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Rabbi Yochanan explains that a "medium-sized cubit" consists of six handbreadths. This terminology implies the existence of a larger cubit. A Mishna in Middot (1:3) is brought to explain that there were two measuring sticks kept in a room at the entrance to the Temple Mount (where a depiction of Shushan the capital was displayed). Both were larger than the medium cubit used by Moshe for the Tabernacle: one was a fingerbreadth longer, and the other was two fingerbreadths longer. The purpose of this was to prevent craftsmen from accidentally misusing consecrated property (Me'ilah). Since they received payment based on exact measurements, if they had erred and made an item slightly too small, they would have personally benefited from the Temple treasury. The shorter one was used for gold and silver, and the longer one for other materials. The verses in Vayikra (24:5-6) describe exactly how many loaves of showbread there were, how many arrangements were on the Table, and how many loaves were in each arrangement. Why were all those descriptions necessary? In what directions did the Ark, Menorah, and Table face in the room, and in which part of the room were they placed?

Study Guide The Gemara offers three suggestions for why the Shulchan, which was made of wood and covered in gold, was treated as a wooden vessel regarding the laws of impurity. After rejecting the first two possibilities, they conclude that the status is derived from a verse in Yechezkel, which describes the structure as "wood." This establishes that despite the gold plating, the table's essence is wood. Relating to the debate in the Mishna of the length and width of the Shulchan in handbreadths, there is a tannaitic debate regarding the two types of cubit measurements used in the Temple: some measuring five handbreadths and others measuring six. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree over which items followed which measurement, though both derive their positions from the same verse in Yechezkel 43:13. The verse specifically identifies four items - the yesod (base), the sovev (ledge), the keren (horns), and the Golden Altar - as using the five-handbreadth measurement. The core of their debate is whether this smaller measurement was restricted to these items or extended to all other vessels, including the Shulchan. In analyzing how these measurements were applied to the yesod and sovev, the Gemara initially assumes the five-handbreadth cubit referred to their height. When this is rejected, the Sages suggest it referred to their width. However, this second suggestion is also dismissed as the math does not align with the traditional dimensions of the Altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that a uniform rule cannot be applied across all four items. Instead, it determines that for certain components, the five-handbreadth measurement applied to the height, while for others, it applied to the width.

Diagram Unlike the showbread (lechem hapanim) and the two loaves (shtei halechem), for which there is a debate about when they are sanctified the minchat chavitin of the Kohen Gadol and regular meal offerings are sanctified the moment they are placed into a service vessel (kli sharet). From that point forward, they are considered holy and can be disqualified by factors such as being left overnight (linah) or leaving the Sanctuary. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding the dimensions of the Table (Shulchan) and the measurements of the individual loaves that made up the showbread. The Mishna explains how the loaves were arranged on the Table according to these two opinions. Rabbi Yochanan calculated the maximum height at which the Table could sanctify the bread, based on the total height of the stacked loaves according to the respective views of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raised several difficulties with his statement but ultimately resolved them. Following this discussion, a dispute arose regarding the frame (misgeret) of the Table—whether it was fixed above the tabletop or beneath it. From there, Rabbi Yochanan linked these different opinions to a question regarding the ritual impurity of a "reversible table" (tavla hamit'pachet). What is clear from his words is that the Table was susceptible to ritual impurity. However, if it was a wooden vessel, a "wooden vessel made to rest in a fixed place" (kli etz ha'asui lenachat) should not be susceptible to impurity. The Gemara resolves this by Reish Lakish's explanation that the Table was moved and lifted to be shown to the festival pilgrims, thus categorizing it as a mobile vessel.

Study Guide Did the lechem hapanim become disqualified in the desert whenever the Tabernacle was dismantled for travel? Furthermore, does this status depend on whether the bread remained on the Table (Shulchan) or had already been removed? There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, which the Gemara interprets in three ways. In the final explanation, Ravin explains that there is actually no disagreement; rather, each Sage was referring to a different scenario - one discussed bread still on the Table, while the other addressed bread that had been removed. The Mishna presents a three-way Tannaitic debate regarding the preparation of the loaves: Can the kneading, shaping, and baking be performed outside the Temple courtyard, or must they occur within? Additionally, could these tasks be performed on Shabbat? This debate centers on the moment the loaves become sanctified. The three positions - held by the Tana Kamma, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon - differ on the catalyst for sanctification: When the flour is first placed into a sacred vessel. When the bread is baked in the oven. When the loaves are formally arranged on the Table. A challenge is raised against the Tanna Kamma's position that remains unresolved. Rabbi Abbahu attempts to derive the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon from a verse, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara explains that their positions are rooted in the specific traditions they each received.

Pictures The Mishna compares the details regarding the laws of semicha (leaning) and tenufa (waving). Semicha has a stringency in that all owners of the sacrifice are obligated to perform it, while the same does not hold true for tenufa. However, waving applies to both individual and communal sacrifices, to animals that are both alive and slaughtered, and to both animals and non-living items, such as breads. These do not apply to semicha, which is only performed on live animals and primarily for individual sacrifices. The Gemara brings a scriptural source for the ruling that semicha is obligatory for all owners of the sacrifice, while only one person performs tenufa on behalf of the others. A difficulty is raised against the fact that semicha is limited only to live animals based on a Mishna in Tamid 33b, which describes a process of semicha performed by a Kohen Gadol on a slaughtered animal. However, Abaye explains that this specific semicha is performed merely out of respect for the Kohen Gadol and is not a formal requirement of the sacrificial service. The loaves of the lechem hapanim (showbread) and the loaves of the shtei halechem (two loaves) were kneaded separately. The shtei halechem were baked separately, while the lechem hapanim - twelve in total - were baked two at a time. The Gemara brings the scriptural source for these details. What shape were the lechem hapanim? Rabbi Chanina and Rabbi Yochanan each describe a different shape: either like an "open box" or like a "rocking boat." The Gemara analyzes these different opinions based on other known details regarding the various components of the table (shulchan) upon which the bread sat.

Study Guide There is a Tannaitic debate regarding whether an heir performs semicha (the laying of hands) on an inherited sacrifice and whether they are subject to the laws of temura (substitution) for such an animal. The Gemara provides scriptural sources for each of these positions. The Mishna specifies who is exempt from the requirement of semicha and the Gemara brings the reason/derivation for each exemption. Although semicha is a significant element of the sacrificial service, it is not indispensable; atonement is achieved even if the ritual is omitted. The Mishna details the location and manner in which semicha must be performed, and the Gemara cites the biblical sources for those details.

There is a tradition that there are two communal offerings that require semicha. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which two they are. They both agree that the communal bull offering (brought for an unintentional sin of the congregation) requires semicha by the elders, but they disagree about the identity of the second one. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is the scapegoat on Yom Kippur, noting that according to the verse in the Torah, the Kohen Gadol performs semicha on it. Rabbi Shimon disagrees because he holds that semicha must be performed by the owner, and he argues the Kohen Gadol is not the owner of that sacrifice; the scapegoat atones only for the sins of the Israelites, while the kohanim receive their atonement from the confession of the Kohen Gadol on his own bull offering. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon's position, holding instead that the scapegoat atones for the sins of the kohanim as well, which makes the Kohen Gadol an owner of that sacrifice. Rabbi Shimon includes the communal goat offering for idolatry as the second sacrifice requiring semicha, deriving this from the word "goat" written in the context of the semicha of the nasi's (leader's) sin offering (Vayikra 4:24); the extra word implies that another goat - the communal one - is included in the requirement. Rabbi Yehuda, however, uses the verse in Vayikra 4:15, which specifies "the bull," to exclude the goat and limit the requirement to the bull alone. The Gemara questions why each sage needs a specific verse to prove his opinion when they could have simply relied on the established tradition that only two communal offerings require semicha. All individual offerings require semicha, with the exception of the firstborn animal, animal tithes, and the Pesach offering. The exclusion of these three is derived from the verse regarding peace offerings, "his offering," which implies an offering that is designated as "his" by choice.

Study Guide The Gemara cites a second braita featuring five arguments against the Baytusi claim that the Omer offering must always be brought on the first Sunday following the first day of Pesach. The braita concludes by deriving from the biblical verses that both the harvesting and the counting of the Omer must take place at night, while the actual sacrifice is offered during the day. Rava reviews the nine rabbinic arguments presented against the Baytusim(compiled from both braitot) and systematically rejects the first three claims found in each. The Mishna continues by describing the process of singeing (parching) the barley grains. Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree regarding the specific stage at which this is done and the manner in which it should be performed. Any barley flour remaining after the sifting process is redeemed. The Sages and Rabbi Akiva dispute whether this redeemed flour is ultimately exempt from tithing.

The Mishna details the ceremony of the Omer harvest, a public event designed to openly reject the opinion of the Baytusim (Boethusians) who held that the date for the Omer offering was the first Sunday after the first day of Pesach. Before the Pesach holiday, messengers of the Beit Din tied the standing barley into bundles to facilitate a quick harvest. On the night following the first day of Passover, residents from surrounding towns gathered to watch as the harvester and the crowd engaged in a question-and-answer ceremony confirming three times each detail: "Has the sun set?", "With this sickle?", "In this basket?", and even "On this Shabbat," if it came out on Shabbat. The Gemara quotes from Megillat Taanit two sets of days on which one cannot fast or eulogize, as they were days where the Sages won debates against the Tzedukim (Sadducees) regarding the Tamid sacrifice (proving it cannot be offered by individuals) and against the Baytusim regarding the date for the Omer offering. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai dismisses the Baytusim claim that Moses scheduled Shavuot for Sunday just to give Israel a "long weekend," pointing out the absurdity of their logic. To solidify the law, he and other Sages offer various proofs for starting the count on the 16th of Nisan, ensuring the tradition remained rooted in the festival itself rather than a fixed day of the week.

Rabbi Shimon derives from the words "et hamincha" that many additional menachot require hagasha (bringing the offering to the altar). However, he uses three other specific exclusions from the verse to exempt certain offerings: The two loaves and showbread: Excluded from the word "m'eleh" (from these), as these are not burned on the altar. The mincha of libations: Excluded from "v'hikriva" (and he shall bring it), as these offerings accompany animal sacrifices. Voluntary offerings of kohanim and the kohen gadol's griddle cakes: Excluded from "v'higisha" (and he shall bring it near), as these are burned entirely and no portion is given to the priests. The Mishna continues by categorizing sacrifices: those that require waving (tenufa) but not hagasha, those that require both, and those that require neither. The Gemara brings the biblical sources for the various sacrifices that require waving. Notably, waving can be performed even on the east side of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara questions why this differs from hagasha, which must be performed specifically at the southwest corner of the altar. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and Rabbi Yehuda each utilize a different verse to derive the source for the waving of the bikkurim. Why was only Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov mentioned in the Mishna? Two answers are suggested. Waving is a collaborative act performed by both the kohen and the owner of the sacrifice. The Gemara identifies the source for this joint action. However, an exception exists: if the owner is a woman, waving is still required, but the woman herself does not perform the act. The Gemara derives the source for this specific exemption. Converts are freed Caananite slaves are obligated in waving, as is derived from "hamakriv," the one who offers the sacrifice.

Which types of meal offerings require hagasha – to be brought to the southwestern corner of the altar? From where do we derive which ones are including in this category? Are they derived by logical arguments or by drashot from the verses?

Study Guide The Mishna discusses the classification of the various meal offerings based on their components, examining which offerings require both oil and frankincense, which require only one of them, and which require neither. To clarify the source of these laws, the Gemara cites a braita that derives the various cases where oil, frankincense, or both are excluded from the verses concerning the Omer offering (the meal offering of the first fruits). During the analysis of the braita, the Gemara analyzes the choice of exclusions and questions why the Midrash focused specifically on the cases mentioned in the braita rather than excluding the law of the Priestly meal offering (minchat kohanim) instead. The Mishna rules that one who adds both oil and frankincense to a sinner's meal offering transgresses two negative prohibitions. However, there is a difference between adding oil and frankincense. If one adds oil, the offering is disqualified as it cannot be removed, but if one adds frankincense, it is not disqualified as it can be removed. Rav bar Rav Huna asks about frankincense that is crushed into small pieces that cannot be removed: is the offering disqualified, as it would be with oil, or is the issue with oil specifically that it is absorbed, whereas this frankincense is not absorbed into the mincha? Three attempts are brought to answer the question. After rejecting the first two, the third leads to the conclusion that it is disqualified.

The verse in Vayikra 2:12 regarding the unique case where one can bring leaven and honey to the Temple on Shavuot uses the phrase "As an offering of the first produce you can offer them." Rabbi Elazar derived that the word "them" is exclusionary. It means that only regarding the two loaves and the bikkurim the ramp of the altar is considered like the altar (as derived from the words following that phrase). Items that came from an item that was burned on the altar are forbidden to be burned on the altar, but can be brought onto the ramp. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with him and forbids even those items to be brought on the ramp. He must have a different drasha on the word "them." To explain his reading of the verse, the Gemara quotes a braita which derives from "them" that even the community cannot bring two loaves as a voluntary sacrifice. The Gemara brings a contradictory braita that seems to say that the two loaves can be brought as a voluntary offering, but this understanding is ultimately rejected. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Chisda whether the words "you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire" (Vayikra 2:11) only excludes items from which part of it was burned on the altar, or does it exclude any item that is considered a korban (offering) but was not meant to be burned on the altar, such as a bird sin offering or the oil of the leper. Rav Chisda responded that this is a tannaitic debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva. A drasha on the words "because all leaven and all honey" teaches that one is liable for offering even a small amount and even in a mixture. Rava and Abaye disagree about what is meant by a "small amount." Abaye says it is half an olive-bulk, while Rava holds it is half a handful. Their difference of opinion derives from whether they hold a handful needs to be at least the size of two olives and is it only considered a halakhically significant burning on the altar if the item burned is the size of an olive (Rava), or if the handful can be less than two olives and burning less than one olive is considered halakhically significant (Abaye). If one offered leavened dough and honey together on the altar, how many sets of lashes (if any) would one receive? Rava holds that one would receive four sets - one for leaven, one for honey, one for a mixture with leaven, and one for a mixture with honey. Abaye explains that this is a "lav shebikhlalot" - a negative prohibition including many prohibitions - and one does not receive lashes for this type of negative prohibition. Some explain Abaye to be saying that there would be no sets of lashes for this action, while others explain that one would receive lashes for the leaven and the honey but not for the mixture.

Rabbi Ami rules that one is liable for placing a leavening agent onto a meal offering dough and leaving it to leaven on its own, just as one is liable on Shabbat for an act of cooking in the same manner. The Gemara questions this, noting Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that on Shabbat, one who places meat on coals is generally only liable if they actively turn the meat. Rava explains that Rabbi Ami's comparison means one is liable for the result even without active intervention, provided the leavening reaches a certain minimum level. The Gemara delves into Rabbi Yochanan's statement regarding turning the meat and establishes the case as one where the meat would not cook on both sides to the minimum level of ben Drosai (1/3 cooked) if not turned. Rava adds that if a portion the size of a fig-bulk were cooked fully on one side, in one place, one would be liable. A Mishna regarding building on Shabbat is brought as a difficulty for Rava's statement, but the challenge is ultimately rejected. Some have a version where Rava said that even if not in one place, and the Mishna is brought to support, but the support is rejected. A braita derives from Vayikra 2:11 that the leavening prohibition applies to the entire mincha, not just the kometz burned on the altar. However, it also derives that this applies only to a valid offering, not a disqualified one. This leads to two unresolved inquiries. Rav Papa asks: if one leavened a dough, took it outside the Temple courtyard, and then leavened it further, is there liability for the second stage? Or, is removing it not considered a disqualification since it was already leavened and invalid? Rav Meri asks if one is liable for leavening an offering already on top of the altar, or if the act of "bringing" is considered complete at that point. The Gemara discusses which additional offerings are included in the prohibition. According to a corrected version, Rabbi Yosi haGelili includes the showbread, while Rabbi Akiva includes the mincha libation accompanying sacrifices. This dispute hinges on whether dry-measure vessels possess the inherent sanctity to disqualify an offering if it leavens within them. This is linked to a debate between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan regarding the sanctification of liquid versus dry-measure vessels in the Temple. The Torah prohibits offering leaven or honey as a fire-offering, and Vayikra 2:11 further teaches that leftovers of various offerings cannot be offered on the altar if a portion has already been burned. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree on whether one is liable for offering these prohibited substances on the ramp (kevesh) of the altar.

The word "oto" (it) in the verse describing the sin offering of the Nasi, "and he slaughters it in the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered" (Vayikra 4:24), is seemingly redundant. The Gemara offers four possible suggestions for what this word is intended to teach. The first suggestion is that the word excludes a different goat sin offering from the requirement of being slaughtered in the north - specifically, the goat offerings brought by the tribal leaders during the consecration of the Tabernacle. This is rejected because there is no logical reason to assume those goats would have required slaughter in the north, making an exclusionary verse unnecessary. The second suggestion is that the word teaches that while the animal must be in the north during slaughter, the slaughterer does not. However, this is initially rejected because Rabbi Achiya derives this law from a different source. The third suggestion is that only animals require slaughter in the north, excluding bird offerings. This is also rejected because birds do not require a knife for their preparation; since their procedure is entirely different, there is no reason to think they would have been subject to the northern requirement. The final suggestion is that the Pesach offering does not need to be performed in the north. This is rejected because one would not logically derive rules for lower-level sanctity offerings, such as the Pesach, from higher-level sanctity offerings that require the north. In conclusion, the Gemara returns to the second answer and explains Rabbi Achiya's source differently. Regarding leavening, one is obligated if one continues any part of the leavening process of a meal offering, even if the dough had already leavened. An example of this is baking a dough that was already leavened during the kneading stage. Rav Papa adds that a person who bakes such dough is liable for two sets of lashes because the act of baking also serves as the final stage of shaping the dough. Although a difficulty is raised from a braita, the Gemara provides a resolution. For the sake of comparison, a braita is brought regarding a firstborn animal that has a blood-related ailment requiring bloodletting. Since this animal is already considered blemished, the question arises whether it is permitted to inflict a further blemish during the procedure. Rabbi Meir, the rabbis, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yehuda each hold different positions on this issue. The Gemara focuses specifically on the first two opinions regarding whether this is legally defined as inflicting a blemish on an already blemished animal. This topic is compared to the obligation for continuing the leavening process through a new action or to the prohibition of castrating an animal that is already castrated. In those instances, there is no debate because the biblical verses indicate liability for each individual action. However, regarding a blemished animal, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis each derive their opinions from different words in the verse, leading them to their respective conclusions.

There is a debate regarding whether apple juice can be used to leaven the dough for the two mincha offerings that are required to be chametz. In Mishna Terumot 10:2, it is explained that apples of teruma that leaven a dough are significant and cannot be nullified; this is because leavening is considered a transformative action that fundamentally alters the dough. While it may initially appear that the Mishna supports the position that apple juice is a valid leavening agent for these offerings, the text can also be reconciled with the opposing view. One can distinguish between different levels of leavening, suggesting that the "leavening" mentioned in the Mishna may be chametz nukshe, which does not satisfy the specific leavening requirements for the mincha offerings. Rabbi Ila and Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi debate whether the mincha of a sinner, which is offered without oil, may contain water. Initially, the Gemara assumes the root of this debate is whether we determine the measurement of an item that has changed form based on its original state or its current state. If we follow the current size, water may be added because the kometz (handful) is measured based on the substance in its present form. However, if it must be measured by its original size, adding water would mean the handful no longer contains the required amount of flour, as the volume has been altered by the liquid. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects this explanation and concludes that both sages agree items are measured by their current state; their actual debate concerns how to interpret the requirement for a sinner's mincha to be "dry"—whether this means it must be completely dry of all liquid, or merely dry of oil. The Gemara continues to delve into whether the halakhic measurements of items that have changed in size are determined by their present state or their original state. A Mishna in Uktzin 2:8 is cited regarding the laws of ritual impurity (tumah) for a piece of meat that has shrunk to less than the size of an egg (kebeitzah)—the minimum volume required to transmit impurity. Two groups of sages disagree over the correct version of this Mishna: one asserting that we assess the item based on its original size, and the other maintaining we assess it by its current size. The Gemara raises a difficulty against the opinion that items are measured by their original size; specifically, in a case where meat expanded to exceed the size of an egg, it is ruled to transmit impurity. This challenge is resolved by explaining that the law in that specific source is Rabbinic in nature, rather than a Torah law. A second difficulty is raised from a braita discussing the opposite case: if meat shrinks below the required volume, it no longer transmits impurity. However, Raba rejects this proof, explaining that all would agree an item cannot transmit impurity if its current state is too small. He clarifies that the sages were only stringent in cases where an item was originally too small but later expanded to the requisite volume. The true point of disagreement, according to Raba, is a case where the item originally met the requirement, shrunk, and then expanded again. The question is whether the item was "rejected" (nidcheh) during its middle stage - thereby losing its ability to transfer impurity permanently - or if it regains its ability to transmit impurity upon re-expanding. A difficulty is then raised against the position that it remains pure even after re-expanding. A challenge from Tosefta Terumot 4:2 is brought against Raba's premise that everyone agrees a shrunken item is measured by its current state. This challenge involves the laws of separating tithes from fresh figs for dried ones; however, the difficulty is ultimately resolved by explaining that the case does not concern standard tithes, but rather terumat ma'aser (the tithe of the tithe). Unlike regular ma'aser, terumat ma'aser does not require an exact measurement, and it is considered preferable to err on the side of generosity by giving more to the Kohen.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether the communal sin offering is paid for by the Temple treasury or if there is a new dedicated collection from the people. Two different versions are brought regarding who held which position, and the Gemara assumes that they switched their positions at some point and concludes that Rabbi Shimon holds it is paid for by the Temple treasury, and Rabbi Yehuda by a new collection. Rabbi Yochanan asked about the situation described in the Mishna that the kohen gadol died and there is no one yet appointed and a full issaron is brought. Is this brought twice daily in both the morning and afternoon, or only once a day? Rava brings a proof that it is brought twice daily, which is mentioned to Rabbi Yirmia, and he scoffs at it, insulting Rava as a "Bavlai tipshai" (stupid Babylonian). Rava then brings a different proof from a verse in the Torah that calls it tamid, comparing it to the tamid sacrifice which is brought twice daily. The Gemara concludes that Rava is correct, as can be seen from a braita that says so explicitly. In a regular case where a kohen gadol brings one issaron and divides it between the morning and afternoon, there is a debate between Abba Yosi ben Dostai and the rabbis about whether two handfuls of frankincense are brought or only one. Rabbi Yochanan asks whether the frankincense would be doubled according to the rabbis in a case when the community or heirs bring it (if the kohen gadol had died) and whether the oil would be doubled according to both opinions. A braita is brought from which they understand that neither is doubled, according to both opinions. Most mincha offerings are matza, other than the special sacrifice brought on Shavuot and ten of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering which are chametz. How was the leavening agent measured in the measuring of the flour for the offering?

A debate exists between a braita and Rav regarding communal peace offerings brought on Shavuot for the sake of rams instead of sheep; the braita deems the sacrifice ineffective, while Rav holds it is. Rav Chisda and Raba disagree on the specific nature of this case. Their dispute centers on whether the laws of "intent for the wrong sacrifice" apply when a kohen mistakenly misidentifies the animal's original purpose. Two objections, one from Mishna Gittin 54a and one from a braita, are raised against Raba's position that a sacrifice offered for the wrong purpose by mistake remains valid. In both instances, the Gemara resolves the objections. The Mishna explains that the daily tamid and the special mussaf sacrifices of Shabbat and festivals do not preclude one another. However, the precise meaning of the Mishna is initially unclear. The Gemara introduces a question posed by Rabbi Chiya bar Avin to Rav Chisda: if only one animal is available, should it be used for today's mussaf or saved for tomorrow's tamid? Initially, our Mishna is cited to prove that there is no specific preference between the two, but this proof is rejected as inconclusive. A different source is brought to resolve the question, but it is also dismissed, as the Gemara determines it refers to a case irrelevant to the current discussion.