Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Study Guide Picture What are the defects and traumas that render an animal a treifa? The Mishna lists various categories, such as a perforated gullet, a severed windpipe, a perforated brain membrane, a perforated heart chamber, a broken spine and a severed spinal cord, a completely removed liver, as well as various perforations or tears to the lungs, stomach, gallbladder, small intestines, and rumen. The list also includes severe external trauma, such as falling from a roof, having a majority of the ribs broken, or being clawed by specific predators. The Mishna establishes the overarching rule: any animal afflicted with a defect or injury such that a similar animal cannot survive is deemed a treifa. Resh Lakish derives the principle that a treifa cannot survive from the verse, "These are the living things which you may eat," teaching that only an animal capable of living is permitted for consumption, whereas one that cannot live is forbidden. Conversely, the opposing view holds that a treifa can survive, deriving from the same verse that a specific type of animal that is capable of living is permitted for consumption, while another animal that is capable of living (the treifa) is forbidden. However, after the Gemara rejects this proof from the verse, it brings another verse to support the opinion that a treifa can survive: "Between the living thing that may be eaten and the living thing that may not be eaten." The Mishna's list does not include all cases, as there are additional cases of treifot—four that are referenced by the acronym BSGR, and another seven Amoraic traditions known as the "shev (seven) shematata." Although these cases are not explicitly mentioned in the Mishna, they can be derived from the rule stated at its end, according to which any animal that is incapable of living is considered a treifa. However, how can the tannaitic tradition of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, which limits the list of treifot to exactly eighteen, be reconciled? After a failed attempt, the Gemara settles the count according to Rabbi Yishmael by grouping all types of perforations into one broad category and all types of severed parts into another single category, thereby reconciling the calculated total with all the treifot appearing in the various lists.

Three difficulties are raised from tannaitic sources against the opinion of Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak that a person cannot forbid property that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she'eino shelo), and they are resolved. The first difficulty is from the braita regarding a sin offering slaughtered outside the Temple for idol worship, which the Gemara resolves by explaining that since the sacrifice achieves atonement for the owner, it is legally considered his own property. The second difficulty is from the Mishna regarding two people holding a knife where one slaughters for an idol, and the third is from a braita regarding one who renders another's property impure, mixes it with tithed produce, or pours it as an idolatrous libation. The Gemara resolves these by explaining that the individual has a financial partnership in the item. The Gemara suggests that the debate between Rav Huna and Rav Nachman is a tannaitic dispute, quoting a dispute regarding whether a gentile can forbid a Jew's wine by offering it up as a libation to idols. Rav Nachman, however, rejects the comparison, as a Jew who does the same thing would be doing it just to annoy his friend, and does not really intend to worship the idol. Some difficulties are raised against this theory from tannaitic sources, but are resolved by explaining them as referring to cases where the Jew is an apostate. The Mishna rules that one may not slaughter an animal directly into seas, rivers, or vessels because it looks to others like they are offering it to an idol (mar'it ayin). However, it is permitted to slaughter into a circular pool of water, which Rava clarifies must be murky. Furthermore, one may not slaughter directly into a pit (gumma) anywhere, but the Mishna then permits doing so in one's house. Abaye and Rava each resolve this seemingly contradictory statement in different manners, and Rava rejects Abaye's explanation. Rava explains that a person may slaughter next to a pit in their private courtyard so that the blood flows into it to keep the yard clean. In the marketplace, even this is strictly forbidden to prevent copying heretical practices (minim), and anyone who does so must be investigated for heresy. A braita is brought to support Rava's explanation. The Mishna establishes that slaughtering a non-sacrifice (chullin) for the sake of a sacrifice that can be voluntarily vowed or donated - such as an olah, asham talui, or todah - renders the shechita invalid, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits it. The rabbis are concerned that people will see this and think that one can slaughter sacrifices outside the Temple. Conversely, slaughtering for sacrifices that cannot be voluntarily vowed, like a sin offering, is valid, as people will assume the slaughterer is just saying it is for the sake of that offering but does not really intend to offer a sacrifice outside the Temple.

What is the status of an animal slaughtered to items connected to the ground, like mountains, seas, rivers or deserts? The Mishna rules that the shechita is invalid, but the assumption from the Mishna is that it is not prohibited for benefit. The Gemara challenges this from a braita which states that such slaughter renders the animal an idolatrous sacrifice (zivchei meitim), which is forbidden for benefit. Abaye resolves this by distinguishing between slaughtering to the item itself - which only disqualifies the shechita - and slaughtering to the angel or deity of the landmark (gadda), which renders it forbidden from any benefit. Can a person render someone else's property forbidden by performing an act of idolatry with it? Rav Huna rules that if a friend's animal is lying before an idol and someone slaughters one siman for the idol, the animal becomes forbidden. He relies on the principle of Ulla that while merely bowing to another's animal does not forbid it, performing a physical action (ma'aseh) directly on the animal does forbid it. A difficulty is raised against Rav Huna from a braita regarding one who slaughters a sin offering on Shabbat outside the Temple courtyard for an idol, who is held liable for three distinct sin offerings. If the animal becomes forbidden at the first siman, as per Rav Huna's position, the completion of the slaughter should not trigger the liability for slaughtering outside the Temple, as it would merely be slaughtering a disqualified animal that would no longer be considered a sacrifice. The Gemara offers two resolutions - applying the case to a bird sin offering where the slaughterer specifies that his intent for idol worship will only take effect upon the completion of the slaughter, or in the shechita of a bird sin offering where half the windpipe was already slit, and in this case the shechita was completed in one small action. Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak disagree with Rav Huna and reaffirm the established principle that a person cannot forbid something that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she'eino shelo) even by performing an action on the item. A difficulty is raised against this position from the braita quoted above with the interpretation given above.

What is the default assumption regarding a gentile's intent when an animal is slaughtered? The rabbis hold that we do not automatically assume a gentile intends it for idol worship unless he explicitly says so, while Rabbi Eliezer holds a gentile's default intent is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosi argues that even if he does intend it for idol worship, we do not say that one person's intent affects another person's act of slaughter. The Gemara presents two ways to explain this dispute and whether the principle of one person intending and another performing the action applies outside the Temple just as it does inside. What is the status of an animal if the slaughter was performed with the intent to perform a later part of the service, like throwing the blood or burning the fat, for idol worship? Rabbi Yochanan rules that the animal is disqualified because we can transfer intent from one action to another, and we learn the laws outside the Temple from the laws inside. Reish Lakish rules that it is permitted because we do not transfer intent from one action to another outside the Temple. The Gemara notes they hold the same argument regarding internal Temple sacrifices and l'shma intent, and then explains why it was necessary to state that they argue in both cases. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yosi's position in the Mishna, but is resolved. A braita is then brought to support Rabbi Yochanan's position. What is the law if someone performs shechita and only thinks about sprinkling the blood for idol worship after the slaughter is finished? The Gemara cites a case in Caesarea where the Sages did not rule whether it was forbidden or permitted. The issue is whether or not a later action or statement retroactively proves the initial intent. After attempting to connect their ruling with the rabbis' and Rabbi Eliezer's positions, that suggestion is rejected and they say it connects with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's ruling. However, the Gemara tries to figure out which ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it connects to. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosi, meaning the gentile's intent does not disqualify the Jew's shechita. The Gemara brings a story where gentiles gave animals to a Jewish butcher and stated the blood and fat were for them, and it was permitted. Rav Ashi qualifies that if a gentile gives money to a Jewish butcher under Rabbi Eliezer's view, it is only forbidden if the gentile is powerful enough that the butcher cannot refuse his intent.

What types of signs of life does one need to observe when performing shechita on an animal that is on the verge of death? Rav, Shmuel, and Rava each bring different actions that serve as indicators that would then permit this animal to be eaten, as it is clear the animal was still alive enough at the time of the shechita. At what point of the slaughtering process does one need to see these signs of life? Rav Chisda, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, and Rava each suggest different points - the middle, the beginning, or the end. Rav Chisda and Rav Nachman provide support for their positions from our Mishna, while Rava brings support from his understanding of a different tannaitic source. Can one perform shechita on an animal for an idol worshipper? Does one need to be concerned that it will be used for idol worship and therefore the Jew would be benefiting from idol worship? Is it the intent of the owner or the one performing the shechita that determines the designation of the animal?

Study Guide

A braita states that if blood spurts onto a gourd during slaughter, Rebbi holds it is susceptible to impurity, while Rabbi Chiya holds we suspend judgment (tolin). Rabbi Oshaya says that since they argue, we should rely on Rabbi Shimon's view that shechita makes an animal susceptible, not blood. Two different explanations are brought by Rav Papa and Rav Ashi to explain Rabbi Chiya's position, the point on which he disagrees with Rebbi, and how Rabbi Shimon's view helps determine that the halakha follows Rabbi Chiya. Rav Papa explains that both Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya agree that blood makes items susceptible if it remains from the beginning to the end of the slaughter, and they only argue if the blood was wiped away between cutting the two simanim. Rebbi holds slaughter is continuous from beginning to end, so it is considered slaughter blood. Rabbi Chiya holds slaughter only occurs at the very end, so the earlier blood is just wound blood, and tolin means we wait to see if blood remains at the end of the slaughter. Rav Ashi argues that for Rabbi Chiya, it is a doubt whether or not slaughter is continuous, so tolin means we neither eat it nor burn it. Both explanations show that Rabbi Oshaya aligned Rabbi Chiya with Rabbi Shimon to make Rebbi a minority opinion of one against two; even though he did not agree with Rabbi Chiya in theory, in practice, they hold the same position. Reish Lakish asks whether the endearment of sacred items (chibat hakodesh) allows the dry crumbs of a meal offering to pass on impurity to other items, or if it only functions to disqualify the item itself. Rabbi Eleazar attempts to prove from a verse that water is always required for susceptibility to pass on impurity to other items, and therefore it is clear that chibat hakodesh would not be able to pass on impurity, but the Gemara rejects his suggestion as it is inconclusive. Rav Yosef challenges Rabbi Elazar's position from Rabbi Shimon's statement that shechita makes an animal susceptible to impurity even to pass on impurity, and Rabbi Zeira brings a similar challenge from a different case. Abaye resolves both challenges by explaining that in those particular cases, the rabbis rabbinically treated them like a regular susceptibility by water, but by Torah law they are not susceptible to impurity at all. The Gemara then proves that chibat hakodesh operates on a Torah level, and therefore Reish Lakish's question is still in place. What is the source in the Torah for chibat hakodesh being a Torah law? The first attempted answer is rejected, but they bring a second answer, which is accepted. Reish Lakish's question regarding whether it can pass on impurity remains unresolved (teiku).

Rabbi Yonatan says in the name of Rabbi that someone who eats a shelishi (third degree) of actual teruma is forbidden to eat teruma but is allowed to touch it. Ulla had said the same thing regarding one who eats a shelishi of chullin that was treated like teruma. The Gemara explains why both statements were needed and could not have necessarily been derived one from the other. Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta says that someone who eats a shelishi of chullin treated like kodashim is still pure to eat actual kodashim, because only real kodashim that are sanctified by an action (like a meal offering when placed in a sanctified vessel or an animal when slaughtered) can create a revi'i (fourth degree). Rami bar Hama challenges this from Rabbi Yehoshua's opinion in the Mishna in Taharot (2:2) that a shelishi that was treated as teruma is considered a sheni for kodashim. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between items treated as teruma and those treated as kodashim. The reason to distinguish is that those who are careful from impurities for teruma are not cautious enough regarding kodashim. This distinction is proven from a Mishna in Chagiga (18b). Rava, however, disagrees with the application of the Mishna in Chagiga to this case, and disagrees with Rav Yitzchak. A difficulty is raised against this distinction from a Mishna in Chagiga (24b) where one designated part of the wine in a barrel of teruma to be kodashim. If the protection for teruma is not valid for kodashim, wouldn't the teruma wine make the kodashim wine impure? To resolve this they distinguish between teruma and kodashim that are combined and those that are not combined. A second difficulty on Rav Yitzchak is brought from a braita that clearly states that a shelishi of items that are treated as kodashim passes on impurity to kodashim. To resolve this difficulty, they conclude that there is a tannaitic debate and brings a braita with two opinions that both support Rav Yitzchak's position. Rabbi Shimon stated in the Mishna that shechita makes the animal susceptible to impurity. Rav Asi explains that Rabbi Shimon means only shechita makes it susceptible, but the blood of the animal does not. The Gemara challenges this to see if he means only shechita, and blood from the slaughter would not be considered a liquid that could render something susceptible to impurity, or did he mean shechita in addition to blood, as blood of the slaughter could also render something susceptible to impurity. Our Mishna is brought to strengthen Rav Asi's reading, but it is rejected as inconclusive. Then three other tannaitic sources are brought to try to either prove or disprove Rav Assi's claim, however, all are deemed inconclusive.

Reish Lakish rules that if the windpipe is cut during slaughter and the lung is subsequently punctured before the gullet is cut, the animal remains kosher because the lung is already considered to have lost its life through the cutting of the windpipe. Rava qualifies that this principle applies exclusively to the lung, which is structurally dependent on the windpipe, but not to the inner digestive organs. Rabbi Zeira disputes this qualification, and the Gemara notes a secondary debate regarding whether or not Rabbi Zeira ultimately retracted his objection. Rav Acha infers from Reish Lakish's ruling that meat from an animal in the process of being slaughtered is forbidden to Noahides. Because the severing of both simanim structurally detaches the internal organs from the animal's life source, it renders them ever min hachai (a limb or flesh from a living animal) for anyone whose meat is not immediately permitted via shechita. Consequently, a gentile eating these organs while the animal still convulses violates the Noachide prohibition. However, others object to this inference, arguing that a concept cannot exist where an item is permitted to Jews but forbidden to gentiles. A debate in the Mishna questions whether the act of slaughter itself renders the animal susceptible to ritual impurity (hechsher lekabel tumah) or if susceptibility is achieved only when the blood emerges and acts as a wetting liquid. The rabbis rule that if no blood emerges, the meat is not susceptible to impurity, meaning one may eat it with ritually impure hands. The Gemara infers from here that if blood had emerged, eating with impure hands would be forbidden. This raises a difficulty, as the Mishna appears to discuss secular meat (chullin), yet impure hands possess only a second-degree status (sheni le'tumah), which cannot create a third-degree status (shelishi) in chullin. To resolve this, the Gemara first presents four textual proofs demonstrating that the Mishna is indeed dealing with chullin. Following these proofs, the Gemara introduces three suggestions for the specific case in the Mishna: according to the first, the Mishna refers to meat purchased with maaser sheni money; according to the second, it involves a rabbinic decree assigning a first-degree status of impurity to the hands; and according to the third, it refers to secular food prepared according to the strict purity standards of consecrated sacrifices (kodashim).

The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the rabbis regarding whether a secular slaughter requires intent has ramifications in the case of one who slaughters an additional animal during the slaughter of a para aduma (engaging in an extraneous activity). If slaughter does not require intent, the cutting of the second animal's simanim is considered a completed act of slaughter, and consequently, the para aduma is disqualified because an extraneous activity was performed at that time. Conversely, if slaughter requires intent, the unintended slaughter is not considered an act at all, and the para aduma remains valid. The disqualifications of shechita begin with the law of shehiya (pausing), which occurs when the slaughterer pauses between the slaughter of one siman and the next. A tannaitic dispute is analyzed regarding the duration of time that disqualifies due to pausing, questioning whether it is the time of an act of slaughter or the time it takes to examine the knife. Several amoraim define the duration of slaughter: Rav defines it as the time needed to slaughter another animal, while Rav and Shmuel dispute whether the disqualifying pause for a bird slaughter is measured by the time it takes to slaughter an animal or a bird. Additional opinions expand this duration to include the time required for physical handling of the animal, such as the time it takes to lower it to the ground or lift it and push it down. The details of the disqualifications continue with ikur (tearing the simanim instead of cutting them) and chalada (inserting the knife beneath the simanim or behind them). These flaws in the act of slaughter trigger a tannitic dispute between Rabbi Yeshevav and Rabbi Akiva over whether animals disqualified by an improper slaughter, such as shehiya, chalada, or ikur, are considered a treifa and do not impart impurity, or whether they are treated as a neveila and impart impurity through carrying. Ultimately, Rabbi Akiva reversed his original understanding and agreed with Rabbi Yeshevav that the status of these animals is like a neveila in all regards. A contradiction to the Mishna arises from a Mishna at the beginning of the third chapter, which lists a severed windpipe among the defects that define an animal as a treifa, seemingly contradicting our Mishna's ruling that such a defect is considered a neveila. To resolve this contradiction, four potential resolutions are proposed, two of which are ultimately rejected.

The Gemara continues the debate over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna l'shechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina l'shechita ela basof). Two further difficulties are raised against the latter opinion and are resolved. There is a debate about whether the shechita needs to be done in a single, continuous cut (shechita mefura'at) or can be done in two or three different spots along the neck. The Gemara raises two difficulties against those who require shechita mefura'at. These challenges are resolved. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav brings a ruling about chalada, a disqualification of shechita when the knife is hidden under the simanim. The Gemara tries to assess what he is adding which wasn't already stated in the Mishna in Chullin 32a. The second part of Rav's statement was that if the knife is under the hide, the shechita is valid. However, the beit midrash of Rav (Bei Rav) stated that it was unknown whether he actually permitted it under the hide. This statement by the scholars of his beit midrash led to several related questions that remain unresolved (teiku), such as hiding the knife under a cloth, under tangled wool, or concealing it during only a minority of the cut. A Mishna rules that slaughtering two heads at once or two people holding a single knife and slaughtering are both valid. However, completely severing the head in one instantaneous downward blow is invalid due to pressing (drisa). The Mishna qualifies this: if the person was actually drawing the knife back and forth, but it came off after just moving the knife in one direction, if the knife was long enough, the shechita is valid. If they slaughtered with a back-and-forth motion, even if the blade is very small, the meat is kosher. Two sources are brought to support the need for moving the blade back and forth when slaughtering.

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

The Gemara asks whether the requirement to slaughter birds is a Torah law or a rabbinic law. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Pinchas rules that it is only a rabbinic law. The Gemara raises three difficulties against his position but resolves them. The final difficulty is resolved by pointing out that this matter is subject to a Tannaitic debate, and the Gemara brings both positions. Although only one siman needs to be slaughtered in a bird, the Gemara asks if it can be any siman or specifically the gullet. Rav Nachman and Rav Ada bar Ahava disagree on this point, and difficulties are raised against both positions. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that cutting either siman is valid. Rabbi Yehuda requires that the veins in the neck (veridin) must also be cut during slaughter. Rav Chisda explains that this rule applies specifically to birds, and its purpose is to drain out the extra blood so people will not come to eat it, but it is not an essential part of the shechita obligation. The Gemara raises three difficulties against this explanation, but they are all resolved. If exactly half of a siman was slaughtered, there is a debate between Rav and Rav Kahana - do we say that since the majority is not unslaughtered, the shechita is valid, or do we say that since the majority has not been slaughtered, the shechita is invalid? The Gemara begins by raising difficulties against Rav's position that half of a siman is considered as if the majority is slaughtered and the bird is permitted.

The Mishna states that slaughtering (shechita) is performed by cutting the two simanim (the windpipe and gullet) or the majority of each of the two simanim for an animal, and one siman or the majority of one siman for a bird. The Gemara asks for the source in the Torah for slaughtering an animal at the neck, meaning by cutting the simanim. The Gemara brings five different answers to this question. Within the discussion of the fifth answer, the Gemara brings the verse in Vayikra 11:46, which compares animals to birds. Other explanations of this verse are brought, including one derivation that birds only require the slaughtering of one siman, while fish can be eaten without shechita at all. Another source is brought to prove this distinction based on the differing ways animals, birds, and fish were originally created. Rabbi Yitzchak ben Pinchas held that by Torah law, one is not required to perform shechita on birds at all. His source is derived from the verse requiring the covering of the blood (kisuy hadam) for birds and undomesticated animals (Vayikra 17:13)

Study Guide The Gemara clarifies which Tanna the Mishna follows regarding temed (grape-seed water). Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avahu explains that the dispute in the Mishna in Ma'asrot between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages applies after it ferments, so our Mishna can align with the view of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabba bar Avahu that if a person bought temed with second tithe funds before it fermented, and it ultimately fermented, it is treated as wine. His words pose a difficulty for our Mishna, which did not present such an option. Rabba establishes the Mishna in a case where it is clear that it will not ferment later, while Rava suggests that the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who holds that everything follows the visual appearance (chazuta) at the time of the sale. Rabbi Elazar disputes Rav Nachman's understanding of the Mishna in Ma'asrot, holding that the dispute applies when it has not fermented, but once it ferments, everyone agrees it is considered wine. A braita brings the laws of purifying temed that has not yet fermented by connecting it to water (haska). Rava limits this rule, explaining that this applies only when the water of the temed was pure from the beginning and became impure after it became temed, but if it was impure from the outset, it does not. However, Rav Ashi rejects his ruling and argues that there is no logic to distinguish between the cases. The Mishna states that anywhere there is a sale (a minor girl, ketana), there is no fine for rape (whose law only applies to a young woman, na'ara), and anywhere there is a fine, there is no sale. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav explains that this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that a fine applies even to a ketana. A Mishna states that anywhere there is refusal (miun, for a ketana), there is no chalitza (for a na'ara), and anywhere there is chalitza, there is no miun. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says that this is also the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages say that miun applies even to a na'ara. A Mishna states that anywhere there is a shofar blast (tekiya), there is no havdala, and anywhere there is havdala, there is no tekiya. If a Festival falls on the eve of the Sabbath, you blow the shofar and do not say havdala. If it falls on the conclusion of the Sabbath, you say havdala and do not blow. The Sages and Rabbi Dosa dispute the exact wording of the havdala.

The braita continues with the analysis of the unique laws governing earthenware vessels. Through a series of suggested logical kal v'chomer arguments, they demonstrate how scriptural verses restrict the ways these vessels contract and protect against ritual impurity, each in their own unique manner. Specifically, the verses dictate that an earthenware vessel can only contract impurity through its interior airspace (me'aviro) and never from its outer surface (miggabbo). Conversely, other types of vessels cannot contract impurity from their airspace but do contract it from their outer surface. The Mishna sets forth an additional rule of contrasting halakhic status: a state that renders a wooden vessel ritually pure leaves a metal vessel impure, and vice versa. A braita clarifies that unfinished wooden vessels are susceptible to impurity while flat wooden vessels are pure. For metal, the law is reversed: unfinished metal vessels are pure while flat metal vessels are susceptible to impurity. The braita explains what is defined as an unfinished vessel in this context. The Gemara presents a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Nachman regarding the underlying reason for the distinction between unfinished wood vessels and unfinished metal vessels - whether it is because these vessels are made for honor, or because they are expensive and therefore their crafting is not considered complete as long as any detail is missing. There is a practical ramification between these two opinions regarding vessels made of bone. The scriptural source establishing that bone vessels can contract ritual impurity is subsequently derived. The Mishna introduces contrasting rules regarding the tithing obligations of bitter and sweet almonds. A braita explains that bitter almonds are subject to tithing only when they are young and small, since they are unfit for consumption when they are mature and large, whereas sweet almonds are subject to tithing only when they are large. Rabbi Yishmael b'Rabbi Yosi quotes an opinion that either both stages are completely exempt or both are completely obligated. The Gemara explains the opinion that both are obligated by explaining that mature bitter almonds can be sweetened by roasting them over a fire. The Mishna outlines the changing legal status of grape-seed water (temed). Prior to fermentation, it does not possess the status of wine and cannot be purchased using second tithe funds, yet it disqualifies a mikveh if three logs of it fall inside a mikveh that does not have the requisite amount of water (forty se'ah). Once it ferments, its status changes to wine, meaning it can be purchased with second tithe funds and no longer disqualifies a mikveh. The Mishna also introduces a contrasting rule regarding brothers who are partners in an estate or partners after already dividing their estate, balancing their obligations toward the Temple half-shekel surcharge (kalbon) against their obligations toward the cattle tithe. The Gemara analyzes which tanna this Mishna follows regarding the status of temed, since on the surface, it does not appear to align with any opinion appearing in the Mishna in Masechet Maasrot (Chapter 5, Mishna 6).

The Mishna states that the method of slaughtering a red heifer (para aduma) is not the same method used for breaking the back of the neck of a decapitated heifer (egla arufa), and vice-versa. A braita brings a source demonstrating that one cannot break the back of the neck of the para aduma and that one cannot slaughter the egla arufa. Both laws are derived from verses found within the passage of the egla arufa. The Mishna notes that while blemished kohanim are disqualified from Temple service, blemished Levites are fit for their respective duties. Conversely, while Levites are restricted to a specific age range for their service, kohanim can work in the Temple at all ages. A braita derives a source for both of these exclusive rules from a verse in Bamidbar 8:24. The age limitation on Levites only concerned the period of carrying the Tabernacle in the desert; for the singing service, there is no age limitation, provided the Levite can still sing properly. Regarding this age restriction for the Levites, a contradiction arises between two verses, as one states the youngest age one can work is thirty, while another states twenty-five. The Gemara reconciles this by differentiating the stages: at twenty-five a Levite begins his training, and at thirty he can actually perform the service. A braita brings a debate about the minimum age for kohanim to begin serving in the Temple - either at the biological age of maturity (the appearance of two pubic hairs) or at the age of twenty. The maximum age for their service is when they reach old age, which Rabbi Ela in the name of Rabbi Chanina defines as the point when one begins to tremble. Rav Chisda explains the scriptural source behind this minimum age debate. Later, the Gemara brings two explanations regarding whether Rebbi's requirement of twenty as the minimum age is an enacted rabbinic law, or if it was instituted because the older kohanim felt uncomfortable with teenagers performing the sacred Temple service. The method of contracting ritual impurity in earthenware vessels is not the same method of contracting impurity in other vessels. A braita details the exact differences and delineates the scriptural sources from which they are derived.

Study Guide The Gemara introduces a braita to show the source for the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon in a bird burnt offering. The braita presents three distinct opinions on the biblical term "k'mishpat" regarding a bird burnt offering. The Sages debate whether this term compares it to an animal sin offering or a bird sin offering, detailing the exact procedural laws they share. This very debate serves as the foundation for the conflicting views of the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon regarding whether the two simanim must be severed completely. The Mishna states the age rules for birds for sacrifices: mature turtledoves (torim) are valid while young ones are not, whereas young pigeons (bnei yonah) are valid while mature ones are not. The Gemara defines the exact boundaries of these stages, analyzing the transitional phase known as techilat hatzahov (when the plumage around the neck begins to turn a golden/yellow color), which is disqualified in both species.

Study Guide Zeiri rules that if an animal or bird's neck bone is broken and the majority of the surrounding flesh is severed, it immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if it is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if this state constitutes a neveila, how can melika be validly performed on a sacrificial bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? Rava answers that in melika, the kohen breaks the neck bone and spinal column without simultaneously severing the majority of the surrounding flesh. Rabbi Ami answers the challenge in the same manner, and his and Rava's answers are supported by a braita. The braita notes that in a bird burnt offering (olat ha'of), either the majority of both simanim or both simanim in their entirety must be cut. Because the Sages and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon dispute whether both simanim must be completely severed or if cutting the majority suffices, the Gemara suggests two interpretations to align the braita with one or both of these respective opinions. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel applies Zeiri's principle to humans, ruling that if a person's backbone and the majority of the surrounding flesh are severed, they immediately impart ritual impurity in a tent (tumat ohel) like a corpse, even if the body is still convulsing. Rabbi Yochanan introduces an additional case where the legal moment of death is determined immediately despite lingering convulsions. A parallel case regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures) is brought from a Mishna, prompting a debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Ami over whether "cutting off the head" means a complete detachment or a partial one, similar to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon concerning a bird burnt offering. The Gemara introduces a braita to show the source for the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon in a bird burnt offering. The braita presents three distinct opinions on the biblical term "k'mishpat"  regarding a bird burnt offering. The Sages debate whether this term compares it to an animal sin offering or a bird sin offering, detailing the exact procedural laws they share. This very debate serves as the foundation for the conflicting views of the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon regarding whether the two simanim must be severed completely.

The sons of Rabbi Chiya taught that when performing melika (pinching the neck of a sacrificial bird), the kohen may draw the simanim (the windpipe and gullet) toward the back of the neck and sever them without breaking the neck bone. The Sages dispute whether they meant this is the only valid method (to avoid rendering the bird a treifa by breaking the bone first), or if breaking the neck bone prior to cutting the simanim is also permitted as a Torah-prescribed approach. The Mishna supports this latter explanation. Rabbi Yannai raises a difficulty against the sons of Rabbi Chiya based on an inference from another line in the Mishna, which the Gemara resolves by demonstrating that an alternative inference can be drawn. The Gemara notes a debate regarding whether melika can be performed with a back-and-forth sawing motion (holacha v'hava'a) similar to shechita. Rabbi Yirmia quotes a statement by Shmuel comparing shechita and melika. After analyzing what specific law was being equated, the Gemara concludes that Shmuel is teaching that if one begins the melika too high on the neck (hagrama) and finishes in the correct area, it is disqualified -  just as we learned regarding shechita. Rami bar Yechezkel cites a braita stating that there is no issue with birds if the simanim are found to be displaced. The Gemara disputes whether this applies only according to the opinion that shechita of a bird is not a Torah law, or if it holds true even for those who view it as a Torah obligation derived via halakha l'Moshe m'Sinai. A further debate ensues over whether Rami bar Yechezkel's braita applies exclusively to melika or extends to the shechita of a bird as well. Additionally, Rabbi Yirmia's statement in the name of Shmuel is presented as a conflicting view to this braita. Zeira rules that if the neck bone is broken, the animal or bird immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if the animal is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if breaking the neck bone creates a neveila, how could melika ever be validly performed on a bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? This would mean the kohen is performing melika on a bird that is already dead. Abaye raises a difficulty against Rava's challenge from the laws of a bird burnt offering, and the Gemara resolves the issue.

Pictures Rav Nachman permitted slaughtering above the large ring, at the point where the "hat" begins to slope inward, provided that the chitim (wheat-shaped glands) are at least partially left intact below the cut. This ruling matches neither the rabbis nor Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda, but appears to follow the position of Rabbi Chanina ben Antignus. Rav Huna and Rav Nachman dispute the exact parameters of the disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda. One view posits that they disagree in a case where the slaughterer cut the first third too high up, and the remaining two-thirds in the correct place - whereas if one cut two-thirds in the correct place and then veered upward for the last third, all agree it is valid (as the majority was already severed properly). An alternative version shifts the opinions between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. Both versions include a difficulty and resolution exchanged between either Rav Chisda, Rav Yosef, and Abaye. Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda further disagree on cases of alternating validity - such as when one slaughters the first third in the wrong place, the next third in the right place, and the final third in the wrong place (or the reverse scenario). Rav Yehuda follows the absolute majority; if the total sum of the valid cuts constitutes a majority, the slaughter is kosher. Rav Huna, however, evaluates the chronological moment the majority is achieved, requiring the majority to be made continuously in a valid manner. Rav Kahana asked Rav Yehuda for the ruling on the cases of alternating thirds. He then raised several subsequent queries regarding the validity of shechita performed over a pre-existing perforation (nekev) in the windpipe. The Mishna notes that the location for shechita is the exact opposite of the location for melika (the sacrificial pinching of a bird's neck). Melika must be performed from the back of the neck (oref), whereas shechita must be performed from the front or the sides of the neck.

Slaughterers who failed to show their knives to a Chacham (Sage) for inspection were penalized, though the severity of the penalty differed depending on whether the knife was subsequently found to be smooth or notched. The teeth of a harvest sickle incline in one direction; therefore, if one used it to slaughter in the direction that cuts cleanly without tearing, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute its validity. However, Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that both agree the slaughter is invalid, and their actual debate is whether the animal is classified as a neveila (a carcass, which imparts impurity) or a treifa. The windpipe features a large ring at the top that encircles it entirely, unlike the lower rings which are C-shaped and do not completely cover it. The Mishna presents two opinions regarding the highest anatomical point where slaughter can be performed without being disqualified by hagrama (slanting outside the designated slaughter area). The Tanna Kama rules that the large ring must be completely severed while leaving a width of a thread of the top ring untouched. Conversely, Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda rules that as long as the majority of the windpipe is cut in the valid area, the slaughter is kosher, even if the slaughterer subsequently cuts above it into the area known as "the hat" (kova) - since the act was legally complete once the majority was cut. Rav and Shmuel explain that Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda also forbade slaughtering directly on the smaller rings, permitting it only between them since they do not encircle the entire windpipe. However, after challenging this with a contradictory braita where Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda explicitly permits slaughtering on the smaller rings, the Gemara concludes that Rav and Shmuel agreed with his view regarding the large ring but ruled against his lenient stance on the smaller rings. When Rabbi Zeira moved from Babylonia to Israel and permitted slaughtering on these rings, the Sages questioned why he did not maintain the stringencies of Rav and Shmuel, given the halakhic rule that a traveler must observe the stringencies of both their place of origin and their destination. Two resolutions are suggested, each presenting different exceptions to the rules of local custom. Ultimately, the Gemara notes that customs varied across different regions of Babylonia, and not all areas adopted this stringency. There is a dispute between Rav Papi and Rav Papa regarding the exact anatomical boundary for the highest point of the windpipe where shechita remains valid.

The Mishna rules that "one may always slaughter." Raba and Rav Yosef both understand this to refer to the period of Exile, but each explains it according to a different Tannaitic view - either Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva. These Sages disagreed over whether the Jewsl in the desert were forbidden to eat meat unless it was brought as a sacrifice, or whether they were permitted to eat meat even without formal ritual slaughter (shechita). After delving into the debate between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva and resolving various difficulties raised against each position, the Gemara challenges the explanations of both Raba and Rav Yosef based on the textual context of the Mishna. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the phrase "one may always slaughter" includes even a Jew who eats non-kosher meat l'teavon (out of appetite). The Gemara then analyzes which specific types of nicks in a knife disqualify a slaughter and render the animal a treifa, and which do not. The Gemara outlines various customs regarding the method used to check the knife, alongside a debate concerning which parts of the blade must be examined.

The Gemara brings a braita to prove that Rebbi differentiates between a slaughter performed with an item attached to the ground and one performed with an item that was originally detached but later became attached. An internal contradiction within the braita is resolved by applying this distinction. The Gemara then delves into the specific cases within the braita. First, it addresses slaughtering using a mechanism. After raising a contradiction from a different braita that rules such a slaughter invalid, the conflict is resolved by distinguishing between a mechanism operated directly by human action and one that functions without human intervention or is only very indirectly affected by it. Rava discusses whether an item that was detached and subsequently re-attached to the ground is legally considered "attached" or "detached" across various areas of halakha - idol worship, susceptibility to impurity, and slaughtering. He notes that regarding idol worship, it is considered detached. Regarding impurity, it is subject to a tannaitic debate. Regarding slaughter, however, he remains unsure. The Gemara cites three quotes from the previously mentioned braita to resolve the status for slaughter, but each proof is ultimately deemed inconclusive. Shmuel limits a ruling in the braita - concerning slaughtering with a knife stuck in a wall - to a case where the animal is positioned below the knife. However, a contradictory braita is brought that makes no distinction regarding whether the animal is above or below. Two possible resolutions are suggested. Rav Chisda (or a braita) discusses five laws involving a reed stalk, forbidding its use in various activities due to the risk of splinters. One of these laws states that one cannot slaughter with it, which contradicts another source permitting its use. The Gemara distinguishes between a soft reed (which grows in a marsh) and a hardened one, which is more likely to splinter. The Mishna explains that "all may slaughter and forever." The term "all" is understood to include birds, which also require ritual slaughter. As for the term "forever," Raba explains that it follows the view of Rabbi Yishmael and serves to permit the consumption of meat even after the destruction of the Temple. Rav Yosef raises two difficulties with Raba's explanation.

Study Guide

The Mishna rules that if one slaughters an animal on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, the slaughter is valid. However, Rav asserts that the meat may not be eaten on that Shabbat, even raw. The Sages in the Yeshiva explained that Rav's position accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the laws of Shabbat, and the Gemara attempts to identify which specific ruling of Rabbi Yehuda serves as the basis for this. Rabbi Abba suggests it refers to Rabbi Yehuda's view on hachana -the requirement that an item be designated for use before Shabbat - citing the example of Rabbi Yehuda's prohibition against cutting up an animal that died on Shabbat to feed to one's dogs.  Abaye rejects this, arguing that animals intended for food are considered inherently designated for slaughter for human consumption (but not for animal consumption) even while alive, citing laws of Yom Tov as proof. Although Rabbi Abba attempts to resolve the difficulty by employing the principle of breira (retroactive designation) to understand the Yom Tov law, this is rejected as Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the concept of breira. The Gemara attempts to find the source for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold by breira. Initially, it attempts to prove this from a case involving the separation of teruma from wine, but after rejecting that proof, the Gemara derives it from Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding eruv techumim. Rav Yosef suggests the source is Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding broken vessels that were not broken before Shabbat; these are forbidden by Rabbi Yehuda  if they cannot be used for their original function. However, this comparison is rejected because an animal can be considered "food" even before it is slaughtered. This discussion aligns with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion regarding liquids that seep out of fruits. The Gemara offers a third suggestion based on Shmuel's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda's view on liquids leaking from olives and grapes. Shmuel posits that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with the Sages that such liquids are forbidden to prevent one from intentionally squeezing the fruit; likewise, permitting meat from a Shabbat slaughter might lead one to intentionally slaughter an animal on Shabbat. This is rejected because Rav disagrees with Shmuel's interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda's position on grapes and olives; since the goal is to clarify Rav's own ruling, it cannot be based on a premise that Rav himself does not accept. Rabbi Sheshet suggests a fourth possibility based on Rabbi Yehuda's ruling on lamps. Rabbi Yehuda deems used lamps muktze because they are repulsive (mi'us); similarly, a living animal would be muktze because it cannot be eaten in its current state. This is also rejected, as the Gemara distinguishes between muktze due to repulsion and muktze resulting from a prohibition.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba recounts a discussion between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the legal weight of a minor's intent. In the first version, the question is whether a minor's thoughts alone are significant. Rabbi Ami argues it is obvious they are not, citing a Mishna in Kelim 17:15. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that the doubt applies when a minor's action reasonably demonstrates their intent, but not completely - such as moving an animal to the northern part of the Temple courtyard, the specific area for slaughtering burnt offerings. Rabbi Ami challenges this, noting that Rabbi Yochanan himself previously ruled in the context of ritual impurity that a minor's action is significant when the minor's intent is reasonably clear from the action. Rabbi Yochanan responds that his question was whether such actions are valid by Torah law or only by Rabbinic decree; the matter remains unresolved. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers a different version of the discussion, focusing on whether a minor's actions are effective. This version concludes with Rabbi Yochanan distinguishing between three categories: actions with clear intent, actions with reasonably clear, but not completely clear intent, and intent without any accompanying action. Shmuel asks Rav Huna for the biblical source disqualifying sacrifices that were slaughtered without the specific intent to perform a slaughter (mitasek). The Mishna rules that meat slaughtered by a non-Jew is considered neveila (a carcass) and imparts impurity by carrying (masa). Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Ami draw different inferences from this. Rabbi Yochanan suggests the Mishna follows the Sages (against Rabbi Eliezer) in assuming that gentiles do not automatically slaughter for idolatrous purposes; if they did, the meat would be forbidden even for benefit. Rabbi Ami infers that the slaughter of a heretic (min), one who is a devout idol worshipped is strictly forbidden for any benefit, a position supported by a braita. The Gemara explains that we generally do not fear a gentile will slaughter for idolatry because they are typically not devout in their practice. However, a min is considered deeply dedicated to their worship, and their slaughter is presumed to be for an idol. Rav Nachman distinguishes between Jewish heretics and gentile heretics, showing more leniency toward the latter, though the Gemara clarifies this applies specifically to accepting their sacrifices. The shechita of one who slaughters in the dark or a blind person is accepted.

Rav Nachman states in the name of Rav that meat is permitted if someone supervised the slaughter throughout the process. The Gemara questions why supervision is necessary, given the principle that most who engage in slaughtering are experts. It concludes that the case involves someone known to be ignorant of the laws of shechita who successfully severed the first siman (sign); however, this is insufficient to assume the second will be handled correctly, thus requiring supervision to ensure no disqualifying error occurs during the remainder of the slaughter. Rav Dimi bar Yosef asked Rav Nachman: If an agent is appointed to slaughter an animal or separate teruma (tithes), and the owner subsequently finds the meat slaughtered or the produce tithed, can we assume the agent performed the task and the food is permitted? Rav Nachman distinguished between the two: the meat is permitted, but the produce is not. He explained that we cannot automatically assume the agent performed the task, and must consider that a third party might have intervened. Regarding shechita, this is acceptable because of the presumption that most slaughterers are experts. However, regarding teruma, if a third party separates tithes without the owner's permission, the act is legally ineffective. The Gemara suggests that the question of whether we presume most slaughterers are experts is a Tannaitic dispute, but this suggestion is ultimately rejected. Although a deaf-mute, a minor, or a mentally incompetent person may slaughter under supervision, the Gemara infers from the Mishna's phrasing that one should not grant them an animal to slaughter ab initio. Furthermore, the fact that their slaughter is valid and the meat is permitted indicates that slaughtering does not require intent (kavana), a position attributed to Rabbi Natan.

Study Guide The Gemara asks for the source of the principle that we follow the statistical majority (rubba), such as in cases of yibum involving minors where we assume the male is not a saris (sterile) and the female is not an aylonit (barren). The Gemara proposes ten different Torah laws as potential sources for this rule. While difficulties are raised against each possibility and some are resolved, the Gemara ultimately rejects them all. It suggests that these sources might only prove that we follow the majority when it is impossible to clarify the actual status; however, in a case where it is possible to determine the reality, one may be required to investigate rather than rely on the majority.

If it is discovered after shechita that the knife has nicks, can we assume the slaughter was valid because the nicks occurred after the two simanim were cut, or is there a concern that they occurred while cutting the hide before the simanim? Rav Huna and Rav Chisda disagree on this matter. Two difficulties are raised against Rav Chisda's ruling to permit, but they are resolved. From where do we derive the principle that an item retains its status until proven otherwise (chazaka)? Rabbi Yonatan derives it from the case of a leprous house, but Rav Acha disagrees with his derivation.

There is a dispute between Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav and Rav Chanania bar Shlemia in the name of Rav regarding which practical skills a Torah scholar must master through repetition. The first opinion lists writing, slaughtering, and circumcision, while the second adds the knot of the tefillin, the sheva berakhot, and the tying of tzitzit. Rav Yehuda quotes two further statements in the name of Shmuel. The first is that a slaughterer must be expert in the laws of shechita; otherwise, the meat may not be eaten. Since meat can be disqualified for five specific reasons, an unlearned slaughterer might perform an invalid slaughter without realizing it. The second statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel is that a slaughterer must inspect the two simanim (the windpipe and gullet) to ensure they were properly severed. While Rav Yosef attempts to provide a proof for this requirement, Abaye rejects it. The Gemara discusses the status of meat that was not inspected, debating whether it is classified as a treifa or a neveila. Both positions are rooted in their interpretation of Rav Huna's principle: a living animal is presumed forbidden until it is proven that a valid shechita was performed, but once slaughtered properly, it is presumed kosher until proven to be a treifa. The Gemara then analyzes the second half of Rav Huna's statement, inferring that an animal remains kosher even if there is an unproven concern that it might be a treifa. This is illustrated by a case where a wolf takes an internal organ and returns it with a hole; we do not assume the hole existed prior to the wolf's intervention. Rabbi Abba challenges this from a ruling regarding food nibbled by creatures, where we fear teh hole where they are nibbling was a pre-existing hole from a snake who may have injected venom into it. To resolve this, Rav Huna distinguishes between matters of danger and matters of ritual prohibition (issur). While Rava rejects this distinction, arguing that stringency regarding danger should imply stringency regarding prohibitions, Abaye accepts the differentiation, citing proofs from the laws of impurity. After Rava rejects Abaye's proof and Rav Shimi raises a difficulty with Rava's position that the Gemara resolves, Rav Ashi concludes by bringing support for Rav Huna's position.

Rabbi Zeira says in the name of Shmuel that if one heats a knife and uses it for slaughtering, the animal is not considered a treifa. Although the heat could potentially damage the animal, the sharp edge of the blade severs the windpipe and gullet before the heat from the sides of the blade can cause a burn. A question is raised regarding a person who strikes another with a hot knife, resulting in a leprous mark: is this classified as a boil (shechin) or a burn (michve)? The Gemara explores the practical halakhic implications of this distinction. Two sources are brought to resolve the matter - the first being the aforementioned statement of Rabbi Zeira - but the Gemara distinguishes between the cases and reaches no definitive conclusion. The Gemara then transitions to a discussion regarding benefit from knives used for idol worship, detailing when they are forbidden or permitted. It further addresses the status of meat slaughtered with a knife previously used for non-kosher slaughter, as well as the process for kashering a knife used on a treifa. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav notes that a slaughterer should maintain three distinct knives: one dedicated solely to slaughtering, one for cutting meat, and one for removing cheilev (forbidden fats).

Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi decreed that produce in Beit Shean did not require tithing, as he ruled the area was not considered part of Israel for those specific purposes. This decision was based on the testimony of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Zeiruz, who observed Rabbi Meir eating a vegetable leaf without tithing it. Rabbi Yirmia challenged this testimony, suggesting various reasons why Rabbi Meir might have eaten the leaf without realizing it was untithed or why it might have actually been tithed. In response, Rabbi Zeira argued that if God protects the animals of the righteous from inadvertent sin, then God certainly protects the righteous themselves. The Gemara recounts the story of Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair's donkey, which refused to eat untithed produce, to support Rabbi Zeira's assertion. This episode is part of a larger narrative regarding Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair's journey to redeem captives: the first part describes him splitting a river to cross; the middle section concerns the donkey's refusal to eat; and the final part involves Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi inviting him to dine, an invitation he ultimately declined. Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair was exceptionally careful never to benefit from the food of others.

When Rabbi Zeira heard that Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Asi were eating meat slaughtered by a Cuti, he assumed they must have been aware of a prior decree permitting it. He reasoned that had it been forbidden, they would have inadvertently consumed non-kosher meat - a mistake God would not allow to befall the righteous. This principle is derived from the story where God protected the animal of a righteous person from sin; how much more so would He protect the righteous individuals themselves! From this incident, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Zeira eventually conceded to Rabbi Yaakov that the shechita of a Cuti had been forbidden by the decree of Rabban Gamliel, even if a Jew was present to supervise the process. The Gemara explains that although Rabban Gamliel and his court originally decreed that the shechita of Cutim was unacceptable, the restriction expanded over time. A story is told of Rabbi Meir, who forbade their wine after discovering that a minority of the Cutim worshipped idols. Later, a subsequent generation of Amoraim in Israel - Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi - were informed that the Cutim had ceased to be "Torah worshippers" entirely. Consequently, they accorded them the status of gentiles regarding all halakhic matters. The Gemara clarifies that while their shechita and wine had been forbidden by Rabbi Meir and Rabban Gamliel previously, the ruling was only universally accepted and finalized in the time of Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi. The Gemara presents two other instances where the concept of God protecting the righteous from accidental transgression is applied. The first involves Rabbi Zeira regarding the laws of demai (produce from an am haaretz which tithes may not have been separated). When produce purchased from an am haaretz is mixed with other ingredients, its status is debated. Seeing Rav Asi eating such a mixture without tithing it, Rabbi Zeira inferred that it must be permitted, as God would not allow a righteous person to eat untithed food. The Gemara challenges this conclusion based on a braita that appears to forbid such mixtures. However, the Gemara resolves this in two possible ways by explaining that the case in the braita involved a unique type of "mixture." While the initial difficulty was raised from the second half of the braita, the Gemara also questions the first part, which permits returning food to a neighbor who is an am haaretz without re-tithing it (as we do not suspect the neighbor of swapping the food). Although three other Tannaitic sources suggest we should fear a swap, the Gemara distinguishes each case as unique. A third situation is mentioned where Rabbi Zeira applied the principle of divine protection. It concerns Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the footsteps of Rabbi Meir permitting produce in Beit Shean to be eaten without tithing, on the basis that Beit Shean was not considered to be within the halakhic borders of the Land of Israel.

After explaining that the source for Rav Anan's statement in the name of Shmuel, that one can trust the slaughter of a person who worships idols was derived from Yehoshafat, the Gemara seeks evidence that Yehoshafat actually consumed Achav's meat. Two additional sources are examined to support Rav Anan. The first involves Eliyahu, who was fed meat by ravens (orvim), which supposedly originated from Achav's kitchen. However, this is dismissed as a unique divine decree that cannot serve as a legal precedent. The second source is a braita previously cited about accepting the slaughter of a Jew who does not observe the commandment. While it was initially thought to support Rav Anan, and referring to one who worships idols, the proof is deemed inconclusive as it can also be reconciled with Rava's position, and be referring to one who eats non-kosher mean to satisfy one's appetite. A challenge is raised against Rav Anan from a braita that equates an idol-worshipping Jew to one who rejects the entire Torah. This difficulty remains unresolved. The braita cites the biblical source for the rule that an apostate cannot bring sacrifices from a verse regarding a burnt offering. However, another braita derives this from verses regarding a sin offering. The Gemara explains why both derivations are necessary. Rabbi Yaakov notes that Rabban Gamliel and his court prohibited slaughter performed by a Cuti. Rabbi Zeira suggests this only applies when no Jew is supervising. Rabbi Yaakov disagrees, arguing that such a case was already prohibited; Rabban Gamliel's decree applied even when a Jew is present. The Gemara questions whether Rabbi Zeira ultimately accepted this view.

Abaye and Rava each found support for their respective positions in a braita - Abaye from the first sentence and Rava from the second. How does each Sage address the proof cited by the other? The second case in the braita permits a Jew to rely on a Cuti and consume birds strung together, provided the Cuti eats the head of one of the birds on the string. The Gemara raises difficulties with this case: perhaps the Cuti is merely tricking the Jew, or perhaps Cutim do not hold that one must slaughter birds at all, as the requirement is not explicitly written in the Torah. The Sages resolve the latter difficulty by explaining that Cutim accepted the laws of shechita upon themselves; therefore, they can be trusted even regarding details not explicitly stated in the Torah, including all the ways in which a slaughter can be disqualified. This, however, is a Tannaitic debate: whether or not Cutim can be relied upon regarding laws not mentioned in the Torah that they are known to have accepted. A separate braita is brought to demonstrate this dispute. Rava holds that one may rely on the slaughter of a person who does not observe the laws of kashrut, specifically one who eats nevelot, provided the knife was checked beforehand. Rava's ruling is based on the principle that a person would rather perform an act in a permissible way than a forbidden way, so long as it does not require significantly more effort. This is proven from a braita regarding the chametz of those who are generally untrusted; one can eat their food after Pesach, relying on the fact that they must have traded their food with gentiles to avoid the prohibition of chametz that remained over the holiday. A Tosefta is brought to further support Rava's position, but it is subsequently rejected. The Gemara explains that the Tosefta refers to a person who worships idols, rather than one who merely consumed non-slaughtered meat. This reading is supported by a statement of Rav Anan in the name of Shmuel that one can trust the meat of a person who worships idols. The source for this is the biblical figure Yehoshafat, who ate from Achav's meat in an incident that appears in Chronicles II, Chapter 18. The Gemara raises several difficulties about deriving this law from that incident, but all difficulties are eventually resolved.

Study Guide Following the presentation of Raba bar Ulla's interpretation, the Gemara introduces five alternative explanations of the Mishna. After surveying these options, it clarifies why each sage rejected the competing positions, highlighting the specific logical or textual difficulties inherent in each.

Study Guide The Mishna rules that all are permitted to slaughter animals, and if they do, the meat is kosher. While establishing this broad permission, the Mishna excludes minors, deaf-mutes (cheresh), and the mentally incompetent (shoteh). However, if an adult supervises them to ensure the slaughter was performed correctly, the meat is valid. The Gemara questions the Mishna's phrasing: the opening phrase "all may slaughter" implies an ab initio (l'chatchila) permission, yet the concluding phrase "their slaughtering is kosher" suggests the act is only valid post facto (b'dieved). Initially, Rav Acha attempts to prove from other Mishnayot that the term "all" can indeed refer to a post facto case, neutralizing the question. Conversely, Rav Ashi cites other Mishnayot to show that "all" is a term typically used for ab initio rulings. While both ultimately concede that "all" can technically carry both meanings, Rav Ashi argues that the context here implies ab initio. To resolve the Gemara's original difficulty, Rava bar Ulla explains that each phrase in the Mishna refers to a different specific case, and he proceeds to re-interpret each line accordingly. However, three difficulties are subsequently raised against Rava bar Ulla's interpretation, all of which the Gemara eventually resolves.

Introduction to Masechet Chullin

Rav Huna differentiates between those living in exile in Babylonia and those living in other places regarding their nature. Rav Chisda (or Rav) is quoted as making a statement differentiating between gentiles who live in different places in the world, specifically in reference to whether or not they recognize God and the place of the Jewish people. However, after raising a difficulty, this statement is emended. A number of Sages extrapolate different verses to highlight the importance of Torah study by comparing it to sacrifices. One view explains that God treats those who study Torah as if they have physically offered sacrifices in the Temple. Another view goes further, suggesting that one who studies Torah has no need for sacrifices at all, effectively idealizing Torah study as a superior form of divine service. The Mishna compares one who sacrifices animals to one who sacrifices birds and to one who sacrifices mincha offerings, stressing that all sacrifices are equal before God—those of the wealthy and those of the poor—as the most important element in sacrifices is the intent. Sacrifices are offered to God and are not intended for God's benefit, but for the person bringing the sacrifice, which further highlights the importance of the person's intention rather than the outward action.

A third challenge is brought against the ruling of Raba bar Avuha, which posits that one who vows to bring "an ox from my oxen" must provide his best ox. The difficulty arises from a comparison to commercial law: if a person sells "a house among my houses," they are not legally obligated to provide the buyer with their finest property. This discrepancy is resolved by distinguishing between the laws of hekdesh (consecration to the Temple), where the Sanctuary maintains the "upper hand," and the laws of sales, where the seller retains the "upper hand." If an individual vows to bring an offering to the Temple of Onias in Egypt, the fulfillment of that vow depends on its specific phrasing. Generally, if the vow was intended for a Temple for God, the offering must be brought to the Temple in Jerusalem; however, if the vow was specific to the Temple of Onias, there is a dispute as to whether the offering is considered a sacrifice and would be punished by karet or if the person has merely committed a "meaningless" act. A kohen who served at the Temple of Onias and subsequently repents is barred from performing service in the Temple in Jerusalem. This was a penalty to such priests, categorizing them as equivalent to a blemished kohen; while they are disqualified from performing the sacrificial service, they are still permitted to eat and share in the distribution of the sacrificial foods (kodashim) with their fellow priests. Likewise, a kohen who served in idolatrous worship is disqualified from serving in the Temple. Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet debate four specific scenarios to determine if they constitute "serving" an idol and whether a priest who performed them can return to Temple service. These four cases are: slaughtering an animal to an idol intentionally, sprinkling the blood unwittingly, bowing down to the idol, and accepting the idol as a god by verbal declaration. A fundamental debate exists between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the nature of the Temple of Onias itself - specifically, whether it was established for worship of God or for idolatry. Each Sage cites a different historical tradition regarding the political and family disputes that led Onias to flee to Egypt and build his Temple.

Six containers were used in the Temple for collecting voluntary offerings, for which six different explanations are provided to clarify their specific purposes. If a person vows to bring a specific animal for a voluntary offering and it becomes blemished, the animal must be redeemed and replaced. The Rabbis permit using the redemption money to purchase a different type, size, or number of animals, whereas Rebbi requires the replacement to match the original animal's type, size, and number exactly. When a person vows to bring "one of my oxen," the best and the middle-quality oxen are sanctified because the specific intent remains unclear. Raba bar Ulla distinguishes this from the phrase "an ox from my oxen," explaining that such language clearly indicates the best ox was intended. The Gemara challenges this distinction by citing laws from house sales, where the definitions of intended property follow different standards.

Study Guide The Mishna lists various vows, such as "I vow to bring gold to the Temple" or "I vow to bring wine," and specifies the exact quantities required to fulfill each obligation. The Gemara then analyzes and clarifies the Mishna's rulings for every case mentioned. A debate exists between Rebbi and the Sages regarding the minimum amount of oil required for a vow—specifically, whether it is one log or three. The scholars who preceded Rav Papa suggested that the root of this dispute lies in their hermeneutical methods: whether to derive both a general principle and its details from a single external source, or to derive the principle from one source while drawing the details from the case itself. Rav Papa proposed an alternative theory but ultimately conceded after Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, cited a braita that definitively refuted his explanation. Regarding the minimum value for one who vows to bring a specific animal to the Temple, the law stipulates that different species require different minimum expenditures to fulfill the obligation.

The Mishna rules that if one vows to bring a mincha (meal offering) but cannot recall which type, they must bring all five standard types. Abaye explains that this ruling can also align with Rabbi Shimon's position, which recognizes a sixth type consisting of both wafers and loaves; he argues that bringing the wafers and loaves separately covers the possibility of the combined type as well. The Gemara raises several practical difficulties regarding this possibility but resolves them all. Rav Kahana asks Rav Ashi why the person in the above case would not also need to offer a minchat nesachim (a meal offering brought with libations), given Rava's view that it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Rav Ashi identifies five distinct differences between a minchat nesachim and other voluntary meal offerings, demonstrating that someone in doubt about their vow would certainly not have been referring to an offering so fundamentally different. The Rabbis and Rebbi disagree in the Mishna regarding a case where one says, "I vowed to bring a mincha of esronim in one vessel, but I do not remember how many." The dispute centers on whether they must bring sixty esronim in one bowl or every amount from one to sixty in sixty separate bowls. The Gemara suggests five different explanations for the nature of this debate and analyzes each suggestion. The Mishna explains the minimum value one must provide when vowing to bring wood, frankincense, gold, silver, or copper to the Temple. The required amount depends on the phrasing used: if one said, "I vow to bring [the item]," they are required to bring the minimum. However, if one said, "I vowed an amount, but I do not remember what amount," they are required to bring the maximum.

There is a contradiction raised against Rav Bibi, who testified about a case where the blood of a carcass was measured to see if there was enough to convey impurity. This contradicts a Mishna in Eduyot, where others testified that the blood of a dead animal is pure. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that there is a tannaitic debate on the matter and clarifies why those who declare it impure set the requisite amount at a quarter-log (revi'it). One may offer voluntary wine libations in the Temple, but only in the volumes used for obligatory offerings: three, four, or six log (or a combination thereof). A question is raised: must the pledged libations be offered all at once, or can they be split? This question is asked egarding someone who pledged five log (an invalid single amount): can one "divide" the five - meaning offer four and redeems the fifth or gives it away - or must one wait until one acquires another log to complete a set of six? Although Abaye and Rava both attempted to bring proofs to resolve this, their answers were rejected as inconclusive. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree over whether one can offer voluntary oil libations. Their debate centers on whether the laws of oil can be derived from the laws of wine. Regarding ownership, a mincha cannot be brought if it is jointly owned by partners. The Gemara explores why this differs from animal and bird sacrifices, which can be brought by partners. There are five (or six, according to Rabbi Shimon) types of voluntary mincha offerings: solet (no pre-baking/frying), machavat (pan), marcheshet (deep pan), rekikim (wafers), and challot (loaves). The Mishna delves into various ambiguous formulations used in vows and explains what specific type and quantity the individual is obligated to bring to ensure they fulfill their commitment.

There is a dispute regarding a case where someone vowed to bring a mincha of barley. The Tana Kama says that because such a thing does not exist, we obligate them to bring a mincha of wheat. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that what was said is nothing, as there is no voluntary mincha of barley. Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan attempt to understand the Tana Kama's position. For Chizkiya, it is based on the view of Beit Shammai who hold that we seize the first expression - the statement "I take upon myself a mincha" already creates an obligation to bring a wheat offering, and what one said afterward (where perhaps it was a retraction) is not accepted at all because it is too late. According to Rabbi Yochanan, who establishes an ukimta for the Mishna, it refers to a case where, when told there is no mincha of barley, the person says that they did not know, and had they known, they would have vowed wheat. There is another dispute in our Mishna between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan that appears to present opinions opposite to what they said previously, but the Gemara explains the matter. Chizkiya retracted and agreed with Rabbi Yochanan, while Rabbi Yochanan challenged his retraction and explained how Chizkiya could have explained the words of the Mishna according to his original logic. Zeiri limits the words of the Mishna to a case where one said "I take upon myself a mincha...", but if one did not say "mincha" but rather "I take upon myself barley" or "I take upon myself a barley mincha," we do not apply the principle of seizing the first expression. Rava challenges Rav Nachman regarding Zeiri's words based on our Mishna, but Rav Nachman resolves his challenges. One who volunteers to bring more than sixty issaron must bring sixty in one vessel and the remainder in another vessel. Why is sixty established as the maximum amount for a single vessel? The Tana Kama explains this based on the day that has the most libations in the Temple - the first day of Sukkot that falls on Shabbat, when they bring libations in the amount of sixty-one issaron. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says it is based on what can be mixed in one vessel; more than sixty is impossible. The Sages challenge him as to why specifically this number was chosen. Rabbi Shimon responds that this is the case with all measurements established by the Sages. The Gemara challenges Rabbi Shimon, noting that a mincha is valid even if it was not actually mixed, so why is the potential for mixing so important? They answer based on the words of Rabbi Zeira, that it must be eligible for mixing (anything eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything not eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it).

The Gemara raises a difficulty from the laws of pigul against the principle that "anything ready to be sprinkled is considered as if it were already sprinkled," which implies viewing the act of sprinkling the blood as having already occurred. After resolving this difficulty, the Gemara presents the position of Rav Ashi, who rejects this principle. However, following a challenge from the laws of meilah (misuse of consecrated property), it is clarified that his statement applies only to the laws of ritual impurity of foods; regarding meilah, conversely, Rav Ashi admits that the principle is valid, and the meat is released from the status of meilah the moment it is ready for sprinkling. Subsequently, another difficulty is raised against Rav Ashi from Rabbi Yosi's ruling regarding the meat of an asham talui, as Rabbi Yosi - according to Rava's understanding - agrees with Rabbi Shimon that "anything standing to be sprinkled is considered as if it were already sprinkled." This difficulty is resolved by providing an alternative explanation for Rabbi Yosi's position that does not rely on this principle. Additionally, Rav Ashi challenges the opposing view, and this difficulty is also resolved. The Mishna discusses the laws of deviations in meal-offering vows, detailing the law for cases where an individual vowed or pledged a specific type of mincha but brought a different type instead.