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After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse "the kohen who offers it shall eat it" that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim. The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those "fit for service" may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in eating. This raises a difficulty regarding blemished priests, who are unfit for offering yet still receive a share. To resolve this, the verse "all male kohanim" is understood to include them, and the Gemara analyzes why a tvul yom is excluded while a blemished priest is included. Reish Lakish further asks whether a blemished kohen who is also impure may receive a portion. Raba cites the case of the kohen gadol who, while an onen (mourner on the day of a relative's death), works in the Temple but cannot eat, and does not receive a share to eat later - showing that eligibility requires fitness for eating. Rav Oshaya raises a similar question about a kohen who is impure in a situation where impurity is permitted for communal offerings, and Ravina responds with the same proof from the kohen gadol, again affirming that fitness for eating is required. The Mishna states that an onen may touch sacred items, which contradicts a Mishna in Chagiga 21a requiring immersion for sacrificial items (kodashim). Three resolutions are offered: first, that our Mishna refers to before immersion, though this is rejected since immersion does not remove aninut; second, distinguishing between one who was careful to avoid impurity that conveys tumah but not impurity that disqualifies, versus one who was careful in all respects; and third, that our Mishna refers to touching, while Chagiga refers to eating. A source is brought to prove that there could be situations where one is careful about one type of impurity and not another, a distinction that carries halakhic consequences. Since the Mishna rules that an onen does not receive a share, it seems to imply that he may nevertheless eat sacrificial meat. Yet this conflicts with Pesachim 91b, which teaches that an onen may immerse and eat the Passover sacrifice at night but not other offerings. The resolution distinguishes between Passover, where eating is permitted due to its unique requirements, and other sacrifices throughout the year. This leads to mention of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over whether nighttime aninut is biblical or rabbinic, since the permission for the onen to eat the Passover sacrifice rests on Rabbi Shimon's view that it is rabbinic. However, a braita suggests that Rabbi Shimon holds aninut at night to be a Torah law. Two possible resolutions are offered to reconcile this apparent contradiction.  

After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse "the kohen who offers it shall eat it" that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim. The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those "fit for service" may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in eating. This raises a difficulty regarding blemished priests, who are unfit for offering yet still receive a share. To resolve this, the verse "all male kohanim" is understood to include them, and the Gemara analyzes why a tvul yom is excluded while a blemished priest is included. Reish Lakish further asks whether a blemished kohen who is also impure may receive a portion. Raba cites the case of the kohen gadol who, while an onen (mourner on the day of a relative's death), works in the Temple but cannot eat, and does not receive a share to eat later - showing that eligibility requires fitness for eating. Rav Oshaya raises a similar question about a kohen who is impure in a situation where impurity is permitted for communal offerings, and Ravina responds with the same proof from the kohen gadol, again affirming that fitness for eating is required. The Mishna states that an onen may touch sacred items, which contradicts a Mishna in Chagiga 21a requiring immersion for sacrificial items (kodashim). Three resolutions are offered: first, that our Mishna refers to before immersion, though this is rejected since immersion does not remove aninut; second, distinguishing between one who was careful to avoid impurity that conveys tumah but not impurity that disqualifies, versus one who was careful in all respects; and third, that our Mishna refers to touching, while Chagiga refers to eating. A source is brought to prove that there could be situations where one is careful about one type of impurity and not another, a distinction that carries halakhic consequences. Since the Mishna rules that an onen does not receive a share, it seems to imply that he may nevertheless eat sacrificial meat. Yet this conflicts with Pesachim 91b, which teaches that an onen may immerse and eat the Passover sacrifice at night but not other offerings. The resolution distinguishes between Passover, where eating is permitted due to its unique requirements, and other sacrifices throughout the year. This leads to mention of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over whether nighttime aninut is biblical or rabbinic, since the permission for the onen to eat the Passover sacrifice rests on Rabbi Shimon's view that it is rabbinic. However, a braita suggests that Rabbi Shimon holds aninut at night to be a Torah law. Two possible resolutions are offered to reconcile this apparent contradiction.  

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita, urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva (rok tafel). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa, whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip (kutach). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita, urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva (rok tafel). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa, whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip (kutach). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.

last midrash of the week

Study Guide Rami bar Hama asks Rav Chisda whether blood that splashes onto a garment already impure requires laundering. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua explains that the question hinges on whether laundering is unnecessary only when impurity and disqualification occur sequentially, or even when they occur simultaneously. Rav Chisda connects the issue to a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis regarding the status of mei chatat that became impure, as interpreted by Abaye. To clarify Abaye's understanding, the Gemara presents a broader disagreement among Raba, Abaye, and Rava about the nature of the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis. A braita teaches that only blood fit for sprinkling requires laundering, excluding blood already disqualified. Rabbi Akiva rules that blood which had a moment of fitness and was later disqualified does require laundering, while Rabbi Shimon maintains that disqualified blood never requires it. The Mishna rules that blood splashed from the neck of the animal, or from the altar's corner or base, does not require laundering, nor does blood spilled on the floor and later gathered, since only blood received in a vessel and fit for sprinkling requires laundering. Two braitot are cited to demonstrate how these laws are derived from verses in the Torah. The Gemara further clarifies that the requirement of being "capable of sprinkling" excludes cases where less than the requisite measure was received in each vessel. Rava explains that this principle is rooted in a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 4:6. After presenting several drashot on the different words of that verse, the Gemara analyzes them both in relation to one another - explaining why each was necessary - and in relation to other statements. The Mishna continues with blood splashed on the hide: before flaying it does not require laundering, but after flaying it does. Rabbi Elazar limits laundering to the place of the blood and only where the material is susceptible to impurity. A braita extends laundering obligations to garments, sackcloth, and hides, and specifies that laundering, breaking of earthenware vessels, and rinsing of copper vessels must all be performed in a sacred place. Laundering is a stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other kodshei kodashim.

Study Guide Rami bar Hama asks Rav Chisda whether blood that splashes onto a garment already impure requires laundering. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua explains that the question hinges on whether laundering is unnecessary only when impurity and disqualification occur sequentially, or even when they occur simultaneously. Rav Chisda connects the issue to a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis regarding the status of mei chatat that became impure, as interpreted by Abaye. To clarify Abaye's understanding, the Gemara presents a broader disagreement among Raba, Abaye, and Rava about the nature of the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis. A braita teaches that only blood fit for sprinkling requires laundering, excluding blood already disqualified. Rabbi Akiva rules that blood which had a moment of fitness and was later disqualified does require laundering, while Rabbi Shimon maintains that disqualified blood never requires it. The Mishna rules that blood splashed from the neck of the animal, or from the altar's corner or base, does not require laundering, nor does blood spilled on the floor and later gathered, since only blood received in a vessel and fit for sprinkling requires laundering. Two braitot are cited to demonstrate how these laws are derived from verses in the Torah. The Gemara further clarifies that the requirement of being "capable of sprinkling" excludes cases where less than the requisite measure was received in each vessel. Rava explains that this principle is rooted in a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 4:6. After presenting several drashot on the different words of that verse, the Gemara analyzes them both in relation to one another - explaining why each was necessary - and in relation to other statements. The Mishna continues with blood splashed on the hide: before flaying it does not require laundering, but after flaying it does. Rabbi Elazar limits laundering to the place of the blood and only where the material is susceptible to impurity. A braita extends laundering obligations to garments, sackcloth, and hides, and specifies that laundering, breaking of earthenware vessels, and rinsing of copper vessels must all be performed in a sacred place. Laundering is a stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other kodshei kodashim.

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  Raba and Rav Chisda disagree on two issues. If items were not completely consumed on the altar, removed before midnight, and returned after midnight, at what point are they considered "consumed" such that they no longer need to be put back on the altar if removed again (assuming they have not yet turned to ash, in which case they would not need to be returned)? Raba rules that they are considered consumed at midnight of the following night, while Rav Chisda holds that the cutoff is dawn. If the items were not returned until after dawn, Raba still maintains that midnight of the next night renders them consumed, whereas Rav Chisda insists they can never be rendered consumed. Rav Yosef challenges the premise of both opinions, which assume that items not on the altar at midnight cannot be rendered consumed. He argues instead that midnight itself renders all items consumed, even if they were removed before midnight and not yet returned to the altar. Rava asked Raba: If items remain at the top of the altar all night, does that prevent them from becoming disqualified through lina (remaining overnight)? Raba answered that they are not disqualified, but Rava did not accept this response. A braita is cited, providing a source in the Torah that the ramp and sanctified vessels also sanctify disqualified items. If such items are placed on the ramp or the altar, they do not need to be removed. Reish Lakish posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding disqualified items placed in sanctified vessels. Initially, Rabbi Yochanan thought the question was whether they were sanctified to the extent that they could not be redeemed. Reish Lakish clarified that he was asking whether items placed in sanctified vessels could be brought ab initio on the altar. Rabbi Yochanan answered yes, based on the Mishna, but this answer was rejected since the Mishna could be read differently. The Gemara then asks: Does the airspace of the altar sanctify items? At first, it attempts to prove that the airspace does sanctify from the Mishna's statement: "Just as the altar sanctifies, so does the ramp." Items sanctified by the ramp must be carried through the altar's airspace to reach it. If the airspace does not sanctify, then carrying them would be akin to removing them, and once removed, they could not be returned. However, this proof is rejected, since it is possible to bring them to the altar by dragging rather than lifting. Rava bar Rav Chanan then attempts to prove the opposite from the case of a bird burnt offering brought at the top of the altar. If the airspace sanctifies, then there could be no case of pigul (disqualification due to improper intent), because as long as the offering remains on the altar, it could be sacrificed even the next day. Thus, a thought to offer it the next day would not constitute pigul. Rav Shimi rejects this argument, explaining that one could still have a pigul thought to remove the offering and then put it back on the altar the next day, which would indeed be disqualifying.

  Raba and Rav Chisda disagree on two issues. If items were not completely consumed on the altar, removed before midnight, and returned after midnight, at what point are they considered "consumed" such that they no longer need to be put back on the altar if removed again (assuming they have not yet turned to ash, in which case they would not need to be returned)? Raba rules that they are considered consumed at midnight of the following night, while Rav Chisda holds that the cutoff is dawn. If the items were not returned until after dawn, Raba still maintains that midnight of the next night renders them consumed, whereas Rav Chisda insists they can never be rendered consumed. Rav Yosef challenges the premise of both opinions, which assume that items not on the altar at midnight cannot be rendered consumed. He argues instead that midnight itself renders all items consumed, even if they were removed before midnight and not yet returned to the altar. Rava asked Raba: If items remain at the top of the altar all night, does that prevent them from becoming disqualified through lina (remaining overnight)? Raba answered that they are not disqualified, but Rava did not accept this response. A braita is cited, providing a source in the Torah that the ramp and sanctified vessels also sanctify disqualified items. If such items are placed on the ramp or the altar, they do not need to be removed. Reish Lakish posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding disqualified items placed in sanctified vessels. Initially, Rabbi Yochanan thought the question was whether they were sanctified to the extent that they could not be redeemed. Reish Lakish clarified that he was asking whether items placed in sanctified vessels could be brought ab initio on the altar. Rabbi Yochanan answered yes, based on the Mishna, but this answer was rejected since the Mishna could be read differently. The Gemara then asks: Does the airspace of the altar sanctify items? At first, it attempts to prove that the airspace does sanctify from the Mishna's statement: "Just as the altar sanctifies, so does the ramp." Items sanctified by the ramp must be carried through the altar's airspace to reach it. If the airspace does not sanctify, then carrying them would be akin to removing them, and once removed, they could not be returned. However, this proof is rejected, since it is possible to bring them to the altar by dragging rather than lifting. Rava bar Rav Chanan then attempts to prove the opposite from the case of a bird burnt offering brought at the top of the altar. If the airspace sanctifies, then there could be no case of pigul (disqualification due to improper intent), because as long as the offering remains on the altar, it could be sacrificed even the next day. Thus, a thought to offer it the next day would not constitute pigul. Rav Shimi rejects this argument, explaining that one could still have a pigul thought to remove the offering and then put it back on the altar the next day, which would indeed be disqualifying.

In a set of intermingled parts of sacrifices, including from a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one was sacrificed, we can "assume" that the one sacrificed was the blemished one and all the others are permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer follows a unique opinion, that of Chanan the Egyptian, who holds that animals, even after slaughter, are not considered "rejected," and if they are brought on the altar, they can be accepted. Similarly, Rav Nachman cites a ruling of Rav that if one ring of idol worship was mixed in with many other rings, and one fell into the sea, all the rest are permitted. After Rava raised a difficulty on this from the Mishna—that all the animals are left to die, so why wouldn't we permit them after the first one dies—the Gemara concludes that Rav holds like Rabbi Eliezer. It is then established that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rav would permit the others only if they are sacrificed or sold in pairs, since one of the pair will certainly be a permitted item. Rav also ruled in a case where there were one hundred rings with one being of idol worship. If they were separated into sixty and forty, and then one from each section was mixed into separate sets of rings, the one that came from the forty is permitted based on a safek sefeika—two doubts: likely it was in the sixty, and even if it was in the forty, likely it remained in the original forty. Shmuel disagreed and did not permit safek sefeika in idol worship. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position from a braita that permits it, but it is established that there is a tannaitic debate. Reish Lakish brings a similar ruling to Rav Nachman regarding a barrel of wine of truma. The Gemara explains why both his case and Rav Nachman's case needed to be ruled on separately, as one would not necessarily be able to infer one from the other. Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about the extent to which Reish Lakish's leniency applies. Rabbi Elazar rules leniently in a case of a barrel of truma, but his ruling is modified after Rav Nachman raised a difficulty against it. Rabbi Oshaya rules about a similar case, adding another potential issue. The Mishna discusses a situation in which a treifa is mixed in with other animals. As a treifa should be recognizable, the Gemara asks how such a situation could occur. Three possible answers are given. If sacrifices of the same type are intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are sacrificed for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in sacrifices where smicha is necessary, how can the sacrifice be brought—since one cannot perform smicha on someone else's sacrifice? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha.

In a set of intermingled parts of sacrifices, including from a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one was sacrificed, we can "assume" that the one sacrificed was the blemished one and all the others are permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer follows a unique opinion, that of Chanan the Egyptian, who holds that animals, even after slaughter, are not considered "rejected," and if they are brought on the altar, they can be accepted. Similarly, Rav Nachman cites a ruling of Rav that if one ring of idol worship was mixed in with many other rings, and one fell into the sea, all the rest are permitted. After Rava raised a difficulty on this from the Mishna—that all the animals are left to die, so why wouldn't we permit them after the first one dies—the Gemara concludes that Rav holds like Rabbi Eliezer. It is then established that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rav would permit the others only if they are sacrificed or sold in pairs, since one of the pair will certainly be a permitted item. Rav also ruled in a case where there were one hundred rings with one being of idol worship. If they were separated into sixty and forty, and then one from each section was mixed into separate sets of rings, the one that came from the forty is permitted based on a safek sefeika—two doubts: likely it was in the sixty, and even if it was in the forty, likely it remained in the original forty. Shmuel disagreed and did not permit safek sefeika in idol worship. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position from a braita that permits it, but it is established that there is a tannaitic debate. Reish Lakish brings a similar ruling to Rav Nachman regarding a barrel of wine of truma. The Gemara explains why both his case and Rav Nachman's case needed to be ruled on separately, as one would not necessarily be able to infer one from the other. Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about the extent to which Reish Lakish's leniency applies. Rabbi Elazar rules leniently in a case of a barrel of truma, but his ruling is modified after Rav Nachman raised a difficulty against it. Rabbi Oshaya rules about a similar case, adding another potential issue. The Mishna discusses a situation in which a treifa is mixed in with other animals. As a treifa should be recognizable, the Gemara asks how such a situation could occur. Three possible answers are given. If sacrifices of the same type are intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are sacrificed for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in sacrifices where smicha is necessary, how can the sacrifice be brought—since one cannot perform smicha on someone else's sacrifice? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha.

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Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.  

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Rava explains the Torah source for cases of improper intent (machshava) that disqualify sacrifices - specifically, when one intends to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial parts, or eat the meat “outside its time” or “outside its location.” The intent of outside its time renders the sacrifice pigul and incurs the punishment of karet for one who eats the meat, whereas outside its location does not carry that penalty. Rava explains that all these laws are derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:18, which also serves as the basis for additional halakhot related to pigul. An alternative interpretation is cited in a braita, which understands that verse as referring to someone who actually ate the meat beyond its designated time (on the third day), rather than to a disqualifying thought during the sacrificial process. Various drashot are brought on the wording of that verse and related verses, such as Vayikra 19:7, to further clarify the scope and implications of pigul. If one has a disqualifying thought of outside its time, but the sacrifice is also performed incorrectly in another way, such as outside its location, the punishment of karet does not apply. However, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and rules that if the outside its time thought occurred first, the sacrifice is considered pigul and punishable by karet. Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite.  

جایی که دالت ד هست منظور به ה میباشد

Harav Yussie Zakutinsky Shlita

What does it really mean to be not provoked? I called in my dear friend Andrew Raba for this one, because he's the final and complete master of Shanti, obviously never disturbed by anything ever. Well, not quite. But we did want to talk about this phrase from the tradition: Om Shanti Shanti Shanti. It's something we've both chanted a thousand times, but the meaning that's really stuck with us is one we learned from Mark, “not provoked.” Andrew shared so honestly about a moment where he lost it in front of a whole group of students. A group of teenage boys showed up to Yoga class, laughing and disrupting everything, and he found himself cold with anger. He was teaching Shanti, and he was not feeling it. What happened next was such a beautiful reminder of how the practice works over time, and how Om comes first for a reason. I loved this conversation so much. It's about friendship, real practice, and what becomes possible when we stop trying to be peaceful and start actually digesting what provokes us. Key Takeaways Not Provoked Is a Practice – Shanti doesn't mean calm or passive. It means being able to receive life without being hijacked by memory or reaction. Yoga as Internal Bomb Diffusal – The point of practice is to clear out those little bombs of pain that get lit up in a relationship. Om Comes First – Om reminds us that life is already complete. From that remembrance, peace becomes possible. Reaction Is a Signal – If I'm reacting, I'm being shown something. That's not failure. That's the moment the fruit is ripe to fall. Shame Doesn't Heal – Beating ourselves up for being reactive just keeps the cycle going. What helps is love, humor, and depersonalizing the pain. Peace Improves Relationships – The true test of Yoga isn't how long you can chant. It's whether your practice helps you stay open when you'd normally shut down. Where to Find Our Guest Andrew Raba's Website: https://www.yogainschools.org.nz Andrew Raba on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/_andyraba_  Links & Resources You are the beauty. You are the intelligence. You are already in perfect harmony with life. You don't need to seek it. You need only participate in it. Learn more and access the course at https://www.heartofyoga.com  Support the Heart of Yoga Foundation.  This podcast is sustained by your donations.

Danes je na sporedu prelomna oddaja. Ker so prelomni časi, v katerih živimo. Kot vidimo, medijsko panogo počasi jemlje hudič, zato pa se krepi obrambna panoga. Tako je povsem normalno, da se kreativni del naše skromne redakcije razpušča in se seli, skupaj s kreativnostjo, na področje obrambne in vojaške industrije. Kako kmalu se bomo vključili v slovenski obrambni grozd, še ni povsem jasno; je pa zanimiv podatek, da se je, čim smo se Evropejci zavezali v obrambo pognati milijarde evrov, obrambni grozd povečal s petdesetih jagod na več kot sto trideset podjetij. Tako se bomo le preimenovali iz »zapisov iz močvirja« v pošasti iz močvirja in začeli služiti denar. Nasproti nam je prišla država v podobi nenadkriljivega Damirja Črnčeca. Kjerkoli se srečajo obramba, vpliv in denar, je najti tudi tega podjetnega strokovnjaka za obrambo; tako ne čudi, kako mu vsi priznavajo, da je prav njemu uspelo znotraj Slovenskega državnega holdinga ustanoviti podjetje, imenovano Dovos. »Družbo za obrambo, varnost in odpornost Slovenije«. Ker se bomo danes s kraticami še srečevali, naj izrazimo samo razočaranje, saj bi bilo ime družbe mnogo bolj zveneče, če bi prvi o spremenili v a, ali pa vsaj zadnji s v z. Kakorkoli; v kratkem – nekje do konca oktobra – je pričakovati javni poziv za prijavljanje obrambnih projektov, ki jih bo sofinancirala ali pa v celoti financirala država. Ker gre za eno največjih naložbenih priložnosti zadnjih desetletij, smo v našem novem obrambnem podjetju takoj zagnali nekaj projektov, ki jih kanimo prijaviti na javni poziv. Prvi projekt se imenuje P.E.N.I.S, kar je kratica za »Prenosni eliptični napadalni izstrelek Slovenije«. Do konca ga bomo sicer razvili, ko dobimo državne milijone; za zdaj lahko z javnostjo delimo samo osnovne taktične karakteristike in potrebne resurse za izdelavo tega obrambnega sistema. Za začetek potrebujemo močno leskovo palico in nekaj leskovih šib. Nato je treba palico elipsoidno upogniti in jo v elipsi držati z uporabo motvoza ali pa plastične vrvi za obešanje perila. Nato je treba s kuhinjskim nožem opremiti visokotehnološke leskove šibe – z utorom na eni in z bojno konico na drugi strani. Tako dobimo multifunkcijski obrambni sistem, saj je mišljeno, da se lahko P.E.N.I.S uporablja proti ciljem na kopnem, v morju in v zraku. YYYDrugi obrambni sistem, na katerem delamo v našem obrambno-raziskovalnem laboratoriju, se imenuje N.A.T.E.G, kar stoji za »natezni avtomatsko-taktični eruptor granat«. Kot za penis imamo tudi za nateg že izdelane prve inženirske skice; kot rečeno, pa ga bomo do konca razvili šele, ko dobimo od države nakazanih približno sto milijonov evrov, kolikor naj bi veljala fabrikacija tega orožja.  Za osnovo smo si zamislili rogovilo, najbolje bukovo, ki jo prirežemo v obliki črke ipsilon. Na zgornji tretjini obeh krajših delov rogovile, z visokotehnološkim »3D« rezkalnikom oziroma pipcem urežemo dva utora, v katera pritrdimo gumico, ki so jo mati zavrgli s kozarca vloženih hrušk. To orožje, v Natovi terminologiji imenovano »launcher« ali »frača« po domače, je enkratno predvsem zaradi velike prilagodljivosti kalibra posameznega izstrelka. Lahko izstreljuje gramoz kalibra »poljčanar«, posamezne prodnike, pa vse do klasičnega Natovega kalibra 7,62 mm. Edino, kjer bomo morali biti pazljivi, in Damir Črnčec bo pri tem kot nadzornik Dovosa še posebej natančen, je dvojna raba vojaških projektov, sprejetih v program. Kot vemo, evropske države, tako tudi Slovenija, ne bodo slepo in po ameriškem diktatu investirale v obrambno industrijo, ki ne bo znala početi nič drugega, kot ubijati sovražnika; oziroma kot se vidi v Združenih državah, pobijati naključne mimoidoče. Ob vojaški rabi morajo projekti imeti vsaj nekakšno funkcijo tudi v civilni sferi, in na srečo ga naša projekta P.E.N.I.S  in N.A.T.E.G imata. Ko bodo ostali vojaški projekti, ki se prav v tem trenutku globalno rojevajo v podobnih državnih podjetjih, kot je Dovos, realizirani … Se pravi, ko bodo damirji črnčeci po vsem planetu odlično opravili svoje delo in mirnodobski denar transformirali v ne-mirnodobskega ter posledično požgali civilizacijo …  Takrat bo mogoče s penisom zalezovati mamuta in ga ob sodelovanju vsega plemena tudi upleniti. In ko bomo mamutovine siti Slovenci zrli v nočno nebo, bomo lahko, kot dvojno rabo, vrhovnemu nategu posvetili plemensko daritev.  

In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.

In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.

The Special Quality of the Arava, Especially as the Arava of Hoshanah Rabbah

In trying to answer whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments neglected after the animal was designated (between designation and slaughter) or only for those neglected before designation, the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon. He explains that the reason two goats are offered on Shavuot is that the second goat atones for impurities in the Temple that occurred after the first goat was offered. If both goats were designated at the same time, this would support the view that an offering can atone for sins committed after designation. A difficulty is raised with that proof because it assumes simultaneous designation; perhaps the second goat needs to be designated only after the first was offered. That possibility is hard to accept because the verse does not indicate a later designation. Rav Papa also rejects the proof, suggesting instead that the court could stipulate from the outset that the second goat will only become sanctified after the blood of the first goat is offered. Two objections are raised to Rav Papa’s reply. First, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the court's stipulations—he therefore would not recognize a court’s postponement of consecration, as shown by his ruling that animals reserved for one year cannot serve as the Tamid in the following year. Second, Rabbi Yirmeya’s question about whether the second goat can cover impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the first goat’s blood and the second’s implies it was understood that the goat covers from the time of designation. That second difficulty is, however, resolved, and the original question remains unanswered. There is a dispute between Raba and Rav Chisda about a toda (thanksgiving offering) brought on behalf of another who needs to bring a toda. Each presents his reasoning; Raba cites a baraita in support, but his proof is rejected. Rava gives six rulings about issues of incorrect intention during the sacrificial rites and adds a seventh about the nature of the olah (burnt offering). He teaches that the olah does not itself provide atonement; rather, it is a gift to God offered after a person has repented for not fulfilling a positive commandment. If the person has not yet repented, the offering provides no atonement, for the sacrifices of the wicked are despicable. The Mishna states that both a sin offering and a Pesach sacrifice brought for the sake of the wrong sacrifice or for the wrong person are disqualified. The Gemara first adduces the source for this rule for Pesach and then for the sin offering.  

In trying to answer whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments neglected after the animal was designated (between designation and slaughter) or only for those neglected before designation, the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon. He explains that the reason two goats are offered on Shavuot is that the second goat atones for impurities in the Temple that occurred after the first goat was offered. If both goats were designated at the same time, this would support the view that an offering can atone for sins committed after designation. A difficulty is raised with that proof because it assumes simultaneous designation; perhaps the second goat needs to be designated only after the first was offered. That possibility is hard to accept because the verse does not indicate a later designation. Rav Papa also rejects the proof, suggesting instead that the court could stipulate from the outset that the second goat will only become sanctified after the blood of the first goat is offered. Two objections are raised to Rav Papa’s reply. First, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the court's stipulations—he therefore would not recognize a court’s postponement of consecration, as shown by his ruling that animals reserved for one year cannot serve as the Tamid in the following year. Second, Rabbi Yirmeya’s question about whether the second goat can cover impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the first goat’s blood and the second’s implies it was understood that the goat covers from the time of designation. That second difficulty is, however, resolved, and the original question remains unanswered. There is a dispute between Raba and Rav Chisda about a toda (thanksgiving offering) brought on behalf of another who needs to bring a toda. Each presents his reasoning; Raba cites a baraita in support, but his proof is rejected. Rava gives six rulings about issues of incorrect intention during the sacrificial rites and adds a seventh about the nature of the olah (burnt offering). He teaches that the olah does not itself provide atonement; rather, it is a gift to God offered after a person has repented for not fulfilling a positive commandment. If the person has not yet repented, the offering provides no atonement, for the sacrifices of the wicked are despicable. The Mishna states that both a sin offering and a Pesach sacrifice brought for the sake of the wrong sacrifice or for the wrong person are disqualified. The Gemara first adduces the source for this rule for Pesach and then for the sin offering.  

Before one learns Torah in the morning, he must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. The Gemara cites different opinions as to which particular subjects within the broad corpus of Torah may not be studied before the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. Rav Huna maintained that only the study of Tanach requires Birkot Ha'Torah; in his view, one may study anything else before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. Rabbi Elazar ruled that both Tanach and Midrash require Birkot Ha'Torah, because the Midrash explains the verses of the Tanach. The next opinion brought is that of Rabbi Yohanan, who held that even the study of Mishna must be preceded by Birkot Ha'Torah. However, Halacha follows the final view brought by the Gemara – that of Raba, who asserted that even Gemara requires Birkot Ha'Torah. Accordingly, the Rambam and Shulhan Aruch write that one must recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying either Tanach or any part of Torah She'be'al Peh (the oral law). Although the Shulhan Aruch does not specify the study of Midrash, the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles of Cracow, 1520-1572) adds that Midrash also requires the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. The Peri Hadash (Rav Hizkiya Da Silva, 1659-1698) writes that the Shulhan Aruch does not disagree with the Rama on this point, even though he did not specifically mention Midrash. The Aruch Ha'shulhan (Rav Yehiel Michel Epstein of Nevardok, 1829-1908) notes the possibility of restricting this requirement to areas related to Halacha. It is possible, he writes, that Birkot Ha'Torah is required only before the study of texts that form the basis of Halacha. The Sages infer Halachot from the verses, and these inferences and their applications are discussed, elucidated and debated in the Midrash, Mishna and Gemara – and it might be for this reason that these texts are specified as the material requiring Birkot Ha'Torah. If so, then one would be permitted to study non-halachic portions of the Torah – such as the stories in Midrashic texts, Aggadic portions of the Gemara, and Zohar – before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. The Aruch Ha'shulhan remains uncertain about this matter. By contrast, the Kaf Ha'haim Sofer (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939) writes that the study of the Zohar requires Birkot Ha'Torah. He does not explain the reason for this ruling, but we may presume that he equated the study of Zohar with the study of Gemara, and, moreover, we occasionally determine practical Halacha based on teachings in the Zohar. The final Halacha is that even the study of non-halachic texts such as the Midrash and Zohar requires Birkot Ha'Torah. The study of works of Mussar also requires Birkot Ha'Torah, because these works are based upon Torah sources. Texts such as Mesilat Yesharim and Michtab Me'Eliyahu, which guide and instruct how to live a religious life, are rooted entirely in Torah, and so they certainly qualify as parts of Torah requiring the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. This applies to works of Hassidic teachings, as well. In principle, biographies of Sadikim, or story books that tell about the lives of great Sages, may be read before Birkot Ha'Torah, because reading these stories – despite being very valuable – does not qualify as the study of Torah. In practice, however, books about great Rabbis almost invariably contain Torah insights which they taught, and so they require Birkot Ha'Torah. One is not required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying general subjects, even those subjects which have great value and are important to learn. For example, one must study math in order to properly understand certain sections of the Gemara, such as those which deal with geometry (e.g. Sukka, Erubin and Kil'ayim). There are texts which address the dimensions and layout of the Bet Ha'mikdash which similarly cannot be understood without a background in mathematics. Scientific knowledge, too, is critically important for the understanding of certain sections of the Talmud – such as the Gemara's discussion about the volume of wine which a Nazir must drink to be liable for violating his vow, which touches upon the subject of volume displacement. This issue requires an understanding of how displacement works, and how the density of wine becomes a factor. One cannot understand the portions of the Talmud that deal with the Jewish calendar without basic knowledge of astronomy. An understanding of modern technology, too, is necessary for learning how Halacha applies in our time, and indeed, Hacham Ovadia Yosef studied the mechanics of boilers in order to determine the relevant Halachot. Nevertheless, the study of these subjects does not require Birkot Ha'Torah, since they are not actual Torah, but rather background information to help in the study of Torah. The Rambam writes that subjects such as mathematics and science are the "chefs" and "maidservants" of Torah, meaning, they are necessary for the understanding of Torah, but are not part of Torah. Therefore, one is not required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying general subjects. Summary: One may not learn any Torah subject before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. This includes Tanach, Midrash, Mishna, Gemara, Halachic texts, Zohar, Mussar and Hassidut. Biographies of Sadikim, too, require Birkot Ha'Torah since they usually incorporate Torah insights by the Sages whose lives and legacy they present. Birkot Ha'Torah is not required before the study of non-Torah subjects, even those which are necessary to learn to properly understand Torah.

Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l’chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch." A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted. Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn’t answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir’s teachings were transmitted as “acherim” (“others”), and Rabbi Natan’s as “yesh omrim” (“some say”). Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile. A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as “acherim omrim.” When his son asked why he didn’t cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family’s honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying “They say in the name of Rabbi Meir.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can “uproot mountains”? Rav Yosef was a sinai, while Raba was an oker Harim. Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba’s tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect. In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others. The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku.

Siyum Masechet Horayot and Seder Nezikin is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of their beloved mother/grandmother Ruth Zemsky z"l, Raizel bat Chaya Kayla, on her 9th yahrzeit on 23rd of Elul. "Marking the completion of Nezikin, a seder that is focused on bein adam l’chavero- both in the building and healing of society, aptly reflects the life she lead. She was a paragon of sensitivity and taking care of "the other", often those unseen, in community, work and home. Her example continues to inspire us all. Yehi zichra baruch." A braita outlines the protocols for showing respect to the Nasi, the Av Beit Din, and the Chacham—each accorded honor in a distinct manner. This differentiation was instituted by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (the Nasi) on a day when Rabbi Natan (Av Beit Din) and Rabbi Meir (the Chacham) were absent from the Beit Midrash. Feeling slighted, they conspired to remove Rabban Shimon from his position. However, their plan was overheard by Rabbi Yaakov ben Karshi and ultimately thwarted. Upon discovering their plot, Rabban Shimon expelled them from the Beit Midrash. In response, they began submitting challenging questions into the study hall. When the students inside couldn’t answer, they would send in the correct answers. Rabbi Yosi eventually intervened, arguing that it was absurd for Torah to remain outside while the students sat within. Rabban Shimon agreed to reinstate them—but imposed a penalty: the Torah they taught would no longer be attributed to them by name. Thus, Rabbi Meir’s teachings were transmitted as “acherim” (“others”), and Rabbi Natan’s as “yesh omrim” (“some say”). Later, they both dreamt that they should seek reconciliation with Rabban Shimon. Only Rabbi Natan acted on the dream. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was not exactly willing to reconcile. A generation later, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was teaching his son, Rabbi Shimon, a teaching of Rabbi Meir, referring to it as “acherim omrim.” When his son asked why he didn’t cite Rabbi Meir directly, Rabbi Yehuda explained that these sages had once tried to undermine their family’s honor. Rabbi Shimon replied that they were long deceased and had failed in their attempt. Rabbi Yehuda relented and agreed to cite Rabbi Meir—though still indirectly, saying “They say in the name of Rabbi Meir.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and other sages also debated a broader question: is it better to be a sinai - one with vast Torah knowledge, or an oker Harim - one with powerful analytical skills who can “uproot mountains”? Rav Yosef was a sinai, while Raba was an oker Harim. Although the scholars in Israel recommended Rav Yosef for leadership, he humbly deferred to Raba. Raba led the yeshiva for 22 years, and only after his passing did Rav Yosef assume the role. During Raba’s tenure, Rav Yosef refrained from receiving honor out of respect. In another case, Abaye, Rava, Rabbi Zeira, and Raba bar Matna were studying together and needed a leader. Abaye was chosen, as his teachings remained unrefuted, unlike the others. The Gemara concludes with a question: who was greater—Rabbi Zeira or Raba bar Rav Matna? Each had unique strengths, and the matter is left unresolved with the classic Talmudic closure: teiku.

In der letzten Episode der diesjährigen Saisonvorschau blickt Yannick mit Kai Bieler auf die anstehende Spielzeit von RaBa Leipzig.

Kelly Sepelyak is a Silicon Valley native driven by a passion for blending communications and technology to fuel innovation. As an Executive Assistant at RABA, she plays a key role in optimizing operations, leading impactful outreach efforts, and building meaningful connections within the community. Kelly is deeply committed to advancing accessibility and ensuring public services truly reflect the needs of those they serve.Tune in to discover how Kelly and other young changemakers are creating space to grow alongside their downtown—and how you can be part of the movement.

When there's hasra and you make a shvua what's the punishment,and Raba when your kofer against eidim your patur from a korban,and Reb yochanan that shvua kneged shtar is patur

Regarding an oath on a deposit, Rav Kahana questions: if witnesses warned the person before taking the oath, that in the event they are lying, they will receive lashes, will they receive lashes in addition to a sacrifice or in place of the sacrifice? Several attempts are made to answer his question from various sources, but none are conclusive. Raba then challenges Rav Kahana's question and suggests that there can never be such a case because if there are witnesses to warn, then they must also be witnesses to the act in which case the denial is irrelevant as the witnesses can make the person pay, regardless of their denial. The Gemara then attempts to prove and then disprove this assumption of Raba that if there are witnesses, one cannot be obligated for an oath of deposit. Only from the last source do they succeed in conclusively disproving this assumption. Is an oath of deposit relevant in a case relating to land?

Public transit in Redding is getting a major upgrade. In this episode, we talk with Redding Area Bus Authority (RABA) Transit General Manager John Andoh and EA Kelly Sepelyak about the many new services and innovations transforming how people move around Shasta County.From free shuttles to the Redding Rodeo and discounted rides to Colt 45s games, to the return of the summer Beach Bus and a brand-new Uber partnership — RABA is making transit more accessible, convenient, and connected than ever before. Riders can now plan and pay for trips through the Moovit app, combining RABA buses with scooters, e-bikes, Uber rides, and on-demand service.We also look ahead to RABA's plans for a zero-emission fleet and explore how public transit is being reimagined to better serve residents, commuters, and visitors alike.Whether you're a daily rider or new to public transit, this episode is packed with insights on how RABA is building a smarter, more flexible transportation system for our region.Learn more about RABA >>Contact the City of Redding Podcast Team Email us at podcast@cityofredding.org Connect with us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram Visit the City of Redding website Love the podcast? The best way to spread the word is to rate and review!

Regarding an oath on a deposit, Rav Kahana questions: if witnesses warned the person before taking the oath, that in the event they are lying, they will receive lashes, will they receive lashes in addition to a sacrifice or in place of the sacrifice? Several attempts are made to answer his question from various sources, but none are conclusive. Raba then challenges Rav Kahana's question and suggests that there can never be such a case because if there are witnesses to warn, then they must also be witnesses to the act in which case the denial is irrelevant as the witnesses can make the person pay, regardless of their denial. The Gemara then attempts to prove and then disprove this assumption of Raba that if there are witnesses, one cannot be obligated for an oath of deposit. Only from the last source do they succeed in conclusively disproving this assumption. Is an oath of deposit relevant in a case relating to land?

This week's learning is sponsored by Dvora Lopez in loving memory of her mother on her 51st yahrzeit. "She had great strength and abundant love." This week's learning is sponsored by the Futornick family in honor of Shira's 21st birthday. This week's learning is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman, for a refuah shleima, a complete and speedy recovery, for Elisheva Mindel bat Masha Tzivia. The Mishna appears to contradict itself regarding general oaths about eating. It implies that a general oath "not to eat" would not include foods that cannot be eaten (which would encompass non-kosher food), yet another case in the Mishna rules that someone who makes a general oath "not to eat" does include non-kosher food in that prohibition. Two different resolutions are offered. The first resolution distinguishes between someone who made a general oath ("I will not eat") and someone who made a specific oath ("I will not eat regular and non-kosher foods"). The sages provide two different interpretations for why an oath that specifically mentions both non-kosher and kosher foods would be effective. Difficulties are raised against both positions, and one remains unresolved. The second interpretation explains that the previous implication from the Mishna is incorrect—"foods that cannot be eaten" refers to truly inedible items and does not include non-kosher foods, which are technically edible. The final case in the Mishna is cited as proof for this position but is ultimately rejected. What distinguishes issur kollel from issur mosif? Issur kollel occurs when a second prohibition encompasses additional prohibited items, while issur mosif occurs when a second prohibition adds further restrictions to the same item or extends the prohibition to additional people. Based on this distinction, Rava explains why someone who accepts that issur mosif applies would not necessarily accept the same for issur kollel. Since issur mosif relates to a single item—adding a prohibition to the item itself or prohibiting the item to more people, it can apply. However, when additional items are included in the prohibition, it will not necessarily apply to what was already forbidden. Rava further explains that just as issur kollel takes effect, the same principle applies to an oath that includes other items. He needed to specify this because one might have assumed it only applies to prohibitions that arise independently, not to oaths where a person creates the prohibition. Rava the son of Raba raises a challenge to Rava's statement based on a Mishna in Kreitut, which suggests that an oath adding additional prohibitions would not apply to what was already forbidden. Six different explanations are offered to resolve this contradiction.

Erstmals verpasst Raba Leipzig den Europapokal. Mit Kai Bieler analysieren wir die enttäuschende Spielzeit: Kaderzusammenstellung, fehlende Entwicklung, Führungswechsel, strategielose Komfortzone und warum der Verein vor einem XXL-Umbruch steht.

Study Guide Shevuot 11 Today's daf is sponsored by the Pittsburgh daf yomi group for a refuah shleima for Rabbi Amy Bardack, haRav Ahuva bat Liba who is having surgery today. "Wishing our organizer and leader a speedy recovery." In support of Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that leftover animals designated for communal offerings can be redeemed at the end of the year, Raba brings an example of incense which has inherent sanctity and can be redeemed at the end of the year. Rav Chisda disagrees with Raba as he holds that incense does not have inherent sanctity until a later stage when it is brought into a sanctified vessel just before being offered on the altar. Raba proves his position that it has inherent sanctity.  The Gemara then returns to Rav Chisda's original question of how can one redeem items with inherent sanctity. Raba answers that the court stipulates at the beginning of the year that any animals not needed will be only sanctified for their value. Abaye raises a difficulty from other communal offerings that cannot be redeemed if lost and replaced and then found. However, Raba answers that the stipulation is for typical, not atypical cases. Why, then, can the red heifer be redeemed in certain circumstances? The Gemara concludes that a stipulation is made because of its high value.  Abaye raises a further difficulty from our Mishna, as Rabbi Shimon answers a question about whether animals designated for one sacrifice that are leftover can be used for another with a particular answer instead of answering that the court stipulated such, as Raba would have said. Raba answers that Rabbi Shimon doesn't agree with the rabbis that the court can stipulate. Rabbi Yochanan and Raba's approach is based only on the rabbis' position.   

Study Guide Shevuot 10 This week's learning is sponsored by Moshe Silver in loving memory of Rebbitzen Miriam Maxine Elkins who passed away on Yom haAtzmaut. "Her love of Torah, the Jewish people, and the land and State of Israel was unsurpassed. Her loving family - Rabbi Dov Pearetz Elkins and her children - bear the lasting imprint of the passion she brought to everything she did, as do all of us who loved her." This week's learning is sponsored by Vicky Harari in loving memory of her father Abraham Eckstein. "He had a smile that could light up the room. He taught me what I know about love. As a Holocaust survivor, he taught me gratitude and resilience something that I have been relying on more today than ever." The Gemara continues to extrapolate verses to explain the basis of the opinions of Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Shimon in the Mishna regarding which sacrifices do each of the communal sin offerings atone for. Ulla explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the extra sheep left at the end of the year that were designated for the Tamid (daily) sacrifice, but were not needed, are redeemed and repurchased with money from that next year's funds. When Raba explained this halakha, Rav Chisda raised a difficulty - how can an item that is sanctified with kedushat haguf  be redeemed? Raba responds by bringing an example from the incense, which is sanctified and can be redeemed. However, this is rejected as the sanctity of the incense is kedushat damim, its value is sanctified, not kedushat haguf.

Study Guide Makkot 15 This week's learning is sponsored by Elana Storch for the refuah shleima of Avraham haLevi Ben Eidel.  Today's daf is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Chaya Golda Bat Esther. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island for the refuah shleima of our friend and co-learner, Leah Brick, Leah Breindel bat Gittel Yenta בתוך שאר חולי ישראל. "We have watched and admired Leah as she meets this challenge with grace, equanimity and absolute faith, and look forward to sharing many smachot in good health with her - especially our Hadran LI trip to Israel!"  Rabba bar Hana quotes Rabbi Yochanan saying that if a positive commandment precedes a negative commandment, one receives lashes and this is not considered a lav hanitak l'ase, a negative commandment that can be corrected/uprooted by a positive commandment for which one does not receive lashes. Rabbi Yochanan denies having said that. Raba doesn't understand why Rabbi Yochanan would deny it, as a case in our Mishna can prove Rabbi Yochanan's rule. However, the Gemara bring a case of a rapist, trying to prove why Rabbi Yochanan changed his mind and did not accept the above rule. Ulla (in three different attempts) and Rava each try to explain why the case of a rapist does not fit into the category of the rule (a positive commandment the precedes the negative commandment). All attempts by Ulla are rejected, but Rava's is accepted.