Podcasts about Rava

Rav Hamnuna states in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the prohibition of oto v'et beno does not apply to consecrated animals (kodashim). This is based on Rabbi Shimon's principle that an invalid slaughter is not halakhically considered a slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya lo shema shechita), and since the meat of a sacrifice is not permitted for consumption until its blood is sprinkled, the slaughter itself is initially unfit. Rava challenges this using a text discussing various combinations of slaughtering consecutive sacrifices inside or outside the Temple courtyard (bifnim or bachutz), tracing the respective liabilities of karet and negative prohibitions under the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. To resolve the contradiction, Rava explains that Rabbi Shimon does acknowledge the prohibition for kodashim, but holds that one does not receive lashes for it because the warning given at the time of slaughter is a doubtful warning (hatra'at safek), as the validity of the slaughter depends on the future sprinkling of the blood, and a doubtful warning is legally invalid. The Mishna states that if one slaughters an animal and it is found to be a treifa, or slaughters it for idolatry, as a Red Heifer, an ox convicted to be stoned, or a broken-necked heifer, Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the prohibition of oto v'et beno because the slaughter is invalid since the animal is not permitted for consumption, while the Rabbis declare him liable. However, if the slaughter itself is physically disqualified, such as if the animal becomes a carcass during the shechita process or if one stabbed the animal, all agree he is exempt. Reish Lakish establishes the Mishna's liability (according to the Rabbis' position) for idolatry only when the first animal was slaughtered for idolatry and the second for consumption. If the second was for idolatry, the rule of kim lei b'draba minei applies (one incurs the capital punishment for idolatry and is exempt from the lashes of oto v'et beno) as one only receives the harsher of the two punishments. Rabbi Yochanan counters that even if the second animal was for idolatry, one can still be liable for lashes for oto v'et beno if one was warned specifically for that prohibition and not for idolatry. Reish Lakish maintains that since one would be exempt if properly warned for the capital crime, one remains exempt even without that warning, and even without receiving the harsher punishment. They have the same dispute regarding the rule of kim lei b'draba minei even in cases of death/lashes and monetary liability when one was not warned for the death/lashes.

Rav Hamnuna states in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the prohibition of oto v'et beno does not apply to consecrated animals (kodashim). This is based on Rabbi Shimon's principle that an invalid slaughter is not halakhically considered a slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya lo shema shechita), and since the meat of a sacrifice is not permitted for consumption until its blood is sprinkled, the slaughter itself is initially unfit. Rava challenges this using a text discussing various combinations of slaughtering consecutive sacrifices inside or outside the Temple courtyard (bifnim or bachutz), tracing the respective liabilities of karet and negative prohibitions under the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. To resolve the contradiction, Rava explains that Rabbi Shimon does acknowledge the prohibition for kodashim, but holds that one does not receive lashes for it because the warning given at the time of slaughter is a doubtful warning (hatra'at safek), as the validity of the slaughter depends on the future sprinkling of the blood, and a doubtful warning is legally invalid. The Mishna states that if one slaughters an animal and it is found to be a treifa, or slaughters it for idolatry, as a Red Heifer, an ox convicted to be stoned, or a broken-necked heifer, Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the prohibition of oto v'et beno because the slaughter is invalid since the animal is not permitted for consumption, while the Rabbis declare him liable. However, if the slaughter itself is physically disqualified, such as if the animal becomes a carcass during the shechita process or if one stabbed the animal, all agree he is exempt. Reish Lakish establishes the Mishna's liability (according to the Rabbis' position) for idolatry only when the first animal was slaughtered for idolatry and the second for consumption. If the second was for idolatry, the rule of kim lei b'draba minei applies (one incurs the capital punishment for idolatry and is exempt from the lashes of oto v'et beno) as one only receives the harsher of the two punishments. Rabbi Yochanan counters that even if the second animal was for idolatry, one can still be liable for lashes for oto v'et beno if one was warned specifically for that prohibition and not for idolatry. Reish Lakish maintains that since one would be exempt if properly warned for the capital crime, one remains exempt even without that warning, and even without receiving the harsher punishment. They have the same dispute regarding the rule of kim lei b'draba minei even in cases of death/lashes and monetary liability when one was not warned for the death/lashes.

In just one day, Elegy Anh's old life–her job, her purpose, and her future–is over. A prophecy predicts either she or her enemy, Rava Vidar, will lead their people to victory over the other...but they don't know which. Elegy and Rava are destined to collide, with the fate of their nations hanging in the balance. And when they do, only one will be left standing. Elegy intends to make sure it's her. #1 New York Times bestselling author of the Divergent series, and master of the dystopian genre, Veronica Roth, is back with an epic new adult dystopian novel, SEEK THE TRAITOR'S SON.  Thrilling and romantic, SEEK THE TRAITOR'S SON, is the harrowing story of two women on opposite sides of a war, bound together by a single man, who they are told will determine their fate. SEEK THE TRAITOR'S SON is Veronica Roth at the height of her power, with everything that made us all fall in love with dystopian adventures in the first place, while still bringing a fresh, exciting spin to the genre. Readers won't want to miss out on what is sure to be the blockbuster hit of the summer, and the next defining work in dystopian literature. Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/arroe-collins-unplugged-totally-uncut--994165/support.

If a bone is broken but the majority of its width is surrounded by flesh and skin, the animal is not considered a treifa—even if the break is above the knee joint (arkuva)—and the limb is not considered a limb severed from a living animal (ever min hachai). A case came before Rava where the bone was covered by a majority of "flesh" only when including soft sinews. Rava initially permitted this based on Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that soft sinews are considered like meat for fulfilling the mitzva of eating the Pesach sacrifice. However, Rav Papa challenged this from Reish Lakish's opposing view that such sinews do not count as meat, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan ultimately retracted his position, rendering the case forbidden. The Gemara clarifies additional questions regarding broken bones surrounded by skin and flesh in different manners, in some of which the flesh is no longer actually attached to the bone. The law of a ben pekua (a fetus found in its mother's womb after she was slaughtered) permits the fetus to be eaten without independent slaughter. This law also permits its placenta (shilya) to be eaten, as derived from the same verse from which the laws of ben pekua are derived. However, if even a small portion of the placenta emerged outside the womb prior to the mother's slaughter, it is forbidden to eat even the portion that remained inside out of concern that the head of the fetus may have emerged with it before the slaughter. If an animal carrying its first offspring miscarries a placenta, one does not have to treat the placenta with the sanctity of a firstborn (bechor). This is because perhaps the fetus inside was a female, and even if it was a male, perhaps it was a non-viable anomaly that is not fit for firstborn sanctity (such as a sheep that looks like a goat). In contrast, the placenta of a consecrated sacrifice is treated with sanctity, as sacrifices can also be brought from female animals, and therefore the likelihood of it having sanctity is much higher. The placenta is not considered food and therefore does not contract food impurity. Within this discussion, the Gemara inquires whether or not the hide of a domestic donkey that was cooked is susceptible to impurity. The Gemara presents two different versions of a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan regarding a placenta that emerges alongside a visible fetus. They debate whether perhaps there is a (second) hidden fetus inside the placenta, with each version of their debate applying this concern to different circumstances. Non-Jews used to bury placentas at intersections or hang them on trees as a superstitious remedy, and therefore these actions are forbidden under the prohibition of following non-Jewish customs (darchei ha-Emori). Regarding this, Abaye and Rava define the boundary, establishing that anything done for a proven medical remedy is permitted, while that which has no apparent medical benefit but is purely superstitious is forbidden.

If a bone is broken but the majority of its width is surrounded by flesh and skin, the animal is not considered a treifa—even if the break is above the knee joint (arkuva)—and the limb is not considered a limb severed from a living animal (ever min hachai). A case came before Rava where the bone was covered by a majority of "flesh" only when including soft sinews. Rava initially permitted this based on Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that soft sinews are considered like meat for fulfilling the mitzva of eating the Pesach sacrifice. However, Rav Papa challenged this from Reish Lakish's opposing view that such sinews do not count as meat, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan ultimately retracted his position, rendering the case forbidden. The Gemara clarifies additional questions regarding broken bones surrounded by skin and flesh in different manners, in some of which the flesh is no longer actually attached to the bone. The law of a ben pekua (a fetus found in its mother's womb after she was slaughtered) permits the fetus to be eaten without independent slaughter. This law also permits its placenta (shilya) to be eaten, as derived from the same verse from which the laws of ben pekua are derived. However, if even a small portion of the placenta emerged outside the womb prior to the mother's slaughter, it is forbidden to eat even the portion that remained inside out of concern that the head of the fetus may have emerged with it before the slaughter. If an animal carrying its first offspring miscarries a placenta, one does not have to treat the placenta with the sanctity of a firstborn (bechor). This is because perhaps the fetus inside was a female, and even if it was a male, perhaps it was a non-viable anomaly that is not fit for firstborn sanctity (such as a sheep that looks like a goat). In contrast, the placenta of a consecrated sacrifice is treated with sanctity, as sacrifices can also be brought from female animals, and therefore the likelihood of it having sanctity is much higher. The placenta is not considered food and therefore does not contract food impurity. Within this discussion, the Gemara inquires whether or not the hide of a domestic donkey that was cooked is susceptible to impurity. The Gemara presents two different versions of a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan regarding a placenta that emerges alongside a visible fetus. They debate whether perhaps there is a (second) hidden fetus inside the placenta, with each version of their debate applying this concern to different circumstances. Non-Jews used to bury placentas at intersections or hang them on trees as a superstitious remedy, and therefore these actions are forbidden under the prohibition of following non-Jewish customs (darchei ha-Emori). Regarding this, Abaye and Rava define the boundary, establishing that anything done for a proven medical remedy is permitted, while that which has no apparent medical benefit but is purely superstitious is forbidden.

The Gemara cites two conflicting statements of Rav regarding a hanging limb of an animal. In one statement, Rav rules that eating this limb incurs lashes, while in the other, he rules it does not. Rav Yosef resolves this contradiction: if the animal dies naturally, death causes legal detachment (oseh nipul), retroactively defining the hanging limb as ever min hachai (a limb from a living animal) which incurs lashes for one who eats it. Conversely, if the animal is slaughtered, slaughter does not cause legal detachment (eino oseh nipul), meaning the limb is not treated as a separate forbidden entity and the eater does not receive lashes. Rava brings a biblical source for this differentiation between death and slaughter, and the Gemara raises two difficulties against his proof but resolves them both. Rav Chisda and Rabba dispute whether the debate between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis - regarding whether slaughter causes legal detachment for an emerged fetal limb - applies only when the fetus is alive, or even when the fetus is dead. Rav Chisda holds that when the fetus is dead, the emerged limb is definitely considered detached and carries impurity. In the course of a back-and-forth argument between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, it was mentioned that slaughtering would not remove impurity from an eight-month fetus, as it is not viable, and there is no type of eight-month fetus that can be validly slaughtered. However, a braita states that there are eight-month fetuses that can be permitted by slaughter. Rav Kahana reconciles this by differentiating between slaughtering the fetus itself and permitting the animal via its mother's slaughter (ben pekua). Rav Hoshaya inquires whether a live nine-month-old fetus can be validly slaughtered while still in utero. This question is evaluated under the views of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Chananya attempts to resolve this inquiry from a braita, but his answer is ultimately rejected by Rava. The Mishna introduces a dispute regarding the laws of ben pekua and whether they apply to a fully formed, nine-month-old fetus found inside its slaughtered mother. Rabbi Meir rules that the laws of ben pekua do not apply here, and the fetus requires its own independent slaughter. Conversely, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that as long as the fetus is still inside the womb, it is covered by the laws of ben pekua and is permitted by the slaughter of the mother. Operating under the Rabbis' position, Rabbi Eleazar states in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the mother's slaughter only covers the animal born from this womb regarding the laws of eating. In other halakhot, this animal is considered a distinct entity and standard animal laws apply to it. The Gemara presents two versions of what Rabbi Oshaya's statement was coming to exclude: the first version suggests it excludes the animal's fat, sciatic nerve, and blood from the mother's exemption, while the second version suggests it excludes using the animal for work or illicit cross-breeding. The first version is ultimately rejected based on other sources, leaving the second version as the preferred explanation. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the blood of a ben pekua (a nine-month fetus) is permitted as well. Rabbi Yochanan raises one difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, which the Gemara subsequently resolves. According to the position of the Rabbis, a question is asked whether one can redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi disagree. A second question is asked whether a ben pekua that is still in utero can be considered a separate unit for the laws of ritual impurity. This is a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and each one raises a difficulty against the other's position.

The Gemara cites two conflicting statements of Rav regarding a hanging limb of an animal. In one statement, Rav rules that eating this limb incurs lashes, while in the other, he rules it does not. Rav Yosef resolves this contradiction: if the animal dies naturally, death causes legal detachment (oseh nipul), retroactively defining the hanging limb as ever min hachai (a limb from a living animal) which incurs lashes for one who eats it. Conversely, if the animal is slaughtered, slaughter does not cause legal detachment (eino oseh nipul), meaning the limb is not treated as a separate forbidden entity and the eater does not receive lashes. Rava brings a biblical source for this differentiation between death and slaughter, and the Gemara raises two difficulties against his proof but resolves them both. Rav Chisda and Rabba dispute whether the debate between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis - regarding whether slaughter causes legal detachment for an emerged fetal limb - applies only when the fetus is alive, or even when the fetus is dead. Rav Chisda holds that when the fetus is dead, the emerged limb is definitely considered detached and carries impurity. In the course of a back-and-forth argument between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, it was mentioned that slaughtering would not remove impurity from an eight-month fetus, as it is not viable, and there is no type of eight-month fetus that can be validly slaughtered. However, a braita states that there are eight-month fetuses that can be permitted by slaughter. Rav Kahana reconciles this by differentiating between slaughtering the fetus itself and permitting the animal via its mother's slaughter (ben pekua). Rav Hoshaya inquires whether a live nine-month-old fetus can be validly slaughtered while still in utero. This question is evaluated under the views of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Chananya attempts to resolve this inquiry from a braita, but his answer is ultimately rejected by Rava. The Mishna introduces a dispute regarding the laws of ben pekua and whether they apply to a fully formed, nine-month-old fetus found inside its slaughtered mother. Rabbi Meir rules that the laws of ben pekua do not apply here, and the fetus requires its own independent slaughter. Conversely, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that as long as the fetus is still inside the womb, it is covered by the laws of ben pekua and is permitted by the slaughter of the mother. Operating under the Rabbis' position, Rabbi Eleazar states in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the mother's slaughter only covers the animal born from this womb regarding the laws of eating. In other halakhot, this animal is considered a distinct entity and standard animal laws apply to it. The Gemara presents two versions of what Rabbi Oshaya's statement was coming to exclude: the first version suggests it excludes the animal's fat, sciatic nerve, and blood from the mother's exemption, while the second version suggests it excludes using the animal for work or illicit cross-breeding. The first version is ultimately rejected based on other sources, leaving the second version as the preferred explanation. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the blood of a ben pekua (a nine-month fetus) is permitted as well. Rabbi Yochanan raises one difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, which the Gemara subsequently resolves. According to the position of the Rabbis, a question is asked whether one can redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi disagree. A second question is asked whether a ben pekua that is still in utero can be considered a separate unit for the laws of ritual impurity. This is a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and each one raises a difficulty against the other's position.

NOTE: Another difficult episode, including mention of fetal death. Rava's understanding of the mishnah - specifically recognizing a different tradition coming from Pompedita regarding the impurity at a rabbinic level and not the level of a Torah prohibition. Including the impurity of a midwife who attends to a woman in travail. Also, a long mishnah - specifically with an eye to the purity and impurity of the animals in the fetal cases. And the impact of kosher slaughtering on the cases -- depending on the order of operations.

The Gemara presents biblical derivations establishing that undomesticated animals (chaya) are included in the legal category of domesticated animals (behema) and vice versa. This crossover applies to kosher signs, crossbreeding laws, sacrificial impurities, and miscarriages. The Mishna rules that if a fetus dies in utero and a midwife reaches inside and touches it, the midwife contracts seven-day corpse impurity, while the mother remains pure until the fetus emerges. Rabba establishes that just as absorbed impurity (tuma belua) does not pass on impurity, absorbed purity (tahara beluah cannot become impure. The Gemara seeks biblical and logical sources for these principles, evaluating various kal va-chomer (a fortiori) arguments, including extending this law to animals. Rava notes that both laws are already stated in Mishnayot concerning a swallowed ring, prompting the Gemara to clarify that Rabba's unique ruling applies to a case where someone swallows two rings simultaneously - one pure and one impure - and the impure ring does not make the pure one impure.

The Gemara presents biblical derivations establishing that undomesticated animals (chaya) are included in the legal category of domesticated animals (behema) and vice versa. This crossover applies to kosher signs, crossbreeding laws, sacrificial impurities, and miscarriages. The Mishna rules that if a fetus dies in utero and a midwife reaches inside and touches it, the midwife contracts seven-day corpse impurity, while the mother remains pure until the fetus emerges. Rabba establishes that just as absorbed impurity (tuma belua) does not pass on impurity, absorbed purity (tahara beluah cannot become impure. The Gemara seeks biblical and logical sources for these principles, evaluating various kal va-chomer (a fortiori) arguments, including extending this law to animals. Rava notes that both laws are already stated in Mishnayot concerning a swallowed ring, prompting the Gemara to clarify that Rabba's unique ruling applies to a case where someone swallows two rings simultaneously - one pure and one impure - and the impure ring does not make the pure one impure.

En el capítulo 1.154 de este viernes, 10 de julio, @tomicarrio les trae una entrevista con Soledad López, gerenta de desarrollo de Rava Bursátil, quien analizó el Programa Financiero 2026-2027 que presentó el Gobierno.

Le prime pagine dei principali quotidiani nazionali commentate in rassegna stampa da Davide Giacalone. Il blocco del Golfo di Hormuz,, la guerra di spie tra Roma e Russia, il campo largo e le contestazioni e le parole di Conte. Il disastro di Seveso, 50 anni fa. 10 luglio 1976. Abbiamo ricostruito quanto accaduto con la dott.ssa Lisa Casali, scienziata ambientale. La scomparsa ieri, a 75 anni, della cantante Bonnie Tyler. Il ricordo di Paolo Giordano, giornalista de Il Giornale. Spazio Mondiali. In collegamento la nostra squadra di Cronisti Mondiali. Con ognuno di loro abbiamo approfondito un tema. La Francia è la prima semifinalista, battuto il Marocco. Il commento della partita con Paolo Pacchioni. Stasera il quarto di finale tra Spagna e Belgio. Le ultime sulla Spagna con Tommaso Angelini. Il commento sul Belgio, con Nicolò Pompei. La Fondazione Francesca Rava ha compiuto 25 anni. Una storia raccontata nel libro "Ti cercherò per sempre" di Claudio Guerrini edito da Piemme, una raccolta di testimonianze dei tanti volontari. Con noi Mariavittoria Rava, presidente della Fondazione. I fatti di attualità commentati dalla direttrice di Qn e dei quotidiani del gruppo Monrif, Agnese Pini. All'interno di Non Stop News, con Barbara Sala, Ludovica Marafini e Dario Vanacore.

#TrasportareOggiOnAirL'ultima puntata di questa stagione è interamente dedicata a IVECO e al lancio del Model Year 2026.Ospiti: Marta Rava, Ezio Camusso e Andrea Martini (IVECO

There is a series of theological debates between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hananya and the Roman emperor, which demonstrate the sublimity of God through man's inability to look directly at the sun or to sustain the natural armies that serve God. A similar discussion with the emperor's daughter, who scoffed at the providence of God in the world, leads to a punishment of leprosy being inflicted upon her, emphasizing the principle that God's presence is indirectly guiding the world. Rav Yehuda defines the difference between the dimensions of an ox and a donkey that affect the laws of buying and selling. He also explains that the ox sacrificed by Adam possessed only a single horn on its forehead, and that its horns preceded its hooves in creation. This structural precedence supports the view of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, according to which all works of creation were created in their full stature, their full understanding, and their full mature form. Rabbi Chanina bar Papa expounds that the Angel of the World praised the grasses when they applied a kal v'chomer argument and proactively emerged according to their specific kinds (without intermixing), as derived from Genesis 1:11–12. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi reconciles the scriptural contradiction regarding the creation of the luminaries, detailing the moon's claim that two kings cannot share a single crown, which prompted the divine decree for it to diminish itself. To appease the moon, God granted it dominion by both day and night, linked Israel's calendar to the moon's counting of days and years, and called righteous people "small" like the moon. However, the moon was not appeased by all of these attempts, and God then established a sin offering to be offered on Rosh Chodesh (the New Moon) - a male goat - as an atonement for God. Rav Asi reconciles a contradiction in Creation regarding the emergence of vegetation, explaining that the grass remained hidden at the opening of the ground until the prayer of Adam brought down rain and caused them to sprout, teaching that God desires the prayers of the righteous. Rav Chanan bar Rava identifies the shesua as a unique creature possessing two backs and two spinal columns - as definitive proof that the Torah is from Heaven, as it is impossible to believe that Moshe knew of the existence of that creature. Reish Lakish analyzes a series of seemingly redundant verses, emphasizing that they constitute the core essentials of the Torah itself. For example, the description of the displacement of nations in the land of the Philistines and the land of Moab via intermediary conquests was legally meant to permit the eventual conquest of the land without violating ancient oaths or divine decrees.

There is a series of theological debates between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hananya and the Roman emperor, which demonstrate the sublimity of God through man's inability to look directly at the sun or to sustain the natural armies that serve God. A similar discussion with the emperor's daughter, who scoffed at the providence of God in the world, leads to a punishment of leprosy being inflicted upon her, emphasizing the principle that God's presence is indirectly guiding the world. Rav Yehuda defines the difference between the dimensions of an ox and a donkey that affect the laws of buying and selling. He also explains that the ox sacrificed by Adam possessed only a single horn on its forehead, and that its horns preceded its hooves in creation. This structural precedence supports the view of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, according to which all works of creation were created in their full stature, their full understanding, and their full mature form. Rabbi Chanina bar Papa expounds that the Angel of the World praised the grasses when they applied a kal v'chomer argument and proactively emerged according to their specific kinds (without intermixing), as derived from Genesis 1:11–12. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi reconciles the scriptural contradiction regarding the creation of the luminaries, detailing the moon's claim that two kings cannot share a single crown, which prompted the divine decree for it to diminish itself. To appease the moon, God granted it dominion by both day and night, linked Israel's calendar to the moon's counting of days and years, and called righteous people "small" like the moon. However, the moon was not appeased by all of these attempts, and God then established a sin offering to be offered on Rosh Chodesh (the New Moon) - a male goat - as an atonement for God. Rav Asi reconciles a contradiction in Creation regarding the emergence of vegetation, explaining that the grass remained hidden at the opening of the ground until the prayer of Adam brought down rain and caused them to sprout, teaching that God desires the prayers of the righteous. Rav Chanan bar Rava identifies the shesua as a unique creature possessing two backs and two spinal columns - as definitive proof that the Torah is from Heaven, as it is impossible to believe that Moshe knew of the existence of that creature. Reish Lakish analyzes a series of seemingly redundant verses, emphasizing that they constitute the core essentials of the Torah itself. For example, the description of the displacement of nations in the land of the Philistines and the land of Moab via intermediary conquests was legally meant to permit the eventual conquest of the land without violating ancient oaths or divine decrees.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye rules that although a standard hole in the windpipe requires the size of an issar (a coin), its clawing measurement (of redness) is a minimal amount, because the predator's venom burns and consumes the tissue continuously. Regarding the scope of the inspection required due to concern for venom, Rav Nachman testifies in the name of Rav that one must inspect from the base of the brain to the thigh, and not only adjacent to the intestines (as some hold). In an interesting story, Rabbi Yochanan defends the supreme authority of Rav against the queries of Reish Lakish, and consequently, Reish Lakish praises a different tradition of Rav, according to which an animal whose organs (simanim) were dislocated and was subsequently slaughtered is kosher. It was established that new cases of treifot may not be added beyond those enumerated by the Sages, even if these injuries cause the death of the animal. The Mishna enumerates structural defects that leave the animal kosher, including a windpipe that was perforated less than the size of an Italian issar, a brain membrane that was not punctured, and a liver of which a remains. This list gives rise to a fundamental dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the scope of the lists in this chapter, which affects their approach to the ruling of Rav Matna, who rules that a femur bone that dislocated is a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan declares the animal kosher because the case was omitted from the exclusive list of treifot, while Reish Lakish rules it a treifa because it is absent from the exclusive list of kosher defects. For the Babylonians, they defined that the size of the isser is similar to a Kurdish dinar, and the Gemara brings a story following this involving Rabbi Yochanan who went to a moneychanger looking for this coin,and told the moneychanger that craftsmen engaged in their work are legally exempt from standing before Torah scholars. How does this differ from craftsmen who would stand up and greet those Jews who were bringing their first fruits to the Temple? Rav Nachman said that "up to an issar" it is not a treifa means up to but not including that size. Rava brings a series of difficulties against his view, but Rav Nachman answers them.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye rules that although a standard hole in the windpipe requires the size of an issar (a coin), its clawing measurement (of redness) is a minimal amount, because the predator's venom burns and consumes the tissue continuously. Regarding the scope of the inspection required due to concern for venom, Rav Nachman testifies in the name of Rav that one must inspect from the base of the brain to the thigh, and not only adjacent to the intestines (as some hold). In an interesting story, Rabbi Yochanan defends the supreme authority of Rav against the queries of Reish Lakish, and consequently, Reish Lakish praises a different tradition of Rav, according to which an animal whose organs (simanim) were dislocated and was subsequently slaughtered is kosher. It was established that new cases of treifot may not be added beyond those enumerated by the Sages, even if these injuries cause the death of the animal. The Mishna enumerates structural defects that leave the animal kosher, including a windpipe that was perforated less than the size of an Italian issar, a brain membrane that was not punctured, and a liver of which a remains. This list gives rise to a fundamental dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the scope of the lists in this chapter, which affects their approach to the ruling of Rav Matna, who rules that a femur bone that dislocated is a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan declares the animal kosher because the case was omitted from the exclusive list of treifot, while Reish Lakish rules it a treifa because it is absent from the exclusive list of kosher defects. For the Babylonians, they defined that the size of the isser is similar to a Kurdish dinar, and the Gemara brings a story following this involving Rabbi Yochanan who went to a moneychanger looking for this coin,and told the moneychanger that craftsmen engaged in their work are legally exempt from standing before Torah scholars. How does this differ from craftsmen who would stand up and greet those Jews who were bringing their first fruits to the Temple? Rav Nachman said that "up to an issar" it is not a treifa means up to but not including that size. Rava brings a series of difficulties against his view, but Rav Nachman answers them.

Rava establishes further laws regarding physical anomalies that render a lung a treifa. If cysts appear on the lung, a single cyst does not disqualify the animal, whereas two distinct cysts render it a treifa. Rava provides a method to inspect an ambiguous cyst to determine whether it is a single divided structure or two separate entities. Regarding the lobes of the lung - which normally consist of three on the right and two on the left – Rava rules that deviations from this norm disqualify the animal. Meriemar permitted an extra lobe provided it is perfectly aligned with the natural row. However, if an extra lobe develops internally facing the heart, its status is disputed, as Rav Huna Mar bar Avia notes that this configuration is common in wild animals, and therefore permits it. Rafram rules that a lung resembling a wood chip is a treifa, a tradition that receives five distinct interpretations in the Gemara to clarify in what way it is similar to a wood chip – in color or in feel. Rava delineates which lung discolorations are valid and which are problematic, a discussion expanded upon by Rav Kahana and Rav Sama regarding specific shades and appearances. Ravina addresses a scenario where a lobe of the lung fails to inflate, explaining that a test must be performed to determine if the lack of airflow is due to a fatal defect or merely a temporary obstruction. Ulla rules that if the internal tissue of the lung liquefies, the animal remains kosher because internal decay does not compromise the outer membrane. Rava qualifies this leniency, limiting it to cases where the primary bronchial tubes remain intact, and Rav Ashi outlines the practical examination method to verify their structural integrity.

Rulings by Rava: Issues of the lungs, specifically with regard to the lobes. Plus, Meimar, who answers the halakhic questions differently from Rava. Until the Gemara establishes that their answers pertain to different cases -- regarding the lobes. The sages are very precise here in their examination of the different concerns. Also, the implications of various colors -- dark grey (kosher) vs. black (not kosher) vs. green (kosher) vs. red (kosher) vs. Black being the shift from the red of blood, as it deteriorates, which means there's a problem in the lung that would lead to the color black. Plus, the stories of Rabbi Natan, who saves a couple of babies by advising their mothers to let the children's blood to be reabsorbed before brit milah (circumcision).

Rava establishes further laws regarding physical anomalies that render a lung a treifa. If cysts appear on the lung, a single cyst does not disqualify the animal, whereas two distinct cysts render it a treifa. Rava provides a method to inspect an ambiguous cyst to determine whether it is a single divided structure or two separate entities. Regarding the lobes of the lung - which normally consist of three on the right and two on the left – Rava rules that deviations from this norm disqualify the animal. Meriemar permitted an extra lobe provided it is perfectly aligned with the natural row. However, if an extra lobe develops internally facing the heart, its status is disputed, as Rav Huna Mar bar Avia notes that this configuration is common in wild animals, and therefore permits it. Rafram rules that a lung resembling a wood chip is a treifa, a tradition that receives five distinct interpretations in the Gemara to clarify in what way it is similar to a wood chip – in color or in feel. Rava delineates which lung discolorations are valid and which are problematic, a discussion expanded upon by Rav Kahana and Rav Sama regarding specific shades and appearances. Ravina addresses a scenario where a lobe of the lung fails to inflate, explaining that a test must be performed to determine if the lack of airflow is due to a fatal defect or merely a temporary obstruction. Ulla rules that if the internal tissue of the lung liquefies, the animal remains kosher because internal decay does not compromise the outer membrane. Rava qualifies this leniency, limiting it to cases where the primary bronchial tubes remain intact, and Rav Ashi outlines the practical examination method to verify their structural integrity.

What is the minimal remnant required to remain of the liver to keep the animal kosher when it is damaged or partially missing? Although our Mishna implies that any minimal amount is sufficient, another Mishna explicitly requires an olive-bulk. Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction by explaining that each Mishna reflects a different Tannaitic position. The established halakha dictates that a size of an olive-bulk is required, and the Amoraim dispute whether this piece must remain specifically where the gallbladder is located, or where the liver attaches to its lifelines; Rav Papa rules that an olive-bulk is required in both locations. Regarding perforations of the lung, the Gemara explains that the lung is surrounded by two membranes, an outer membrane and an inner membrane. If only one membrane is punctured, the second membrane that remains intact protects it, and the lung remains kosher. To diagnose a lung that is suspected of leaking air, Rav Yosef suggests one test involving a feather and a second involving water. In the water test, the lung is placed inside a bowl of lukewarm water and inflated. If the water bubbles, this proves that it contains a disqualifying perforation; if no bubbling appears, the sound is attributed only to air trapped between the membranes, and the lung remains kosher. Rava establishes rules regarding various changes in the appearance and structure of the lung. External peelings, multiple changes in color, or spots of different shades generally do not disqualify the animal. Conversely, if a part of the lung is dry to the extent that it crumbles under a fingernail, the animal is disqualified as a treifa. The Gemara discusses the laws of lung adhesions (sirchot). An adhesion between two lobes that occurs out of their natural anatomical order constitutes an absolute defect that cannot be tested, while an adhesion occurring in their normal order is considered a natural growth and remains kosher.

What is the minimal remnant required to remain of the liver to keep the animal kosher when it is damaged or partially missing? Although our Mishna implies that any minimal amount is sufficient, another Mishna explicitly requires an olive-bulk. Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction by explaining that each Mishna reflects a different Tannaitic position. The established halakha dictates that a size of an olive-bulk is required, and the Amoraim dispute whether this piece must remain specifically where the gallbladder is located, or where the liver attaches to its lifelines; Rav Papa rules that an olive-bulk is required in both locations. Regarding perforations of the lung, the Gemara explains that the lung is surrounded by two membranes, an outer membrane and an inner membrane. If only one membrane is punctured, the second membrane that remains intact protects it, and the lung remains kosher. To diagnose a lung that is suspected of leaking air, Rav Yosef suggests one test involving a feather and a second involving water. In the water test, the lung is placed inside a bowl of lukewarm water and inflated. If the water bubbles, this proves that it contains a disqualifying perforation; if no bubbling appears, the sound is attributed only to air trapped between the membranes, and the lung remains kosher. Rava establishes rules regarding various changes in the appearance and structure of the lung. External peelings, multiple changes in color, or spots of different shades generally do not disqualify the animal. Conversely, if a part of the lung is dry to the extent that it crumbles under a fingernail, the animal is disqualified as a treifa. The Gemara discusses the laws of lung adhesions (sirchot). An adhesion between two lobes that occurs out of their natural anatomical order constitutes an absolute defect that cannot be tested, while an adhesion occurring in their normal order is considered a natural growth and remains kosher.

What are the primary categories of treifot? Ulla states that eight categories that were transmitted as halakha to Moshe from Sinai: perforated (nekuva), severed (pesuka), removed (netula), deficient (chasura), torn (kru'a), clawed (drusa), fallen (nefula), and broken (shevura). Chiya bar Rav said there are eight cases in the category of perforated, and this excludes the gall bladder, which is considered a treifa only by Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the ruling is like Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. He brings a proof for Rabbi Yosi's position from a verse in Iyov 16:13, in which Iyov explains that his gall bladder was poured on the ground, and yet, he still lived. The rabbis' retort to that is that Iyov's situation was miraculous and we cannot derive halakha from a miracle. Another ruling of Rabbi Yochanan was brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef regarding the liver – if the liver is reduced to less than an olive bulk, the animal is a treifa. If, according to Rabba bar bar Hanna, Rabbi Yochanan holds like an unattributed Mishna, there is a contradiction as our Mishna rules it is a treifa only if the liver is completely removed. This is resolved by explaining there is a debate between the two amoraim what Rabbi Yochanan held. Two other rulings are brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef in the name of Rabbi Yochanan regarding treifot. A gall bladder that was perforated but the liver covered up the hole, or a bird's gizzard that was perforated, but the inner lining was not, both are kosher. Raba notes that the gullet consists of two distinct linings - an outer red membrane and an inner white membrane. If only one layer is punctured while the other remains intact, the animal remains kosher. What happens if both layers of an organ are punctured, but the holes do not align? Rav Ashi rules that in a stationary organ like the gizzard, non-aligned punctures are kosher because the layers do not shift. However, in a dynamic organ like the gullet, which constantly expands, contracts, and moves during feeding, the holes are liable to realign; therefore, non-aligned punctures render the animal a treifa. In one version, Mar Zutra quotes Rav Papa saying the opposite; in another, he agrees. Raba notes that the gullet cannot be evaluated for predatory clawing (safek drusa) from the outside, as the outside is red and blood would not be noticeable. It must be inverted and inspected from the inside. If a thorn is found lodged inside the gullet with a perforation on the inside, but no noticeable perforation on the outside, Ulla rules that we do not fear it caused a perforation which healed, as free-roaming livestock regularly consume thorny vegetation without injury. Is the turbatz haveshet, the uppermost part of the gullet, legally treated as part of the gullet? Rav and Shmuel disagree on its status. Rav maintains it is a valid location for slaughter; thus, any extraneous puncture of even a minimal size renders it a treifa. Shmuel argues it is not a valid location for slaughter, meaning it is only rendered a treifa if the majority of it is severed. This dispute culminated in a practical case involving an ox belonging to the sons of Rav Ukva, where the slaughter began in the turbatz haveshet and finished in the gullet. Rava applied the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, declaring the animal a treifa. Rabbi Abba reversed Rava's decision, demonstrating that the ox was completely kosher under either authority individually. If one followed Rav, the slaughter location was valid; if one followed Shmuel, the minor cut in the turbatz haveshet did not render it a treifa before the slaughter was completed. Because Rava's logically contradictory ruling caused an impermissible destruction of kosher property, Rabbi Abba ordered Rava to financially compensate the owner of the ox.

What are the primary categories of treifot? Ulla states that eight categories that were transmitted as halakha to Moshe from Sinai: perforated (nekuva), severed (pesuka), removed (netula), deficient (chasura), torn (kru'a), clawed (drusa), fallen (nefula), and broken (shevura). Chiya bar Rav said there are eight cases in the category of perforated, and this excludes the gall bladder, which is considered a treifa only by Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the ruling is like Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. He brings a proof for Rabbi Yosi's position from a verse in Iyov 16:13, in which Iyov explains that his gall bladder was poured on the ground, and yet, he still lived. The rabbis' retort to that is that Iyov's situation was miraculous and we cannot derive halakha from a miracle. Another ruling of Rabbi Yochanan was brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef regarding the liver – if the liver is reduced to less than an olive bulk, the animal is a treifa. If, according to Rabba bar bar Hanna, Rabbi Yochanan holds like an unattributed Mishna, there is a contradiction as our Mishna rules it is a treifa only if the liver is completely removed. This is resolved by explaining there is a debate between the two amoraim what Rabbi Yochanan held. Two other rulings are brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef in the name of Rabbi Yochanan regarding treifot. A gall bladder that was perforated but the liver covered up the hole, or a bird's gizzard that was perforated, but the inner lining was not, both are kosher. Raba notes that the gullet consists of two distinct linings - an outer red membrane and an inner white membrane. If only one layer is punctured while the other remains intact, the animal remains kosher. What happens if both layers of an organ are punctured, but the holes do not align? Rav Ashi rules that in a stationary organ like the gizzard, non-aligned punctures are kosher because the layers do not shift. However, in a dynamic organ like the gullet, which constantly expands, contracts, and moves during feeding, the holes are liable to realign; therefore, non-aligned punctures render the animal a treifa. In one version, Mar Zutra quotes Rav Papa saying the opposite; in another, he agrees. Raba notes that the gullet cannot be evaluated for predatory clawing (safek drusa) from the outside, as the outside is red and blood would not be noticeable. It must be inverted and inspected from the inside. If a thorn is found lodged inside the gullet with a perforation on the inside, but no noticeable perforation on the outside, Ulla rules that we do not fear it caused a perforation which healed, as free-roaming livestock regularly consume thorny vegetation without injury. Is the turbatz haveshet, the uppermost part of the gullet, legally treated as part of the gullet? Rav and Shmuel disagree on its status. Rav maintains it is a valid location for slaughter; thus, any extraneous puncture of even a minimal size renders it a treifa. Shmuel argues it is not a valid location for slaughter, meaning it is only rendered a treifa if the majority of it is severed. This dispute culminated in a practical case involving an ox belonging to the sons of Rav Ukva, where the slaughter began in the turbatz haveshet and finished in the gullet. Rava applied the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, declaring the animal a treifa. Rabbi Abba reversed Rava's decision, demonstrating that the ox was completely kosher under either authority individually. If one followed Rav, the slaughter location was valid; if one followed Shmuel, the minor cut in the turbatz haveshet did not render it a treifa before the slaughter was completed. Because Rava's logically contradictory ruling caused an impermissible destruction of kosher property, Rabbi Abba ordered Rava to financially compensate the owner of the ox.

durée : 00:59:22 - par : Nathalie Piolé -

Three difficulties are raised from tannaitic sources against the opinion of Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak that a person cannot forbid property that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she'eino shelo), and they are resolved. The first difficulty is from the braita regarding a sin offering slaughtered outside the Temple for idol worship, which the Gemara resolves by explaining that since the sacrifice achieves atonement for the owner, it is legally considered his own property. The second difficulty is from the Mishna regarding two people holding a knife where one slaughters for an idol, and the third is from a braita regarding one who renders another's property impure, mixes it with tithed produce, or pours it as an idolatrous libation. The Gemara resolves these by explaining that the individual has a financial partnership in the item. The Gemara suggests that the debate between Rav Huna and Rav Nachman is a tannaitic dispute, quoting a dispute regarding whether a gentile can forbid a Jew's wine by offering it up as a libation to idols. Rav Nachman, however, rejects the comparison, as a Jew who does the same thing would be doing it just to annoy his friend, and does not really intend to worship the idol. Some difficulties are raised against this theory from tannaitic sources, but are resolved by explaining them as referring to cases where the Jew is an apostate. The Mishna rules that one may not slaughter an animal directly into seas, rivers, or vessels because it looks to others like they are offering it to an idol (mar'it ayin). However, it is permitted to slaughter into a circular pool of water, which Rava clarifies must be murky. Furthermore, one may not slaughter directly into a pit (gumma) anywhere, but the Mishna then permits doing so in one's house. Abaye and Rava each resolve this seemingly contradictory statement in different manners, and Rava rejects Abaye's explanation. Rava explains that a person may slaughter next to a pit in their private courtyard so that the blood flows into it to keep the yard clean. In the marketplace, even this is strictly forbidden to prevent copying heretical practices (minim), and anyone who does so must be investigated for heresy. A braita is brought to support Rava's explanation. The Mishna establishes that slaughtering a non-sacrifice (chullin) for the sake of a sacrifice that can be voluntarily vowed or donated - such as an olah, asham talui, or todah - renders the shechita invalid, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits it. The rabbis are concerned that people will see this and think that one can slaughter sacrifices outside the Temple. Conversely, slaughtering for sacrifices that cannot be voluntarily vowed, like a sin offering, is valid, as people will assume the slaughterer is just saying it is for the sake of that offering but does not really intend to offer a sacrifice outside the Temple.

Three difficulties are raised from tannaitic sources against the opinion of Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak that a person cannot forbid property that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she'eino shelo), and they are resolved. The first difficulty is from the braita regarding a sin offering slaughtered outside the Temple for idol worship, which the Gemara resolves by explaining that since the sacrifice achieves atonement for the owner, it is legally considered his own property. The second difficulty is from the Mishna regarding two people holding a knife where one slaughters for an idol, and the third is from a braita regarding one who renders another's property impure, mixes it with tithed produce, or pours it as an idolatrous libation. The Gemara resolves these by explaining that the individual has a financial partnership in the item. The Gemara suggests that the debate between Rav Huna and Rav Nachman is a tannaitic dispute, quoting a dispute regarding whether a gentile can forbid a Jew's wine by offering it up as a libation to idols. Rav Nachman, however, rejects the comparison, as a Jew who does the same thing would be doing it just to annoy his friend, and does not really intend to worship the idol. Some difficulties are raised against this theory from tannaitic sources, but are resolved by explaining them as referring to cases where the Jew is an apostate. The Mishna rules that one may not slaughter an animal directly into seas, rivers, or vessels because it looks to others like they are offering it to an idol (mar'it ayin). However, it is permitted to slaughter into a circular pool of water, which Rava clarifies must be murky. Furthermore, one may not slaughter directly into a pit (gumma) anywhere, but the Mishna then permits doing so in one's house. Abaye and Rava each resolve this seemingly contradictory statement in different manners, and Rava rejects Abaye's explanation. Rava explains that a person may slaughter next to a pit in their private courtyard so that the blood flows into it to keep the yard clean. In the marketplace, even this is strictly forbidden to prevent copying heretical practices (minim), and anyone who does so must be investigated for heresy. A braita is brought to support Rava's explanation. The Mishna establishes that slaughtering a non-sacrifice (chullin) for the sake of a sacrifice that can be voluntarily vowed or donated - such as an olah, asham talui, or todah - renders the shechita invalid, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits it. The rabbis are concerned that people will see this and think that one can slaughter sacrifices outside the Temple. Conversely, slaughtering for sacrifices that cannot be voluntarily vowed, like a sin offering, is valid, as people will assume the slaughterer is just saying it is for the sake of that offering but does not really intend to offer a sacrifice outside the Temple.

What types of signs of life does one need to observe when performing shechita on an animal that is on the verge of death? Rav, Shmuel, and Rava each bring different actions that serve as indicators that would then permit this animal to be eaten, as it is clear the animal was still alive enough at the time of the shechita. At what point of the slaughtering process does one need to see these signs of life? Rav Chisda, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, and Rava each suggest different points - the middle, the beginning, or the end. Rav Chisda and Rav Nachman provide support for their positions from our Mishna, while Rava brings support from his understanding of a different tannaitic source. Can one perform shechita on an animal for an idol worshipper? Does one need to be concerned that it will be used for idol worship and therefore the Jew would be benefiting from idol worship? Is it the intent of the owner or the one performing the shechita that determines the designation of the animal?

What types of signs of life does one need to observe when performing shechita on an animal that is on the verge of death? Rav, Shmuel, and Rava each bring different actions that serve as indicators that would then permit this animal to be eaten, as it is clear the animal was still alive enough at the time of the shechita. At what point of the slaughtering process does one need to see these signs of life? Rav Chisda, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, and Rava each suggest different points - the middle, the beginning, or the end. Rav Chisda and Rav Nachman provide support for their positions from our Mishna, while Rava brings support from his understanding of a different tannaitic source. Can one perform shechita on an animal for an idol worshipper? Does one need to be concerned that it will be used for idol worship and therefore the Jew would be benefiting from idol worship? Is it the intent of the owner or the one performing the shechita that determines the designation of the animal?

Rabbi Yonatan says in the name of Rabbi that someone who eats a shelishi (third degree) of actual teruma is forbidden to eat teruma but is allowed to touch it. Ulla had said the same thing regarding one who eats a shelishi of chullin that was treated like teruma. The Gemara explains why both statements were needed and could not have necessarily been derived one from the other. Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta says that someone who eats a shelishi of chullin treated like kodashim is still pure to eat actual kodashim, because only real kodashim that are sanctified by an action (like a meal offering when placed in a sanctified vessel or an animal when slaughtered) can create a revi'i (fourth degree). Rami bar Hama challenges this from Rabbi Yehoshua's opinion in the Mishna in Taharot (2:2) that a shelishi that was treated as teruma is considered a sheni for kodashim. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between items treated as teruma and those treated as kodashim. The reason to distinguish is that those who are careful from impurities for teruma are not cautious enough regarding kodashim. This distinction is proven from a Mishna in Chagiga (18b). Rava, however, disagrees with the application of the Mishna in Chagiga to this case, and disagrees with Rav Yitzchak. A difficulty is raised against this distinction from a Mishna in Chagiga (24b) where one designated part of the wine in a barrel of teruma to be kodashim. If the protection for teruma is not valid for kodashim, wouldn't the teruma wine make the kodashim wine impure? To resolve this they distinguish between teruma and kodashim that are combined and those that are not combined. A second difficulty on Rav Yitzchak is brought from a braita that clearly states that a shelishi of items that are treated as kodashim passes on impurity to kodashim. To resolve this difficulty, they conclude that there is a tannaitic debate and brings a braita with two opinions that both support Rav Yitzchak's position. Rabbi Shimon stated in the Mishna that shechita makes the animal susceptible to impurity. Rav Asi explains that Rabbi Shimon means only shechita makes it susceptible, but the blood of the animal does not. The Gemara challenges this to see if he means only shechita, and blood from the slaughter would not be considered a liquid that could render something susceptible to impurity, or did he mean shechita in addition to blood, as blood of the slaughter could also render something susceptible to impurity. Our Mishna is brought to strengthen Rav Asi's reading, but it is rejected as inconclusive. Then three other tannaitic sources are brought to try to either prove or disprove Rav Assi's claim, however, all are deemed inconclusive.

Rabbi Yonatan says in the name of Rabbi that someone who eats a shelishi (third degree) of actual teruma is forbidden to eat teruma but is allowed to touch it. Ulla had said the same thing regarding one who eats a shelishi of chullin that was treated like teruma. The Gemara explains why both statements were needed and could not have necessarily been derived one from the other. Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta says that someone who eats a shelishi of chullin treated like kodashim is still pure to eat actual kodashim, because only real kodashim that are sanctified by an action (like a meal offering when placed in a sanctified vessel or an animal when slaughtered) can create a revi'i (fourth degree). Rami bar Hama challenges this from Rabbi Yehoshua's opinion in the Mishna in Taharot (2:2) that a shelishi that was treated as teruma is considered a sheni for kodashim. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between items treated as teruma and those treated as kodashim. The reason to distinguish is that those who are careful from impurities for teruma are not cautious enough regarding kodashim. This distinction is proven from a Mishna in Chagiga (18b). Rava, however, disagrees with the application of the Mishna in Chagiga to this case, and disagrees with Rav Yitzchak. A difficulty is raised against this distinction from a Mishna in Chagiga (24b) where one designated part of the wine in a barrel of teruma to be kodashim. If the protection for teruma is not valid for kodashim, wouldn't the teruma wine make the kodashim wine impure? To resolve this they distinguish between teruma and kodashim that are combined and those that are not combined. A second difficulty on Rav Yitzchak is brought from a braita that clearly states that a shelishi of items that are treated as kodashim passes on impurity to kodashim. To resolve this difficulty, they conclude that there is a tannaitic debate and brings a braita with two opinions that both support Rav Yitzchak's position. Rabbi Shimon stated in the Mishna that shechita makes the animal susceptible to impurity. Rav Asi explains that Rabbi Shimon means only shechita makes it susceptible, but the blood of the animal does not. The Gemara challenges this to see if he means only shechita, and blood from the slaughter would not be considered a liquid that could render something susceptible to impurity, or did he mean shechita in addition to blood, as blood of the slaughter could also render something susceptible to impurity. Our Mishna is brought to strengthen Rav Asi's reading, but it is rejected as inconclusive. Then three other tannaitic sources are brought to try to either prove or disprove Rav Assi's claim, however, all are deemed inconclusive.

Reish Lakish rules that if the windpipe is cut during slaughter and the lung is subsequently punctured before the gullet is cut, the animal remains kosher because the lung is already considered to have lost its life through the cutting of the windpipe. Rava qualifies that this principle applies exclusively to the lung, which is structurally dependent on the windpipe, but not to the inner digestive organs. Rabbi Zeira disputes this qualification, and the Gemara notes a secondary debate regarding whether or not Rabbi Zeira ultimately retracted his objection. Rav Acha infers from Reish Lakish's ruling that meat from an animal in the process of being slaughtered is forbidden to Noahides. Because the severing of both simanim structurally detaches the internal organs from the animal's life source, it renders them ever min hachai (a limb or flesh from a living animal) for anyone whose meat is not immediately permitted via shechita. Consequently, a gentile eating these organs while the animal still convulses violates the Noachide prohibition. However, others object to this inference, arguing that a concept cannot exist where an item is permitted to Jews but forbidden to gentiles. A debate in the Mishna questions whether the act of slaughter itself renders the animal susceptible to ritual impurity (hechsher lekabel tumah) or if susceptibility is achieved only when the blood emerges and acts as a wetting liquid. The rabbis rule that if no blood emerges, the meat is not susceptible to impurity, meaning one may eat it with ritually impure hands. The Gemara infers from here that if blood had emerged, eating with impure hands would be forbidden. This raises a difficulty, as the Mishna appears to discuss secular meat (chullin), yet impure hands possess only a second-degree status (sheni le'tumah), which cannot create a third-degree status (shelishi) in chullin. To resolve this, the Gemara first presents four textual proofs demonstrating that the Mishna is indeed dealing with chullin. Following these proofs, the Gemara introduces three suggestions for the specific case in the Mishna: according to the first, the Mishna refers to meat purchased with maaser sheni money; according to the second, it involves a rabbinic decree assigning a first-degree status of impurity to the hands; and according to the third, it refers to secular food prepared according to the strict purity standards of consecrated sacrifices (kodashim).

Reish Lakish rules that if the windpipe is cut during slaughter and the lung is subsequently punctured before the gullet is cut, the animal remains kosher because the lung is already considered to have lost its life through the cutting of the windpipe. Rava qualifies that this principle applies exclusively to the lung, which is structurally dependent on the windpipe, but not to the inner digestive organs. Rabbi Zeira disputes this qualification, and the Gemara notes a secondary debate regarding whether or not Rabbi Zeira ultimately retracted his objection. Rav Acha infers from Reish Lakish's ruling that meat from an animal in the process of being slaughtered is forbidden to Noahides. Because the severing of both simanim structurally detaches the internal organs from the animal's life source, it renders them ever min hachai (a limb or flesh from a living animal) for anyone whose meat is not immediately permitted via shechita. Consequently, a gentile eating these organs while the animal still convulses violates the Noachide prohibition. However, others object to this inference, arguing that a concept cannot exist where an item is permitted to Jews but forbidden to gentiles. A debate in the Mishna questions whether the act of slaughter itself renders the animal susceptible to ritual impurity (hechsher lekabel tumah) or if susceptibility is achieved only when the blood emerges and acts as a wetting liquid. The rabbis rule that if no blood emerges, the meat is not susceptible to impurity, meaning one may eat it with ritually impure hands. The Gemara infers from here that if blood had emerged, eating with impure hands would be forbidden. This raises a difficulty, as the Mishna appears to discuss secular meat (chullin), yet impure hands possess only a second-degree status (sheni le'tumah), which cannot create a third-degree status (shelishi) in chullin. To resolve this, the Gemara first presents four textual proofs demonstrating that the Mishna is indeed dealing with chullin. Following these proofs, the Gemara introduces three suggestions for the specific case in the Mishna: according to the first, the Mishna refers to meat purchased with maaser sheni money; according to the second, it involves a rabbinic decree assigning a first-degree status of impurity to the hands; and according to the third, it refers to secular food prepared according to the strict purity standards of consecrated sacrifices (kodashim).

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

Study Guide The Gemara clarifies which Tanna the Mishna follows regarding temed (grape-seed water). Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avahu explains that the dispute in the Mishna in Ma'asrot between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages applies after it ferments, so our Mishna can align with the view of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabba bar Avahu that if a person bought temed with second tithe funds before it fermented, and it ultimately fermented, it is treated as wine. His words pose a difficulty for our Mishna, which did not present such an option. Rabba establishes the Mishna in a case where it is clear that it will not ferment later, while Rava suggests that the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that everything follows the visual appearance (chazuta) at the time of the sale. Rabbi Elazar disputes Rav Nachman's understanding of the Mishna in Ma'asrot, holding that the dispute applies when it has not fermented, but once it ferments, everyone agrees it is considered wine. A braita brings the laws of purifying temed that has not yet fermented by connecting it to water (haska). Rava limits this rule, explaining that this applies only when the water of the temed was pure from the beginning and became impure after it became temed, but if it was impure from the outset, it does not. However, Rav Ashi rejects his ruling and argues that there is no logic to distinguish between the cases. The Mishna states that anywhere there is a sale (a minor girl, ketana), there is no fine for rape (whose law only applies to a young woman, na'ara), and anywhere there is a fine, there is no sale. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav explains that this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that a fine applies even to a ketana. A Mishna states that anywhere there is refusal (miun, for a ketana), there is no chalitza (for a na'ara), and anywhere there is chalitza, there is no miun. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says that this is also the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that miun applies even to a na'ara. A Mishna states that anywhere there is a shofar blast (tekiya), there is no havdala, and anywhere there is havdala, there is no tekiya. If a Festival falls on the eve of the Sabbath, you blow the shofar and do not say havdala. If it falls on the conclusion of the Sabbath, you say havdala and do not blow. The Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute the exact wording of the havdala.

Study Guide The Gemara clarifies which Tanna the Mishna follows regarding temed (grape-seed water). Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avahu explains that the dispute in the Mishna in Ma'asrot between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages applies after it ferments, so our Mishna can align with the view of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabba bar Avahu that if a person bought temed with second tithe funds before it fermented, and it ultimately fermented, it is treated as wine. His words pose a difficulty for our Mishna, which did not present such an option. Rabba establishes the Mishna in a case where it is clear that it will not ferment later, while Rava suggests that the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that everything follows the visual appearance (chazuta) at the time of the sale. Rabbi Elazar disputes Rav Nachman's understanding of the Mishna in Ma'asrot, holding that the dispute applies when it has not fermented, but once it ferments, everyone agrees it is considered wine. A braita brings the laws of purifying temed that has not yet fermented by connecting it to water (haska). Rava limits this rule, explaining that this applies only when the water of the temed was pure from the beginning and became impure after it became temed, but if it was impure from the outset, it does not. However, Rav Ashi rejects his ruling and argues that there is no logic to distinguish between the cases. The Mishna states that anywhere there is a sale (a minor girl, ketana), there is no fine for rape (whose law only applies to a young woman, na'ara), and anywhere there is a fine, there is no sale. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav explains that this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that a fine applies even to a ketana. A Mishna states that anywhere there is refusal (miun, for a ketana), there is no chalitza (for a na'ara), and anywhere there is chalitza, there is no miun. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says that this is also the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that miun applies even to a na'ara. A Mishna states that anywhere there is a shofar blast (tekiya), there is no havdala, and anywhere there is havdala, there is no tekiya. If a Festival falls on the eve of the Sabbath, you blow the shofar and do not say havdala. If it falls on the conclusion of the Sabbath, you say havdala and do not blow. The Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute the exact wording of the havdala.

Study Guide Zeiri rules that if an animal or bird's neck bone is broken and the majority of the surrounding flesh is severed, it immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if it is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if this state constitutes a neveila, how can melika be validly performed on a sacrificial bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? Rava answers that in melika, the kohen breaks the neck bone and spinal column without simultaneously severing the majority of the surrounding flesh. Rabbi Ami answers the challenge in the same manner, and his and Rava's answers are supported by a braita. The braita notes that in a bird burnt offering (olat ha'of), either the majority of both simanim or both simanim in their entirety must be cut. Because the Sages and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon dispute whether both simanim must be completely severed or if cutting the majority suffices, the Gemara suggests two interpretations to align the braita with one or both of these respective opinions. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel applies Zeiri's principle to humans, ruling that if a person's backbone and the majority of the surrounding flesh are severed, they immediately impart ritual impurity in a tent (tumat ohel) like a corpse, even if the body is still convulsing. Rabbi Yochanan introduces an additional case where the legal moment of death is determined immediately despite lingering convulsions. A parallel case regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures) is brought from a Mishna, prompting a debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Ami over whether "cutting off the head" means a complete detachment or a partial one, similar to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon concerning a bird burnt offering. The Gemara introduces a braita to show the source for the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon in a bird burnt offering. The braita presents three distinct opinions on the biblical term "k'mishpat"  regarding a bird burnt offering. The Sages debate whether this term compares it to an animal sin offering or a bird sin offering, detailing the exact procedural laws they share. This very debate serves as the foundation for the conflicting views of the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon regarding whether the two simanim must be severed completely.

Study Guide Zeiri rules that if an animal or bird's neck bone is broken and the majority of the surrounding flesh is severed, it immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if it is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if this state constitutes a neveila, how can melika be validly performed on a sacrificial bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? Rava answers that in melika, the kohen breaks the neck bone and spinal column without simultaneously severing the majority of the surrounding flesh. Rabbi Ami answers the challenge in the same manner, and his and Rava's answers are supported by a braita. The braita notes that in a bird burnt offering (olat ha'of), either the majority of both simanim or both simanim in their entirety must be cut. Because the Sages and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon dispute whether both simanim must be completely severed or if cutting the majority suffices, the Gemara suggests two interpretations to align the braita with one or both of these respective opinions. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel applies Zeiri's principle to humans, ruling that if a person's backbone and the majority of the surrounding flesh are severed, they immediately impart ritual impurity in a tent (tumat ohel) like a corpse, even if the body is still convulsing. Rabbi Yochanan introduces an additional case where the legal moment of death is determined immediately despite lingering convulsions. A parallel case regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures) is brought from a Mishna, prompting a debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Ami over whether "cutting off the head" means a complete detachment or a partial one, similar to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon concerning a bird burnt offering. The Gemara introduces a braita to show the source for the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon in a bird burnt offering. The braita presents three distinct opinions on the biblical term "k'mishpat"  regarding a bird burnt offering. The Sages debate whether this term compares it to an animal sin offering or a bird sin offering, detailing the exact procedural laws they share. This very debate serves as the foundation for the conflicting views of the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon regarding whether the two simanim must be severed completely.

The sons of Rabbi Chiya taught that when performing melika (pinching the neck of a sacrificial bird), the kohen may draw the simanim (the windpipe and gullet) toward the back of the neck and sever them without breaking the neck bone. The Sages dispute whether they meant this is the only valid method (to avoid rendering the bird a treifa by breaking the bone first), or if breaking the neck bone prior to cutting the simanim is also permitted as a Torah-prescribed approach. The Mishna supports this latter explanation. Rabbi Yannai raises a difficulty against the sons of Rabbi Chiya based on an inference from another line in the Mishna, which the Gemara resolves by demonstrating that an alternative inference can be drawn. The Gemara notes a debate regarding whether melika can be performed with a back-and-forth sawing motion (holacha v'hava'a) similar to shechita. Rabbi Yirmia quotes a statement by Shmuel comparing shechita and melika. After analyzing what specific law was being equated, the Gemara concludes that Shmuel is teaching that if one begins the melika too high on the neck (hagrama) and finishes in the correct area, it is disqualified -  just as we learned regarding shechita. Rami bar Yechezkel cites a braita stating that there is no issue with birds if the simanim are found to be displaced. The Gemara disputes whether this applies only according to the opinion that shechita of a bird is not a Torah law, or if it holds true even for those who view it as a Torah obligation derived via halakha l'Moshe m'Sinai. A further debate ensues over whether Rami bar Yechezkel's braita applies exclusively to melika or extends to the shechita of a bird as well. Additionally, Rabbi Yirmia's statement in the name of Shmuel is presented as a conflicting view to this braita. Zeira rules that if the neck bone is broken, the animal or bird immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if the animal is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if breaking the neck bone creates a neveila, how could melika ever be validly performed on a bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? This would mean the kohen is performing melika on a bird that is already dead. Abaye raises a difficulty against Rava's challenge from the laws of a bird burnt offering, and the Gemara resolves the issue.

The sons of Rabbi Chiya taught that when performing melika (pinching the neck of a sacrificial bird), the kohen may draw the simanim (the windpipe and gullet) toward the back of the neck and sever them without breaking the neck bone. The Sages dispute whether they meant this is the only valid method (to avoid rendering the bird a treifa by breaking the bone first), or if breaking the neck bone prior to cutting the simanim is also permitted as a Torah-prescribed approach. The Mishna supports this latter explanation. Rabbi Yannai raises a difficulty against the sons of Rabbi Chiya based on an inference from another line in the Mishna, which the Gemara resolves by demonstrating that an alternative inference can be drawn. The Gemara notes a debate regarding whether melika can be performed with a back-and-forth sawing motion (holacha v'hava'a) similar to shechita. Rabbi Yirmia quotes a statement by Shmuel comparing shechita and melika. After analyzing what specific law was being equated, the Gemara concludes that Shmuel is teaching that if one begins the melika too high on the neck (hagrama) and finishes in the correct area, it is disqualified -  just as we learned regarding shechita. Rami bar Yechezkel cites a braita stating that there is no issue with birds if the simanim are found to be displaced. The Gemara disputes whether this applies only according to the opinion that shechita of a bird is not a Torah law, or if it holds true even for those who view it as a Torah obligation derived via halakha l'Moshe m'Sinai. A further debate ensues over whether Rami bar Yechezkel's braita applies exclusively to melika or extends to the shechita of a bird as well. Additionally, Rabbi Yirmia's statement in the name of Shmuel is presented as a conflicting view to this braita. Zeira rules that if the neck bone is broken, the animal or bird immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if the animal is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if breaking the neck bone creates a neveila, how could melika ever be validly performed on a bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? This would mean the kohen is performing melika on a bird that is already dead. Abaye raises a difficulty against Rava's challenge from the laws of a bird burnt offering, and the Gemara resolves the issue.

The Gemara brings a braita to prove that Rebbi differentiates between a slaughter performed with an item attached to the ground and one performed with an item that was originally detached but later became attached. An internal contradiction within the braita is resolved by applying this distinction. The Gemara then delves into the specific cases within the braita. First, it addresses slaughtering using a mechanism. After raising a contradiction from a different braita that rules such a slaughter invalid, the conflict is resolved by distinguishing between a mechanism operated directly by human action and one that functions without human intervention or is only very indirectly affected by it. Rava discusses whether an item that was detached and subsequently re-attached to the ground is legally considered "attached" or "detached" across various areas of halakha - idol worship, susceptibility to impurity, and slaughtering. He notes that regarding idol worship, it is considered detached. Regarding impurity, it is subject to a tannaitic debate. Regarding slaughter, however, he remains unsure. The Gemara cites three quotes from the previously mentioned braita to resolve the status for slaughter, but each proof is ultimately deemed inconclusive. Shmuel limits a ruling in the braita - concerning slaughtering with a knife stuck in a wall - to a case where the animal is positioned below the knife. However, a contradictory braita is brought that makes no distinction regarding whether the animal is above or below. Two possible resolutions are suggested. Rav Chisda (or a braita) discusses five laws involving a reed stalk, forbidding its use in various activities due to the risk of splinters. One of these laws states that one cannot slaughter with it, which contradicts another source permitting its use. The Gemara distinguishes between a soft reed (which grows in a marsh) and a hardened one, which is more likely to splinter. The Mishna explains that "all may slaughter and forever." The term "all" is understood to include birds, which also require ritual slaughter. As for the term "forever," Raba explains that it follows the view of Rabbi Yishmael and serves to permit the consumption of meat even after the destruction of the Temple. Rav Yosef raises two difficulties with Raba's explanation.

The Gemara brings a braita to prove that Rebbi differentiates between a slaughter performed with an item attached to the ground and one performed with an item that was originally detached but later became attached. An internal contradiction within the braita is resolved by applying this distinction. The Gemara then delves into the specific cases within the braita. First, it addresses slaughtering using a mechanism. After raising a contradiction from a different braita that rules such a slaughter invalid, the conflict is resolved by distinguishing between a mechanism operated directly by human action and one that functions without human intervention or is only very indirectly affected by it. Rava discusses whether an item that was detached and subsequently re-attached to the ground is legally considered "attached" or "detached" across various areas of halakha - idol worship, susceptibility to impurity, and slaughtering. He notes that regarding idol worship, it is considered detached. Regarding impurity, it is subject to a tannaitic debate. Regarding slaughter, however, he remains unsure. The Gemara cites three quotes from the previously mentioned braita to resolve the status for slaughter, but each proof is ultimately deemed inconclusive. Shmuel limits a ruling in the braita - concerning slaughtering with a knife stuck in a wall - to a case where the animal is positioned below the knife. However, a contradictory braita is brought that makes no distinction regarding whether the animal is above or below. Two possible resolutions are suggested. Rav Chisda (or a braita) discusses five laws involving a reed stalk, forbidding its use in various activities due to the risk of splinters. One of these laws states that one cannot slaughter with it, which contradicts another source permitting its use. The Gemara distinguishes between a soft reed (which grows in a marsh) and a hardened one, which is more likely to splinter. The Mishna explains that "all may slaughter and forever." The term "all" is understood to include birds, which also require ritual slaughter. As for the term "forever," Raba explains that it follows the view of Rabbi Yishmael and serves to permit the consumption of meat even after the destruction of the Temple. Rav Yosef raises two difficulties with Raba's explanation.

There is a dispute between Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav and Rav Chanania bar Shlemia in the name of Rav regarding which practical skills a Torah scholar must master through repetition. The first opinion lists writing, slaughtering, and circumcision, while the second adds the knot of the tefillin, the sheva berakhot, and the tying of tzitzit. Rav Yehuda quotes two further statements in the name of Shmuel. The first is that a slaughterer must be expert in the laws of shechita; otherwise, the meat may not be eaten. Since meat can be disqualified for five specific reasons, an unlearned slaughterer might perform an invalid slaughter without realizing it. The second statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel is that a slaughterer must inspect the two simanim (the windpipe and gullet) to ensure they were properly severed. While Rav Yosef attempts to provide a proof for this requirement, Abaye rejects it. The Gemara discusses the status of meat that was not inspected, debating whether it is classified as a treifa or a neveila. Both positions are rooted in their interpretation of Rav Huna's principle: a living animal is presumed forbidden until it is proven that a valid shechita was performed, but once slaughtered properly, it is presumed kosher until proven to be a treifa. The Gemara then analyzes the second half of Rav Huna's statement, inferring that an animal remains kosher even if there is an unproven concern that it might be a treifa. This is illustrated by a case where a wolf takes an internal organ and returns it with a hole; we do not assume the hole existed prior to the wolf's intervention. Rabbi Abba challenges this from a ruling regarding food nibbled by creatures, where we fear teh hole where they are nibbling was a pre-existing hole from a snake who may have injected venom into it. To resolve this, Rav Huna distinguishes between matters of danger and matters of ritual prohibition (issur). While Rava rejects this distinction, arguing that stringency regarding danger should imply stringency regarding prohibitions, Abaye accepts the differentiation, citing proofs from the laws of impurity. After Rava rejects Abaye's proof and Rav Shimi raises a difficulty with Rava's position that the Gemara resolves, Rav Ashi concludes by bringing support for Rav Huna's position.

After explaining that the source for Rav Anan's statement in the name of Shmuel, that one can trust the slaughter of a person who worships idols was derived from Yehoshafat, the Gemara seeks evidence that Yehoshafat actually consumed Achav's meat. Two additional sources are examined to support Rav Anan. The first involves Eliyahu, who was fed meat by ravens (orvim), which supposedly originated from Achav's kitchen. However, this is dismissed as a unique divine decree that cannot serve as a legal precedent. The second source is a braita previously cited about accepting the slaughter of a Jew who does not observe the commandment. While it was initially thought to support Rav Anan, and referring to one who worships idols, the proof is deemed inconclusive as it can also be reconciled with Rava's position, and be referring to one who eats non-kosher mean to satisfy one's appetite. A challenge is raised against Rav Anan from a braita that equates an idol-worshipping Jew to one who rejects the entire Torah. This difficulty remains unresolved. The braita cites the biblical source for the rule that an apostate cannot bring sacrifices from a verse regarding a burnt offering. However, another braita derives this from verses regarding a sin offering. The Gemara explains why both derivations are necessary. Rabbi Yaakov notes that Rabban Gamliel and his court prohibited slaughter performed by a Cuti. Rabbi Zeira suggests this only applies when no Jew is supervising. Rabbi Yaakov disagrees, arguing that such a case was already prohibited; Rabban Gamliel's decree applied even when a Jew is present. The Gemara questions whether Rabbi Zeira ultimately accepted this view.

Abaye and Rava each found support for their respective positions in a braita - Abaye from the first sentence and Rava from the second. How does each Sage address the proof cited by the other? The second case in the braita permits a Jew to rely on a Cuti and consume birds strung together, provided the Cuti eats the head of one of the birds on the string. The Gemara raises difficulties with this case: perhaps the Cuti is merely tricking the Jew, or perhaps Cutim do not hold that one must slaughter birds at all, as the requirement is not explicitly written in the Torah. The Sages resolve the latter difficulty by explaining that Cutim accepted the laws of shechita upon themselves; therefore, they can be trusted even regarding details not explicitly stated in the Torah, including all the ways in which a slaughter can be disqualified. This, however, is a Tannaitic debate: whether or not Cutim can be relied upon regarding laws not mentioned in the Torah that they are known to have accepted. A separate braita is brought to demonstrate this dispute. Rava holds that one may rely on the slaughter of a person who does not observe the laws of kashrut, specifically one who eats nevelot, provided the knife was checked beforehand. Rava's ruling is based on the principle that a person would rather perform an act in a permissible way than a forbidden way, so long as it does not require significantly more effort. This is proven from a braita regarding the chametz of those who are generally untrusted; one can eat their food after Pesach, relying on the fact that they must have traded their food with gentiles to avoid the prohibition of chametz that remained over the holiday. A Tosefta is brought to further support Rava's position, but it is subsequently rejected. The Gemara explains that the Tosefta refers to a person who worships idols, rather than one who merely consumed non-slaughtered meat. This reading is supported by a statement of Rav Anan in the name of Shmuel that one can trust the meat of a person who worships idols. The source for this is the biblical figure Yehoshafat, who ate from Achav's meat in an incident that appears in Chronicles II, Chapter 18. The Gemara raises several difficulties about deriving this law from that incident, but all difficulties are eventually resolved.

If one finds a string of birds in the possession of a Kuti, there are various ways of increasing rigor to test whether the Kuti had done the slaughtering properly, each of which concludes with determining whether the Kuti himself would eat from his shechitah. That is, where they accepted the halakhic requirements, they were incredibly careful -- and if they didn't accept the requirement to begin with, then they weren't trustworthy. Also, investigating Rava's view on one who intentionally eats non-kosher food - and yet that person can be relied upon for his assessment of kashrut, and even if that person does idolatry. Plus, the human enticement of food and drink just won't work for the Divine.

Study Guide The Mishna rules that all are permitted to slaughter animals, and if they do, the meat is kosher. While establishing this broad permission, the Mishna excludes minors, deaf-mutes (cheresh), and the mentally incompetent (shoteh). However, if an adult supervises them to ensure the slaughter was performed correctly, the meat is valid. The Gemara questions the Mishna's phrasing: the opening phrase "all may slaughter" implies an ab initio (l'chatchila) permission, yet the concluding phrase "their slaughtering is kosher" suggests the act is only valid post facto (b'dieved). Initially, Rav Acha attempts to prove from other Mishnayot that the term "all" can indeed refer to a post facto case, neutralizing the question. Conversely, Rav Ashi cites other Mishnayot to show that "all" is a term typically used for ab initio rulings. While both ultimately concede that "all" can technically carry both meanings, Rav Ashi argues that the context here implies ab initio. To resolve the Gemara's original difficulty, Rava bar Ulla explains that each phrase in the Mishna refers to a different specific case, and he proceeds to re-interpret each line accordingly. However, three difficulties are subsequently raised against Rava bar Ulla's interpretation, all of which the Gemara eventually resolves.

The Mishna rules that if one vows to bring a mincha (meal offering) but cannot recall which type, they must bring all five standard types. Abaye explains that this ruling can also align with Rabbi Shimon's position, which recognizes a sixth type consisting of both wafers and loaves; he argues that bringing the wafers and loaves separately covers the possibility of the combined type as well. The Gemara raises several practical difficulties regarding this possibility but resolves them all. Rav Kahana asks Rav Ashi why the person in the above case would not also need to offer a minchat nesachim (a meal offering brought with libations), given Rava's view that it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Rav Ashi identifies five distinct differences between a minchat nesachim and other voluntary meal offerings, demonstrating that someone in doubt about their vow would certainly not have been referring to an offering so fundamentally different. The Rabbis and Rebbi disagree in the Mishna regarding a case where one says, "I vowed to bring a mincha of esronim in one vessel, but I do not remember how many." The dispute centers on whether they must bring sixty esronim in one bowl or every amount from one to sixty in sixty separate bowls. The Gemara suggests five different explanations for the nature of this debate and analyzes each suggestion. The Mishna explains the minimum value one must provide when vowing to bring wood, frankincense, gold, silver, or copper to the Temple. The required amount depends on the phrasing used: if one said, "I vow to bring [the item]," they are required to bring the minimum. However, if one said, "I vowed an amount, but I do not remember what amount," they are required to bring the maximum.

On today's pages, Menachot 96 and 97, we dive into the intricate organization of the showbread and the golden rods that supported them. While the technical details of arranging these rods on Shabbat might seem overwhelming, Rava teaches us a vital lesson: any labor that can be done in advance should be. Can a little foresight transform a stressful list of rules into a day of true rest? Listen and find out.