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Study Guide A Mishna is quoted from Masechet Eruvin 103, permitting a kohen to put on a bandage made from a reed on an injured finger while he is in the Temple, but not outside the Temple, as this is forbidden by rabbinic laws, and rabbinic laws are suspended in the Temple. However, if he intends to draw blood, that is forbidden as that is a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Chiya, qualifies the Mishna that it is only relating to issues of Shabbat, but if the kohen put a sash around his finger, there would be an additional problem of wearing an extra garment. However, Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and only forbids an extra garment in a location where the special kohen clothes are meant to be. Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan, as he holds even where there are no clothes, e.g., on a finger, there is still a prohibition, but distinguishes. If it is where the kohen wears his clothes, any side cloth will be problematic. If it is somewhere else, it will be prohibited if it is 3x3 fingers. A second version of the three opinions are brought, in which it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, and that Rabbi Yochanan and Rava disagree, but the Gemara asks whether or not Rava and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and they conclude that they do not disagree. Rava asks six questions, Rav Ashi adds a seventh, and Rabbi Zeira an eighth relating to issues with the kohen’s clothing. An answer is brought only for the last question regarding tefillin, if they are considered a chatzitza (interposition) between the clothing and the kohen’s body. Two braitot are brought to raise a difficulty with the answer, but are resolved. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who is mechusar kipuurim. A source is brought for the disqualification of work performed in the Temple by a kohen who has not washed his hands and feet from the basin in the Temple beforehand. A braita distinguishes between the washing of hands that the kohen gadol does on Yom Kippur before and after going in the mikveh when changing his clothes, which is not essential, and the washing done by the kohanim daily, which is essential. Why is there a distinction?
Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.
Study Guide Zevachim 16 The Gemara presents three proofs that the service of a non-priest (zar) in the Temple is invalid: one from a verse, and two derived through a kal va-chomer argument. It then brings four proofs that the service of a mourner, before burial (onen), in the Temple is also invalid: two from verses and two from kal va-chomer reasoning. Rava attempts to limit the disqualification of the onen to the case of an individual offering, based on a kal va-chomer from ritual impurity that is permitted in communal offerings. In other words, if impurity does not invalidate a communal offering (when the majority of the community is impure), perhaps mourning should not invalidate it either. However, Rava bar Ahilai rejects this argument, claiming that accepting such a kal va-chomer would open the door to additional a fortiori arguments that could lead to incorrect halakhic conclusions, and therefore it should not be accepted.
Study Guide Zevachim 16 The Gemara presents three proofs that the service of a non-priest (zar) in the Temple is invalid: one from a verse, and two derived through a kal va-chomer argument. It then brings four proofs that the service of a mourner, before burial (onen), in the Temple is also invalid: two from verses and two from kal va-chomer reasoning. Rava attempts to limit the disqualification of the onen to the case of an individual offering, based on a kal va-chomer from ritual impurity that is permitted in communal offerings. In other words, if impurity does not invalidate a communal offering (when the majority of the community is impure), perhaps mourning should not invalidate it either. However, Rava bar Ahilai rejects this argument, claiming that accepting such a kal va-chomer would open the door to additional a fortiori arguments that could lead to incorrect halakhic conclusions, and therefore it should not be accepted.
Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.
1 section- final clarification in machloket Tannaim (RY and RS) and debate in Amoraim (RAbY and Rava) who is the author of the Mishna (and related debate in understanding the position of RY)
1 section- final clarification in machloket Tannaim (RY and RS) and debate in Amoraim (RAbY and Rava) who is the author of the Mishna
Following Ulla’s ruling that conveying the blood without moving one’s feet is invalid, the Gemara explores whether such a situation can be rectified if the initial conveying was performed without foot movement. The first attempt to prove that it can be corrected is from the Mishna in Zevachim 32a, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. A definitive proof is then brought from a statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, establishing that the flaw cannot be corrected. Rav Nachman raises two challenges to Ulla’s position based on rulings in the Mishna (Zevachim 32a and 25a). The first challenge is addressed, though not convincingly, while the second remains unresolved. A new interpretation is proposed regarding the debate between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning the act of conveying. According to this view, when Rabbi Shimon rules that improper intention during conveying does not disqualify the sacrifice, he refers specifically to conveying without foot movement. However, this interpretation is mocked by the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, the Gemara explains their ridicule by suggesting that if Rabbi Shimon is correct, there would be no case in the sprinkling of the blood of a bird sin offering where improper intent could disqualify the offering, despite the known principle that intent during sprinkling can indeed disqualify. This explanation is rejected, and a more compelling reason is offered: Rabbi Shimon’s own words in the Mishna indicate that he was discussing conveying by foot. He explains that conveying may be unnecessary because the animal can be slaughtered adjacent to the altar. Only foot-based conveying is deemed unnecessary, since even when slaughtered nearby, the blood still needs to be transferred to the altar by passing by hand. The Gemara then discusses a case where a non-kohen conveys the blood to the altar, and a kohen returns it to its original location before conveying it properly. There is a dispute over whether this sequence validates the offering or disqualifies it. In a reverse scenario, where a kohen conveys the blood, and a non-kohen returns it and then conveys it again, there is disagreement about whether this case parallels the previous one. Rav Shimi bar Ashi links the two cases: the one who permits in the first case forbids in the second, and vice versa, depending on whether the initial or final action is considered decisive. Rava, however, does not connect the cases, asserting that both would disqualify the second scenario. Once the blood is distanced from the altar, it must be returned in a valid manner - specifically, by a kohen. Rav Yirmia quotes Rav Yirmia of Difti, who claims that the question of whether blood that was brought to the altar and then distanced must be returned is itself a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis in our Mishna. This interpretation is based on Rava’s reading of the Mishna. Abaye challenges this view with a braita and ultimately rejects it, leading Rava to concede to Abaye’s position. The Mishna enumerates various cases in which the handling of blood by someone disqualified from performing Temple service invalidates the sacrifice. The first example is a non-kohen. What is the source for this? One possibility is a derivation from Vayikra 22:2–3, while another is a kal va’chomer from the case of a blemished kohen.
In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.
In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.
Study Guide Zevachim 8 If any of the four sacrificial rites of a sin offering - slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying it, or sprinkling it - are performed with the intent of a different sacrifice or for a different owner, the offering is disqualified. The Gemara investigates the source of this law. Initially, it cites verses that establish the requirement to slaughter, collect, and sprinkle the blood with the correct intent, both for the appropriate sacrifice and for the proper owner, and that failure to do so invalidates the offering. However, these sources do not explicitly prove that intent for a different sacrifice disqualifies the offering, nor that slaughtering and collecting must be done for the correct owner. The Gemara first attempts to derive this from verses concerning the sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper, but both are rejected due to unique stringencies in each case. It then explores combinations - nazirite and leper, nazirite and standard sin offering, or leper and standard sin offering - but each pairing is also dismissed, as each has its own distinctive stringency. Ultimately, Rava derives the requirement to perform all rites with the correct intent, from both the perspective of the sacrifice and the owner, from a verse that juxtaposes the peace offering with the sin offering, as the source for the basic law of proper intent is found in the laws of the peace offering, as explained in Zevachim 4. The verses previously cited in the sugya are then reinterpreted to teach that without proper designation, the offering is invalid—based on the principle that in kodashim (sacrificial laws), repetition in the Torah indicates necessity (l’akev). The proof from the verses above pertains to a standard sin offering. The Gemara then asks: how do we know the same applies to a sin offering brought for idol worship or to a sliding-scale offering (korban oleh veyored)? These cases are derived through comparative analysis with other offerings mentioned previously. The discussion shifts to the case of a Pesach offering. If one designates an animal for the Passover sacrifice but slaughters it on a day that is not Pesach, the offering is not disqualified and is instead brought as a peace offering. The father of Shmuel cites a verse from Vayikra 3:6, which discusses peace offerings, as the source. However, a difficulty arises: the verse may only support the case where the animal was offered as a peace offering. If it were offered with the intent for a different sacrifice, it might be disqualified. To address this, the Gemara explains that the term zevach in the verse encompasses other types of offerings. Yet this resolution is unsatisfactory, as it could still be argued that if the Pesach was offered with intent for any other sacrifice, it should be brought as that sacrifice, not necessarily as a peace offering. To resolve this, the Gemara presents two alternative derivations from the verse and proceeds to analyze their validity.
Study Guide Zevachim 8 If any of the four sacrificial rites of a sin offering - slaughtering, collecting the blood, carrying it, or sprinkling it - are performed with the intent of a different sacrifice or for a different owner, the offering is disqualified. The Gemara investigates the source of this law. Initially, it cites verses that establish the requirement to slaughter, collect, and sprinkle the blood with the correct intent, both for the appropriate sacrifice and for the proper owner, and that failure to do so invalidates the offering. However, these sources do not explicitly prove that intent for a different sacrifice disqualifies the offering, nor that slaughtering and collecting must be done for the correct owner. The Gemara first attempts to derive this from verses concerning the sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper, but both are rejected due to unique stringencies in each case. It then explores combinations - nazirite and leper, nazirite and standard sin offering, or leper and standard sin offering - but each pairing is also dismissed, as each has its own distinctive stringency. Ultimately, Rava derives the requirement to perform all rites with the correct intent, from both the perspective of the sacrifice and the owner, from a verse that juxtaposes the peace offering with the sin offering, as the source for the basic law of proper intent is found in the laws of the peace offering, as explained in Zevachim 4. The verses previously cited in the sugya are then reinterpreted to teach that without proper designation, the offering is invalid—based on the principle that in kodashim (sacrificial laws), repetition in the Torah indicates necessity (l’akev). The proof from the verses above pertains to a standard sin offering. The Gemara then asks: how do we know the same applies to a sin offering brought for idol worship or to a sliding-scale offering (korban oleh veyored)? These cases are derived through comparative analysis with other offerings mentioned previously. The discussion shifts to the case of a Pesach offering. If one designates an animal for the Passover sacrifice but slaughters it on a day that is not Pesach, the offering is not disqualified and is instead brought as a peace offering. The father of Shmuel cites a verse from Vayikra 3:6, which discusses peace offerings, as the source. However, a difficulty arises: the verse may only support the case where the animal was offered as a peace offering. If it were offered with the intent for a different sacrifice, it might be disqualified. To address this, the Gemara explains that the term zevach in the verse encompasses other types of offerings. Yet this resolution is unsatisfactory, as it could still be argued that if the Pesach was offered with intent for any other sacrifice, it should be brought as that sacrifice, not necessarily as a peace offering. To resolve this, the Gemara presents two alternative derivations from the verse and proceeds to analyze their validity.
In trying to answer whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments neglected after the animal was designated (between designation and slaughter) or only for those neglected before designation, the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon. He explains that the reason two goats are offered on Shavuot is that the second goat atones for impurities in the Temple that occurred after the first goat was offered. If both goats were designated at the same time, this would support the view that an offering can atone for sins committed after designation. A difficulty is raised with that proof because it assumes simultaneous designation; perhaps the second goat needs to be designated only after the first was offered. That possibility is hard to accept because the verse does not indicate a later designation. Rav Papa also rejects the proof, suggesting instead that the court could stipulate from the outset that the second goat will only become sanctified after the blood of the first goat is offered. Two objections are raised to Rav Papa’s reply. First, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the court's stipulations—he therefore would not recognize a court’s postponement of consecration, as shown by his ruling that animals reserved for one year cannot serve as the Tamid in the following year. Second, Rabbi Yirmeya’s question about whether the second goat can cover impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the first goat’s blood and the second’s implies it was understood that the goat covers from the time of designation. That second difficulty is, however, resolved, and the original question remains unanswered. There is a dispute between Raba and Rav Chisda about a toda (thanksgiving offering) brought on behalf of another who needs to bring a toda. Each presents his reasoning; Raba cites a baraita in support, but his proof is rejected. Rava gives six rulings about issues of incorrect intention during the sacrificial rites and adds a seventh about the nature of the olah (burnt offering). He teaches that the olah does not itself provide atonement; rather, it is a gift to God offered after a person has repented for not fulfilling a positive commandment. If the person has not yet repented, the offering provides no atonement, for the sacrifices of the wicked are despicable. The Mishna states that both a sin offering and a Pesach sacrifice brought for the sake of the wrong sacrifice or for the wrong person are disqualified. The Gemara first adduces the source for this rule for Pesach and then for the sin offering.
In trying to answer whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments neglected after the animal was designated (between designation and slaughter) or only for those neglected before designation, the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon. He explains that the reason two goats are offered on Shavuot is that the second goat atones for impurities in the Temple that occurred after the first goat was offered. If both goats were designated at the same time, this would support the view that an offering can atone for sins committed after designation. A difficulty is raised with that proof because it assumes simultaneous designation; perhaps the second goat needs to be designated only after the first was offered. That possibility is hard to accept because the verse does not indicate a later designation. Rav Papa also rejects the proof, suggesting instead that the court could stipulate from the outset that the second goat will only become sanctified after the blood of the first goat is offered. Two objections are raised to Rav Papa’s reply. First, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the court's stipulations—he therefore would not recognize a court’s postponement of consecration, as shown by his ruling that animals reserved for one year cannot serve as the Tamid in the following year. Second, Rabbi Yirmeya’s question about whether the second goat can cover impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the first goat’s blood and the second’s implies it was understood that the goat covers from the time of designation. That second difficulty is, however, resolved, and the original question remains unanswered. There is a dispute between Raba and Rav Chisda about a toda (thanksgiving offering) brought on behalf of another who needs to bring a toda. Each presents his reasoning; Raba cites a baraita in support, but his proof is rejected. Rava gives six rulings about issues of incorrect intention during the sacrificial rites and adds a seventh about the nature of the olah (burnt offering). He teaches that the olah does not itself provide atonement; rather, it is a gift to God offered after a person has repented for not fulfilling a positive commandment. If the person has not yet repented, the offering provides no atonement, for the sacrifices of the wicked are despicable. The Mishna states that both a sin offering and a Pesach sacrifice brought for the sake of the wrong sacrifice or for the wrong person are disqualified. The Gemara first adduces the source for this rule for Pesach and then for the sin offering.
Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering (lo lishma). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner's obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all? Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs. Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish’s view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer’s position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well. Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma. Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: “And he slaughtered it as a sin offering” (Vayikra 4:33). From the word “it,” we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma. The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner's obligation. Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v’chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone (“And he slaughtered it as a sin offering”). Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn’t Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn’t Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother’s burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?
2 sections- final points in Rava's thirds contradiction and 2 more contradiction of other Amoraim within positions of Rav regarding similiarity/dissimilarity interrupting processes
Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering (lo lishma). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner's obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all? Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs. Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish’s view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer’s position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well. Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma. Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: “And he slaughtered it as a sin offering” (Vayikra 4:33). From the word “it,” we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma. The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner's obligation. Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v’chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone (“And he slaughtered it as a sin offering”). Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn’t Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn’t Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother’s burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?
1 section- 2nd and 3rd contradictions of Rava with resolutions: between korbanos/gittin and korbanos/tumah transfers regarding dissimilar items being considered as impactful/barrier or not
2 sections- final points in Rava's thirds contradiction and 2 more contradiction of other Amoraim within positions of Rav regarding similiarity/dissimilarity interrupting processes
3 sections- debate in Mishna which korbanos with wrong intention during shechita render it entirely invalid, "ela" implies should continue properly, first contradiction and resolution of Rava regarding "stam" status of korbanos and gittin
1 section- 2nd and 3rd contradictions of Rava with resolutions: between korbanos/gittin and korbanos/tumah transfers regarding dissimilar items being considered as impactful/barrier or not
Zevachim 3: Rava's awesome shiur by “Dafsplaining”: daf yomi made simple
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. "He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life." Today’s daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of her mother, Yocheved bat Zvi and Sara, on her 4th yahrzeit. If one takes an animal that was designated for a specific sacrificial purpose and slaughters it with the intention that it be used for a different type of offering (shelo lishma), the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the sacrifice. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which slaughtering with the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering. The Mishna records four differing opinions regarding these exceptions: Tana Kamma holds that a sin offering (chatat) and a Passover offering (korban Pesach) - when brought at the proper time (the afternoon of the 14th of Nissan, or possibly even the morning) - are disqualified if slaughtered with incorrect intent. Rabbi Eliezer adds the guilt offering (asham) to the list, arguing that it is similar in nature to the sin offering. Yosi ben Honi expands the rule further, stating that any sacrifice slaughtered with the mistaken intent that it be offered as a sin offering or a Passover offering on the 14th of Nissan is disqualified. Shimon, brother of Azaria, maintains that if a sacrifice is slaughtered with the intent that it be offered as a higher-level offering than originally designated, it remains valid. However, if the intent is to downgrade it to a lower-level offering, the sacrifice is disqualified. The Mishna provides examples of what constitutes higher and lower offerings. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase “but [a sacrifice slaughtered with the wrong intent] does not fulfill the owner’s obligation”? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling—one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning. A further question arises: If a sacrifice is slaughtered without any specific intent, is that considered “no intent” or does it count as “intent”? Rava infers from the Mishna that such a case is treated as if it were done with intent. However, he notes a contradiction with the laws of lishma regarding a get (divorce document), which must be written specifically for the woman being divorced. Why, then, is the law different in each case? After addressing this question, the Gemara investigates the sources that underpin Rava’s apparent contradiction: first, that a sacrifice brought without specific intent is still valid; and second, that a get lacking explicit intent is invalid.
3 sections- debate in Mishna which korbanos with wrong intention during shechita render it entirely invalid, "ela" implies should continue properly, first contradiction and resolution of Rava regarding "stam" status of korbanos and gittin
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. "He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life." Today’s daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of her mother, Yocheved bat Zvi and Sara, on her 4th yahrzeit. If one takes an animal that was designated for a specific sacrificial purpose and slaughters it with the intention that it be used for a different type of offering (shelo lishma), the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the sacrifice. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which slaughtering with the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering. The Mishna records four differing opinions regarding these exceptions: Tana Kamma holds that a sin offering (chatat) and a Passover offering (korban Pesach) - when brought at the proper time (the afternoon of the 14th of Nissan, or possibly even the morning) - are disqualified if slaughtered with incorrect intent. Rabbi Eliezer adds the guilt offering (asham) to the list, arguing that it is similar in nature to the sin offering. Yosi ben Honi expands the rule further, stating that any sacrifice slaughtered with the mistaken intent that it be offered as a sin offering or a Passover offering on the 14th of Nissan is disqualified. Shimon, brother of Azaria, maintains that if a sacrifice is slaughtered with the intent that it be offered as a higher-level offering than originally designated, it remains valid. However, if the intent is to downgrade it to a lower-level offering, the sacrifice is disqualified. The Mishna provides examples of what constitutes higher and lower offerings. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela" ("but") instead of "ve" ("and") in the phrase “but [a sacrifice slaughtered with the wrong intent] does not fulfill the owner’s obligation”? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner's obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling—one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning. A further question arises: If a sacrifice is slaughtered without any specific intent, is that considered “no intent” or does it count as “intent”? Rava infers from the Mishna that such a case is treated as if it were done with intent. However, he notes a contradiction with the laws of lishma regarding a get (divorce document), which must be written specifically for the woman being divorced. Why, then, is the law different in each case? After addressing this question, the Gemara investigates the sources that underpin Rava’s apparent contradiction: first, that a sacrifice brought without specific intent is still valid; and second, that a get lacking explicit intent is invalid.
Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l’chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch." A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted. Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn’t answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir’s teachings were transmitted as “acherim” (“others”), and Rabbi Natan’s as “yesh omrim” (“some say”). Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile. A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as “acherim omrim.” When his son asked why he didn’t cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family’s honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying “They say in the name of Rabbi Meir.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can “uproot mountains”? Rav Yosef was a sinai, while Raba was an oker Harim. Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba’s tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect. In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others. The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku.
Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l’chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch." A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted. Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn’t answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir’s teachings were transmitted as “acherim” (“others”), and Rabbi Natan’s as “yesh omrim” (“some say”). Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile. A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as “acherim omrim.” When his son asked why he didn’t cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family’s honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying “They say in the name of Rabbi Meir.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can “uproot mountains”? Rav Yosef was a sinai, while Raba was an oker Harim. Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba’s tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect. In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others. The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku.
A braita explains that the words “מעם הארץ” — “from one of the land” — mentioned in the section about the individual’s sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon’s view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis’ position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon’s position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person’s change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved. A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored. There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad. A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya. The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position. A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising. If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo’s anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers.
How could Yehoachaz have been anointed with shemen hamishcha if Yoshiyahu hid the shemen hamishcha? What else did Yoshiyahu hide, and for what reason? The king and kohen gadol are anointed in different ways—how is each performed? Kings were anointed near a flowing stream as a good omen, symbolizing that their reign would endure. The Gemara digresses into a broader discussion about various practices people use to seek signs—whether they will survive the year, succeed in business, return safely from a journey, and so on. Some authorities caution against relying on such signs. Abaye, however, says that since we see signs do have meaning, one should eat symbolic foods on Rosh Hashana—such as gourds, chard, dates, and others—because they grow quickly, serving as a good omen for the coming year. Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Mishna, holding that even a kohen gadol who assumed the role by wearing the special garments (rather than being anointed) would still be required to bring a bull offering if he sinned. From where does he derive this ruling? A difficulty arises, as the continuation of the Mishna appears to align with Rabbi Meir’s position. Could it be that the Mishna is split—part following Rabbi Meir and part not? If not, how can the Mishna be reconciled? Three different answers are offered to resolve this question. The Mishna teaches that there are five mitzvot commanded to the kohen gadol that also apply to the mashuach milchama—the kohen who addresses the people before they go out to war. A braita provides the source for this ruling. Rava asked Rav Nachman whether a kohen gadol who becomes leprous is permitted to marry a widow. Rav Nachman did not know the answer. Rav Papa later posed the same question, and Rav Huna son of Rav Nachman responded. The Mishna discusses differences between a kohen gadol and a regular kohen regarding the laws of mourning—specifically, whether they may perform Temple service while in the state of onen (the period between the death of a relative and burial), and how they tear their garments. The kohen gadol tears his garment l’mata and a regular kohen l’maala. Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to translate these terms in this context. The Mishna rules that an action performed regularly (tadir) takes precedence over one that is less frequent. Additionally, if one mitzvah is more sanctified than another, it takes precedence. From where are these principles derived?
A braita explains that the words “מעם הארץ” — “from one of the land” — mentioned in the section about the individual’s sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon’s view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis’ position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering. Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon’s position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person’s change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved. A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored. There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad. A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya. The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position. A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising. If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo’s anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers.
How could Yehoachaz have been anointed with shemen hamishcha if Yoshiyahu hid the shemen hamishcha? What else did Yoshiyahu hide, and for what reason? The king and kohen gadol are anointed in different ways—how is each performed? Kings were anointed near a flowing stream as a good omen, symbolizing that their reign would endure. The Gemara digresses into a broader discussion about various practices people use to seek signs—whether they will survive the year, succeed in business, return safely from a journey, and so on. Some authorities caution against relying on such signs. Abaye, however, says that since we see signs do have meaning, one should eat symbolic foods on Rosh Hashana—such as gourds, chard, dates, and others—because they grow quickly, serving as a good omen for the coming year. Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Mishna, holding that even a kohen gadol who assumed the role by wearing the special garments (rather than being anointed) would still be required to bring a bull offering if he sinned. From where does he derive this ruling? A difficulty arises, as the continuation of the Mishna appears to align with Rabbi Meir’s position. Could it be that the Mishna is split—part following Rabbi Meir and part not? If not, how can the Mishna be reconciled? Three different answers are offered to resolve this question. The Mishna teaches that there are five mitzvot commanded to the kohen gadol that also apply to the mashuach milchama—the kohen who addresses the people before they go out to war. A braita provides the source for this ruling. Rava asked Rav Nachman whether a kohen gadol who becomes leprous is permitted to marry a widow. Rav Nachman did not know the answer. Rav Papa later posed the same question, and Rav Huna son of Rav Nachman responded. The Mishna discusses differences between a kohen gadol and a regular kohen regarding the laws of mourning—specifically, whether they may perform Temple service while in the state of onen (the period between the death of a relative and burial), and how they tear their garments. The kohen gadol tears his garment l’mata and a regular kohen l’maala. Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to translate these terms in this context. The Mishna rules that an action performed regularly (tadir) takes precedence over one that is less frequent. Additionally, if one mitzvah is more sanctified than another, it takes precedence. From where are these principles derived?
A kohen gadol is obligated to bring a special bull offering only if he issues an erroneous halachic ruling unintentionally and then personally acts upon that ruling. A braita derives this from the verse “לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם” (“for the guilt of the nation”), which compares the kohen gadol’s actions to those of the community when they bring a communal sin offering. This drasha is necessary because one might have assumed that the kohen gadol’s obligation could be learned directly from the communal offering paradigm, given their similarities. However, since the kohen gadol could also be compared to the nasi (king), who brings a sacrifice without issuing a mistaken ruling, the comparison is not straightforward. The drasha clarifies that the kohen gadol’s case aligns specifically with the communal model. Another drasha teaches that if the kohen gadol issues an erroneous ruling but the people act on it while he himself does not, no special bull offering is brought. The offering is only required when the kohen gadol personally commits the sin. The Mishna rules that if the kohen gadol and the court issue rulings simultaneously but on different matters—where the community follows the court and the kohen gadol follows his own ruling—he must bring an individual sacrifice. However, if he rules with the court on the same issue and acts together with the community, he is atoned through the communal bull offering, not the unique one designated for the kohen gadol. A braita attempts to derive this latter case by comparing the kohen gadol to the nasi, but this is rejected. The nasi is included in the communal Yom Kippur offering, whereas the kohen gadol receives atonement through his own unique Yom Kippur sacrifice. Ultimately, the source is derived from the verse “עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא” (“for the sin which he sinned,” Vayikra 4:3). Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the earlier case—where the kohen gadol and the court ruled simultaneously—refers to rulings made in the same location or in different places. The Gemara explores various scenarios in which the kohen gadol and the court ruled on different matters. Some cases are obvious, while others remain uncertain. The Mishna further explains that the kohen gadol’s sacrifice resembles the communal sin offering in that both require two conditions: (1) a mistaken ruling that leads to erroneous instruction, and (2) an unwitting action based on that ruling. The same principle applies to idol worship—to be liable, there must be both an erroneous ruling and a subsequent action. A braita derives this from a gezeira shava based on the phrase “מֵעֵינֵי” (“from the eyes”). When the Mishna states that the same applies to idol worship, it does not explicitly say, “And the same is true for the kohen gadol,” as it did earlier. Initially, the Gemara interprets this to mean that the Mishna follows Rebbi, who holds that the kohen gadol brings a sacrifice for idol worship based solely on an unwitting action, even without a mistaken ruling. However, this interpretation is rejected, and the Mishna is re-explained as the sentence “And such is true for the kohen gadol” would apply to both the sentence before and the sentence after, as is the case in the upcoming Mishna.
A kohen gadol is obligated to bring a special bull offering only if he issues an erroneous halachic ruling unintentionally and then personally acts upon that ruling. A braita derives this from the verse “לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם” (“for the guilt of the nation”), which compares the kohen gadol’s actions to those of the community when they bring a communal sin offering. This drasha is necessary because one might have assumed that the kohen gadol’s obligation could be learned directly from the communal offering paradigm, given their similarities. However, since the kohen gadol could also be compared to the nasi (king), who brings a sacrifice without issuing a mistaken ruling, the comparison is not straightforward. The drasha clarifies that the kohen gadol’s case aligns specifically with the communal model. Another drasha teaches that if the kohen gadol issues an erroneous ruling but the people act on it while he himself does not, no special bull offering is brought. The offering is only required when the kohen gadol personally commits the sin. The Mishna rules that if the kohen gadol and the court issue rulings simultaneously but on different matters—where the community follows the court and the kohen gadol follows his own ruling—he must bring an individual sacrifice. However, if he rules with the court on the same issue and acts together with the community, he is atoned through the communal bull offering, not the unique one designated for the kohen gadol. A braita attempts to derive this latter case by comparing the kohen gadol to the nasi, but this is rejected. The nasi is included in the communal Yom Kippur offering, whereas the kohen gadol receives atonement through his own unique Yom Kippur sacrifice. Ultimately, the source is derived from the verse “עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא” (“for the sin which he sinned,” Vayikra 4:3). Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the earlier case—where the kohen gadol and the court ruled simultaneously—refers to rulings made in the same location or in different places. The Gemara explores various scenarios in which the kohen gadol and the court ruled on different matters. Some cases are obvious, while others remain uncertain. The Mishna further explains that the kohen gadol’s sacrifice resembles the communal sin offering in that both require two conditions: (1) a mistaken ruling that leads to erroneous instruction, and (2) an unwitting action based on that ruling. The same principle applies to idol worship—to be liable, there must be both an erroneous ruling and a subsequent action. A braita derives this from a gezeira shava based on the phrase “מֵעֵינֵי” (“from the eyes”). When the Mishna states that the same applies to idol worship, it does not explicitly say, “And the same is true for the kohen gadol,” as it did earlier. Initially, the Gemara interprets this to mean that the Mishna follows Rebbi, who holds that the kohen gadol brings a sacrifice for idol worship based solely on an unwitting action, even without a mistaken ruling. However, this interpretation is rejected, and the Mishna is re-explained as the sentence “And such is true for the kohen gadol” would apply to both the sentence before and the sentence after, as is the case in the upcoming Mishna.
This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans. The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering. There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.
This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans. The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering. There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.
This week's learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. "My dear Uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Deborah Dickson. "Happy birthday to Hadran’s newest wonderful addition to the team. I’m excited to start another (school) year of learning with you, my friend!” The Mishna teaches that if the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and an individual follows, the individual does not have to bring a sin offering. However, the Gemara will later explain that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but the rabbis disagree and obligate the individual. If the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and a judge or student who has reached a stage of one who can issue halakhic rulings realizes they have made a mistake but follows their ruling anyway, he is obligated to bring a sin offering. If the court issues an erroneous ruling and the majority of the community follow it, there is an obligation to bring a special sacrifice called ‘the bull offering of an unwitting communal sin (par he’elem davar shel tzibur). Shmuel and Rav Dimi disagree about the language that must be used by the court for it to be considered “an erroneous ruling of the court.” Three sources are brought to support Rav Dimi’s position. In a second version of the debate, they switch positions, and the sources are raised as difficulties against Rav Dimi. The Mishna described the actions of the individual who is exempt when sinning by following an erroneous ruling of the court using the words “shogeg al pihem, unwitting by their words.” In two different versions of Rava’s explanation of this term, it either refers to two different cases or to one. If it refers to two, it would include an exemption in an additional case – if the court ruled by mistake that a piece of forbidden fat was permitted, and the individual meant to eat a piece of permitted fat, but accidentally ate the piece that the court permitted. Even though Rava had an answer to that question (obligated or exempt, depending on the different versions of Rava’s explanation), Rami bar Hama asked the same question and did not know the answer. Again, in two different versions, Rava answers the question by explaining the term in the Mishna. However, Rami bar Hama rejects his answer as the term is ambiguous. The Mishna lists various ways in which the individual or a judge/student can potentially follow a ruling of the court. What is the significance of the order in each case? How is a “teacher capable of issuing halakhic rulings" defined, and why was it necessary to include this category in addition to that of a judge? The Gemara quotes two braitot, one explaining the source for Rabbi Yehuda’s position in the Mishna, exempting an individual who follows the court, and the other explaining the source for the rabbis' dissenting opinion obligating an individual who follows the court. The latter braita is complicated to understand, and the Gemara irons out its meaning and shows how it reflects the rabbis' position.
1 section- 3 proofs supporting the positions of Rava v'Abayey in the 2 approaches of explaining the debate above regarding hana'ah ba'al korcho (smelled incense of avoda zara while walking)
1 section- 3 proofs supporting the positions of Rava v'Abayey in the 2 approaches of explaining the debate above regarding hana'ah ba'al korcho (smelled incense of avoda zara while walking)
This week's learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. "My dear Uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Deborah Dickson. "Happy birthday to Hadran’s newest wonderful addition to the team. I’m excited to start another (school) year of learning with you, my friend!” The Mishna teaches that if the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and an individual follows, the individual does not have to bring a sin offering. However, the Gemara will later explain that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but the rabbis disagree and obligate the individual. If the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and a judge or student who has reached a stage of one who can issue halakhic rulings realizes they have made a mistake but follows their ruling anyway, he is obligated to bring a sin offering. If the court issues an erroneous ruling and the majority of the community follow it, there is an obligation to bring a special sacrifice called ‘the bull offering of an unwitting communal sin (par he’elem davar shel tzibur). Shmuel and Rav Dimi disagree about the language that must be used by the court for it to be considered “an erroneous ruling of the court.” Three sources are brought to support Rav Dimi’s position. In a second version of the debate, they switch positions, and the sources are raised as difficulties against Rav Dimi. The Mishna described the actions of the individual who is exempt when sinning by following an erroneous ruling of the court using the words “shogeg al pihem, unwitting by their words.” In two different versions of Rava’s explanation of this term, it either refers to two different cases or to one. If it refers to two, it would include an exemption in an additional case – if the court ruled by mistake that a piece of forbidden fat was permitted, and the individual meant to eat a piece of permitted fat, but accidentally ate the piece that the court permitted. Even though Rava had an answer to that question (obligated or exempt, depending on the different versions of Rava’s explanation), Rami bar Hama asked the same question and did not know the answer. Again, in two different versions, Rava answers the question by explaining the term in the Mishna. However, Rami bar Hama rejects his answer as the term is ambiguous. The Mishna lists various ways in which the individual or a judge/student can potentially follow a ruling of the court. What is the significance of the order in each case? How is a “teacher capable of issuing halakhic rulings" defined, and why was it necessary to include this category in addition to that of a judge? The Gemara quotes two braitot, one explaining the source for Rabbi Yehuda’s position in the Mishna, exempting an individual who follows the court, and the other explaining the source for the rabbis' dissenting opinion obligating an individual who follows the court. The latter braita is complicated to understand, and the Gemara irons out its meaning and shows how it reflects the rabbis' position.
10 cases of Rava being meikel on yayin nesech due to mirtas
Rava ruled that if a Jew is with a non-Jewish prostitute and there is wine present, one can assume that the Jew ensured the prostitute did not come into contact with the wine, and therefore it is permitted. Although he may not be able to control his sexual desires, he is not presumed to be lax in the laws of yayin nesech (forbidden wine). However, in the reverse case—where a Jewish prostitute is with a non-Jew—since the non-Jew holds the dominant position in the relationship, we assume she has no way to prevent him from touching the wine, and thus it is forbidden. There are nine different cases in which a Jew’s wine was left with a non-Jew, and Rava issued rulings on whether the wine was permitted or forbidden in each instance. In many of these cases, he permitted the wine based on his assessment that the non-Jew would likely not have touched it, due to the possibility of being caught by the owner or another Jew. In other cases, there was uncertainty about whether the non-Jew had even come into contact with the wine, or whether the individuals present were Jews or non-Jews. Two additional cases were brought before other rabbis. In the second case, Abaye introduces a comparison to the laws of impurity, and the Gemara addresses this comparison. It notes that the rabbis were stricter regarding impurity laws than they were with wine, citing a debate between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan to support this point. Three challenges are raised against the positions of Rav and Rabbi Yochanan—two against Rav and one against Rabbi Yochanan—and each is resolved.
Rava ruled that if a Jew is with a non-Jewish prostitute and there is wine present, one can assume that the Jew ensured the prostitute did not come into contact with the wine, and therefore it is permitted. Although he may not be able to control his sexual desires, he is not presumed to be lax in the laws of yayin nesech (forbidden wine). However, in the reverse case—where a Jewish prostitute is with a non-Jew—since the non-Jew holds the dominant position in the relationship, we assume she has no way to prevent him from touching the wine, and thus it is forbidden. There are nine different cases in which a Jew’s wine was left with a non-Jew, and Rava issued rulings on whether the wine was permitted or forbidden in each instance. In many of these cases, he permitted the wine based on his assessment that the non-Jew would likely not have touched it, due to the possibility of being caught by the owner or another Jew. In other cases, there was uncertainty about whether the non-Jew had even come into contact with the wine, or whether the individuals present were Jews or non-Jews. Two additional cases were brought before other rabbis. In the second case, Abaye introduces a comparison to the laws of impurity, and the Gemara addresses this comparison. It notes that the rabbis were stricter regarding impurity laws than they were with wine, citing a debate between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan to support this point. Three challenges are raised against the positions of Rav and Rabbi Yochanan—two against Rav and one against Rabbi Yochanan—and each is resolved.
This week's learning is sponsored by Danielle & Jason Friedman in honor of Anabelle Friedman on her siyum of Mashechet Rosh Hashana on the occasion of her Bat Mitzvah, and in honor and appreciation of Rabbanit Michelle for inspiring and enabling multiple generations of women, in our family and around the world, to engage in Talmud study. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in memory of Myer Senders a”h, beloved father of our friend and co-learner Tina Lamm. "May the Torah learned today by all of us be a zechut for his neshama ותהא נשמתו צרורה בצרור החיים." What is the law regarding a mouse that falls into vinegar? Is the mouse nullified, and if so, at what ratio? The Mishna presents three distinct scenarios involving a Jew and a non-Jew, where wine is left in a location accessible to the non-Jew, raising concerns about potential libation (נסך) and thus rendering the wine prohibited. In each case, the Mishna outlines whether there is reason to suspect that the non-Jew offered the wine as a libation. The determining factor is whether the Jew stated they would be gone for a while or whether the Jew is considered to be supervising. The Gemara defines supervision as a situation in which the Jew could return at any moment, even if they are not physically present. The amount of time that must elapse to prohibit the wine (in a case where the Jew leaves for a while) is debated between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The Rabbis hold that the wine becomes prohibited if enough time passes to pierce the stopper, reseal it, and allow it to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that the required time is that needed to break the stopper entirely, fashion a new one, and let it dry. A fourth case involves a non-Jew dining in a Jew’s home, with wine left either on the table or on a side table. If the Jew leaves the room, there is concern that the non-Jew may touch the wine on the table, but not the wine on the side table—unless the Jew instructed the non-Jew to dilute the wine. If the bottle is sealed and enough time has passed for the stopper to be broken, replaced, and dried, the wine is prohibited. Why are all three cases necessary? What is unique about each, and why did the Mishna include them all? Rabbi Yochanan limits the scope of the debate between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to stoppers made of lime plaster, excluding those made of clay. If a non-Jew were to pierce a clay stopper and reseal it, the tampering would be visibly noticeable. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan’s explanation from a braita, but it is ultimately resolved. Rava rules in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as the final case in the Mishna reflects his opinion exclusively, without presenting the view of the Rabbis. The sugya concludes with a practical question: If the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—requiring a longer time to prohibit the wine—and also follows Rabbi Eliezer (Avodah Zarah 31a), who permits leaving a barrel with a single seal in the possession of a non-Jew without concern for tampering, why is the current practice to avoid leaving wine in a non-Jew’s possession? The Gemara answers that the concern lies with the bunghole, which was used to smell the wine. The worry is that the non-Jew might widen the hole to drink from it and offer the wine as a libation. Bungholes were apparently not present in barrels during the time of the Mishna but were commonly used at a later time in Babylonia when the question was asked.
This week's learning is sponsored by Danielle & Jason Friedman in honor of Anabelle Friedman on her siyum of Mashechet Rosh Hashana on the occasion of her Bat Mitzvah, and in honor and appreciation of Rabbanit Michelle for inspiring and enabling multiple generations of women, in our family and around the world, to engage in Talmud study. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in memory of Myer Senders a”h, beloved father of our friend and co-learner Tina Lamm. "May the Torah learned today by all of us be a zechut for his neshama ותהא נשמתו צרורה בצרור החיים." What is the law regarding a mouse that falls into vinegar? Is the mouse nullified, and if so, at what ratio? The Mishna presents three distinct scenarios involving a Jew and a non-Jew, where wine is left in a location accessible to the non-Jew, raising concerns about potential libation (נסך) and thus rendering the wine prohibited. In each case, the Mishna outlines whether there is reason to suspect that the non-Jew offered the wine as a libation. The determining factor is whether the Jew stated they would be gone for a while or whether the Jew is considered to be supervising. The Gemara defines supervision as a situation in which the Jew could return at any moment, even if they are not physically present. The amount of time that must elapse to prohibit the wine (in a case where the Jew leaves for a while) is debated between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The Rabbis hold that the wine becomes prohibited if enough time passes to pierce the stopper, reseal it, and allow it to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that the required time is that needed to break the stopper entirely, fashion a new one, and let it dry. A fourth case involves a non-Jew dining in a Jew’s home, with wine left either on the table or on a side table. If the Jew leaves the room, there is concern that the non-Jew may touch the wine on the table, but not the wine on the side table—unless the Jew instructed the non-Jew to dilute the wine. If the bottle is sealed and enough time has passed for the stopper to be broken, replaced, and dried, the wine is prohibited. Why are all three cases necessary? What is unique about each, and why did the Mishna include them all? Rabbi Yochanan limits the scope of the debate between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to stoppers made of lime plaster, excluding those made of clay. If a non-Jew were to pierce a clay stopper and reseal it, the tampering would be visibly noticeable. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan’s explanation from a braita, but it is ultimately resolved. Rava rules in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as the final case in the Mishna reflects his opinion exclusively, without presenting the view of the Rabbis. The sugya concludes with a practical question: If the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—requiring a longer time to prohibit the wine—and also follows Rabbi Eliezer (Avodah Zarah 31a), who permits leaving a barrel with a single seal in the possession of a non-Jew without concern for tampering, why is the current practice to avoid leaving wine in a non-Jew’s possession? The Gemara answers that the concern lies with the bunghole, which was used to smell the wine. The worry is that the non-Jew might widen the hole to drink from it and offer the wine as a libation. Bungholes were apparently not present in barrels during the time of the Mishna but were commonly used at a later time in Babylonia when the question was asked.
This week's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik and Professor Adi Wyner in honor of the birth of their first Israeli grandson, David Rafael, son of Rivkah & Charlie Gottlieb. Davidi was born at Sheba Medical Center on 26 Tammuz/ July 22. He is named after his great-grandfathers, David Malik z"l and Dr. Donald Stoltz z"l. As we begin the month of Elul with the recitation of Tehillim 27 (“L’David HaShem Ori v’Yishi”), we continue to pray for Davidi’s refuah shleima as he meets the challenges of a cleft palate, including surgery sometime before his first birthday. דוד רפאל בן רבקה אריאנא ואליעזר בנימין Today's daf is sponsored by Terri Krivosha in memory of her mother, חני מנדל בת שימה פיגה וירחמיאל הכהן, on her second yahrzeit. She was an eshet chayil whom we miss and think of every day. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir dispute whether a mixture is prohibited when the forbidden component imparts a bad taste to the permitted food. Ulla and Rabbi Yochanan differ on the scope of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir: Ulla holds that they disagree when the forbidden item initially gives a good taste and only later turns bad, while Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in a case where the bad taste is immediate. A challenge to Ulla’s view is raised and resolved. The Gemara then asks whether Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in both scenarios, but the question remains unresolved. Rav Amram raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan’s view, noting that this debate is absent from the Mishna. After further searching, he identifies what seems to be the same dispute in Mishna Orlah 2:9. Rabbi Zeira, however, rejects the connection, explaining that the prohibition there rests on a different principle. A braita is then brought that directly supports Rabbi Yochanan: it describes a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding two leavening agents — one of truma, one of chullin — each potent enough to leaven dough on its own. Since adding both would cause over-leavening and produce a bad taste, this proves that there is indeed a debate in cases where a prohibited item imparts a bad taste. The braita lists another disputed scenario — when both leavening agents are added simultaneously. Abaye explains the need for this case: it was brought to clarify Rabbi Shimon’s position that even when the prohibited agent initially aids leavening, if it acts in tandem with the permitted agent, it is not considered to have been beneficial to the dough initially, and therefore, the dough is permitted. A case is brought where a mouse fell into a barrel of beer, and Rav prohibited the consumption of the beer. Some assumed Rav ruled like Rabbi Meir, prohibiting mixtures even when the forbidden element imparts bad taste. Rav Sheshet instead interprets Rav’s decision as a special stringency regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures), and two objections to this reading are resolved. Rava rejects Rav Sheshet’s explanation and holds that if a prohibited item imparts bad taste, the mixture is permitted, and suggests either that the halakha is not in accordance with Rav, or that Rav held the mouse imparted a good taste to the beer.
Old (fermented) wine that was used for a libation that spills onto grapes will be prohibited or not, depending on it affecting the taste of the grapes. New wine, however, is the subject of dispute - are they only forbidden if the new wine affected their flavor, or any amount would be an issue (it's a machloket between Abaye and Rava, on taste vs. name). Also, the smell of the wine helps evaluate how good it is - via the "bat tiha" - a hole in the wine cask, and the tester would smell the wine at that point (via a tube, etc.). Cumin becomes a parallel example for smell and food, but then it stops short of being a real parallel, because of all the differences between cumin and wine.
On today's pages, Avodah Zarah 65 and 66, we meet a minister in rose water and Rava himself debating pleasure versus power. Dr. Tevi Troy, our very own Presidentischer Rav, helps us draw lessons from presidents, CEOs, and moguls who thought they were untouchable—until the government reminded them otherwise. Can political reality burst even the strongest illusions? Listen and find out.
Daf Yomi Avodah Zarah 65Episode 2057Slides: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1PCGNxBuRXKIiU9jbL4XcuCRUd_R_-VJfZZ0-7sdzefo/edit?usp=sharingJoin the community: https://chat.whatsapp.com/LMbsU3a5f4Y3b61DxFRsqfSefaria: https://www.sefaria.org/Avodah_Zarah.65a?lang=heEmail: sruli@babbleontalmud.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/babble_on_talmudFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/p/Babble-on-Talmud-100080258961218/#dafyomi #talmud00:00 Intro04:19 Rava visits Bar Shayshakh14:03 Acceptable avodah zarah wages52:16 When there's yayn nesech in a mixure67:03 Tosfos74:40 Conclusion