges the explanations of both Raba and Rav Yosef based on the textual context of the Mishna. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the phrase "one may always slaughter" includes even a Jew who eats non-kosher meat l'teavon (out of appetite). The Gemara then analyzes which specific types of nicks in a knife disqualify a slaughter and render the animal a treifa, and which do not. The Gemara outlines various customs regarding the method used to check the knife, alongside a debate concerning which parts of the blade must be examined.

The Gemara brings a braita to prove that Rebbi differentiates between a slaughter performed with an item attached to the ground and one performed with an item that was originally detached but later became attached. An internal contradiction within the braita is resolved by applying this distinction. The Gemara then delves into the specific cases within the braita. First, it addresses slaughtering using a mechanism. After raising a contradiction from a different braita that rules such a slaughter invalid, the conflict is resolved by distinguishing between a mechanism operated directly by human action and one that functions without human intervention or is only very indirectly affected by it. Rava discusses whether an item that was detached and subsequently re-attached to the ground is legally considered "attached" or "detached" across various areas of halakha - idol worship, susceptibility to impurity, and slaughtering. He notes that regarding idol worship, it is considered detached. Regarding impurity, it is subject to a tannaitic debate. Regarding slaughter, however, he remains unsure. The Gemara cites three quotes from the previously mentioned braita to resolve the status for slaughter, but each proof is ultimately deemed inconclusive. Shmuel limits a ruling in the braita - concerning slaughtering with a knife stuck in a wall - to a case where the animal is positioned below the knife. However, a contradictory braita is brought that makes no distinction regarding whether the animal is above or below. Two possible resolutions are suggested. Rav Chisda (or a braita) discusses five laws involving a reed stalk, forbidding its use in various activities due to the risk of splinters. One of these laws states that one cannot slaughter with it, which contradicts another source permitting its use. The Gemara distinguishes between a soft reed (which grows in a marsh) and a hardened one, which is more likely to splinter. The Mishna explains that "all may slaughter and forever." The term "all" is understood to include birds, which also require ritual slaughter. As for the term "forever," Raba explains that it follows the view of Rabbi Yishmael and serves to permit the consumption of meat even after the destruction of the Temple. Rav Yosef raises two difficulties with Raba's explanation.

The Gemara brings a braita to prove that Rebbi differentiates between a slaughter performed with an item attached to the ground and one performed with an item that was originally detached but later became attached. An internal contradiction within the braita is resolved by applying this distinction. The Gemara then delves into the specific cases within the braita. First, it addresses slaughtering using a mechanism. After raising a contradiction from a different braita that rules such a slaughter invalid, the conflict is resolved by distinguishing between a mechanism operated directly by human action and one that functions without human intervention or is only very indirectly affected by it. Rava discusses whether an item that was detached and subsequently re-attached to the ground is legally considered "attached" or "detached" across various areas of halakha - idol worship, susceptibility to impurity, and slaughtering. He notes that regarding idol worship, it is considered detached. Regarding impurity, it is subject to a tannaitic debate. Regarding slaughter, however, he remains unsure. The Gemara cites three quotes from the previously mentioned braita to resolve the status for slaughter, but each proof is ultimately deemed inconclusive. Shmuel limits a ruling in the braita - concerning slaughtering with a knife stuck in a wall - to a case where the animal is positioned below the knife. However, a contradictory braita is brought that makes no distinction regarding whether the animal is above or below. Two possible resolutions are suggested. Rav Chisda (or a braita) discusses five laws involving a reed stalk, forbidding its use in various activities due to the risk of splinters. One of these laws states that one cannot slaughter with it, which contradicts another source permitting its use. The Gemara distinguishes between a soft reed (which grows in a marsh) and a hardened one, which is more likely to splinter. The Mishna explains that "all may slaughter and forever." The term "all" is understood to include birds, which also require ritual slaughter. As for the term "forever," Raba explains that it follows the view of Rabbi Yishmael and serves to permit the consumption of meat even after the destruction of the Temple. Rav Yosef raises two difficulties with Raba's explanation.

The Mishna rules that if one slaughters an animal on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, the slaughter is valid. However, Rav asserts that the meat may not be eaten on that Shabbat, even raw. The Sages in the Yeshiva explained that Rav's position accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the laws of Shabbat, and the Gemara attempts to identify which specific ruling of Rabbi Yehuda serves as the basis for this. Rabbi Abba suggests it refers to Rabbi Yehuda's view on hachana -the requirement that an item be designated for use before Shabbat - citing the example of Rabbi Yehuda's prohibition against cutting up an animal that died on Shabbat to feed to one's dogs.  Abaye rejects this, arguing that animals intended for food are considered inherently designated for slaughter for human consumption (but not for animal consumption) even while alive, citing laws of Yom Tov as proof. Although Rabbi Abba attempts to resolve the difficulty by employing the principle of breira (retroactive designation) to understand the Yom Tov law, this is rejected as Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the concept of breira. The Gemara attempts to find the source for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold by breira. Initially, it attempts to prove this from a case involving the separation of teruma from wine, but after rejecting that proof, the Gemara derives it from Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding eruv techumim. Rav Yosef suggests the source is Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding broken vessels that were not broken before Shabbat; these are forbidden by Rabbi Yehuda  if they cannot be used for their original function. However, this comparison is rejected because an animal can be considered "food" even before it is slaughtered. This discussion aligns with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion regarding liquids that seep out of fruits. The Gemara offers a third suggestion based on Shmuel's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda's view on liquids leaking from olives and grapes. Shmuel posits that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with the Sages that such liquids are forbidden to prevent one from intentionally squeezing the fruit; likewise, permitting meat from a Shabbat slaughter might lead one to intentionally slaughter an animal on Shabbat. This is rejected because Rav disagrees with Shmuel's interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda's position on grapes and olives; since the goal is to clarify Rav's own ruling, it cannot be based on a premise that Rav himself does not accept. Rabbi Sheshet suggests a fourth possibility based on Rabbi Yehuda's ruling on lamps. Rabbi Yehuda deems used lamps muktze because they are repulsive (mi'us); similarly, a living animal would be muktze because it cannot be eaten in its current state. This is also rejected, as the Gemara distinguishes between muktze due to repulsion and muktze resulting from a prohibition.

The Mishna rules that if one slaughters an animal on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, the slaughter is valid. However, Rav asserts that the meat may not be eaten on that Shabbat, even raw. The Sages in the Yeshiva explained that Rav's position accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the laws of Shabbat, and the Gemara attempts to identify which specific ruling of Rabbi Yehuda serves as the basis for this. Rabbi Abba suggests it refers to Rabbi Yehuda's view on hachana -the requirement that an item be designated for use before Shabbat - citing the example of Rabbi Yehuda's prohibition against cutting up an animal that died on Shabbat to feed to one's dogs.  Abaye rejects this, arguing that animals intended for food are considered inherently designated for slaughter for human consumption (but not for animal consumption) even while alive, citing laws of Yom Tov as proof. Although Rabbi Abba attempts to resolve the difficulty by employing the principle of breira (retroactive designation) to understand the Yom Tov law, this is rejected as Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the concept of breira. The Gemara attempts to find the source for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold by breira. Initially, it attempts to prove this from a case involving the separation of teruma from wine, but after rejecting that proof, the Gemara derives it from Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding eruv techumim. Rav Yosef suggests the source is Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding broken vessels that were not broken before Shabbat; these are forbidden by Rabbi Yehuda  if they cannot be used for their original function. However, this comparison is rejected because an animal can be considered "food" even before it is slaughtered. This discussion aligns with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion regarding liquids that seep out of fruits. The Gemara offers a third suggestion based on Shmuel's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda's view on liquids leaking from olives and grapes. Shmuel posits that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with the Sages that such liquids are forbidden to prevent one from intentionally squeezing the fruit; likewise, permitting meat from a Shabbat slaughter might lead one to intentionally slaughter an animal on Shabbat. This is rejected because Rav disagrees with Shmuel's interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda's position on grapes and olives; since the goal is to clarify Rav's own ruling, it cannot be based on a premise that Rav himself does not accept. Rabbi Sheshet suggests a fourth possibility based on Rabbi Yehuda's ruling on lamps. Rabbi Yehuda deems used lamps muktze because they are repulsive (mi'us); similarly, a living animal would be muktze because it cannot be eaten in its current state. This is also rejected, as the Gemara distinguishes between muktze due to repulsion and muktze resulting from a prohibition.

This class explores the Gemara's statement that humility ceased with the passing of certain sages, focusing on Rav Yosef's claim and its deeper meaning. Through analysis of Rashi, the Rebbe, and stories of Sinai and Moshe, we learn how true humility coexists with self-awareness. https://www.torahrecordings.com/classes/by_parsha/003_vayikra/009_behar/004

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Rava explains that the top knot on the tzitzit (after all the windings) must be of Torah origin. If it were not, the attachment would be considered temporary, and there would be no need for the Torah to permit the use of mixed types (shatnez—wool and linen) in tzitzit. Raba bar Rav Ada transmitted in the name of Rav that if a single thread is torn at its base (the top of the tzitzit), the tzitzit are no longer valid. When Rav Nachman taught this, Rava raised a challenge from a braita, but Rav Nachman reinterpreted the source in a way that resolved the contradiction. Raba stated in the name of Rav that the specific thread used for the windings counts as one of the required threads of the tzitzit. Rav Yosef corrected the attribution, noting that the statement actually originated from Shmuel. Raba taught in the name of Shmuel that if the techelet thread was mostly consumed by the windings, leaving only a small amount of string to hang down, the tzitzit remain valid. Rav Yosef again corrected him, clarifying that this statement came from Rav. Rav is quoted by another source as establishing the halakha on three points: a minimum of set of one windings is necessary, and the ideal tzitzit consists of one-third windings and two-thirds hanging string. According to Rebbi, each winding (chulya) should of one thread wound at least three times. However, a different braita states there should be between seven and thirteen windings, representing the seven firmaments and the spaces between them. One should also begin and end the windings with a white string, as derived from the biblical verse. Rav and Raba bar bar Hana disagree about whether a garment with only windings and no loose strings hanging is valid. Their debate is rooted in different ways of understanding the purpose of the terms petil and gedilim used in the Torah. Shmuel says in the name of Levi that even the white threads can be made of wool when placed on a linen garment. A question is then raised as to whether a woolen garment can have linen threads; Rav Yehuda's statement is cited to answer this, as he explicitly permits linen strings in a woolen garment. He even permits using both wool and linen strings in a silk garment. Rav Nachman disagrees with this last point and exempts a silk garment from tzitzit entirely. Rava challenges Rav Nachman's position, but Rav Nachman resolves the difficulty. Their underlying dispute is whether the word beged (clothing) in the Torah refers to all materials or only to those made of wool or linen.

Rava explains that the top knot on the tzitzit (after all the windings) must be of Torah origin. If it were not, the attachment would be considered temporary, and there would be no need for the Torah to permit the use of mixed types (shatnez—wool and linen) in tzitzit. Raba bar Rav Ada transmitted in the name of Rav that if a single thread is torn at its base (the top of the tzitzit), the tzitzit are no longer valid. When Rav Nachman taught this, Rava raised a challenge from a braita, but Rav Nachman reinterpreted the source in a way that resolved the contradiction. Raba stated in the name of Rav that the specific thread used for the windings counts as one of the required threads of the tzitzit. Rav Yosef corrected the attribution, noting that the statement actually originated from Shmuel. Raba taught in the name of Shmuel that if the techelet thread was mostly consumed by the windings, leaving only a small amount of string to hang down, the tzitzit remain valid. Rav Yosef again corrected him, clarifying that this statement came from Rav. Rav is quoted by another source as establishing the halakha on three points: a minimum of set of one windings is necessary, and the ideal tzitzit consists of one-third windings and two-thirds hanging string. According to Rebbi, each winding (chulya) should of one thread wound at least three times. However, a different braita states there should be between seven and thirteen windings, representing the seven firmaments and the spaces between them. One should also begin and end the windings with a white string, as derived from the biblical verse. Rav and Raba bar bar Hana disagree about whether a garment with only windings and no loose strings hanging is valid. Their debate is rooted in different ways of understanding the purpose of the terms petil and gedilim used in the Torah. Shmuel says in the name of Levi that even the white threads can be made of wool when placed on a linen garment. A question is then raised as to whether a woolen garment can have linen threads; Rav Yehuda's statement is cited to answer this, as he explicitly permits linen strings in a woolen garment. He even permits using both wool and linen strings in a silk garment. Rav Nachman disagrees with this last point and exempts a silk garment from tzitzit entirely. Rava challenges Rav Nachman's position, but Rav Nachman resolves the difficulty. Their underlying dispute is whether the word beged (clothing) in the Torah refers to all materials or only to those made of wool or linen.

As mentioned previously, one of the reasons Hashem may give a person suffering in this world is to save him from something far worse. Sometimes a person endures such hardship that he cannot imagine anything being worse. It is important to remember that there are endless reasons why a person may have to suffer, even if he is completely righteous. The Chovot HaLevavot in Shaar HaBitachon lists several possibilities and then cautions that we will never be able to determine why any individual is experiencing what he is going through. Hashem has a different calculation for every person, and only He knows the true reasons. What we do need to know is that whatever the reason may be, when a person eventually discovers why Hashem dealt with him this way — whether when Mashiach comes or when he reaches the next world — he will be grateful for every moment of the life Hashem gave him. If he can trust in Hashem now and accept it with joy even before understanding, his spiritual level will rise tremendously and his reward will be beyond imagination. One of the explanations given by the Chovot HaLevavot for why a tzaddik may suffer in this world is that through that suffering, Hashem grants him a far greater Olam Haba. We know from Chazal that even the faintest taste of Olam Haba is more pleasurable than all the delights of this world combined. And Olam Haba is eternal, while this world is temporary. But how does suffering here produce a higher Olam Haba? One explanation is based on the teaching of Chazal that one mitzvah performed with difficulty is worth far more than the same mitzvah performed easily. When someone is going through hardship, illness, or pain and still manages to perform a mitzvah, still manages to pray, still manages to learn, everything he does carries infinitely greater value. One minute of his avodah may outweigh hours of effortless service. Two people may be praying in the same shul, learning in the same class, appearing identical in this world. Yet in the next world, one may stand far higher than the other — because the effort required of him was so much greater. For him, getting to shul or opening a sefer demanded real sacrifice, while the other person had it easy. We do not ask for hardship, because we fear we may not accept it properly. But if hardship does come, we must understand that it carries within it a golden opportunity to earn reward beyond anything we can imagine. It may be that someone who appears to be an ordinary Jew in this world is in truth among the greatest of the generation — not because of how much he accomplishes , but because of what he must endure to accomplish whatever he does manage to accomplish. He keeps going with a smile. He keeps doing mitzvot even when it is painfully difficult. He keeps his emunah in Hashem even when life feels unbearably hard. This may also explain the Gemara which tells that when Rav Yosef became ill, his soul briefly departed and then returned. Afterward he said he saw an upside-down world — those who appeared lowly here were elevated there, and those who appeared elevated here were low there. His father told him, "You saw a clear world." A person who looks like a simple Jew down here may occupy the highest place in the upper world because of the enormous difficulty he faces in serving Hashem within the life he was given. There are infinite reasons for suffering in this world. For now, our task is to trust that every one of them is for the best. If a person can accept that Hashem is doing what is best for him and continue to serve Him with joy, he will merit the highest places in Olam Haba for all eternity.

Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel rules that a mezuza written on two sheets or columns is invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty from a braita that invalidates a mezuza written on two sheets only when it is placed within two separate sippin (doorposts), implying that if it were placed within a single post, it would be valid. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Shmuel's intent was that even if it is placed in one post, the mere fact that it is "fit" or able to be divided between two posts renders it invalid, as a mezuza. Regarding the determination of the right side in doorways between two rooms, Shmuel rules that one follows the "heker tzir" (the placement of the hinges). Rav Adda explains that this refers to the socket in which the door hinge turns; the side toward which the door opens is considered the primary room, and the right side is determined according to the direction of entry into that room. Rav Nachman instructed the Exilarch (Resh Galuta), who wished to fix a mezuza in his house before its construction was complete, that he must first hang the doors and only afterward fix the mezuza. Concerning the manner of placing the mezuza, Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav invalidates a mezuza placed "k'min neger" (like a bolt), meaning like a horizontal bar inserted into the doorway. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the practice in Rabbi's house, where the mezuzot were placed "k'min neger," and resolves it by distinguishing between a completely vertical placement and a horizontal placement. It is further mentioned in this context that Rav Huna would fix a mezuza in the doorway between his house and the Beit Midrash even though Rabbi did not do so, because Rav Huna followed the practice of those accustomed to using that doorway, which renders it a doorway obligated in a mezuza. In the matter of the mezuza's height, Shmuel rules that it should be placed at the beginning of the upper third of the doorway's height. Rav Huna disagrees, holding that the entire area of the doorway is valid, provided the mezuza is one handbreadth (tefach) away from the ground and one handbreadth away from the ceiling beam. The Gemara raises a difficulty against Shmuel from a braita and resolves it by explaining that Shmuel rules in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who learns from a hekesh (textual comparison) between "u'kshartam" (tefillin) and "u'khtavtam" (mezuza) that just as tefillin are placed high up, so too the mezuza must be high up in the doorway. Rava adds that the mezuza should be placed in the handbreadth closest to the public domain so that a person encounters the mitzva immediately upon entry. Rabbi Chanina adds a conceptual dimension: unlike a king of flesh and blood who sits inside while his subjects guard him from the outside, God guards His servants from the outside while they sit inside, as it is written, "The Lord is your guardian." Additional laws discussed on this page deal with the requirements of a mezuza that depend on the structure of the doorway and the room. Rav Yosef in the name of Rava invalidates a mezuza that was recessed into the thickness of the wall more than a handbreadth. Rava exempts "pitchi shimai" (defective doorways) from mezuza; the Amoraim dispute whether this refers to a doorway without a ceiling or one without a proper doorpost. Similarly, an achsadra (portico) is exempt from mezuza because its posts are intended to support the ceiling rather than to create a doorway. A gatehouse (beit shaar) that opens both to a house and a courtyard needs a mezeua on both entrances. However, a gatehouse that opens to both a house and a garden, the Tannaim dispute - and the Amoraim dispute the interpretation of their words - whether the obligation is determined by the entry to the house or the exit to the garden. Rav Ashi rules according to the stringency of Rav and Shmuel: any doorway used for entry into a house, even if it leads to an open space like a garden, is obligated in a mezuza.  

Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel rules that a mezuza written on two sheets or columns is invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty from a braita that invalidates a mezuza written on two sheets only when it is placed within two separate sippin (doorposts), implying that if it were placed within a single post, it would be valid. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Shmuel's intent was that even if it is placed in one post, the mere fact that it is "fit" or able to be divided between two posts renders it invalid, as a mezuza. Regarding the determination of the right side in doorways between two rooms, Shmuel rules that one follows the "heker tzir" (the placement of the hinges). Rav Adda explains that this refers to the socket in which the door hinge turns; the side toward which the door opens is considered the primary room, and the right side is determined according to the direction of entry into that room. Rav Nachman instructed the Exilarch (Resh Galuta), who wished to fix a mezuza in his house before its construction was complete, that he must first hang the doors and only afterward fix the mezuza. Concerning the manner of placing the mezuza, Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav invalidates a mezuza placed "k'min neger" (like a bolt), meaning like a horizontal bar inserted into the doorway. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the practice in Rabbi's house, where the mezuzot were placed "k'min neger," and resolves it by distinguishing between a completely vertical placement and a horizontal placement. It is further mentioned in this context that Rav Huna would fix a mezuza in the doorway between his house and the Beit Midrash even though Rabbi did not do so, because Rav Huna followed the practice of those accustomed to using that doorway, which renders it a doorway obligated in a mezuza. In the matter of the mezuza's height, Shmuel rules that it should be placed at the beginning of the upper third of the doorway's height. Rav Huna disagrees, holding that the entire area of the doorway is valid, provided the mezuza is one handbreadth (tefach) away from the ground and one handbreadth away from the ceiling beam. The Gemara raises a difficulty against Shmuel from a braita and resolves it by explaining that Shmuel rules in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who learns from a hekesh (textual comparison) between "u'kshartam" (tefillin) and "u'khtavtam" (mezuza) that just as tefillin are placed high up, so too the mezuza must be high up in the doorway. Rava adds that the mezuza should be placed in the handbreadth closest to the public domain so that a person encounters the mitzva immediately upon entry. Rabbi Chanina adds a conceptual dimension: unlike a king of flesh and blood who sits inside while his subjects guard him from the outside, God guards His servants from the outside while they sit inside, as it is written, "The Lord is your guardian." Additional laws discussed on this page deal with the requirements of a mezuza that depend on the structure of the doorway and the room. Rav Yosef in the name of Rava invalidates a mezuza that was recessed into the thickness of the wall more than a handbreadth. Rava exempts "pitchi shimai" (defective doorways) from mezuza; the Amoraim dispute whether this refers to a doorway without a ceiling or one without a proper doorpost. Similarly, an achsadra (portico) is exempt from mezuza because its posts are intended to support the ceiling rather than to create a doorway. A gatehouse (beit shaar) that opens both to a house and a courtyard needs a mezeua on both entrances. However, a gatehouse that opens to both a house and a garden, the Tannaim dispute - and the Amoraim dispute the interpretation of their words - whether the obligation is determined by the entry to the house or the exit to the garden. Rav Ashi rules according to the stringency of Rav and Shmuel: any doorway used for entry into a house, even if it leads to an open space like a garden, is obligated in a mezuza.  

Study Guide There are two contradictory braitot regarding the oil of the leper that was sprinkled for the sake of the wrong sacrifice. One rules that it is disqualified, and the other rules that it is valid. At first, it was suggested that one matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer - who disqualifies a guilt offering (which the oil of the leper is brought with) that is brought with the wrong intent - but this suggestion is rejected. They conclude by saying that each relates to a different issue: the one that permits is referring to permitting the remainder of the oil to be eaten, while the one that disqualifies relates to the owner receiving purification. The Mishna discusses elements of the Menora, mezuza, tefillin, and tzitzit that are essential. In the Menora, the seven branches are essential. The Gemara brings a braita that explains other elements of the Menora that are essential. It must be made from one chunk of gold; however, while the "chunk" is essential, it could be made from metals other than gold if gold is unavailable. How is this derived from the verses? How does this differ from the trumpets? Rav Papa, son of Rav Chanin, brought a braita with a debate between two Tannaim about whether all other metals could be used or only silver. However, Rav Yosef brings an alternative braita stating that the debate was about wood, but all agree that all other metals can be used. Rav Yosef further proves from two other braitot that his version is correct. Shmuel quotes an elder who described the height of the Menora and what could be found at every level. He also listed how many of the decorative elements were to be found on the Menora and ruled that each one is an essential part of the Menora.

Study Guide There are two contradictory braitot regarding the oil of the leper that was sprinkled for the sake of the wrong sacrifice. One rules that it is disqualified, and the other rules that it is valid. At first, it was suggested that one matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer - who disqualifies a guilt offering (which the oil of the leper is brought with) that is brought with the wrong intent - but this suggestion is rejected. They conclude by saying that each relates to a different issue: the one that permits is referring to permitting the remainder of the oil to be eaten, while the one that disqualifies relates to the owner receiving purification. The Mishna discusses elements of the Menora, mezuza, tefillin, and tzitzit that are essential. In the Menora, the seven branches are essential. The Gemara brings a braita that explains other elements of the Menora that are essential. It must be made from one chunk of gold; however, while the "chunk" is essential, it could be made from metals other than gold if gold is unavailable. How is this derived from the verses? How does this differ from the trumpets? Rav Papa, son of Rav Chanin, brought a braita with a debate between two Tannaim about whether all other metals could be used or only silver. However, Rav Yosef brings an alternative braita stating that the debate was about wood, but all agree that all other metals can be used. Rav Yosef further proves from two other braitot that his version is correct. Shmuel quotes an elder who described the height of the Menora and what could be found at every level. He also listed how many of the decorative elements were to be found on the Menora and ruled that each one is an essential part of the Menora.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

  Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however, the Gemara distinguishes between the two cases and rejects the comparison. Another discussion concerns a sacrifice slaughtered at night on a private altar. Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether such an offering is valid. Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan also dispute whether burnt offerings brought on private altars require hefshet and nituach - flaying and cutting into pieces - just as they do on the public altar. Although private altars operate with fewer restrictions, several laws apply equally to both private and public offerings. A braita entertains the possibility that time‑based limitations might not apply to private‑altar sacrifices, just as spatial limitations do not. However, a verse is cited to demonstrate that time restrictions indeed remain binding even for offerings brought on private altars.

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

  Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however, the Gemara distinguishes between the two cases and rejects the comparison. Another discussion concerns a sacrifice slaughtered at night on a private altar. Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether such an offering is valid. Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan also dispute whether burnt offerings brought on private altars require hefshet and nituach - flaying and cutting into pieces - just as they do on the public altar. Although private altars operate with fewer restrictions, several laws apply equally to both private and public offerings. A braita entertains the possibility that time‑based limitations might not apply to private‑altar sacrifices, just as spatial limitations do not. However, a verse is cited to demonstrate that time restrictions indeed remain binding even for offerings brought on private altars.

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

Parashat Shemot tells about the enslavement of Beneh Yisrael in Egypt, a policy enacted by the king about whom the Torah writes: "A new king arose in Egypt, who did not know Yosef" (1:8). Rashi brings a debate among the Amoraim regarding this verse. One view accepts the simple meaning, that a new king came to power. According to the other view, however, this Pharaoh who decided to persecute Beneh Yisrael was the same king who ruled Egypt previously, but he is called "new" because "Nit'hadeshu Gezerotav" – he issued new decrees. This second opinion cited by Rashi requires some explanation. The phrase "Nit'hadeshu Gezerotav" does not actually denote "new" decrees. Its precise translation is "his decrees were renewed." There is, of course, a significant difference between a "new" decree and a "renewed" decree. A "new" decree is one which never existed before, whereas a "renewed decree" is a policy that was once in place and is now restored. We must ask, then, which old policy did Pharaoh "renew" in Egypt? Rav Yosef Salant (Jerusalem, 1885-1981), in his Be'er Yosef, answers this question by examining Onkelos' translation of this verse, which concludes: "De'la Mekayem Gezerat Yosef" – "who did not uphold Yosef's decree." According to Onkelos, Pharaoh annulled the policy that Yosef had put into place. This likely refers to the measures Yosef had enacted in order to feed the population of Egypt during the famine. As we read toward the end of Parashat Vayigash, once the famine struck, Yosef began selling the vast quantities of grain that had been stored during the seven years of surplus. At first, he sold grain to the people in exchange for money, and then, after they had spent all their money, he sold them grain in exchange for their animals and their land. Eventually, the people were left with nothing with which to purchase grain. Yosef therefore turned the entire population into Pharaoh's servants, giving them land to till, in exchange for which they gave Pharaoh a percentage of their crops. The Torah writes that the Egyptians were happy with this arrangement, as it ensured their survival during the devastating famine that ravaged the country. Many years later, Rav Salant explains, Pharaoh changed this policy and brought back the conditions that had been in place before Yosef came along. And thus he "renewed" the old decrees. Rav Salant writes that once the famine ended, Pharaoh used the arrangement established by Yosef as a means of provoking resentment and hostility toward Beneh Yisrael. As politicians often do, Pharaoh sought to win the people's support by convincing them that they were victims of an evil scheme from which he would heroically rescue them. He thus charged that Beneh Yisrael – who were living comfortably in the Goshen region – were responsible for the Egyptian people's lack of freedom, for their status as Pharaoh's servants, because it was Yosef who enacted this policy. And thus the arrangement that saved Egypt from widespread starvation was turned into an evil, malicious scheme to subjugate the people. The Egyptians who were previously grateful for this arrangement now resented it, blaming Yosef – and, by extension, all Beneh Yisrael – for the injustice that they were told they now experienced. One contemporary Rabbi added that this might shed light on Rav Yosef's comment in the Gemara (Pesahim 68b) expressing the great importance of the holiday of Shabuot. Rav Yosef remarked that if not for the event of Matan Torah, which is celebrated on Shabuot, "Kama Yosef Ika Be'shuka" – "There are several 'Yosef's' in the marketplace. Meaning, it is only because of the Torah that Rav Yosef was able to achieve and to distinguish himself through his outstanding scholarship. On a deeper level, however, Rav Yosef was perhaps lamenting the fact that the phenomenon of Yosef, of a Jew who was unfairly maligned and scapegoated after having helped and contributed to a country – has recurred many times. There are, unfortunately, many examples of "Yosef," occasions when Jews were viewed with suspicion and treated with hostility despite their having been hard-working, law-abiding, contributing members of society. This observation is, on the one hand, sobering, but on the other hand, it should give us hope and encouragement at this time of rising antisemitism. This phenomenon is upsetting, but not new. It has happened before – and, each time, we've prevailed. Hashem has always helped us in the past, and he will help us now, as well. We will continue to proudly carry the legacy of Yosef Ha'sadik, passionately adhering to our values and traditions while contributing to the society around us, and placing our trust in Hashem at all times.

Parashat Shemot tells about the enslavement of Beneh Yisrael in Egypt, a policy enacted by the king about whom the Torah writes: "A new king arose in Egypt, who did not know Yosef" (1:8). Rashi brings a debate among the Amoraim regarding this verse. One view accepts the simple meaning, that a new king came to power. According to the other view, however, this Pharaoh who decided to persecute Beneh Yisrael was the same king who ruled Egypt previously, but he is called "new" because "Nit'hadeshu Gezerotav" – he issued new decrees. This second opinion cited by Rashi requires some explanation. The phrase "Nit'hadeshu Gezerotav" does not actually denote "new" decrees. Its precise translation is "his decrees were renewed." There is, of course, a significant difference between a "new" decree and a "renewed" decree. A "new" decree is one which never existed before, whereas a "renewed decree" is a policy that was once in place and is now restored. We must ask, then, which old policy did Pharaoh "renew" in Egypt? Rav Yosef Salant (Jerusalem, 1885-1981), in his Be'er Yosef, answers this question by examining Onkelos' translation of this verse, which concludes: "De'la Mekayem Gezerat Yosef" – "who did not uphold Yosef's decree." According to Onkelos, Pharaoh annulled the policy that Yosef had put into place. This likely refers to the measures Yosef had enacted in order to feed the population of Egypt during the famine. As we read toward the end of Parashat Vayigash, once the famine struck, Yosef began selling the vast quantities of grain that had been stored during the seven years of surplus. At first, he sold grain to the people in exchange for money, and then, after they had spent all their money, he sold them grain in exchange for their animals and their land. Eventually, the people were left with nothing with which to purchase grain. Yosef therefore turned the entire population into Pharaoh's servants, giving them land to till, in exchange for which they gave Pharaoh a percentage of their crops. The Torah writes that the Egyptians were happy with this arrangement, as it ensured their survival during the devastating famine that ravaged the country. Many years later, Rav Salant explains, Pharaoh changed this policy and brought back the conditions that had been in place before Yosef came along. And thus he "renewed" the old decrees. Rav Salant writes that once the famine ended, Pharaoh used the arrangement established by Yosef as a means of provoking resentment and hostility toward Beneh Yisrael. As politicians often do, Pharaoh sought to win the people's support by convincing them that they were victims of an evil scheme from which he would heroically rescue them. He thus charged that Beneh Yisrael – who were living comfortably in the Goshen region – were responsible for the Egyptian people's lack of freedom, for their status as Pharaoh's servants, because it was Yosef who enacted this policy. And thus the arrangement that saved Egypt from widespread starvation was turned into an evil, malicious scheme to subjugate the people. The Egyptians who were previously grateful for this arrangement now resented it, blaming Yosef – and, by extension, all Beneh Yisrael – for the injustice that they were told they now experienced. One contemporary Rabbi added that this might shed light on Rav Yosef's comment in the Gemara (Pesahim 68b) expressing the great importance of the holiday of Shabuot. Rav Yosef remarked that if not for the event of Matan Torah, which is celebrated on Shabuot, "Kama Yosef Ika Be'shuka" – "There are several 'Yosef's' in the marketplace. Meaning, it is only because of the Torah that Rav Yosef was able to achieve and to distinguish himself through his outstanding scholarship. On a deeper level, however, Rav Yosef was perhaps lamenting the fact that the phenomenon of Yosef, of a Jew who was unfairly maligned and scapegoated after having helped and contributed to a country – has recurred many times. There are, unfortunately, many examples of "Yosef," occasions when Jews were viewed with suspicion and treated with hostility despite their having been hard-working, law-abiding, contributing members of society. This observation is, on the one hand, sobering, but on the other hand, it should give us hope and encouragement at this time of rising antisemitism. This phenomenon is upsetting, but not new. It has happened before – and, each time, we've prevailed. Hashem has always helped us in the past, and he will help us now, as well. We will continue to proudly carry the legacy of Yosef Ha'sadik, passionately adhering to our values and traditions while contributing to the society around us, and placing our trust in Hashem at all times.

  Raba and Rav Chisda disagree on two issues. If items were not completely consumed on the altar, removed before midnight, and returned after midnight, at what point are they considered "consumed" such that they no longer need to be put back on the altar if removed again (assuming they have not yet turned to ash, in which case they would not need to be returned)? Raba rules that they are considered consumed at midnight of the following night, while Rav Chisda holds that the cutoff is dawn. If the items were not returned until after dawn, Raba still maintains that midnight of the next night renders them consumed, whereas Rav Chisda insists they can never be rendered consumed. Rav Yosef challenges the premise of both opinions, which assume that items not on the altar at midnight cannot be rendered consumed. He argues instead that midnight itself renders all items consumed, even if they were removed before midnight and not yet returned to the altar. Rava asked Raba: If items remain at the top of the altar all night, does that prevent them from becoming disqualified through lina (remaining overnight)? Raba answered that they are not disqualified, but Rava did not accept this response. A braita is cited, providing a source in the Torah that the ramp and sanctified vessels also sanctify disqualified items. If such items are placed on the ramp or the altar, they do not need to be removed. Reish Lakish posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding disqualified items placed in sanctified vessels. Initially, Rabbi Yochanan thought the question was whether they were sanctified to the extent that they could not be redeemed. Reish Lakish clarified that he was asking whether items placed in sanctified vessels could be brought ab initio on the altar. Rabbi Yochanan answered yes, based on the Mishna, but this answer was rejected since the Mishna could be read differently. The Gemara then asks: Does the airspace of the altar sanctify items? At first, it attempts to prove that the airspace does sanctify from the Mishna's statement: "Just as the altar sanctifies, so does the ramp." Items sanctified by the ramp must be carried through the altar's airspace to reach it. If the airspace does not sanctify, then carrying them would be akin to removing them, and once removed, they could not be returned. However, this proof is rejected, since it is possible to bring them to the altar by dragging rather than lifting. Rava bar Rav Chanan then attempts to prove the opposite from the case of a bird burnt offering brought at the top of the altar. If the airspace sanctifies, then there could be no case of pigul (disqualification due to improper intent), because as long as the offering remains on the altar, it could be sacrificed even the next day. Thus, a thought to offer it the next day would not constitute pigul. Rav Shimi rejects this argument, explaining that one could still have a pigul thought to remove the offering and then put it back on the altar the next day, which would indeed be disqualifying.

  Raba and Rav Chisda disagree on two issues. If items were not completely consumed on the altar, removed before midnight, and returned after midnight, at what point are they considered "consumed" such that they no longer need to be put back on the altar if removed again (assuming they have not yet turned to ash, in which case they would not need to be returned)? Raba rules that they are considered consumed at midnight of the following night, while Rav Chisda holds that the cutoff is dawn. If the items were not returned until after dawn, Raba still maintains that midnight of the next night renders them consumed, whereas Rav Chisda insists they can never be rendered consumed. Rav Yosef challenges the premise of both opinions, which assume that items not on the altar at midnight cannot be rendered consumed. He argues instead that midnight itself renders all items consumed, even if they were removed before midnight and not yet returned to the altar. Rava asked Raba: If items remain at the top of the altar all night, does that prevent them from becoming disqualified through lina (remaining overnight)? Raba answered that they are not disqualified, but Rava did not accept this response. A braita is cited, providing a source in the Torah that the ramp and sanctified vessels also sanctify disqualified items. If such items are placed on the ramp or the altar, they do not need to be removed. Reish Lakish posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding disqualified items placed in sanctified vessels. Initially, Rabbi Yochanan thought the question was whether they were sanctified to the extent that they could not be redeemed. Reish Lakish clarified that he was asking whether items placed in sanctified vessels could be brought ab initio on the altar. Rabbi Yochanan answered yes, based on the Mishna, but this answer was rejected since the Mishna could be read differently. The Gemara then asks: Does the airspace of the altar sanctify items? At first, it attempts to prove that the airspace does sanctify from the Mishna's statement: "Just as the altar sanctifies, so does the ramp." Items sanctified by the ramp must be carried through the altar's airspace to reach it. If the airspace does not sanctify, then carrying them would be akin to removing them, and once removed, they could not be returned. However, this proof is rejected, since it is possible to bring them to the altar by dragging rather than lifting. Rava bar Rav Chanan then attempts to prove the opposite from the case of a bird burnt offering brought at the top of the altar. If the airspace sanctifies, then there could be no case of pigul (disqualification due to improper intent), because as long as the offering remains on the altar, it could be sacrificed even the next day. Thus, a thought to offer it the next day would not constitute pigul. Rav Shimi rejects this argument, explaining that one could still have a pigul thought to remove the offering and then put it back on the altar the next day, which would indeed be disqualifying.

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

If sacrifices of the same type become intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are offered for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in cases where smicha is required, how can the sacrifice be brought, since one cannot perform smicha on another's offering? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha. Men's sacrifices, by contrast, would not be offered; instead, they would be left to graze until they developed a blemish and then sold, with new animals purchased for the altar. Abaye raises a difficulty from a braita that discusses public and individual sacrifices that became mixed both before and after slaughter and were nevertheless offered. Since public sacrifices are brought by men, the braita must also be referring to individual sacrifices brought by men. Rava resolves this by reinterpreting the braita, noting a difficulty in its plain reading. He explains that it refers only to a case where the blood of the animals was mixed after slaughter, and not to intermingling of live animals. In the braita cited by Abaye, Rebbi rules that if the blood of two animals was mixed in one cup, the kohen may combine the sprinkling for both sacrifices, but only if there is enough blood for each. A difficulty is raised against Rebbi from another braita in which he quotes Rabbi Eliezer regarding the red heifer purification waters, where no minimum amount is required for sprinkling. The same should apply to blood. Two answers are offered: either the purification waters differ from blood, or Rebbi was not stating his own view but merely quoting Rabbi Eliezer. Rami bar Hama poses two questions concerning a firstborn animal that became blemished. Rabbi Yosi bar Zevida attempts to answer from the Mishna about firstborns intermingled with other sacrifices, but his answer is rejected. The Mishna states that only sin and guilt offerings cannot be intermingled, since their differences are identifiable. The Gemara considers whether other offerings might also fall into this category, but all such suggestions are rejected. If a guilt offering becomes mixed with a peace offering, they are offered according to the stricter requirements of the two. This could potentially cause sanctified items to be disqualified. Rabbi Shimon does not have an issue with this, but the rabbis disagree and do not allow it. Rava limits Rabbi Shimon's ruling to a post facto situation and does not permit it ab initio.

In a set of intermingled parts of sacrifices, including from a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one was sacrificed, we can "assume" that the one sacrificed was the blemished one and all the others are permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer follows a unique opinion, that of Chanan the Egyptian, who holds that animals, even after slaughter, are not considered "rejected," and if they are brought on the altar, they can be accepted. Similarly, Rav Nachman cites a ruling of Rav that if one ring of idol worship was mixed in with many other rings, and one fell into the sea, all the rest are permitted. After Rava raised a difficulty on this from the Mishna—that all the animals are left to die, so why wouldn't we permit them after the first one dies—the Gemara concludes that Rav holds like Rabbi Eliezer. It is then established that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rav would permit the others only if they are sacrificed or sold in pairs, since one of the pair will certainly be a permitted item. Rav also ruled in a case where there were one hundred rings with one being of idol worship. If they were separated into sixty and forty, and then one from each section was mixed into separate sets of rings, the one that came from the forty is permitted based on a safek sefeika—two doubts: likely it was in the sixty, and even if it was in the forty, likely it remained in the original forty. Shmuel disagreed and did not permit safek sefeika in idol worship. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position from a braita that permits it, but it is established that there is a tannaitic debate. Reish Lakish brings a similar ruling to Rav Nachman regarding a barrel of wine of truma. The Gemara explains why both his case and Rav Nachman's case needed to be ruled on separately, as one would not necessarily be able to infer one from the other. Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about the extent to which Reish Lakish's leniency applies. Rabbi Elazar rules leniently in a case of a barrel of truma, but his ruling is modified after Rav Nachman raised a difficulty against it. Rabbi Oshaya rules about a similar case, adding another potential issue. The Mishna discusses a situation in which a treifa is mixed in with other animals. As a treifa should be recognizable, the Gemara asks how such a situation could occur. Three possible answers are given. If sacrifices of the same type are intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are sacrificed for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in sacrifices where smicha is necessary, how can the sacrifice be brought—since one cannot perform smicha on someone else's sacrifice? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha.

Sources Can kodshim kalim be eaten when there is no altar? Abaye proved from a braita of Rabbi Yishmael that they cannot be eaten. Rabbi Yirmia raised a difficulty against Abaye from a contradiction between braitot, resolving it in a way that one would conclude that kodshim kalim could be eaten even without an altar. However, Ravina provides an alternative resolution to the contradiction, and the Gemara brings another. Rav Huna says in the name of Rav that the altar in the Tabernacle of Shilo was made of stone. However, a difficulty is raised against this from a braita that explains that the fire of Moshe's copper altar continued until the time of Shlomo. They resolve it by saying that Rav Huna held by a different tannaitic opinion. Alternatively, one can explain that the fire could have still been on Moshe's altar, even though they were using the stone altar. If so, what was the fire used for? The Gemara suggests two possible answers. A Mishna is brought which says that the altar in the time of the Second Temple was expanded to be larger than the one in the First Temple, from 28x28 cubits to 32x32. Why? Rav Yosef suggests it was expanded as they needed more space. Ravin explained it based on a Mishna in Middot that described the addition of the shitin, two holes that were added for the libations.

Rav Yosef offers two additional explanations for why the altar in the Second Temple was constructed larger than the altar in the First Temple. When the Second Temple was built, how did they determine the correct location for the altar? Three explanations are brought. Which components of the altar are essential for carrying out sacrificial rites? The ramp of the altar was positioned on its southern side, measuring sixteen cubits in width and thirty-two cubits in length. Rav Huna cites a source to confirm that the ramp was indeed located in the south. A braita presents an alternative source from a statement by Rabbi Yehuda. There was a space between the altar and the ramp - the origin and function of this gap are clarified. If the ramp was thirty-two cubits long and the altar itself also measured thirty-two cubits in length, how does this align with the Mishna in Midot 5:2, which states that the total length was sixty-two cubits?

The halakha was decided according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Shimon regarding pigul in the inner sin offerings. Rava (and some say Rav Yosef) wondered: Why is halacha being decided on a matter that is no longer relevant in our times? To this, Abaye responded: "Expound and receive reward." Is there a difference between offerings brought by non-Jews and those brought by Jews? Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi disagree on this matter. From which verses does Rabbi Shimon derive that certain laws do not apply to offerings brought by non-Jews? A baraita is brought which states that the tzitz (forehead plate of the High Priest) does not atone for offerings brought by non-Jews. Does this baraita align with the opinion of Rabbi Yosi as well? The prohibition against eating notar (leftover sacrificial meat) and tamei (impure items) applies even to offerings that do not have elements permitting consumption. What is the source for these halakhot?

Study Guide Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty. A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this. A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so. Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara. This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma. A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.  

Who is permitted to slaughter an animal for a sacrifice? The Mishna presents the matter in a way that suggests slaughter by a non-priest is only valid post facto. However, this seems to contradict another source that explicitly permits such slaughter ab initio. Upon further analysis, this apparent contradiction is resolved: non-priests are indeed permitted to slaughter sacrificial animals from the outset. If an impure person performs the slaughter, the sacrifice remains valid. Yet another source seems to prohibit this. The resolution lies in distinguishing between biblical and rabbinic law: while biblically valid, rabbinic authorities forbade impure individuals from slaughtering as a precaution, lest they come into contact with the sacrificial animal and thereby render it impure. There are two different versions of a braita relating to the prohibition for an impure person to slaughter or do smicha on the animal. Each version has a different understanding of the prohibition to enter the Azara (Temple courtyard). Is it prohibited even for a small part of one’s body to enter or only for the majority?   Ulla, in the name of Reish Lakish, holds that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara, it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover, who is allowed to go ahead with the purification process, which requires a small part of his body to enter the Azara. Ulla resolves the difficulty. Rav Yosef infers from Ulla’s resolution that in a parallel case—where zavim became impure through contact with the dead before Passover—the same ruling would apply. Abaye, however, raises two objections to Rav Yosef’s inference.