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This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi to the continued health and good outcome for Chesya Rut bat Chana.  The Mishna explains that Yom Kippur atones for positive commandments. If one has already repented, they receive atonement immediately. Therefore, it is assumed that the Mishna is referring to one who has not yet repented. This accords with the opinion of Rebbi who holds that Yom Kippur atones even for sins for which one has not yet repented. The rabbis disagree and hold that Yom Kippur only atones for sins if one has repented. A difficulty is raised as the next part of the Mishna accords with Rabbi Yehuda's position that the goat sent to Azazel atones for kohanim as well. This issue is resolved - both parts of the Mishna are attributed to Rebbi, and on the issue of the goat to Azazel, he adopts Rabbi Yehuda's position. Abaye asked Rav Yosef if Rabbi Yehuda holds by Rebbi's position regarding one who did not repent before Yom Kippur. Rav Yosef explains that he does not and brings a source from Safra to support his answer, as it is known that an unattributed Safra is assumed to be authored by Rabbi Yehuda. There is a contradiction between two different sources in the Safra - one says that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance and the other says it only atones with repentance. Abaye and Rava each resolve the contradiction differently. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which sacrifices on Yom Kippur atone for all the kohanim's sins - the goat that is sent to Azazel or the bull of the high priest. What is the basis in the verses in the Torah for each of the approaches? A braita is brought regarding which sacrifice atones for the sins of the kohanim. Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the braita's author is Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Yehuda.

This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi to the continued health and good outcome for Chesya Rut bat Chana.  The Mishna explains that Yom Kippur atones for positive commandments. If one has already repented, they receive atonement immediately. Therefore, it is assumed that the Mishna is referring to one who has not yet repented. This accords with the opinion of Rebbi who holds that Yom Kippur atones even for sins for which one has not yet repented. The rabbis disagree and hold that Yom Kippur only atones for sins if one has repented. A difficulty is raised as the next part of the Mishna accords with Rabbi Yehuda's position that the goat sent to Azazel atones for kohanim as well. This issue is resolved - both parts of the Mishna are attributed to Rebbi, and on the issue of the goat to Azazel, he adopts Rabbi Yehuda's position. Abaye asked Rav Yosef if Rabbi Yehuda holds by Rebbi's position regarding one who did not repent before Yom Kippur. Rav Yosef explains that he does not and brings a source from Safra to support his answer, as it is known that an unattributed Safra is assumed to be authored by Rabbi Yehuda. There is a contradiction between two different sources in the Safra - one says that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance and the other says it only atones with repentance. Abaye and Rava each resolve the contradiction differently. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which sacrifices on Yom Kippur atone for all the kohanim's sins - the goat that is sent to Azazel or the bull of the high priest. What is the basis in the verses in the Torah for each of the approaches? A braita is brought regarding which sacrifice atones for the sins of the kohanim. Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the braita's author is Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Yehuda.

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters.  How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition. 

Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters.  How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition. 

Rav holds that if even the poor person's tithe wasn't separated, the produce is considered tevel and one who eats it receives lashes. The tannaitic opinion of Rabbi Yosi supports this. Rav Yosef explains that this is a tannaitic debate, as seen in a disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis. However, Abaye rejects Rav Yosef's explanation of the debate and claims it could be based on a different issue. The rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree in the Mishna regarding the requisite amount that one must eat of untithed produce to receive lashes - is it any amount or an olive-bulk? Rabbi Shimon, who holds it is any amount, questions the rabbis from the prohibition to eat an ant, for which one receives lashes even for eating just one. The rabbis counter by explaining that an ant is a complete creature and therefore has significance. But Rabbi Shimon responds that a complete grain of wheat also has significance. Rav Bivi and Rabbi Yirmia disagree about what Reish Lakish held about this debate - is it only about a grain of wheat or even about flour, as the flour is ground and not a complete grain and perhaps it loses its significance? Other sins are listed regarding sins concerning the Temple for which one would get lashes. The opinion in the Mishna matches Rabbi Akiva's opinion, which was also his student Rabbi Shimon's opinion, as can be found in a braita. Rabbi Shimon's derivation in the braita is questioned and rejected.

Rav holds that if even the poor person's tithe wasn't separated, the produce is considered tevel and one who eats it receives lashes. The tannaitic opinion of Rabbi Yosi supports this. Rav Yosef explains that this is a tannaitic debate, as seen in a disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis. However, Abaye rejects Rav Yosef's explanation of the debate and claims it could be based on a different issue. The rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree in the Mishna regarding the requisite amount that one must eat of untithed produce to receive lashes - is it any amount or an olive-bulk? Rabbi Shimon, who holds it is any amount, questions the rabbis from the prohibition to eat an ant, for which one receives lashes even for eating just one. The rabbis counter by explaining that an ant is a complete creature and therefore has significance. But Rabbi Shimon responds that a complete grain of wheat also has significance. Rav Bivi and Rabbi Yirmia disagree about what Reish Lakish held about this debate - is it only about a grain of wheat or even about flour, as the flour is ground and not a complete grain and perhaps it loses its significance? Other sins are listed regarding sins concerning the Temple for which one would get lashes. The opinion in the Mishna matches Rabbi Akiva's opinion, which was also his student Rabbi Shimon's opinion, as can be found in a braita. Rabbi Shimon's derivation in the braita is questioned and rejected.

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1441!!יח ניסןRav Yosef Dov Soloveitchikרב יוסף דב ב״ר משה הלוי סולובייצ׳יקראש ישיבת רבינו יצחק אלחנן(1903 - 1993)----------------------------------------------------Upcoming Nissan Yahrtzeits18. Yad Ramah, Rav JB Soloveitchik19. Rav Menachem Ziemba, Rebbetzin Bruria David20. Rav Hai Gaon21. Krias Yam Suf22. Mishnah LaMelech, Rav Itzikel of Vorki23. Mabit, Kaliver Rebbe24. Mateh Moshe25. Divrei Chaim26. Yehoshua bin Nun, Machaneh Efraim27. Kozhiglover Gaon, Rav Avigdor Miller28. Rav Nota Greenblatt29. Knesses Mordechai30. Ri Migash, Rav Chaim Vital, Rav Yaakov Emden----------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1437!!יג ניסן Rav Yosef CaroThe Beis YosefThe Mechaberרב יוסף ב״ר אפרים קארובית יוסףשלחן ערוך(1488 - 1575)----------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Kollel Iyun Halacha. Shuirim are held Sun-Thurs at 185 Miller Road Lakewood NJ. For more info email: kih185miller@gmail.com

Kollel Iyun Halacha. Shuirim are held Sun-Thurs at 185 Miller Road Lakewood NJ. For more info email: kih185miller@gmail.com

What is the definition of an apikoris? Several suggestions are brought, mainly related to one who does not treat the rabbis with the proper respect as it undermines belief in rabbinic Judaism. What is the definition of sefarim chitzoniyim, external literature, that if one reads them, one does not get a portion in the World-to-come, according to Rabbi Akiva? A braita says it is book of the Saducees. Rav Yosef says it is the book of Ben Sira. Abaye tries to understand what is wrong with learning it since many of the ideas there appear in the Tanach or in rabbinic thought.

What is the definition of an apikoris? Several suggestions are brought, mainly related to one who does not treat the rabbis with the proper respect as it undermines belief in rabbinic Judaism. What is the definition of sefarim chitzoniyim, external literature, that if one reads them, one does not get a portion in the World-to-come, according to Rabbi Akiva? A braita says it is book of the Saducees. Rav Yosef says it is the book of Ben Sira. Abaye tries to understand what is wrong with learning it since many of the ideas there appear in the Tanach or in rabbinic thought.

Yahrtzeit Yomi #1397!!יט אדר (שני)Rav Yosef Chaim SonnenfeldGuardian of Jerusalemרב יוסף חיים ב״ר אברהם שלמה זוננפלדהאיש על החומהשלמת חיים(1848 - 1932)----------------------------------------------------Adar Yahrtzeits1. Ibn Ezra, The Shach2. Rav Avrohom Kalmanowitz, The Beis Yisroel, Rav Berel Soloveitchik3. The Levush, R' Binyomin Kotzker, The Aderes4. Rav Leizer Gordon, Rav Dovid Karliner, Rav Avraham Blumenkrantz5. Rav Avraham Bing, Boyaner Rebbe6. Rav Naftali Amsterdam, Rav Dovid Povarsky7. Moshe Rabbeinu8. Nitra Rav, Rav Moshe Aaron Stern9. Rav Zalman Volozhiner, Rav Shmuel Auerbach10. Avodas HaGershuni11. Chida, Rashash, The Rogatchaver, Rav Shmuel Brudny12. Avnei Nezer, Rav Naftuli Halberstam (Bobov)13. Taanis Esther, Yom Nikanor, Rav Moshe Feinstein14. Rav Shimon Schwab15. Rav Chaim Kanievsky16. Rebuilding of Jerusalem, Pnei Menachem17. Rav Shimon Sofer, R' Meir Schuster18. Yesod V'Shoresh Ha'avodah, Rav Chatzkel Levenstein19. Rav YC Sonnenfeld, Rav Mordechai Schwab20. The Bach, Rav SZ Auerbach21. The Noam Elimelech, Rav YE Spector, Rav Yosef Zevin22. The Aruch HaShulchan, Rav Reuven Grozovsky23. Chiddushei HaRim, Rav Rephael Shapiro, Rav Yisroel Grossman, Mountaindale Roshei Yeshiva24. Rav Elya Boruch Finkel25. Dayan Fischer26. Sarah Schenirer, Rav Chaim Brim27. The Shoel U'meishiv, The Leshem, Rav CP Scheinberg28. The Machatzis Hashekel29. Rav Avraham Shaag, Rav Yaakov Kamenetzky, Dr. Joseph Kaminetzky----------------------------------------------------Share the Yahrtzeit Yomi link with your contacts!!https://chat.whatsapp.com/JimbwNtBaX31vmRDdnO3yk---------------------------------------------------To dedicate or sponsor, please contact 917-841-5059, or email yahrtzeityomidaily@gmail.com. Sponsorships can be paid by Zelle to the same number. First come, first served.Monthly sponsorships are $540.Weekly sponsorships are $180.Daily sponsorships are as follows:Dedications (l'Zecher Nishmas, Zechus shidduch/refuah/yeshuah, etc.) are $50.Sponsorships (fliers, advertising, promotions, additional links, etc.) are $100.The cost to request and sponsor a specific Tzaddik (unlisted on the Yahrtzeit Yomi schedule) is $180.MAY THE ZECHUS OF ALL THE TZADDIKIM PROTECT US FROM ALL TZAROS, AND MAY HASHEM GRANT US, AND ALL OF KLAL YISROEL, YESHUOS, NECHAMOS AND BESUROS TOVOS!!!

Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Sagui Dekel-Chen, Alexandre Troufanov, and Iair Horn after 498 days in captivity. Wishing them a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages.  Rabbi Zakai brought a braita which stated that one who performs multiple acts of idol worship in a single lapse of awareness is only liable for one sin offering. Rabbi Yochanan told him to teach this braita outside the study hall because the braita was corrupted. Rabbi Abba tried to justify Rabbi Zakai's words based on Rabbi Yosi's opinion in his dispute with Rabbi Natan regarding the laws of Shabbat - whether the prohibition of kindling fire was singled out as a negative commandment or to divide liability. However, Rav Yosef rejects this comparison as even Rabbi Yosi holds that if one does several actions in a single lapse of awareness, one will be liable to bring a sin offering for each one. The Gemara raises another difficulty and resolves it. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda brought a different version of the braita that Rabbi Zakai had presented to Rabbi Yochanan, which also dealt with someone who performs multiple acts and is only liable for one sin offering. The Gemara brings four possible explanations to understand the braita, concluding with the final one, and explaining why Rabbi Yochanan did not accept this braita from Rabbi Zakai.

Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Sagui Dekel-Chen, Alexandre Troufanov, and Iair Horn after 498 days in captivity. Wishing them a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages.  Rabbi Zakai brought a braita which stated that one who performs multiple acts of idol worship in a single lapse of awareness is only liable for one sin offering. Rabbi Yochanan told him to teach this braita outside the study hall because the braita was corrupted. Rabbi Abba tried to justify Rabbi Zakai's words based on Rabbi Yosi's opinion in his dispute with Rabbi Natan regarding the laws of Shabbat - whether the prohibition of kindling fire was singled out as a negative commandment or to divide liability. However, Rav Yosef rejects this comparison as even Rabbi Yosi holds that if one does several actions in a single lapse of awareness, one will be liable to bring a sin offering for each one. The Gemara raises another difficulty and resolves it. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda brought a different version of the braita that Rabbi Zakai had presented to Rabbi Yochanan, which also dealt with someone who performs multiple acts and is only liable for one sin offering. The Gemara brings four possible explanations to understand the braita, concluding with the final one, and explaining why Rabbi Yochanan did not accept this braita from Rabbi Zakai.

Study Guide Sanhedrin 57 This week's learning is sponsored by Efrat Avraham for the refuah shleima of a very brave soldier, Itamar Avraham ben Merav. A braita from the school of Menashe taught a different version of the seven Noahide laws, replacing the establishment of courts and cursing God with the prohibitions of castration and forbidden mixtures (kilayim). From what verses in the Torah  are these seven laws derived? A debate follows between Rav Yosef and Rav Sheshet, who share a tradition from Rav that not all Noahide laws carry the death penalty. They disagree on the number - either three or four are capital offenses. Contrasting this, Rav Yehuda and Rav Huna cite Rav as saying all Noahide laws are punishable by death. The Gemara raises a challenge from a braita about theft, but resolves it. This braita discusses legal distinctions between cases of gentiles stealing from other gentiles or Jews, and Jews stealing from gentiles. The braita mentions theft, the beautiful captive woman (eshet yefat toar), and "similar cases" - prompting questions about what cases are considered similar to theft and similar to the beautiful captive woman. The legal requirements for convicting a gentile are less stringent than those for convicting a Jewish person. A single judge can render the verdict, testimony from one witness is sufficient, even if the witness is related to the accused, and no formal warning is required beforehand. However, testimony from women is not accepted. Rabbi Yishmael holds that a gentile who strikes a pregnant woman causing fetal death is subject to capital punishment. What are the scriptural sources of these legal principles? There are two different verses used to establish that forbidden sexual relations are included in the Noahide laws, and the Gemara explains why two separate sources are necessary, as there are some cases where a Noahide will be judged according to Jewish law.    

Study Guide Sanhedrin 57 This week's learning is sponsored by Efrat Avraham for the refuah shleima of a very brave soldier, Itamar Avraham ben Merav. A braita from the school of Menashe taught a different version of the seven Noahide laws, replacing the establishment of courts and cursing God with the prohibitions of castration and forbidden mixtures (kilayim). From what verses in the Torah  are these seven laws derived? A debate follows between Rav Yosef and Rav Sheshet, who share a tradition from Rav that not all Noahide laws carry the death penalty. They disagree on the number - either three or four are capital offenses. Contrasting this, Rav Yehuda and Rav Huna cite Rav as saying all Noahide laws are punishable by death. The Gemara raises a challenge from a braita about theft, but resolves it. This braita discusses legal distinctions between cases of gentiles stealing from other gentiles or Jews, and Jews stealing from gentiles. The braita mentions theft, the beautiful captive woman (eshet yefat toar), and "similar cases" - prompting questions about what cases are considered similar to theft and similar to the beautiful captive woman. The legal requirements for convicting a gentile are less stringent than those for convicting a Jewish person. A single judge can render the verdict, testimony from one witness is sufficient, even if the witness is related to the accused, and no formal warning is required beforehand. However, testimony from women is not accepted. Rabbi Yishmael holds that a gentile who strikes a pregnant woman causing fetal death is subject to capital punishment. What are the scriptural sources of these legal principles? There are two different verses used to establish that forbidden sexual relations are included in the Noahide laws, and the Gemara explains why two separate sources are necessary, as there are some cases where a Noahide will be judged according to Jewish law.    

This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment? 

This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment? 

Study Guide Sanhedrin 47 Today's daf is dedicated in honor of the release of Yarden Bibas, Ofer Calderon, and Keith Siegal after 484 days in captivity. May we see the speedy release of all the rest of the hostages! Are eulogies primarily intended to honor the deceased or to comfort their relatives? After examining nine different textual sources, the Gemara concludes definitively that eulogies serve to honor the deceased. The Gemara discusses why there must be separate burial places for those executed by the court, explaining that righteous people cannot be buried alongside wicked people. The discussion explores the source in the Tanach for this requirement. Rabbi Yochanan makes two statements about sin offerings: If someone designates an animal as a sin offering but then becomes disqualified from bringing it (either by leaving Judaism or becoming mentally incompetent), that sacrifice can never be offered, even if the person later returns to a qualified state. This follows the principle that once an animal is rejected as a sacrifice, it remains permanently invalid. Rav Yosef reinforces this ruling by comparing it to the law of animals designated for sacrifice in an idolatrous city, arguing that just as the city's inhabitants receive atonement through death and yet the animals can never be brought for sacrificing. Abaye challenges this, as he holds that death does not automatically atone for sins. Rava attempts to support Rav Yosef by distinguishing between different types of death, but Abaye rejects these distinctions. While Abaye brings our Mishna to support his position, his proof is rejected.  A practical case arose where people were taking soil from Rav's grave as a remedy for illness. When concerned individuals asked Shmuel to prohibit this practice, citing the general prohibition against deriving benefit from grave-related items, Shmuel permitted it because soil still connected to the ground is not subject to this prohibition. The Gemara explores the source for this ruling, and although several challenges are raised to Shmuel's position, they are all successfully addressed. Rava and Abaye debate whether shrouds embroidered for a deceased person are prohibited from being used by others. Their fundamental disagreement centers on whether merely designating an item for use by the dead is sufficient to prohibit others from benefiting from it. The Gemara examines the textual sources each sage uses to support his position.

Study Guide Sanhedrin 47 Today's daf is dedicated in honor of the release of Yarden Bibas, Ofer Calderon, and Keith Siegal after 484 days in captivity. May we see the speedy release of all the rest of the hostages! Are eulogies primarily intended to honor the deceased or to comfort their relatives? After examining nine different textual sources, the Gemara concludes definitively that eulogies serve to honor the deceased. The Gemara discusses why there must be separate burial places for those executed by the court, explaining that righteous people cannot be buried alongside wicked people. The discussion explores the source in the Tanach for this requirement. Rabbi Yochanan makes two statements about sin offerings: If someone designates an animal as a sin offering but then becomes disqualified from bringing it (either by leaving Judaism or becoming mentally incompetent), that sacrifice can never be offered, even if the person later returns to a qualified state. This follows the principle that once an animal is rejected as a sacrifice, it remains permanently invalid. Rav Yosef reinforces this ruling by comparing it to the law of animals designated for sacrifice in an idolatrous city, arguing that just as the city's inhabitants receive atonement through death and yet the animals can never be brought for sacrificing. Abaye challenges this, as he holds that death does not automatically atone for sins. Rava attempts to support Rav Yosef by distinguishing between different types of death, but Abaye rejects these distinctions. While Abaye brings our Mishna to support his position, his proof is rejected.  A practical case arose where people were taking soil from Rav's grave as a remedy for illness. When concerned individuals asked Shmuel to prohibit this practice, citing the general prohibition against deriving benefit from grave-related items, Shmuel permitted it because soil still connected to the ground is not subject to this prohibition. The Gemara explores the source for this ruling, and although several challenges are raised to Shmuel's position, they are all successfully addressed. Rava and Abaye debate whether shrouds embroidered for a deceased person are prohibited from being used by others. Their fundamental disagreement centers on whether merely designating an item for use by the dead is sufficient to prohibit others from benefiting from it. The Gemara examines the textual sources each sage uses to support his position.

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of Yovel MorYosef and Yossi Cohen who were killed in a terror attack (ה טבת תשע"ט/ December 13, 2018) at Givat Assaf, on their 6th yahrzeit, and for the continued refuah shleima of her son, Netanel Ilan ben Shayna Tzipora, who was critically injured in the attack. Today's daf is sponsored by Aimee Kahan and Rabbi Joshua Waxman in loving memory of Alex Kahan, Eliyahu ben Shlomo ha-Kohen v'Aliza, on his first yahrzeit. "May his gentleness and wisdom continue to guide us all."  Today's daf is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie, who continues to learn with her each day on the fifth anniversary of starting daf yomi.  A kohen gadol cannot perform yibum - why doesn't the positive commandment to fulfill yibum override the negative commandment to not marry a widow? Rabbis Meir and Yehuda disagree about whether a kohen gadol can escort a close relative's dead body until the city limits (at a distance) or is he not allowed to escort the body at all. This debate centers on a verse in the Torah, "And he shall not leave the Temple." How can this verse be explained according to both positions? When the kohen gadol would go to comfort mourners in a shura (line meant to comfort mourners), where would he stand and where was everyone else positioned? What about when a shura was created to comfort the kohen gadol? How does a shura work? Originally the people walked in a line and the mourners stood in one place. Later it was changed to be the reverse due to a fight that ensued between people who each wanted to walk first. In Tzipori, Rabbi Yosi reinstated the original custom. He also instituted that a mother should never walk in the marketplace with her child behind her, as a child was once kidnapped from behind her and when she went and screamed for the child, someone showed her where the kidnappers were and she was raped. A third takana of Rabbi Yosi was that women should always talk when going to the bathroom in an outhouse so that a man who may approach will know she is there and will not accidentally be secluded with her (yichud). Rabbi Yoshiya ruled that to have a shura, there is a minimum requirement of ten people, in addition to the mourners. Rav Yosef narrows the law in the Mishna that a king cannot be a judge or be judged to the Israelite kings, not from the Davidic dynasty, as kings from the Davidic dynasty were commanded to judge. This law limiting other kings from being judged was created as a reaction to a story where Shimon ben Shatach demanded that King Yannai (his brother-in-law) appear in court regarding one of his slaves who had murdered someone. Yannai challenged Shimon's decision to judge him and beseeched the other judges to side with him. When they did not get up to defend Shimon's position, they were struck down by Gabriel (the angel) and killed. At that moment they realized the dangers of judging a king. If a king is not allowed to relinquish the honor due to him, how can Rabbi Yehuda permit a king to do yibum? For the sake of a mitzva, this can be overridden. The student of Rabbi Yosi asked him how David was able to marry two sisters, Meirav and Michal? Rabbi Yosi answered that he married Michal after Meirav had died. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha brings a different answer - the betrothal to Meriav was never effective. The details of the story and how to explain certain complicated verses are explained according to both commentaries. One who raises someone else's children, those children are considered their own. This is proved by several verses in the Tanach. 

Today’s daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of Yovel MorYosef and Yossi Cohen who were killed in a terror attack (ה טבת תשע"ט/ December 13, 2018) at Givat Assaf, on their 6th yahrzeit, and for the continued refuah shleima of her son, Netanel Ilan ben Shayna Tzipora, who was critically injured in the attack. Today's daf is sponsored by Aimee Kahan and Rabbi Joshua Waxman in loving memory of Alex Kahan, Eliyahu ben Shlomo ha-Kohen v'Aliza, on his first yahrzeit. "May his gentleness and wisdom continue to guide us all."  Today's daf is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie, who continues to learn with her each day on the fifth anniversary of starting daf yomi.  A kohen gadol cannot perform yibum - why doesn't the positive commandment to fulfill yibum override the negative commandment to not marry a widow? Rabbis Meir and Yehuda disagree about whether a kohen gadol can escort a close relative's dead body until the city limits (at a distance) or is he not allowed to escort the body at all. This debate centers on a verse in the Torah, "And he shall not leave the Temple." How can this verse be explained according to both positions? When the kohen gadol would go to comfort mourners in a shura (line meant to comfort mourners), where would he stand and where was everyone else positioned? What about when a shura was created to comfort the kohen gadol? How does a shura work? Originally the people walked in a line and the mourners stood in one place. Later it was changed to be the reverse due to a fight that ensued between people who each wanted to walk first. In Tzipori, Rabbi Yosi reinstated the original custom. He also instituted that a mother should never walk in the marketplace with her child behind her, as a child was once kidnapped from behind her and when she went and screamed for the child, someone showed her where the kidnappers were and she was raped. A third takana of Rabbi Yosi was that women should always talk when going to the bathroom in an outhouse so that a man who may approach will know she is there and will not accidentally be secluded with her (yichud). Rabbi Yoshiya ruled that to have a shura, there is a minimum requirement of ten people, in addition to the mourners. Rav Yosef narrows the law in the Mishna that a king cannot be a judge or be judged to the Israelite kings, not from the Davidic dynasty, as kings from the Davidic dynasty were commanded to judge. This law limiting other kings from being judged was created as a reaction to a story where Shimon ben Shatach demanded that King Yannai (his brother-in-law) appear in court regarding one of his slaves who had murdered someone. Yannai challenged Shimon's decision to judge him and beseeched the other judges to side with him. When they did not get up to defend Shimon's position, they were struck down by Gabriel (the angel) and killed. At that moment they realized the dangers of judging a king. If a king is not allowed to relinquish the honor due to him, how can Rabbi Yehuda permit a king to do yibum? For the sake of a mitzva, this can be overridden. The student of Rabbi Yosi asked him how David was able to marry two sisters, Meirav and Michal? Rabbi Yosi answered that he married Michal after Meirav had died. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha brings a different answer - the betrothal to Meriav was never effective. The details of the story and how to explain certain complicated verses are explained according to both commentaries. One who raises someone else's children, those children are considered their own. This is proved by several verses in the Tanach. 

Due to the brave actions of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who defied the Roman decree forbidding semicha (ordination), the tradition of rabbinic ordination continued. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was killed for this act, but not before he ordained Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamoa. Rav Avia added that Rabbi Nechemia was also ordained at this time. While the story appears to suggest that one person alone could perform ordination, this contradicts a braita requiring three judges. The Gemara resolves this contradiction by explaining that two others must have been present with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled that rabbinic ordination cannot occur outside of Israel. The Gemara explores whether someone in Israel could ordain someone in Babylonia through written authorization or a messenger. The conclusion is that ordination requires the physical presence of both parties - the ordainer and the one being ordained must be together in person, as demonstrated by several stories of failed attempts at ordination on account of the distance. Rabbi Zeira initially hid to avoid ordination, believing it better to remain humble and avoid positions of power. However, upon hearing that one's sins are forgiven when rising to a position of authority, he agreed to be ordained. Regarding the egla arufa ceremony, Rabbi Shimon holds it requires three judges, while Rabbi Yehuda requires five. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov presents a third position not mentioned in the Mishna - that the king and High Priest must also participate. Rav Yosef concludes that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov requires the entire Great Sanhedrin to attend, supporting this with a tannatic source. While Abaye interprets this source differently, a braita is brought supporting Rav Yosef's reading. Maaser sheni whose value is unclear must be evaluated by three people. What Is meant by the term "whose value is unclear"? What kind of people can do the evaluation? The Mishna also states that evaluation of consecrated movable items requires three judges. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's position requiring ten, which he derives from the word 'kohen' appearing ten times in Vayikra 27 in the section about consecrated items. The Gemara leaves unanswered the question of how the rabbis derive their requirement of three judges.

Due to the brave actions of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who defied the Roman decree forbidding semicha (ordination), the tradition of rabbinic ordination continued. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was killed for this act, but not before he ordained Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamoa. Rav Avia added that Rabbi Nechemia was also ordained at this time. While the story appears to suggest that one person alone could perform ordination, this contradicts a braita requiring three judges. The Gemara resolves this contradiction by explaining that two others must have been present with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled that rabbinic ordination cannot occur outside of Israel. The Gemara explores whether someone in Israel could ordain someone in Babylonia through written authorization or a messenger. The conclusion is that ordination requires the physical presence of both parties - the ordainer and the one being ordained must be together in person, as demonstrated by several stories of failed attempts at ordination on account of the distance. Rabbi Zeira initially hid to avoid ordination, believing it better to remain humble and avoid positions of power. However, upon hearing that one's sins are forgiven when rising to a position of authority, he agreed to be ordained. Regarding the egla arufa ceremony, Rabbi Shimon holds it requires three judges, while Rabbi Yehuda requires five. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov presents a third position not mentioned in the Mishna - that the king and High Priest must also participate. Rav Yosef concludes that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov requires the entire Great Sanhedrin to attend, supporting this with a tannatic source. While Abaye interprets this source differently, a braita is brought supporting Rav Yosef's reading. Maaser sheni whose value is unclear must be evaluated by three people. What Is meant by the term "whose value is unclear"? What kind of people can do the evaluation? The Mishna also states that evaluation of consecrated movable items requires three judges. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's position requiring ten, which he derives from the word 'kohen' appearing ten times in Vayikra 27 in the section about consecrated items. The Gemara leaves unanswered the question of how the rabbis derive their requirement of three judges.

Study Guide Sanhedrin 9 Today's daf is sponsored by Adina Gewirtz in loving memory of her father, Mel Rishe. "He loved learning, loved and served the state of Israel as a lawyer, and would be thrilled to see the learning that has flourished with Hadran."  Today’s daf is sponsored by Art Gould in loving memory of Carol Robinson's father Louis Robinson, Yehuda Leib ben Moshe, z”l. “Today, the first day of Hanukkah, we mark his 25th yahrtzeit. Lou was a devoted family man and active participant in his synagogue. He could fix anything. When one of his girls was on a date, he never went to bed until she was safely home."  Under what circumstances do Rabbi Meir and the rabbis debate whether a defamation case should be heard by a court of three or twenty-three judges, and what underlies their disagreement? Four additional suggestions are presented (bringing the total to eight) to address this question. Rav Yosef presents a law concerning defamation. Generally, when someone faces both capital punishment and a monetary obligation for the same act, they are exempt from the monetary payment. However, in a defamation case, there can be a situation where both penalties apply. If a husband brings witnesses against his wife, and then the father brings witnesses who prove the first group to be eidim zomemim (false witnesses), and subsequently the husband brings witnesses who prove the father's witnesses to be zomemim, the father's witnesses receive both capital punishment (for attempting to have the first group of witnesses executed) and must pay the husband (the penalty he would have owed his wife had their testimony been accepted). These dual punishments are possible because the death penalty stems from their attempt to execute the husband's witnesses, while the monetary payment relates to their attempted financial penalty to the husband himself. Rav Yosef offers a second ruling: When someone testifies against another person but incriminates themselves in the process, their entire testimony is inadmissible because they are considered a sinner, and a sinner's testimony is not accepted in court. Rava, however, disagrees. He maintains that we can divide the testimony, accepting what the witness says about others while disregarding their self-incriminating statements, since one's testimony against oneself is not legally binding for self-incrimination.

Study Guide Sanhedrin 9 Today's daf is sponsored by Adina Gewirtz in loving memory of her father, Mel Rishe. "He loved learning, loved and served the state of Israel as a lawyer, and would be thrilled to see the learning that has flourished with Hadran."  Today’s daf is sponsored by Art Gould in loving memory of Carol Robinson's father Louis Robinson, Yehuda Leib ben Moshe, z”l. “Today, the first day of Hanukkah, we mark his 25th yahrtzeit. Lou was a devoted family man and active participant in his synagogue. He could fix anything. When one of his girls was on a date, he never went to bed until she was safely home."  Under what circumstances do Rabbi Meir and the rabbis debate whether a defamation case should be heard by a court of three or twenty-three judges, and what underlies their disagreement? Four additional suggestions are presented (bringing the total to eight) to address this question. Rav Yosef presents a law concerning defamation. Generally, when someone faces both capital punishment and a monetary obligation for the same act, they are exempt from the monetary payment. However, in a defamation case, there can be a situation where both penalties apply. If a husband brings witnesses against his wife, and then the father brings witnesses who prove the first group to be eidim zomemim (false witnesses), and subsequently the husband brings witnesses who prove the father's witnesses to be zomemim, the father's witnesses receive both capital punishment (for attempting to have the first group of witnesses executed) and must pay the husband (the penalty he would have owed his wife had their testimony been accepted). These dual punishments are possible because the death penalty stems from their attempt to execute the husband's witnesses, while the monetary payment relates to their attempted financial penalty to the husband himself. Rav Yosef offers a second ruling: When someone testifies against another person but incriminates themselves in the process, their entire testimony is inadmissible because they are considered a sinner, and a sinner's testimony is not accepted in court. Rava, however, disagrees. He maintains that we can divide the testimony, accepting what the witness says about others while disregarding their self-incriminating statements, since one's testimony against oneself is not legally binding for self-incrimination.

Abaye questions Rav Yosef's difficulty with Rav Yehuda and Rav Yirmia's interpretation of the Mishna by showing that sometimes the Mishna uses the word "karka (land)" to include movable items (metaltelin) and "kol shehu (any amount)" can refer to a particular size (larger than just any amount). One Mishna is in Peah 3:8 regarding the language used to free a slave. The other is in Chulin 11:2 regarding the first shearings where "kol shehu" means a particular amount. However, in conclusion, they explain these words in the above-mentioned Mishnayot as exceptions to the rule, and Abaye's difficulty against Rav Yosef is resolved. What is the difference between one who says "My metaltelin (movable property)should be given to...," "All my metaltelin (movable property) should be given to...," and "Anything that is metaltel (can be moved) should be given to..."?  Are slaves considered property (karka) or movable items (metaltelin)? Two sources are brought to prove that they are categorized as movable property, but both suggestions are rejected.  Five cases are brought where the halakha will only be effective if ALL of one's property is included. Regarding four out of five of these rulings, "all of one's property" includes movable and non-movable items, meaning that even if one were to leave out some movable items, the halakha would not be in effect. The one case where it does not include movable items is a woman who forfeits the right to collect her ketuba if all of the property is divided between her and the sons. If movable items were not divided, we can still assume she forfeited her right to collect the ketuba, as a ketuba can only be collected from land.  If one gives away all of one's "nechasim (possessions)," what items does that word include?

Abaye questions Rav Yosef's difficulty with Rav Yehuda and Rav Yirmia's interpretation of the Mishna by showing that sometimes the Mishna uses the word "karka (land)" to include movable items (metaltelin) and "kol shehu (any amount)" can refer to a particular size (larger than just any amount). One Mishna is in Peah 3:8 regarding the language used to free a slave. The other is in Chulin 11:2 regarding the first shearings where "kol shehu" means a particular amount. However, in conclusion, they explain these words in the above-mentioned Mishnayot as exceptions to the rule, and Abaye's difficulty against Rav Yosef is resolved. What is the difference between one who says "My metaltelin (movable property)should be given to...," "All my metaltelin (movable property) should be given to...," and "Anything that is metaltel (can be moved) should be given to..."?  Are slaves considered property (karka) or movable items (metaltelin)? Two sources are brought to prove that they are categorized as movable property, but both suggestions are rejected.  Five cases are brought where the halakha will only be effective if ALL of one's property is included. Regarding four out of five of these rulings, "all of one's property" includes movable and non-movable items, meaning that even if one were to leave out some movable items, the halakha would not be in effect. The one case where it does not include movable items is a woman who forfeits the right to collect her ketuba if all of the property is divided between her and the sons. If movable items were not divided, we can still assume she forfeited her right to collect the ketuba, as a ketuba can only be collected from land.  If one gives away all of one's "nechasim (possessions)," what items does that word include?

Study Guide Bava Batra 149 What language must be used for a gift stated on one's deathbed to be valid? If one sells all of one's property on one's deathbed, is it a valid sale if one recovers from one's illness? If one admits on one's deathbed that one owes money, do we believe the admission or is it possible the person is lying and just wants to show they don’t have a lot of money? A story is brought with Issur the convert and how he was able to use this (an admission) as a solution to passing on his money that was in Rava’s possession (as Rava was watching it for him) to his son, who was conceived before his conversion and therefore was unable to inherit the money. The Mishna says the gift is valid if one divides up one's possessions on one's deathbed but leaves over land of any amount, and then recovers. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that "any amount" actually means an amount worthy of sustaining him/her. Rav Yirmiya bar Abba says that even if one leaves movable items worthy of sustaining the person. Rav Zeira supports their opinions and Rav Yosef questions them based on the wording in the Mishna ("land" and "any amount"). Abaye supports Rabbi Zeira from a Mishna in Peah where land includes movable items.

Study Guide Bava Batra 149 What language must be used for a gift stated on one's deathbed to be valid? If one sells all of one's property on one's deathbed, is it a valid sale if one recovers from one's illness? If one admits on one's deathbed that one owes money, do we believe the admission or is it possible the person is lying and just wants to show they don’t have a lot of money? A story is brought with Issur the convert and how he was able to use this (an admission) as a solution to passing on his money that was in Rava’s possession (as Rava was watching it for him) to his son, who was conceived before his conversion and therefore was unable to inherit the money. The Mishna says the gift is valid if one divides up one's possessions on one's deathbed but leaves over land of any amount, and then recovers. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that "any amount" actually means an amount worthy of sustaining him/her. Rav Yirmiya bar Abba says that even if one leaves movable items worthy of sustaining the person. Rav Zeira supports their opinions and Rav Yosef questions them based on the wording in the Mishna ("land" and "any amount"). Abaye supports Rabbi Zeira from a Mishna in Peah where land includes movable items.

A contradiction was brought from a braita against the Mishna regarding returning reciprocal gifts for a wedding (shushbinim). There were three resolutions. The third established the case of the Mishna of one when the groom died and left a yabam, a brother to perform levirate marriage. When the gifts are given to the yabam, he must share them with his brothers. To raise a difficulty against this answer they compare the case to one where the groom dies after betrothal and before the marriage. Just as in that case, the money from the betrothal does not have to be returned as the woman can claim that it is not her fault that they are not getting married, likewise with the shushbinim, the family that first received gifts can claim that there is no need for them to send gifts if the groom is no longer alive since they did not rejoice with him at the wedding. However, Rav Yosef explains that the cases aren't comparable as the case with the yabam was one where the other family did join the brother's wedding before he died and rejoiced with him, but did not yet bring the gifts. The Gemara attempts to establish that the opinion mentioned previously, that a woman does not have to return the money of the betrothal if the husband died as she can claim it was not her fault they never got married, is a subject of a tannaitic debate. However, this suggestion is rejected and the tannaitic debate is explained to be regarding a case where the woman, not the man, died and the debate is whether or not betrothal money was meant to be given and kept even if the marriage never happened. If one holds that it was not intended to be kept even if the marriage never happened, the woman's heirs would need to return the money if that was the custom in the place where they lived. That issue was not only a debate between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the source quoted previously, but also can help explain a debate in a different braita between Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yossi. In the time of the amoraim, there were different opinions about whether the betrothal money would be returned or whether other gifts given from the groom to the bride were to be returned. The five unique laws that govern the shushbinot gifts. The court can enforce its collection. It is returned only when the one who gave first gets married. There is no interest if the reciprocal gift is larger than the first. It is not canceled in the shmita year like other loans. And a firstborn would not collect a double portion if the father was owed shushbinot gifts for his sons. If one doesn't attend the wedding, one is still obligated to bring reciprocal gifts. However, if he was not invited to the wedding, while he still needs to pay, he can hold a grievance against the person. However, since he did not eat at the wedding, he can deduct the amount he would have eaten from his gift. How is the amount of the deduction calculated? A braita sets up various cases in which one is not obligated to return the shushbinot. In the context of that braita, they mention a public wedding (pumbi) and therefore another braita that mentions this word pumbi in a different context is brought. That braita quotes various drashot comparing one who is wealthy in different types of property to one who is wealthy in different types of Torah knowledge. What is the ideal? Rav and Rava deliberation about whether it is better to master Mishna or better to matter Talmud. They each derive their opinion from Proverbs 15:15. Other drashot are brought on that verse which relate to middot or other things that will make a person happy or will cause them to lead an unhappy life. Some of these sources view having a happy life as a good thing whereas others do not view it in a positive light.

A contradiction was brought from a braita against the Mishna regarding returning reciprocal gifts for a wedding (shushbinim). There were three resolutions. The third established the case of the Mishna of one when the groom died and left a yabam, a brother to perform levirate marriage. When the gifts are given to the yabam, he must share them with his brothers. To raise a difficulty against this answer they compare the case to one where the groom dies after betrothal and before the marriage. Just as in that case, the money from the betrothal does not have to be returned as the woman can claim that it is not her fault that they are not getting married, likewise with the shushbinim, the family that first received gifts can claim that there is no need for them to send gifts if the groom is no longer alive since they did not rejoice with him at the wedding. However, Rav Yosef explains that the cases aren't comparable as the case with the yabam was one where the other family did join the brother's wedding before he died and rejoiced with him, but did not yet bring the gifts. The Gemara attempts to establish that the opinion mentioned previously, that a woman does not have to return the money of the betrothal if the husband died as she can claim it was not her fault they never got married, is a subject of a tannaitic debate. However, this suggestion is rejected and the tannaitic debate is explained to be regarding a case where the woman, not the man, died and the debate is whether or not betrothal money was meant to be given and kept even if the marriage never happened. If one holds that it was not intended to be kept even if the marriage never happened, the woman's heirs would need to return the money if that was the custom in the place where they lived. That issue was not only a debate between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the source quoted previously, but also can help explain a debate in a different braita between Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yossi. In the time of the amoraim, there were different opinions about whether the betrothal money would be returned or whether other gifts given from the groom to the bride were to be returned. The five unique laws that govern the shushbinot gifts. The court can enforce its collection. It is returned only when the one who gave first gets married. There is no interest if the reciprocal gift is larger than the first. It is not canceled in the shmita year like other loans. And a firstborn would not collect a double portion if the father was owed shushbinot gifts for his sons. If one doesn't attend the wedding, one is still obligated to bring reciprocal gifts. However, if he was not invited to the wedding, while he still needs to pay, he can hold a grievance against the person. However, since he did not eat at the wedding, he can deduct the amount he would have eaten from his gift. How is the amount of the deduction calculated? A braita sets up various cases in which one is not obligated to return the shushbinot. In the context of that braita, they mention a public wedding (pumbi) and therefore another braita that mentions this word pumbi in a different context is brought. That braita quotes various drashot comparing one who is wealthy in different types of property to one who is wealthy in different types of Torah knowledge. What is the ideal? Rav and Rava deliberation about whether it is better to master Mishna or better to matter Talmud. They each derive their opinion from Proverbs 15:15. Other drashot are brought on that verse which relate to middot or other things that will make a person happy or will cause them to lead an unhappy life. Some of these sources view having a happy life as a good thing whereas others do not view it in a positive light.

Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Geri Goldstein Geudalia's grandson, Moshe, on his bar mitzvah in Ottawa, Canada this Shabbat.  In explaining why the commitment of the father to his son, "I will give you a portion with all your yet-to-be-born children" is ineffective, it is compared to one who says "Acquire it like a donkey." If one says to another, "You and a donkey shall acquire the item" is the kinyan effective? Rav Nachman holds that the person acquires half, Rav Hamnuna holds this is entirely ineffective and Rav Sheshet holds that the person acquires the entire item. Rav Sheshet brings a source regarding teruma to prove his position. However, this proof is rejected. Rav Avia brings a difficulty against those who were against Rav Sheshet's position from a case regarding a man who betrothed five women, two of whom could not be betrothed by him in this way as they were sisters (kiddushin that are not able to be consummated, shelo nimseru l'bia). Since the betrothal is effective to some, it can be compared to the "you and the donkey" case. However, this is also rejected as the case was misunderstood by Rav Avia and in fact, the man only had already excluded the sisters in the act of betrothal as he said, "Whoever is eligible to have relations with me will be betrothed." Therefore, the case is not similar at all to the donkey case. If one says, I will give my wife and my sons my possessions, does she get 50% or an equal share with all the sons? Rav Yosef ruled that she receives half and proved it from a verse about the lechem hapanim (shewbread) being divided between Aharon and his sons, where Aharon received half. Abaye rejects the comparison and rules that she receives an equal share. This is questioned in light of rulings where rabbis granted the wife half, and a ruling of Rebbi regarding a division of taxes. However, the ruling of Rebbi is rejected as it is more similar to the case of Aharon and his sons, than to the case of the woman and her sons. A difficulty is raised against Rav Yosef's ruling from the laws regarding dividing up a large meal offering into two vessels. However, the comparison to the meal offering is rejected as well. The halakha is like Rav Yosef in this case and in two others previously cited in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 12b and Bava Batra 114a). If one sends silk to his family, how is it divided between sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law? If one has one son and one daughter and promised his property to his "sons", does that wording include the daughter as well? If one has one son and a grandson and promises his property to his "sons" does that include his grandson? When the estate is not yet divided and the older children invest the property, are the proceeds divided evenly between all the brothers or only the ones who invested? On what does it depend?

Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Geri Goldstein Geudalia's grandson, Moshe, on his bar mitzvah in Ottawa, Canada this Shabbat.  In explaining why the commitment of the father to his son, "I will give you a portion with all your yet-to-be-born children" is ineffective, it is compared to one who says "Acquire it like a donkey." If one says to another, "You and a donkey shall acquire the item" is the kinyan effective? Rav Nachman holds that the person acquires half, Rav Hamnuna holds this is entirely ineffective and Rav Sheshet holds that the person acquires the entire item. Rav Sheshet brings a source regarding teruma to prove his position. However, this proof is rejected. Rav Avia brings a difficulty against those who were against Rav Sheshet's position from a case regarding a man who betrothed five women, two of whom could not be betrothed by him in this way as they were sisters (kiddushin that are not able to be consummated, shelo nimseru l'bia). Since the betrothal is effective to some, it can be compared to the "you and the donkey" case. However, this is also rejected as the case was misunderstood by Rav Avia and in fact, the man only had already excluded the sisters in the act of betrothal as he said, "Whoever is eligible to have relations with me will be betrothed." Therefore, the case is not similar at all to the donkey case. If one says, I will give my wife and my sons my possessions, does she get 50% or an equal share with all the sons? Rav Yosef ruled that she receives half and proved it from a verse about the lechem hapanim (shewbread) being divided between Aharon and his sons, where Aharon received half. Abaye rejects the comparison and rules that she receives an equal share. This is questioned in light of rulings where rabbis granted the wife half, and a ruling of Rebbi regarding a division of taxes. However, the ruling of Rebbi is rejected as it is more similar to the case of Aharon and his sons, than to the case of the woman and her sons. A difficulty is raised against Rav Yosef's ruling from the laws regarding dividing up a large meal offering into two vessels. However, the comparison to the meal offering is rejected as well. The halakha is like Rav Yosef in this case and in two others previously cited in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 12b and Bava Batra 114a). If one sends silk to his family, how is it divided between sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law? If one has one son and one daughter and promised his property to his "sons", does that wording include the daughter as well? If one has one son and a grandson and promises his property to his "sons" does that include his grandson? When the estate is not yet divided and the older children invest the property, are the proceeds divided evenly between all the brothers or only the ones who invested? On what does it depend?

If one performs a transaction with a kinyan chalipin, a symbolic act of acquiring, until what point can each side renege on the agreement? Raba and Rav Yosef differ on this point. Rav Yosef supports his opinion from the statement of Rav Yehuda regarding three who went to visit a dying person who can function as a court regarding dividing up the dying person's property. However, Raba rejects his proof. Why did the Mishna need to list the people who inherit but do not bequeath to each other, as it can be derived from the previous section of those who bequeath but do not inherit? The answer is that they wanted to teach something additional by connecting two of the three cases - a woman from her son and a woman from her husband - just as a husband does not inherit property the wife inherits after her death (property she would have inherited, were she still alive), a son does not inherit property from his mother if he is no longer alive to pass to his paternal brothers. Rabbi Yochanan quotes a statement of Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Shimon that a mother inherits her son.

If one performs a transaction with a kinyan chalipin, a symbolic act of acquiring, until what point can each side renege on the agreement? Raba and Rav Yosef differ on this point. Rav Yosef supports his opinion from the statement of Rav Yehuda regarding three who went to visit a dying person who can function as a court regarding dividing up the dying person's property. However, Raba rejects his proof. Why did the Mishna need to list the people who inherit but do not bequeath to each other, as it can be derived from the previous section of those who bequeath but do not inherit? The answer is that they wanted to teach something additional by connecting two of the three cases - a woman from her son and a woman from her husband - just as a husband does not inherit property the wife inherits after her death (property she would have inherited, were she still alive), a son does not inherit property from his mother if he is no longer alive to pass to his paternal brothers. Rabbi Yochanan quotes a statement of Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Shimon that a mother inherits her son.

Rav Yosef brings a braita to clarify whether we hold that wine that is turning to vinegar one should say borei pri hagafen or shehakol. However, the braita had several interpretations and it was therefore unclear which opinion Rav Yosef was trying to prove from the braita.   If one purchases wine and it goes bad soon after, is the seller responsible to give the buyer new wine? What is the halakha regarding wine that was made from the leftover grapes that had already been used for making wine - is it considered wine or not?

This week's learning is sponsored by an anonymous donor for the safety of our chayalim, the recovery of those wounded and for the safe and speedy return of the hostages.  If one purchases three trees, what is the minimum and maximum space needed between the trees to enable the purchaser to acquire the land in between as well? Rav Nachman holds 8-16 cubits and Rav Yosef holds 4-6 cubits. After Abaye questions Rav Yosef from a Mishna that clearly supports Rav Nachman, Rav Yosef supports his position based on a ruling of Rav Yehuda in a particular case. A Mishna is brought in support of Rav Yosef, as well, but Rav Nachman's position is stronger as the Mishna in support of his position had a situation where they ruled like his position. However, Rava explained that the halakha is from 4-16 cubits and a braita is brought in support of this position. Rabbi Yirmiya asks whether we measure from the lower wider part of the trunk or the higher narrower part. He also asks if three branches grew from one tree and were subsequently covered up and then sold, if there was the minimum distance required between the growths, would the buyer acquire the land as well? Rav Geviha answers both questions. Several questions were asked about situations where the three trees had two different owners or two in the field and one on the border (which was higher or lower than the field), or what if some large object was in the middle of the three trees like a water channel, public domain, etc.? All of these questions remain unanswered. However, if a cedar tree was between the three trees, it would not block the buyer from acquiring the land and the buyer even acquires the cedar tree. Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether the three trees are in a straight line or a triangular formation.  The Mishna explains that if one sells the head, legs, liver, or windpipe (with the lungs) of a large animal, the sale includes only the item mentioned. But in a small animal, the sale of the head would include the legs and the sale of the windpipe would include the liver, but not the reverse.  The Mishna lists four types of sales and explains in each case whether or not the buyer or the seller or both can renege on the agreement.   

This week's learning is sponsored by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 24th yahrzeit. "She had a "נותן בעין יפה" approach to her interactions with everyone she encountered. She was generous of heart, of mind and of spirit, and we miss her. Yehi zichra baruch." Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother, Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, Adina bat Aryeh Leib, on her 20th yahrzeit. "She was devoted to her husband, family, and the Beth El Synagogue community in New Rochelle, NY. Her two sons made Aliyah and her daughter has lived a professional life of service to the American Jewish community." Today's daf is sponsored by Ayala Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shulamit.  How does one determine if the branches grew out of the trunk or the ground to determine whether the growths belong to the owner of the tree or the owner of the land? Rav Nachman rules that a palm tree does not have laws of geza, the trunk. Rav Zevid and Rav Papa each understand this statement differently. If one purchases three trees, one acquires land with the trees. How much land does one acquire? Rabbi Yochanan rules that they acquire the land beneath each tree, between each tree, and, in addition, the amount of space needed for a fig gatherer to walk around with a basket. Rabbi Elazar raises a question about the space for the fig gatherer - if one does not get an access route, as per the rabbis' position that a seller sells sparingly (ayin ra'ah), how does the buyer get space for collecting? The land underneath and in between the trees can be used by the tree's owner for planting, but who has the right to plant in the area around the trees for the fig gatherer and basket? How much space can/should there be between the trees to consider them a field so that the purchaser will acquire the land? Rav Yosef and Rava disagree. Abaye raises a difficulty from a Mishna against Rav Yosef's position.

An unmarried woman whose father died can claim her dowry from up to one-tenth of the father’s estate. However, this amount can only be collected from 1/10 of the land of the father’s estate. Rav Nechemia, the son of Rav Yosef accorded a woman one-tenth of her father’s estate for her dowry and permitted the value of the estate to include moveable items that were attached to the ground as they are considered like land itself. Rav Ashi also included rental income from the father’s properties in the calculation for a daughter's dowry. If one sold a courtyard, an olive press, or a bathhouse, what items are included in the sale, and what items are not included in the sale? Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the mainstream opinion.

When one sells a house, it does not include certain parts of the house, unless the seller specifies that the sale includes everything in the house. The Mishna lists the properties not included in the sale – the yetzia, for which the Gemara brings two possible definitions, an inner room used for storage, and a room with a parapet of ten handsbreadths. Rav Yosef quotes a braita that says there are two other synonyms for the word yetzia – tzela and ta – and sources from the Torah and tannaitic sources are brought to show where these words are used. Mar Zutra qualifies the yetzia exclusion to one where the yetzia was four cubits. Ravina questions this but Mar Zutra resolves the difficulty. Why was it necessary for the Mishna to add the case of the room if one could have derived the ruling for the storage room from the yetzia? It teaches that even if the seller designates a border, and the storage room is included in the border, if the seller says “house,” the room is not included. This accords with two statements of Rav Nachman that the Gemara proceeds to analyze and establish the circumstances of the cases. Why did Rav Nachman need to teach about both cases – why couldn’t we have derived one from the other? The Gemara mentions certain terms and explains what would be included in a sale if that particular term was used, such as ara, arata, zihara, and nichsei.