Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Study Guide The Gemara introduces a braita to show the source for the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon in a bird burnt offering. The braita presents three distinct opinions on the biblical term "k'mishpat" regarding a bird burnt offering. The Sages debate whether this term compares it to an animal sin offering or a bird sin offering, detailing the exact procedural laws they share. This very debate serves as the foundation for the conflicting views of the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon regarding whether the two simanim must be severed completely. The Mishna states the age rules for birds for sacrifices: mature turtledoves (torim) are valid while young ones are not, whereas young pigeons (bnei yonah) are valid while mature ones are not. The Gemara defines the exact boundaries of these stages, analyzing the transitional phase known as techilat hatzahov (when the plumage around the neck begins to turn a golden/yellow color), which is disqualified in both species.

Study Guide Zeiri rules that if an animal or bird's neck bone is broken and the majority of the surrounding flesh is severed, it immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if it is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if this state constitutes a neveila, how can melika be validly performed on a sacrificial bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? Rava answers that in melika, the kohen breaks the neck bone and spinal column without simultaneously severing the majority of the surrounding flesh. Rabbi Ami answers the challenge in the same manner, and his and Rava's answers are supported by a braita. The braita notes that in a bird burnt offering (olat ha'of), either the majority of both simanim or both simanim in their entirety must be cut. Because the Sages and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon dispute whether both simanim must be completely severed or if cutting the majority suffices, the Gemara suggests two interpretations to align the braita with one or both of these respective opinions. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel applies Zeiri's principle to humans, ruling that if a person's backbone and the majority of the surrounding flesh are severed, they immediately impart ritual impurity in a tent (tumat ohel) like a corpse, even if the body is still convulsing. Rabbi Yochanan introduces an additional case where the legal moment of death is determined immediately despite lingering convulsions. A parallel case regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures) is brought from a Mishna, prompting a debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Ami over whether "cutting off the head" means a complete detachment or a partial one, similar to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon concerning a bird burnt offering. The Gemara introduces a braita to show the source for the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon in a bird burnt offering. The braita presents three distinct opinions on the biblical term "k'mishpat"  regarding a bird burnt offering. The Sages debate whether this term compares it to an animal sin offering or a bird sin offering, detailing the exact procedural laws they share. This very debate serves as the foundation for the conflicting views of the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon regarding whether the two simanim must be severed completely.

The sons of Rabbi Chiya taught that when performing melika (pinching the neck of a sacrificial bird), the kohen may draw the simanim (the windpipe and gullet) toward the back of the neck and sever them without breaking the neck bone. The Sages dispute whether they meant this is the only valid method (to avoid rendering the bird a treifa by breaking the bone first), or if breaking the neck bone prior to cutting the simanim is also permitted as a Torah-prescribed approach. The Mishna supports this latter explanation. Rabbi Yannai raises a difficulty against the sons of Rabbi Chiya based on an inference from another line in the Mishna, which the Gemara resolves by demonstrating that an alternative inference can be drawn. The Gemara notes a debate regarding whether melika can be performed with a back-and-forth sawing motion (holacha v'hava'a) similar to shechita. Rabbi Yirmia quotes a statement by Shmuel comparing shechita and melika. After analyzing what specific law was being equated, the Gemara concludes that Shmuel is teaching that if one begins the melika too high on the neck (hagrama) and finishes in the correct area, it is disqualified -  just as we learned regarding shechita. Rami bar Yechezkel cites a braita stating that there is no issue with birds if the simanim are found to be displaced. The Gemara disputes whether this applies only according to the opinion that shechita of a bird is not a Torah law, or if it holds true even for those who view it as a Torah obligation derived via halakha l'Moshe m'Sinai. A further debate ensues over whether Rami bar Yechezkel's braita applies exclusively to melika or extends to the shechita of a bird as well. Additionally, Rabbi Yirmia's statement in the name of Shmuel is presented as a conflicting view to this braita. Zeira rules that if the neck bone is broken, the animal or bird immediately becomes a neveila (carcass), even if the animal is still convulsing. Rava challenges this: if breaking the neck bone creates a neveila, how could melika ever be validly performed on a bird, given that the process begins by breaking the neck? This would mean the kohen is performing melika on a bird that is already dead. Abaye raises a difficulty against Rava's challenge from the laws of a bird burnt offering, and the Gemara resolves the issue.

Pictures Rav Nachman permitted slaughtering above the large ring, at the point where the "hat" begins to slope inward, provided that the chitim (wheat-shaped glands) are at least partially left intact below the cut. This ruling matches neither the rabbis nor Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda, but appears to follow the position of Rabbi Chanina ben Antignus. Rav Huna and Rav Nachman dispute the exact parameters of the disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda. One view posits that they disagree in a case where the slaughterer cut the first third too high up, and the remaining two-thirds in the correct place - whereas if one cut two-thirds in the correct place and then veered upward for the last third, all agree it is valid (as the majority was already severed properly). An alternative version shifts the opinions between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. Both versions include a difficulty and resolution exchanged between either Rav Chisda, Rav Yosef, and Abaye. Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda further disagree on cases of alternating validity - such as when one slaughters the first third in the wrong place, the next third in the right place, and the final third in the wrong place (or the reverse scenario). Rav Yehuda follows the absolute majority; if the total sum of the valid cuts constitutes a majority, the slaughter is kosher. Rav Huna, however, evaluates the chronological moment the majority is achieved, requiring the majority to be made continuously in a valid manner. Rav Kahana asked Rav Yehuda for the ruling on the cases of alternating thirds. He then raised several subsequent queries regarding the validity of shechita performed over a pre-existing perforation (nekev) in the windpipe. The Mishna notes that the location for shechita is the exact opposite of the location for melika (the sacrificial pinching of a bird's neck). Melika must be performed from the back of the neck (oref), whereas shechita must be performed from the front or the sides of the neck.

Slaughterers who failed to show their knives to a Chacham (Sage) for inspection were penalized, though the severity of the penalty differed depending on whether the knife was subsequently found to be smooth or notched. The teeth of a harvest sickle incline in one direction; therefore, if one used it to slaughter in the direction that cuts cleanly without tearing, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute its validity. However, Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that both agree the slaughter is invalid, and their actual debate is whether the animal is classified as a neveila (a carcass, which imparts impurity) or a treifa. The windpipe features a large ring at the top that encircles it entirely, unlike the lower rings which are C-shaped and do not completely cover it. The Mishna presents two opinions regarding the highest anatomical point where slaughter can be performed without being disqualified by hagrama (slanting outside the designated slaughter area). The Tanna Kama rules that the large ring must be completely severed while leaving a width of a thread of the top ring untouched. Conversely, Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda rules that as long as the majority of the windpipe is cut in the valid area, the slaughter is kosher, even if the slaughterer subsequently cuts above it into the area known as "the hat" (kova) - since the act was legally complete once the majority was cut. Rav and Shmuel explain that Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda also forbade slaughtering directly on the smaller rings, permitting it only between them since they do not encircle the entire windpipe. However, after challenging this with a contradictory braita where Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda explicitly permits slaughtering on the smaller rings, the Gemara concludes that Rav and Shmuel agreed with his view regarding the large ring but ruled against his lenient stance on the smaller rings. When Rabbi Zeira moved from Babylonia to Israel and permitted slaughtering on these rings, the Sages questioned why he did not maintain the stringencies of Rav and Shmuel, given the halakhic rule that a traveler must observe the stringencies of both their place of origin and their destination. Two resolutions are suggested, each presenting different exceptions to the rules of local custom. Ultimately, the Gemara notes that customs varied across different regions of Babylonia, and not all areas adopted this stringency. There is a dispute between Rav Papi and Rav Papa regarding the exact anatomical boundary for the highest point of the windpipe where shechita remains valid.

The Mishna rules that "one may always slaughter." Raba and Rav Yosef both understand this to refer to the period of Exile, but each explains it according to a different Tannaitic view - either Rabbi Yishmael or Rabbi Akiva. These Sages disagreed over whether the Jewsl in the desert were forbidden to eat meat unless it was brought as a sacrifice, or whether they were permitted to eat meat even without formal ritual slaughter (shechita). After delving into the debate between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva and resolving various difficulties raised against each position, the Gemara challenges the explanations of both Raba and Rav Yosef based on the textual context of the Mishna. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the phrase "one may always slaughter" includes even a Jew who eats non-kosher meat l'teavon (out of appetite). The Gemara then analyzes which specific types of nicks in a knife disqualify a slaughter and render the animal a treifa, and which do not. The Gemara outlines various customs regarding the method used to check the knife, alongside a debate concerning which parts of the blade must be examined.

The Gemara brings a braita to prove that Rebbi differentiates between a slaughter performed with an item attached to the ground and one performed with an item that was originally detached but later became attached. An internal contradiction within the braita is resolved by applying this distinction. The Gemara then delves into the specific cases within the braita. First, it addresses slaughtering using a mechanism. After raising a contradiction from a different braita that rules such a slaughter invalid, the conflict is resolved by distinguishing between a mechanism operated directly by human action and one that functions without human intervention or is only very indirectly affected by it. Rava discusses whether an item that was detached and subsequently re-attached to the ground is legally considered "attached" or "detached" across various areas of halakha - idol worship, susceptibility to impurity, and slaughtering. He notes that regarding idol worship, it is considered detached. Regarding impurity, it is subject to a tannaitic debate. Regarding slaughter, however, he remains unsure. The Gemara cites three quotes from the previously mentioned braita to resolve the status for slaughter, but each proof is ultimately deemed inconclusive. Shmuel limits a ruling in the braita - concerning slaughtering with a knife stuck in a wall - to a case where the animal is positioned below the knife. However, a contradictory braita is brought that makes no distinction regarding whether the animal is above or below. Two possible resolutions are suggested. Rav Chisda (or a braita) discusses five laws involving a reed stalk, forbidding its use in various activities due to the risk of splinters. One of these laws states that one cannot slaughter with it, which contradicts another source permitting its use. The Gemara distinguishes between a soft reed (which grows in a marsh) and a hardened one, which is more likely to splinter. The Mishna explains that "all may slaughter and forever." The term "all" is understood to include birds, which also require ritual slaughter. As for the term "forever," Raba explains that it follows the view of Rabbi Yishmael and serves to permit the consumption of meat even after the destruction of the Temple. Rav Yosef raises two difficulties with Raba's explanation.

Study Guide

The Mishna rules that if one slaughters an animal on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, the slaughter is valid. However, Rav asserts that the meat may not be eaten on that Shabbat, even raw. The Sages in the Yeshiva explained that Rav's position accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the laws of Shabbat, and the Gemara attempts to identify which specific ruling of Rabbi Yehuda serves as the basis for this. Rabbi Abba suggests it refers to Rabbi Yehuda's view on hachana -the requirement that an item be designated for use before Shabbat - citing the example of Rabbi Yehuda's prohibition against cutting up an animal that died on Shabbat to feed to one's dogs.  Abaye rejects this, arguing that animals intended for food are considered inherently designated for slaughter for human consumption (but not for animal consumption) even while alive, citing laws of Yom Tov as proof. Although Rabbi Abba attempts to resolve the difficulty by employing the principle of breira (retroactive designation) to understand the Yom Tov law, this is rejected as Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the concept of breira. The Gemara attempts to find the source for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold by breira. Initially, it attempts to prove this from a case involving the separation of teruma from wine, but after rejecting that proof, the Gemara derives it from Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding eruv techumim. Rav Yosef suggests the source is Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding broken vessels that were not broken before Shabbat; these are forbidden by Rabbi Yehuda  if they cannot be used for their original function. However, this comparison is rejected because an animal can be considered "food" even before it is slaughtered. This discussion aligns with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion regarding liquids that seep out of fruits. The Gemara offers a third suggestion based on Shmuel's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda's view on liquids leaking from olives and grapes. Shmuel posits that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with the Sages that such liquids are forbidden to prevent one from intentionally squeezing the fruit; likewise, permitting meat from a Shabbat slaughter might lead one to intentionally slaughter an animal on Shabbat. This is rejected because Rav disagrees with Shmuel's interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda's position on grapes and olives; since the goal is to clarify Rav's own ruling, it cannot be based on a premise that Rav himself does not accept. Rabbi Sheshet suggests a fourth possibility based on Rabbi Yehuda's ruling on lamps. Rabbi Yehuda deems used lamps muktze because they are repulsive (mi'us); similarly, a living animal would be muktze because it cannot be eaten in its current state. This is also rejected, as the Gemara distinguishes between muktze due to repulsion and muktze resulting from a prohibition.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba recounts a discussion between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the legal weight of a minor's intent. In the first version, the question is whether a minor's thoughts alone are significant. Rabbi Ami argues it is obvious they are not, citing a Mishna in Kelim 17:15. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that the doubt applies when a minor's action reasonably demonstrates their intent, but not completely - such as moving an animal to the northern part of the Temple courtyard, the specific area for slaughtering burnt offerings. Rabbi Ami challenges this, noting that Rabbi Yochanan himself previously ruled in the context of ritual impurity that a minor's action is significant when the minor's intent is reasonably clear from the action. Rabbi Yochanan responds that his question was whether such actions are valid by Torah law or only by Rabbinic decree; the matter remains unresolved. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers a different version of the discussion, focusing on whether a minor's actions are effective. This version concludes with Rabbi Yochanan distinguishing between three categories: actions with clear intent, actions with reasonably clear, but not completely clear intent, and intent without any accompanying action. Shmuel asks Rav Huna for the biblical source disqualifying sacrifices that were slaughtered without the specific intent to perform a slaughter (mitasek). The Mishna rules that meat slaughtered by a non-Jew is considered neveila (a carcass) and imparts impurity by carrying (masa). Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Ami draw different inferences from this. Rabbi Yochanan suggests the Mishna follows the Sages (against Rabbi Eliezer) in assuming that gentiles do not automatically slaughter for idolatrous purposes; if they did, the meat would be forbidden even for benefit. Rabbi Ami infers that the slaughter of a heretic (min), one who is a devout idol worshipped is strictly forbidden for any benefit, a position supported by a braita. The Gemara explains that we generally do not fear a gentile will slaughter for idolatry because they are typically not devout in their practice. However, a min is considered deeply dedicated to their worship, and their slaughter is presumed to be for an idol. Rav Nachman distinguishes between Jewish heretics and gentile heretics, showing more leniency toward the latter, though the Gemara clarifies this applies specifically to accepting their sacrifices. The shechita of one who slaughters in the dark or a blind person is accepted.

Rav Nachman states in the name of Rav that meat is permitted if someone supervised the slaughter throughout the process. The Gemara questions why supervision is necessary, given the principle that most who engage in slaughtering are experts. It concludes that the case involves someone known to be ignorant of the laws of shechita who successfully severed the first siman (sign); however, this is insufficient to assume the second will be handled correctly, thus requiring supervision to ensure no disqualifying error occurs during the remainder of the slaughter. Rav Dimi bar Yosef asked Rav Nachman: If an agent is appointed to slaughter an animal or separate teruma (tithes), and the owner subsequently finds the meat slaughtered or the produce tithed, can we assume the agent performed the task and the food is permitted? Rav Nachman distinguished between the two: the meat is permitted, but the produce is not. He explained that we cannot automatically assume the agent performed the task, and must consider that a third party might have intervened. Regarding shechita, this is acceptable because of the presumption that most slaughterers are experts. However, regarding teruma, if a third party separates tithes without the owner's permission, the act is legally ineffective. The Gemara suggests that the question of whether we presume most slaughterers are experts is a Tannaitic dispute, but this suggestion is ultimately rejected. Although a deaf-mute, a minor, or a mentally incompetent person may slaughter under supervision, the Gemara infers from the Mishna's phrasing that one should not grant them an animal to slaughter ab initio. Furthermore, the fact that their slaughter is valid and the meat is permitted indicates that slaughtering does not require intent (kavana), a position attributed to Rabbi Natan.

Study Guide The Gemara asks for the source of the principle that we follow the statistical majority (rubba), such as in cases of yibum involving minors where we assume the male is not a saris (sterile) and the female is not an aylonit (barren). The Gemara proposes ten different Torah laws as potential sources for this rule. While difficulties are raised against each possibility and some are resolved, the Gemara ultimately rejects them all. It suggests that these sources might only prove that we follow the majority when it is impossible to clarify the actual status; however, in a case where it is possible to determine the reality, one may be required to investigate rather than rely on the majority.

If it is discovered after shechita that the knife has nicks, can we assume the slaughter was valid because the nicks occurred after the two simanim were cut, or is there a concern that they occurred while cutting the hide before the simanim? Rav Huna and Rav Chisda disagree on this matter. Two difficulties are raised against Rav Chisda's ruling to permit, but they are resolved. From where do we derive the principle that an item retains its status until proven otherwise (chazaka)? Rabbi Yonatan derives it from the case of a leprous house, but Rav Acha disagrees with his derivation.

There is a dispute between Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav and Rav Chanania bar Shlemia in the name of Rav regarding which practical skills a Torah scholar must master through repetition. The first opinion lists writing, slaughtering, and circumcision, while the second adds the knot of the tefillin, the sheva berakhot, and the tying of tzitzit. Rav Yehuda quotes two further statements in the name of Shmuel. The first is that a slaughterer must be expert in the laws of shechita; otherwise, the meat may not be eaten. Since meat can be disqualified for five specific reasons, an unlearned slaughterer might perform an invalid slaughter without realizing it. The second statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel is that a slaughterer must inspect the two simanim (the windpipe and gullet) to ensure they were properly severed. While Rav Yosef attempts to provide a proof for this requirement, Abaye rejects it. The Gemara discusses the status of meat that was not inspected, debating whether it is classified as a treifa or a neveila. Both positions are rooted in their interpretation of Rav Huna's principle: a living animal is presumed forbidden until it is proven that a valid shechita was performed, but once slaughtered properly, it is presumed kosher until proven to be a treifa. The Gemara then analyzes the second half of Rav Huna's statement, inferring that an animal remains kosher even if there is an unproven concern that it might be a treifa. This is illustrated by a case where a wolf takes an internal organ and returns it with a hole; we do not assume the hole existed prior to the wolf's intervention. Rabbi Abba challenges this from a ruling regarding food nibbled by creatures, where we fear teh hole where they are nibbling was a pre-existing hole from a snake who may have injected venom into it. To resolve this, Rav Huna distinguishes between matters of danger and matters of ritual prohibition (issur). While Rava rejects this distinction, arguing that stringency regarding danger should imply stringency regarding prohibitions, Abaye accepts the differentiation, citing proofs from the laws of impurity. After Rava rejects Abaye's proof and Rav Shimi raises a difficulty with Rava's position that the Gemara resolves, Rav Ashi concludes by bringing support for Rav Huna's position.

Rabbi Zeira says in the name of Shmuel that if one heats a knife and uses it for slaughtering, the animal is not considered a treifa. Although the heat could potentially damage the animal, the sharp edge of the blade severs the windpipe and gullet before the heat from the sides of the blade can cause a burn. A question is raised regarding a person who strikes another with a hot knife, resulting in a leprous mark: is this classified as a boil (shechin) or a burn (michve)? The Gemara explores the practical halakhic implications of this distinction. Two sources are brought to resolve the matter - the first being the aforementioned statement of Rabbi Zeira - but the Gemara distinguishes between the cases and reaches no definitive conclusion. The Gemara then transitions to a discussion regarding benefit from knives used for idol worship, detailing when they are forbidden or permitted. It further addresses the status of meat slaughtered with a knife previously used for non-kosher slaughter, as well as the process for kashering a knife used on a treifa. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav notes that a slaughterer should maintain three distinct knives: one dedicated solely to slaughtering, one for cutting meat, and one for removing cheilev (forbidden fats).

Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi decreed that produce in Beit Shean did not require tithing, as he ruled the area was not considered part of Israel for those specific purposes. This decision was based on the testimony of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Zeiruz, who observed Rabbi Meir eating a vegetable leaf without tithing it. Rabbi Yirmia challenged this testimony, suggesting various reasons why Rabbi Meir might have eaten the leaf without realizing it was untithed or why it might have actually been tithed. In response, Rabbi Zeira argued that if God protects the animals of the righteous from inadvertent sin, then God certainly protects the righteous themselves. The Gemara recounts the story of Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair's donkey, which refused to eat untithed produce, to support Rabbi Zeira's assertion. This episode is part of a larger narrative regarding Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair's journey to redeem captives: the first part describes him splitting a river to cross; the middle section concerns the donkey's refusal to eat; and the final part involves Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi inviting him to dine, an invitation he ultimately declined. Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair was exceptionally careful never to benefit from the food of others.

When Rabbi Zeira heard that Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Asi were eating meat slaughtered by a Cuti, he assumed they must have been aware of a prior decree permitting it. He reasoned that had it been forbidden, they would have inadvertently consumed non-kosher meat - a mistake God would not allow to befall the righteous. This principle is derived from the story where God protected the animal of a righteous person from sin; how much more so would He protect the righteous individuals themselves! From this incident, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Zeira eventually conceded to Rabbi Yaakov that the shechita of a Cuti had been forbidden by the decree of Rabban Gamliel, even if a Jew was present to supervise the process. The Gemara explains that although Rabban Gamliel and his court originally decreed that the shechita of Cutim was unacceptable, the restriction expanded over time. A story is told of Rabbi Meir, who forbade their wine after discovering that a minority of the Cutim worshipped idols. Later, a subsequent generation of Amoraim in Israel - Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi - were informed that the Cutim had ceased to be "Torah worshippers" entirely. Consequently, they accorded them the status of gentiles regarding all halakhic matters. The Gemara clarifies that while their shechita and wine had been forbidden by Rabbi Meir and Rabban Gamliel previously, the ruling was only universally accepted and finalized in the time of Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi. The Gemara presents two other instances where the concept of God protecting the righteous from accidental transgression is applied. The first involves Rabbi Zeira regarding the laws of demai (produce from an am haaretz which tithes may not have been separated). When produce purchased from an am haaretz is mixed with other ingredients, its status is debated. Seeing Rav Asi eating such a mixture without tithing it, Rabbi Zeira inferred that it must be permitted, as God would not allow a righteous person to eat untithed food. The Gemara challenges this conclusion based on a braita that appears to forbid such mixtures. However, the Gemara resolves this in two possible ways by explaining that the case in the braita involved a unique type of "mixture." While the initial difficulty was raised from the second half of the braita, the Gemara also questions the first part, which permits returning food to a neighbor who is an am haaretz without re-tithing it (as we do not suspect the neighbor of swapping the food). Although three other Tannaitic sources suggest we should fear a swap, the Gemara distinguishes each case as unique. A third situation is mentioned where Rabbi Zeira applied the principle of divine protection. It concerns Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the footsteps of Rabbi Meir permitting produce in Beit Shean to be eaten without tithing, on the basis that Beit Shean was not considered to be within the halakhic borders of the Land of Israel.

After explaining that the source for Rav Anan's statement in the name of Shmuel, that one can trust the slaughter of a person who worships idols was derived from Yehoshafat, the Gemara seeks evidence that Yehoshafat actually consumed Achav's meat. Two additional sources are examined to support Rav Anan. The first involves Eliyahu, who was fed meat by ravens (orvim), which supposedly originated from Achav's kitchen. However, this is dismissed as a unique divine decree that cannot serve as a legal precedent. The second source is a braita previously cited about accepting the slaughter of a Jew who does not observe the commandment. While it was initially thought to support Rav Anan, and referring to one who worships idols, the proof is deemed inconclusive as it can also be reconciled with Rava's position, and be referring to one who eats non-kosher mean to satisfy one's appetite. A challenge is raised against Rav Anan from a braita that equates an idol-worshipping Jew to one who rejects the entire Torah. This difficulty remains unresolved. The braita cites the biblical source for the rule that an apostate cannot bring sacrifices from a verse regarding a burnt offering. However, another braita derives this from verses regarding a sin offering. The Gemara explains why both derivations are necessary. Rabbi Yaakov notes that Rabban Gamliel and his court prohibited slaughter performed by a Cuti. Rabbi Zeira suggests this only applies when no Jew is supervising. Rabbi Yaakov disagrees, arguing that such a case was already prohibited; Rabban Gamliel's decree applied even when a Jew is present. The Gemara questions whether Rabbi Zeira ultimately accepted this view.

Abaye and Rava each found support for their respective positions in a braita - Abaye from the first sentence and Rava from the second. How does each Sage address the proof cited by the other? The second case in the braita permits a Jew to rely on a Cuti and consume birds strung together, provided the Cuti eats the head of one of the birds on the string. The Gemara raises difficulties with this case: perhaps the Cuti is merely tricking the Jew, or perhaps Cutim do not hold that one must slaughter birds at all, as the requirement is not explicitly written in the Torah. The Sages resolve the latter difficulty by explaining that Cutim accepted the laws of shechita upon themselves; therefore, they can be trusted even regarding details not explicitly stated in the Torah, including all the ways in which a slaughter can be disqualified. This, however, is a Tannaitic debate: whether or not Cutim can be relied upon regarding laws not mentioned in the Torah that they are known to have accepted. A separate braita is brought to demonstrate this dispute. Rava holds that one may rely on the slaughter of a person who does not observe the laws of kashrut, specifically one who eats nevelot, provided the knife was checked beforehand. Rava's ruling is based on the principle that a person would rather perform an act in a permissible way than a forbidden way, so long as it does not require significantly more effort. This is proven from a braita regarding the chametz of those who are generally untrusted; one can eat their food after Pesach, relying on the fact that they must have traded their food with gentiles to avoid the prohibition of chametz that remained over the holiday. A Tosefta is brought to further support Rava's position, but it is subsequently rejected. The Gemara explains that the Tosefta refers to a person who worships idols, rather than one who merely consumed non-slaughtered meat. This reading is supported by a statement of Rav Anan in the name of Shmuel that one can trust the meat of a person who worships idols. The source for this is the biblical figure Yehoshafat, who ate from Achav's meat in an incident that appears in Chronicles II, Chapter 18. The Gemara raises several difficulties about deriving this law from that incident, but all difficulties are eventually resolved.

Study Guide Following the presentation of Raba bar Ulla's interpretation, the Gemara introduces five alternative explanations of the Mishna. After surveying these options, it clarifies why each sage rejected the competing positions, highlighting the specific logical or textual difficulties inherent in each.

Study Guide The Mishna rules that all are permitted to slaughter animals, and if they do, the meat is kosher. While establishing this broad permission, the Mishna excludes minors, deaf-mutes (cheresh), and the mentally incompetent (shoteh). However, if an adult supervises them to ensure the slaughter was performed correctly, the meat is valid. The Gemara questions the Mishna's phrasing: the opening phrase "all may slaughter" implies an ab initio (l'chatchila) permission, yet the concluding phrase "their slaughtering is kosher" suggests the act is only valid post facto (b'dieved). Initially, Rav Acha attempts to prove from other Mishnayot that the term "all" can indeed refer to a post facto case, neutralizing the question. Conversely, Rav Ashi cites other Mishnayot to show that "all" is a term typically used for ab initio rulings. While both ultimately concede that "all" can technically carry both meanings, Rav Ashi argues that the context here implies ab initio. To resolve the Gemara's original difficulty, Rava bar Ulla explains that each phrase in the Mishna refers to a different specific case, and he proceeds to re-interpret each line accordingly. However, three difficulties are subsequently raised against Rava bar Ulla's interpretation, all of which the Gemara eventually resolves.

Introduction to Masechet Chullin

Rav Huna differentiates between those living in exile in Babylonia and those living in other places regarding their nature. Rav Chisda (or Rav) is quoted as making a statement differentiating between gentiles who live in different places in the world, specifically in reference to whether or not they recognize God and the place of the Jewish people. However, after raising a difficulty, this statement is emended. A number of Sages extrapolate different verses to highlight the importance of Torah study by comparing it to sacrifices. One view explains that God treats those who study Torah as if they have physically offered sacrifices in the Temple. Another view goes further, suggesting that one who studies Torah has no need for sacrifices at all, effectively idealizing Torah study as a superior form of divine service. The Mishna compares one who sacrifices animals to one who sacrifices birds and to one who sacrifices mincha offerings, stressing that all sacrifices are equal before God—those of the wealthy and those of the poor—as the most important element in sacrifices is the intent. Sacrifices are offered to God and are not intended for God's benefit, but for the person bringing the sacrifice, which further highlights the importance of the person's intention rather than the outward action.

A third challenge is brought against the ruling of Raba bar Avuha, which posits that one who vows to bring "an ox from my oxen" must provide his best ox. The difficulty arises from a comparison to commercial law: if a person sells "a house among my houses," they are not legally obligated to provide the buyer with their finest property. This discrepancy is resolved by distinguishing between the laws of hekdesh (consecration to the Temple), where the Sanctuary maintains the "upper hand," and the laws of sales, where the seller retains the "upper hand." If an individual vows to bring an offering to the Temple of Onias in Egypt, the fulfillment of that vow depends on its specific phrasing. Generally, if the vow was intended for a Temple for God, the offering must be brought to the Temple in Jerusalem; however, if the vow was specific to the Temple of Onias, there is a dispute as to whether the offering is considered a sacrifice and would be punished by karet or if the person has merely committed a "meaningless" act. A kohen who served at the Temple of Onias and subsequently repents is barred from performing service in the Temple in Jerusalem. This was a penalty to such priests, categorizing them as equivalent to a blemished kohen; while they are disqualified from performing the sacrificial service, they are still permitted to eat and share in the distribution of the sacrificial foods (kodashim) with their fellow priests. Likewise, a kohen who served in idolatrous worship is disqualified from serving in the Temple. Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet debate four specific scenarios to determine if they constitute "serving" an idol and whether a priest who performed them can return to Temple service. These four cases are: slaughtering an animal to an idol intentionally, sprinkling the blood unwittingly, bowing down to the idol, and accepting the idol as a god by verbal declaration. A fundamental debate exists between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the nature of the Temple of Onias itself - specifically, whether it was established for worship of God or for idolatry. Each Sage cites a different historical tradition regarding the political and family disputes that led Onias to flee to Egypt and build his Temple.

Six containers were used in the Temple for collecting voluntary offerings, for which six different explanations are provided to clarify their specific purposes. If a person vows to bring a specific animal for a voluntary offering and it becomes blemished, the animal must be redeemed and replaced. The Rabbis permit using the redemption money to purchase a different type, size, or number of animals, whereas Rebbi requires the replacement to match the original animal's type, size, and number exactly. When a person vows to bring "one of my oxen," the best and the middle-quality oxen are sanctified because the specific intent remains unclear. Raba bar Ulla distinguishes this from the phrase "an ox from my oxen," explaining that such language clearly indicates the best ox was intended. The Gemara challenges this distinction by citing laws from house sales, where the definitions of intended property follow different standards.

Study Guide The Mishna lists various vows, such as "I vow to bring gold to the Temple" or "I vow to bring wine," and specifies the exact quantities required to fulfill each obligation. The Gemara then analyzes and clarifies the Mishna's rulings for every case mentioned. A debate exists between Rebbi and the Sages regarding the minimum amount of oil required for a vow—specifically, whether it is one log or three. The scholars who preceded Rav Papa suggested that the root of this dispute lies in their hermeneutical methods: whether to derive both a general principle and its details from a single external source, or to derive the principle from one source while drawing the details from the case itself. Rav Papa proposed an alternative theory but ultimately conceded after Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, cited a braita that definitively refuted his explanation. Regarding the minimum value for one who vows to bring a specific animal to the Temple, the law stipulates that different species require different minimum expenditures to fulfill the obligation.

The Mishna rules that if one vows to bring a mincha (meal offering) but cannot recall which type, they must bring all five standard types. Abaye explains that this ruling can also align with Rabbi Shimon's position, which recognizes a sixth type consisting of both wafers and loaves; he argues that bringing the wafers and loaves separately covers the possibility of the combined type as well. The Gemara raises several practical difficulties regarding this possibility but resolves them all. Rav Kahana asks Rav Ashi why the person in the above case would not also need to offer a minchat nesachim (a meal offering brought with libations), given Rava's view that it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Rav Ashi identifies five distinct differences between a minchat nesachim and other voluntary meal offerings, demonstrating that someone in doubt about their vow would certainly not have been referring to an offering so fundamentally different. The Rabbis and Rebbi disagree in the Mishna regarding a case where one says, "I vowed to bring a mincha of esronim in one vessel, but I do not remember how many." The dispute centers on whether they must bring sixty esronim in one bowl or every amount from one to sixty in sixty separate bowls. The Gemara suggests five different explanations for the nature of this debate and analyzes each suggestion. The Mishna explains the minimum value one must provide when vowing to bring wood, frankincense, gold, silver, or copper to the Temple. The required amount depends on the phrasing used: if one said, "I vow to bring [the item]," they are required to bring the minimum. However, if one said, "I vowed an amount, but I do not remember what amount," they are required to bring the maximum.

There is a contradiction raised against Rav Bibi, who testified about a case where the blood of a carcass was measured to see if there was enough to convey impurity. This contradicts a Mishna in Eduyot, where others testified that the blood of a dead animal is pure. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that there is a tannaitic debate on the matter and clarifies why those who declare it impure set the requisite amount at a quarter-log (revi'it). One may offer voluntary wine libations in the Temple, but only in the volumes used for obligatory offerings: three, four, or six log (or a combination thereof). A question is raised: must the pledged libations be offered all at once, or can they be split? This question is asked egarding someone who pledged five log (an invalid single amount): can one "divide" the five - meaning offer four and redeems the fifth or gives it away - or must one wait until one acquires another log to complete a set of six? Although Abaye and Rava both attempted to bring proofs to resolve this, their answers were rejected as inconclusive. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree over whether one can offer voluntary oil libations. Their debate centers on whether the laws of oil can be derived from the laws of wine. Regarding ownership, a mincha cannot be brought if it is jointly owned by partners. The Gemara explores why this differs from animal and bird sacrifices, which can be brought by partners. There are five (or six, according to Rabbi Shimon) types of voluntary mincha offerings: solet (no pre-baking/frying), machavat (pan), marcheshet (deep pan), rekikim (wafers), and challot (loaves). The Mishna delves into various ambiguous formulations used in vows and explains what specific type and quantity the individual is obligated to bring to ensure they fulfill their commitment.

There is a dispute regarding a case where someone vowed to bring a mincha of barley. The Tana Kama says that because such a thing does not exist, we obligate them to bring a mincha of wheat. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that what was said is nothing, as there is no voluntary mincha of barley. Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan attempt to understand the Tana Kama's position. For Chizkiya, it is based on the view of Beit Shammai who hold that we seize the first expression - the statement "I take upon myself a mincha" already creates an obligation to bring a wheat offering, and what one said afterward (where perhaps it was a retraction) is not accepted at all because it is too late. According to Rabbi Yochanan, who establishes an ukimta for the Mishna, it refers to a case where, when told there is no mincha of barley, the person says that they did not know, and had they known, they would have vowed wheat. There is another dispute in our Mishna between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan that appears to present opinions opposite to what they said previously, but the Gemara explains the matter. Chizkiya retracted and agreed with Rabbi Yochanan, while Rabbi Yochanan challenged his retraction and explained how Chizkiya could have explained the words of the Mishna according to his original logic. Zeiri limits the words of the Mishna to a case where one said "I take upon myself a mincha...", but if one did not say "mincha" but rather "I take upon myself barley" or "I take upon myself a barley mincha," we do not apply the principle of seizing the first expression. Rava challenges Rav Nachman regarding Zeiri's words based on our Mishna, but Rav Nachman resolves his challenges. One who volunteers to bring more than sixty issaron must bring sixty in one vessel and the remainder in another vessel. Why is sixty established as the maximum amount for a single vessel? The Tana Kama explains this based on the day that has the most libations in the Temple - the first day of Sukkot that falls on Shabbat, when they bring libations in the amount of sixty-one issaron. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says it is based on what can be mixed in one vessel; more than sixty is impossible. The Sages challenge him as to why specifically this number was chosen. Rabbi Shimon responds that this is the case with all measurements established by the Sages. The Gemara challenges Rabbi Shimon, noting that a mincha is valid even if it was not actually mixed, so why is the potential for mixing so important? They answer based on the words of Rabbi Zeira, that it must be eligible for mixing (anything eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything not eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it).

The Gemara raises a difficulty from the laws of pigul against the principle that "anything ready to be sprinkled is considered as if it were already sprinkled," which implies viewing the act of sprinkling the blood as having already occurred. After resolving this difficulty, the Gemara presents the position of Rav Ashi, who rejects this principle. However, following a challenge from the laws of meilah (misuse of consecrated property), it is clarified that his statement applies only to the laws of ritual impurity of foods; regarding meilah, conversely, Rav Ashi admits that the principle is valid, and the meat is released from the status of meilah the moment it is ready for sprinkling. Subsequently, another difficulty is raised against Rav Ashi from Rabbi Yosi's ruling regarding the meat of an asham talui, as Rabbi Yosi - according to Rava's understanding - agrees with Rabbi Shimon that "anything standing to be sprinkled is considered as if it were already sprinkled." This difficulty is resolved by providing an alternative explanation for Rabbi Yosi's position that does not rely on this principle. Additionally, Rav Ashi challenges the opposing view, and this difficulty is also resolved. The Mishna discusses the laws of deviations in meal-offering vows, detailing the law for cases where an individual vowed or pledged a specific type of mincha but brought a different type instead.

The Gemara cites Vayikra 27:11 to teach that blemished animals are called impure. Although the verse refers to "impure animals," there is a different verse (Vayikra 27:27) that explains that impure animals be redeemed; therefore, the first verse must refer specifically to blemished animals.  Shmuel maintains that items consecrated for their value can be redeemed even if they are unblemished. Two difficulties are raised against Shmuel - one by Rav Huna bar Manoach from our Mishna and another by Rav Papa from a braita. Both are resolved by distinguishing between common items and rare items suitable for Temple use; the Sages prohibited the redemption of rare items to avoid a shortage in the Temple. Several rabbis disagree with Shmuel, holding that items dedicated for their value cannot be redeemed if they are pure. There are two versions of Rabbi Oshaya's position regarding whether he agreed with Shmuel. A difficulty is raised against the version that he permitted their redemption, but it is ultimately resolved.

The Mishna states that when Yom Kippur fell on a Friday, preventing the meat from being cooked, the Babylonians would eat the goat sin offering raw. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that these people were actually Alexandrians, but they were called Babylonians due to a general dislike of the Babylonians. The Mishna discusses various errors that can occur while setting up the showbread and the frankincense, such as placing one or both on the wrong day or burning the frankincense at the incorrect time. For each scenario, the text explores the resulting legal status and the solution, if there is one. A Mishna from Tractate Yoma mentions a case where the Tamid offering was brought too early and had to be burned because it was disqualified. A braita applies this same rule to a mincha offering where the kemitza was taken at night. This raises a question: if sanctified vessels do not normally sanctify their contents at night when offerings cannot be brought, why is the mincha disqualified? To resolve this, it is explained that the offering is sanctified enough to be disqualified even if it is not sanctified for the altar. However, Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from our Mishna, noting that when the bread is placed too early, it is not sanctified enough to be disqualified and can remain on the table for extra days. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between an act performed the night before it is due and an act performed several days early. Yet, this distinction still faces issues with the Mishna's case, as the bread should theoretically become sanctified on Friday night and be disqualified by the next Shabbat morning. Ultimately, two resolutions are offered to address this difficulty. The Mishna outlines how many days after baking the two loaves and the showbread may be eaten. Different scenarios are presented based on whether festivals fall before or after Shabbat, since these loaves cannot typically be baked on Shabbat or a festival. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this, permitting the baking on a festival though not on Shabbat. Items whose value is sanctified can be redeemed whether they are ritually pure or impure. However, items sanctified within a sacred vessel possess inherent sanctity and cannot be redeemed even if they become impure. The only exception to this rule is a blemished animal, which retains the possibility of being redeemed despite its status.

The Gemara raises a difficulty regarding the opinion that the Table (Shulchan) was positioned in an east-west orientation. It resolves this by explaining that the Table crafted by Moses was not placed centrally between the other rows of tables, but rather stood on the western side, close to the Parochet, not in between the others. Regarding the ten Tables and ten Menoras added by King Solomon, there is a Tannaic dispute: were they purely decorative - with only the one from Moshe's time being used for the service - or were the lamps lit and the bread arranged on all of them? In addition to the main Table, two other tables stood in the Ulam (the Entrance Hall) to serve as transition stations for the showbread. One was made of marble (or silver), where the bread was placed before being brought into the Sanctuary, and the other was made of gold, where the bread was placed upon its removal. This distinction is based on the halakhic principle "ma'alin b'kodesh v'lo moridin" (one ascends in holiness but does not descend). Since the bread had already been on a golden table inside the Sanctuary, it could not be placed on a table of lesser value when being taken out. The Gemara finds support for this concept in the fact that the broken Tablets were placed in the Ark also. This leads to a discussion on the importance of preserving one's Torah learning and the gravity of forgetting it, while emphasizing that one must still honor a Torah scholar who has forgotten his learning due to circumstances beyond his control. The Mishna brings a tannaitic debate about how the bread was replaced each week, based on how each opinion understands the word "tamid" (continually) regarding the showbread. This triggers a fundamental debate regarding the mitzvah of Torah study and the verse, "This book of the Torah shall not depart (lo yamush) from your mouth." While some view this as a mandate to toil in Torah at every available moment, Rabbi Yochanan suggests that even a person who recites the Shema in the morning and evening has fulfilled "lo yamush." For such an individual, it is considered as if they had occupied themselves with Torah day and night.

Rabbi Yochanan explains that a "medium-sized cubit" consists of six handbreadths. This terminology implies the existence of a larger cubit. A Mishna in Middot (1:3) is brought to explain that there were two measuring sticks kept in a room at the entrance to the Temple Mount (where a depiction of Shushan the capital was displayed). Both were larger than the medium cubit used by Moshe for the Tabernacle: one was a fingerbreadth longer, and the other was two fingerbreadths longer. The purpose of this was to prevent craftsmen from accidentally misusing consecrated property (Me'ilah). Since they received payment based on exact measurements, if they had erred and made an item slightly too small, they would have personally benefited from the Temple treasury. The shorter one was used for gold and silver, and the longer one for other materials. The verses in Vayikra (24:5-6) describe exactly how many loaves of showbread there were, how many arrangements were on the Table, and how many loaves were in each arrangement. Why were all those descriptions necessary? In what directions did the Ark, Menorah, and Table face in the room, and in which part of the room were they placed?

Study Guide The Gemara offers three suggestions for why the Shulchan, which was made of wood and covered in gold, was treated as a wooden vessel regarding the laws of impurity. After rejecting the first two possibilities, they conclude that the status is derived from a verse in Yechezkel, which describes the structure as "wood." This establishes that despite the gold plating, the table's essence is wood. Relating to the debate in the Mishna of the length and width of the Shulchan in handbreadths, there is a tannaitic debate regarding the two types of cubit measurements used in the Temple: some measuring five handbreadths and others measuring six. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree over which items followed which measurement, though both derive their positions from the same verse in Yechezkel 43:13. The verse specifically identifies four items - the yesod (base), the sovev (ledge), the keren (horns), and the Golden Altar - as using the five-handbreadth measurement. The core of their debate is whether this smaller measurement was restricted to these items or extended to all other vessels, including the Shulchan. In analyzing how these measurements were applied to the yesod and sovev, the Gemara initially assumes the five-handbreadth cubit referred to their height. When this is rejected, the Sages suggest it referred to their width. However, this second suggestion is also dismissed as the math does not align with the traditional dimensions of the Altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that a uniform rule cannot be applied across all four items. Instead, it determines that for certain components, the five-handbreadth measurement applied to the height, while for others, it applied to the width.

Diagram Unlike the showbread (lechem hapanim) and the two loaves (shtei halechem), for which there is a debate about when they are sanctified the minchat chavitin of the Kohen Gadol and regular meal offerings are sanctified the moment they are placed into a service vessel (kli sharet). From that point forward, they are considered holy and can be disqualified by factors such as being left overnight (linah) or leaving the Sanctuary. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding the dimensions of the Table (Shulchan) and the measurements of the individual loaves that made up the showbread. The Mishna explains how the loaves were arranged on the Table according to these two opinions. Rabbi Yochanan calculated the maximum height at which the Table could sanctify the bread, based on the total height of the stacked loaves according to the respective views of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raised several difficulties with his statement but ultimately resolved them. Following this discussion, a dispute arose regarding the frame (misgeret) of the Table—whether it was fixed above the tabletop or beneath it. From there, Rabbi Yochanan linked these different opinions to a question regarding the ritual impurity of a "reversible table" (tavla hamit'pachet). What is clear from his words is that the Table was susceptible to ritual impurity. However, if it was a wooden vessel, a "wooden vessel made to rest in a fixed place" (kli etz ha'asui lenachat) should not be susceptible to impurity. The Gemara resolves this by Reish Lakish's explanation that the Table was moved and lifted to be shown to the festival pilgrims, thus categorizing it as a mobile vessel.

Study Guide Did the lechem hapanim become disqualified in the desert whenever the Tabernacle was dismantled for travel? Furthermore, does this status depend on whether the bread remained on the Table (Shulchan) or had already been removed? There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, which the Gemara interprets in three ways. In the final explanation, Ravin explains that there is actually no disagreement; rather, each Sage was referring to a different scenario - one discussed bread still on the Table, while the other addressed bread that had been removed. The Mishna presents a three-way Tannaitic debate regarding the preparation of the loaves: Can the kneading, shaping, and baking be performed outside the Temple courtyard, or must they occur within? Additionally, could these tasks be performed on Shabbat? This debate centers on the moment the loaves become sanctified. The three positions - held by the Tana Kamma, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon - differ on the catalyst for sanctification: When the flour is first placed into a sacred vessel. When the bread is baked in the oven. When the loaves are formally arranged on the Table. A challenge is raised against the Tanna Kamma's position that remains unresolved. Rabbi Abbahu attempts to derive the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon from a verse, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara explains that their positions are rooted in the specific traditions they each received.

Pictures The Mishna compares the details regarding the laws of semicha (leaning) and tenufa (waving). Semicha has a stringency in that all owners of the sacrifice are obligated to perform it, while the same does not hold true for tenufa. However, waving applies to both individual and communal sacrifices, to animals that are both alive and slaughtered, and to both animals and non-living items, such as breads. These do not apply to semicha, which is only performed on live animals and primarily for individual sacrifices. The Gemara brings a scriptural source for the ruling that semicha is obligatory for all owners of the sacrifice, while only one person performs tenufa on behalf of the others. A difficulty is raised against the fact that semicha is limited only to live animals based on a Mishna in Tamid 33b, which describes a process of semicha performed by a Kohen Gadol on a slaughtered animal. However, Abaye explains that this specific semicha is performed merely out of respect for the Kohen Gadol and is not a formal requirement of the sacrificial service. The loaves of the lechem hapanim (showbread) and the loaves of the shtei halechem (two loaves) were kneaded separately. The shtei halechem were baked separately, while the lechem hapanim - twelve in total - were baked two at a time. The Gemara brings the scriptural source for these details. What shape were the lechem hapanim? Rabbi Chanina and Rabbi Yochanan each describe a different shape: either like an "open box" or like a "rocking boat." The Gemara analyzes these different opinions based on other known details regarding the various components of the table (shulchan) upon which the bread sat.

Study Guide There is a Tannaitic debate regarding whether an heir performs semicha (the laying of hands) on an inherited sacrifice and whether they are subject to the laws of temura (substitution) for such an animal. The Gemara provides scriptural sources for each of these positions. The Mishna specifies who is exempt from the requirement of semicha and the Gemara brings the reason/derivation for each exemption. Although semicha is a significant element of the sacrificial service, it is not indispensable; atonement is achieved even if the ritual is omitted. The Mishna details the location and manner in which semicha must be performed, and the Gemara cites the biblical sources for those details.

There is a tradition that there are two communal offerings that require semicha. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which two they are. They both agree that the communal bull offering (brought for an unintentional sin of the congregation) requires semicha by the elders, but they disagree about the identity of the second one. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is the scapegoat on Yom Kippur, noting that according to the verse in the Torah, the Kohen Gadol performs semicha on it. Rabbi Shimon disagrees because he holds that semicha must be performed by the owner, and he argues the Kohen Gadol is not the owner of that sacrifice; the scapegoat atones only for the sins of the Israelites, while the kohanim receive their atonement from the confession of the Kohen Gadol on his own bull offering. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon's position, holding instead that the scapegoat atones for the sins of the kohanim as well, which makes the Kohen Gadol an owner of that sacrifice. Rabbi Shimon includes the communal goat offering for idolatry as the second sacrifice requiring semicha, deriving this from the word "goat" written in the context of the semicha of the nasi's (leader's) sin offering (Vayikra 4:24); the extra word implies that another goat - the communal one - is included in the requirement. Rabbi Yehuda, however, uses the verse in Vayikra 4:15, which specifies "the bull," to exclude the goat and limit the requirement to the bull alone. The Gemara questions why each sage needs a specific verse to prove his opinion when they could have simply relied on the established tradition that only two communal offerings require semicha. All individual offerings require semicha, with the exception of the firstborn animal, animal tithes, and the Pesach offering. The exclusion of these three is derived from the verse regarding peace offerings, "his offering," which implies an offering that is designated as "his" by choice.

Study Guide