Podcasts about Rav

How does coming to Israel for yeshiva and seminary affect a student's mental health? When do difficult emotional feelings cross the line from normal struggles to something that should be addressed? Should a student who believes another is emotionally unstable report that behavior to the school administration? What are the key similarities and differences in how boys and girls experience stress, anxiety, depression, or other emotional pressures? Host: Ari Wasserman, author of the newly published, revised and expanded book Making it Work, on workplace challenges and Halachic Q & A on the Job with Rabbi Yitzchak Schwartz – Posek, Rosh Yeshiva & Rav, Givat Ze'ev, Israel – 8:50 with Dr. Jacob Freedman – psychiatrist, speaker and author – 29:43 with Dr. Shmuel Harris – psychiatrist, author and founder and director of Machon Dvir Institute, Yerushalayim – 29:43 with Rabbi Dr. Dovid Fox – Dayan, forensic and clinical psychologist, Director of Crisis and Trauma Services for Chai Lifeline – 1:02:35 with Mrs. Debbie Fox – clinical social worker and author of Seminary Savvy – 1:02:35 Conclusions and takeaways – 1:40:40 מראי מקומות   

If the remainder of the mincha offering becomes impure, lost, or burned before the kometz is offered, according to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua's approaches regarding sacrifices, one can explain what they would each hold on whether the kometz may still be burned. In the case of animal sacrifices, Rabbi Eliezer permits the sprinkling of the blood even if there is no meat left, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua forbids it. Rav explains that Rabbi Yehoshua's restriction only applies if the entire remainder is lost; however, if even a portion remains, the kometz may be burned. This aligns with his view on animal sacrifices - that if even an olive-bulk of meat or sacrificial fats remains, the blood may be sprinkled. Does the kometz require a sacred vessel after being taken from the meal offering, or can it be brought by hand to the altar? Rabbi Shimon and the Sages differ on this requirement, with Rabbi Shimon ruling that a vessel is not required at this stage. The Gemara explores three different approaches to explain the underlying logic of Rabbi Shimon's lenient view, bringing braitot to challenge the different opinions. If the kometz is split into two parts, the Mishna rules that it can be burned in two separate actions. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about whether it can be split into more than two parts. What is the basis of their debate? Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Chanina disagree about the exact point at which the burning of the kometz renders the remainder permitted for consumption.  

Episode 182 Monday, January 26, 2026   Check us out on BOOKS ARE MY PEOPLE, releasing February 9   Join us as we try an Olympic-level craft project, cooking and reading during the Olympics February 6 to 22, 2026 On the Needles 4:12 ALL KNITTING LINKS GO TO RAVELRY UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.  Please visit our Instagram page @craftcookreadrepeat for non-Rav photos and info     Clapotis ‘24 by Kate Davies, Three Irish Girls Adorn Sock in Ainsley-- DONE!!   Avena by Jennifer Steingass, Yarnaceous Fibers Brontosaurus DK in Starbies and Cup of Cheer minis – DONE!!   Contradict Me MKAL by Maggie Fangmann, Yarnaceous Fibers Brontosaurus DK in Starbies and Cup of Cheer minis – DONE!! On the Easel 13:03 100-Day composition studies Staffordshire stationery set–in progress!! Exploring R&F drawing oils and pigment sticks On the Table 18:03   Palak khichdi (spinach, rice and red lentils) from Hetty Lui McKinnon   broccoli + pork with soy + hot honey - by Julia Turshen   https://yossyarefi.substack.com/p/vanilla-corn-cake-with-blueberry   Citrus Salad from Good Things by Samin Nosrat (allll the citrus!!) Helping my boys figure out leftover ingredient puzzles. On the Nightstand 25:59 We are now a Bookshop.org affiliate!  You can visit our shop to find books we've talked about or click on the links below.  The books are supplied by local independent bookstores and a percentage goes to us at no cost to you!   Maid for Each Other by Lynn Painter History Lessons by Zoe B. Wallbrook Brigands and Breadknives by Travis Baldree Ocean's Godori by Elaine U. Cho Convenience Store Woman by Sayaka Murata, trans by Ginny Tapley Takemori Sky Daddy by Kate Folk   The Correspondent by Virginia Evans (my JOYful book for January) The Art Spy by Michelle Young (non-fiction) Art Day by Day ed. Alex Johnson (non-fiction, anthology)  

After months of waiting and speculation, details about the All-American Halftime Show are finally out. Kid Rock joins the program to announce his headline role, and discuss his fellow performers Brantley Gilbert, Lee Brice, and Gabby Barrett. Plus, TPUSA Enterprise director Nick Cocoa announces a plan to bring Club America chapters to every Montana high school, and Luke Rosiak exposes government waste, audit obstruction, and corruption tied to the African Development Foundation. Be sure to catch the All-America Halftime Show Feb. 8 on Rumble, RAV, X, TBN, and more. Watch every episode ad-free on members.charliekirk.com! Get new merch at charliekirkstore.com!Support the show: http://www.charliekirk.com/supportSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this Jewish Inspiration Podcast episode (Day 121), Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe concludes the Gate of Falsehood (Sheker) from Orchos Tzaddikim, detailing the final categories of liars and emphasizing the Torah's command to distance oneself from all falsehood ("midvar sheker tirchak").The rabbi reviews the nine types of falsehood:Obvious lies, subtle forgeries, sophisticated rationalizations."White lies" (inconsequential exaggerations) that curry favor or lower guards.Lies to steal potential benefit (e.g., poaching clients).Distorting heard facts for no gain/damage.False promises/assurances (e.g., "I'll give you this" without intent).Leading someone to trust falsely, then breaking it (breaking a covenant-like bond).Taking praise for unpossessed qualities (even true praise can be misused).Lies about what was heard, changing facts to suit needs.Key lessons: Falsehood distances one from Hashem (Emet/truth); even "harmless" lies train the tongue for worse deception. Rav's story warns against teaching children to reverse words—even for "good" reasons—as it habituates falsehood. Punishment varies by severity, but all lies harm soul and others. The chapter ends urging vigilance: purge traits that rationalize lies to attain pure truth.Recorded at TORCH Centre in the Levin Family Studios (B) to a live audience on July 15, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on February 3, 2026_____________This series on Orchos Tzadikim/Ways of the Righteous is produced in partnership with Hachzek.Join the revolution of daily Mussar study at hachzek.com.We are using the Treasure of Life edition of the Orchos Tzadikkim (Published by Feldheim)_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/jewish-inspiration-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1476610783Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4r0KfjMzmCNQbiNaZBCSU7) to stay inspired! Share your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Our Mission is Connecting Jews & Judaism. Help us spread Judaism globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org.Your support makes a HUGE difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Hey Rabbi! Podcast: https://heyrabbi.transistor.fm/episodesPrayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#JewishInspiration, #Mussar, #MasterClass, #WhiteLies, #Truth, #Lies, #Rationalizations, #Sheker, #FalsePromises ★ Support this podcast ★

Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

Rav explained that details that are essential (me'akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit) appears in the verse, signifying its indispensable status regardless of repetition. The Gemara then raises a difficulty with the premise of the original challenge, noting that the word for salt actually does appear twice in Vayikra 2:13. This is answered by explaining that the repetition in that verse is necessary for specific drashot found in a braita. The braita extrapolates from the verse to teach which sacrificial items require salt and which do not - concluding that while most offerings require it, wood and blood do not. After quoting the brraita in its entirety, the Gemara delves into the different sections of the text, analyzing each clause to better understand the underlying logic of these inclusions and exclusions.

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon's reasoning was based on "a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action," but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the "vav"("and") connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav's statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle's inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.

Today on Fletch, Vaughan & Hayley's Big Pod, Cleaner vs Tiny Ducks SLP - DO you like asparagus rolls? Rav 4 is the hot new car to have Top 6 - Problems being a 13-year-old in prison Hayley air tags her keys 1 in 4 Aussies don't exercise Hayleys Interactive Date Why did you move to NZ? Daniel Beddingfield follows Hayley Is the Quiff back? Fact of the day How liberal are your parents? An Analogue bag Where did someone flirt with you? Hayley's PM See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The sharp scholars (charifei) of Pumbedita argue that one burning can create pigul for another. Specifically, if one burns the kometz (handful) with the intention to burn the levona (frankincense) outside its designated time, it becomes pigul. They explain that even the Rabbis - who generally hold that a pigul thought during only half of a permitting act (matir) is ineffective - would agree here, because the levona was included in the person's thoughts. Rava supports this from the general rule in the Mishna, however, his proof is rejected as it is inconclusive. Rav Hisda, however, cites Rav to argue that one burning cannot create pigul for another. He reasons that since the kometz is not the permitting agent (matir) for the levona, an intention concerning burning the levona during the burning of the kometz is irrelevant. A proof is brought for this from a case involving the two lambs of Shavuot, but it is countered by distinguishing between items in separate vessels versus items in the same vessel. Rav Hamnuna presents a unique case that he considers of immense value, where the pigul thought "spreads" through the entire process. If one burns the kometz with intent to burn the levona tomorrow, and with intent to eat the shirayim (remnants) tomorrow, the offering is pigul. This is because the thoughts combined eventually cover both the completion of the permitting acts and the consumption of the remnants. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a braita regarding a case that all agree on. At first it seems they all agree that there is pigul even if the pigul thought is only in one matir. However, since it is clear that is not the case, they edit the braita to read "pasul" instead of "pigul," as all agree that it is disqualified, even if it is not necessarily pigul. The third chapter begins with a Mishna discussing intentions regarding items not normally meant for that specific use. If one has intent during the kometz service to eat something not usually eaten (like the kometz itself) or to burn something not usually burned (like the remnants), the rabbis rule the offering valid, while Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it. Additionally, if the intention involves a quantity less than an olive-bulk, or if it combines half an olive-bulk of eating and half an olive-bulk of burning, it remains valid because eating and burning do not combine to reach the required measure for pigul. Rabbi Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the double expression in the verse: "ve'im he'achol ye'achel" (and if it should surely be eaten). He understands this to include two types of "eating": human consumption and the consumption of the altar (burning). Therefore, an intention to switch these roles - intending to eat what is meant for the fire - is a valid disqualifying thought. The rabbis who disagree extrapolate that verse in a different manner, either to include a case of one who uses the language of eating instead of burning when having a pigul intent, or to derive the requisite amount of burning from the requisite amount for eating - an olive-bulk - meaning one who has a thought to burn less than an olive-bulk beyond its given time will not render the offering pigul. Rabbi Zeira questions Rav Asi that if Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the Torah, it should carry the penalty of karet, and yet Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that is does not. Rav Asi answer that there is a Tannaitic dispute regarding the nature of Rabbi Eliezer's disqualification: one view holds it is a Torah-level disqualification punishable by karet, while another suggests it is a Rabbinic disqualification and he brings a braita to support this. The braita discusses one who slaughters a sacrifice with the intent to drink the blood tomorrow or to burn the meat tomorrow. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies these cases, while the rabbis validate them. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar disagree in a case where one's intent was to leave the blood for tomorrow. Rabbi Yehuda says it is disqualified while Rabbi Elazar says that the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree about this as well. In trying to assess the point of disagreement between Rabbis Yehuda and Elazar, they suggest that it is on their understanding of Rabbi Eliezer's position and whether he views these cases as disqualified (rabbinic) or as pigul (Torah law, with karet). However, this understanding of the braita is rejected.

The Rav's first time Shechting!! Should you learn or pray!? Iyun or bekius!?

Machloeks Reb Meir and the chachomim if mefaglin bchatzi hamatir,machlokes Rav and Shmuel Al das rishona hu oseh,and if there's pigul bholacha

The sharp scholars (charifei) of Pumbedita argue that one burning can create pigul for another. Specifically, if one burns the kometz (handful) with the intention to burn the levona (frankincense) outside its designated time, it becomes pigul. They explain that even the Rabbis - who generally hold that a pigul thought during only half of a permitting act (matir) is ineffective - would agree here, because the levona was included in the person's thoughts. Rava supports this from the general rule in the Mishna, however, his proof is rejected as it is inconclusive. Rav Hisda, however, cites Rav to argue that one burning cannot create pigul for another. He reasons that since the kometz is not the permitting agent (matir) for the levona, an intention concerning burning the levona during the burning of the kometz is irrelevant. A proof is brought for this from a case involving the two lambs of Shavuot, but it is countered by distinguishing between items in separate vessels versus items in the same vessel. Rav Hamnuna presents a unique case that he considers of immense value, where the pigul thought "spreads" through the entire process. If one burns the kometz with intent to burn the levona tomorrow, and with intent to eat the shirayim (remnants) tomorrow, the offering is pigul. This is because the thoughts combined eventually cover both the completion of the permitting acts and the consumption of the remnants. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a braita regarding a case that all agree on. At first it seems they all agree that there is pigul even if the pigul thought is only in one matir. However, since it is clear that is not the case, they edit the braita to read "pasul" instead of "pigul," as all agree that it is disqualified, even if it is not necessarily pigul. The third chapter begins with a Mishna discussing intentions regarding items not normally meant for that specific use. If one has intent during the kometz service to eat something not usually eaten (like the kometz itself) or to burn something not usually burned (like the remnants), the rabbis rule the offering valid, while Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it. Additionally, if the intention involves a quantity less than an olive-bulk, or if it combines half an olive-bulk of eating and half an olive-bulk of burning, it remains valid because eating and burning do not combine to reach the required measure for pigul. Rabbi Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the double expression in the verse: "ve'im he'achol ye'achel" (and if it should surely be eaten). He understands this to include two types of "eating": human consumption and the consumption of the altar (burning). Therefore, an intention to switch these roles - intending to eat what is meant for the fire - is a valid disqualifying thought. The rabbis who disagree extrapolate that verse in a different manner, either to include a case of one who uses the language of eating instead of burning when having a pigul intent, or to derive the requisite amount of burning from the requisite amount for eating - an olive-bulk - meaning one who has a thought to burn less than an olive-bulk beyond its given time will not render the offering pigul. Rabbi Zeira questions Rav Asi that if Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the Torah, it should carry the penalty of karet, and yet Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that is does not. Rav Asi answer that there is a Tannaitic dispute regarding the nature of Rabbi Eliezer's disqualification: one view holds it is a Torah-level disqualification punishable by karet, while another suggests it is a Rabbinic disqualification and he brings a braita to support this. The braita discusses one who slaughters a sacrifice with the intent to drink the blood tomorrow or to burn the meat tomorrow. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies these cases, while the rabbis validate them. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar disagree in a case where one's intent was to leave the blood for tomorrow. Rabbi Yehuda says it is disqualified while Rabbi Elazar says that the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree about this as well. In trying to assess the point of disagreement between Rabbis Yehuda and Elazar, they suggest that it is on their understanding of Rabbi Eliezer's position and whether he views these cases as disqualified (rabbinic) or as pigul (Torah law, with karet). However, this understanding of the braita is rejected.

Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether the meal offering can become pigul if the pigul thought was only during part of the permitting act (matir), such as during the burning of the kometz, but not the burning of the frankincense, or the slaughtering of one sheep of the two sheep offerings on Shavuot. Rabbi Meir holds that it is pigul, while the rabbis do not. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding this debate. Rav holds that if the first action included a pigul thought, while the second was performed in silence, it is pigul, even according to the rabbis, as the second action follows the first and is considered to have been performed with the same thought. Shmuel disagrees and holds that silence following a pigul thought does not render the item pigul according to the rabbis, who require pigul in both actions that are considered a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's position from two different sources from the Tosefta. The first is resolved but the second is only partially resolved, i.e., according to one position in a different debate. A question is raised on the Tosefta quoted previously. If one is not punished by karet in a case of pigul unless the rest of the sacrifice was brought properly, in the case of the sacrifice on Yom Kippur, if one had a pigul thought while sprinkling the first set of blood, but not the next, how could Rabbi Meir call this pigul as the next sets of blood are considered like sprinkling water, as the sacrifice is already disqualified since the earlier sprinkling of blood is invalid. Raba and Rava each provide solutions to this problem. If one had a pigul thought while bringing the kometz to the altar, is that considered half a matir, as also the frankincense needs to be brought to the altar? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree. Rabbi Yochanan views it like taking the kometz, and it is therefore considered a whole matir. He holds that bringing it to the altar is not actually a matir, but an important part of the service and therefore a pigul thought will disqualify the sacrifice even if there is a parallel action (bringing the frankincense to the altar) that is not performed with a pigul thought. Reish Lakish views it like the burning of the kometz and is only half a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rabbi Yochanan, from our Mishna and a braita, and are both resolved, and one against Reish Lakish which is left unresolved. If one burned a tiny amount with a thought to eat a tiny amount beyond its designated time, and continually does this until the whole thing is burned and the thoughts cover the whole remainder, is it pigul. Three rabbis disagree – one says it's pigul, one says it is disqualified and the third says it's permitted. At first they think they each are based on a different opinion – Rabbi Meir, the rabbis and Rebbi. But this suggestion is rejected and it is explained to be based on whether one views a burning of a tiny amount as a proper act of burning and the eating of a tiny amount as a proper act of eating.

A long mishnah - on the affect of pigul when it only affects part of the "permitter" - matirin - namely, by burning one part, the rest becomes permitted for consumption. Including a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the sages -- which leads to other areas of dispute between them. And further, a dispute between Rav and Shmuel about the dispute of Rabbi Meir and the sages. Also, the 43 (or 47 or 48) presentations of blood from the animal sacrifices of Yom Kippur. Also, a sesame seed and the smallest amount of potential pigul. Plus, a rejection of Rabbi Meir's views here.

Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether the meal offering can become pigul if the pigul thought was only during part of the permitting act (matir), such as during the burning of the kometz, but not the burning of the frankincense, or the slaughtering of one sheep of the two sheep offerings on Shavuot. Rabbi Meir holds that it is pigul, while the rabbis do not. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding this debate. Rav holds that if the first action included a pigul thought, while the second was performed in silence, it is pigul, even according to the rabbis, as the second action follows the first and is considered to have been performed with the same thought. Shmuel disagrees and holds that silence following a pigul thought does not render the item pigul according to the rabbis, who require pigul in both actions that are considered a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rav's position from two different sources from the Tosefta. The first is resolved but the second is only partially resolved, i.e., according to one position in a different debate. A question is raised on the Tosefta quoted previously. If one is not punished by karet in a case of pigul unless the rest of the sacrifice was brought properly, in the case of the sacrifice on Yom Kippur, if one had a pigul thought while sprinkling the first set of blood, but not the next, how could Rabbi Meir call this pigul as the next sets of blood are considered like sprinkling water, as the sacrifice is already disqualified since the earlier sprinkling of blood is invalid. Raba and Rava each provide solutions to this problem. If one had a pigul thought while bringing the kometz to the altar, is that considered half a matir, as also the frankincense needs to be brought to the altar? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree. Rabbi Yochanan views it like taking the kometz, and it is therefore considered a whole matir. He holds that bringing it to the altar is not actually a matir, but an important part of the service and therefore a pigul thought will disqualify the sacrifice even if there is a parallel action (bringing the frankincense to the altar) that is not performed with a pigul thought. Reish Lakish views it like the burning of the kometz and is only half a matir. Two difficulties are raised against Rabbi Yochanan, from our Mishna and a braita, and are both resolved, and one against Reish Lakish which is left unresolved. If one burned a tiny amount with a thought to eat a tiny amount beyond its designated time, and continually does this until the whole thing is burned and the thoughts cover the whole remainder, is it pigul. Three rabbis disagree – one says it's pigul, one says it is disqualified and the third says it's permitted. At first they think they each are based on a different opinion – Rabbi Meir, the rabbis and Rebbi. But this suggestion is rejected and it is explained to be based on whether one views a burning of a tiny amount as a proper act of burning and the eating of a tiny amount as a proper act of eating.

If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is effective to permit the other (pure) bread to be eaten. But if it does not atone for food items, the blood can be sprinkled, but since the bread was not complete at the time, it is forbidden to eat, as per Rabbi Yochanan's opinion in Menachot 9b. However, Rav Papa's explanation is rejected on three counts. First, Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis also disagree in a case where the item that was to be offered on the altar becomes impure. Second, Rabbi Yehuda's position by the Paschal sacrifice, as appears in the braita, demonstrates that the phrase "the communal offerings are not divided" has no connection at all to the tzitz atoning. Third, the Mishna states explicitly the reason for Rabbi Yehuda's position and it is because the communal offerings are not divided and not on account of the tzitz. In a thanksgiving (toda) offering, if there is a pigul thought about the meat, the breads are disqualified, but a pigul thought about the bread only disqualifies the bread, but not the meat. The same holds true for the two sheep regarding the accompanying breads. After attempting one explanation, which is rejected, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind the law – the bread comes on account of the animal offering, but the animal offering does not come on account of the bread. Both cases were necessary to bring, as one may have thought that the sheep and the accompanying breads are waved together and therefore might be considered completely one unit, but they are not. There are three different versions of a question Rabbi Elazar asked Rav. The first version: if one slaughters the animal for the toda offering with a thought to eat a half an olive-bulk of the meat and half an olive-bulk of the bread, do they combine to make the bread pigul? Rav answers that it is. The Gemara asks why a kal v'chomer reasoning isn't employed to lead us to say that the bread wouldn't be pigul, as it cannot even make the meat pigul. A difficulty is raised against that suggestion as in a similar situation regarding mixed breeds in a vineyard, that kind of kal v'chomer isn't used. But they distinguish between the two cases, resolving the difficulty. The second version has the same type question asked but regarding the two sheep offering and the accompanying breads. The third version of the question is about the meaning of someone's language if they slaughtered the sheep to "eat an olive-bulk of its friend tomorrow." Does "its friend" refer to the other sheep (it would not be pigul, as the sheep is a "permitter") or to the bread (it would be pigul as bread is not a "permitter")? Rav brings a tannaitic source which makes it clear that the meaning was the other sheep. The Gemara rejects this proof of Rav. What is the relationship between the sacrifice and its libations regarding pigul? Rabbi Meir holds that if the libations were already placed in a sanctified vessel and the sacrifice is brought with a pigul intent, the libations are disqualified as well. But a pigul thought regarding the libations only disqualifies the libation, not the sacrifice. In the Tosefta Zevachim 5:1, the rabbis bring counter arguments to Rabbi Meir. First, they view the libations as completely separate and do not agree with Rabbi Meir that they become disqualified if the sacrifice becomes pigul, as they can be brought up to ten days later. When Rabbi Meir qualifies his ruling to a case where the libations are brought together with the offering, the rabbis continue with another claim. Since the libations can be designated to a different sacrifice, that proves that they are not inherently connected. Rava explains that Rabbi Meir must have held that the libations cannot be designated for a different sacrifice. In the Tosefta, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree as well regarding the oil of the leper – if the guilt offering becomes pigul, does the oil become pigul as well, and the same discussion ensues.

2 mishanyot! 1 - How combinations can make items pigul or not. With the cases of the thanksgiving offering (animal offering plus loaves) and also the "Shtei HaLehem" - lambs and 2 loaves of Shavuot. Also, a long discussion about what question Rabbi Elazar asked of Rav (to determine the question itself), in terms of pigul with varied factors -- the order of events, with regard to offerings, intent, minimal measure, and so on. Plus, a mention of "cannabis" (hemp) in the context of mixtures. 2 - Pigul intent renders the libations pigul once they've been sanctified, but the libations, if brought with pigul intent, would not make the offerings themselves pigul.

If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is effective to permit the other (pure) bread to be eaten. But if it does not atone for food items, the blood can be sprinkled, but since the bread was not complete at the time, it is forbidden to eat, as per Rabbi Yochanan's opinion in Menachot 9b. However, Rav Papa's explanation is rejected on three counts. First, Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis also disagree in a case where the item that was to be offered on the altar becomes impure. Second, Rabbi Yehuda's position by the Paschal sacrifice, as appears in the braita, demonstrates that the phrase "the communal offerings are not divided" has no connection at all to the tzitz atoning. Third, the Mishna states explicitly the reason for Rabbi Yehuda's position and it is because the communal offerings are not divided and not on account of the tzitz. In a thanksgiving (toda) offering, if there is a pigul thought about the meat, the breads are disqualified, but a pigul thought about the bread only disqualifies the bread, but not the meat. The same holds true for the two sheep regarding the accompanying breads. After attempting one explanation, which is rejected, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind the law – the bread comes on account of the animal offering, but the animal offering does not come on account of the bread. Both cases were necessary to bring, as one may have thought that the sheep and the accompanying breads are waved together and therefore might be considered completely one unit, but they are not. There are three different versions of a question Rabbi Elazar asked Rav. The first version: if one slaughters the animal for the toda offering with a thought to eat a half an olive-bulk of the meat and half an olive-bulk of the bread, do they combine to make the bread pigul? Rav answers that it is. The Gemara asks why a kal v'chomer reasoning isn't employed to lead us to say that the bread wouldn't be pigul, as it cannot even make the meat pigul. A difficulty is raised against that suggestion as in a similar situation regarding mixed breeds in a vineyard, that kind of kal v'chomer isn't used. But they distinguish between the two cases, resolving the difficulty. The second version has the same type question asked but regarding the two sheep offering and the accompanying breads. The third version of the question is about the meaning of someone's language if they slaughtered the sheep to "eat an olive-bulk of its friend tomorrow." Does "its friend" refer to the other sheep (it would not be pigul, as the sheep is a "permitter") or to the bread (it would be pigul as bread is not a "permitter")? Rav brings a tannaitic source which makes it clear that the meaning was the other sheep. The Gemara rejects this proof of Rav. What is the relationship between the sacrifice and its libations regarding pigul? Rabbi Meir holds that if the libations were already placed in a sanctified vessel and the sacrifice is brought with a pigul intent, the libations are disqualified as well. But a pigul thought regarding the libations only disqualifies the libation, not the sacrifice. In the Tosefta Zevachim 5:1, the rabbis bring counter arguments to Rabbi Meir. First, they view the libations as completely separate and do not agree with Rabbi Meir that they become disqualified if the sacrifice becomes pigul, as they can be brought up to ten days later. When Rabbi Meir qualifies his ruling to a case where the libations are brought together with the offering, the rabbis continue with another claim. Since the libations can be designated to a different sacrifice, that proves that they are not inherently connected. Rava explains that Rabbi Meir must have held that the libations cannot be designated for a different sacrifice. In the Tosefta, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree as well regarding the oil of the leper – if the guilt offering becomes pigul, does the oil become pigul as well, and the same discussion ensues.

In this week's parashah, Bo, we learn about the final three makkot. Chazal tell us that a large number of Jews passed away during the makkah of Choshech. Rav Shlomo Kluger writes that the people who died in Choshech were those who did not have enough emunah to follow Hashem into the desert. They wanted the others to first go and conquer the land, and only then would they be willing to follow later. The Rav adds that all of those neshamot were destined to come back into the world in the final generation before Mashiach, and their job would be to overcome very difficult tests in the area of emunah. If they succeed, they will make their tikkun and live on for all eternity. One of the most difficult parts of emunah is when a person is harmed by another individual. The natural reaction is to think that the other person used his free will to do wrong and that it was not from Hashem, chas v'shalom. The Sefer HaChinuch, in the mitzvah of lo tikom v'lo titor, as well as other sources, teach us that even though the person who caused the harm did use his free will and is fully accountable for his actions, it was only able to happen because it was the will of Hashem for the person to be affected that way. Nothing can ever happen to a person through a baal bechirah unless Hashem wants it to happen to him first, and always for his best. The Yitev Lev writes that one of the lessons we learn from Yetziat Mitzrayim is that when a person causes harm to another, the one who received the harm must take to heart that it was Hashem who was giving life to the one who harmed him, and that person was only His messenger. The Maggid of Mezritch writes that when a person is causing harm to another and the one who is being harmed fully believes that it is only coming from Hashem and that it is for his absolute best, that belief nullifies all the judgments against him. The Passu says כִּי הִנֵּה אֹיְבֶיךָ ה', כִּי הִנֵּה אֹיְבֶיךָ יֹאבֵדוּ. The Yitev Lev explains that when a person knows that his enemies are being sent by Hashem כִּי הִנֵּה אֹיְבֶיךָ-- ה, then הִנֵּה אֹיְבֶיךָ יֹאבֵדוּ, those enemies will stop bothering him. All of the stress and heartache caused by other people is simply Hashem giving a person what he needs in order to fulfill his mission in this world. When a person fully believes that it is really Hashem and not the one who appears to be doing it, that itself can accomplish the tikkun that he needs. It is extremely hard to take the person out of the picture and honestly feel that he is not responsible for the harm. When Yosef HaTzaddik revealed himself to his brothers, he said to them, "I am Yosef, your brother, whom you sold to Egypt." The Or HaChaim HaKadosh explains that Yosef was telling them that even while they were selling him, he still felt close to them like a brother. How could Yosef possibly have felt that way? Because when Shimon and Levi were lowering him into the pit with snakes and scorpions, all he saw was Hashem in control. As he later said, "It was not you who sent me here, but only Hashem." With the proper outlook, we too can live our lives with this emunah, seeing only Hashem in everything that happens. Rabbi Menashe Reizman said to imagine how the newspaper articles would read if the Chafetz Chaim were writing them. Of course, HaKadosh Baruch Hu would be in every headline. It would say: Hashem made it that this person was attacked. Hashem made it that this person was arrested. Hashem made it that this person won the lottery. We hope that we are living in the generation of Mashiach, and if our tikkun is to pass the test of emunah, we must take this message to heart and understand that people cannot harm us or give us anything. Everything happens only by the word of Hashem, and it is always for our best. Shabbat Shalom.

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Rabbi Eliezer holds that when the Kohen accepts the blood from a sacrifice into a sanctified vessel, there must be enough collected in that single bowl to be used for placing the blood on the altar. If one collects some blood in one bowl and some in another, and later mixes them together before performing the placements, the blood is not sanctified. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Eliezer contradicts himself, as regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin), he holds that it is sanctified even if placed in two separate bowls. To resolve this, the Gemara first suggests that perhaps Rabbi Eliezer does not derive one law from another—specifically, a mincha offering from blood. However, this is rejected because Rabbi Eliezer does derive laws for a mincha from the bowls of frankincense of the Showbread. In conclusion, the Gemara distinguishes between learning a mincha offering from another mincha-style offering and learning a mincha offering from an animal sacrifice (blood). Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin and rules that it is not sanctified if placed in the vessel in parts. Rabbi Acha brings the source in the Torah for his prohibition, and the Gemara brings two braitot that support his opinion and contradict Rabbi Elazar's position. Rabbi Yochanan's position regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin) is questioned in light of a position he holds against Rav in a case of a regular mincha offering that is sanctified even before the person completely filled the vessel with the fine flour. Why does he differentiate between the cases? The Gemara then asks about Rav, who disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan and requires the vessel to be filled: would he hold like Rabbi Yochanan or Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin offering? They conclude that since he derives one item from another (on a different mincha-related issue), he would derive from the minchat chavitin to here, and therefore he must hold like Rabbi Yochanan by the minchat chavitin and requires it to be complete to sanctify. Since the Gemara mentions a different mincha-related issue where Rav derives one thing from another, they quote that source in its entirety and delve into his debate with Rabbi Chanina about mincha offerings where not all the parts were added yet to the bowl – are they sanctified without everything being there? At the beginning of the daf, Rabbi Elazar had made a comparison of taking the kometz from a mincha in the Sanctuary, which is permitted as it is derived from the bowls of frankincense from the Showbread. Rabbi Yirmia raises a difficulty against this from a braita, but the drasha in that braita is reinterpreted to fit with Rabbi Elazar's ruling.

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Rabbi Eliezer holds that when the Kohen accepts the blood from a sacrifice into a sanctified vessel, there must be enough collected in that single bowl to be used for placing the blood on the altar. If one collects some blood in one bowl and some in another, and later mixes them together before performing the placements, the blood is not sanctified. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Eliezer contradicts himself, as regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin), he holds that it is sanctified even if placed in two separate bowls. To resolve this, the Gemara first suggests that perhaps Rabbi Eliezer does not derive one law from another—specifically, a mincha offering from blood. However, this is rejected because Rabbi Eliezer does derive laws for a mincha from the bowls of frankincense of the Showbread. In conclusion, the Gemara distinguishes between learning a mincha offering from another mincha-style offering and learning a mincha offering from an animal sacrifice (blood). Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin and rules that it is not sanctified if placed in the vessel in parts. Rabbi Acha brings the source in the Torah for his prohibition, and the Gemara brings two braitot that support his opinion and contradict Rabbi Elazar's position. Rabbi Yochanan's position regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin) is questioned in light of a position he holds against Rav in a case of a regular mincha offering that is sanctified even before the person completely filled the vessel with the fine flour. Why does he differentiate between the cases? The Gemara then asks about Rav, who disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan and requires the vessel to be filled: would he hold like Rabbi Yochanan or Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin offering? They conclude that since he derives one item from another (on a different mincha-related issue), he would derive from the minchat chavitin to here, and therefore he must hold like Rabbi Yochanan by the minchat chavitin and requires it to be complete to sanctify. Since the Gemara mentions a different mincha-related issue where Rav derives one thing from another, they quote that source in its entirety and delve into his debate with Rabbi Chanina about mincha offerings where not all the parts were added yet to the bowl – are they sanctified without everything being there? At the beginning of the daf, Rabbi Elazar had made a comparison of taking the kometz from a mincha in the Sanctuary, which is permitted as it is derived from the bowls of frankincense from the Showbread. Rabbi Yirmia raises a difficulty against this from a braita, but the drasha in that braita is reinterpreted to fit with Rabbi Elazar's ruling.

According to Yosi ben Yasiyan and Rabbi Yehuda the Baker, ben Beteira permits returning a kometz taken in a disqualified manner to the original dough, provided it has not yet been placed in a sanctified vessel. Rav Nachman challenges this ruling: if taking the kometz is a significant ritual, the act should be irreversible; if it is not, placing it in a sanctified vessel should be meaningless. Rav Nachman resolves this by explaining that while taking the kometz is indeed a ritual act, it is not complete until the kometz is placed in the vessel. If so, the Gemara objects, returning the kometz to the original dough - which is also held in a sanctified vessel - should complete the act and permanently disqualify it. This difficulty is answered in two ways. Rabbi Yochanan answers that one can derive a principle from here: sanctified vessels only sanctify items if they are placed inside with intent to sanctify. The Gemara questions this assumption, noting that it implies one could intentionally sanctify disqualified items; yet, Rabbi Yochanan previously answered Reish Lakish that disqualified items cannot be sanctified for the altar by being placed in a sanctified vessel. This contradiction is resolved by distinguishing between sanctifying an item to permit it to be offered on the altar (which is not effective) and sanctifying an item merely to disqualify it (which is effective). Rav Amram answers the original question by qualifying the case to when the kometz is returned to a heaping bowl. As a sanctified vessel only sanctifies what is within the walls of the vessel, the kometz is not sanctified to be disqualified when placed back in the original vessel. After raising a difficulty regarding the reality of this case, his answer is partially modified to a level bowl, not heaping. Rabbi Yirmia tells Rabbi Zeira that he derives from the fact that they did not suggest returning it to the vessel when it was on the ground, that the actions of kemitza do not need to be performed while a kohen is holding the vessel in his hands. Rabbi Zeira points out that this was an issue raised by Rav Nachman to Avimi, who explained that the kohen indeed needs to be holding the vessel. Rav Sheshet disagrees, holding that the Kohen does not need to be holding the vessel for all the actions of kemitza. He derives this from the laws of the Showbread, as he understands from a Mishna that the kohanim did not hold up the Table when the Showbread and bowls of frankincense was switched at the end of each week. Rav brings a third position: The first two actions - placing the dough in the bowl and taking the kemitza - do not require the kohen to be holding the vessel, but the kometz must be placed in a vessel held by a kohen, as it is parallel to accepting the blood of a sacrifice.

According to Yosi ben Yasiyan and Rabbi Yehuda the Baker, ben Beteira permits returning a kometz taken in a disqualified manner to the original dough, provided it has not yet been placed in a sanctified vessel. Rav Nachman challenges this ruling: if taking the kometz is a significant ritual, the act should be irreversible; if it is not, placing it in a sanctified vessel should be meaningless. Rav Nachman resolves this by explaining that while taking the kometz is indeed a ritual act, it is not complete until the kometz is placed in the vessel. If so, the Gemara objects, returning the kometz to the original dough - which is also held in a sanctified vessel - should complete the act and permanently disqualify it. This difficulty is answered in two ways. Rabbi Yochanan answers that one can derive a principle from here: sanctified vessels only sanctify items if they are placed inside with intent to sanctify. The Gemara questions this assumption, noting that it implies one could intentionally sanctify disqualified items; yet, Rabbi Yochanan previously answered Reish Lakish that disqualified items cannot be sanctified for the altar by being placed in a sanctified vessel. This contradiction is resolved by distinguishing between sanctifying an item to permit it to be offered on the altar (which is not effective) and sanctifying an item merely to disqualify it (which is effective). Rav Amram answers the original question by qualifying the case to when the kometz is returned to a heaping bowl. As a sanctified vessel only sanctifies what is within the walls of the vessel, the kometz is not sanctified to be disqualified when placed back in the original vessel. After raising a difficulty regarding the reality of this case, his answer is partially modified to a level bowl, not heaping. Rabbi Yirmia tells Rabbi Zeira that he derives from the fact that they did not suggest returning it to the vessel when it was on the ground, that the actions of kemitza do not need to be performed while a kohen is holding the vessel in his hands. Rabbi Zeira points out that this was an issue raised by Rav Nachman to Avimi, who explained that the kohen indeed needs to be holding the vessel. Rav Sheshet disagrees, holding that the Kohen does not need to be holding the vessel for all the actions of kemitza. He derives this from the laws of the Showbread, as he understands from a Mishna that the kohanim did not hold up the Table when the Showbread and bowls of frankincense was switched at the end of each week. Rav brings a third position: The first two actions - placing the dough in the bowl and taking the kemitza - do not require the kohen to be holding the vessel, but the kometz must be placed in a vessel held by a kohen, as it is parallel to accepting the blood of a sacrifice.

More on learning the details of the treyfa from "min ha-bakar" - to disqualify the treyfa. How several verses work together to learn the teaching that the Gemara wants to prove. Plus, a new mishnah! With a list of ways the offering would be rendered invalid. Also, a statement from Rav that seems to contradict the statement that a non-kohen taking the fistful of the grain would render it invalid. Can this error simply be redone? That may depend on the details of the case.

Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, "If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument." As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected. Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v'chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v'chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural childbirth, one could reject that kal v'chomer as they both have a stringency that is not in a treifa as they have noticeable issues, whereas a treifa is not necessarily noticeable. The braita concluded that the source for a treifa not being able to be offered on the altar is derived from "from the cattle." However, two other verses also are used to exclude a treifa. Why are all three verses necessary? The Mishna rules that any meal offering that the kemitza is done by a non-kohen, onen, impure person, etc. (i.e. not in the proper manner), is disqualified. Ben Beteira disagrees and explains that if it was done with the left hand, one returns the kometz to the pile and redoes it with the right hand. If a kohen took the kemitza but there was something else in there like a pebble or frankincense, it is invalid as the kemitza must be a precise handful, no more and no less. The Gemara first questions the language of the Mishna – why does it list the mincha offering brought for a sin together separately from the others. The answer is that the Mishna is highlighting that even according to Rabbi Shimon who holds that a sinner's offering should not be glorious, it still needs to be done properly. Even though in Zevachim, the parallel Mishna relating to sacrifices does not single out the sin offering, the Gemara explains why there was no need there to explain it according to Rabbi Shimon, but there was a need here. Rav explains that any disqualification can be fixed by redoing it. At first, they question Rav's ruling in light of the rabbis' position in the Mishna, but then they explain that Rav holds like ben Beteira and is coming to explain that even though ben Beteira only mentioned the disqualification of the left hand in the Mishna, his ruling applies for all disqualifications. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this from tannaitic sources that show that this was clear even before Rav made his statement. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different explanation – that Rav was pointing out that ben Beteira permits it to be redone even if the kometz was placed in a sanctified vessel, which disagrees with a tannaitic opinion that it can be fixed only if it wasn't yet placed in a sanctified vessel. According to others, Rav is coming to teach the exact opposite and to show that he agrees with the tannaitic opinion that it can only be fixed if it was not yet placed in the vessel.

There are three different opinions about the status of the mincha offering of the omer that is offered for the sake of a different offering. Rav says it is completely disqualified, Reish Lakish holds it is valid, but the obligation to bring the mincha is not fulfilled and a new one must be brought, and Rava holds that it is valid and the obligation is fulfilled. Rav added another disqualified case to the list – a guilt offering of the nazir and leper. After a discussion about why he would distinguish between that guilt offering and a guilt offering for theft or misuse of consecrated property, the Gemara brings a braita that clearly contradicts Rav as it says explicitly that a guilt offering of a leper offered for the sake of the wrong sacrifice is brought on the altar. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position. If the omer offering that is brought for the sake of the wrong offering does not fulfill its obligation, how can it be offered on the altar as one can only offer on the altar items that can be eaten by Jews and this is an offering from the chadash (new grain) and the chadash is only permitted with the omer offering. Two answers are brought to resolve this difficulty. The first answer is brought by Rav Ada bar Ahava who suggests that since it will be permitted later that day, when the omer offering is brought correctly, it is not considered a forbidden item. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Ada, two are resolved but the last one is not. Rav Papa offers an alternative answer – that the actual omer offering does not permit the chadash, but the illumination of the eastern horizon on that day permits it (16th of Nisan). This suggestion of Rav Papa is further supported by claiming that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish both agreed that the chadash is permitted from that time and not from the offering of the omer, as is derived from a statement of Reish Lakish. A braita teaches that one can derive from a verse "from the cattle" that a treifa cannot be brought on the altar. However, the braita suggests that it could have been derived by a kal v'chomer, but since one can raise a difficulty against that kal v'chomer, it is derived from a verse. However, it is unclear what the difficulty could have been and the Gemara brings several possible suggestions. But difficulties are raised against each of them.

There are three different opinions about the status of the mincha offering of the omer that is offered for the sake of a different offering. Rav says it is completely disqualified, Reish Lakish holds it is valid, but the obligation to bring the mincha is not fulfilled and a new one must be brought, and Rava holds that it is valid and the obligation is fulfilled. Rav added another disqualified case to the list – a guilt offering of the nazir and leper. After a discussion about why he would distinguish between that guilt offering and a guilt offering for theft or misuse of consecrated property, the Gemara brings a braita that clearly contradicts Rav as it says explicitly that a guilt offering of a leper offered for the sake of the wrong sacrifice is brought on the altar. A difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's position. If the omer offering that is brought for the sake of the wrong offering does not fulfill its obligation, how can it be offered on the altar as one can only offer on the altar items that can be eaten by Jews and this is an offering from the chadash (new grain) and the chadash is only permitted with the omer offering. Two answers are brought to resolve this difficulty. The first answer is brought by Rav Ada bar Ahava who suggests that since it will be permitted later that day, when the omer offering is brought correctly, it is not considered a forbidden item. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Ada, two are resolved but the last one is not. Rav Papa offers an alternative answer – that the actual omer offering does not permit the chadash, but the illumination of the eastern horizon on that day permits it (16th of Nisan). This suggestion of Rav Papa is further supported by claiming that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish both agreed that the chadash is permitted from that time and not from the offering of the omer, as is derived from a statement of Reish Lakish. A braita teaches that one can derive from a verse "from the cattle" that a treifa cannot be brought on the altar. However, the braita suggests that it could have been derived by a kal v'chomer, but since one can raise a difficulty against that kal v'chomer, it is derived from a verse. However, it is unclear what the difficulty could have been and the Gemara brings several possible suggestions. But difficulties are raised against each of them.

Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, "If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument." As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected. Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v'chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v'chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural childbirth, one could reject that kal v'chomer as they both have a stringency that is not in a treifa as they have noticeable issues, whereas a treifa is not necessarily noticeable. The braita concluded that the source for a treifa not being able to be offered on the altar is derived from "from the cattle." However, two other verses also are used to exclude a treifa. Why are all three verses necessary? The Mishna rules that any meal offering that the kemitza is done by a non-kohen, onen, impure person, etc. (i.e. not in the proper manner), is disqualified. Ben Beteira disagrees and explains that if it was done with the left hand, one returns the kometz to the pile and redoes it with the right hand. If a kohen took the kemitza but there was something else in there like a pebble or frankincense, it is invalid as the kemitza must be a precise handful, no more and no less. The Gemara first questions the language of the Mishna – why does it list the mincha offering brought for a sin together separately from the others. The answer is that the Mishna is highlighting that even according to Rabbi Shimon who holds that a sinner's offering should not be glorious, it still needs to be done properly. Even though in Zevachim, the parallel Mishna relating to sacrifices does not single out the sin offering, the Gemara explains why there was no need there to explain it according to Rabbi Shimon, but there was a need here. Rav explains that any disqualification can be fixed by redoing it. At first, they question Rav's ruling in light of the rabbis' position in the Mishna, but then they explain that Rav holds like ben Beteira and is coming to explain that even though ben Beteira only mentioned the disqualification of the left hand in the Mishna, his ruling applies for all disqualifications. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this from tannaitic sources that show that this was clear even before Rav made his statement. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different explanation – that Rav was pointing out that ben Beteira permits it to be redone even if the kometz was placed in a sanctified vessel, which disagrees with a tannaitic opinion that it can be fixed only if it wasn't yet placed in a sanctified vessel. According to others, Rav is coming to teach the exact opposite and to show that he agrees with the tannaitic opinion that it can only be fixed if it was not yet placed in the vessel.

What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon's words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon's position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their obligation): the sinner's meal offering (minchat choteh) and the jealousy offering  of a Sotah (minchat kenaot) are completely disqualified if perfomed for the wrong purpose (shelo lishmah). What is the source for this? The Gemara initially presents a derivation for each of them from the sin offering (chatat), but after rejecting these derivations due to a difficulty regarding the guilt offering (asham), it brings a different exposition based on a gezeirah shava (verbal analogy) to both of these meal offerings. Rav adds the Omer meal offering to this list, stating that if it was performed for the wrong purpose, it is disqualified because it is intended to permit the consumption of the "new grain" (chadash), and if brought for the wrong purpose, it fails to permit it and is useless. He says the same regarding the nazirite's guilt offering (asham nazir) and the leper's guilt offering (asham metzora). If so, why are this meal offering and these sacrifices not mentioned in the Mishnayot in Menachot and Zevachim that list those disqualified if they were brought for the wrong purpose? The Gemara answers this question and settles the difficulty. The Gemara further challenges Rav: if the asham nazir and asham metzora are meant to "enable" (le'hachshir) a status change and fail to do so when brought for the wrong purpose, then the guilt offering for misappropriation (asham me'ilot) and the guilt offering for theft (asham gezeilot) - which are meant to "atone" (le'chaper) - likewise fail to atone; why then are they valid if brought for the wrong purpose? Rabbi Yirmiya makes a distinction between offerings that "enable" status (machshirim) and those that "atone" (mechaperim). He brings proof from the laws of sacrifices brought after the death of the owner, specifically citing a Mishna regarding a woman after childbirth (yoledet). Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, challenges this distinction (regarding the laws after death) from a Mishna in Nazir, where an enabling sacrifice is indeed brought after death.  

What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon's words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon's position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their obligation): the sinner's meal offering (minchat choteh) and the jealousy offering  of a Sotah (minchat kenaot) are completely disqualified if perfomed for the wrong purpose (shelo lishmah). What is the source for this? The Gemara initially presents a derivation for each of them from the sin offering (chatat), but after rejecting these derivations due to a difficulty regarding the guilt offering (asham), it brings a different exposition based on a gezeirah shava (verbal analogy) to both of these meal offerings. Rav adds the Omer meal offering to this list, stating that if it was performed for the wrong purpose, it is disqualified because it is intended to permit the consumption of the "new grain" (chadash), and if brought for the wrong purpose, it fails to permit it and is useless. He says the same regarding the nazirite's guilt offering (asham nazir) and the leper's guilt offering (asham metzora). If so, why are this meal offering and these sacrifices not mentioned in the Mishnayot in Menachot and Zevachim that list those disqualified if they were brought for the wrong purpose? The Gemara answers this question and settles the difficulty. The Gemara further challenges Rav: if the asham nazir and asham metzora are meant to "enable" (le'hachshir) a status change and fail to do so when brought for the wrong purpose, then the guilt offering for misappropriation (asham me'ilot) and the guilt offering for theft (asham gezeilot) - which are meant to "atone" (le'chaper) - likewise fail to atone; why then are they valid if brought for the wrong purpose? Rabbi Yirmiya makes a distinction between offerings that "enable" status (machshirim) and those that "atone" (mechaperim). He brings proof from the laws of sacrifices brought after the death of the owner, specifically citing a Mishna regarding a woman after childbirth (yoledet). Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, challenges this distinction (regarding the laws after death) from a Mishna in Nazir, where an enabling sacrifice is indeed brought after death.  

How we know 57 years of ohel moed in Nov and givon,what's Menucha and nachla,and Rav kahanas halacha that shas heter mikadesh and hala chayav kares

  Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however, the Gemara distinguishes between the two cases and rejects the comparison. Another discussion concerns a sacrifice slaughtered at night on a private altar. Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether such an offering is valid. Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan also dispute whether burnt offerings brought on private altars require hefshet and nituach - flaying and cutting into pieces - just as they do on the public altar. Although private altars operate with fewer restrictions, several laws apply equally to both private and public offerings. A braita entertains the possibility that time‑based limitations might not apply to private‑altar sacrifices, just as spatial limitations do not. However, a verse is cited to demonstrate that time restrictions indeed remain binding even for offerings brought on private altars.

  Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however, the Gemara distinguishes between the two cases and rejects the comparison. Another discussion concerns a sacrifice slaughtered at night on a private altar. Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether such an offering is valid. Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan also dispute whether burnt offerings brought on private altars require hefshet and nituach - flaying and cutting into pieces - just as they do on the public altar. Although private altars operate with fewer restrictions, several laws apply equally to both private and public offerings. A braita entertains the possibility that time‑based limitations might not apply to private‑altar sacrifices, just as spatial limitations do not. However, a verse is cited to demonstrate that time restrictions indeed remain binding even for offerings brought on private altars.

Episode 180 December 18, 2025 On the Needles 1:14 ALL KNITTING LINKS GO TO RAVELRY UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.  Please visit our Instagram page @craftcookreadrepeat for non-Rav photos and info     Succulents 2025 Blanket CAL by Mallory Krall, Hue Loco DK in Hens & Chicks– DONE!! And started joining!    Tentacula Cowl by Jenny Noto, Jems Luxe Fibers Monstrous Minis in Scylla    Gnandad's Grand Adventure by Sarah Schira, Little Squirrel Yarn Oak Sock in Gnandad's Adventure (skis!)   Gnot Just Another Gnome by Sarah Schira, KnitPicks Stroll Fingering in Hollyberry, KnitCircus Opulence in Badger Tracks Stripes, Sanguine Gryphon Skinny Bugga in Blue Emperor Dragonfly   Avena by Jennifer Steingass, Yarnaceous Fibers Brontosaurus DK in Starbies and Cup of Cheer minis On the Easel 8:27 Studio cleaning Making plans for 2026 Maybe a 100-Day project focusing on composition On the Table 11:56   Merry Chrunchmas Wrap from Washington Post   From Linger by Hetty Liu McKinnon Sweet, Sour and Spicy Mushrooms with Brown Rice Herby Roasted Cinnamon Delicata Squash and Quinoa   Sweet potato with seasoned ground turkey + lime/yogurt crema   Corzetti afternoon tea (Instagram post) On the Nightstand 23:21 We are now a Bookshop.org affiliate!  You can visit our shop to find books we've talked about or click on the links below.  The books are supplied by local independent bookstores and a percentage goes to us at no cost to you!   Noel Nook:  Blackmail & Bibingka by Mia P. Manansala Duke, Actually by Jenny Holiday Mistletoe Motive by Chloe Liese Grace and Henry's Holiday Movie Marathon by Matthew Norman    Smoke and Whispers by Mick Herron (audio) Clown Town by Mick Herron (slow horses 9) The Everlasting by Alix E. Harrow  The Mistletoe Mystery by Nita Prose This is Happiness by Niall Williams

President Trump stunned the world over the weekend with a daring raid that captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro without a single American casualty. It was an impressive victory, but how can the Administration translate into a long-term MAGA political win? Rep. Andy Biggs discusses that along with his continuing run for Arizona governor, and RAV's David Zere gives an update from the courthouse where Maduro is facing charges. Watch every episode ad-free on members.charliekirk.com! Get new merch at charliekirkstore.com!Support the show: http://www.charliekirk.com/supportSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

President Trump stunned the world over the weekend with a daring raid that captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro without a single American casualty. It was an impressive victory, but how can the Administration translate into a long-term MAGA political win? Rep. Andy Biggs discusses that along with his continuing run for Arizona governor, and RAV's David Zere gives an update from the courthouse where Maduro is facing charges. Watch every episode ad-free on members.charliekirk.com! Get new merch at charliekirkstore.com!Support the show: http://www.charliekirk.com/supportSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Study Guide A third answer is introduced to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Elazar's ruling in the Mishna concerning the incense and Rav's statement about Rabbi Elazar's position in a braita. The second answer,Abaye's, had been rejected earlier, but Rav Ashi reinstates it by resolving the difficulty raised against it. The Gemara asks: If part of a sacrificial item is missing after it has already been taken out of the Temple courtyard, is one liable for offering the remainder outside? Three sources are brought to address this question, but each is ultimately rejected. If the fatty portions of a peace offering are burned outside together with the meat, one is liable, even though the meat should theoretically constitute a barrier (chatzitza). The Gemara offers three explanations for why it is not considered a chatzitza in this case. If the kometz was never taken from a meal offering, one is not liable for offering the entire mixture outside, since such an act would not fulfill the mitzvah of offering a mincha even inside the Temple. However, if the kometz was taken and then returned to the rest of the mincha, one would be liable for burning the entire mixture outside. The Gemara asks: why is the kometz not nullified in the remainder? A meal offering is brought through the burning of both the kometz and the frankincense. If only one of these is burned outside, the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar again disagree about liability, since the act is only partial. Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha asks whether burning the kometz permits half of the remainder to be eaten by the priest, or whether it merely weakens the prohibition on the remainder. The Gemara first analyzes according to whose view the question is posed, and then leaves the matter unresolved. One who sprinkles part of the blood outside is liable, even according to Rabbi Elazar, consistent with his position regarding the Yom Kippur goat in a case where the blood spills midway through the sprinklings of blood. Rabbi Elazar also rules that one who pours the water libation outside the Temple on Sukkot is liable. Rabbi Yochanan cites Rabbi Menachem Yodafa, who explains that Rabbi Elazar must follow the view of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the water libation on Sukkot is a Torah obligation derived from the laws of wine libations. However, Reish Lakish raises three objections to this explanation.

Study Guide A third answer is introduced to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Elazar's ruling in the Mishna concerning the incense and Rav's statement about Rabbi Elazar's position in a braita. The second answer,Abaye's, had been rejected earlier, but Rav Ashi reinstates it by resolving the difficulty raised against it. The Gemara asks: If part of a sacrificial item is missing after it has already been taken out of the Temple courtyard, is one liable for offering the remainder outside? Three sources are brought to address this question, but each is ultimately rejected. If the fatty portions of a peace offering are burned outside together with the meat, one is liable, even though the meat should theoretically constitute a barrier (chatzitza). The Gemara offers three explanations for why it is not considered a chatzitza in this case. If the kometz was never taken from a meal offering, one is not liable for offering the entire mixture outside, since such an act would not fulfill the mitzvah of offering a mincha even inside the Temple. However, if the kometz was taken and then returned to the rest of the mincha, one would be liable for burning the entire mixture outside. The Gemara asks: why is the kometz not nullified in the remainder? A meal offering is brought through the burning of both the kometz and the frankincense. If only one of these is burned outside, the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar again disagree about liability, since the act is only partial. Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha asks whether burning the kometz permits half of the remainder to be eaten by the priest, or whether it merely weakens the prohibition on the remainder. The Gemara first analyzes according to whose view the question is posed, and then leaves the matter unresolved. One who sprinkles part of the blood outside is liable, even according to Rabbi Elazar, consistent with his position regarding the Yom Kippur goat in a case where the blood spills midway through the sprinklings of blood. Rabbi Elazar also rules that one who pours the water libation outside the Temple on Sukkot is liable. Rabbi Yochanan cites Rabbi Menachem Yodafa, who explains that Rabbi Elazar must follow the view of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the water libation on Sukkot is a Torah obligation derived from the laws of wine libations. However, Reish Lakish raises three objections to this explanation.

It is forbidden to offer any sacrificial item outside the Azara. This prohibition applies both to valid offerings and to offerings that became invalid in the kodesh—meaning either after they were brought into the Azara or after they were slaughtered. A braita derives the various valid and invalid items for which one is liable if offered outside the Azara from derashot on the verses in Vayikra 19:8–9. The Mishna rules that if one offers outside the Temple an olive‑bulk composed of a combination of meat and imurim (the fatty portions burned on the altar) of a burnt offering, one is liable. This implies that in the case of a peace offering, the two would not combine, since the meat is designated for consumption while the imurim are designated for burning. Although this inference is supported by Tosefta Meila 1:15, that Tosefta appears to contradict a Mishna in Meila 15b. The Tosefta states that in a burnt offering, the meat and imurim combine for pigul, notar, and impurity, whereas the Mishna states that they combine for pigul and notar in all types of offerings, not only burnt offerings. The Gemara resolves these contradictions by explaining that the terms pigul and notar refer to different cases in each source. The distinction regarding pigul is between (1) eating pigul and (2) having a pigul thought concerning eating or burning the combined olive‑bulk. The distinction regarding notar is between (1) eating leftover meat and imurim after their designated time and (2) a case where parts of an animal (a combined olive‑bulk of meat and imurim) remained from an animal that had been lost before the blood was sprinkled. Since in a peace offering the meat and imurim are destined for different places - human consumption and the altar - they cannot combine in situations where the law depends on their being in the same place (such as pigul thought or leftover parts from before the sprinkling of the blood). However, they can combine in a case involving the eating of disqualified parts. This interpretation of the Tosefta aligns with the view of Rabbi Yehoshua, who discusses a case in which only an olive‑bulk of the animal remains before the sprinkling of the blood. Items that are entirely burned on the altar - such as the kometz, frankincense, the mincha of the priests, and similar offerings - also incur liability if offered outside. However, there is a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar regarding whether liability applies for offering merely an olive‑bulk or only when the entire item is burned outside. A braita is then cited concerning the requisite amounts for liability when offering a incense outside and for burning incense inside. Initially, a question is raised about the incense and the meaning of the braita. After Rabbi Zeira resolves the question, he raises a further difficulty based on a statement of Rav regarding Rabbi Elazar's opinion about the required amount for liability when offering incense outside the Temple. Rava and Abaye each propose solutions, but both are ultimately rejected.

It is forbidden to offer any sacrificial item outside the Azara. This prohibition applies both to valid offerings and to offerings that became invalid in the kodesh—meaning either after they were brought into the Azara or after they were slaughtered. A braita derives the various valid and invalid items for which one is liable if offered outside the Azara from derashot on the verses in Vayikra 19:8–9. The Mishna rules that if one offers outside the Temple an olive‑bulk composed of a combination of meat and imurim (the fatty portions burned on the altar) of a burnt offering, one is liable. This implies that in the case of a peace offering, the two would not combine, since the meat is designated for consumption while the imurim are designated for burning. Although this inference is supported by Tosefta Meila 1:15, that Tosefta appears to contradict a Mishna in Meila 15b. The Tosefta states that in a burnt offering, the meat and imurim combine for pigul, notar, and impurity, whereas the Mishna states that they combine for pigul and notar in all types of offerings, not only burnt offerings. The Gemara resolves these contradictions by explaining that the terms pigul and notar refer to different cases in each source. The distinction regarding pigul is between (1) eating pigul and (2) having a pigul thought concerning eating or burning the combined olive‑bulk. The distinction regarding notar is between (1) eating leftover meat and imurim after their designated time and (2) a case where parts of an animal (a combined olive‑bulk of meat and imurim) remained from an animal that had been lost before the blood was sprinkled. Since in a peace offering the meat and imurim are destined for different places - human consumption and the altar - they cannot combine in situations where the law depends on their being in the same place (such as pigul thought or leftover parts from before the sprinkling of the blood). However, they can combine in a case involving the eating of disqualified parts. This interpretation of the Tosefta aligns with the view of Rabbi Yehoshua, who discusses a case in which only an olive‑bulk of the animal remains before the sprinkling of the blood. Items that are entirely burned on the altar - such as the kometz, frankincense, the mincha of the priests, and similar offerings - also incur liability if offered outside. However, there is a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar regarding whether liability applies for offering merely an olive‑bulk or only when the entire item is burned outside. A braita is then cited concerning the requisite amounts for liability when offering a incense outside and for burning incense inside. Initially, a question is raised about the incense and the meaning of the braita. After Rabbi Zeira resolves the question, he raises a further difficulty based on a statement of Rav regarding Rabbi Elazar's opinion about the required amount for liability when offering incense outside the Temple. Rava and Abaye each propose solutions, but both are ultimately rejected.

In this episode of Inside ArtScroll, Rabbi Shlomo Landau sits down with writer and journalist Gedalia Guttentag to discuss his newly released biography, Rav Simcha Kook. Drawing on years of research and personal encounters, Gedalia introduces listeners to the remarkable life and leadership of Rav Simcha Kook, the revered Rav of Rechovot, whose warmth, wisdom, and clarity left an indelible mark on Israeli society. The conversation explores what made Rav Simcha Kook such a beloved figure across communities — his deep love of every Jewish soul, his quiet courage, and his unwavering commitment to Torah ideals expressed with humanity and grace. As Gedalia shares stories and insights from the book, this episode offers a meaningful window into a towering Torah personality and the values that continue to inspire long after his passing.

Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute. One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af,  anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this by saying that Moshe slapped Pharaoh in the face. This explanation is challenged by another statement of Reish Lakish, in which he says that Moshe showed respect toward Pharaoh. Two answers are offered to reconcile these conflicting statements. Two verses are then brought to support the principle that one must show respect to a king, even a wicked king, one verse concerning Pharaoh and another concerning Ahab. Earlier, a source had referred to Moshe as a king. However, Ulla stated that Moshe desired to be king but was not granted that status. Rava resolves this by qualifying Ulla's statement: Moshe wished for his sons to inherit kingship, and that request was denied, but Moshe himself was indeed considered a king. The Gemara then asks: from where do we derive that kohanim with any type of blemish are entitled to receive portions of the priestly gifts? Four braitot are cited, each offering a drasha that builds upon the previous one. The Mishna states that those who cannot serve in the Temple do not receive a portion, which seems to contradict the ruling regarding blemished kohanim. Furthermore, the implication that those who do serve may eat is difficult in the case of impure kohanim during communal offerings, where they may serve, yet do not receive a portion. The Gemara explains how this contradiction is resolved. Rav relates that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon was once in the bathroom and devised various arguments that a tevul yom might use to claim a share of sacrificial portions. Yet for every argument he proposed, a pure kohen could cite a verse proving that a tevul yom is excluded, since he cannot perform the Temple service. The Gemara then asks: how was Rabbi Elazar able to think Torah thoughts in the bathroom, something that is normally forbidden?  

Study Guide There is a dispute between Rabbi Nechemia and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding the reason Aaron burned the sin‑offering goat on the eighth day of the inauguration (miluim). Rabbi Nehemiah holds that the reason was aninut (the status of a mourner on the day of death), whereas Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda argue that the goat was burned because it had become impure. They raise three objections to Rabbi Nechemia's position - how can these objections be resolved, and how does each of them interpret the verses in the passage? When did Pinchas become a kohen? According to Rav, Moshe served as the kohen gadol. The Gemara raises objections to his statement.

In this conversation, Rav and Loch Kelly explore the intersection of mindfulness and psychotherapy. They discuss practical steps for experiencing non-duality, the importance of integrating mindfulness with psychotherapy, and the role of agency and free will in personal development. Loch shares his personal journey into meditation and psychotherapy, highlighting the significance of understanding consciousness and the “true self.” The conversation emphasizes the need for a balanced approach to healing and enjoyment in life, and how different meditation methods can lead to various experiences. The discussion emphasizes the significance of living awake in the world, integrating spiritual practices into daily life, and making wise decisions from a place of authenticity and trust.Apple linkSpotify linkYouTube link(Available on all other podcast platforms too)Timestamps:00:00 – Intro00:59 – Who Is Loch Kelly?06:05 – How Meditation And Therapy Differ10:30 – Discovering Awareness Through Sport14:20 – Losing A Parent And Opening Up18:10 – Psychedelics And Consciousness Explained26:30 – Why Spiritual Bypass Causes Problems34:10 – When Meditation Fails Emotionally41:16 – Agency Free Will And Mental Health57:50 – What Is ‘The Self' In IFS01:23:00 – Noticing The Anxious Part01:27:30 – The Root Of Dissatisfaction01:36:30 – A Meditation01:48:30 – Why Pure Awareness Is Not Enough02:03:47 – Making Wise Decisions From The SelfI highly recommend you download Loch Kelly's ‘Mindful Glimpses' App here:https://lochkelly.org/mindful-glimpsesSupport The Illusion of Consensus!The Illusion of Consensus is a fully reader-supported publication. If you support the high-quality mental health and wellness journalism on this site, consider becoming a paid or founding member to receive exclusive articles, early-access episodes, and ask questions for future episodes. Or support The Illusion of Consensus with a one-time donation. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.illusionconsensus.com/subscribe

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita, urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva (rok tafel). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa, whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip (kutach). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.