Podcasts about Rava

Study Guide The Gemara discusses a contradiction regarding the time for redeeming a firstborn donkey (peter chamor). One braita states that is can be done immediately, while another states that it cannot be performed before thirty days. Three resolutions are brought. Rav Nachman explains that if one redeemed it within thirty days, it is redeemed post-facto (b'dieved). Rav Sheshet suggests that the thirty-day timeframe teaches that one does not violate the prohibition against delaying the mitzva during this period. Rava resolves the conflicting opinions and explains that the dispute depends on whether one follows Rabbi Eliezer, who compares a firstborn donkey to a firstborn son, or the rabbis, who do not. The Mishna rules that if the owner does not wish to redeem the firstborn donkey, he decapitates it from behind and buries it. The commandment of redemption takes precedence. The Mishna lists additional mitzvot that have an order of precedence: the commandment of designation (ye'ida) takes precedence over the commandment of redemption for a Hebrew maidservant; the commandment of Levirate marriage (yibbum) originally took precedence over chalitza, but nowadays the commandment of chalitza takes precedence because people do not intend it for the sake of the mitzvah; and the commandment of redemption by the owner takes precedence over any other person in redeeming sanctified non-kosher animals. At the opening of the second chapter, the Mishna rules that if an Israelite buys, sells, enters a partnership in, or receives on a sharecropping contract (kibalat) a fetus or an animal of a Gentile, the offspring is exempt from firstborn status of kosher animals, as it is stated in the Torah "in Israel," excluding animals under joint or full ownership of Gentiles. Kohanim and Levites are obligated in the firstborn of a kosher animal, as their exemption applies only to pidyon haben and peter chamor. The Gemara asks why the masechet begins with laws of firstborn donkey and then of kosher animals given that kosher animals possess intrinsic sanctity (kedushat haguf) while a donkey possesses only monetary sanctity (kedushat damim). The Gemara answers that matters regarding non-kosher animals are few, and therefore the matter was concluded first, or because a firstborn donkey is cherished. Regarding transactions with a Gentile, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Nachmani said in the name of Resh Lakish, who quoted the words of Rabbi Oshaya, that an Israelite who gave money to a Gentile (and a Gentile who gave money to an Israelite) acquires through money alone, and does not require physical pulling (meshikha). This derives this from the verse "from the hand of your neighbor" (mi-yad amitekha), teaching that meshikha is required only between an Israelite and his neighbor, whereas a transaction with a Gentile is effected through money. Ameimar holds a dissenting opinion – that a transaction between a Gentile and an Israelite is effected through money. The Gemara analyzes how to understand the verse of amitekha according to Ameimar according to the positions of both Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. A difficulty is raised from a braita against the position of Rabbi Oshaya regarding one who buys pieces of silver (gruta'ot) from Gentiles and finds an idol inside, where ownership depends on whether money was given or physical pulling (meshikha) was performed. The Gemara resolves the difficulty through four different explanations.

The Mishna lists animals that cannot be used for redemption, including a calf, an undomesticated animal, a slaughtered or treifa animal, a hybrid (kilayim), or a koy (a creature of doubtful status between a domesticated and undomesticated animal). Rabbi Eliezer permits redemption using a hybrid because it is nevertheless a lamb (born to two animals in the sheep family), but forbids a koy. The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Ben Bag Bag, who derives from a textual comparison (gezeira shava) of the word seh from the Paschal sacrifice that only a standard, kosher lamb or goat fulfills the obligation. Four questions are asked regarding animals that may or may not be used to redeem a firstborn donkey. The first question: may a fetus that was in the womb of its mother when she was slaughtered (ben pekua) be used? At first, the Gemara assesses that the question is according to the Sages' position regarding a ben pekua, and not Rabbi Meir's. Mar Zutra holds it is invalid because it does not require ritual slaughter, and therefore it is considered equivalent to a slaughtered animal. Rav Ashi permits it because the Torah repeats the word tifdeh (redeem) to include all kosher sheep. The second question: can an animal that does not resemble its mother (nidmeh) be used for redemption? At first, the Gemara assesses that the question is according to the Sages' position and not Rabbi Eliezer's, since it is clear he would permit it, given that even kilayim is permitted for use. Two sources are brought to answer the question, but in the end, each source is inconclusive. The third question: may consecrated animals that became blemished (pesulei hamukdashin) be used to redeem a firstborn donkey? Rav Mari son of Rav Kahana proves from the verse comparing them to a gazelle and a deer (k'tzvi v'ka'ayal) that just as a gazelle or deer cannot be used to redeem a firstborn donkey, blemished consecrated animals likewise cannot be used. The final question: may one use an animal that possesses Sabbatical year sanctity for redemption? One clearly cannot use it to redeem a definite firstborn donkey, as the Torah specifies that Sabbatical produce is designated "for eating" (l'okhla) and not for commerce (l'skhora). To answer the question, a statement of Rav Chisda is brought showing that one may use a Sabbatical year animal to redeem a doubtful firstborn donkey, according to Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Chisda ruled on other issues regarding animals with the sanctity of the Sabbatical year—that they are exempt from firstborn status and obligated in priestly gifts. A difficulty is raised from a braita regarding halla, but it is resolved. If an Israelite gives an unredeemed firstborn donkey to a kohen, the kohen is not permitted to keep it until a lamb is designated in its place immediately, as kohanim were suspected of taking firstborn donkeys without properly redeeming them. If one designates a lamb for redemption and the lamb dies, Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages dispute who bears responsibility. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the owner remains responsible to provide another lamb (comparing it to redemption of a firstborn son, pidyon haben), whereas the Sages hold that the owner is free of responsibility (comparing it to the redemption of second tithe, ma'aser sheni). Testimony from Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Tzadok confirms the Sages' view that the kohen receives nothing if the designated redemption dies before reaching him. Rav Yosef and Rava subsequently explain the source for Rabbi Eliezer's position.

A machlokes Abaya and Rava what the kal vchomer of the mishna means to patur kohanim from bechor,how we know all kohanim are included in the patur of pidyon,and Was there kedushas bchor in the midbar machlokes Reb yochanan and Reish lakish

The Mishna rules that Kohanim and Levites are exempt from bekhora (firstborn male donkeys) based on a kal v'chomer: if they exempted the firstborns of Israelites in the desert, logic dictates that they exempt their own. The Gemara challenges the Mishna's premise as the Levites themselves did not exempt the donkeys of the Israelites – they themselves exempted the Israelite firstborn males, and their animals exempted the Israelite firstborn donkeys. Two answers are offered to resolve this question, by both Abaye and Rava. Abaye answers that the Mishna means the livestock of the Levites exempted their own livestock. Rava rejects Abaye's interpretation on two grounds: first, the Mishna uses the verb "they exempted", referring to the Levites themselves; second, if Abaye were correct, Levites' kosher firstborn animals should be exempt from bekhora also, yet a Mishna explicitly teaches that Kohanim and Levites are obligated in the firstborn of kosher animals and exempt only from redeeming their sons (pidyon haben) and firstborn donkey (peter chamor). Rava provides his own answer, explaining that the Levites exempted themselves (their human firstborns) via kal v'chomer from what transpired in the desert where the Levites exempted the Israelite firstborns. To derive their exemption from the firstborn donkey (peter chamor), the Gemara cites a verse equating human firstborns with impure animal firstborns ("האדם ואת בכור הבהמה הטמאה תפדה"), establishing that whoever is exempt from human firstborn is exempt from the redemption of the donkeys. Rav Safra raises four difficulties against both Abaye and Rava: if the exemption depends on the Levites' exchange in the desert, what about those who were not involved in the exemption, such as a Levite who did not own animals or was under a month old, or a female Levite, or Aharon? All difficulties are resolved. Three other questions are asked and answered, namely, the source for kohanim being included in this exemption, that this exemption applies for future generations, and that the redemption of a firstborn donkey in the desert was performed specifically with a lamb (seh) just as it is for future generations. Rav Chanina states that a single lamb belonging to a Levite exempted multiple firstborn donkeys of Israelites in the desert. Abaye attempts to prove this from the fact that Scripture notes how many excess human firstborns there were compared to Levites, but did not mention any excess firstborn animals. After rejecting Abaye's proof, the Gemara proves this from the precise phrasing "ואת בהמת הלוים תחת בהמתם" – "an animal (single) of the Levites in place of their (Israelites) animals (plural)", and Rava notes that this aligns with a Mishna ruling that one may redeem with a lamb multiple times, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Chanina's statement was meant to give the reason for that Mishna. Rabbi Yochanan challenges Reish Lakish from two tannaitic sources, but both difficulties against Reish Lakish are resolved. An alternative version suggests that the second difficulty was brought by Reish Lakish to challenge Rabbi Yochanan's position. A third source is brought by the Gemara to prove Rabbi Yochanan's position, but Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak provides an alternative explanation of that source to reconcile it with Reish Lakish. Following a difficulty on this explanation, raised by Rav Papa, the Gemara is forced to slightly adjust Reish Lakish's view: it is clear that at the beginning of their stay in the desert, firstborns were sanctified; according to Reish Lakish, it was only after that specific event (the exchange of the firstborns for the Levites) that they ceased to sanctify them until entering the Land of Israel.

Reconciling Rav's two rulings on the required fleece yield, where he states "a mane and a half" (mane v'pras) in one context and "sixty" in another, the Gemara explains that Rav refers to a mane of forty sela'im, making a mane and a half equal to sixty sela'im. Regarding the five-sela'im gift, a braita clarifies that the owner is not required to bleach the wool before giving it; rather, he must provide enough wool so that five sela'im remain after the kohen bleaches it. Deriving from "l'amod l'sharet" ("to stand and serve"), Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains that the gift must yield enough processed wool to weave a small priestly garment - specifically identifying the belt (avnet) as the smallest garment used in Temple service. If one shears each sheep and immediately sells it before shearing the next, Rav Chisda obligates the owner because shearing occurred under one's ownership, whereas Rabbi Natan bar Hoshaya exempts because complete flock ownership was lacking when the total required quantity was met (when all five sheep were sheared). In sales where a buyer purchases shearings from a flock, if the seller keeps some of the shearings, the seller is obligated in the mitzva. The amoraim try to find a tannaitic opinion by which to explain this ruling. Rav Chisda's suggestion is rejected, and Rava connects it with a Mishna regarding the priestly gifts. A seller cannot sell the kohen's portion as it does not belong to the seller, but to the kohen. Thus, if the seller retained any shearings, the liability remains with the seller, but if no shearings were retained, liability falls upon the buyer. Beginning Chapter 12, the Mishna defines the mandate to send away the mother bird (shiluach haken), contrasting its scope with the commandments in the previous chapters. Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Meisha compare the structure of the previous chapters and highlight which laws were necessary, and which were brought just as a foil. The Gemara explains why consecrated birds as well as a kosher bird condemned by a court are exempt from this commandment.

Reconciling Rav's two rulings on the required fleece yield, where he states "a mane and a half" (mane v'pras) in one context and "sixty" in another, the Gemara explains that Rav refers to a mane of forty sela'im, making a mane and a half equal to sixty sela'im. Regarding the five-sela'im gift, a braita clarifies that the owner is not required to bleach the wool before giving it; rather, he must provide enough wool so that five sela'im remain after the kohen bleaches it. Deriving from "l'amod l'sharet" ("to stand and serve"), Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains that the gift must yield enough processed wool to weave a small priestly garment - specifically identifying the belt (avnet) as the smallest garment used in Temple service. If one shears each sheep and immediately sells it before shearing the next, Rav Chisda obligates the owner because shearing occurred under one's ownership, whereas Rabbi Natan bar Hoshaya exempts because complete flock ownership was lacking when the total required quantity was met (when all five sheep were sheared). In sales where a buyer purchases shearings from a flock, if the seller keeps some of the shearings, the seller is obligated in the mitzva. The amoraim try to find a tannaitic opinion by which to explain this ruling. Rav Chisda's suggestion is rejected, and Rava connects it with a Mishna regarding the priestly gifts. A seller cannot sell the kohen's portion as it does not belong to the seller, but to the kohen. Thus, if the seller retained any shearings, the liability remains with the seller, but if no shearings were retained, liability falls upon the buyer. Beginning Chapter 12, the Mishna defines the mandate to send away the mother bird (shiluach haken), contrasting its scope with the commandments in the previous chapters. Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Meisha compare the structure of the previous chapters and highlight which laws were necessary, and which were brought just as a foil. The Gemara explains why consecrated birds as well as a kosher bird condemned by a court are exempt from this commandment.

After escaping the Eternal Eye's ambush, the party finds themselves exhausted. They'll need to continue traveling south towards Rava's Grove, while avoiding the Eternal Eye. Will they make it there or will the Eternal Eye catch up? Find out in this episode of T&C! Join us as our DM Rhyan (HaphazardDM) tries to kill our beloved characters – Nomu (Robert), Yelar (Rodimus7901), and Relinoa (a new full-time NPC) while we try to ruin whatever it is he has planned. Please leave us a rating/review on Apple Podcasts or any other podcast platform you use! We would greatly appreciate it! Also don't forget to check out the Taverns & Caverns Patreon for ad-free and additional exclusive content! Thank you Adventurers!  

Du 2 au 6 septembre 2026, vous avez pu assister a l'un des plus grands festivals agricoles de Slovaquie au centre d'exposition Agrokomplex Nitra. Zemplínska Šírava est un réservoir d'eau situé dans l'est de la Slovaquie. Des étés ensoleillés et aquatiques attiraient des générations de visiteurs, slovaques et étrangers. Des le mois d'aout, de nombreux oiseaux entament leur migration vers des pays plus chauds. Parmi eux, les cigognes : la plupart quittent leurs nids durant la premiere quinzaine d'aout, tandis que les retardataires les rejoignent généralement a la fin du mois.

Rav Chisda's requirement for complete mastery of all twenty-four priestly gifts is rejected based on Rabbi Simeon's standard: any kohen who acknowledges the validity of the Temple service (modeh b'avoda) is eligible to receive gifts. Deriving from "v'natan" ("and he shall give"), kohanim are forbidden from grabbing gifts, prompting Abaye to outline his personal practice that developed from seizing gifts to eventually refusing them altogether, except on the Eve of Yom Kippur to demonstrate his priestly lineage. Rav Yosef rules that a kohen can assign gifts to an impoverished scholar even before taking physical possession. However, when Rava insisted a host's servant assign gifts to himself and Rav Safra, Rava ate while Rav Safra refrained; Rav Safra subsequently experienced a troubling dream regarding improper conduct, prompting the Gemara into a broader ethical discussion condemning the instruction of an unworthy student who will misconstrue the teacher's words. Addressing mixed partnerships with a non-Jew or kohen, the Gemara clarifies contradictory sources regarding when marking the animal is required to prevent public suspicion (mar'it ayin). Resolving a dispute between Rav Huna and Chiya bar Rav, the Gemara rejects Chiya bar Rav - explaining his misinterpretation of the braita listing the twenty-four priestly gifts - and concludes that a kohen's partial ownership in a specific section of an animal exempts only that corresponding gift, such that partial ownership of the head exempts the jaw, while the foreleg and abomasum remain obligated. Where an Israelite owns the head and a kohen owns the rest of the body, the Gemara establishes that halakhic liability follows the locus of obligation, requiring the Israelite to give the jaw.

Rav Yosef tested Rava and Abaye, regarding the gifts that are supposed to go to the kohen - when the kohen grabs the goods, he presents himself with the defense of obtaining the materials. Abaye explains how he used to reach of the gifts, but was schooled by others to simply wait. Plus, did Abaye teach Torah when he should have been functioning as a kohen? Also, partnered ownership of animals with an idolator -- how far can that be taken?

Chullin 133: rava eats tongue with mustard by “Dafsplaining”: daf yomi made simple

Rav Chisda's requirement for complete mastery of all twenty-four priestly gifts is rejected based on Rabbi Simeon's standard: any kohen who acknowledges the validity of the Temple service (modeh b'avoda) is eligible to receive gifts. Deriving from "v'natan" ("and he shall give"), kohanim are forbidden from grabbing gifts, prompting Abaye to outline his personal practice that developed from seizing gifts to eventually refusing them altogether, except on the Eve of Yom Kippur to demonstrate his priestly lineage. Rav Yosef rules that a kohen can assign gifts to an impoverished scholar even before taking physical possession. However, when Rava insisted a host's servant assign gifts to himself and Rav Safra, Rava ate while Rav Safra refrained; Rav Safra subsequently experienced a troubling dream regarding improper conduct, prompting the Gemara into a broader ethical discussion condemning the instruction of an unworthy student who will misconstrue the teacher's words. Addressing mixed partnerships with a non-Jew or kohen, the Gemara clarifies contradictory sources regarding when marking the animal is required to prevent public suspicion (mar'it ayin). Resolving a dispute between Rav Huna and Chiya bar Rav, the Gemara rejects Chiya bar Rav - explaining his misinterpretation of the braita listing the twenty-four priestly gifts - and concludes that a kohen's partial ownership in a specific section of an animal exempts only that corresponding gift, such that partial ownership of the head exempts the jaw, while the foreleg and abomasum remain obligated. Where an Israelite owns the head and a kohen owns the rest of the body, the Gemara establishes that halakhic liability follows the locus of obligation, requiring the Israelite to give the jaw.

The eligibility of a Kohen's daughter (kohenet) to receive priestly gifts (matanot) is disputed between Rava (forbidding) and Ulla (permitting), reflecting a broader Tannaitic disagreement between the academy of Rabbi Yishmael (excluding a kohenet) and the academy of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov (including her). Following common practice where several amoraim received and ate matanot on account of their wives, Marimar codifies four definitive rulings: the halakha follows Rav regarding the unenforceability of Levite obligations, Rav Chisda regarding exemption from restitution for destroyed gifts, Ulla permitting gifts to a kohenet, and Rav Adda bar Ahava regarding pidyon haben exemptions for a Levite woman's son. Regarding crossbred animals (kil'ayim) and a koy, the Sages obligate matanot while Rabbi Eliezer exempts them. Addressing the underlying doubt over paternal seed (zera ha'av), the Gemara questions why the Sages require full gifts rather than half-gifts, ultimately explaining that the obligation of the rabbis is only for half. However an alternative explanation is brought concluding that explicit scriptural inclusions ("im shor", "im seh") mandate full obligation. This discussion also establishes Rava's rule that legal recourse for unseparated gifts lies directly against the butcher (hadin im hatabach). The Mishna notes that a blemished firstborn (bechor) mixed among non-sacred animals or slaughtering for a non-Jew or kohen creates exemptions from matanot. However, a kohen slaughtering for someone else is obligated in matanot. A kohen who sets up a slaughterhouse is exempt from giving gifts for two to three weeks, but becomes obligated once his business is more established. To ensure compliance, courts may penalize non-compliant butchers by excommunication. Matanot must be eaten roasted with mustard as they should be eaten like royalty, and may be given to any kohen who acknowledges the validity of the Temple service (modeh ba'avoda). 

The eligibility of a Kohen's daughter (kohenet) to receive priestly gifts (matanot) is disputed between Rava (forbidding) and Ulla (permitting), reflecting a broader Tannaitic disagreement between the academy of Rabbi Yishmael (excluding a kohenet) and the academy of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov (including her). Following common practice where several amoraim received and ate matanot on account of their wives, Marimar codifies four definitive rulings: the halakha follows Rav regarding the unenforceability of Levite obligations, Rav Chisda regarding exemption from restitution for destroyed gifts, Ulla permitting gifts to a kohenet, and Rav Adda bar Ahava regarding pidyon haben exemptions for a Levite woman's son. Regarding crossbred animals (kil'ayim) and a koy, the Sages obligate matanot while Rabbi Eliezer exempts them. Addressing the underlying doubt over paternal seed (zera ha'av), the Gemara questions why the Sages require full gifts rather than half-gifts, ultimately explaining that the obligation of the rabbis is only for half. However an alternative explanation is brought concluding that explicit scriptural inclusions ("im shor", "im seh") mandate full obligation. This discussion also establishes Rava's rule that legal recourse for unseparated gifts lies directly against the butcher (hadin im hatabach). The Mishna notes that a blemished firstborn (bechor) mixed among non-sacred animals or slaughtering for a non-Jew or kohen creates exemptions from matanot. However, a kohen slaughtering for someone else is obligated in matanot. A kohen who sets up a slaughterhouse is exempt from giving gifts for two to three weeks, but becomes obligated once his business is more established. To ensure compliance, courts may penalize non-compliant butchers by excommunication. Matanot must be eaten roasted with mustard as they should be eaten like royalty, and may be given to any kohen who acknowledges the validity of the Temple service (modeh ba'avoda). 

Rav Chisda rules that anyone who destroys or eats priestly gifts (zero'a, lechayayim, keva) prior to distribution is exempt from financial restitution, whether derived from the word "zeh" in the verse or because these gifts constitute property with no specific claimant (mamon she-ein lo tove'in). The Gemara raises seven challenges from various Tannaitic sources (including rulings on other priestly gifts and poor-person's gifts)—some directed against Rav Chisda's overall exemption from restitution, and others against the explanation that it constitutes property with no specific claimant. The Gemara resolves all of these challenges, upholding Rav Chisda's position. The Gemara then turns to evaluate whether Levites are obligated to give priestly gifts when slaughtering their own non-sacred animals. Rav remains in doubt as to whether Levites are legally included in the biblical description of "from the nation" (me'et ha-am) or whether their tribe's distinct status exempts them from giving matanot; consequently, while Levites are technically obligated to give them, this obligation cannot be legally enforced against them. The Gemara presents three challenges against Rav's uncertainty from explicit braitot, but answers all of them, leaving Rav's underlying doubt intact. Mareimar rules halakhically in accordance with both Rav Chisda and Rav's doubt. Finally, Ulla permitted giving priestly gifts to a kohen's daughter, even if she is married to an Israelite. Rava challenges Ulla's ruling from the laws regarding the meal-offering (minchah) of a kohen's daughter, which differs from that of a male kohen in that it is not completely burned on the altar, demonstrating that her status as a priestess is not entirely identical.

Rav Chisda rules that anyone who destroys or eats priestly gifts (zero'a, lechayayim, keva) prior to distribution is exempt from financial restitution, whether derived from the word "zeh" in the verse or because these gifts constitute property with no specific claimant (mamon she-ein lo tove'in). The Gemara raises seven challenges from various Tannaitic sources (including rulings on other priestly gifts and poor-person's gifts)—some directed against Rav Chisda's overall exemption from restitution, and others against the explanation that it constitutes property with no specific claimant. The Gemara resolves all of these challenges, upholding Rav Chisda's position. The Gemara then turns to evaluate whether Levites are obligated to give priestly gifts when slaughtering their own non-sacred animals. Rav remains in doubt as to whether Levites are legally included in the biblical description of "from the nation" (me'et ha-am) or whether their tribe's distinct status exempts them from giving matanot; consequently, while Levites are technically obligated to give them, this obligation cannot be legally enforced against them. The Gemara presents three challenges against Rav's uncertainty from explicit braitot, but answers all of them, leaving Rav's underlying doubt intact. Mareimar rules halakhically in accordance with both Rav Chisda and Rav's doubt. Finally, Ulla permitted giving priestly gifts to a kohen's daughter, even if she is married to an Israelite. Rava challenges Ulla's ruling from the laws regarding the meal-offering (minchah) of a kohen's daughter, which differs from that of a male kohen in that it is not completely burned on the altar, demonstrating that her status as a priestess is not entirely identical.

The Golem of Prague is one of the most famous monsters in Jewish folklore: a silent giant shaped from clay, awakened by sacred Hebrew letters, and ordered to defend Prague's Jewish community. But did Rabbi Judah Loew - the Maharal of Prague - really create a supernatural protector, and could the golem's body still be hidden in the attic of the Old-New Synagogue? This pre-Halloween Terrifying & True investigation traces the golem legend from Psalm 139 and the Babylonian Talmud to Sefer Yetzirah, medieval Jewish mysticism, the older golem of Chelm, and the famous Prague story. We separate documented religious tradition from later folklore, literary invention, and horror imagery while preserving the eerie question at the center: what happens when human beings create power without judgment? Long before the golem became a stone-faced monster in movies, games, and Halloween culture, it was an unfinished human form - a body close enough to life to become unsettling. Rabbinic texts describe a created man who cannot speak. Medieval traditions connect artificial creation with combinations of the twenty-two Hebrew letters and the 231 gates. Early modern stories place the runaway servant not in Prague, but in Chelm, where a creature built to obey grows too large for its maker to control. The episode then enters the Old-New Synagogue and the legend of Rabbi Loew. The historical Maharal was a major Jewish thinker who met Emperor Rudolf II, but no surviving writing from the rabbi, his disciples, or contemporary Prague chronicles records a clay guardian. The Prague connection emerged through nineteenth-century literature, while Yudl Rosenberg's 1909 book decisively shaped the now-familiar story of Yossele, the golem created to defeat blood libels - false antisemitic accusations that had caused real persecution and violence - and protect a threatened community. As Halloween season approaches, this deep dive explores why the golem remains one of folklore's most powerful supernatural legends - and why it is more than a simple monster story. It is a tale of antisemitic persecution, communal fear, sacred language, obedience, artificial life, and the terrifying responsibility of a creator. From Prague's locked attic and rumors of a Nazi intruder to Paul Wegener's silent-film monster and modern comparisons with robots and artificial intelligence, the golem keeps receiving new commands. Inside this episode:The meaning of golem in Psalm 139, rabbinic tradition, and the story of Rava's silent created manSefer Yetzirah, sacred Hebrew letters, medieval Jewish mysticism, and the corrected 231 gatesThe older golem of Chelm and the changing traditions of emet, met, and the removable shemRabbi Judah Loew, Emperor Rudolf II, the Old-New Synagogue, and the real history of Jewish PragueYudl Rosenberg's 1909 literary hoax and the protector created to fight false blood-libel accusationsThe synagogue attic, the Nazi-intruder rumor, Paul Wegener's film, classic monsters, robots, and AIWas the Golem of Prague an ancient protector waiting in a synagogue attic - or a modern legend assembled from sacred texts, persecution, folklore, and the human fear of creations that obey too well? We're telling that story tonight.

Rabbi Shulman analyzes the Gemara's warning that a year in which “we do not blow at its beginning” may end “with teru'ah,” focusing on the purpose of shofar as “מְעַרְבֵּב את השטן” and how that interacts with shofar's absence on shabbat. He contrasts the Ritva and the בה״ג on whether the Gemara refers to intentional neglect of extra blasts or an אונס that prevented shofar entirely. From there, Rabbi Shulman opens the larger sugya: why shofar is not blown on shabbat, how Rava reframes earlier Amoraic readings, and how later Acharonim (notably the מרום שדה) understand the “פסוקים” as אסמכתא rather than a true דאורייתא exclusion. Outline: https://danielggordon.github.io/ateresami/no-blowing-shofar-on-shabbos-20260907-180434-outline-20260907-180519.pdf

A braita rules that if one cuts an olive-bulk of flesh from a limb attached to a living animal, designating it for food only after cutting renders it pure, whereas designating it prior to cutting renders it susceptible to food impurity, as it touches the limb (which has high level impurity) as it is being cut. The Gemara presents Rav Asi's challenge to Rabbi Zeira as to why prior designation causes impurity, given that the cut site is a concealed place (tumat beit ha-satarim) and concealed impurity does not transmit impurity. Rava clarifies that the case involves a situation where liquids (hechsher) came upon it and Rabba bar Rav Chanan questions that, noting that it should not even require hechsher under the rule of an item destined to transmit severe impurity does not need hechsher, since here it came from a limb with a high level of impurity. Rava responds with a fundamental principle that when food functions as a connection or for a purpose other than food, it is considered "when used, it functioned like wood" and thus the rule of "destined to transmit severe impurity" does not apply. The Gemara presents five challenges that are resolved by applying this same explanation – "when used, it functioned like wood." Returning to the Mishna dealing with a dangling limb and flesh on an animal, the Gemara asks for the rationale of Rabbi Shimon, who rules them pure in the case of the animal's death, challenging his view as completely illogical. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the reisha (opening clause) of the Mishna when the animal is still alive, based on Rabbi Yochanan's explanation that Rabbi Shimon derives from scripture "מכל אשר יאכל"  that food is defined as such only if you can feed it to others; since a dangling limb or flesh from a living animal is forbidden to consume even for non-Jews, it cannot transmit food impurity. However, Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty, explaining that if Rabbi Shimon disagrees with that case, it is because the flesh and limb are still somewhat attached, as learned from a Mishna in Uktzin (3:8). Thus, Rabbi Yochanan's explanation of Rabbi Shimon's view must apply to another case. The Gemara suggests it might apply to the metzi'ata (middle clause) where the animal was slaughtered, but this resolution is also difficult. In light of these difficulties, the Gemara returns to understand Rabbi Shimon's statement and Rabbi Yochanan's explanation, concluding that they actually refer to the seifa (final clause), not regarding the dangling limb (from which the difficulty was raised), but rather regarding the dangling flesh. The Mishna discusses a dangling limb and flesh on a living human, ruling that they are pure during the person's lifetime. Upon the person's death, the flesh is pure from food impurity, while the dangling limb transmits impurity as a limb from a living person, but not as a limb from a corpse, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon considers it pure. The Gemara again challenges Rabbi Shimon's view in the same manner as before. As a first resolution, it explains that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with a general underlying premise of Rabbi Meir's view. Subsequently, however, the Gemara successfully understands Rabbi Shimon's position in a different manner, based on a Mishna in Eduyot 6:3.

A braita rules that if one cuts an olive-bulk of flesh from a limb attached to a living animal, designating it for food only after cutting renders it pure, whereas designating it prior to cutting renders it susceptible to food impurity, as it touches the limb (which has high level impurity) as it is being cut. The Gemara presents Rav Asi's challenge to Rabbi Zeira as to why prior designation causes impurity, given that the cut site is a concealed place (tumat beit ha-satarim) and concealed impurity does not transmit impurity. Rava clarifies that the case involves a situation where liquids (hechsher) came upon it and Rabba bar Rav Chanan questions that, noting that it should not even require hechsher under the rule of an item destined to transmit severe impurity does not need hechsher, since here it came from a limb with a high level of impurity. Rava responds with a fundamental principle that when food functions as a connection or for a purpose other than food, it is considered "when used, it functioned like wood" and thus the rule of "destined to transmit severe impurity" does not apply. The Gemara presents five challenges that are resolved by applying this same explanation – "when used, it functioned like wood." Returning to the Mishna dealing with a dangling limb and flesh on an animal, the Gemara asks for the rationale of Rabbi Shimon, who rules them pure in the case of the animal's death, challenging his view as completely illogical. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the reisha (opening clause) of the Mishna when the animal is still alive, based on Rabbi Yochanan's explanation that Rabbi Shimon derives from scripture "מכל אשר יאכל"  that food is defined as such only if you can feed it to others; since a dangling limb or flesh from a living animal is forbidden to consume even for non-Jews, it cannot transmit food impurity. However, Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty, explaining that if Rabbi Shimon disagrees with that case, it is because the flesh and limb are still somewhat attached, as learned from a Mishna in Uktzin (3:8). Thus, Rabbi Yochanan's explanation of Rabbi Shimon's view must apply to another case. The Gemara suggests it might apply to the metzi'ata (middle clause) where the animal was slaughtered, but this resolution is also difficult. In light of these difficulties, the Gemara returns to understand Rabbi Shimon's statement and Rabbi Yochanan's explanation, concluding that they actually refer to the seifa (final clause), not regarding the dangling limb (from which the difficulty was raised), but rather regarding the dangling flesh. The Mishna discusses a dangling limb and flesh on a living human, ruling that they are pure during the person's lifetime. Upon the person's death, the flesh is pure from food impurity, while the dangling limb transmits impurity as a limb from a living person, but not as a limb from a corpse, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon considers it pure. The Gemara again challenges Rabbi Shimon's view in the same manner as before. As a first resolution, it explains that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with a general underlying premise of Rabbi Meir's view. Subsequently, however, the Gemara successfully understands Rabbi Shimon's position in a different manner, based on a Mishna in Eduyot 6:3.

A braita discusses whether a sea-mouse transmits impurity—that is, whether the word "mouse" includes a sea-mouse. Within that discussion, it also addresses a mouse that is half flesh and half earth, deriving from scripture that it transmits impurity like a standard mouse. The braita concludes that a sea-mouse does not transmit impurity. The Gemara raises two challenges against the braita, but resolves both. Following the discussion on the verse regarding the mouse, the Gemara turns to expound the words "ha-tzav le-minehu" from that same verse, which includes other unique creatures—the arod,  ben nefilim), and the salamander—and notes Rabbi Akiva's marveling at the diversity of creation ("Mah rabu ma'asecha Hashem"). Another braita asserts that every creature found on land has a counterpart in the sea except for the chulda (weasel), derived from "kol yoshvei chaled". The Gemara digresses to an aggadic discussion regarding the questionable character of the inhabitants of Naresh (after mentioning a law regarding the beavers of Naresh), and presents an account where Rav Huna bar Torta witnessed a snake mating with a tzav to produce an arod, which Rava characterizes as a "miracle within a miracle" sent as a punishment. The Mishna rules that a dangling limb or flesh attached to a live animal is susceptible to food impurity (tumat ochlin) in its place (if one thought to give it to a non-Jew to eat), provided a liquid came upon it rendering it susceptible to impurity, but it does not impart impurity as a limb from a living animal (ever min hachai). If the animal is slaughtered, Rabbi Meir holds that the slaughtering blood creates susceptibility to food impurity, whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that it does not; neither holds that there is impurity of a limb from a live animal. If the animal dies, Rabbi Meir holds that the flesh requires a liquid to render it susceptible to food impurity, while the dangling limb transmits impurity as a limb from a living animal, though not as a carcass (neveila). Rabbi Shimon, on the other hand, considers it pure from the impurity of a limb from a live animal. Analyzing the Mishna, the Gemara asks why dangling flesh/limbs transmit food impurity but not impurity of a limb from a live animal, in the case where the animal is alive. It resolves that even if the flesh cannot heal (ein ma'alin arucha), impurity as a limb from a living animal requires the limb to completely detach from the verse "ki yipol". A braita supports this, ruling that even if attached by only a hair's breadth, it does not transmit impurity until it falls off, yet it remains susceptible to food impurity. The Gemara compares this to produce withered on the tree, such as dried figs, which transmit food impurity while still considered attached regarding the prohibition of picking on Shabbat. Regarding the case in the Mishna where the animal was slaughtered, the Gemara asks what constitutes the core point of dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon, ultimately offering six different explanations. Rabba explains that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree on whether the main body of the animal acts as a "handle" (yad) to transmit hechsher to the dangling limb. Abaye and Rabbi Yochanan explain the debate differently: they disagree on the status of a handle where lifting the smaller dangling part does not carry the larger body (as it detaches), with Rabbi Meir considering it attached and Rabbi Shimon disagreeing.

A braita discusses whether a sea-mouse transmits impurity—that is, whether the word "mouse" includes a sea-mouse. Within that discussion, it also addresses a mouse that is half flesh and half earth, deriving from scripture that it transmits impurity like a standard mouse. The braita concludes that a sea-mouse does not transmit impurity. The Gemara raises two challenges against the braita, but resolves both. Following the discussion on the verse regarding the mouse, the Gemara turns to expound the words "ha-tzav le-minehu" from that same verse, which includes other unique creatures—the arod,  ben nefilim), and the salamander—and notes Rabbi Akiva's marveling at the diversity of creation ("Mah rabu ma'asecha Hashem"). Another braita asserts that every creature found on land has a counterpart in the sea except for the chulda (weasel), derived from "kol yoshvei chaled". The Gemara digresses to an aggadic discussion regarding the questionable character of the inhabitants of Naresh (after mentioning a law regarding the beavers of Naresh), and presents an account where Rav Huna bar Torta witnessed a snake mating with a tzav to produce an arod, which Rava characterizes as a "miracle within a miracle" sent as a punishment. The Mishna rules that a dangling limb or flesh attached to a live animal is susceptible to food impurity (tumat ochlin) in its place (if one thought to give it to a non-Jew to eat), provided a liquid came upon it rendering it susceptible to impurity, but it does not impart impurity as a limb from a living animal (ever min hachai). If the animal is slaughtered, Rabbi Meir holds that the slaughtering blood creates susceptibility to food impurity, whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that it does not; neither holds that there is impurity of a limb from a live animal. If the animal dies, Rabbi Meir holds that the flesh requires a liquid to render it susceptible to food impurity, while the dangling limb transmits impurity as a limb from a living animal, though not as a carcass (neveila). Rabbi Shimon, on the other hand, considers it pure from the impurity of a limb from a live animal. Analyzing the Mishna, the Gemara asks why dangling flesh/limbs transmit food impurity but not impurity of a limb from a live animal, in the case where the animal is alive. It resolves that even if the flesh cannot heal (ein ma'alin arucha), impurity as a limb from a living animal requires the limb to completely detach from the verse "ki yipol". A braita supports this, ruling that even if attached by only a hair's breadth, it does not transmit impurity until it falls off, yet it remains susceptible to food impurity. The Gemara compares this to produce withered on the tree, such as dried figs, which transmit food impurity while still considered attached regarding the prohibition of picking on Shabbat. Regarding the case in the Mishna where the animal was slaughtered, the Gemara asks what constitutes the core point of dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon, ultimately offering six different explanations. Rabba explains that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree on whether the main body of the animal acts as a "handle" (yad) to transmit hechsher to the dangling limb. Abaye and Rabbi Yochanan explain the debate differently: they disagree on the status of a handle where lifting the smaller dangling part does not carry the larger body (as it detaches), with Rabbi Meir considering it attached and Rabbi Shimon disagreeing.

The Gemara continues analyzing Rava's attempt to prove that "touch" (maga) can include tent-impurity (ohel) based on Rabbi Yosi's ruling regarding bed frames and window bars. Abaye rejects this proof, explaining that the case involves a space under a handbreadth (tefach), and due to a challenge raised against his explanation, Abaye is forced to explain that Rabbi Yosi holds concealed impurity does not break through (tumei tmunah eina boka'at). He proves his stance on concealed impurity from a Mishna discussing a cabinet (migdal) and Rabbi Yosi's commentary on it. A challenge is raised against Abaye from another case where Rabbi Yosi appears to hold that concealed impurity does break through and ascend (a dead dog that swallowed corpse flesh and is lying on a threshold). Rava resolves this by explaining that Rabbi Yosi does not rely on concealed impurity breaking out, but rather his dispute with Rabbi Meir regarding the dog is based on other considerations - whether the cavity of the dog contains a handbreadth of space and whether the threshold is considered part of the house. The Gemara returns to clarify the identity of Rabbi Yosi's disputant, who holds that tent-impurity is not included in the term "touch." The Gemara identifies him as Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with Rabbi Yosi in a braita by stating that there are three items that impart corpse-impurity through only two of the three standard modes (touch, carrying, and tent): a ladleful of dust of a human carcass (melo tarvad rakav) imparts impurity through carrying and tent, but not touch; a barley-grain-sized bone (etzem k'seorah) imparts impurity through touch and carrying, but not tent; and a tombstone lid and supporting frame (golel v'dofek) impart impurity through touch and tent, but not carrying. His ruling regarding dust demonstrates that he does not categorize tent-impurity under touch. Regarding a carcass marrow-bone (kulit), the braita cites a scriptural source establishing that a sealed marrow-bone does not impart impurity, whereas a perforated one does. Rav Oshaya inquires whether a sealed marrow-bone that one intends to perforate is considered "lacking an action" (mechusar ma'aseh) because it requires perforation, or is it already considered perforated and can pass on impurity. He concludes that one's intent to perforate would make the bone susceptible to impurity. The Mishna rules that a formed embryo egg of a creeping creature (sheretz) is pure unless perforated. Regarding a mouse that is half flesh and half earth, touching the flesh imparts impurity - and according to Rabbi Yehuda, touching earth directly opposite the flesh also imparts impurity. Analyzing the Mishna, the Gemara brings a braita deriving that a sheretz egg requires embryo formation (rikem) and a perforation as thin as a hairbreadth (k'chut ha-se'arah) to transmit impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi clarifies that the half-earth mouse transmits impurity only if it developed flesh across its whole body. The braita discusses whether a sea-mouse is subject to the same laws of impurity as a land-mouse.

The Gemara continues analyzing Rava's attempt to prove that "touch" (maga) can include tent-impurity (ohel) based on Rabbi Yosi's ruling regarding bed frames and window bars. Abaye rejects this proof, explaining that the case involves a space under a handbreadth (tefach), and due to a challenge raised against his explanation, Abaye is forced to explain that Rabbi Yosi holds concealed impurity does not break through (tumei tmunah eina boka'at). He proves his stance on concealed impurity from a Mishna discussing a cabinet (migdal) and Rabbi Yosi's commentary on it. A challenge is raised against Abaye from another case where Rabbi Yosi appears to hold that concealed impurity does break through and ascend (a dead dog that swallowed corpse flesh and is lying on a threshold). Rava resolves this by explaining that Rabbi Yosi does not rely on concealed impurity breaking out, but rather his dispute with Rabbi Meir regarding the dog is based on other considerations - whether the cavity of the dog contains a handbreadth of space and whether the threshold is considered part of the house. The Gemara returns to clarify the identity of Rabbi Yosi's disputant, who holds that tent-impurity is not included in the term "touch." The Gemara identifies him as Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with Rabbi Yosi in a braita by stating that there are three items that impart corpse-impurity through only two of the three standard modes (touch, carrying, and tent): a ladleful of dust of a human carcass (melo tarvad rakav) imparts impurity through carrying and tent, but not touch; a barley-grain-sized bone (etzem k'seorah) imparts impurity through touch and carrying, but not tent; and a tombstone lid and supporting frame (golel v'dofek) impart impurity through touch and tent, but not carrying. His ruling regarding dust demonstrates that he does not categorize tent-impurity under touch. Regarding a carcass marrow-bone (kulit), the braita cites a scriptural source establishing that a sealed marrow-bone does not impart impurity, whereas a perforated one does. Rav Oshaya inquires whether a sealed marrow-bone that one intends to perforate is considered "lacking an action" (mechusar ma'aseh) because it requires perforation, or is it already considered perforated and can pass on impurity. He concludes that one's intent to perforate would make the bone susceptible to impurity. The Mishna rules that a formed embryo egg of a creeping creature (sheretz) is pure unless perforated. Regarding a mouse that is half flesh and half earth, touching the flesh imparts impurity - and according to Rabbi Yehuda, touching earth directly opposite the flesh also imparts impurity. Analyzing the Mishna, the Gemara brings a braita deriving that a sheretz egg requires embryo formation (rikem) and a perforation as thin as a hairbreadth (k'chut ha-se'arah) to transmit impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi clarifies that the half-earth mouse transmits impurity only if it developed flesh across its whole body. The braita discusses whether a sea-mouse is subject to the same laws of impurity as a land-mouse.

En este imperdible vivo, Pablo Almazán y Tais Rava, nos invitan a desarmar la mente, comprender la lógica detrás de nuestros síntomas y tomar las riendas de nuestra propia evolución.Una charla profunda, reveladora e inmensa para dejar de vivir en piloto automático y activar tu poder creador.

The Moon reaches its brightest in sidereal Capricorn on July 29 at 15.35 BST/ 10.35 EDT, conjunct Pluto and opposite an exalted but combust Jupiter in Cancer. This Full Moon may bring resolution and mark a significant turning point.It occurs in Śravaṇa, the lunar mansion associated with listening and tradition. This is a time to tune in and hear what matters, as Saturn, Capricorn's ruler, begins to backtrack. Ruled by Viṣṇu, Śravaṇa seeks balance and harmony, although this must sometimes be restored through major events that require more adjustments.Globally, tensions may emerge between the profound changes underway and how leaders respond. Important steps are likely to be taken, which will affect the world in various ways. This Full Moon also coincides with Guru Pūrṇimā, a Vedic festival honouring teachers and commemorating the birth of Sage Veda Vyāsa. This year's observance is especially significant, as Jupiter (Guru) is exalted directly opposite the Full Moon.It is a powerful time to reconnect with teachers and teachings that clarify what is right and true, inspiring us to act for the good of all. Emotions may run high as we dig beneath the surface and listen for the deeper truth.

Paso Robles may be best known for bold reds, but some of the region's most thoughtful and exciting work is happening with white wine.In this episode of The Pour, Adam Montiel sits down with Natalie Brown of Willow Creek Wine Co., Dave McGee of Monochrome Wines, and Ryan Pease of Paix Sur Terre for a conversation about the White Wine Invitational and the growing movement behind serious white wine production in Paso Robles.Recorded at SLO CAL Studios in San Luis Obispo, the conversation explores what it takes to become part of the Paso Robles White Wine Guild, why membership is not automatic, and how the group is working to raise expectations for white wine across the region.This is not simply a collection of wineries that happen to make a white wine. The Guild brings together producers with a demonstrated commitment to the category, and prospective members must meet established standards before being considered.White Wine InvitationalThe White Wine Invitational brings together dedicated producers for an event focused entirely on the range, quality, and future of white wine in Paso Robles.Learn more about the Paso Robles White Wine Guild:https://pasorobleswhitewineguild.com/Get tickets to the White Wine Invitational:https://www.exploretock.com/willowcreekwineco/event/592534Join Adam on the DanubeAdam is also heading to Europe in November 2027 for a Danube River cruise with Cork & Cruise, Epoch Estate Wines, and LXV Wine.For cruise details, visit:https://www.adammontiel.comClick the Cruise tab for the complete itinerary and reservation information.Sponsored by:Tin City Distillery: Join the Private Barrel Club and craft your own custom whiskey. The Pour has its own barrel - you can too! Check it out here: tincitydistillery.com/club/private-barrel-club.Follow Adam:Instagram: @adamontheairWebsite: adammontiel.com – Find episodes, giveaways, and more.Podcasts: Up & Adam, Where Wine Takes You, and The Pour with Adam Montiel—stream wherever you get your podcasts.Pop the cork and join the conversation—this is one pour you don't want to miss!********For info on Tin City Distillery's Private Barrel Club Click Here***********The Pour is recorded, edited, produced, and hosted by Adam Montiel. Follow Adam on Instagram @AdamOnTheAir and check out his daily podcast Up + Adam as well as Where Wine Takes You. To connect with Adam, learn more, or for Spotify or other pod links, visit AdamMontiel.comAbout ‘The Pour with Adam Montiel':In 2010, Radio Host Adam Montiel combined his longtime love for broadcasting with his, then, new love for wine. He created and produced, ‘The Cork Dorks'. The show was hosted with Adam and his good friend Jeremy West. It was the first of its kind. It began focusing on central coast wineries but as the show grew, so did their ability to travel and meet other winemakers they found everywhere from Napa to Bordeaux that adopted that same Central Coast quality of people willing to share their wines, and their stories. As the area's producer's grew, soon Adam's interview's covered everything from spirits, craft beer, cider, cuisine, hospitality, and more. Fast forward to today, the spirit and enthusiasm cultivated with the award winning show, is reborn as The Pour with Adam Montiel, this time independently, and unfettered by corporate authority leaving it even more free to share the journey of making wine more approachable and fun for everyone.  Here, We Taste It. We Spill It. We Leave it All On the Table. This is ‘The Pour' with Adam Montiel.__________Sincere Thanks to those who support The Pour. Please take a moment and visit them and thank them for supporting local broadcasting, and valuing what we do here. Thank you for supporting them!Original Music, ‘Come Alive' by Dan Curcio and Moonshiner Collective Moonshiner on Spotify HEREFollow Adam on Instagram HEREPlease Rate, Review, and Subscribe to the podcast, and learn more at AdamMontiel.com

Rav Hamnuna states in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the prohibition of oto v'et beno does not apply to consecrated animals (kodashim). This is based on Rabbi Shimon's principle that an invalid slaughter is not halakhically considered a slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya lo shema shechita), and since the meat of a sacrifice is not permitted for consumption until its blood is sprinkled, the slaughter itself is initially unfit. Rava challenges this using a text discussing various combinations of slaughtering consecutive sacrifices inside or outside the Temple courtyard (bifnim or bachutz), tracing the respective liabilities of karet and negative prohibitions under the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. To resolve the contradiction, Rava explains that Rabbi Shimon does acknowledge the prohibition for kodashim, but holds that one does not receive lashes for it because the warning given at the time of slaughter is a doubtful warning (hatra'at safek), as the validity of the slaughter depends on the future sprinkling of the blood, and a doubtful warning is legally invalid. The Mishna states that if one slaughters an animal and it is found to be a treifa, or slaughters it for idolatry, as a Red Heifer, an ox convicted to be stoned, or a broken-necked heifer, Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the prohibition of oto v'et beno because the slaughter is invalid since the animal is not permitted for consumption, while the Rabbis declare him liable. However, if the slaughter itself is physically disqualified, such as if the animal becomes a carcass during the shechita process or if one stabbed the animal, all agree he is exempt. Reish Lakish establishes the Mishna's liability (according to the Rabbis' position) for idolatry only when the first animal was slaughtered for idolatry and the second for consumption. If the second was for idolatry, the rule of kim lei b'draba minei applies (one incurs the capital punishment for idolatry and is exempt from the lashes of oto v'et beno) as one only receives the harsher of the two punishments. Rabbi Yochanan counters that even if the second animal was for idolatry, one can still be liable for lashes for oto v'et beno if one was warned specifically for that prohibition and not for idolatry. Reish Lakish maintains that since one would be exempt if properly warned for the capital crime, one remains exempt even without that warning, and even without receiving the harsher punishment. They have the same dispute regarding the rule of kim lei b'draba minei even in cases of death/lashes and monetary liability when one was not warned for the death/lashes.

Rav Hamnuna states in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the prohibition of oto v'et beno does not apply to consecrated animals (kodashim). This is based on Rabbi Shimon's principle that an invalid slaughter is not halakhically considered a slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya lo shema shechita), and since the meat of a sacrifice is not permitted for consumption until its blood is sprinkled, the slaughter itself is initially unfit. Rava challenges this using a text discussing various combinations of slaughtering consecutive sacrifices inside or outside the Temple courtyard (bifnim or bachutz), tracing the respective liabilities of karet and negative prohibitions under the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. To resolve the contradiction, Rava explains that Rabbi Shimon does acknowledge the prohibition for kodashim, but holds that one does not receive lashes for it because the warning given at the time of slaughter is a doubtful warning (hatra'at safek), as the validity of the slaughter depends on the future sprinkling of the blood, and a doubtful warning is legally invalid. The Mishna states that if one slaughters an animal and it is found to be a treifa, or slaughters it for idolatry, as a Red Heifer, an ox convicted to be stoned, or a broken-necked heifer, Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the prohibition of oto v'et beno because the slaughter is invalid since the animal is not permitted for consumption, while the Rabbis declare him liable. However, if the slaughter itself is physically disqualified, such as if the animal becomes a carcass during the shechita process or if one stabbed the animal, all agree he is exempt. Reish Lakish establishes the Mishna's liability (according to the Rabbis' position) for idolatry only when the first animal was slaughtered for idolatry and the second for consumption. If the second was for idolatry, the rule of kim lei b'draba minei applies (one incurs the capital punishment for idolatry and is exempt from the lashes of oto v'et beno) as one only receives the harsher of the two punishments. Rabbi Yochanan counters that even if the second animal was for idolatry, one can still be liable for lashes for oto v'et beno if one was warned specifically for that prohibition and not for idolatry. Reish Lakish maintains that since one would be exempt if properly warned for the capital crime, one remains exempt even without that warning, and even without receiving the harsher punishment. They have the same dispute regarding the rule of kim lei b'draba minei even in cases of death/lashes and monetary liability when one was not warned for the death/lashes.

In just one day, Elegy Anh's old life–her job, her purpose, and her future–is over. A prophecy predicts either she or her enemy, Rava Vidar, will lead their people to victory over the other...but they don't know which. Elegy and Rava are destined to collide, with the fate of their nations hanging in the balance. And when they do, only one will be left standing. Elegy intends to make sure it's her. #1 New York Times bestselling author of the Divergent series, and master of the dystopian genre, Veronica Roth, is back with an epic new adult dystopian novel, SEEK THE TRAITOR'S SON.  Thrilling and romantic, SEEK THE TRAITOR'S SON, is the harrowing story of two women on opposite sides of a war, bound together by a single man, who they are told will determine their fate. SEEK THE TRAITOR'S SON is Veronica Roth at the height of her power, with everything that made us all fall in love with dystopian adventures in the first place, while still bringing a fresh, exciting spin to the genre. Readers won't want to miss out on what is sure to be the blockbuster hit of the summer, and the next defining work in dystopian literature. Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/arroe-collins-unplugged-totally-uncut--994165/support.

If a bone is broken but the majority of its width is surrounded by flesh and skin, the animal is not considered a treifa—even if the break is above the knee joint (arkuva)—and the limb is not considered a limb severed from a living animal (ever min hachai). A case came before Rava where the bone was covered by a majority of "flesh" only when including soft sinews. Rava initially permitted this based on Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that soft sinews are considered like meat for fulfilling the mitzva of eating the Pesach sacrifice. However, Rav Papa challenged this from Reish Lakish's opposing view that such sinews do not count as meat, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan ultimately retracted his position, rendering the case forbidden. The Gemara clarifies additional questions regarding broken bones surrounded by skin and flesh in different manners, in some of which the flesh is no longer actually attached to the bone. The law of a ben pekua (a fetus found in its mother's womb after she was slaughtered) permits the fetus to be eaten without independent slaughter. This law also permits its placenta (shilya) to be eaten, as derived from the same verse from which the laws of ben pekua are derived. However, if even a small portion of the placenta emerged outside the womb prior to the mother's slaughter, it is forbidden to eat even the portion that remained inside out of concern that the head of the fetus may have emerged with it before the slaughter. If an animal carrying its first offspring miscarries a placenta, one does not have to treat the placenta with the sanctity of a firstborn (bechor). This is because perhaps the fetus inside was a female, and even if it was a male, perhaps it was a non-viable anomaly that is not fit for firstborn sanctity (such as a sheep that looks like a goat). In contrast, the placenta of a consecrated sacrifice is treated with sanctity, as sacrifices can also be brought from female animals, and therefore the likelihood of it having sanctity is much higher. The placenta is not considered food and therefore does not contract food impurity. Within this discussion, the Gemara inquires whether or not the hide of a domestic donkey that was cooked is susceptible to impurity. The Gemara presents two different versions of a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan regarding a placenta that emerges alongside a visible fetus. They debate whether perhaps there is a (second) hidden fetus inside the placenta, with each version of their debate applying this concern to different circumstances. Non-Jews used to bury placentas at intersections or hang them on trees as a superstitious remedy, and therefore these actions are forbidden under the prohibition of following non-Jewish customs (darchei ha-Emori). Regarding this, Abaye and Rava define the boundary, establishing that anything done for a proven medical remedy is permitted, while that which has no apparent medical benefit but is purely superstitious is forbidden.

If a bone is broken but the majority of its width is surrounded by flesh and skin, the animal is not considered a treifa—even if the break is above the knee joint (arkuva)—and the limb is not considered a limb severed from a living animal (ever min hachai). A case came before Rava where the bone was covered by a majority of "flesh" only when including soft sinews. Rava initially permitted this based on Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that soft sinews are considered like meat for fulfilling the mitzva of eating the Pesach sacrifice. However, Rav Papa challenged this from Reish Lakish's opposing view that such sinews do not count as meat, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan ultimately retracted his position, rendering the case forbidden. The Gemara clarifies additional questions regarding broken bones surrounded by skin and flesh in different manners, in some of which the flesh is no longer actually attached to the bone. The law of a ben pekua (a fetus found in its mother's womb after she was slaughtered) permits the fetus to be eaten without independent slaughter. This law also permits its placenta (shilya) to be eaten, as derived from the same verse from which the laws of ben pekua are derived. However, if even a small portion of the placenta emerged outside the womb prior to the mother's slaughter, it is forbidden to eat even the portion that remained inside out of concern that the head of the fetus may have emerged with it before the slaughter. If an animal carrying its first offspring miscarries a placenta, one does not have to treat the placenta with the sanctity of a firstborn (bechor). This is because perhaps the fetus inside was a female, and even if it was a male, perhaps it was a non-viable anomaly that is not fit for firstborn sanctity (such as a sheep that looks like a goat). In contrast, the placenta of a consecrated sacrifice is treated with sanctity, as sacrifices can also be brought from female animals, and therefore the likelihood of it having sanctity is much higher. The placenta is not considered food and therefore does not contract food impurity. Within this discussion, the Gemara inquires whether or not the hide of a domestic donkey that was cooked is susceptible to impurity. The Gemara presents two different versions of a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan regarding a placenta that emerges alongside a visible fetus. They debate whether perhaps there is a (second) hidden fetus inside the placenta, with each version of their debate applying this concern to different circumstances. Non-Jews used to bury placentas at intersections or hang them on trees as a superstitious remedy, and therefore these actions are forbidden under the prohibition of following non-Jewish customs (darchei ha-Emori). Regarding this, Abaye and Rava define the boundary, establishing that anything done for a proven medical remedy is permitted, while that which has no apparent medical benefit but is purely superstitious is forbidden.

The Gemara cites two conflicting statements of Rav regarding a hanging limb of an animal. In one statement, Rav rules that eating this limb incurs lashes, while in the other, he rules it does not. Rav Yosef resolves this contradiction: if the animal dies naturally, death causes legal detachment (oseh nipul), retroactively defining the hanging limb as ever min hachai (a limb from a living animal) which incurs lashes for one who eats it. Conversely, if the animal is slaughtered, slaughter does not cause legal detachment (eino oseh nipul), meaning the limb is not treated as a separate forbidden entity and the eater does not receive lashes. Rava brings a biblical source for this differentiation between death and slaughter, and the Gemara raises two difficulties against his proof but resolves them both. Rav Chisda and Rabba dispute whether the debate between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis - regarding whether slaughter causes legal detachment for an emerged fetal limb - applies only when the fetus is alive, or even when the fetus is dead. Rav Chisda holds that when the fetus is dead, the emerged limb is definitely considered detached and carries impurity. In the course of a back-and-forth argument between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, it was mentioned that slaughtering would not remove impurity from an eight-month fetus, as it is not viable, and there is no type of eight-month fetus that can be validly slaughtered. However, a braita states that there are eight-month fetuses that can be permitted by slaughter. Rav Kahana reconciles this by differentiating between slaughtering the fetus itself and permitting the animal via its mother's slaughter (ben pekua). Rav Hoshaya inquires whether a live nine-month-old fetus can be validly slaughtered while still in utero. This question is evaluated under the views of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Chananya attempts to resolve this inquiry from a braita, but his answer is ultimately rejected by Rava. The Mishna introduces a dispute regarding the laws of ben pekua and whether they apply to a fully formed, nine-month-old fetus found inside its slaughtered mother. Rabbi Meir rules that the laws of ben pekua do not apply here, and the fetus requires its own independent slaughter. Conversely, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that as long as the fetus is still inside the womb, it is covered by the laws of ben pekua and is permitted by the slaughter of the mother. Operating under the Rabbis' position, Rabbi Eleazar states in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the mother's slaughter only covers the animal born from this womb regarding the laws of eating. In other halakhot, this animal is considered a distinct entity and standard animal laws apply to it. The Gemara presents two versions of what Rabbi Oshaya's statement was coming to exclude: the first version suggests it excludes the animal's fat, sciatic nerve, and blood from the mother's exemption, while the second version suggests it excludes using the animal for work or illicit cross-breeding. The first version is ultimately rejected based on other sources, leaving the second version as the preferred explanation. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the blood of a ben pekua (a nine-month fetus) is permitted as well. Rabbi Yochanan raises one difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, which the Gemara subsequently resolves. According to the position of the Rabbis, a question is asked whether one can redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi disagree. A second question is asked whether a ben pekua that is still in utero can be considered a separate unit for the laws of ritual impurity. This is a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and each one raises a difficulty against the other's position.

The Gemara cites two conflicting statements of Rav regarding a hanging limb of an animal. In one statement, Rav rules that eating this limb incurs lashes, while in the other, he rules it does not. Rav Yosef resolves this contradiction: if the animal dies naturally, death causes legal detachment (oseh nipul), retroactively defining the hanging limb as ever min hachai (a limb from a living animal) which incurs lashes for one who eats it. Conversely, if the animal is slaughtered, slaughter does not cause legal detachment (eino oseh nipul), meaning the limb is not treated as a separate forbidden entity and the eater does not receive lashes. Rava brings a biblical source for this differentiation between death and slaughter, and the Gemara raises two difficulties against his proof but resolves them both. Rav Chisda and Rabba dispute whether the debate between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis - regarding whether slaughter causes legal detachment for an emerged fetal limb - applies only when the fetus is alive, or even when the fetus is dead. Rav Chisda holds that when the fetus is dead, the emerged limb is definitely considered detached and carries impurity. In the course of a back-and-forth argument between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, it was mentioned that slaughtering would not remove impurity from an eight-month fetus, as it is not viable, and there is no type of eight-month fetus that can be validly slaughtered. However, a braita states that there are eight-month fetuses that can be permitted by slaughter. Rav Kahana reconciles this by differentiating between slaughtering the fetus itself and permitting the animal via its mother's slaughter (ben pekua). Rav Hoshaya inquires whether a live nine-month-old fetus can be validly slaughtered while still in utero. This question is evaluated under the views of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Chananya attempts to resolve this inquiry from a braita, but his answer is ultimately rejected by Rava. The Mishna introduces a dispute regarding the laws of ben pekua and whether they apply to a fully formed, nine-month-old fetus found inside its slaughtered mother. Rabbi Meir rules that the laws of ben pekua do not apply here, and the fetus requires its own independent slaughter. Conversely, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that as long as the fetus is still inside the womb, it is covered by the laws of ben pekua and is permitted by the slaughter of the mother. Operating under the Rabbis' position, Rabbi Eleazar states in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the mother's slaughter only covers the animal born from this womb regarding the laws of eating. In other halakhot, this animal is considered a distinct entity and standard animal laws apply to it. The Gemara presents two versions of what Rabbi Oshaya's statement was coming to exclude: the first version suggests it excludes the animal's fat, sciatic nerve, and blood from the mother's exemption, while the second version suggests it excludes using the animal for work or illicit cross-breeding. The first version is ultimately rejected based on other sources, leaving the second version as the preferred explanation. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the blood of a ben pekua (a nine-month fetus) is permitted as well. Rabbi Yochanan raises one difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, which the Gemara subsequently resolves. According to the position of the Rabbis, a question is asked whether one can redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi disagree. A second question is asked whether a ben pekua that is still in utero can be considered a separate unit for the laws of ritual impurity. This is a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and each one raises a difficulty against the other's position.

NOTE: Another difficult episode, including mention of fetal death. Rava's understanding of the mishnah - specifically recognizing a different tradition coming from Pompedita regarding the impurity at a rabbinic level and not the level of a Torah prohibition. Including the impurity of a midwife who attends to a woman in travail. Also, a long mishnah - specifically with an eye to the purity and impurity of the animals in the fetal cases. And the impact of kosher slaughtering on the cases -- depending on the order of operations.

The Gemara presents biblical derivations establishing that undomesticated animals (chaya) are included in the legal category of domesticated animals (behema) and vice versa. This crossover applies to kosher signs, crossbreeding laws, sacrificial impurities, and miscarriages. The Mishna rules that if a fetus dies in utero and a midwife reaches inside and touches it, the midwife contracts seven-day corpse impurity, while the mother remains pure until the fetus emerges. Rabba establishes that just as absorbed impurity (tuma belua) does not pass on impurity, absorbed purity (tahara beluah cannot become impure. The Gemara seeks biblical and logical sources for these principles, evaluating various kal va-chomer (a fortiori) arguments, including extending this law to animals. Rava notes that both laws are already stated in Mishnayot concerning a swallowed ring, prompting the Gemara to clarify that Rabba's unique ruling applies to a case where someone swallows two rings simultaneously - one pure and one impure - and the impure ring does not make the pure one impure.

The Gemara presents biblical derivations establishing that undomesticated animals (chaya) are included in the legal category of domesticated animals (behema) and vice versa. This crossover applies to kosher signs, crossbreeding laws, sacrificial impurities, and miscarriages. The Mishna rules that if a fetus dies in utero and a midwife reaches inside and touches it, the midwife contracts seven-day corpse impurity, while the mother remains pure until the fetus emerges. Rabba establishes that just as absorbed impurity (tuma belua) does not pass on impurity, absorbed purity (tahara beluah cannot become impure. The Gemara seeks biblical and logical sources for these principles, evaluating various kal va-chomer (a fortiori) arguments, including extending this law to animals. Rava notes that both laws are already stated in Mishnayot concerning a swallowed ring, prompting the Gemara to clarify that Rabba's unique ruling applies to a case where someone swallows two rings simultaneously - one pure and one impure - and the impure ring does not make the pure one impure.

There is a series of theological debates between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hananya and the Roman emperor, which demonstrate the sublimity of God through man's inability to look directly at the sun or to sustain the natural armies that serve God. A similar discussion with the emperor's daughter, who scoffed at the providence of God in the world, leads to a punishment of leprosy being inflicted upon her, emphasizing the principle that God's presence is indirectly guiding the world. Rav Yehuda defines the difference between the dimensions of an ox and a donkey that affect the laws of buying and selling. He also explains that the ox sacrificed by Adam possessed only a single horn on its forehead, and that its horns preceded its hooves in creation. This structural precedence supports the view of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, according to which all works of creation were created in their full stature, their full understanding, and their full mature form. Rabbi Chanina bar Papa expounds that the Angel of the World praised the grasses when they applied a kal v'chomer argument and proactively emerged according to their specific kinds (without intermixing), as derived from Genesis 1:11–12. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi reconciles the scriptural contradiction regarding the creation of the luminaries, detailing the moon's claim that two kings cannot share a single crown, which prompted the divine decree for it to diminish itself. To appease the moon, God granted it dominion by both day and night, linked Israel's calendar to the moon's counting of days and years, and called righteous people "small" like the moon. However, the moon was not appeased by all of these attempts, and God then established a sin offering to be offered on Rosh Chodesh (the New Moon) - a male goat - as an atonement for God. Rav Asi reconciles a contradiction in Creation regarding the emergence of vegetation, explaining that the grass remained hidden at the opening of the ground until the prayer of Adam brought down rain and caused them to sprout, teaching that God desires the prayers of the righteous. Rav Chanan bar Rava identifies the shesua as a unique creature possessing two backs and two spinal columns - as definitive proof that the Torah is from Heaven, as it is impossible to believe that Moshe knew of the existence of that creature. Reish Lakish analyzes a series of seemingly redundant verses, emphasizing that they constitute the core essentials of the Torah itself. For example, the description of the displacement of nations in the land of the Philistines and the land of Moab via intermediary conquests was legally meant to permit the eventual conquest of the land without violating ancient oaths or divine decrees.

There is a series of theological debates between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hananya and the Roman emperor, which demonstrate the sublimity of God through man's inability to look directly at the sun or to sustain the natural armies that serve God. A similar discussion with the emperor's daughter, who scoffed at the providence of God in the world, leads to a punishment of leprosy being inflicted upon her, emphasizing the principle that God's presence is indirectly guiding the world. Rav Yehuda defines the difference between the dimensions of an ox and a donkey that affect the laws of buying and selling. He also explains that the ox sacrificed by Adam possessed only a single horn on its forehead, and that its horns preceded its hooves in creation. This structural precedence supports the view of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, according to which all works of creation were created in their full stature, their full understanding, and their full mature form. Rabbi Chanina bar Papa expounds that the Angel of the World praised the grasses when they applied a kal v'chomer argument and proactively emerged according to their specific kinds (without intermixing), as derived from Genesis 1:11–12. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi reconciles the scriptural contradiction regarding the creation of the luminaries, detailing the moon's claim that two kings cannot share a single crown, which prompted the divine decree for it to diminish itself. To appease the moon, God granted it dominion by both day and night, linked Israel's calendar to the moon's counting of days and years, and called righteous people "small" like the moon. However, the moon was not appeased by all of these attempts, and God then established a sin offering to be offered on Rosh Chodesh (the New Moon) - a male goat - as an atonement for God. Rav Asi reconciles a contradiction in Creation regarding the emergence of vegetation, explaining that the grass remained hidden at the opening of the ground until the prayer of Adam brought down rain and caused them to sprout, teaching that God desires the prayers of the righteous. Rav Chanan bar Rava identifies the shesua as a unique creature possessing two backs and two spinal columns - as definitive proof that the Torah is from Heaven, as it is impossible to believe that Moshe knew of the existence of that creature. Reish Lakish analyzes a series of seemingly redundant verses, emphasizing that they constitute the core essentials of the Torah itself. For example, the description of the displacement of nations in the land of the Philistines and the land of Moab via intermediary conquests was legally meant to permit the eventual conquest of the land without violating ancient oaths or divine decrees.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye rules that although a standard hole in the windpipe requires the size of an issar (a coin), its clawing measurement (of redness) is a minimal amount, because the predator's venom burns and consumes the tissue continuously. Regarding the scope of the inspection required due to concern for venom, Rav Nachman testifies in the name of Rav that one must inspect from the base of the brain to the thigh, and not only adjacent to the intestines (as some hold). In an interesting story, Rabbi Yochanan defends the supreme authority of Rav against the queries of Reish Lakish, and consequently, Reish Lakish praises a different tradition of Rav, according to which an animal whose organs (simanim) were dislocated and was subsequently slaughtered is kosher. It was established that new cases of treifot may not be added beyond those enumerated by the Sages, even if these injuries cause the death of the animal. The Mishna enumerates structural defects that leave the animal kosher, including a windpipe that was perforated less than the size of an Italian issar, a brain membrane that was not punctured, and a liver of which a remains. This list gives rise to a fundamental dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the scope of the lists in this chapter, which affects their approach to the ruling of Rav Matna, who rules that a femur bone that dislocated is a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan declares the animal kosher because the case was omitted from the exclusive list of treifot, while Reish Lakish rules it a treifa because it is absent from the exclusive list of kosher defects. For the Babylonians, they defined that the size of the isser is similar to a Kurdish dinar, and the Gemara brings a story following this involving Rabbi Yochanan who went to a moneychanger looking for this coin,and told the moneychanger that craftsmen engaged in their work are legally exempt from standing before Torah scholars. How does this differ from craftsmen who would stand up and greet those Jews who were bringing their first fruits to the Temple? Rav Nachman said that "up to an issar" it is not a treifa means up to but not including that size. Rava brings a series of difficulties against his view, but Rav Nachman answers them.

Rava establishes further laws regarding physical anomalies that render a lung a treifa. If cysts appear on the lung, a single cyst does not disqualify the animal, whereas two distinct cysts render it a treifa. Rava provides a method to inspect an ambiguous cyst to determine whether it is a single divided structure or two separate entities. Regarding the lobes of the lung - which normally consist of three on the right and two on the left – Rava rules that deviations from this norm disqualify the animal. Meriemar permitted an extra lobe provided it is perfectly aligned with the natural row. However, if an extra lobe develops internally facing the heart, its status is disputed, as Rav Huna Mar bar Avia notes that this configuration is common in wild animals, and therefore permits it. Rafram rules that a lung resembling a wood chip is a treifa, a tradition that receives five distinct interpretations in the Gemara to clarify in what way it is similar to a wood chip – in color or in feel. Rava delineates which lung discolorations are valid and which are problematic, a discussion expanded upon by Rav Kahana and Rav Sama regarding specific shades and appearances. Ravina addresses a scenario where a lobe of the lung fails to inflate, explaining that a test must be performed to determine if the lack of airflow is due to a fatal defect or merely a temporary obstruction. Ulla rules that if the internal tissue of the lung liquefies, the animal remains kosher because internal decay does not compromise the outer membrane. Rava qualifies this leniency, limiting it to cases where the primary bronchial tubes remain intact, and Rav Ashi outlines the practical examination method to verify their structural integrity.

Rulings by Rava: Issues of the lungs, specifically with regard to the lobes. Plus, Meimar, who answers the halakhic questions differently from Rava. Until the Gemara establishes that their answers pertain to different cases -- regarding the lobes. The sages are very precise here in their examination of the different concerns. Also, the implications of various colors -- dark grey (kosher) vs. black (not kosher) vs. green (kosher) vs. red (kosher) vs. Black being the shift from the red of blood, as it deteriorates, which means there's a problem in the lung that would lead to the color black. Plus, the stories of Rabbi Natan, who saves a couple of babies by advising their mothers to let the children's blood to be reabsorbed before brit milah (circumcision).

What is the minimal remnant required to remain of the liver to keep the animal kosher when it is damaged or partially missing? Although our Mishna implies that any minimal amount is sufficient, another Mishna explicitly requires an olive-bulk. Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction by explaining that each Mishna reflects a different Tannaitic position. The established halakha dictates that a size of an olive-bulk is required, and the Amoraim dispute whether this piece must remain specifically where the gallbladder is located, or where the liver attaches to its lifelines; Rav Papa rules that an olive-bulk is required in both locations. Regarding perforations of the lung, the Gemara explains that the lung is surrounded by two membranes, an outer membrane and an inner membrane. If only one membrane is punctured, the second membrane that remains intact protects it, and the lung remains kosher. To diagnose a lung that is suspected of leaking air, Rav Yosef suggests one test involving a feather and a second involving water. In the water test, the lung is placed inside a bowl of lukewarm water and inflated. If the water bubbles, this proves that it contains a disqualifying perforation; if no bubbling appears, the sound is attributed only to air trapped between the membranes, and the lung remains kosher. Rava establishes rules regarding various changes in the appearance and structure of the lung. External peelings, multiple changes in color, or spots of different shades generally do not disqualify the animal. Conversely, if a part of the lung is dry to the extent that it crumbles under a fingernail, the animal is disqualified as a treifa. The Gemara discusses the laws of lung adhesions (sirchot). An adhesion between two lobes that occurs out of their natural anatomical order constitutes an absolute defect that cannot be tested, while an adhesion occurring in their normal order is considered a natural growth and remains kosher.

What are the primary categories of treifot? Ulla states that eight categories that were transmitted as halakha to Moshe from Sinai: perforated (nekuva), severed (pesuka), removed (netula), deficient (chasura), torn (kru'a), clawed (drusa), fallen (nefula), and broken (shevura). Chiya bar Rav said there are eight cases in the category of perforated, and this excludes the gall bladder, which is considered a treifa only by Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the ruling is like Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. He brings a proof for Rabbi Yosi's position from a verse in Iyov 16:13, in which Iyov explains that his gall bladder was poured on the ground, and yet, he still lived. The rabbis' retort to that is that Iyov's situation was miraculous and we cannot derive halakha from a miracle. Another ruling of Rabbi Yochanan was brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef regarding the liver – if the liver is reduced to less than an olive bulk, the animal is a treifa. If, according to Rabba bar bar Hanna, Rabbi Yochanan holds like an unattributed Mishna, there is a contradiction as our Mishna rules it is a treifa only if the liver is completely removed. This is resolved by explaining there is a debate between the two amoraim what Rabbi Yochanan held. Two other rulings are brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef in the name of Rabbi Yochanan regarding treifot. A gall bladder that was perforated but the liver covered up the hole, or a bird's gizzard that was perforated, but the inner lining was not, both are kosher. Raba notes that the gullet consists of two distinct linings - an outer red membrane and an inner white membrane. If only one layer is punctured while the other remains intact, the animal remains kosher. What happens if both layers of an organ are punctured, but the holes do not align? Rav Ashi rules that in a stationary organ like the gizzard, non-aligned punctures are kosher because the layers do not shift. However, in a dynamic organ like the gullet, which constantly expands, contracts, and moves during feeding, the holes are liable to realign; therefore, non-aligned punctures render the animal a treifa. In one version, Mar Zutra quotes Rav Papa saying the opposite; in another, he agrees. Raba notes that the gullet cannot be evaluated for predatory clawing (safek drusa) from the outside, as the outside is red and blood would not be noticeable. It must be inverted and inspected from the inside. If a thorn is found lodged inside the gullet with a perforation on the inside, but no noticeable perforation on the outside, Ulla rules that we do not fear it caused a perforation which healed, as free-roaming livestock regularly consume thorny vegetation without injury. Is the turbatz haveshet, the uppermost part of the gullet, legally treated as part of the gullet? Rav and Shmuel disagree on its status. Rav maintains it is a valid location for slaughter; thus, any extraneous puncture of even a minimal size renders it a treifa. Shmuel argues it is not a valid location for slaughter, meaning it is only rendered a treifa if the majority of it is severed. This dispute culminated in a practical case involving an ox belonging to the sons of Rav Ukva, where the slaughter began in the turbatz haveshet and finished in the gullet. Rava applied the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, declaring the animal a treifa. Rabbi Abba reversed Rava's decision, demonstrating that the ox was completely kosher under either authority individually. If one followed Rav, the slaughter location was valid; if one followed Shmuel, the minor cut in the turbatz haveshet did not render it a treifa before the slaughter was completed. Because Rava's logically contradictory ruling caused an impermissible destruction of kosher property, Rabbi Abba ordered Rava to financially compensate the owner of the ox.

Three difficulties are raised from tannaitic sources against the opinion of Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak that a person cannot forbid property that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she'eino shelo), and they are resolved. The first difficulty is from the braita regarding a sin offering slaughtered outside the Temple for idol worship, which the Gemara resolves by explaining that since the sacrifice achieves atonement for the owner, it is legally considered his own property. The second difficulty is from the Mishna regarding two people holding a knife where one slaughters for an idol, and the third is from a braita regarding one who renders another's property impure, mixes it with tithed produce, or pours it as an idolatrous libation. The Gemara resolves these by explaining that the individual has a financial partnership in the item. The Gemara suggests that the debate between Rav Huna and Rav Nachman is a tannaitic dispute, quoting a dispute regarding whether a gentile can forbid a Jew's wine by offering it up as a libation to idols. Rav Nachman, however, rejects the comparison, as a Jew who does the same thing would be doing it just to annoy his friend, and does not really intend to worship the idol. Some difficulties are raised against this theory from tannaitic sources, but are resolved by explaining them as referring to cases where the Jew is an apostate. The Mishna rules that one may not slaughter an animal directly into seas, rivers, or vessels because it looks to others like they are offering it to an idol (mar'it ayin). However, it is permitted to slaughter into a circular pool of water, which Rava clarifies must be murky. Furthermore, one may not slaughter directly into a pit (gumma) anywhere, but the Mishna then permits doing so in one's house. Abaye and Rava each resolve this seemingly contradictory statement in different manners, and Rava rejects Abaye's explanation. Rava explains that a person may slaughter next to a pit in their private courtyard so that the blood flows into it to keep the yard clean. In the marketplace, even this is strictly forbidden to prevent copying heretical practices (minim), and anyone who does so must be investigated for heresy. A braita is brought to support Rava's explanation. The Mishna establishes that slaughtering a non-sacrifice (chullin) for the sake of a sacrifice that can be voluntarily vowed or donated - such as an olah, asham talui, or todah - renders the shechita invalid, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits it. The rabbis are concerned that people will see this and think that one can slaughter sacrifices outside the Temple. Conversely, slaughtering for sacrifices that cannot be voluntarily vowed, like a sin offering, is valid, as people will assume the slaughterer is just saying it is for the sake of that offering but does not really intend to offer a sacrifice outside the Temple.

What types of signs of life does one need to observe when performing shechita on an animal that is on the verge of death? Rav, Shmuel, and Rava each bring different actions that serve as indicators that would then permit this animal to be eaten, as it is clear the animal was still alive enough at the time of the shechita. At what point of the slaughtering process does one need to see these signs of life? Rav Chisda, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, and Rava each suggest different points - the middle, the beginning, or the end. Rav Chisda and Rav Nachman provide support for their positions from our Mishna, while Rava brings support from his understanding of a different tannaitic source. Can one perform shechita on an animal for an idol worshipper? Does one need to be concerned that it will be used for idol worship and therefore the Jew would be benefiting from idol worship? Is it the intent of the owner or the one performing the shechita that determines the designation of the animal?

Rabbi Yonatan says in the name of Rabbi that someone who eats a shelishi (third degree) of actual teruma is forbidden to eat teruma but is allowed to touch it. Ulla had said the same thing regarding one who eats a shelishi of chullin that was treated like teruma. The Gemara explains why both statements were needed and could not have necessarily been derived one from the other. Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta says that someone who eats a shelishi of chullin treated like kodashim is still pure to eat actual kodashim, because only real kodashim that are sanctified by an action (like a meal offering when placed in a sanctified vessel or an animal when slaughtered) can create a revi'i (fourth degree). Rami bar Hama challenges this from Rabbi Yehoshua's opinion in the Mishna in Taharot (2:2) that a shelishi that was treated as teruma is considered a sheni for kodashim. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between items treated as teruma and those treated as kodashim. The reason to distinguish is that those who are careful from impurities for teruma are not cautious enough regarding kodashim. This distinction is proven from a Mishna in Chagiga (18b). Rava, however, disagrees with the application of the Mishna in Chagiga to this case, and disagrees with Rav Yitzchak. A difficulty is raised against this distinction from a Mishna in Chagiga (24b) where one designated part of the wine in a barrel of teruma to be kodashim. If the protection for teruma is not valid for kodashim, wouldn't the teruma wine make the kodashim wine impure? To resolve this they distinguish between teruma and kodashim that are combined and those that are not combined. A second difficulty on Rav Yitzchak is brought from a braita that clearly states that a shelishi of items that are treated as kodashim passes on impurity to kodashim. To resolve this difficulty, they conclude that there is a tannaitic debate and brings a braita with two opinions that both support Rav Yitzchak's position. Rabbi Shimon stated in the Mishna that shechita makes the animal susceptible to impurity. Rav Asi explains that Rabbi Shimon means only shechita makes it susceptible, but the blood of the animal does not. The Gemara challenges this to see if he means only shechita, and blood from the slaughter would not be considered a liquid that could render something susceptible to impurity, or did he mean shechita in addition to blood, as blood of the slaughter could also render something susceptible to impurity. Our Mishna is brought to strengthen Rav Asi's reading, but it is rejected as inconclusive. Then three other tannaitic sources are brought to try to either prove or disprove Rav Assi's claim, however, all are deemed inconclusive.

Reish Lakish rules that if the windpipe is cut during slaughter and the lung is subsequently punctured before the gullet is cut, the animal remains kosher because the lung is already considered to have lost its life through the cutting of the windpipe. Rava qualifies that this principle applies exclusively to the lung, which is structurally dependent on the windpipe, but not to the inner digestive organs. Rabbi Zeira disputes this qualification, and the Gemara notes a secondary debate regarding whether or not Rabbi Zeira ultimately retracted his objection. Rav Acha infers from Reish Lakish's ruling that meat from an animal in the process of being slaughtered is forbidden to Noahides. Because the severing of both simanim structurally detaches the internal organs from the animal's life source, it renders them ever min hachai (a limb or flesh from a living animal) for anyone whose meat is not immediately permitted via shechita. Consequently, a gentile eating these organs while the animal still convulses violates the Noachide prohibition. However, others object to this inference, arguing that a concept cannot exist where an item is permitted to Jews but forbidden to gentiles. A debate in the Mishna questions whether the act of slaughter itself renders the animal susceptible to ritual impurity (hechsher lekabel tumah) or if susceptibility is achieved only when the blood emerges and acts as a wetting liquid. The rabbis rule that if no blood emerges, the meat is not susceptible to impurity, meaning one may eat it with ritually impure hands. The Gemara infers from here that if blood had emerged, eating with impure hands would be forbidden. This raises a difficulty, as the Mishna appears to discuss secular meat (chullin), yet impure hands possess only a second-degree status (sheni le'tumah), which cannot create a third-degree status (shelishi) in chullin. To resolve this, the Gemara first presents four textual proofs demonstrating that the Mishna is indeed dealing with chullin. Following these proofs, the Gemara introduces three suggestions for the specific case in the Mishna: according to the first, the Mishna refers to meat purchased with maaser sheni money; according to the second, it involves a rabbinic decree assigning a first-degree status of impurity to the hands; and according to the third, it refers to secular food prepared according to the strict purity standards of consecrated sacrifices (kodashim).

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

Study Guide The Gemara clarifies which Tanna the Mishna follows regarding temed (grape-seed water). Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avahu explains that the dispute in the Mishna in Ma'asrot between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages applies after it ferments, so our Mishna can align with the view of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabba bar Avahu that if a person bought temed with second tithe funds before it fermented, and it ultimately fermented, it is treated as wine. His words pose a difficulty for our Mishna, which did not present such an option. Rabba establishes the Mishna in a case where it is clear that it will not ferment later, while Rava suggests that the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that everything follows the visual appearance (chazuta) at the time of the sale. Rabbi Elazar disputes Rav Nachman's understanding of the Mishna in Ma'asrot, holding that the dispute applies when it has not fermented, but once it ferments, everyone agrees it is considered wine. A braita brings the laws of purifying temed that has not yet fermented by connecting it to water (haska). Rava limits this rule, explaining that this applies only when the water of the temed was pure from the beginning and became impure after it became temed, but if it was impure from the outset, it does not. However, Rav Ashi rejects his ruling and argues that there is no logic to distinguish between the cases. The Mishna states that anywhere there is a sale (a minor girl, ketana), there is no fine for rape (whose law only applies to a young woman, na'ara), and anywhere there is a fine, there is no sale. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav explains that this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that a fine applies even to a ketana. A Mishna states that anywhere there is refusal (miun, for a ketana), there is no chalitza (for a na'ara), and anywhere there is chalitza, there is no miun. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says that this is also the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that miun applies even to a na'ara. A Mishna states that anywhere there is a shofar blast (tekiya), there is no havdala, and anywhere there is havdala, there is no tekiya. If a Festival falls on the eve of the Sabbath, you blow the shofar and do not say havdala. If it falls on the conclusion of the Sabbath, you say havdala and do not blow. The Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute the exact wording of the havdala.