Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Rav Hamnuna states in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the prohibition of oto v'et beno does not apply to consecrated animals (kodashim). This is based on Rabbi Shimon's principle that an invalid slaughter is not halakhically considered a slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya lo shema shechita), and since the meat of a sacrifice is not permitted for consumption until its blood is sprinkled, the slaughter itself is initially unfit. Rava challenges this using a text discussing various combinations of slaughtering consecutive sacrifices inside or outside the Temple courtyard (bifnim or bachutz), tracing the respective liabilities of karet and negative prohibitions under the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. To resolve the contradiction, Rava explains that Rabbi Shimon does acknowledge the prohibition for kodashim, but holds that one does not receive lashes for it because the warning given at the time of slaughter is a doubtful warning (hatra'at safek), as the validity of the slaughter depends on the future sprinkling of the blood, and a doubtful warning is legally invalid. The Mishna states that if one slaughters an animal and it is found to be a treifa, or slaughters it for idolatry, as a Red Heifer, an ox convicted to be stoned, or a broken-necked heifer, Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the prohibition of oto v'et beno because the slaughter is invalid since the animal is not permitted for consumption, while the Rabbis declare him liable. However, if the slaughter itself is physically disqualified, such as if the animal becomes a carcass during the shechita process or if one stabbed the animal, all agree he is exempt. Reish Lakish establishes the Mishna's liability (according to the Rabbis' position) for idolatry only when the first animal was slaughtered for idolatry and the second for consumption. If the second was for idolatry, the rule of kim lei b'draba minei applies (one incurs the capital punishment for idolatry and is exempt from the lashes of oto v'et beno) as one only receives the harsher of the two punishments. Rabbi Yochanan counters that even if the second animal was for idolatry, one can still be liable for lashes for oto v'et beno if one was warned specifically for that prohibition and not for idolatry. Reish Lakish maintains that since one would be exempt if properly warned for the capital crime, one remains exempt even without that warning, and even without receiving the harsher punishment. They have the same dispute regarding the rule of kim lei b'draba minei even in cases of death/lashes and monetary liability when one was not warned for the death/lashes.

Study Guide After the Gemara establishes the root of the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding a koy, Rav Papa clarifies the specific type of koy they dispute concerning the prohibition of slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno) and the distribution of priestly gifts (matnot kehuna). He also explains that the Mishna's ruling—which prohibits slaughtering a koy on Yom Tov due to the uncertainty of whether its blood requires covering (kisuy hadam)—aligns specifically with the Rabbis' position. The Gemara then introduces three other opinions regarding the exact definition of a koy. Rabbi Oshaya notes that the Mishna does not align with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who views any slaughter that is not fit for consumption—including the slaughter of sacrifices in general, since it does not permit the meat until the blood is sprinkled—as an invalid slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya). Consequently, under his view, one who slaughters an animal in the Temple and its offspring on the same day does not violate the prohibition of "you shall not slaughter it and its offspring on the same day" (oto v'et beno lo tishchatu b'yom echad). The Gemara questions why the Mishna omits the rule that one receives lashes for slaughtering an animal in the Temple courtyard whose time has not yet come (mechusar zman—because its mother was already slaughtered today) on account of slaughtering an unfit animal in the Temple, and offers two answers to resolve this.

The Gemara discusses the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno). The Mishna presents various permutations of non-sacred animals (chullin) and consecrated sacrifices slaughtered either inside or outside the Temple courtyard, outlining the respective punishments incurred and the halakhic status of the meat. A braita derives from biblical verses that this prohibition applies to consecrated animals, and the Gemara subsequently demonstrates that it applies to non-consecrated animals as well. Since the laws of oto v'et beno are learned from consecrated animals, the Gemara questions why the prohibition also applies to crossbreeds (kilayim), which are unfit for the Altar. This is resolved by explaining that the word "or" (o) in the verse serves to include crossbreeds. This explanation raises a difficulty, as the word "or" should be needed to teach that one is liable for slaughtering either an ox or a sheep with its offspring, rather than needing to slaughter both to violate the prohibition. The Gemara resolves this by pointing to the singular word "its" (oto), which teaches individual liability. Alternatively, according to Chananya - who uses the word "its" to include male parents in the prohibition - it is already self-evident that one is liable for either animal individually, in accordance with Rabbi Yonatan's interpretive principle regarding the biblical prohibition of cursing one's parents. This discussion leads to a discussion about the  dispute between Chananya and the Rabbis r regarding whether the prohibition of oto v'et beno applies to both the father and mother, or exclusively to the mother.

If a bone is broken but the majority of its width is surrounded by flesh and skin, the animal is not considered a treifa—even if the break is above the knee joint (arkuva)—and the limb is not considered a limb severed from a living animal (ever min hachai). A case came before Rava where the bone was covered by a majority of "flesh" only when including soft sinews. Rava initially permitted this based on Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that soft sinews are considered like meat for fulfilling the mitzva of eating the Pesach sacrifice. However, Rav Papa challenged this from Reish Lakish's opposing view that such sinews do not count as meat, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yochanan ultimately retracted his position, rendering the case forbidden. The Gemara clarifies additional questions regarding broken bones surrounded by skin and flesh in different manners, in some of which the flesh is no longer actually attached to the bone. The law of a ben pekua (a fetus found in its mother's womb after she was slaughtered) permits the fetus to be eaten without independent slaughter. This law also permits its placenta (shilya) to be eaten, as derived from the same verse from which the laws of ben pekua are derived. However, if even a small portion of the placenta emerged outside the womb prior to the mother's slaughter, it is forbidden to eat even the portion that remained inside out of concern that the head of the fetus may have emerged with it before the slaughter. If an animal carrying its first offspring miscarries a placenta, one does not have to treat the placenta with the sanctity of a firstborn (bechor). This is because perhaps the fetus inside was a female, and even if it was a male, perhaps it was a non-viable anomaly that is not fit for firstborn sanctity (such as a sheep that looks like a goat). In contrast, the placenta of a consecrated sacrifice is treated with sanctity, as sacrifices can also be brought from female animals, and therefore the likelihood of it having sanctity is much higher. The placenta is not considered food and therefore does not contract food impurity. Within this discussion, the Gemara inquires whether or not the hide of a domestic donkey that was cooked is susceptible to impurity. The Gemara presents two different versions of a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan regarding a placenta that emerges alongside a visible fetus. They debate whether perhaps there is a (second) hidden fetus inside the placenta, with each version of their debate applying this concern to different circumstances. Non-Jews used to bury placentas at intersections or hang them on trees as a superstitious remedy, and therefore these actions are forbidden under the prohibition of following non-Jewish customs (darchei ha-Emori). Regarding this, Abaye and Rava define the boundary, establishing that anything done for a proven medical remedy is permitted, while that which has no apparent medical benefit but is purely superstitious is forbidden.

Study Guide

The Gemara cites two conflicting statements of Rav regarding a hanging limb of an animal. In one statement, Rav rules that eating this limb incurs lashes, while in the other, he rules it does not. Rav Yosef resolves this contradiction: if the animal dies naturally, death causes legal detachment (oseh nipul), retroactively defining the hanging limb as ever min hachai (a limb from a living animal) which incurs lashes for one who eats it. Conversely, if the animal is slaughtered, slaughter does not cause legal detachment (eino oseh nipul), meaning the limb is not treated as a separate forbidden entity and the eater does not receive lashes. Rava brings a biblical source for this differentiation between death and slaughter, and the Gemara raises two difficulties against his proof but resolves them both. Rav Chisda and Rabba dispute whether the debate between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis - regarding whether slaughter causes legal detachment for an emerged fetal limb - applies only when the fetus is alive, or even when the fetus is dead. Rav Chisda holds that when the fetus is dead, the emerged limb is definitely considered detached and carries impurity. In the course of a back-and-forth argument between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, it was mentioned that slaughtering would not remove impurity from an eight-month fetus, as it is not viable, and there is no type of eight-month fetus that can be validly slaughtered. However, a braita states that there are eight-month fetuses that can be permitted by slaughter. Rav Kahana reconciles this by differentiating between slaughtering the fetus itself and permitting the animal via its mother's slaughter (ben pekua). Rav Hoshaya inquires whether a live nine-month-old fetus can be validly slaughtered while still in utero. This question is evaluated under the views of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Chananya attempts to resolve this inquiry from a braita, but his answer is ultimately rejected by Rava. The Mishna introduces a dispute regarding the laws of ben pekua and whether they apply to a fully formed, nine-month-old fetus found inside its slaughtered mother. Rabbi Meir rules that the laws of ben pekua do not apply here, and the fetus requires its own independent slaughter. Conversely, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that as long as the fetus is still inside the womb, it is covered by the laws of ben pekua and is permitted by the slaughter of the mother. Operating under the Rabbis' position, Rabbi Eleazar states in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the mother's slaughter only covers the animal born from this womb regarding the laws of eating. In other halakhot, this animal is considered a distinct entity and standard animal laws apply to it. The Gemara presents two versions of what Rabbi Oshaya's statement was coming to exclude: the first version suggests it excludes the animal's fat, sciatic nerve, and blood from the mother's exemption, while the second version suggests it excludes using the animal for work or illicit cross-breeding. The first version is ultimately rejected based on other sources, leaving the second version as the preferred explanation. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about whether the blood of a ben pekua (a nine-month fetus) is permitted as well. Rabbi Yochanan raises one difficulty against Reish Lakish's position, which the Gemara subsequently resolves. According to the position of the Rabbis, a question is asked whether one can redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi disagree. A second question is asked whether a ben pekua that is still in utero can be considered a separate unit for the laws of ritual impurity. This is a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and each one raises a difficulty against the other's position.

Study Guide

The Gemara presents biblical derivations establishing that undomesticated animals (chaya) are included in the legal category of domesticated animals (behema) and vice versa. This crossover applies to kosher signs, crossbreeding laws, sacrificial impurities, and miscarriages. The Mishna rules that if a fetus dies in utero and a midwife reaches inside and touches it, the midwife contracts seven-day corpse impurity, while the mother remains pure until the fetus emerges. Rabba establishes that just as absorbed impurity (tuma belua) does not pass on impurity, absorbed purity (tahara beluah cannot become impure. The Gemara seeks biblical and logical sources for these principles, evaluating various kal va-chomer (a fortiori) arguments, including extending this law to animals. Rava notes that both laws are already stated in Mishnayot concerning a swallowed ring, prompting the Gemara to clarify that Rabba's unique ruling applies to a case where someone swallows two rings simultaneously - one pure and one impure - and the impure ring does not make the pure one impure.

The Mishna explains at what stage a delivery is considered a birth (even for a stillborn animal) to determine whether it exempts subsequent offspring from firstborn status, particularly in the case of a difficult birth where the fetus is extracted in pieces. Rav Huna and Raba disagree regarding when the majority of the animal emerges: does the sanctity of the firstborn apply retroactively or only from that moment onward? The Gemara presents two cases demonstrating the practical ramifications of this dispute. A difficulty is raised against Rav Huna's position from our Mishna, but it is ultimately resolved through a reinterpretation of the Mishna. A series of unanswered questions are then raised regarding whether a newborn is considered a firstborn if there is some type of chatzitza (interposition) between the fetus and the womb. The Mishna explains that touching a dead fetus while it is in utero does not convey the impurity of a carcass. However, the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosi haGelili debate whether this exemption applies to all animals - both kosher and non-kosher- or only to kosher animals, and the Gemara presents explanations for each position.

Different rabbis raise a total of four questions regarding various scenarios in which a ben pekua (a fetus of an animal whose mother was slaughtered) previously had a limb or limbs leave the womb. The Gemara investigates the biblical source for the Mishna's ruling that parts of a fetus that were severed but remained inside the mother at the time of slaughter are permitted to be eaten, offering two different suggested sources.

Study Guide A fetus that is inside the mother at the time of her slaughter is permitted without needing its own slaughter. If a limb of the fetus emerges before the mother is slaughtered, that limb is forbidden. However, if the limb is pulled back inside before the mother's slaughter, its status is subject to a dispute: Rav holds that the limb remains forbidden, while Rabbi Yochanan rules that it is permitted. Three difficulties are raised against Rav's position—one from our Mishna and two from other tannaitic sources—and all are ultimately resolved in the same manner. A difficulty raised against Rabbi Yochanan's position remains unresolved.

The Gemara details the hermeneutical methods used to permit drinking water from pits, ditches, or caves without concern for finless and scaleless creatures. Regarding water in vessels, the braita states that its exemption is explicit in one verse and implicit in another. One version holds that the permission for vessels is explicit, derived from the verse explaining that fish in seas and streams must have fins and scales to be eaten (Vayikra 11:9), meaning that anything in vessels is permitted. The second version reverses this, arguing that the explicit source is the subsequent verse (Vayikra 11:10-11) which forbids fish in seas and streams that lack fins and scales. The discussion then shifts to spontaneous generation. While creatures that crawl upon the ground are biblically forbidden, creatures that spontaneously generate within vessels or food are excluded from this prohibition, provided they have not yet crawled upon the ground. The Gemara delineates the exact parameters of this exclusion.

The braita from the school of Rav and the braita from the school of Rabbi Yishmael disagree about whether a grasshopper with a long head is kosher. The source of the dispute stems from their application of different hermeneutical principles to the verse. Further on, the Gemara raises two difficulties against other parts of the braita of the school of Rabbi Yishmael and resolves them. The definitive kosher signs of fish are fins and scales. A fish that lacks scales in its youth but will grow them later, or a fish that has scales but sheds them upon leaving the water, is kosher. Since any fish with scales inherently has fins, the Torah did not need to specify fin, but did so to magnify the Torah and make it glorious. The need for two separate verses, one permitting fish with fins and scales and one prohibiting fish without fins and scales, is to establish both a positive and a negative commandment for one who transgresses. The words "This you can eat from all that are in the waters," which are seemingly superfluous, teach that one who drinks water from pits, ditches, and caves does not need to be concerned about fish that grew there that lack fins and scales, as they are not included in the prohibition.

What are the signs of kosher grasshoppers? 

One may purchase eggs from a non-Jew if the seller explicitly specifies that they come from a particular kosher species. The Gemara asks why we cannot simply rely on the physical diagnostic signs of kosher eggs, which are: being pointed on one end and rounded on the other, and having the yolk (chalmon) on the inside with the albumen (chelbon, or white) on the outside. The Gemara explains that these signs alone are insufficient because certain non-kosher species (such as the crow) lay eggs that mimic these exact characteristics. Regarding blood found in an egg, the halakhic status depends entirely on its location: depending on where the blood spot is positioned, one either removes the blood spot alone or is forbidden from eating the entire egg. The Gemara presents two conflicting traditions regarding which specific location (the yolk or the albumen) triggers the stricter prohibition. The Gemara identifies the biblical source prohibiting the eggs of non-kosher birds, deriving it hermeneutically from the verse banning the "daughter of the ostrich" (bat ha-ya'anah), where the "daughter" is expounded to mean the egg of the ostrich.

Study Guide The Gemara continues to enumerate various species of birds, identifying which are kosher and which are not, while providing helpful mnemonics to remember their status. A debate is cited regarding whether there are 23 or 24 non-kosher bird species in total; both opinions require structural explanations as to how they arrived at their respective counts, given that there are 20 species listed in Vayikra and 21 listed in Devarim. One can purchase eggs from a non-Jew, provided the non-Jew identifies the specific bird they came from, and that species is known to be kosher.

There is a dispute between Rav Nachman and Ameimar whether a bird possessing a single sign can be permitted if one is not expert in identifying the peres and ozniyah. Rav Nachman does not permit it, but Ameimar rules that any bird with a single sign is permitted, provided it is not known to be a predator (doreis), as there is no concern regarding the peres and ozniyah since they do not inhabit populated areas. The characteristics of specific birds are defined, such as the white swallow (concerning which Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree) and the sacrificial eligibility of birds like the tasil—which is valid before its maturity as a young dove (ben yona), but invalid if it has already reached maturity as a turtledove (tor). Rav Asi enumerates eight birds whose status remains in doubt ("eight doubts") because their gizzards do not peel easily by hand but only with a knife. A series of short Amoraic traditions is presented, identifying various birds as forbidden or permitted and providing mnemonic signs to remember which of them are forbidden.

The Mishna states that the four physiological signs of a kosher bird are not explicitly detailed in the Torah, but are instead established by the Sages. The Gemara challenges this assertion based on a braita, which indicates that these kosher indicators are actually derived through a comparison of the anatomical details of each type of bird—specifically evaluating the characteristics of the nesher (griffin vulture), which is listed as non-kosher, against those of the tor (turtledove), which is known to be kosher due to its role in sacrificial offerings. Abaye resolves this difficulty by explaining that the analytical comparison of the physical details between the tor and the nesher outlined in the braita is precisely the methodology employed by the Sages to formulate and define these diagnostic signs. Rabbi Chiya introduces a braita asserting that a bird possessing even a single kosher sign is permitted, based on the premise that only a bird structurally identical to the nesher—which lacks all four signs—is fundamentally excluded, along with the other non-kosher species explicitly enumerated in the Torah. The Gemara raises a difficulty, noting that one could argue the exact inverse: using the tor as the absolute paradigm, one could deduce that a bird is kosher only if it possesses all four signs. Since the other non-kosher birds listed in the Torah possess either one, two, or three kosher signs, the Gemara resolves the difficulty by explaining that if all four signs were universally required to render a bird kosher, there would be no logical necessity for the Torah to detail the other twenty-three non-kosher species, as their status as non-kosher would already be self-evident. The Gemara then proceeds with a series of analytical queries, asking why the halakhic paradigm should not be derived from those forbidden birds that possess three signs, two signs, or one sign, respectively. In each instance, the Gemara answers using a redundant-case logic: if any of those categories served as the baseline paradigm, the Torah would have had no need to explicitly list the remaining forbidden species that possess fewer kosher signs (simanim). The premise of the final query assumes that the peres and ozniyah (birds possessing a single kosher sign) could have established a binding paradigm were it not for the counter-example of the nesher. The Gemara immediately questions this, invoking the hermeneutical rule that two biblical verses teaching the same law cannot serve as a general paradigm (shnei ketuvim haba'im k'echad). Since both the peres and ozniyah share the same baseline characteristics, how could it be suggested that they form a general rule? The Gemara answers that they represent two distinct halakhic categories; one of them is completely unique because, within the entire biblical list of non-kosher birds, it is the sole species that possesses a specific, distinct kosher sign not found in any of the others. In conclusion, the ultimate paradigm is the nesher (representing the principle that a bird is kosher unless it shares all the forbidden traits of the listed species), and we do not derive the rule from the tor. The tor (with all four kosher signs) is explicitly mentioned in the Torah solely to indicate its validity for sacrifices, rather than to serve as a universal archetype for kosher birds.

There is a series of theological debates between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hananya and the Roman emperor, which demonstrate the sublimity of God through man's inability to look directly at the sun or to sustain the natural armies that serve God. A similar discussion with the emperor's daughter, who scoffed at the providence of God in the world, leads to a punishment of leprosy being inflicted upon her, emphasizing the principle that God's presence is indirectly guiding the world. Rav Yehuda defines the difference between the dimensions of an ox and a donkey that affect the laws of buying and selling. He also explains that the ox sacrificed by Adam possessed only a single horn on its forehead, and that its horns preceded its hooves in creation. This structural precedence supports the view of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, according to which all works of creation were created in their full stature, their full understanding, and their full mature form. Rabbi Chanina bar Papa expounds that the Angel of the World praised the grasses when they applied a kal v'chomer argument and proactively emerged according to their specific kinds (without intermixing), as derived from Genesis 1:11–12. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi reconciles the scriptural contradiction regarding the creation of the luminaries, detailing the moon's claim that two kings cannot share a single crown, which prompted the divine decree for it to diminish itself. To appease the moon, God granted it dominion by both day and night, linked Israel's calendar to the moon's counting of days and years, and called righteous people "small" like the moon. However, the moon was not appeased by all of these attempts, and God then established a sin offering to be offered on Rosh Chodesh (the New Moon) - a male goat - as an atonement for God. Rav Asi reconciles a contradiction in Creation regarding the emergence of vegetation, explaining that the grass remained hidden at the opening of the ground until the prayer of Adam brought down rain and caused them to sprout, teaching that God desires the prayers of the righteous. Rav Chanan bar Rava identifies the shesua as a unique creature possessing two backs and two spinal columns - as definitive proof that the Torah is from Heaven, as it is impossible to believe that Moshe knew of the existence of that creature. Reish Lakish analyzes a series of seemingly redundant verses, emphasizing that they constitute the core essentials of the Torah itself. For example, the description of the displacement of nations in the land of the Philistines and the land of Moab via intermediary conquests was legally meant to permit the eventual conquest of the land without violating ancient oaths or divine decrees.

Rav Yehuda discusses the physical dangers of consuming chiltit (asafoetida), particularly on an empty stomach, which Rav Yosef expands upon by listing other hazardous foods consumed on an empty stomach. The Gemara notes that Rav initially permitted an animal whose legs had been severed because he verified that the convergence of sinews (tzumat hagidim) remained intact. Shmuel, however, cautioned him that the severing might have been caused by a venomous snakebite, rendering the animal forbidden due to mortal danger. Shmuel proposed a specific diagnostic test to detect the presence of venom; upon execution, the test confirmed Shmuel's suspicion that the injury was indeed the result of a snakebite. The Mishna enumerates the physiological kosher signs for animals, birds, grasshoppers, and fish. A kosher mammal must possess fully split hooves and chew its cud. While explicit kosher signs for birds are absent from the Torah, the Sages established four indicators: a bird must not be predatory (dores), and it must possess an extra digit, a crop, and a gizzard with an easily peelable inner lining. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Tzadok adds another sign, noting that a bird that evenly splits its digits when perched on a rope is definitively non-kosher. For fish, the required signs are fins and scales, though the Sages debate whether multiple scales are required or if a single scale suffices. Kosher grasshoppers must exhibit four specific traits: four legs, four wings, two extra jumping legs (kartzulayim), and wings that cover the majority of their body. A braita asserts that any animal that chews its cud lacks upper front teeth. After addressing a series of difficulties regarding this rule, the Gemara clarifies that the absence of upper front teeth serves as a reliable indicator that an animal chews its cud and is kosher, with the sole exception of the camel (namely, a young camel). This anatomical indicator is practically valuable in cases where an animal's hooves have been severed, leaving no other means to determine its kosher status. To differentiate between domesticated animals (behema) and wild animals (chaya) - a distinction crucial for determining the prohibition of forbidden fats (chelev), which applies exclusively to domesticated species - a braita states that a wild animal is identified by its horns and cloven hooves. The Sages debate whether the horn alone is a clear sign or if both criteria must be checked. To resolve the anomaly of the goat and an ox, which possess both traits yet are classified as domesticated, the Gemara explains that the horns of a wild animal must be either branched, or layered, grooved, and rounded. The braita further notes that a single-horned animal, known as the keresh, is classified as a wild animal. This introduces a discussion regarding legendary creatures, specifically the keresh and the tigris. The Gemara recounts an incident where a Roman emperor requested that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hananya show him the tigris. However, the creature's immense power caused widespread destruction from a distance, prompting the terrified emperor to beg Rabbi Yehoshua to return the beast to its place.

Conflicting traditions existed regarding Rav's ruling in the case of a dislocated femur in a bird. Ultimately, the analysis indicates that Rav permitted such a bird, except in regions where the prevailing custom was to forbid it. However, after presenting various differing opinions regarding this issue, which leaned primarily toward permissibility, the Gemara brings an incident demonstrating that the widespread, accepted custom was indeed to forbid this condition; consequently, the practical halakha is established to be stringent in accordance with this accepted communal custom. Rav Huna defines a treifa as an animal that cannot survive for more than twelve months. A contradiction is raised against this definition from a braita that brings three alternative opinions regarding what legally constitutes a treifa, none of which align with Rav Huna's position. This difficulty is resolved by explaining that Rav Huna follows a different Tanna, whose view is reflected in another braita stating that one must wait through the winter months to determine whether an animal can successfully recover from its specific ailment.

The Mishna enumerates all the physical defects that cause a bird to be rendered a treifa, as well as those that leave it kosher. If a weasel (chulda) attacks a bird in an area where the brain membrane could have been perforated, the bird is considered a treifa. There are, however, different tests one can perform to ascertain whether the membrane was actually punctured, and the Gemara suggests various methods for this inspection. Conversely, in the case of birds that live in the water, a broken skull creates an absolute presumption that the brain membrane was punctured, meaning that no subsequent test will be effective in permitting the bird. If a bird was caught in a fire and burned, the Gemara outlines specific ways to determine whether its internal organs were affected to the point of rendering the bird a treifa. This diagnostic procedure relies on checking for a change in color - either from red to green, or from green to red, depending on the specific internal organ being evaluated. Following the Mishnaic list of kosher conditions in a bird that do not render it a treifa, the Amoraim introduce specific qualifications and limitations to restrict the scope of some of these permitted cases.

Pictures Rava raises several difficulties against Rav Nachman's position that the term "until" implies up to but not including the final value. However, it concludes that the exact meaning depends on the specific context as one must always rule stringently with requisite amounts (shiurim), with the sole exception of a single requisite amount regarding the laws of niddah. Regarding some of the cases enumerated as kosher in the Mishna (if the spleen and kidneys are removed, or the lungs shrivel up out of fear), the Sages qualify and restrict the specific parameters under which the animal is permitted. Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree regarding a skinned animal (geludah), where the skin has been entirely removed. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar notes, however, that Rabbi Meir ultimately retracted his position and conceded to the view of the Sages.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye rules that although a standard hole in the windpipe requires the size of an issar (a coin), its clawing measurement (of redness) is a minimal amount, because the predator's venom burns and consumes the tissue continuously. Regarding the scope of the inspection required due to concern for venom, Rav Nachman testifies in the name of Rav that one must inspect from the base of the brain to the thigh, and not only adjacent to the intestines (as some hold). In an interesting story, Rabbi Yochanan defends the supreme authority of Rav against the queries of Reish Lakish, and consequently, Reish Lakish praises a different tradition of Rav, according to which an animal whose organs (simanim) were dislocated and was subsequently slaughtered is kosher. It was established that new cases of treifot may not be added beyond those enumerated by the Sages, even if these injuries cause the death of the animal. The Mishna enumerates structural defects that leave the animal kosher, including a windpipe that was perforated less than the size of an Italian issar, a brain membrane that was not punctured, and a liver of which a remains. This list gives rise to a fundamental dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the scope of the lists in this chapter, which affects their approach to the ruling of Rav Matna, who rules that a femur bone that dislocated is a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan declares the animal kosher because the case was omitted from the exclusive list of treifot, while Reish Lakish rules it a treifa because it is absent from the exclusive list of kosher defects. For the Babylonians, they defined that the size of the isser is similar to a Kurdish dinar, and the Gemara brings a story following this involving Rabbi Yochanan who went to a moneychanger looking for this coin,and told the moneychanger that craftsmen engaged in their work are legally exempt from standing before Torah scholars. How does this differ from craftsmen who would stand up and greet those Jews who were bringing their first fruits to the Temple? Rav Nachman said that "up to an issar" it is not a treifa means up to but not including that size. Rava brings a series of difficulties against his view, but Rav Nachman answers them.

A cat or a weasel (chulda) renders a bird a treifa through clawing (derisa), whereas only a cat can do so for small cattle such as young goats and lambs. Other predatory birds besides those explicitly listed in the Mishna can also render other birds a treifa by clawing, but only when targeting birds smaller than themselves, while a hawk (netz) can do so even to birds of its own size. According to an alternate version, ordinary predatory birds can claw birds of their own size or smaller, whereas the hawk can even render birds larger than itself a treifa. Furthermore, two conflicting versions are presented regarding Rav Kahana's ruling in the name of Rav Shimi bar Ashi concerning foxes, debating whether or not they possess the capacity to render animals a treifa through clawing. Abaye limits the laws of derisa to the predator's front legs, specifying that it must be executed specifically with a claw and not with teeth, must be done with intent, and must occur while the prey is still alive. In a case where a lion was found among oxen and a dislodged claw was subsequently discovered on the back of one of the oxen, Rabba bar Rav Huna ruled in the name of Rav that there is no concern for derisa. He reasoned that while most lions do claw, their claws do not generally detach in the process; thus, it is more probable that the ox rubbed against a wall and accidentally picked up a nail embedded there. The Gemara initially rejects this argument, countering that while oxen frequently rub against walls, nails rarely stick to their backs in this manner, and since the lion remains a viable source, one should rule stringently. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that because the logic can support either side, the ox retains its presumptive status of permissibility; as a matter of pure doubt, Rav remains consistent with his opinion stated elsewhere that we rule leniently in cases of uncertain clawing. Abaye restricts this leniency, clarifying that it only applies when an actual claw is found embedded rather than a mere mark, when the claw is moist rather than dry, and when there are only one, two, or three claws scattered at random rather than two or three found in a distinct row. Rav and Shmuel disagree on whether to rule leniently or stringently in cases of doubt regarding derisa. While both agree to rule leniently in certain scenarios, they dispute a case where a lion entered among oxen and the lion remained silent while the oxen were found bellowing in distress. Ameimar ruled stringently in accordance with Shmuel, either because he rejected Rav's view or because he believed Rav ultimately retracted his opinion, a shift suggested by a practical incident that occurred. Although several difficulties are raised regarding the specific details of that incident, they are successfully resolved. Rav Ashi similarly ruled leniently in a case of doubt. If there is a doubt as to whether an animal was clawed, the Gemara rules that one may inspect the internal areas of the carcass to see if redness has formed from the venom; if no redness is present, the animal is permitted. This testing method was originally stated by the sons of Rabbi Chiya, though Rav Yosef pointed out that Shmuel himself had already articulated this principle. This discussion leads the Gemara to a series of inquiries - some regarding the laws of clawing and others concerning unrelated laws of treifot - all of which were concisely resolved by an authority who declared that each question had already been answered by a prior Rabbinic statement.

The Gemara discusses what other protective materials a bird could fall upon that would successfully cushion its impact and prevent it from being rendered a treifa. Relatedly, if a bird's wings become stuck to each other or to its body, a debate arises as to whether or not the bird will become a treifa upon falling, as its ability to break the fall is compromised. Two opinions are brought regarding the scope of this debate - specifically, whether the dispute applies to a case where only one wing is glued or if it is restricted to a case where both wings are glued. The Mishna rules that if the majority of an animal's ribs are broken, it is a treifa. While there are twenty-six ribs total, consisting of thirteen on each side, two of these are excluded from the halakhic count; therefore, a majority is defined as twelve ribs, which can be comprised of six on each side or any other combination totaling twelve. Rav rules that even a single rib dislocated along with its socket from the vertebra renders the animal a treifa. Rav Asi and Rav Kahana then questioned Rav regarding a case where two opposite ribs are completely removed while the vertebra remains intact, to which Rav responded that it is a neveila because the animal is essentially cut in half. Several questions are raised against this response in light of Rav's own previous statement, wondering why they would ask about two ribs if Rav already held that even one dislocated rib is a treifa. Ultimately, the Gemara resolves this by reinterpreting the precise details of their question and explaining that they were unaware of Rav's original ruling when they questioned him. Three of the seven extra cases of treifot introduced by the Amoraim were authored by Shmuel and are analyzed here because one of them directly relates to uprooted ribs. The next case in the Mishna transitions to an attack by a predator animal that emits venom (derisa), creating a treifa status. At first, a statement of Rav is brought asserting that a cat does not emit venom capable of making an animal a treifa, prompting the Gemara to question why this rule could not be inferred directly from the wording of the Mishna itself. Rav Chisda rules that a cat and a mongoose do emit venom that can kill a small kid or a baby lamb. A contradictory braita is brought against this view, and the contradiction is ultimately resolved in two possible manners.

A braita establishes the laws of a needle found in the thickness of the beit hakosot, ruling that a single-sided penetration is kosher while a complete perforation renders the animal a treifa. The presence of a drop of blood or a scab determines if the injury occurred before shechita. Internal organ crushing (risuk evarim) caused by falls is a treifa according to the Mishna. Rav Huna rules that an animal left on a roof and subsequently found below is not assumed to have crushed organs, a principle the Gemara applies to a practical case involving Ravina's goat. Addressing a sheep with dragging hind legs, Rav Yeimar and Ravina debate whether the cause is common rheumatism or a severed spinal cord. Rav Huna, Rav Menashye, and Rav further delineate which specific impacts - such as goring rams, sheep handled by thieves, or direct blows from a stick - instigate a concern for internal trauma. Rav Nachman rules that the womb protects a fetus from organ crushing during birth, and three sources are brought to attempt to prove his ruling, but all proofs are rejected. Animals falling in a slaughterhouse are similarly not suspected of risuk evarim. The Gemara outlines the physical indicators of recovery for a fallen animal, establishing when a twenty-four-hour waiting period or an internal inspection of the body cavity is required. Shmuel addresses a bird that strikes the surface of the water, ruling it valid if it swims its body length. The Gemara evaluates various impact surfaces - including garments, nets, sifted ash, and different preparations of flax - to determine whether their specific textures and density buffer a fall or cause a treifa status.

Rav Nachman identifies two types of fat on the stomach: bar chimtza, which can effectively seal a perforation, and chimtza, which cannot. To clarify which specific fat constitutes bar chimtza, the Gemara cites an independent statement by Rav Nachman regarding a halakhic dispute between the Sages of the Land of Israel and those of the Diaspora. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that if internal mucus seals a perforation in the intestines, the animal is not a treifa. Rabbi Yochanan is cited as ruling in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on this issue and on an unrelated matter regarding mourning - that if a mourner returns home toward the end of shiva, they may conclude their mourning period alongside the other family members, provided they were not far away when the death occured. A discussion follows regarding whether the final halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on one or both of these issues. To determine whether a perforation occurred before or after the shechita, a practical test can be performed by creating a comparable post-mortem puncture to observe and compare the tissue's reaction. Different sages note that this testing method is applicable to the intestines, lung, and windpipe; however, some outline specific limitations to this procedure. The Mishna distinguishes between the laws of the keres hapnimi (inner stomach), where a perforation of any size renders the animal a treifa, and the keres hachitzona (outer stomach), which requires a rupture across the majority of its area to disqualify the animal. The Gemara presents seven distinct interpretations to identify precisely which anatomical section constitutes the inner stomach. Rabbi Yehuda's dissenting opinion regarding the outer stomach is explained to mean that a perforation of either a tefach (handbreadth) or a majority of the area will render the animal a treifa.

The Gemara explores the halakhic distinction between finding a needle embedded within the wall of the beit hakosot (reticulum) versus inside the liver. In the liver, the orientation of the needle indicates its trajectory, allowing the Sages to determine whether it caused a disqualifying perforation. Conversely, in the beit hakosot, the orientation is inconclusive, as the movement of food within the stomach could have pushed the needle out. When a perforation is discovered, it may be uncertain whether the puncture occurred before or after the shechita (ritual slaughter). The Sages present differing opinions regarding whether it can be assumed to have happened after the shechita in order to permit the animal. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva dispute two unrelated matters: the status of certain fats (chelev) on the stomach as either permitted or forbidden, and the interpretation of the phrase "and I will bless them" in Birkat Kohanim (the Priestly Blessing)—specifically, whether God's blessing is directed toward the Kohanim or toward the Jewish people. The Gemara delineates which internal fats are sticky enough to serve as an effective seal over a tear, preventing it from rendering the animal a treifa. In this context, the Sages evaluate whether to rule leniently based on the overarching principle that the Torah has compassion for the financial resources of the Jewish people.

The Gemara discusses additional cases of treifot, alongside several real-life incidents brought before the Sages, detailing how they ruled - or, in certain instances, declined to render a definitive decision. The first issue concerns a lung that has become attached to the ribs. Because the lesion causing the adhesion might have originated in the chest wall rather than the lung itself, the animal might not be a treifa. The Sages dispute whether this condition is permissible and outline diagnostic methods to determine the source of the underlying wound. Regarding cysts or fluid-filled blisters on the lung, the majority of the Sages permit the animal, whereas Rabbi Yochanan forbids it. The Sages divide over a case where a needle is discovered inside the lung. One opinion holds that the needle likely traveled through the gullet into the stomach, perforating internal organs on its way to the lung, which renders the animal a treifa. The opposing view permits the animal, operating under the assumption that the needle took a direct path down the windpipe into the bronchi without causing a disqualifying perforation.

Rava establishes further laws regarding physical anomalies that render a lung a treifa. If cysts appear on the lung, a single cyst does not disqualify the animal, whereas two distinct cysts render it a treifa. Rava provides a method to inspect an ambiguous cyst to determine whether it is a single divided structure or two separate entities. Regarding the lobes of the lung - which normally consist of three on the right and two on the left – Rava rules that deviations from this norm disqualify the animal. Meriemar permitted an extra lobe provided it is perfectly aligned with the natural row. However, if an extra lobe develops internally facing the heart, its status is disputed, as Rav Huna Mar bar Avia notes that this configuration is common in wild animals, and therefore permits it. Rafram rules that a lung resembling a wood chip is a treifa, a tradition that receives five distinct interpretations in the Gemara to clarify in what way it is similar to a wood chip – in color or in feel. Rava delineates which lung discolorations are valid and which are problematic, a discussion expanded upon by Rav Kahana and Rav Sama regarding specific shades and appearances. Ravina addresses a scenario where a lobe of the lung fails to inflate, explaining that a test must be performed to determine if the lack of airflow is due to a fatal defect or merely a temporary obstruction. Ulla rules that if the internal tissue of the lung liquefies, the animal remains kosher because internal decay does not compromise the outer membrane. Rava qualifies this leniency, limiting it to cases where the primary bronchial tubes remain intact, and Rav Ashi outlines the practical examination method to verify their structural integrity.

What is the minimal remnant required to remain of the liver to keep the animal kosher when it is damaged or partially missing? Although our Mishna implies that any minimal amount is sufficient, another Mishna explicitly requires an olive-bulk. Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction by explaining that each Mishna reflects a different Tannaitic position. The established halakha dictates that a size of an olive-bulk is required, and the Amoraim dispute whether this piece must remain specifically where the gallbladder is located, or where the liver attaches to its lifelines; Rav Papa rules that an olive-bulk is required in both locations. Regarding perforations of the lung, the Gemara explains that the lung is surrounded by two membranes, an outer membrane and an inner membrane. If only one membrane is punctured, the second membrane that remains intact protects it, and the lung remains kosher. To diagnose a lung that is suspected of leaking air, Rav Yosef suggests one test involving a feather and a second involving water. In the water test, the lung is placed inside a bowl of lukewarm water and inflated. If the water bubbles, this proves that it contains a disqualifying perforation; if no bubbling appears, the sound is attributed only to air trapped between the membranes, and the lung remains kosher. Rava establishes rules regarding various changes in the appearance and structure of the lung. External peelings, multiple changes in color, or spots of different shades generally do not disqualify the animal. Conversely, if a part of the lung is dry to the extent that it crumbles under a fingernail, the animal is disqualified as a treifa. The Gemara discusses the laws of lung adhesions (sirchot). An adhesion between two lobes that occurs out of their natural anatomical order constitutes an absolute defect that cannot be tested, while an adhesion occurring in their normal order is considered a natural growth and remains kosher.

Pictures Under what conditions do perforations, cracks, or missing fragments in the windpipe render an animal or bird a treifa? How do perforations add up to the requisite amount needed to determine the animal is a treifa? The Sages delineate specific measurements for damage to the windpipe, depending on the type of perforation. For a crack along its length, the organ remains kosher provided that a little remains intact at the beginning and the end of the windpipe. The Sages discuss the precise anatomical boundaries of several vital organs, as these definitions carry significant halakhic weight across multiple areas of law. This includes defining the exact parameters of the neck to establish the zone permitted for ritual slaughter, and identifying the borders of the chest to isolate the specific cut of meat designated for the kohen from a peace offering. Furthermore, the Sages map out the exact perimeters of the brain and the heart to establish the critical zones where a perforation of any minimal size immediately disqualifies the animal as a treifa. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding the threshold size of a perforation in the aorta (the primary artery originating from the heart) that renders an animal a treifa. Rav maintains that a puncture of any minimal size is fatal, whereas Shmuel rules that the animal is only deemed a treifa if the majority of the aorta's circumference is perforated or severed. What are the precise boundaries of the spinal cord, and what specific injuries make it a treifa? The Gemara establishes the lower boundary of the spinal cord up to which physical trauma affects the animal's halakhic status. An animal is rendered a treifa if its spinal cord is severed, or if the internal neural tissue undergoes severe degradation, such as liquefying or softening to the point where the structural integrity of the cord is lost.

What are the primary categories of treifot? Ulla states that eight categories that were transmitted as halakha to Moshe from Sinai: perforated (nekuva), severed (pesuka), removed (netula), deficient (chasura), torn (kru'a), clawed (drusa), fallen (nefula), and broken (shevura). Chiya bar Rav said there are eight cases in the category of perforated, and this excludes the gall bladder, which is considered a treifa only by Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the ruling is like Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda. He brings a proof for Rabbi Yosi's position from a verse in Iyov 16:13, in which Iyov explains that his gall bladder was poured on the ground, and yet, he still lived. The rabbis' retort to that is that Iyov's situation was miraculous and we cannot derive halakha from a miracle. Another ruling of Rabbi Yochanan was brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef regarding the liver – if the liver is reduced to less than an olive bulk, the animal is a treifa. If, according to Rabba bar bar Hanna, Rabbi Yochanan holds like an unattributed Mishna, there is a contradiction as our Mishna rules it is a treifa only if the liver is completely removed. This is resolved by explaining there is a debate between the two amoraim what Rabbi Yochanan held. Two other rulings are brought by Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef in the name of Rabbi Yochanan regarding treifot. A gall bladder that was perforated but the liver covered up the hole, or a bird's gizzard that was perforated, but the inner lining was not, both are kosher. Raba notes that the gullet consists of two distinct linings - an outer red membrane and an inner white membrane. If only one layer is punctured while the other remains intact, the animal remains kosher. What happens if both layers of an organ are punctured, but the holes do not align? Rav Ashi rules that in a stationary organ like the gizzard, non-aligned punctures are kosher because the layers do not shift. However, in a dynamic organ like the gullet, which constantly expands, contracts, and moves during feeding, the holes are liable to realign; therefore, non-aligned punctures render the animal a treifa. In one version, Mar Zutra quotes Rav Papa saying the opposite; in another, he agrees. Raba notes that the gullet cannot be evaluated for predatory clawing (safek drusa) from the outside, as the outside is red and blood would not be noticeable. It must be inverted and inspected from the inside. If a thorn is found lodged inside the gullet with a perforation on the inside, but no noticeable perforation on the outside, Ulla rules that we do not fear it caused a perforation which healed, as free-roaming livestock regularly consume thorny vegetation without injury. Is the turbatz haveshet, the uppermost part of the gullet, legally treated as part of the gullet? Rav and Shmuel disagree on its status. Rav maintains it is a valid location for slaughter; thus, any extraneous puncture of even a minimal size renders it a treifa. Shmuel argues it is not a valid location for slaughter, meaning it is only rendered a treifa if the majority of it is severed. This dispute culminated in a practical case involving an ox belonging to the sons of Rav Ukva, where the slaughter began in the turbatz haveshet and finished in the gullet. Rava applied the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel, declaring the animal a treifa. Rabbi Abba reversed Rava's decision, demonstrating that the ox was completely kosher under either authority individually. If one followed Rav, the slaughter location was valid; if one followed Shmuel, the minor cut in the turbatz haveshet did not render it a treifa before the slaughter was completed. Because Rava's logically contradictory ruling caused an impermissible destruction of kosher property, Rabbi Abba ordered Rava to financially compensate the owner of the ox.

Study Guide Picture What are the defects and traumas that render an animal a treifa? The Mishna lists various categories, such as a perforated gullet, a severed windpipe, a perforated brain membrane, a perforated heart chamber, a broken spine and a severed spinal cord, a completely removed liver, as well as various perforations or tears to the lungs, stomach, gallbladder, small intestines, and rumen. The list also includes severe external trauma, such as falling from a roof, having a majority of the ribs broken, or being clawed by specific predators. The Mishna establishes the overarching rule: any animal afflicted with a defect or injury such that a similar animal cannot survive is deemed a treifa. Resh Lakish derives the principle that a treifa cannot survive from the verse, "These are the living things which you may eat," teaching that only an animal capable of living is permitted for consumption, whereas one that cannot live is forbidden. Conversely, the opposing view holds that a treifa can survive, deriving from the same verse that a specific type of animal that is capable of living is permitted for consumption, while another animal that is capable of living (the treifa) is forbidden. However, after the Gemara rejects this proof from the verse, it brings another verse to support the opinion that a treifa can survive: "Between the living thing that may be eaten and the living thing that may not be eaten." The Mishna's list does not include all cases, as there are additional cases of treifot—four that are referenced by the acronym BSGR, and another seven Amoraic traditions known as the "shev (seven) shematata." Although these cases are not explicitly mentioned in the Mishna, they can be derived from the rule stated at its end, according to which any animal that is incapable of living is considered a treifa. However, how can the tannaitic tradition of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, which limits the list of treifot to exactly eighteen, be reconciled? After a failed attempt, the Gemara settles the count according to Rabbi Yishmael by grouping all types of perforations into one broad category and all types of severed parts into another single category, thereby reconciling the calculated total with all the treifot appearing in the various lists.

Three difficulties are raised from tannaitic sources against the opinion of Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak that a person cannot forbid property that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she'eino shelo), and they are resolved. The first difficulty is from the braita regarding a sin offering slaughtered outside the Temple for idol worship, which the Gemara resolves by explaining that since the sacrifice achieves atonement for the owner, it is legally considered his own property. The second difficulty is from the Mishna regarding two people holding a knife where one slaughters for an idol, and the third is from a braita regarding one who renders another's property impure, mixes it with tithed produce, or pours it as an idolatrous libation. The Gemara resolves these by explaining that the individual has a financial partnership in the item. The Gemara suggests that the debate between Rav Huna and Rav Nachman is a tannaitic dispute, quoting a dispute regarding whether a gentile can forbid a Jew's wine by offering it up as a libation to idols. Rav Nachman, however, rejects the comparison, as a Jew who does the same thing would be doing it just to annoy his friend, and does not really intend to worship the idol. Some difficulties are raised against this theory from tannaitic sources, but are resolved by explaining them as referring to cases where the Jew is an apostate. The Mishna rules that one may not slaughter an animal directly into seas, rivers, or vessels because it looks to others like they are offering it to an idol (mar'it ayin). However, it is permitted to slaughter into a circular pool of water, which Rava clarifies must be murky. Furthermore, one may not slaughter directly into a pit (gumma) anywhere, but the Mishna then permits doing so in one's house. Abaye and Rava each resolve this seemingly contradictory statement in different manners, and Rava rejects Abaye's explanation. Rava explains that a person may slaughter next to a pit in their private courtyard so that the blood flows into it to keep the yard clean. In the marketplace, even this is strictly forbidden to prevent copying heretical practices (minim), and anyone who does so must be investigated for heresy. A braita is brought to support Rava's explanation. The Mishna establishes that slaughtering a non-sacrifice (chullin) for the sake of a sacrifice that can be voluntarily vowed or donated - such as an olah, asham talui, or todah - renders the shechita invalid, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits it. The rabbis are concerned that people will see this and think that one can slaughter sacrifices outside the Temple. Conversely, slaughtering for sacrifices that cannot be voluntarily vowed, like a sin offering, is valid, as people will assume the slaughterer is just saying it is for the sake of that offering but does not really intend to offer a sacrifice outside the Temple.

What is the status of an animal slaughtered to items connected to the ground, like mountains, seas, rivers or deserts? The Mishna rules that the shechita is invalid, but the assumption from the Mishna is that it is not prohibited for benefit. The Gemara challenges this from a braita which states that such slaughter renders the animal an idolatrous sacrifice (zivchei meitim), which is forbidden for benefit. Abaye resolves this by distinguishing between slaughtering to the item itself - which only disqualifies the shechita - and slaughtering to the angel or deity of the landmark (gadda), which renders it forbidden from any benefit. Can a person render someone else's property forbidden by performing an act of idolatry with it? Rav Huna rules that if a friend's animal is lying before an idol and someone slaughters one siman for the idol, the animal becomes forbidden. He relies on the principle of Ulla that while merely bowing to another's animal does not forbid it, performing a physical action (ma'aseh) directly on the animal does forbid it. A difficulty is raised against Rav Huna from a braita regarding one who slaughters a sin offering on Shabbat outside the Temple courtyard for an idol, who is held liable for three distinct sin offerings. If the animal becomes forbidden at the first siman, as per Rav Huna's position, the completion of the slaughter should not trigger the liability for slaughtering outside the Temple, as it would merely be slaughtering a disqualified animal that would no longer be considered a sacrifice. The Gemara offers two resolutions - applying the case to a bird sin offering where the slaughterer specifies that his intent for idol worship will only take effect upon the completion of the slaughter, or in the shechita of a bird sin offering where half the windpipe was already slit, and in this case the shechita was completed in one small action. Rav Nachman, Rav Avram, and Rav Yitzchak disagree with Rav Huna and reaffirm the established principle that a person cannot forbid something that is not theirs (ein adam oser davar she'eino shelo) even by performing an action on the item. A difficulty is raised against this position from the braita quoted above with the interpretation given above.

What is the default assumption regarding a gentile's intent when an animal is slaughtered? The rabbis hold that we do not automatically assume a gentile intends it for idol worship unless he explicitly says so, while Rabbi Eliezer holds a gentile's default intent is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosi argues that even if he does intend it for idol worship, we do not say that one person's intent affects another person's act of slaughter. The Gemara presents two ways to explain this dispute and whether the principle of one person intending and another performing the action applies outside the Temple just as it does inside. What is the status of an animal if the slaughter was performed with the intent to perform a later part of the service, like throwing the blood or burning the fat, for idol worship? Rabbi Yochanan rules that the animal is disqualified because we can transfer intent from one action to another, and we learn the laws outside the Temple from the laws inside. Reish Lakish rules that it is permitted because we do not transfer intent from one action to another outside the Temple. The Gemara notes they hold the same argument regarding internal Temple sacrifices and l'shma intent, and then explains why it was necessary to state that they argue in both cases. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yosi's position in the Mishna, but is resolved. A braita is then brought to support Rabbi Yochanan's position. What is the law if someone performs shechita and only thinks about sprinkling the blood for idol worship after the slaughter is finished? The Gemara cites a case in Caesarea where the Sages did not rule whether it was forbidden or permitted. The issue is whether or not a later action or statement retroactively proves the initial intent. After attempting to connect their ruling with the rabbis' and Rabbi Eliezer's positions, that suggestion is rejected and they say it connects with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's ruling. However, the Gemara tries to figure out which ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it connects to. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosi, meaning the gentile's intent does not disqualify the Jew's shechita. The Gemara brings a story where gentiles gave animals to a Jewish butcher and stated the blood and fat were for them, and it was permitted. Rav Ashi qualifies that if a gentile gives money to a Jewish butcher under Rabbi Eliezer's view, it is only forbidden if the gentile is powerful enough that the butcher cannot refuse his intent.

What types of signs of life does one need to observe when performing shechita on an animal that is on the verge of death? Rav, Shmuel, and Rava each bring different actions that serve as indicators that would then permit this animal to be eaten, as it is clear the animal was still alive enough at the time of the shechita. At what point of the slaughtering process does one need to see these signs of life? Rav Chisda, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, and Rava each suggest different points - the middle, the beginning, or the end. Rav Chisda and Rav Nachman provide support for their positions from our Mishna, while Rava brings support from his understanding of a different tannaitic source. Can one perform shechita on an animal for an idol worshipper? Does one need to be concerned that it will be used for idol worship and therefore the Jew would be benefiting from idol worship? Is it the intent of the owner or the one performing the shechita that determines the designation of the animal?

Study Guide

A braita states that if blood spurts onto a gourd during slaughter, Rebbi holds it is susceptible to impurity, while Rabbi Chiya holds we suspend judgment (tolin). Rabbi Oshaya says that since they argue, we should rely on Rabbi Shimon's view that shechita makes an animal susceptible, not blood. Two different explanations are brought by Rav Papa and Rav Ashi to explain Rabbi Chiya's position, the point on which he disagrees with Rebbi, and how Rabbi Shimon's view helps determine that the halakha follows Rabbi Chiya. Rav Papa explains that both Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya agree that blood makes items susceptible if it remains from the beginning to the end of the slaughter, and they only argue if the blood was wiped away between cutting the two simanim. Rebbi holds slaughter is continuous from beginning to end, so it is considered slaughter blood. Rabbi Chiya holds slaughter only occurs at the very end, so the earlier blood is just wound blood, and tolin means we wait to see if blood remains at the end of the slaughter. Rav Ashi argues that for Rabbi Chiya, it is a doubt whether or not slaughter is continuous, so tolin means we neither eat it nor burn it. Both explanations show that Rabbi Oshaya aligned Rabbi Chiya with Rabbi Shimon to make Rebbi a minority opinion of one against two; even though he did not agree with Rabbi Chiya in theory, in practice, they hold the same position. Reish Lakish asks whether the endearment of sacred items (chibat hakodesh) allows the dry crumbs of a meal offering to pass on impurity to other items, or if it only functions to disqualify the item itself. Rabbi Eleazar attempts to prove from a verse that water is always required for susceptibility to pass on impurity to other items, and therefore it is clear that chibat hakodesh would not be able to pass on impurity, but the Gemara rejects his suggestion as it is inconclusive. Rav Yosef challenges Rabbi Elazar's position from Rabbi Shimon's statement that shechita makes an animal susceptible to impurity even to pass on impurity, and Rabbi Zeira brings a similar challenge from a different case. Abaye resolves both challenges by explaining that in those particular cases, the rabbis rabbinically treated them like a regular susceptibility by water, but by Torah law they are not susceptible to impurity at all. The Gemara then proves that chibat hakodesh operates on a Torah level, and therefore Reish Lakish's question is still in place. What is the source in the Torah for chibat hakodesh being a Torah law? The first attempted answer is rejected, but they bring a second answer, which is accepted. Reish Lakish's question regarding whether it can pass on impurity remains unresolved (teiku).

Rabbi Yonatan says in the name of Rabbi that someone who eats a shelishi (third degree) of actual teruma is forbidden to eat teruma but is allowed to touch it. Ulla had said the same thing regarding one who eats a shelishi of chullin that was treated like teruma. The Gemara explains why both statements were needed and could not have necessarily been derived one from the other. Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta says that someone who eats a shelishi of chullin treated like kodashim is still pure to eat actual kodashim, because only real kodashim that are sanctified by an action (like a meal offering when placed in a sanctified vessel or an animal when slaughtered) can create a revi'i (fourth degree). Rami bar Hama challenges this from Rabbi Yehoshua's opinion in the Mishna in Taharot (2:2) that a shelishi that was treated as teruma is considered a sheni for kodashim. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between items treated as teruma and those treated as kodashim. The reason to distinguish is that those who are careful from impurities for teruma are not cautious enough regarding kodashim. This distinction is proven from a Mishna in Chagiga (18b). Rava, however, disagrees with the application of the Mishna in Chagiga to this case, and disagrees with Rav Yitzchak. A difficulty is raised against this distinction from a Mishna in Chagiga (24b) where one designated part of the wine in a barrel of teruma to be kodashim. If the protection for teruma is not valid for kodashim, wouldn't the teruma wine make the kodashim wine impure? To resolve this they distinguish between teruma and kodashim that are combined and those that are not combined. A second difficulty on Rav Yitzchak is brought from a braita that clearly states that a shelishi of items that are treated as kodashim passes on impurity to kodashim. To resolve this difficulty, they conclude that there is a tannaitic debate and brings a braita with two opinions that both support Rav Yitzchak's position. Rabbi Shimon stated in the Mishna that shechita makes the animal susceptible to impurity. Rav Asi explains that Rabbi Shimon means only shechita makes it susceptible, but the blood of the animal does not. The Gemara challenges this to see if he means only shechita, and blood from the slaughter would not be considered a liquid that could render something susceptible to impurity, or did he mean shechita in addition to blood, as blood of the slaughter could also render something susceptible to impurity. Our Mishna is brought to strengthen Rav Asi's reading, but it is rejected as inconclusive. Then three other tannaitic sources are brought to try to either prove or disprove Rav Assi's claim, however, all are deemed inconclusive.

Reish Lakish rules that if the windpipe is cut during slaughter and the lung is subsequently punctured before the gullet is cut, the animal remains kosher because the lung is already considered to have lost its life through the cutting of the windpipe. Rava qualifies that this principle applies exclusively to the lung, which is structurally dependent on the windpipe, but not to the inner digestive organs. Rabbi Zeira disputes this qualification, and the Gemara notes a secondary debate regarding whether or not Rabbi Zeira ultimately retracted his objection. Rav Acha infers from Reish Lakish's ruling that meat from an animal in the process of being slaughtered is forbidden to Noahides. Because the severing of both simanim structurally detaches the internal organs from the animal's life source, it renders them ever min hachai (a limb or flesh from a living animal) for anyone whose meat is not immediately permitted via shechita. Consequently, a gentile eating these organs while the animal still convulses violates the Noachide prohibition. However, others object to this inference, arguing that a concept cannot exist where an item is permitted to Jews but forbidden to gentiles. A debate in the Mishna questions whether the act of slaughter itself renders the animal susceptible to ritual impurity (hechsher lekabel tumah) or if susceptibility is achieved only when the blood emerges and acts as a wetting liquid. The rabbis rule that if no blood emerges, the meat is not susceptible to impurity, meaning one may eat it with ritually impure hands. The Gemara infers from here that if blood had emerged, eating with impure hands would be forbidden. This raises a difficulty, as the Mishna appears to discuss secular meat (chullin), yet impure hands possess only a second-degree status (sheni le'tumah), which cannot create a third-degree status (shelishi) in chullin. To resolve this, the Gemara first presents four textual proofs demonstrating that the Mishna is indeed dealing with chullin. Following these proofs, the Gemara introduces three suggestions for the specific case in the Mishna: according to the first, the Mishna refers to meat purchased with maaser sheni money; according to the second, it involves a rabbinic decree assigning a first-degree status of impurity to the hands; and according to the third, it refers to secular food prepared according to the strict purity standards of consecrated sacrifices (kodashim).

The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the rabbis regarding whether a secular slaughter requires intent has ramifications in the case of one who slaughters an additional animal during the slaughter of a para aduma (engaging in an extraneous activity). If slaughter does not require intent, the cutting of the second animal's simanim is considered a completed act of slaughter, and consequently, the para aduma is disqualified because an extraneous activity was performed at that time. Conversely, if slaughter requires intent, the unintended slaughter is not considered an act at all, and the para aduma remains valid. The disqualifications of shechita begin with the law of shehiya (pausing), which occurs when the slaughterer pauses between the slaughter of one siman and the next. A tannaitic dispute is analyzed regarding the duration of time that disqualifies due to pausing, questioning whether it is the time of an act of slaughter or the time it takes to examine the knife. Several amoraim define the duration of slaughter: Rav defines it as the time needed to slaughter another animal, while Rav and Shmuel dispute whether the disqualifying pause for a bird slaughter is measured by the time it takes to slaughter an animal or a bird. Additional opinions expand this duration to include the time required for physical handling of the animal, such as the time it takes to lower it to the ground or lift it and push it down. The details of the disqualifications continue with ikur (tearing the simanim instead of cutting them) and chalada (inserting the knife beneath the simanim or behind them). These flaws in the act of slaughter trigger a tannitic dispute between Rabbi Yeshevav and Rabbi Akiva over whether animals disqualified by an improper slaughter, such as shehiya, chalada, or ikur, are considered a treifa and do not impart impurity, or whether they are treated as a neveila and impart impurity through carrying. Ultimately, Rabbi Akiva reversed his original understanding and agreed with Rabbi Yeshevav that the status of these animals is like a neveila in all regards. A contradiction to the Mishna arises from a Mishna at the beginning of the third chapter, which lists a severed windpipe among the defects that define an animal as a treifa, seemingly contradicting our Mishna's ruling that such a defect is considered a neveila. To resolve this contradiction, four potential resolutions are proposed, two of which are ultimately rejected.