Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Today's daf is sponsored by Aviran and Miki Kadosh on the occasion of their son, Avishai's bar mitzvah and in honor of him completing Shas Mishnayot, Masechet Tamid and Masechet Taanit during the past year. "We wish that you continue to persevere in learning, to advance and grow wise in all your hobbies and areas of interest! Mazel tov!" Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari for the refuah shleima of Shaiel Ram ben Rivka. Today's daf is sponsored anonymously, "To all the women who have served as my role models for Jewish learning." In which place in prayer are personal requests inserted? What are the different opinions, and what is the basis for the dispute? What are the holidays of the idol worshippers during which there is a prohibition to sell to or buy from them? The Gemara works on the list of holidays and explains the reason behind the establishment of each of the holidays. Kalenda and Saturnalia were established in response to the first year of the first man (Adam) when he saw in winter that the days were getting shorter and thought that, because of his sin, God was returning the world to chaos. When he saw that the days were getting longer, he realized it was just the way of the world and established a holiday before and after that day on which the days began to lengthen (winter solstice). Another holiday was established in response to the successes of the Roman kingdom against the Egyptians and the Greeks. Rav Dimi explained that the Jews helped the Romans in their victory over the Greeks and ruled together with the Romans for twenty-six years before the Romans subjugated the Jews. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia Klein in loving memory of her brother, Bobby Klein, who passed away 40 years ago. "He taught us about love and acceptance. His humor, friendliness, and loving spirit is greatly missed." Rav Huna ruled like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, who distinguished between loans with a promissory note and those without, and permitted Jews to collect loans without a promissory note from gentiles before their holidays. He also ruled like Rabbi Yehuda on the issue of a dyer who dyed someone's wool the wrong color. Rav Yosef did not understand why Rav Huna needed to explain the ruling like Rabbi Yehuda, as he thought it was obvious from the stam Mishna in Bava Metzia that corresponded to his opinion, as when there is a Mishna with a debate that is followed by a stam Mishna, the ruling is always like the stam Mishna. What was that not obvious to Rav Huna?  The Gemara quotes several other debates between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha and others in which the ruling is like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha. Rabbi Yishmael forbade doing business dealings with gentiles three days before and three days after their holidays. Shmuel explained that based on Rabbi Yishmael, it is forbidden to have any business dealings with Christians, as every Sunday they have a holiday.  The rabbis disagree and forbid business dealings before. The Gemara questions how their opinion differs from the tanna's opinion in the first Mishna of the masechet. Four suggestions are brought. The last relates to an opinion of Nahum the Mede. There are several issues brought in the Gemara where Naum the Mede disagreed with the sages or individual sages on a particular issue, and the rabbis were unwilling to accept his position. 

Study Guide Avodah Zarah 6 Today’s daf is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman in loving memory of Masha’s grandfather, Jacob Maltz, Yaakov Yitzchak ben Moshe Aaron, ztz”l, on his 65th yahrzeit, which was last Thursday. "Although my Zeidie died when I was still a child, I was inspired by the stories of his sacrifices to stay religious at a time when many were leaving the fold. I still remember his smile, radiant with warmth and love." Today’s daf is sponsored by Cliff and Minna Felig in honor of Michelle and Seth Farber on the occasion of their daughter Chani’s marriage in the throes of our war with Iran. When the Mishna mentions "three days before the holiday," does this include the holiday itself (making three days total), or does it refer to three complete days prior to the holiday (with the holiday being additional)? The Gemara brings four sources attempting to prove that the Mishna means three full days before the holiday. While three proofs are rejected, the final one provides conclusive evidence. What underlies this prohibition? Is it because the idol worshipper will thank their gods for their commercial success, and the Jew will have indirectly caused idol worship, thereby transgressing the verse in Shmot 23:13: "Make no mention of names of other gods, they shall not be heard on your lips"? Or is the concern the prohibition against placing a stumbling block before others, as the Jew causes the idol worshipper to engage in idol worship? What is the practical ramification of these different rationales? If someone transgressed and conducted business with a gentile during the prohibited days before their holiday, is it forbidden to benefit from the money or items received? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this issue. Each raises objections against the other's position, and each resolves the difficulties posed against him. A braita is cited supporting Reish Lakish's view that benefiting from such transactions is permitted. Why does the Mishna forbid all the listed activities both when the Jew benefits the non-Jew and when the non-Jew benefits the Jew? What makes each of these cases unique, making it necessary for the Mishna to list them all? Regarding collecting loans from gentiles three days before their holidays, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree in the Mishna about whether this is forbidden or permitted. The Gemara introduces a third position from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, who distinguishes between oral loans and those documented in writing. Rav Huna ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha's position.

Reish Lakish explains that if the Jews had not sinned with the golden calf, later generations would not have been born because the Jews would have been transformed into angels. After several objections are raised against this statement, the sages reinterpret his words to mean that the Jews would have become similar to angels in that they would have become immortal, yet still have children. Difficulties are raised against this interpretation as well, but these are resolved. Why is it forbidden to conduct business with gentiles specifically during the three days preceding their holidays? Objections are raised against this three-day restriction by drawing comparisons to Jewish practices before their own holidays. How are these discrepancies resolved?  

For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here. For more information about What is a Siyum, click here. Siyum Masechet Shevuot is dedicated by Raquel & Joe Bijou in loving memory of our dearest Grandpa Richard Cohen. Naftali ben Yosef HaKohen. "You always cherished family and valued learning. By completing this masechet, we have accomplished both. We love and miss you deeply, and we hope to continue fulfilling many more mitzvot in your memory." If one watches an item belonging to another (shomer), there are different levels of responsibility, depending on whether the shomer was paid/not paid or one borrowed or rented an object. When a shomer takes a false oath regarding the item, if the lie either didn't change the level of responsibility or created an obligation instead of providing an exemption, then there is no liability since there were no financial repercussions from the lie. However, even though one is exempt from liability for an oath concerning a deposit, Rav rules that the person is still liable for an oath of expression. Shmuel disagrees. What is the basis of their debate?

This week's learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Chaim Avraham HaKohen ben Alter Gershon HaKohen. Various statements are brought regarding differences between the way God relates to Jews and non-Jews, and particularly that God punishes the Jews in small doses to enable them to get their reward in the World-to-Come. 

Avodah Zarah Bookmark Masechet Avodah Zarah is sponsored by the Talmud class of Congregation Beth Jacob in Redwood City, CA in honor of the staff of Hadran who make learning possible. "Pirkei Avot 1:6 teaches us עֲשֵׂה לְךָ רַב, וּקְנֵה לְךָ חָבֵר, make for yourself a Rav, and acquire for yourself a companion. We are blessed to have Rabbanit Michelle Farber as our extraordinary teacher, and we- Leslie, Joe, David, Sue, Helen, Batya, Adam, Alana, and Bill- are blessed to have the companionship of our learning." Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik & Prof. Adi Wyner in honor of the upcoming wedding of their daughter, Eva Wyner, who was just promoted to Director of Jewish Affairs for the State of NY in Governor Hochul’s Executive Chamber. And in honor of their future son-in-law, Reuven Rosen, who just graduated with honors from Rutgers’ MD/ Ph.D. program and who will be starting his medical residency at NYU. The Mishna says that all types of business dealings with idol worshippers are forbidden three days before their holidays. Rav and Shmuel discuss the spelling of the word used for holidays - "eidaihem" - is it with an aleph or ayin? From which verse in the Torah is the meaning of the term derived from, according to each opinion? One of the verses mentioned is the basis of a long aggada about the nations coming before God in the World-to-Come, looking to get rewarded. God reprimands them for never having kept the Torah. Various claims are made by the nations trying to justify why they didn't keep the Torah.

Introduction to Masechet Avodah Zarah

Today's daf is sponsored by Rena Kurs in loving memory of Dr. Leatrice Rabinsky, on her 7th yahrzeit. "She instilled the love of learning in all of her children, grandchildren and generations of students. May her memory be for a blessing." Rav and Shmuel held that orphans cannot collect a loan of their parents from other orphans if the parent of the debtor died first, as a parent can't pass an oath on to one's children. Rabbi Elazar disagreed and permitted them to collect with an oath of orphans (that their father did not tell them that the loan was already collected). The rabbis of later generations tried to override Rav and Shmuel's opinion without success but managed to limit it in various ways. Can one do a gilgul shvua in a case where the oath is a rabbinic oath?

When both parties are untrustworthy and cannot take an oath, Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Meir disagree about the proper procedure. A debate emerges about who holds which opinion, as one maintains the money should be split while the other argues that the oath returns to its original place, though it remains unclear which rabbi said which. Additionally, there is disagreement about the meaning of the position stating "the oath returns to its place." Rabbi Ami explains that one position is held by the rabbis in Israel while the other belongs to the rabbis in Babylonia. Rav Pappa clarifies that the Babylonian rabbis are Rav and Shmuel, while the Israeli position is represented by Rabbi Abba. Shimon ben Tarfon offers several statements concerning the importance of associating with the right people and avoiding the wrong ones. The Gemara examines the case of a storekeeper who was asked to pay someone's workers. The workers claim they never received payment while the storekeeper insists he paid them. The question arises whether Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agreed with the Mishna's opinion that each party can take an oath to get paid by the employer. Another issue concerns contradictory witness testimony. If two groups of witnesses contradict each other in court, can they be believed to testify in a different case? Or since we know one group certainly lied, should we reject both groups' testimony in future cases? Rav Huna and Rav Chisda each take different positions on this matter.

Today's daf is sponsored by Deborah Aschheim (Weiss) on the occasion of the Bat Mitzvah of her granddaughter Tamar Chava Baumser. "She demonstrates that there are no boundaries to acts of gemulat chasidim." Today's daf is dedicated by the Hadran Zoom family in honor of Chani Farber and Saar Har-Chen, on the occasion of their wedding. We wish you a new home that will be grounded in the happiness that is promised to one who brings their learning always, as we learned with Chani's mother, Rabbanit Michelle: אַשְׁרִי מִי שֶׁבָּא לְכָאן וְתַלְמוּדוּ בְּיָדו. If the person who is obligated to take an oath by Torah law is not trustworthy, i.e. if they lied in a previous case or are in the category of those who are exempt from testifying, the obligation to take the oath is placed upon the other person. If one asks a storekeeper to pay their workers and they will pay back the storekeeper later, and the storekeeper claims that he/she paid them and the workers claim they were never paid, each of them takes an oath and the person needs to pay them both. Ben Nanas agrees that the person needs to pay both, but does not allow each side to take an oath as it creates a situation where clearly one side is taking a false oath. The Mishna lists other cases where there is a disagreement between a storekeeper and a buyer about whether the money was already paid or the item was given to the buyer. Who takes the oath in each case? Generally, when one holds a deed in hand, they have the upper hand. However, the Mishna mentions cases where the one holding the deed needs to take an oath in order to collect the money. The Gemara explains why the worker is believed to say he/she didn't get paid for a job performed. However, this halacha is qualified as only applying in a case where the time in which the worker should have been paid hasn't passed yet - once that time passes, there is an assumption that the employer paid the worker. Shmuel and Rav both hold that the worker can take this oath to get paid only if there were witnesses who saw the worker being hired. If not, the employer can claim he/she never hired the worker at all and therefore is believed by saying the worker was already paid because of a "migo." Rava disagrees with this.

Study Guide Shevuot 44 Is Shmuel's opinion—that a creditor who loses collateral cannot collect the loan even if the collateral was worth much less than the loan amount—the subject of a tannaitic debate? The Gemara suggests two possible tannaitic debates that could relate to this issue, but rejects both, since the basis for each argument can be explained differently. Generally, oaths are used to exempt defendants from payment. However, in several unique circumstances delineated in the Mishna, a claimant can take an oath in order to receive payment.

Today's daf is sponsored by Binyamin Cohen to wish Mazel tov to Caroline Musin Berkowitz on completing Shas! "We're inspired by your amazing accomplishment and dedication to learning." What categories of items are excluded from oaths of the shomrim? How is this derived from the Torah? What is the argument between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis in the Mishna regarding items that are or are not considered like land (to be exempt from oaths)? Another criterion for oaths is that the claim must be for a measured item. Rava and Abaye disagree about how to understand this. The Mishna lists several cases regarding a disagreement between the creditor and debtor about the value of an item given as collateral that the creditor claims was lost. In which cases would one side, or perhaps both, need to take an oath? If one loans money with collateral and the item gets lost, what type of responsibility does the creditor assume for the item? What if the creditor and debtor disagree regarding the value of the lost item? Shmuel holds that the creditor no longer owes any money even if the item is worth significantly less than the loan. How does his opinion work with the Mishna?

Today’s daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould “in gratitude to HaShem for helping me to find a new partner to love and be loved by, and to walk with on a new journey.” The Gemara continues by presenting cases involving disputes between lenders and borrowers regarding debt repayment, along with the ruling given in each case. In the Mishna there is a contradiction because it is written that we do not administer oaths to a minor and it is also written that we administer oaths to a minor. Rav and Shmuel each interpret the case of administering oaths to a minor in different ways. Rav says it refers to a child who makes a claim for their deceased father's money, and therefore we administer an oath because the loan was to an adult, even though he is not the actual creditor who gave the money originally. According to his explanation, the Mishna matches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov because the Sages disagree in such a case and do not obligate. The Gemara brings two different explanations to understand what the point of dispute is between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the Sages. Shmuel's explanation is that the Mishna refers to the oath of one who tries to collect his father's loan from an orphan. There is no oath for cases of land, slaves, documents, and consecrated property. Also, there are no laws of double, four and five payment, and oaths of guardians for these type of items. From where is this derived in the verses?

Today's daf is sponsored for a refuah shleima for Shmuel Henoch Yaakov Ben Chiyena. Rav Nachman instituted a shevuat heiset, a rabbinic oath, for defendants who completely denied a claim. There is debate about the exact circumstances under which Rav Nachman required this oath. What distinguishes a Torah-mandated oath from a rabbinically instituted one (heiset)? The Gemara presents three possible differences. Under what circumstances can a creditor demand that a debtor repay money in front of witnesses, such that without witnesses, the debtor's claim of having already repaid becomes invalid? The Gemara quotes two different versions of Rav Asi's position, as well as two different versions of Shmuel's response to Rav Asi. Their opinions are then questioned and explained in light of our Mishna. The Gemara presents four actual cases involving disputes between creditors and debtors, explaining how each case was ruled. In some instances, Abaye and Rava disagreed about the proper ruling.

Study Guide Shevuot 40 Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to understand the line in the Mishna regarding an oath of a partial admission: "a claim must be two ma'ah of silver" - is it referring to the amount of the claim - meaning what the claimant's side is demanding or is it referring to the defendant's claim - how much is the defendant denying? There are four attempts to support Rav's understanding from the Mishna and other tannaitic sources, however the first three can be explained according to Shmuel as well. Two other rulings of Shmuel are brought, including a basic one that if one claims the other owes two different items and the other admits of having one of the items, the defendant takes an oath of partial admission. Two versions are brought about whether Rabbi Yochanan agreed or disagreed with this opinion. Proofs are brought to prove Shmuel's opinion but are proven to be inconclusive. Likewise, those same proofs are brought to disprove the opinion that Rabbi Yochanan disagrees but are rejected in the same way.  

Today's daf is dedicated by the Hadran Zoom family in honor of Maggie Sandler's birthday! "Your incredible work elevates not just the content of our daily learning, but its entire atmosphere, as you create a beautiful, seamless experience for all of us. You truly bring to life the principle of hiddur mitzva that we learned in Masechet Shabbat: ״זֶה אֵלִי וְאַנְוֵהוּ״, הִתְנָאֵה לְפָנָיו בְּמִצְוֹת" Before administering the oath to a defendant, the court delivers several cautionary statements about the severity of swearing falsely. These warnings are designed to deter the person from taking a false oath. A braita lists all these statements, and the Gemara both raises difficulties with them and clarifies their meaning and sources. The Gemara then turns to a dispute between Rav and Shmuel regarding the minimum amounts required for a claim, denial, and admission. They disagree about the interpretation of the sentence: "The claim is two maah of silver and the admission is one pruta." Rav holds that for the oath to apply, the total claim must amount to two maah and a pruta—with the minimum denial being two maah and the minimum admission being one pruta. Shmuel, however, rules that both the minimum admission and the minimum denial need only be worth a pruta each, while the minimum total claim must be worth two maah. Rava explains that Rav's interpretation finds support in the Mishna, while Shmuel's position aligns with the biblical verses in the Torah.  

Study Guide Shevuot 38 This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Helen Cohen, Henna bat Yitzchak Nechemia.  Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg, in memory of her father Zvi Tyberg on his yahrzeit today. If one takes an oath of deposit to several people at once, in what circumstances will that be required to bring multiple sacrifices? The Mishna listed three different opinions and a braita is brought with two opinions - Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan bring different explanations as to which wording Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about. If one takes an oath that one does not have several items of another, if it was a lie, are they liable also for the general statement that they do not have any item or only on the particular different items? There is a debate between amoraim about this issue. The sixth chapter discusses an oath administered by the judges, more particularly an oath of one who admits to part of a claim. What is the minimum value of the claim and the partial admission required in order to be obligated to take an oath? Another requirement is that the admission be about the same type of item as the claim. However, Rabban Gamliel disagrees about this.

Regarding an oath on a deposit, Rav Kahana questions: if witnesses warned the person before taking the oath, that in the event they are lying, they will receive lashes, will they receive lashes in addition to a sacrifice or in place of the sacrifice? Several attempts are made to answer his question from various sources, but none are conclusive. Raba then challenges Rav Kahana's question and suggests that there can never be such a case because if there are witnesses to warn, then they must also be witnesses to the act in which case the denial is irrelevant as the witnesses can make the person pay, regardless of their denial. The Gemara then attempts to prove and then disprove this assumption of Raba that if there are witnesses, one cannot be obligated for an oath of deposit. Only from the last source do they succeed in conclusively disproving this assumption. Is an oath of deposit relevant in a case relating to land?

Today's daf is sponsored by Meryll Page in loving memory of her father George M. Levine, Yosef Michael haLevi, on his 16th yahrzeit. "His memory is a blessing and a constant presence in my life." Words can carry different meanings depending on their context. Several examples are brought from the Tanach to show the meanings of various words.  Rabbi Meir and the rabbis debate whether invoking God's name in various contexts requires using the actual divine name or whether a substitute designation suffices. What textual sources do they cite to support their respective positions? One should be careful to change the language of the Mishna and even a verse if it may sound like one is cursing someone else while reciting it.  In the Mishna, Rabbi Meir disagreed with the rabbis that one can apply the principle that allows deriving a positive statement from a negative one. However, this creates a contradiction with his stance on stipulations, where he maintains that they must be formulated in both positive and negative terms. To resolve this inconsistency, the text reassigns the positions—switching who said what in our Mishna. Under what circumstances would someone be obligated or exempt from bringing a guilt offering for an oath of deposit? In which situations could a person become liable for multiple sacrifices regarding a single oath of deposit? An oath of deposit applies only to denying monetary claims, not to matters involving fines.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Avishag Edri for a refuah shleima and rescue of Alon Ben Idit. In which cases are people not obligated in an oath of testimony? What exact phraseology can be used for it to be considered an oath of testimony for which one is obligated to bring a sacrifice? Does one need to include the name of God? Is a word that refers to God also considered using the name of God? What names of God can or cannot be erased. There are various places in the Tanach where it is unclear if a word references God or someone else. The Gemara lists a number of these cases.

Study Guide Shevuot 34 Four different opinions are brought to explain why an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases. Difficulties are raised about each one of the four opinions and are resolved.

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

An oath of testimony is only relevant when the claimant has asked the witnesses to testify. Shmuel ruled that if the claimant was chasing the witnesses and they swore they did not know any testimony, this would not be considered an oath of testimony. Why did Shmuel need to specify this particular case? From where do we derive that an oath of testimony initiated by others (rather than the witnesses themselves) is only valid if the witnesses agree to it in court? If the witnesses agreed to the oath while in court but had denied knowledge of the testimony multiple times previously outside the court, from where do we derive that they are liable for each denial made outside the court? The Mishna discusses a case where both witnesses testified together. Since two people cannot testify at exactly the same moment, this is understood to mean one witness testified immediately after the other (toch k'dei dibbur - within the time it takes to speak a few words). The Mishna ruled that if the two witnesses did not testify one right after the other, the second witness is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. This principle is a matter of debate when applied to an oath of testimony involving a single witness. What is the underlying basis of this debate? Abaye makes a statement that sounds like a riddle: all agree regarding one witness in a sotah case, all agree regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, there is debate regarding two witnesses in a sotah case, all agree regarding one witness, and all agree regarding a case where the person who should take the oath is unable to do so. What is the meaning of each part of this cryptic statement? Rav Pappa adds additional cases where all agree.

Study Guide Shevuot 31 This week's learning is sponsored by Joy Benatar in memory of her mother, Miriam David, Malcah bat Meechael v'Esther, on her 9th yahrzeit. "A devoted wife, mother, grandmother, and educator." This week's learning is sponsored by Naomi Kadish for a refuah shleima for Mordechai Getzel ben Reizel and Chana bat Leah. Several bad practices are discouraged based on the verse in Shmot 23:7, "Distance yourself from false matters." After listing in the Mishna that women, relatives and disqualified witnesses are not obligated for an oath of testimony, there was a general line saying "And all who are not qualified to testify." Rav Pappa understands this line to include a king and Rav Acha to include a gambler. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding an oath of testimony taken outside the court on one's own? What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding an oath on a deposit initiated by others taken outside the court? Rav Pappa and his students disagreed about whether the root of the debate in both situations was the same. One is obligated to bring a sacrifice for an oath of testimony that was taken intentionally (the witnesses intentionally lied) and one for which they knew they were lying but did not understand the severity of the offense (that they would be obligated to bring a sacrifice. However, they do not bring a sacrifice if the witnesses do not remember that they knew the testimony. What part of the oath of testimony needs to take place in the court? In what situations can the witnesses be liable to bring several sacrifices?  

What is an oath of testimony for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale sin offering? Anyone who cannot testify is excluded from responsibility, including women. The Gemara asks from where in the Torah is it derived that women cannot testify. They bring various braitot that all prove from the same verse, Devarim 19:17, each using a different drasha, that women cannot be witnesses. They learn other laws from that same verse regarding court cases, i.e. who stands and who sits, and requirements of the judges to be fair and balanced. What types of exceptions are made if a talmid chacham is being judged in the court?

Today's daf is sponsored by Laurence and Michelle Berkowitz in memory of Joy Rochwarger Balsam on her 21st yahrzeit. A pioneer of women's Jewish learning who cared for every Jew near and far. May her memory be a blessing for all her nephews and nieces serving in the IDF and protecting am Yisrael during these difficult times. What is an oath made in vain? There are three basic categories of this type of oath. Details regarding these categories are analyzed. The Mishna compares the cases where oaths of expression and oath in vain apply - men and women, non-kosher witnesses, in court or out of court, one who takes the oath on one's own or is sworn by another, etc. The laws are the same, other than the sacrifice, which only applies to oaths of expression.  Shmuel states that one who answers amen to someone else's oath is as if they took an oath themselves. This is derived from two different places, one of them being our Mishna. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Batsheva and Daniel Pava. "Eighty-one years ago, on bet Sivan, the deportation of Hungarian Jewry to Auschwitz began. May our learning be dedicated to the memory of my great-grandmother, Raizel, my grandmother, Batsheva bat Yisroel, the Steinmetz and Vegh families of Apsha, and all the Jews of Marmarosh who were murdered in Auschwitz. May their memories be a blessing." Rava rules that one who takes an oath to not eat a loaf of bread, even if they have already eaten most of it, as long as there is still an olive bulk of bread left, the person can go to a chacham to repeal the oath retroactively. How can this case work with both the language of "I will not eat any of it" and "I will not eat it in its entirety"? A source is brought regarding a nazir to raise a contradiction to Rava. However, it is resolved in three possible ways. Ameimar disagrees with Rava and holds that one has even longer to repeal the oath, as long as the punishment has not yet been implemented. Rava explains that if an oath is made with a condition, if the condition is fulfilled without intention, the oath does not take effect. If the person remembers the condition but forgets the oath when eating the forbidden item, one is liable to bring a sacrifice. If the person remembers both the condition and the oath when eating both, and first eats the one fulfilling the condition, they will receive lashes. If the person first eats the forbidden one and then eats the one fulfilling the condition, it is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding a warning given in doubt, hatraat safek. Rava continues with another case where a person said that each item is forbidden on condition that they eat the other item. He discusses four possible permutations of what the person did unintentionally and intentionally and explains the law in each case. Rav Meri brings support from a Mishna and braita for Rava's principle in the above cases that if the condition is fulfilled unintentionally, the oath does not go into effect. Avimi asks his brother Eifa about the ruling in different cases of a double/overlapping oath. Each time Eifa answers, Avimi disagrees with Eifa's ruling.

Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Shapiro in honor of Shira Krebs, our fearless Minneapolis Hadran convener, on yesterday’s frailich wedding of her daughter Yonit to Yaakov Zinberg: Mazal tov!!! Tali Oberman sponsors today's daf in honor of her grandmother, Barbara Oberman, who has contributed greatly to the Jewish people and celebrated her 90th birthday this week. Would one be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one takes an oath of expression to fulfill a mitzva? There is a debate in the Mishna on this issue between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the rabbis. A braita teaches that one who takes an oath not to observe a mitzva or to observe a mitzva is not a valid oath. From where do they derive this? The working assumption is that the topic of the verse in the Torah is optional actions. From where is this derived? The Gemara brings three suggested answers, while the first one is rejected. If one takes an oath that repeats itself without adding on something new, the subsequent oaths are not valid and if one breaks them accidentally, one would be only obligated to bring one sacrifice. However, if the person were to go to a chacham to repeal the oath, the second oath would apply.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved.

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa."  Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day." The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression (shevuot bitui), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow. Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control. The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful. The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties. Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut, one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories. 

This week's learning is sponsored by Dvora Lopez in loving memory of her mother on her 51st yahrzeit. "She had great strength and abundant love." This week's learning is sponsored by the Futornick family in honor of Shira's 21st birthday. This week's learning is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman, for a refuah shleima, a complete and speedy recovery, for Elisheva Mindel bat Masha Tzivia. The Mishna appears to contradict itself regarding general oaths about eating. It implies that a general oath "not to eat" would not include foods that cannot be eaten (which would encompass non-kosher food), yet another case in the Mishna rules that someone who makes a general oath "not to eat" does include non-kosher food in that prohibition. Two different resolutions are offered. The first resolution distinguishes between someone who made a general oath ("I will not eat") and someone who made a specific oath ("I will not eat regular and non-kosher foods"). The sages provide two different interpretations for why an oath that specifically mentions both non-kosher and kosher foods would be effective. Difficulties are raised against both positions, and one remains unresolved. The second interpretation explains that the previous implication from the Mishna is incorrect—"foods that cannot be eaten" refers to truly inedible items and does not include non-kosher foods, which are technically edible. The final case in the Mishna is cited as proof for this position but is ultimately rejected. What distinguishes issur kollel from issur mosif? Issur kollel occurs when a second prohibition encompasses additional prohibited items, while issur mosif occurs when a second prohibition adds further restrictions to the same item or extends the prohibition to additional people. Based on this distinction, Rava explains why someone who accepts that issur mosif applies would not necessarily accept the same for issur kollel. Since issur mosif relates to a single item—adding a prohibition to the item itself or prohibiting the item to more people, it can apply. However, when additional items are included in the prohibition, it will not necessarily apply to what was already forbidden. Rava further explains that just as issur kollel takes effect, the same principle applies to an oath that includes other items. He needed to specify this because one might have assumed it only applies to prohibitions that arise independently, not to oaths where a person creates the prohibition. Rava the son of Raba raises a challenge to Rava's statement based on a Mishna in Kreitut, which suggests that an oath adding additional prohibitions would not apply to what was already forbidden. Six different explanations are offered to resolve this contradiction.

From where can one derive that the word "food" includes drinking? Does our Mishna support this understanding? In the cases in our Mishna where someone detailed a number of items that are forbidden, why is it assumed that they meant to create a separate oath for each item rather than to exclude other items from the oath? How does an expressive oath differ from an oath in which one denies having another person's item in one's possession? The debate regarding an oath that combines forbidden and permitted items, which was discussed previously, is now examined more in depth.

Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law. 

Study Guide Shevuot 21 Today's daf is sponsored by Ruth Leah Kahan, Jessica Shklar, and Emily Michelson in commemoration of the seventh yahrzeit of their mother, Kadimah Freedman Michelson -- קדימה בת הרב אברהם זבי וחיה. We miss her every day. What is the type of oath that is included in the negative commandment - do not swear falsely in my (God's) name? There is a debate regarding Rabbi Yochanan's opinion on this matter  - is it referring to an oath on future actions or on past actions? Difficulties are raised on both approaches and are resolved. When Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna says that one is obligated for not keeping to one's oath by eating a minuscule amount, meaning there is no requisite amount, does he hold this across the board (as per Rabbi Shimon's opinion), or only for oaths? The Gemara proves from other sources that it is a unique ruling only for oaths.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Helen Danczak in memory of her beloved mother on her 28th yahrzeit. "Her love of family is a guiding force for me." Today's daf is sponsored by Debbie and Yossi Gevir on the birth of two new grandchildren. "With joy and gratitude to Hashem! Mazal Tov to our beloved children Elazar and Sarah on the birth, two months ago. of their daughter, Shaked Tova. And to our beloved children Eliav and Noya, upon the birth of their son Ofek Shalom, whose Brit was yesterday. שירבו שמחות בישראל! A contradiction is brought between a braita and the Mishna regarding the language "I take an oath that I will eat." This contradiction is resolved in two different ways. A braita explains what "mivta" is and what "isar" is. They are both languages of oaths. But an isar can be liable a sacrifice and also not necessarily. The meaning of this braita is a subject of debate between Abaye and Rava who disagree about whether isar is a language of being matpis on an oath or not. Rav Dimi explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan what negative commandments are transgressed by different types of oath of expression (past and future) and for vows. He explains that oaths about something that one will do in the future are "false oaths" and in the past are "vain oaths." However, there is a braita that says that false and vain oaths are the same. How can this braita be explained in light of Rav Dimi's statement?

Study Guide Shevuot 19 Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about how to extrapolate the verse in Vayikra 5:2. Chizkiya explains the difference of opinion between them, while Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Sheshet hold that they do not disagree, rather each exempts one who forgot the Temple or sacrificial items from bringing a sacrifice, but extrapolates it from different words in the verse. Rava asks Rav Nachman: if forgetting the Temple or sacrificial items does not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, what if one forgot both the Temple and that one was impure? Rav Nachman answers that since the person also forgot they were impure, of course there is an obligation to bring a sacrifice. But Rava retorts that perhaps since one who forgets the Temple is exempt, this person would be exempt as well. Rav Ashi suggests an answer to this deliberation, but Ravina rejects it. A case is brought of one who walked on two paths - one pure and one impure and went into the Temple. Two variations are brought and there is a debate about the halakha in each case. There are three different opinions regarding these three cases. What is the root of their debate? The issues raised here relate to what type of previous knowledge of impurity is necessary to obligate one for a sacrifice. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each offer different interpretations for the first opinion in the cases of the two paths. Their opinions here contradict their opinions in a different place. How are these contradictions reconciled?

The Gemara discusses a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then explains the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment. The man is a Torah scholar who engages in relations with his wife when she is about to menstruate. When she informs him in the middle of the act that she has begun menstruating, he withdraws immediately. He is considered shogeg (unintentional transgressor) regarding entering the woman's body, as he incorrectly assumed he would be able to complete relations before she began menstruating. He is also considered shogeg regarding his immediate withdrawal from her body, as he, despite being a Torah scholar, was unaware of the halakha requiring him to wait until he is no longer erect before withdrawing. Rava explains that the obligation to bring a sacrifice for each of these acts can be found in tannaitic sources. The rule about withdrawing appears in our Mishna, while the rule about entering appears in a Mishna in Nidda 14a. Rav Ada bar Matna debates with Rava whether the Mishna in Nidda actually refers to the case under discussion. Rav Ada suggests that it instead refers to withdrawal. Rava and Abaye disagree about why a man who withdraws while not erect is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. Rava maintains that intercourse without an erection is not considered a true act of intercourse. Abaye, however, argues that the exemption exists because a situation where his wife begins menstruating during intercourse is considered beyond the person's control (ones). Where can one find in the Torah a source for both a negative commandment (prohibition) and a positive commandment regarding a man's obligation to withdraw when not erect and to not withdraw when erect in the situation described above? Additionally, what is the source for the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in relations when a woman expects to begin her menstrual period soon? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the Mishna, though the precise point of their disagreement is unclear. Chizkia clarifies the subject of their debate.

Today's daf is dedicated to Mimi and Rafi Schachat on the birth of a daughter! Rava and Rav Ashi each pose a series of unresolved questions concerning the minimum duration one must spend in the Temple to incur the obligation of bringing a sacrifice if they became ritually impure while inside. They debate whether these requirements apply only to unwitting impurity or also to intentional cases, and whether similar requirements would apply to a nazir who unknowingly entered a cemetery. The Mishna states that one who leaves the Temple by the shortest path after becoming impure will be exempt from bringing a sacrifice, while one who takes a longer path will be obligated. The Gemara then questions whether this distinction is measured in terms of time or physical distance. Rabbi Oshaya offers a ruling regarding a leprous house: if one enters backward with only their nose remaining outside, they would not become impure, as the Torah imposes impurity only when entering a house in the typical manner. A braita supports this reasoning, noting that an impure person entering the Temple through the roof would not be liable for entering the Temple while impure, as entering through the roof is not the conventional method. The Mishna clarifies that entering the Temple while impure is excluded from cases where the community would bring a bull offering for an erroneous court ruling. The bull offering applies only to sins requiring a fixed sin offering, not to those requiring a sliding scale offering. However, a bull sin offering would be brought for an erroneous court ruling involving nidda, specifically in a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then attempts to understand the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment.

Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Storch in honor of  Patti Evan’s birthday. " יומולדת שמח to my dear friend and chevruta partner! Wishing you many more years of good health, Mazal and bracha. Loads of love." Are all the elements mentioned in the Mishna that are needed for sanctifying additional space essential or is it sufficient for just one of them?  This has ramifications for expansions in the second Temple period where not all these elements were present. This debate is dependent on  whether or not the kedusha from the first Temple remained forever or did it need to be resanctified in the time of Ezra.  From where is it derived that one who becomes impure while in the Temple will need to bring a sliding-scale sacrifice if one doesn't leave the temple immediately?  What are the measurements for how long one needs to be in there to be obligated in the sacrifice? Would it be the same measurements for one who did it intentionally and will be punished by lashes?

Today’s daf is dedicated in memory of Tzeela Gez and for the refuah shleima of her newborn son. The ceremony for consecrated additional space in Jerusalem and the azara of the Temple is discussed at length. Consecrating additional space was done in the same way that the Temple was dedicated as is derived from a verse in Shmot 25:9. If so, why were Temple vessels consecrating differently? Two thanksgiving offerings were carried during the procession of consecrating additional space to the city of Jerusalem. This is derived from the ceremony in Nechemia of consecrating the city of Jerusalem. How is it clear that it was bread from the thanksgiving offering, not animals? Just as Jerusalem is consecrated with thanksgiving breads, which are only permitted to be eaten in the city of Jerusalem, so the consecration of the azara is with the remainder of the meal offerings, which are only permitted to be eaten in the azara. Why are they also not made from chametz, as the thanksgiving breads are? What songs (Psalms) were recited? Why? In what formation were the breads carried?

Study Guide Shevuot 14 Questions on the braita at the end of Shevuot 13b are raised and answered.  The second chapter starts with a description of the 4 cases of "yediot ha'tuma" and explains the four cases. It also describes the laws of one who becomes impure while inside the Temple.  Rav Papa challenges the number four used in the Mishna and the Gemara brings 2 versions of his answer to his own question.  A few questions for which there are no answers regarding the criteria for having known something and then forgotten it, for which one is obligated to bring a sacrifice.

This week's learning is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi to the continued health and good outcome for Chesya Rut bat Chana.  The Mishna explains that Yom Kippur atones for positive commandments. If one has already repented, they receive atonement immediately. Therefore, it is assumed that the Mishna is referring to one who has not yet repented. This accords with the opinion of Rebbi who holds that Yom Kippur atones even for sins for which one has not yet repented. The rabbis disagree and hold that Yom Kippur only atones for sins if one has repented. A difficulty is raised as the next part of the Mishna accords with Rabbi Yehuda's position that the goat sent to Azazel atones for kohanim as well. This issue is resolved - both parts of the Mishna are attributed to Rebbi, and on the issue of the goat to Azazel, he adopts Rabbi Yehuda's position. Abaye asked Rav Yosef if Rabbi Yehuda holds by Rebbi's position regarding one who did not repent before Yom Kippur. Rav Yosef explains that he does not and brings a source from Safra to support his answer, as it is known that an unattributed Safra is assumed to be authored by Rabbi Yehuda. There is a contradiction between two different sources in the Safra - one says that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance and the other says it only atones with repentance. Abaye and Rava each resolve the contradiction differently. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which sacrifices on Yom Kippur atone for all the kohanim's sins - the goat that is sent to Azazel or the bull of the high priest. What is the basis in the verses in the Torah for each of the approaches? A braita is brought regarding which sacrifice atones for the sins of the kohanim. Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the braita's author is Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Yehuda.

Today's daf is dedicated to the release of Idan Alexander after 584 days in captivity. Wishing him a refuah shleima and praying for the safe release of the rest of the hostages.  According to Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether or not animals left over from the previous year that were designated for the Tamid sacrifice can be redeemed without a blemish. The Gemara tries to find a source for Rabbi Yochanan's understanding that the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon, but they are not successful. According to Rabbi Shimon, they cannot - so what does one do with them? If they were designated for communal burnt offerings, they would sacrifice them as voluntary communal offerings on the altar meant to keep the altar busy at all times. If they were designated for communal sin offerings, they could not be used directly as voluntary burnt offerings so they would wait until they were blemished, redeem them, and buy animals with the money to be sacrificed as voluntary burnt offerings. There is a concern that if this were to be permitted, one may think that one can change the destination even at an earlier stage (before the atonement for that sacrifice is achieved.  The rabbis bring three tannaitic sources to support this. Another braita is brought to support the explanation that the extra animals designated for the Tamid sacrifice are used for voluntary burnt offerings. Can one purchase birds for the burnt offerings used to fill the altar? Shmuel also held like Rabbi Yochanan that according to Rabbi Shimon, the extra animals could be used as voluntary burnt offerings. What is the source for the fact that the goat offering brought inside on Yom Kippur atones also for intentional sins of impurity in the Temple?    

Study Guide Shevuot 11 Today's daf is sponsored by the Pittsburgh daf yomi group for a refuah shleima for Rabbi Amy Bardack, haRav Ahuva bat Liba who is having surgery today. "Wishing our organizer and leader a speedy recovery." In support of Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that leftover animals designated for communal offerings can be redeemed at the end of the year, Raba brings an example of incense which has inherent sanctity and can be redeemed at the end of the year. Rav Chisda disagrees with Raba as he holds that incense does not have inherent sanctity until a later stage when it is brought into a sanctified vessel just before being offered on the altar. Raba proves his position that it has inherent sanctity.  The Gemara then returns to Rav Chisda's original question of how can one redeem items with inherent sanctity. Raba answers that the court stipulates at the beginning of the year that any animals not needed will be only sanctified for their value. Abaye raises a difficulty from other communal offerings that cannot be redeemed if lost and replaced and then found. However, Raba answers that the stipulation is for typical, not atypical cases. Why, then, can the red heifer be redeemed in certain circumstances? The Gemara concludes that a stipulation is made because of its high value.  Abaye raises a further difficulty from our Mishna, as Rabbi Shimon answers a question about whether animals designated for one sacrifice that are leftover can be used for another with a particular answer instead of answering that the court stipulated such, as Raba would have said. Raba answers that Rabbi Shimon doesn't agree with the rabbis that the court can stipulate. Rabbi Yochanan and Raba's approach is based only on the rabbis' position.   

Study Guide Shevuot 10 This week's learning is sponsored by Moshe Silver in loving memory of Rebbitzen Miriam Maxine Elkins who passed away on Yom haAtzmaut. "Her love of Torah, the Jewish people, and the land and State of Israel was unsurpassed. Her loving family - Rabbi Dov Pearetz Elkins and her children - bear the lasting imprint of the passion she brought to everything she did, as do all of us who loved her." This week's learning is sponsored by Vicky Harari in loving memory of her father Abraham Eckstein. "He had a smile that could light up the room. He taught me what I know about love. As a Holocaust survivor, he taught me gratitude and resilience something that I have been relying on more today than ever." The Gemara continues to extrapolate verses to explain the basis of the opinions of Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Shimon in the Mishna regarding which sacrifices do each of the communal sin offerings atone for. Ulla explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that the extra sheep left at the end of the year that were designated for the Tamid (daily) sacrifice, but were not needed, are redeemed and repurchased with money from that next year's funds. When Raba explained this halakha, Rav Chisda raised a difficulty - how can an item that is sanctified with kedushat haguf  be redeemed? Raba responds by bringing an example from the incense, which is sanctified and can be redeemed. However, this is rejected as the sanctity of the incense is kedushat damim, its value is sanctified, not kedushat haguf.

Study Guide Shevuot 9 Today's daf is sponsored by Leya Landau in loving memory of her mother Ita bat Zvi on her 3rd yahrzeit. "She loved learning and encouraged me to start learning the daf." Today's daf is sponsored by Naama Tal in loving memory of her grandmother Devorah Cohen, who always valued learning.  The Gemara analyzes the different opinions brought in the Mishna regarding the purposes of the goat sin offerings brought on the outer altar on Yom Kippur and on the regalim and Rosh Chodesh. What is the basis for each opinion?

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of my uncle, Richard Cohen, Naftali ben Yosef haKohen v'Henna who passed away this week. He was a man who loved and appreciated by every person and was loved and appreciated by everyone who met him. The goat sin offering whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh kodashim on Yom Kippur atones for sins for one who knew they were impure, then forgot and went into the Temple or ate sacrificial items while impure and did not yet remember that they are impure. A braita explains from where this is derived. The different parts of the braita are analyzed. First, the braita suggested that perhaps it atones for the three most grievous sins - idolatry, murder and licentious behavior. The Gemara explains this suggestion - in what manner of performing these transgressions would one have thought this sacrifice could atone for? The first opinion in the braita, Rabbi Yehuda, is that entering the Temple/eating sacrificial items while impure is uniquely distinguished and therefore it is clear that is the one being atoned for by this special offering. The Gemara explains what the braita meant by 'uniquely distinguished' - as it has a sliding scale offering. Several other sacrifices are also uniquely distinguished, such as idol worship as one can only bring a sin offering of a female goat, a woman after childbirth, a leper, and a nazir who became impure who also can bring a sliding scale offering. Why are these not considered 'uniquely distinguished'? Rabbi Shimon derives this from the verse itself describing the offering, as it says "It atones for sanctified items from impurities." Why didn't Rabbi Yehuda accept that understanding - how does he understand the verse? Why doesn't this offering atone for all sins relating to impurity? Why is it only for a person who knew at first they were impure, then forgot, and does not have awareness of the sin? The braita explains that this atones for something not atoned by a sacrifice of an individual, as can be derived from the verse. What is being excluded by this derivation that isn't already obvious? Another derivation in the braita teaches why it specifically atones for a sin that can eventually be atoned for by an individual sin offering (when the person will realize that a sin was committed, and not for one where the person did not know before entering the Temple that one was impure, as that type can never be obligated to bring an individual offering. Why does this case need excluding, if it is already known that the latter is atoned for by the sin offering whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar on Yom Kippur? If the offering does not completely atone for the sin, but simply provides atonement until such time that the sinner realizes their sin and brings an individual offering, what is the purpose of the temporary atonement? Rabbi Zeira and Rava each offer a suggested answer - either to atone for the sin in case the sinner dies before realizing their sin or to protect from suffering. If the type of sin atoned for by the outer sin offering is derived from the inner sin offering, why can't the inner one atone for both types of sins? Or why can't the outer one atone for both?  

From where is it derived that the verses that obligate one to bring a sliding scale sin offering if one is impure refer to one who entered the Temple or ate sacrificial items? Four different answers are brought and analyzed. Some are rejected. From where is it derived that the sin offering of Yom Kippur offered inside is to atone for one who entered the Temple impure or ate sacrificial items when they knew at first they were impure, then forgot and then didn't remember?