Podcasts about tosefta

For centuries, supersessionist assumptions in higher education led generations of academics to assume that Jesus came to abolish the Mosaic Law. Today, a new generation of professors and researchers is producing rigorous, meticulously cited work arguing for a different perspective—that Jesus kept the Torah, valued the Torah, and instructed his disciples to keep the Torah and keep practicing Judaism. We're joined today by Dr. Logan Williams and Dr. Paul Sloan, who have recently inaugurated a podcast of their own, called Jesus and Jewish Law, where they demonstrate how their research has led them to this pro-Torah view of Jesus. — Takeaways — ► Jesus' relationship to the Torah is a complex issue with varied interpretations. The traditional view that Jesus came to abolish the law is being challenged by a new generation of scholars who argue that Jesus was Torah-observant. ► Studying ancient Jewish sources like the Mishnah and Tosefta is important to properly understand the legal and cultural debates in Jesus' time. Misunderstandings arise from a lack of familiarity with these sources and the nuances of Jewish law. ► A Torah-observant view of Jesus can have a transformative impact on Christian faith and practice. The Torah contains life-giving principles . They believe that understanding Jesus within his Jewish context can help to overcome negative stereotypes about Jewish law and enrich Christian spirituality. — Chapters — (00:00) Meet Our Guests (01:52) Diverse Perspectives in Academia on Jesus and Jewish Law (07:41) Jesus and Jewish Law Podcast Perspective Summary (16:36) Personal Journeys into Biblical Studies (30:36) Using Rabbinic Literature in Academic Contexts (39:58) New Testament as Jewish Literature (42:23) Healing on the Sabbath: Jesus' Perspective (44:51) Experiencing the Commandments as Life (01:03:36) Upcoming Books and Research — Resources — Jesus and Jewish Law Podcast on Apple Podcast Jesus and the Law of Moses: The Gospels and the Restoration of Israel within First-Century Judaism by Paul T. Sloan Jesus and the forces of Death: The Gospels' Portrayal of Ritual Impurity within First-Century Judaism by Matthew Thiessen

Welcome to our special Shovavim series on Humility. We are continuing with lessons from Rabbi Ades on humility: Rabbi Yehezkiel Abramsky was exiled to Siberia for a year and a half. All he did all day was chop wood in the forest in frigid weather. His hands were cracked and bleeding. One morning after saying Modeh Ani , which is a Thank You to Hashem for getting up, he asked himself, " Why am I saying thank you for getting up? What am I getting up for? I don't pray. I don't learn. I can't serve Hashem. "And he came up with the answer that, " I'm saying, thank you for being able to say, Modeh Ani ." Unbelievable. When Rav Shach eulogized Rav Abramsky, he said, " I'm jealous of you. Not because the books you wrote (Rav Abramsky wrote 24 volumes of commentary on the Tosefta), and because f your learning. I'm jealous of your years of Siberia." Rabbi Ades asked, What is going on? You're jealous of his years in Siberia? And he explained, Man's goal ultimate goal in this world is to connect Hashem. And a person cannot connect himself to Hashem until he nullifies himself before Hashem's will. The first step to that is to humble oneself in front of his Creator, and realize I'm a mortal, created by Hashem and I have to accept His yoke. Reaching this level is extremely difficult but Rav Shach was convinced that the year and a half in Siberia did that for Rav Abramsky. But he stresses, You don't have to go to Siberia . People have challenging situations, when life is not going the way we'd like it to go. For example, if a person has a mono- type of virus, he's in bed for a month and it seems like it'll be another month until he recuperates. Let's say this is a learning man. He gets frustrated by his inability to learn and serve Hashem. He says, What does Hashem want from me? You know what Hashem wants from you? He wants you to have Mono. What should I do ? Do what people with Mono do. Lie in bed and do nothing. What about all the Torah and Mitzvot I should be doing? You decided you should be learning and praying and functioning. That's your opinion. Hashem thinks otherwise. He says that it's a expression of arrogance to say, I think I know what I should be doing, and how I should serve Hashem and how I can bring him pleasure. Wrong. Hashem knows what He wants from you and needs from you in the situation that you're in, but your arrogance doesn't let you accept it. That arrogance actually ends up causing the person to feel down and depressed because their first reaction is to feel worthless, like they have no purpose, and that Hashem doesn't love them. But if you peel away a little of the arrogance and say, " I know I don't understand this, but I know it's all planned by Hashem, and there's a reason for it , and Hashem knows the reason, and probably the reason is for me to be able to say, Hey, I don't get it," that's humility. But our Gaava decides what we think Hashem should give us. And when I don't get it, I decide that Hashem doesn't love me. One of the great Hasidic Rebbes was once asked, " If you were Hashem, what would you do differently? What would you change in the world?" Personally, I think the first thing I would do is let all the hostages out. That's a good thing to do. After letting all hostages out, I would probably destroy Hamas. I would probably also eliminate the burden of the tuition crisis. And solve the shidduch crisis. I have a long list of things that I would do if I was in that position. But the great Hasidic Rebbi answered, " You know what I would do? I wouldn't change a thing. Because whatever God is doing, He knows what He is doing." When we start things to change, it means we think we know how the world should be run. Again, we go back to, So then why do I pray? Well, I pray for a very good reason. I pray because the prayer in itself is humbling. Because prayer says, I'm asking Hashem, I'm not in control. You please do what You can do for me. There's a beautiful thought in Midrash Rabba in Shemot 21:5 which says when the Jewish people left Egypt, Hashem sent the Egyptians after them and they were stuck and they cried out to Hashem. Why did Hashem do this? And it says, because Hashem wants to hear the praises of the sadikim. What does that mean? Rav Yehuda Ben Levi brings a mashal of a king on the road when a princess was screaming out, " Help ! Save me from these thieves. " The king heard her cries and saved her. And after a while they got married, and sometime into the marriage they weren't on speaking terms. He wanted her to talk to him but she didn't want to. So he sent thieves out against her. And again she cried out. The king went and saved her, and the king said to her, " That's what I wanted. I wanted to hear your voice." The Jewish people in Mitzrayim were being subjugated. They were crying out Hashem. They were looking up to Hashem, as it says, " ויצעקו and they cried out Hashem saw their problem and started to take them out with the strong hand and the outstretched arm." He wanted to hear their voice again and they didn't want to, so He sent Paroah to chase after them. And they cried out. Hashem said, that's what I wanted. I wanted to hear your voice. Like it says יונתי בחגוי הסלע השמיעני קול אינו אומר אלא השמיעני את קולך אותו הקול שכבר My dove was in the cleft of the rock. I want to hear the voice -the voice that I heard in Mitzrayim. And then they cried out and that was it. Hashem told Moshe, What are you praying for? I already heard their cries . What does it mean that I want to hear, not the voice but that voice? There's a difference between how you pray when everything's fine and how you pray when you're in trouble. And that is what was going on in Mitzrayim. At first they were crying out from the bottom of their hearts. But then they started to look at things differently. And that was a problem. So when it says that Hashem wants the prayers of the sadikim , it means He wants that connection from us. And He doesn't want it to be the everything's fine type of lukewarm prayer. He wants the prayer of connection . The Sefer Imre Menachem says the prayer of connection means the humble prayer. Going back to what we started with, about Why do we pray if everything is good, why are we praying for it to change? The answer is Yes, it's good and it's wonderful because it's doing what it needs to do right now. But if I could accomplish that without needing the difficulty , I'd like to get there. There is a famous saying, in the name of the Chafetz Chaim: A person is allowed to say about an event that it's bitter, because a medicine that's good for a person is bitter. But you can't say that it's bad because everything Hashem does is good. So it's good. It's bitter and it's good. But what if I don't want it to be bitter anymore? Do how do I get rid of the bitter? The bitterness is necessary to humble us. In another story, the Chafetz Chaim was talking to a certain person who had a job. The Chafetz Chaim asked how he was doing and the man answered, " A few extra dollars wouldn't hurt." The Chafetz Chaim said, " Of course it would hurt. Hashem is merciful and kind. He wants to do what's best for you. And if He gave you what He gave you, that's good." In yet another story the Chafetz Chaim once asked someone, " How are things going?" And the person replied, " Things could be better." Thr Chafetz Chaim's answer was, "If it could be better, it would be better." The Ramchal writes somewhere in his Otzrot " Whatever was done, it can't be better than that." What do you mean that it can't be better than that? This life is difficult. It can't be better because right now you need that dose. It's like saying life would be better without aspirin. But you need it. This is your aspirin, this is your medicine. This is your healing process. But once I get the message of it, I don't need it anymore. That's the answer to understanding this seeming dichotomy.

Today's daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein in loving memory of her father, Cantor Yoel ben Meir Fromm. "A lone survivor who served his kehilla in Canada devotedly. His advice to me, spiced with midrashim, encouraged my learning and independent thinking. My grandchildren are his legacy. I miss his nigunim and stories. He was my guiding light." Abaye proposes a kal v'chomer argument regarding someone sentenced to death who is working in the Temple: if he is engaged in communal sacrifices, he should not be taken for execution. He interprets the verse, "From my altar you will be taken to be killed" (Shmot 21:14) as referring only to individual sacrifices. Rava challenges this interpretation, noting that since some authorities permit individual offerings on Yom Tov, one cannot differentiate between communal and individual sacrifices on this basis, as both override Shabbat/Yom Tov while execution does not. According to that opinion, accepting Abaye's kal v'chomer would render the verse meaningless, as execution would never override Temple service. Rava therefore concludes that court-ordered execution takes precedence over all Temple service. In Rabbi Yehuda haNasi's court, Rav would speak first in monetary cases, despite the rule that the most senior judge should begin deliberations. Rava's son explains that this exception was due to Rabbi Yehuda haNasi's unique status - from Moshe until his time, no one matched his combined greatness in both political leadership and Torah scholarship. While the Gemara suggests other potential candidates from this period, each is dismissed because they had contemporaries of equal stature. Rav Ada bar Ahava notes that this singular combination of political and Torah leadership remained unmatched from Rabbi Yehuda haNasi until Rav Ashi. The Gemara brings two verses supporting the Mishna's requirement that in capital cases, deliberations begin with the junior judge. It then addresses Rav's ruling that a teacher can instruct his student about a case and later both can serve as judges. This seems to conflict with Tosefta Sanhedrin 7:2, which states that in capital cases, a teacher-student pair counts as one vote since the student's opinion is influenced by the teacher. The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between different types of teacher-student relationships. Rabbi Abahu rules that while a case of an ox that killed a person requires twenty-three judges, other aspects follow monetary rather than capital case procedures. He references ten differences between monetary and capital cases in the Mishna, though the Gemara initially counts only nine, resolving the discrepancy by citing an additional difference from the Tosefta. The Gemara then examines why converts and mamzerim are disqualified from judging capital cases, questioning why each disqualification requires its own derivation. It also explores the source for disqualifying witnesses based on lineage.  The semicircular arrangement of the twenty-three-judge Sanhedrin enabled all judges to see each other and the witnesses. How many scribes were there to record the judges' opinions during the deliberations?

Today's daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein in loving memory of her father, Cantor Yoel ben Meir Fromm. "A lone survivor who served his kehilla in Canada devotedly. His advice to me, spiced with midrashim, encouraged my learning and independent thinking. My grandchildren are his legacy. I miss his nigunim and stories. He was my guiding light." Abaye proposes a kal v'chomer argument regarding someone sentenced to death who is working in the Temple: if he is engaged in communal sacrifices, he should not be taken for execution. He interprets the verse, "From my altar you will be taken to be killed" (Shmot 21:14) as referring only to individual sacrifices. Rava challenges this interpretation, noting that since some authorities permit individual offerings on Yom Tov, one cannot differentiate between communal and individual sacrifices on this basis, as both override Shabbat/Yom Tov while execution does not. According to that opinion, accepting Abaye's kal v'chomer would render the verse meaningless, as execution would never override Temple service. Rava therefore concludes that court-ordered execution takes precedence over all Temple service. In Rabbi Yehuda haNasi's court, Rav would speak first in monetary cases, despite the rule that the most senior judge should begin deliberations. Rava's son explains that this exception was due to Rabbi Yehuda haNasi's unique status - from Moshe until his time, no one matched his combined greatness in both political leadership and Torah scholarship. While the Gemara suggests other potential candidates from this period, each is dismissed because they had contemporaries of equal stature. Rav Ada bar Ahava notes that this singular combination of political and Torah leadership remained unmatched from Rabbi Yehuda haNasi until Rav Ashi. The Gemara brings two verses supporting the Mishna's requirement that in capital cases, deliberations begin with the junior judge. It then addresses Rav's ruling that a teacher can instruct his student about a case and later both can serve as judges. This seems to conflict with Tosefta Sanhedrin 7:2, which states that in capital cases, a teacher-student pair counts as one vote since the student's opinion is influenced by the teacher. The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between different types of teacher-student relationships. Rabbi Abahu rules that while a case of an ox that killed a person requires twenty-three judges, other aspects follow monetary rather than capital case procedures. He references ten differences between monetary and capital cases in the Mishna, though the Gemara initially counts only nine, resolving the discrepancy by citing an additional difference from the Tosefta. The Gemara then examines why converts and mamzerim are disqualified from judging capital cases, questioning why each disqualification requires its own derivation. It also explores the source for disqualifying witnesses based on lineage.  The semicircular arrangement of the twenty-three-judge Sanhedrin enabled all judges to see each other and the witnesses. How many scribes were there to record the judges' opinions during the deliberations?

Today is the song of the Pered/Mule . As we know, a horse and a donkey make a mule. That doesn't even sound like a creature to me. What is his greatness? His song is: פֶּרֶד אוֹמֵר. יוֹדוּךָ יְיָ כָּל מַלְכֵי אָרֶץ כִּי שָׁמְעוּ אִמְרֵי פִיךָ: (תהילים קלח ד) All the kings of the world will praise You, because they heard the words of Your mouth. What does this refer to? We need to go to the Gemara in Kiddushin 31A, where it says the great Ulah made a derasha on why it says Imrei ficha / Words of Your mouth and not Ma'Amareh Ficha When Hashem said, Anochi V'Lo Yiheh Lecha, I am Hashem, there is no one but Me, the nations heard about that and thought He only cares about Himself. But when they heard Kabed et Aviva V'et Imecha, they reverted to belief in the original statements. The Maharsha explains the word Imre comes from imra , which is the end of a garment. So when they got to the end of the first half of the Luchot and they heard, on the side of ben Adam L'Makom , that Hashem brought in parents, they said, " So He's not just out for Himself." Moreover, the Chatam Sofer says, simply speaking, Kibud Av V'Em is between man and man. Only the first four commandments, so to say, concerned Hashem. The other six were for people. So when they saw that Hashem gave the majority to Ben Adam L'Chavero, that impressed them. That's our pasuk. The next piece of information is a Tosafot in Hagiga 2B that quotes a Tosefta in the fifth perek that a certain Tanna said You're not allowed to ride on a mule because a mule is kilayim . It's a mixture of a donkey and a horse, and therefore you can't benefit from it. Although we don't hold like that, they questioned, "What about the pasuk in Melachim 1,1 that says Shlomo Hamelech was on a mule? How can it be forbidden? To which the Yerushalmi says (in the perek of Kilayim) that this mule was created at the beginning of time, according to the opinion that God created mules as well. So, what exactly is the purpose of Hashem creating a mule from the beginning of time- just for Shlomo Hamelech to ride on? What's going on? The Chatam Sofer, in his sefer Torat Moshe on sefer Likutim, says that a horse symbolizes arrogance, as we said in a previous lesson. And the Ramban writes this on Ki Gaoh Gaah Sus V'Rochbo Rama B'Yam , that Hashem was more arrogant or more powerful than the horse and its rider. And the hamor/donkey symbolizes humility . The donkey keeps his head down, he doesn't bother anybody. That's why Abraham Avinu, Moshe Rabbenu, and Mashiach, BeH b'yamenu, all ride on donkeys, which symbolize humility. The king has a mixture. On one hand, he has to be arrogant. It says He can't forgo his honor because he's the king. The king has to be in charge of the country, he has to be tough. On the other hand, internally, his heart has to be broken, as it says, he is not allowed be externally arrogant. On one hand, externally, he has to show a royal appearance. There are many laws about his kavod. He can't bathe with people.. etc. It says that he has to be the king above you, and upon you. The Gemara in Ketubot 17 says, if a king forgives his honor, the honor is not forgiven. The Torah tells us, You shall place the king upon you. Which the Gemara says means, fear has to be upon you. So on one hand, the king has to be feared. He has to have a presence. But inside, he can't be arrogant. Therefore, God wanted Shlomo Hamelech to ride on this mule. It has the blend of the horse, which has a little bit of arrogance, and the donkey, which has humility. Beautiful. That's what the mule represents. And Hashem is similar. On one hand, Hashem is the king. Ge'ut Lavesh/He wears arrogance. On the other hand, it says, wherever you find Hashem's greatness, you find His humility. We see this in the Aseret HaDibrot. Hashem says four things about Himself, and then suddenly tells us, Respect your parents, and so on. And that's when the nations of the earth said, " יוֹדוּךָ יְיָ כָּל מַלְכֵי אָרֶץ All the kings will praise God." Why the kings? Because the kings look to God and say, " Look at how, how God acts. He has a blend of arrogance and humility. And therefore, the song of the mule is the song of the blend of arrogance and humility. His song is, " Listen, oh, kings of the world, listen and look at the way Hashem acts." And our first major king, (David Hamelech was the first king, but it says Shlomo Hamelech was the full strength, he was the 15th generation from Avraham Avinu. He was the moon in its fullest phase. And that is the ultimate- even with all his wives and his wealth and his power, with that, he still had a blend of humility. That's the message of the mule. And that's the message to all of us, to have this blend and appreciate these Middot.

There are certain fruits that grow on trees with unusual features, giving rise to the question of whether the Beracha over these fruits is "Ha'etz" – like for other fruits – or "Ha'adama." These fruits include papaya, banana, pineapple and passion fruit. As for papaya, Hacham Ovadia Yosef ruled (in Hazon Ovadia – Berachot, p. 23) that since the papaya tree produces fruit within the first year after it is planted, it does not qualify as a Halachic "tree." This is based on the Tosefta's ruling that a defining characteristic of trees, as defined by Halacha, is that they produce fruit in a slow, gradual process. As such, the Beracha over papaya is "Ha'adama." Nevertheless, given the different opinions that exist, the halachic status of papayas, as well as that of bananas, pineapples and passion fruit, remains uncertain. We recite "Ha'adama" over these fruits, since "Ha'adama" suffices after the fact even for fruits that optimally require "Ha'etz," but the possibility that these fruits require "Ha'etz" has certain important ramifications. One example would be a fruit plate at a Kiddush on Shabbat that consists of grapes, melon and pineapple. Grapes certainly require "Ha'etz," melon certainly requires "Ha'adama," and the status of pineapple, as mentioned, is uncertain. If one wishes to partake of all three, he should first recite the Beracha of "Ha'etz" over the grape, followed by "Ha'adama" over the melon. The pineapple is then covered according to all views, since both Berachot have been recited. As the status of pineapple is uncertain, it is preferable to recite the Berachot over the other fruits in order to avoid a situation of Halachic doubt. Another example is where one eats dates and pineapple. The individual in this case can either first recite "Ha'adama" over the pineapple, and then recite "Ha'etz" over the dates, or, if he prefers eating the date first, he can recite "Ha'etz" over the date with specific intention that this Beracha does not cover the pineapple. After eating, he should first recite "Boreh Nefashot" over the pineapple, followed by "Al Ha'etz" over the dates. If he would first recite "Al Ha'etz," this Beracha would cover the pineapple, and so he should recite "Boreh Nefashot" before "Al Ha'etz." Summary: The halachic status of papayas, bananas, pineapple and passion fruit with respect to Berachot is uncertain, and so, in order to cover both possibilities, we recite "Ha'adama" over these fruits. If one eats one of these fruits – such as a pineapple – together with a fruit that requires "Ha'etz," one should either first recite "Ha'adama" over the pineapple, or first recite "Ha'etz" over the other fruit with specific intention that this Beracha should not cover the pineapple. If the other fruit is one which requires the recitation of "Al Ha'etz" after eating, one should first recite "Boreh Nefashot" over the pineapple and then "A Ha'etz" over the other fruit.

IntroductionEver wondered how our early rabbis discussed or otherwise considered drunkenness? The 163rd episode of The Jewish Drinking Show considers drunkenness in the Mishnah, the Tosefta, and Midreshei Halakhah.Source SheetsSource sheets for this episode are available:Drunkenness in the MishnahDrunkenness in the ToseftaDrunkenness in Midreshei HalakhahTime Stamps0:00 Welcome0:12 Introduction0:48 Drunkenness in the Mishnah13:00 Drunkenness in the Tosefta26:37 Drunkenness in Midreshei Halakhah37:08 Conclusion38:44 l'chaim“Drinks and Discussion”-style EpisodesThis episode is the ninth "Drinks and Discussion"-style episode of The Jewish Drinking Show on various topics led by Rabbi Drew:Drunkenness in Early Rabbinic Literature - Episode #163 (This episode)Dukhening Under the Influence - Episode #161Drinking Between Glasses of Wine at the Passover Seder - Episode #154The Purim Katan Episode – Episode #151Drinking During Mourning – Episode #150Drinking In/Out of Sukkot – Episode #142A Significant Rabbinic Discussion on Wine & Drinking: Eruvin 64-65 – Episode #47Drinking During the Ten Days of Repentance: An Introduction – Episode #44Drinking During the Nine Days – Episode #40Support the showThank you for listening!If you have any questions, suggestions, or more, feel free to reach out at Drew@JewishDrinking.coml'chaim!

A beraita (Tosefta) presents the idea of enhancement to the property that takes place after the death of the father - for which the first-born does not get the double-portion. But that's a point that needs refinement. It may depend who made those improvements. Plus, the question of who pays the father's debt - that is, as a double portion, or not? Also, more on the first-born not taking a double-portion when a loan was returned to the estate. But who supports that view?

The Mishna rules that if one sold produce to another and the buyer planted it but nothing grew, the seller would have to compensate the buyer. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that this is only the case if the sale was for inedible seeds and it was thereby clear that the purpose of the purchase was for planting and not for eating. If one buys an ox that can be sold for two different uses, either for plowing or for slaughtering, and the buyer doesn't specify for which purpose, and after the sale it becomes clear that the ox is a gorer and cannot be kept alive, can the buyer claim that it is not usable for the purposes for which it was purchased (plowing) or not? Does it depend on the majority, i.e. if the majority of people use it for the purpose that the buyer claims, can we believe the buyer and cancel the sale? Or do we say "the burden of proof is on the one trying to get the money from the other" in which case, the buyer is stuck with the item unless the buyer can prove with what intent the item was purchased? Rav rules that the sale can be cancelled and Shmuel rules that it cannot. A difficulty is raised against Rav from a Mishna but is resolved. A Tosefta is brought to support Rav, but it is rejected.

The Mishna rules that if one sold produce to another and the buyer planted it but nothing grew, the seller would have to compensate the buyer. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that this is only the case if the sale was for inedible seeds and it was thereby clear that the purpose of the purchase was for planting and not for eating. If one buys an ox that can be sold for two different uses, either for plowing or for slaughtering, and the buyer doesn't specify for which purpose, and after the sale it becomes clear that the ox is a gorer and cannot be kept alive, can the buyer claim that it is not usable for the purposes for which it was purchased (plowing) or not? Does it depend on the majority, i.e. if the majority of people use it for the purpose that the buyer claims, can we believe the buyer and cancel the sale? Or do we say "the burden of proof is on the one trying to get the money from the other" in which case, the buyer is stuck with the item unless the buyer can prove with what intent the item was purchased? Rav rules that the sale can be cancelled and Shmuel rules that it cannot. A difficulty is raised against Rav from a Mishna but is resolved. A Tosefta is brought to support Rav, but it is rejected.

Study Guide Bava Batra 66 Today's daf is sponsored by Sarah & Inna Pasternak, in honor of their first wedding anniversary. "We fell in love studying the daf and look forward to remaining havrutas as we build a home full of Torah together."  Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of their friend and co-learner Miriam Eckstein-Koas on the engagement of her son, Daniel. "May Daniel and Talia build a bayit neeman b'Yisrael firmly grounded in Torah and chesed, and may all of Am Yisrael see smachot!" The Gemara continues to figure out which opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis doesn't seem to correspond to the Tosefta Mikvaot that distinguishes between a pipe that was constructed and then attached to the ground and one that was hollowed out from the ground or while it is attached to the ground. After rejecting the first two possibilities (the braita that related to our Mishna and a Mishna regarding a beehive), they find a Mishna Keilim 15:2 regarding a baker's board attached to a wall in which it seems that both Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree with the Tosefta Mikvaot. Since the Tosefta must fit with one of the two opinions, the Gemara then tries to assess which one. First, they attempt to reconcile it with Rabbi Eliezer, claiming that Rabbi Eliezer was more lenient in the baker's board case as it was only impure on a rabbinic level (a flat wood vessel). However, this is rejected on two accounts. One, mayim she'uvim disqualifies a mikveh by rabbinic law. Secondly, Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Chanina's explained that the Mishna in Keilim refers to a metal baker's block, which would make it impure by Torah law. In conclusion, the Gemara establishes that the rabbi's opinion corresponds to the Tosefta Mikvaot, as the issue of mayim she'uvim is only rabbinic. Therefore the rabbis are more lenient there than in the case of a baker's board. If rain falls on a movable item (vessel) that is detached from the ground and at the same time on food that is inside/on that item, if the owner wants the rain to fall on the item, the food also becomes susceptible to impurity. What if the moveable item was attached to the ground, would it be considered like the ground and the food inside it would not become susceptible to impurity, or would it be considered a vessel and the food inside it would become susceptible to impurity? The question is only asked according to the rabbis (and there is no answer), as according to Rabbi Eliezer, it would clearly be considered like the ground and the food would not become susceptible to impurity.

Study Guide Bava Batra 66 Today's daf is sponsored by Sarah & Inna Pasternak, in honor of their first wedding anniversary. "We fell in love studying the daf and look forward to remaining havrutas as we build a home full of Torah together."  Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of their friend and co-learner Miriam Eckstein-Koas on the engagement of her son, Daniel. "May Daniel and Talia build a bayit neeman b'Yisrael firmly grounded in Torah and chesed, and may all of Am Yisrael see smachot!" The Gemara continues to figure out which opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis doesn't seem to correspond to the Tosefta Mikvaot that distinguishes between a pipe that was constructed and then attached to the ground and one that was hollowed out from the ground or while it is attached to the ground. After rejecting the first two possibilities (the braita that related to our Mishna and a Mishna regarding a beehive), they find a Mishna Keilim 15:2 regarding a baker's board attached to a wall in which it seems that both Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree with the Tosefta Mikvaot. Since the Tosefta must fit with one of the two opinions, the Gemara then tries to assess which one. First, they attempt to reconcile it with Rabbi Eliezer, claiming that Rabbi Eliezer was more lenient in the baker's board case as it was only impure on a rabbinic level (a flat wood vessel). However, this is rejected on two accounts. One, mayim she'uvim disqualifies a mikveh by rabbinic law. Secondly, Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Chanina's explained that the Mishna in Keilim refers to a metal baker's block, which would make it impure by Torah law. In conclusion, the Gemara establishes that the rabbi's opinion corresponds to the Tosefta Mikvaot, as the issue of mayim she'uvim is only rabbinic. Therefore the rabbis are more lenient there than in the case of a baker's board. If rain falls on a movable item (vessel) that is detached from the ground and at the same time on food that is inside/on that item, if the owner wants the rain to fall on the item, the food also becomes susceptible to impurity. What if the moveable item was attached to the ground, would it be considered like the ground and the food inside it would not become susceptible to impurity, or would it be considered a vessel and the food inside it would become susceptible to impurity? The question is only asked according to the rabbis (and there is no answer), as according to Rabbi Eliezer, it would clearly be considered like the ground and the food would not become susceptible to impurity.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Esther's birthday. "To my big sister, thank you for introducing me to this shiur. I’m so proud of you. Many happy and healthy returns!" Regarding the debate between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis about whether a seller sells generously (Rabbi Akiva) or sparingly (the rabbis), Rav ruled like the rabbis, and Shmuel like Rabbi Akiva. The difference of opinion between Rav and Shmuel on this issue is compared to a different debate between Rav and Shmuel regarding the distribution of inherited property. However, the comparison is rejected as the circumstances are unique and not applicable in a regular sale. Rav Huna held like Rav, and Rav Nachman held like Shmuel, but Rav Huna deferred to Rav Nachman as he was an expert in monetary law. If one sells an inner house and an outer house to two different people, both Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis will hold that the inner resident cannot pass through the outer resident's house as the seller has no reason to favor one over the other. However, if the inner one received the house as a gift, there is an assumption that a gift is given generously and therefore the buyer would be able to pass through the outer house without having to purchase an access route. If one sells a house without specifying what parts are included, does it include the door, key, lock, mortar, millstone, oven, etc? The Mishna explains that items that are attached to the ground are included, while those that are moveable are not. The Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir who held that one who sells a vineyard, any objects that serve the vineyard are included in the sale, even if they are not attached to the ground. A braita similar to the Mishna is quoted, however, there are some differences. In the braita, Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about an item attached to the ground after its construction. Tosefta Mikvaot 4:1 is brought regarding a pipe through which water is brought to the mikveh. If it is hollowed out (constructed) and then attached to the ground, it is considered a vessel and disqualifies the mivkeh as the water is considered 'mayim she'uvim,' water that is drawn with a vessel. The Gemara explains that this Tosefta doesn't correspond to Rabbi Eliezer's nor the rabbis' opinions. To which opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis is this statement referring? At first, the Gemara suggests it is referring to Rabbi Eliezer in the previous braita, but that suggestion is rejected. Then they suggest Rabbi Eliezer's opinion regarding a beehive as per the Mishna Shviit 10:4. This too, will be rejected.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Esther's birthday. "To my big sister, thank you for introducing me to this shiur. I’m so proud of you. Many happy and healthy returns!" Regarding the debate between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis about whether a seller sells generously (Rabbi Akiva) or sparingly (the rabbis), Rav ruled like the rabbis, and Shmuel like Rabbi Akiva. The difference of opinion between Rav and Shmuel on this issue is compared to a different debate between Rav and Shmuel regarding the distribution of inherited property. However, the comparison is rejected as the circumstances are unique and not applicable in a regular sale. Rav Huna held like Rav, and Rav Nachman held like Shmuel, but Rav Huna deferred to Rav Nachman as he was an expert in monetary law. If one sells an inner house and an outer house to two different people, both Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis will hold that the inner resident cannot pass through the outer resident's house as the seller has no reason to favor one over the other. However, if the inner one received the house as a gift, there is an assumption that a gift is given generously and therefore the buyer would be able to pass through the outer house without having to purchase an access route. If one sells a house without specifying what parts are included, does it include the door, key, lock, mortar, millstone, oven, etc? The Mishna explains that items that are attached to the ground are included, while those that are moveable are not. The Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir who held that one who sells a vineyard, any objects that serve the vineyard are included in the sale, even if they are not attached to the ground. A braita similar to the Mishna is quoted, however, there are some differences. In the braita, Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about an item attached to the ground after its construction. Tosefta Mikvaot 4:1 is brought regarding a pipe through which water is brought to the mikveh. If it is hollowed out (constructed) and then attached to the ground, it is considered a vessel and disqualifies the mivkeh as the water is considered 'mayim she'uvim,' water that is drawn with a vessel. The Gemara explains that this Tosefta doesn't correspond to Rabbi Eliezer's nor the rabbis' opinions. To which opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis is this statement referring? At first, the Gemara suggests it is referring to Rabbi Eliezer in the previous braita, but that suggestion is rejected. Then they suggest Rabbi Eliezer's opinion regarding a beehive as per the Mishna Shviit 10:4. This too, will be rejected.

3 sections- final laws about hatmana/nolad (Tosefta), restraints that are normal and not issue of "masa'uy" on Shabbos, excessive restraints

2 sections- hatmana on Shabbos if negated proper hatmana before and hatmana for cold (retain coolness), Tosefta with series of laws of hatmana (adding layers/switching material, muktzeh materials)

If one rents a donkey or a boat and the animal dies or the boat sinks halfway through the journey, what is the law? What are the circumstances of the cases discussed? In the context of this discussion, a debate between Rav and Shmuel addresses whether one can sell the carcass of a rented animal in a way that the principal (the original animal) will no longer exist—specifically, whether the renter can sell it and use the money from the sale to rent a new animal. Rav's opinion is questioned by a Tosefta, which is then resolved. A case is brought regarding a boat rented to carry wine, which sinks. The Gemara examines the specifics of the rental agreement: whether the renter rented "this boat" or "a boat" and whether it was to carry "this wine" or "any wine." This distinction is crucial for determining the renter's obligations and rights. Two additional cases clarify other rights of the renter: How much can the renter load on a donkey that was rented for riding, and how much can the driver load? If the donkey was rented to a man to ride, can a woman ride instead, or vice versa? Is there a difference if the woman is pregnant or nursing? These discussions provide detailed insights into the legal nuances of rental agreements, the responsibilities of renters, and the permissible uses of rented property.

If one rents a donkey or a boat and the animal dies or the boat sinks halfway through the journey, what is the law? What are the circumstances of the cases discussed? In the context of this discussion, a debate between Rav and Shmuel addresses whether one can sell the carcass of a rented animal in a way that the principal (the original animal) will no longer exist—specifically, whether the renter can sell it and use the money from the sale to rent a new animal. Rav's opinion is questioned by a Tosefta, which is then resolved. A case is brought regarding a boat rented to carry wine, which sinks. The Gemara examines the specifics of the rental agreement: whether the renter rented "this boat" or "a boat" and whether it was to carry "this wine" or "any wine." This distinction is crucial for determining the renter's obligations and rights. Two additional cases clarify other rights of the renter: How much can the renter load on a donkey that was rented for riding, and how much can the driver load? If the donkey was rented to a man to ride, can a woman ride instead, or vice versa? Is there a difference if the woman is pregnant or nursing? These discussions provide detailed insights into the legal nuances of rental agreements, the responsibilities of renters, and the permissible uses of rented property.

The Mishna brings cases where an individual rents an item, such as an animal, for a specific purpose and then uses it for a different purpose. The renter is held responsible if the animal dies because of this change. The first line of the Mishna states that the renter is responsible in all cases where a change was made. However, in the second line, the Mishna's ruling depends on the circumstances—specifically, how the animal died and the nature of the change made by the renter. The Gemara explores four possible answers to reconcile these two lines. The first three answers establish that the first line in the Mishna refers to a case where the animal died directly because of the change, regardless of whether the change was from mountain to valley or the reverse. The fourth answer differentiates the two lines of the Mishna as representing the opinions of different authorities. According to this view, the first line reflects Rabbi Meir's opinion, while the second line represents the rabbis' stance. Rabbi Meir holds a stringent view that anyone who goes against the owner's wishes is considered a thief, thus making them automatically liable for any resulting damage or death. The Gemara then seeks to find tannaitic sources to substantiate that this is indeed Rabbi Meir's position. The first two sources examined are rejected, but the third source is accepted, affirming that Rabbi Meir considers any deviation from the owner’s instructions to be considered theft. A case referred to as 'hivrika,' has two different interpretations. The Mishna describes a scenario where a donkey rented by an individual is seized by the king's men (angaria). In such a case, the renter is left without the animal, and the owner is not required to provide a replacement. Rav and Shmuel disagree about the specifics of this case. A Tosefta is brought to challenge Shmuel's interpretation, and two explanations are offered to resolve this difficulty.

The Mishna brings cases where an individual rents an item, such as an animal, for a specific purpose and then uses it for a different purpose. The renter is held responsible if the animal dies because of this change. The first line of the Mishna states that the renter is responsible in all cases where a change was made. However, in the second line, the Mishna's ruling depends on the circumstances—specifically, how the animal died and the nature of the change made by the renter. The Gemara explores four possible answers to reconcile these two lines. The first three answers establish that the first line in the Mishna refers to a case where the animal died directly because of the change, regardless of whether the change was from mountain to valley or the reverse. The fourth answer differentiates the two lines of the Mishna as representing the opinions of different authorities. According to this view, the first line reflects Rabbi Meir's opinion, while the second line represents the rabbis' stance. Rabbi Meir holds a stringent view that anyone who goes against the owner's wishes is considered a thief, thus making them automatically liable for any resulting damage or death. The Gemara then seeks to find tannaitic sources to substantiate that this is indeed Rabbi Meir's position. The first two sources examined are rejected, but the third source is accepted, affirming that Rabbi Meir considers any deviation from the owner’s instructions to be considered theft. A case referred to as 'hivrika,' has two different interpretations. The Mishna describes a scenario where a donkey rented by an individual is seized by the king's men (angaria). In such a case, the renter is left without the animal, and the owner is not required to provide a replacement. Rav and Shmuel disagree about the specifics of this case. A Tosefta is brought to challenge Shmuel's interpretation, and two explanations are offered to resolve this difficulty.

SHOW NOTES  Our texts this week are here  Our prayer this week is “For A Faith Community” from Feminist Prayers for My Daughter by Shannon K. Evans  A quick review of the historical context for eunuchs in the ancient world: https://www.britannica.com/topic/eunuch  Two ancient references worth considering that highlight the non-binary reality of eunuchs: The first one is from St. Augustine who describes castrated eunuchs as “neither changed into a woman nor allowed to remain a man” (City of God 7.24). The other comes from the Tosefta (a Jewish commentary on the Mishnah), which applies *both* male and female laws to the eunuchs.  Browse our curated booklists! Purchasing through this affiliate link generates a small commission for us and is a great way to support the show https://bookshop.org/shop/aplainaccount   Other resources on our website: commentaries, discipleship, liturgics, music.

 A Tale of Two Sedarim: From Bnei B'rak to Lod, by Rav Yitzchak Etshalom Why wasn't R. Gamliel at the "Seder" in B'nei Brak?  Although we envision the evening of the Seder as being focused on the story of יציאת מצרים, there is another theme which holds a position of honor in the evening's discussion - the laws of Korban haPesach. Just as the famous "Seder" in Bnei Brak involved 5 of our greatest sages engaged in the recounting of the story of the Exodus all night, the Tosefta tells of a "parallel" seder led by R. Gamliel, where the focus of discussion all night was הלכות (קרבן) הפסח. The significance of the Korban, although relegated to commemorative status after the destruction of the Mikdash, still has a significant impact on the nature of the evening. We explore the dispute among Tannaim - and, later - Rishonim - as to whether the Korban Pesach needed to be eaten before midnight or could be eaten until dawn as a reflection of different approaches to understanding the underlying reason for the Korban and, essentially, the nature of the celebration of this most powerful of sanctified feasts. Source sheet >>

Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of the engagement of Sara’s daughter, Estie Brauner, to Tina Lamm’s nephew, Jason Ast. May we have many more Hadran family smachot! After Mari bar Isak's 'brother' brought witnesses, Rav Chisda ruled that the brother could receive his portion. Rav Chisda also ruled that the brother could receive 50% of the profits from Mari's investment in the land after the father's death, based on a Mishna in Bava Batra 143b. Abaye and Rabbi Ami raised difficulties with the latter's ruling. Rav Chisda responds and answers Rabbi Ami's question. If one gives a shomer produce to watch, the shomer can deduct a certain amount when returning the produce as one can assume that mice ate some or that some was lost over time. What percentage? The calculation is based on the item in question, the amount of time it was being watched, and the quantity. Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri holds that quantity is not a factor as mice eat the same amount regardless of how much is in the pile. The Tosefta limits these laws to a case when the shomer mixed the produce with his/her produce. Rabbi Yehuda holds that if the shomer watched a large measure of produce, the depreciation would be offset by the expansion of the grains. Based on an alternate reading of a braita, Rav Nachman limits this to a particular case where the grains were given to be watched in the summer and returned in the winter. How much deduction is there for oil and wine? On what point does Rabbi Yehuda disagree with the rabbis regarding deducting the sediment in oil? What is the basis of their debate? The Gemara brings two different suggestions.

Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of the engagement of Sara’s daughter, Estie Brauner, to Tina Lamm’s nephew, Jason Ast. May we have many more Hadran family smachot! After Mari bar Isak's 'brother' brought witnesses, Rav Chisda ruled that the brother could receive his portion. Rav Chisda also ruled that the brother could receive 50% of the profits from Mari's investment in the land after the father's death, based on a Mishna in Bava Batra 143b. Abaye and Rabbi Ami raised difficulties with the latter's ruling. Rav Chisda responds and answers Rabbi Ami's question. If one gives a shomer produce to watch, the shomer can deduct a certain amount when returning the produce as one can assume that mice ate some or that some was lost over time. What percentage? The calculation is based on the item in question, the amount of time it was being watched, and the quantity. Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri holds that quantity is not a factor as mice eat the same amount regardless of how much is in the pile. The Tosefta limits these laws to a case when the shomer mixed the produce with his/her produce. Rabbi Yehuda holds that if the shomer watched a large measure of produce, the depreciation would be offset by the expansion of the grains. Based on an alternate reading of a braita, Rav Nachman limits this to a particular case where the grains were given to be watched in the summer and returned in the winter. How much deduction is there for oil and wine? On what point does Rabbi Yehuda disagree with the rabbis regarding deducting the sediment in oil? What is the basis of their debate? The Gemara brings two different suggestions.

Today's daf is sponsored by Allie Alperovich in loving memory of her grandmother, Frima Iosilevich who passed away this week a month shy of her 98th birthday. Rav Ashi was uncertain whether the law that a person can retrieve lost items by giving an identifying mark (siman) is a Torah law or not. As a result, when he reconciled the contradiction between the Tosefta that permitted one to return a lost get to the wife when the husband agreed and Mishna that did not, he explained that it could be returned if the husband gave a siman muvhak, a very clear one, and not more generic siman. Raba bar bar Hanna lost a get that he was supposed to deliver. It was found and he retrieved it by giving a siman (a basic one) and also by tviut aina, visual recognition, which is specifically permitted to Torah scholars, but he was unsure if the rabbis permitted it to be returned to him on account of the siman or the visual recognition. The Tosefta Bava Metzia 1:5, quoted previously, ruled that a get for divorce or emancipation document for a slave can be returned to the wife/slave if the husband/owner agrees. Both documents have financial ramifications, as the produce of the woman's property becomes her own in the event of divorce, and items the slave purchases belong to his owner while he is a slave but are his own if he is a free man. If so, why are we not concerned that perhaps they were not divorced/freed, and by returning the document to the woman or slave, we may be allowing them to collect property that is not rightfully theirs? If one gives a gift using the language "now and after death," the body of the item is given as a gift, but the produce is still owned by the original owner until his/her death. There is another contradiction between our Mishna and a braita as our Mishna states that wills can be returned if the owner admits he/she gave it and we are not concerned that the owner wrote it and then changed his/her mind and never gave it to the recipient, and a braita states that even if both agree that it was given, we do not return the document to either one. Rabbi Abba bar Mamal resolves the contradiction by differentiating between the cases - the Mishna refers to a promise of one on one's deathbed (which one can rescind)  and the braita refers to a gift of a healthy person (which can't be rescinded). The Gemara explains in detail the relevance of that distinction. Rav Zevid resolves the contradiction differently. He says that both the Mishna and braita refer to a gift on one's deathbed but the Mishna is in a case where the one who wants to return the deed is the person who wrote it and the braita is when it is his son (after the original owner's death). 

Today's daf is sponsored by Allie Alperovich in loving memory of her grandmother, Frima Iosilevich who passed away this week a month shy of her 98th birthday. Rav Ashi was uncertain whether the law that a person can retrieve lost items by giving an identifying mark (siman) is a Torah law or not. As a result, when he reconciled the contradiction between the Tosefta that permitted one to return a lost get to the wife when the husband agreed and Mishna that did not, he explained that it could be returned if the husband gave a siman muvhak, a very clear one, and not more generic siman. Raba bar bar Hanna lost a get that he was supposed to deliver. It was found and he retrieved it by giving a siman (a basic one) and also by tviut aina, visual recognition, which is specifically permitted to Torah scholars, but he was unsure if the rabbis permitted it to be returned to him on account of the siman or the visual recognition. The Tosefta Bava Metzia 1:5, quoted previously, ruled that a get for divorce or emancipation document for a slave can be returned to the wife/slave if the husband/owner agrees. Both documents have financial ramifications, as the produce of the woman's property becomes her own in the event of divorce, and items the slave purchases belong to his owner while he is a slave but are his own if he is a free man. If so, why are we not concerned that perhaps they were not divorced/freed, and by returning the document to the woman or slave, we may be allowing them to collect property that is not rightfully theirs? If one gives a gift using the language "now and after death," the body of the item is given as a gift, but the produce is still owned by the original owner until his/her death. There is another contradiction between our Mishna and a braita as our Mishna states that wills can be returned if the owner admits he/she gave it and we are not concerned that the owner wrote it and then changed his/her mind and never gave it to the recipient, and a braita states that even if both agree that it was given, we do not return the document to either one. Rabbi Abba bar Mamal resolves the contradiction by differentiating between the cases - the Mishna refers to a promise of one on one's deathbed (which one can rescind)  and the braita refers to a gift of a healthy person (which can't be rescinded). The Gemara explains in detail the relevance of that distinction. Rav Zevid resolves the contradiction differently. He says that both the Mishna and braita refer to a gift on one's deathbed but the Mishna is in a case where the one who wants to return the deed is the person who wrote it and the braita is when it is his son (after the original owner's death). 

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Audrey Mondrow from her children and grandchildren. "You are an example of a lifetime learner." Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in honor of the marriage of their daughter, Sophia Altman today, and also the recent marriage of their son, Isaac Altman, and the yahrtzeit of Moshe Rabbeinu. "Sending brachot that the ultimate Shadchan find matches for all of those who are looking." Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia (Sara Devora) Simmons in loving memory of her father, Avraham Nachum ben Yisroel Simelis z"l on his yahrzeit today. "Survivor of the Kovno ghetto, "a brand plucked from burning fire" he planted the seeds of Torah learning with his enduring faith still inspiring today and in the future." There is another unsuccessful attempt to find a source to show that a betrothed woman who is widowed receives the ketuba money, even if she did not have a written ketuba. Therefore, Abaye's support for Rabbi Yochanan's reading of the Mishna in Ketubot 88b is edited and is derived directly from the words of the Mishna by rejecting the possibility that the Mishna was referring only to a place where in general they did not write ketubot and women used their get documents to collect their ketuba money. Therefore the Mishna is referring even to a case where a ketuba was written and yet we allow the woman to collect her ketuba money even without producing the ketuba document and do not trust the husband to claim it was already paid. The Mishna says if one finds a get or will or gift document, one cannot return it because maybe the person changed their mind and decided not to give it. This implies that if the husband/owner says now that he wants to give it (after we find it) he can, even if time has elapsed. This contradicts a Mishna in Gittin 27 that rules that one can only give a get that was found immediately and not after time has elapsed, as perhaps someone else with the same name lost it and it is not the get written for this man and this woman. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between a place where there are caravans and it is known that there are two couples with the same names. Rabbi Zeira raises the same contradiction but between the Mishna in Gittin and a Tosefta, not from an inference from our Mishna. He resolves it in the same way as Raba, however, it is unclear if he limits the Mishna to a case where there are caravans or also when it is known that there are two people with the same names. If he disagrees with Raba on that issue, what is the root of their debate? Why did Raba choose to bring the contradiction from our Mishna and Rabbi Zeira to bring it from the Tosefta? Rabbi Yirmia and Rav Ashi each bring two other resolutions to the contradiction between the Tosefta and the Mishna in Gittin.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Audrey Mondrow from her children and grandchildren. "You are an example of a lifetime learner." Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in honor of the marriage of their daughter, Sophia Altman today, and also the recent marriage of their son, Isaac Altman, and the yahrtzeit of Moshe Rabbeinu. "Sending brachot that the ultimate Shadchan find matches for all of those who are looking." Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia (Sara Devora) Simmons in loving memory of her father, Avraham Nachum ben Yisroel Simelis z"l on his yahrzeit today. "Survivor of the Kovno ghetto, "a brand plucked from burning fire" he planted the seeds of Torah learning with his enduring faith still inspiring today and in the future." There is another unsuccessful attempt to find a source to show that a betrothed woman who is widowed receives the ketuba money, even if she did not have a written ketuba. Therefore, Abaye's support for Rabbi Yochanan's reading of the Mishna in Ketubot 88b is edited and is derived directly from the words of the Mishna by rejecting the possibility that the Mishna was referring only to a place where in general they did not write ketubot and women used their get documents to collect their ketuba money. Therefore the Mishna is referring even to a case where a ketuba was written and yet we allow the woman to collect her ketuba money even without producing the ketuba document and do not trust the husband to claim it was already paid. The Mishna says if one finds a get or will or gift document, one cannot return it because maybe the person changed their mind and decided not to give it. This implies that if the husband/owner says now that he wants to give it (after we find it) he can, even if time has elapsed. This contradicts a Mishna in Gittin 27 that rules that one can only give a get that was found immediately and not after time has elapsed, as perhaps someone else with the same name lost it and it is not the get written for this man and this woman. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between a place where there are caravans and it is known that there are two couples with the same names. Rabbi Zeira raises the same contradiction but between the Mishna in Gittin and a Tosefta, not from an inference from our Mishna. He resolves it in the same way as Raba, however, it is unclear if he limits the Mishna to a case where there are caravans or also when it is known that there are two people with the same names. If he disagrees with Raba on that issue, what is the root of their debate? Why did Raba choose to bring the contradiction from our Mishna and Rabbi Zeira to bring it from the Tosefta? Rabbi Yirmia and Rav Ashi each bring two other resolutions to the contradiction between the Tosefta and the Mishna in Gittin.

A Tale of Two Adars, by Rav Yitzchak Etshalom Why do we delay celebrating Purim until Adar Sheini?  The Mishna in Megila addresses the circumstance where after fully celebrating Purim, the Beit-Din decided to add another month to the year; although the Tosefta records a dissenting opinion, the Mishna rules (and such is the Halakha) that the Megila must be re-read in the "added" Adar - as well as the special Parashot that are read in Adar (Shekalim, Zakhor etc.). To wit, (virtually) all of the Mitzvot unique to Adar may only be fulfilled in Adar Sheini. We explore the Bavli and Yerushalmi's discussion of the various opinions and the rationale provided for ruling in accord with רשב"ג - that the Megila must be read in the Adar that is proximate to Nisan. We discover a curious explanation in the Yerushalmi, along with an innovative understanding of the impact of "מסמך גאולה לגאולה" - keeping the celebration of the redemption from Haman as close as possible the celebration of the Exodus. Source sheet >>

Today's daf is sponsored by Meryl and Harold Sasnowitz in loving memory of their mothers, Malka bat Chaya Etle & Mordechai, and Toby Raizel bat Rechel & Tzvi whose yahrzeits both fall on 16 Adar. "They left a legacy of Yiddishkite that has grown through multiple generations."  Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether one can keep impure truma wine in one's house to be used over time for creating a good smell in the house (ziluf) or does one need to be concerned that it may cause transgression as one may forget that the wine is impure and may drink it. Rabbi Yishamel son of Rabbi Yosi suggests a compromise approach, however, others did not like the suggestion. If honey is dripping from a vessel and the honey owner promises the wine owner that if he/she spills the wine, the honey owner will compensate him/her for the loss of wine, then the honey owner must pay. However, from a different braita it seems that one can claim, "I never really meant what I said, I was just fooling with you." How is this resolved? Why does the Mishna not only bring a case of honey/wine but also a case with two people who each have a donkey (one worth more than the other) that gets swept away by a river and one asks the other to save his/hers instead of saving their own donkey? Two questions are asked about variations on the donkey case. What if one saves the other donkey and is promised to be compensated for his/her donkey but then their donkey comes out of the river on its own - do they still receive compensation as promised? What if one tries to save the donkey but is unsuccessful? The Tosefta Bava Metzia 7:7 is quoted where there are several cases of distribution of expenditures for a group of people traveling together if for example robbers come or if they need to hire someone for the group. What are the criteria used for determining the method of dividing? The Tosefta continues with a case of people on a boat that is beginning to sink - how do they determine how much each person needs to throw off the boat to save themselves? If one steals a field and then gives it to thugs who come to seize property, does the thief need to return the land or can he/she say to the owner, "Go get it from the thugs?" On what does it depend?

Today's daf is sponsored by Meryl and Harold Sasnowitz in loving memory of their mothers, Malka bat Chaya Etle & Mordechai, and Toby Raizel bat Rechel & Tzvi whose yahrzeits both fall on 16 Adar. "They left a legacy of Yiddishkite that has grown through multiple generations."  Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether one can keep impure truma wine in one's house to be used over time for creating a good smell in the house (ziluf) or does one need to be concerned that it may cause transgression as one may forget that the wine is impure and may drink it. Rabbi Yishamel son of Rabbi Yosi suggests a compromise approach, however, others did not like the suggestion. If honey is dripping from a vessel and the honey owner promises the wine owner that if he/she spills the wine, the honey owner will compensate him/her for the loss of wine, then the honey owner must pay. However, from a different braita it seems that one can claim, "I never really meant what I said, I was just fooling with you." How is this resolved? Why does the Mishna not only bring a case of honey/wine but also a case with two people who each have a donkey (one worth more than the other) that gets swept away by a river and one asks the other to save his/hers instead of saving their own donkey? Two questions are asked about variations on the donkey case. What if one saves the other donkey and is promised to be compensated for his/her donkey but then their donkey comes out of the river on its own - do they still receive compensation as promised? What if one tries to save the donkey but is unsuccessful? The Tosefta Bava Metzia 7:7 is quoted where there are several cases of distribution of expenditures for a group of people traveling together if for example robbers come or if they need to hire someone for the group. What are the criteria used for determining the method of dividing? The Tosefta continues with a case of people on a boat that is beginning to sink - how do they determine how much each person needs to throw off the boat to save themselves? If one steals a field and then gives it to thugs who come to seize property, does the thief need to return the land or can he/she say to the owner, "Go get it from the thugs?" On what does it depend?

2 sections- clarification of Tosefta and related points (8 expressions with pesukim), aggadita's relating to judges perspectives

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle Altman in loving memory of Honorable Myriam Altman. "She was a beloved wife, mother and grandmother, and an unforgettable role model and jurist. A Holocaust survivor, she would have been so proud of her family and Am Yisrael, today and every day." Two sources, one of them our Mishna, are brought to prove that there was a takana instituted in Usha that a woman cannot sell her usufruct (melog) property while she is still married. However, both proofs are rejected. The first source is a case where witnesses lied and said a woman was divorced and received her ketuba money. Once it was proven they were zomemim and that the woman was still married, the witnesses do not pay her the full amount of the ketuba, but the amount she could have sold it for while she was married (tovat hana'a). A woman can sell the rights to her ketuba to someone else for less than its value, as it is not clear that it has monetary value since it will only be worth money if the husband predeceases the wife. If she dies first, her husband inherits everything. If there was no takana of Usha, she can sell part of the ketuba that includes property she brought into the marriage, and therefore it does have value regardless of whether she or the husband die first. However, this is rejected as the property in the ketuba is nichsei tzon barzel, which cannot be sold in any case as the husband has right to the produce and to the principal, and the takana was regarding nichsei melog. Abaye infers from the ruling regarding the witnesses, that if a woman sells her ketuba, the money would go to her and not to her husband. Rav Shalman rejects Abaye's proof but Rava rules like Abaye. The second proof is from our Mishna, that a woman is exempt from paying damages she inflicts on others (until her husband dies or divorces her) as she has no money of her own. If there was no takana of Usha, she could sell her usufruct property and pay damages. To reject this proof, they suggest that the Mishna is referring to a case where the woman has no usufruct property. However, the Gemara begins to raise other questions on the Mishna. Why doesn't the woman sell her ketuba for its market value (tovat hana'a)? Three different answers are brought. What if the woman injured her husband, could she not give him the ketuba as payment? And if so, why does the Tosefta rule that she does not? A few questions are asked on the Tosefta. The Gemara suggests that whether or not the takana of Usha was instituted is a tanaitic debate. The case is one where there is a slave that is usufruct property of the woman - in one braita they rule that the slave goes freed if the woman breaks his arm; in the other, he does not get freed either by the woman or by the husband breaking his arm as neither fully owns him (the woman does not, as per the takana of Usha). However, this is rejected as the reason for the disagreement is not necessarily related to our issue.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle Altman in loving memory of Honorable Myriam Altman. "She was a beloved wife, mother and grandmother, and an unforgettable role model and jurist. A Holocaust survivor, she would have been so proud of her family and Am Yisrael, today and every day." Two sources, one of them our Mishna, are brought to prove that there was a takana instituted in Usha that a woman cannot sell her usufruct (melog) property while she is still married. However, both proofs are rejected. The first source is a case where witnesses lied and said a woman was divorced and received her ketuba money. Once it was proven they were zomemim and that the woman was still married, the witnesses do not pay her the full amount of the ketuba, but the amount she could have sold it for while she was married (tovat hana'a). A woman can sell the rights to her ketuba to someone else for less than its value, as it is not clear that it has monetary value since it will only be worth money if the husband predeceases the wife. If she dies first, her husband inherits everything. If there was no takana of Usha, she can sell part of the ketuba that includes property she brought into the marriage, and therefore it does have value regardless of whether she or the husband die first. However, this is rejected as the property in the ketuba is nichsei tzon barzel, which cannot be sold in any case as the husband has right to the produce and to the principal, and the takana was regarding nichsei melog. Abaye infers from the ruling regarding the witnesses, that if a woman sells her ketuba, the money would go to her and not to her husband. Rav Shalman rejects Abaye's proof but Rava rules like Abaye. The second proof is from our Mishna, that a woman is exempt from paying damages she inflicts on others (until her husband dies or divorces her) as she has no money of her own. If there was no takana of Usha, she could sell her usufruct property and pay damages. To reject this proof, they suggest that the Mishna is referring to a case where the woman has no usufruct property. However, the Gemara begins to raise other questions on the Mishna. Why doesn't the woman sell her ketuba for its market value (tovat hana'a)? Three different answers are brought. What if the woman injured her husband, could she not give him the ketuba as payment? And if so, why does the Tosefta rule that she does not? A few questions are asked on the Tosefta. The Gemara suggests that whether or not the takana of Usha was instituted is a tanaitic debate. The case is one where there is a slave that is usufruct property of the woman - in one braita they rule that the slave goes freed if the woman breaks his arm; in the other, he does not get freed either by the woman or by the husband breaking his arm as neither fully owns him (the woman does not, as per the takana of Usha). However, this is rejected as the reason for the disagreement is not necessarily related to our issue.  

In part 3 of this captivating three-part series, Dr. Jeffrey Rubenstein returns to our podcast to unravel the intricate tapestry of Talmudic narratives surrounding Elisha ben Abuyah, also known as "Aḥer" (the Other), the apostate. Exploring the accounts in the Mishna, Tosefta, Talmud Yerushalmi, and Talmud Bavli, Dr. Rubenstein provides a meticulous analysis of the traditions about Aḥer, examining the striking similarities, nuanced differences, varied approaches, and profound lessons embedded within the various cultural settings of these Aggadic stories. The episodes ponder the contemporary relevance of Aḥer, questioning what insights can be drawn from his enigmatic journey into "Pardes" to his brazen violation of halakha, and more. Join us as we dive into the intricate perspectives of the Sages on the heretic teacher of Rabbi Meir, contemplating the extent to which Torah lessons can be gleaned from a scholar who once stood within the religious fold. An intellectual odyssey awaits as we navigate the complexities of Aḥer's tale and unravel its timeless implications. Join us for episode 3 of 3 in the Aḥer series. (FYI this 3-part series was recorded over a span of a year, so some personal anecdotes should be understood in that context) --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/judaismdemystified/support

Today's daf is sponsored by Rozy & Larry Jaffe in loving memory of Rozy's mother, Dita Muhlrad, Doba Faiga bat Menachem on her 8th yahrzeit. "Although she's gone 8 years, "nana" continues to inspire us all daily by recalling her elegance, generosity, and sharp witticisms. Born on Simchat Torah, she always smiled and exuded simcha to all who knew her." Under what circumstances can one raise small animals in Israel? Rabban Gamliel took a more lenient approach, however, in the Tosefta there is a more stringent approach. The Tosefta also rules the one who raises many small animals and wants to repent does not need to sell them all at once. Similarly, a convert who inherits dogs and pigs can sell them over time. Similarly, one who vowed to marry a woman or buy a house does not need to marry/buy the first woman/house he finds but can take his time to find the right one. A story is told of a widow who was desperate to marry to help discipline her son and vowed to marry the first man who proposed, but when inappropriate men proposed, the rabbis permitted her to wait until an appropriate man proposed. What kind of animals can one raise in the home and why? Cats are permitted, along with others, as they eat mice and worms. However, in a contradictory story, Rav rules that cats should be killed and it is forbidden to keep them, as they are dangerous! To resolve this, they distinguish between black and white cats. Rav Papa's sons mentioned three laws/ideas - when there is a plague of sores, people can cry out publicly in prayer on Shabbat (or perhaps it means they can declare fast days on account of it), a door that is closed, does not open very easily (understood metaphorically - how?) and one who purchases a house in Israel from a gentile can write a deed on Shabbat (by asking a gentile to write it for them). The Gemara raises a contradiction on the first, brings two suggestions to understand the second and better explains in what way the third is permitted. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Rozy & Larry Jaffe in loving memory of Rozy's mother, Dita Muhlrad, Doba Faiga bat Menachem on her 8th yahrzeit. "Although she's gone 8 years, "nana" continues to inspire us all daily by recalling her elegance, generosity, and sharp witticisms. Born on Simchat Torah, she always smiled and exuded simcha to all who knew her." Under what circumstances can one raise small animals in Israel? Rabban Gamliel took a more lenient approach, however, in the Tosefta there is a more stringent approach. The Tosefta also rules the one who raises many small animals and wants to repent does not need to sell them all at once. Similarly, a convert who inherits dogs and pigs can sell them over time. Similarly, one who vowed to marry a woman or buy a house does not need to marry/buy the first woman/house he finds but can take his time to find the right one. A story is told of a widow who was desperate to marry to help discipline her son and vowed to marry the first man who proposed, but when inappropriate men proposed, the rabbis permitted her to wait until an appropriate man proposed. What kind of animals can one raise in the home and why? Cats are permitted, along with others, as they eat mice and worms. However, in a contradictory story, Rav rules that cats should be killed and it is forbidden to keep them, as they are dangerous! To resolve this, they distinguish between black and white cats. Rav Papa's sons mentioned three laws/ideas - when there is a plague of sores, people can cry out publicly in prayer on Shabbat (or perhaps it means they can declare fast days on account of it), a door that is closed, does not open very easily (understood metaphorically - how?) and one who purchases a house in Israel from a gentile can write a deed on Shabbat (by asking a gentile to write it for them). The Gemara raises a contradiction on the first, brings two suggestions to understand the second and better explains in what way the third is permitted. 

In part 2 of this captivating three-part series, Dr. Jeffrey Rubenstein returns to our podcast to unravel the intricate tapestry of Talmudic narratives surrounding Elisha ben Abuyah, also known as "Aḥer" (the Other), the apostate. Exploring the accounts in the Mishna, Tosefta, Talmud Yerushalmi, and Talmud Bavli, Dr. Rubenstein provides a meticulous analysis of the traditions about Aḥer, examining the striking similarities, nuanced differences, varied approaches, and profound lessons embedded within the various cultural settings of these Aggadic stories. The episodes ponder the contemporary relevance of Aḥer, questioning what insights can be drawn from his enigmatic journey into "Pardes" to his brazen violation of halakha, and more. Join us as we dive into the intricate perspectives of the Sages on the heretic teacher of Rabbi Meir, contemplating the extent to which Torah lessons can be gleaned from a scholar who once stood within the religious fold. An intellectual odyssey awaits as we navigate the complexities of Aḥer's tale and unravel its timeless implications. Join us for episode 2 of 3 in the Aḥer series. (FYI this 3-part series was recorded over a span of a year, so some personal anecdotes should be understood in that context) *This episode is dedicated to the neshama of Meir ben Moshe a'h — Abdolrahim Ilian, the late father of our dear friend, Rod Ilian. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/judaismdemystified/support

Its a tour of Tannaitic texts, a veritable a Mishnah, Midrash, and Tosefta fabula in this week's daf. We focus on the daughters of Zelophehad and their inheritance and how that intertwines with the detailed discussions of inheriting the Land. Its all in this week's daf!This week's daf can found in the following places:1. Vilna page (Hebrew and Aramaic) from Hebrewbooks.org2. Hebrew and English from Sefaria.org3. Hebrew and Aramaic with many commentaries from Alhatorah.orgPlease be in touch with any comments, criticisms, or witticisms at thewidowandthebrothers@gmail.comBecome a Patron of Daf Shvui @ Patreon. 

In this captivating three-part series, Dr. Jeffrey Rubenstein returns to our podcast to unravel the intricate tapestry of Talmudic narratives surrounding Elisha ben Abuyah, also known as "Aḥer" (the Other), the apostate. Exploring the accounts in the Mishna, Tosefta, Talmud Yerushalmi, and Talmud Bavli, Dr. Rubenstein provides a meticulous analysis of the traditions about Aḥer, examining the striking similarities, nuanced differences, varied approaches, and profound lessons embedded within the various cultural settings of these Aggadic stories. The episodes ponder the contemporary relevance of Aḥer, questioning what insights can be drawn from his enigmatic journey into "Pardes" to his brazen violation of halakha, and more. Join us as we dive into the intricate perspectives of the Sages on the heretic teacher of Rabbi Meir, contemplating the extent to which Torah lessons can be gleaned from a scholar who once stood within the religious fold.An intellectual odyssey awaits as we navigate the complexities of Aḥer's tale and unravel its timeless implications. Join us for episode 1 of 3 in the Aḥer series. (FYI this 3-part series was recorded over a span of a year, so some personal anecdotes should be understood in that context. Also, it's ideal to watch this episode in particular on our YouTube channel because of all the slideshow visuals he provided. Go to YouTube and type in Judaism.Demystified in the search bar - please like, subscribe, and share while you're at it.) *This episode is dedicated to the neshama of Meir ben Moshe a'h — Abdolrahim Ilian, the late father of our dear friend, Rod Ilian. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/judaismdemystified/support

Todd and Daniel talk about some significant ancient texts: Targum Onkelos, Targum Jonathan, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, Tosefta, Mishnah, Talmud, Midrash, and other Second Temple texts.

Study Guide Nazir 56 Today's daf is sponsored by Ruth Leah Kahan with gratitude to HKB"H for her recovery and return to health one year after being caught in a chlorine gas leak. "Thanks to my family and friends around the world for their unstinting encouragement and support." Two further questions are raised against Rav Chisda’s understanding of our Mishna from tannaitic sources. One relates to a case where one is a nazir and possibly became impure and possibly was a leper but is unsure. The other relates to the source for the law that the days of leprosy are not counted as days of the nazirite's term. There are no resolutions to the difficulties. Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua that the impurities for which the nazir needs to shave are the same impurities that one is liable by the punishment of karet for entering the Temple. Impurities that the nazir does not need to shave for, are not punishable by karet if one enters the Temple with that state of impurity. Rabbi Meir raises a question on that - why would the latter category of impurity be more lenient than the light impurity of a sheretz, one of the eight creeping creatures who pass on impurity when dead? Why does our Mishna say that Rabbi Elazar quoted this law in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua when in the Tosefta it says that he learned it from Rabbi Yehoshua bar Mamel who heard it from Rabbi Yehoshua? We learn from here that when passing down a halacha in the name of a middle person who heard it from the source, one mentions the source and not the middle person from whom he learned it. Rabbi Akiva questions a law learned previously in the chapter - that a quarter-log of blood does not make a nazir shave. The question is a logical one: if a bone the size of a barley grain causes a nazir to shave, even though it only passes on impurity by touching or carrying, wouldn't a quarter-log of blood pass that passes on impurity also in a tent, also be a cause for the nazir to shave if he touches or carries it? Rabbi Yehoshua answered that while Rabbi Akiva's logic may be sound, the tradition passed down is not that way.

Rabbi Yehuda questioned the law in our Mishna as quoted by Sumchus "on a corpse and on an olive bulk from a dead corpse" - if an olive bulk is enough to make the nazir shave, obviously a whole corpse. Since Rabbi Yehuda was angry at this, Rabbi Yosi tries to explain the Mishna. However, his answer is rejected, but the Gemara quotes Rabbi Yochanan and Rava who each bring different ways to understand this phrase - either it was from a miscarried fetus whose limbs were not yet joined or it was bones from a very small corpse that did not contain the minimum size (1/4 kav) to pass on impurity, but they formed the majority of the limbs in the body or the majority of the structure of the body. Netzel is defined as liquid from a corpse that congealed. Why does it need to congeal? Is the law of netzel (liquid from a dead body carries impurity) also applicable to impurity of dead animals? If one holds that high-level impurity of a neveila (dead animal) is only for food that is fit to be eaten by humans, then netzel is clearly not impure in animals, but if one holds it must be fit to be eaten by a dog, then it may apply to animals as well. They try to answer the question from a braita about liquid cooked by the sun which does not carry impurity, but they conclude that it is so rotten that it is not even fit to be eaten by a dog and therefore can't be used to answer the question. Rami bar Hama asks a question on a Mishna in Machshirin 5:9 regarding thick liquids that when poured, both parts are considered as one and one part can make the other impure in this way. Rami bar Hama asks whether the rabbis disagree with Beit Shamai, do they hold that one part makes the other impure only if the substance flows backwards when the pouring stops or is it when the substance is so thick and sticky that it is viewed as one unit? The Tosefta in Ohalot 4:3 and our Mishna are quoted to answer the question, however, both attempts are rejected. How much is the requisite amount "melo tarvad" (a ladleful) mentioned in the Mishna? Two opinions are brought. A difficulty is raised against one of the opinions from a braita but it is resolved in two possible ways.

Study Guide Nazir 16 Today’s daf is sponsored by Joyce Bendavid in honor of Rabbanit Michelle. “Thank you to Rabbanit Michelle Farber for the clarity of your teaching as you motivate us to continue learning the daily daf.” If Rabbi Yossi holds that part of the day is considered a whole day regarding the impurity of a zava, how could one ever become a zava gedola? The Gemara brings two possible answers. The third chapter begins with a description of few different cases of one who took upon oneself to be a nazir either without a specified amount of time or with a specified amount of time. The Mishna explains in each case what is the ideal day for the sacrifices and shaving to take place and what is the law if it was done a day earlier. What if one became impure on the last day or on the day the sacrifices were to be brought? Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree in most cases. The Gemara explains the reasoning for Rabbi Eliezer in each of the different cases. If one takes upon oneself to be a nazir while they are in a cemetery, one is not considered that they became impure as a nazir and does not bring the sacrifices of a nazir who became impure as the nazirite status never began. But if one left and then came back in, even on the day that one became pure again, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer about whether or not they would be obligated in the sacrifices for one who becomes impure. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue about a case where one took upon to be a nazir in a cemetery - would that be effective once they became pure again (Rabbi Yochanan) or would they need only become a nazir if they reaccepted to be a nazir once they became pure? Rabbi Yochanan brings a number of sources to raise difficulties with Reish Lakish's position. The first one is from our Mishna and it is resolved, the second is from a Tosefta and is resolved.

Study Guide Nedarim 84 Today’s daf is sponsored by Adrienne Robb-Fund in honor of her friend and chavruta, Joanna Rom, on her birthday! Today’s daf is sponsored by Idana Goldberg on the first yahrzeit of Meyer Weitz, Meir Ben Yehoshua v’Leah. “An Orthodox feminist, my grandfather was so proud of my gemara knowledge and even in his 101st year always asked what masechet I was learning.” Rava challenged Rav Nachman from a different Mishna in the chapter which seemed to imply that the husband was included in a vow made against ‘all people’. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between the two Mishnayot. From our Mishna it has been established that a woman who vows to not benefit from others can collect the produce left in the fields but cannot collect produce from the tithe of the poor people. However, in the Tosefta the tithe for the poor people is added to the list with the other gifts for the poor. Rav Yosef suggests that the contradiction between the Mishna and the Tosefta can be resolved by connecting each source to a different tannaitic opinion. To prove this, he quotes a Mishna in Demai 4:3 which relates a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding the obligation to separate the tithe for the poor from produce taken from an am haaeretz. He connects their opinions there to whether or not the one who separates the tithe for the poor can decide who they want to give it to which would then translate as still being “owned” by them. But Abaye rejects Rav Yosef’s explanation because he does not see the point of contention between them as Rav Yosef did. Rava offers a different resolution in that the Mishna and the Tosefta refer to two different cases of the tithe for the poor - one who set aside it from in the house and the one who set it aside in the threshing floor/field. From the one at home, the owner can choose who to give it to but the one in the field has to be left ownerless for anyone to come to take. In the Mishna, there were two laws regarding a woman who vows that Kohanim/Levites won’t benefit from her. From the first case, it can be inferred that getting to choose who to give the gifts to is not considered financial value. From the second case, the opposite can be inferred. Rav Hoshaya suggests that each case represents a different tannaitic opinion and he quotes a braita where those opinions appear and explains how the root of the debate there is the same as here.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Yaffa Wenner in memory of her father, David ben Rab Shaya Meir Hakohen on his 26th yahrzeit. “May his neshama have an aliya, b’zchut our continued learning.”  Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Zoom family in memory of Leroy Muzzey, beloved father of Deborah Hoffman Wade and in memory of her chevruta, Simcha Elisheva bat Avraham v’Sarah. “May your memories and your learning bring you nechama.” A gezeira shava (comparison of two different sections where the same words are used) is made between the section of vows and the section dealing with one who slaughters an animal for a sacrifice outside of the Temple/Tabernacle from the words ‘ze hadavar’ that appear in both sections. From the comparison, it is derived that vows can be annulled with three regular people (not judges) and that if one slaughters an animal that was sanctified, one can annul the sanctification and thus avoid the karet punishment. Beit Shamai doesn’t hold by the rule about annulling sanctification so they conclude that he must not hold by the gezeira shava. If so, what do they learn from ‘ze hadavar’ in each of these sections? From where do they derive the law that three regular people can annul vows? It is derived from the verses of the holidays – as the holidays are differentiated from vows – holidays require judges to determine their sanctity (by declaring the new moon) while vows do not. Rabbi Chanina brings an exception to the rule that the husband must cancel his wife’s vows on the day he hears them. If he wants to rebuke her first for vowing, he can push off the nullification for up to ten days. Rava raises a difficulty with Rabbi Chanina’s statement from the Tosefta, but it is resolved.

English Study Guide Nedarim 75 Today's daf is sponsored by Anina, Plia, and Gordon Marx in honor of Sara Marx’s birthday. "We love you so much and are so inspired by your learning!" 

Study Guide Nedarim 74 Today’s daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein in memory of her father Yoel Halevi ben Mayer & Rivka Fromm. “A teenage holocaust survivor from Buchenwald, Aba arrived alone in Canada searching for his schlichut in life. He had a beautiful voice which he pierced the heavens Shabbat, Chag & zmirot. He dedicated his life to Torah and gmilut chasadim. As a member of the Kashrut Committee was instrumental in importing many kosher items to Montreal. Any loving advice was spiced with midrashim. He challenged my thirst for learning. I miss his special nigunim. He was my guiding light." If a woman is supposed to do levirate marriage with the brother of her deceased husband, does the yabam, the brother, allowed to nullify her vows? There are three opinions in the Mishna. The Mishna records a conversation between the three of them, each trying to prove his opinion. The Gemara explains each side, particularly as they relate to a debate in Yevamot about whether or not there is zika, a strong connection between the couple before levirate marriage is actually performed. However, Rabbi Eliezer's opinion is questioned as he permits the yabam to nullify even if there is only one brother. Rabbi Ami explains that Rabbi Eliezer holds this only if the yabam performed maamar (something similar to betrothal for a yibum situation). And that he holds by Beit Shamai who holds that maamar is a really act of acquiring. Two (or possibly three) difficulties are raised against Rabbi Ami but are resolved. The Tosefta is then quoted to support Rabbi Ami's understanding. 

Study Guide Nedarim 71 Today’s daf is sponsored by Elisa Hartstein in loving memory of her father Malcolm Minsk, Mordechai Nachum ben Tzvi v’Chaya Bluma, for whom she completes 11 months of kaddish today and who she misses very much. "Thanks to my kaddish buddies including daffers Judi and Emma for their support and companionship." The Mishnah stated that if a woman vowed while betrothed then divorced and got engaged on the same day, her father and new husband can annul the vow. Shmuel brings a proof from a verse to show that this is also true for vows that the first fiancé already knew about. The Gemara brings the Tosefta to support Shmuel's opinion. It emerges from the Tosefta that Beit Shammai believes that it is not possible for a second fiancé to break vows known to the first fiancé, but Beit Hillel holds that he can. The Gemara asks a question: If a husband divorces his wife, is the divorce considered a ratification of the vow or as silence? In what case would there be relevance to this question?    

Today’s daf is sponsored by Mark Baker in honor his wife Shoshana on their 29th wedding anniversary. “Marriage is enhanced with daf yomi in the mix. Love Mark.”