Podcasts about rabbi elazar

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Best podcasts about rabbi elazar

Latest podcast episodes about rabbi elazar

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Zevachim 20 - Shabbat October 4, 12 Tishrei

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 3, 2025 38:08


Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Zevachim 14 - September 28, 6 Tishrei

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 28, 2025 47:08


In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English
Zevachim 14 - September 28, 6 Tishrei

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 28, 2025 47:08


In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Zevachim 12 - September 26, 4 Tishrei

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 26, 2025 46:44


Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English
Zevachim 12 - September 26, 4 Tishrei

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 26, 2025 46:44


Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Zevachim 11 - September 25, 3 Tishrei

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 25, 2025 52:43


Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English
Zevachim 11 - September 25, 3 Tishrei

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 25, 2025 52:43


Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Zevachim 5 - September 19, 26 Elul

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 19, 2025 47:56


Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering (lo lishma). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner's obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all? Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs. Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish’s view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer’s position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well. Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma. Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: “And he slaughtered it as a sin offering” (Vayikra 4:33). From the word “it,” we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma. The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner's obligation. Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v’chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone (“And he slaughtered it as a sin offering”). Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn’t Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn’t Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother’s burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?  

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Zevachim 6 - Shabbat September 20, 27 Elul

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 19, 2025 38:18


Continuing the discussion surrounding Reish Lakish’s response to Rabbi Elazar, the Gemara examines whether heirs acquire the sacrificial offering of someone who dies. Various sources are presented supporting both sides of the debate. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the heirs do not acquire the offering, though they may receive a limited degree of atonement through it. Another question arises regarding a sacrifice brought lo lishma, with intent for a different type of offering. If the original sacrifice is still offered, does it fulfill its intended purpose? If not, why is it brought at all? And if it does, why is a second offering required? Rav Ashi clarifies that the first offering is brought due to the power of its original designation, while the second is needed to achieve full atonement. The Gemara also explores whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments that were neglected between the time the animal was designated and the time it was slaughtered, or only for those neglected before its designation. Sources are cited in an attempt to resolve this question.  

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English
Zevachim 6 - Shabbat September 20, 27 Elul

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 19, 2025 38:18


Continuing the discussion surrounding Reish Lakish’s response to Rabbi Elazar, the Gemara examines whether heirs acquire the sacrificial offering of someone who dies. Various sources are presented supporting both sides of the debate. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the heirs do not acquire the offering, though they may receive a limited degree of atonement through it. Another question arises regarding a sacrifice brought lo lishma, with intent for a different type of offering. If the original sacrifice is still offered, does it fulfill its intended purpose? If not, why is it brought at all? And if it does, why is a second offering required? Rav Ashi clarifies that the first offering is brought due to the power of its original designation, while the second is needed to achieve full atonement. The Gemara also explores whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments that were neglected between the time the animal was designated and the time it was slaughtered, or only for those neglected before its designation. Sources are cited in an attempt to resolve this question.  

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering (lo lishma). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner's obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all? Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs. Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish’s view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer’s position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well. Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma. Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: “And he slaughtered it as a sin offering” (Vayikra 4:33). From the word “it,” we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma. The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner's obligation. Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v’chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone (“And he slaughtered it as a sin offering”). Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn’t Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn’t Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother’s burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?  

Daily Halacha Podcast - Daily Halacha By Rabbi Eli J. Mansour
Which Subjects May Not be Studied Before the Recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah?

Daily Halacha Podcast - Daily Halacha By Rabbi Eli J. Mansour

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 15, 2025


Before one learns Torah in the morning, he must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. The Gemara cites different opinions as to which particular subjects within the broad corpus of Torah may not be studied before the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. Rav Huna maintained that only the study of Tanach requires Birkot Ha'Torah; in his view, one may study anything else before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. Rabbi Elazar ruled that both Tanach and Midrash require Birkot Ha'Torah, because the Midrash explains the verses of the Tanach. The next opinion brought is that of Rabbi Yohanan, who held that even the study of Mishna must be preceded by Birkot Ha'Torah. However, Halacha follows the final view brought by the Gemara – that of Raba, who asserted that even Gemara requires Birkot Ha'Torah. Accordingly, the Rambam and Shulhan Aruch write that one must recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying either Tanach or any part of Torah She'be'al Peh (the oral law). Although the Shulhan Aruch does not specify the study of Midrash, the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles of Cracow, 1520-1572) adds that Midrash also requires the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. The Peri Hadash (Rav Hizkiya Da Silva, 1659-1698) writes that the Shulhan Aruch does not disagree with the Rama on this point, even though he did not specifically mention Midrash. The Aruch Ha'shulhan (Rav Yehiel Michel Epstein of Nevardok, 1829-1908) notes the possibility of restricting this requirement to areas related to Halacha. It is possible, he writes, that Birkot Ha'Torah is required only before the study of texts that form the basis of Halacha. The Sages infer Halachot from the verses, and these inferences and their applications are discussed, elucidated and debated in the Midrash, Mishna and Gemara – and it might be for this reason that these texts are specified as the material requiring Birkot Ha'Torah. If so, then one would be permitted to study non-halachic portions of the Torah – such as the stories in Midrashic texts, Aggadic portions of the Gemara, and Zohar – before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. The Aruch Ha'shulhan remains uncertain about this matter. By contrast, the Kaf Ha'haim Sofer (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939) writes that the study of the Zohar requires Birkot Ha'Torah. He does not explain the reason for this ruling, but we may presume that he equated the study of Zohar with the study of Gemara, and, moreover, we occasionally determine practical Halacha based on teachings in the Zohar. The final Halacha is that even the study of non-halachic texts such as the Midrash and Zohar requires Birkot Ha'Torah. The study of works of Mussar also requires Birkot Ha'Torah, because these works are based upon Torah sources. Texts such as Mesilat Yesharim and Michtab Me'Eliyahu, which guide and instruct how to live a religious life, are rooted entirely in Torah, and so they certainly qualify as parts of Torah requiring the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. This applies to works of Hassidic teachings, as well. In principle, biographies of Sadikim, or story books that tell about the lives of great Sages, may be read before Birkot Ha'Torah, because reading these stories – despite being very valuable – does not qualify as the study of Torah. In practice, however, books about great Rabbis almost invariably contain Torah insights which they taught, and so they require Birkot Ha'Torah. One is not required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying general subjects, even those subjects which have great value and are important to learn. For example, one must study math in order to properly understand certain sections of the Gemara, such as those which deal with geometry (e.g. Sukka, Erubin and Kil'ayim). There are texts which address the dimensions and layout of the Bet Ha'mikdash which similarly cannot be understood without a background in mathematics. Scientific knowledge, too, is critically important for the understanding of certain sections of the Talmud – such as the Gemara's discussion about the volume of wine which a Nazir must drink to be liable for violating his vow, which touches upon the subject of volume displacement. This issue requires an understanding of how displacement works, and how the density of wine becomes a factor. One cannot understand the portions of the Talmud that deal with the Jewish calendar without basic knowledge of astronomy. An understanding of modern technology, too, is necessary for learning how Halacha applies in our time, and indeed, Hacham Ovadia Yosef studied the mechanics of boilers in order to determine the relevant Halachot. Nevertheless, the study of these subjects does not require Birkot Ha'Torah, since they are not actual Torah, but rather background information to help in the study of Torah. The Rambam writes that subjects such as mathematics and science are the "chefs" and "maidservants" of Torah, meaning, they are necessary for the understanding of Torah, but are not part of Torah. Therefore, one is not required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying general subjects. Summary: One may not learn any Torah subject before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. This includes Tanach, Midrash, Mishna, Gemara, Halachic texts, Zohar, Mussar and Hassidut. Biographies of Sadikim, too, require Birkot Ha'Torah since they usually incorporate Torah insights by the Sages whose lives and legacy they present. Birkot Ha'Torah is not required before the study of non-Torah subjects, even those which are necessary to learn to properly understand Torah.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Horayot 4 - September 5, 12 Elul

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 5, 2025 47:59


This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans.  The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering.  There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.    

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans.  The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering.  There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.    

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Horayot 3 - September 4, 11 Elul

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 4, 2025 51:15


Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that the exemption discussed in the Mishna—for an individual who follows an erroneous ruling of the court—is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. However, the other rabbis disagree and require the individual to bring a sin offering. In contrast, Rav Nachman, also quoting Shmuel, asserts that the Mishna reflects Rabbi Meir’s view, with the rabbis again dissenting. This dispute between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis appears in a braita, though it is unclear whether the braita is actually addressing this specific issue. Rav Papa offers an alternative interpretation of the braita, followed by three additional suggestions. Rav Asi maintains that the majority required for a communal sin offering refers specifically to the majority of Jews living in Israel, as supported by a verse in Melachim I (8:65). A question arises: if the people sinned while constituting a majority, but by the time the offering is to be brought, they are no longer the majority (e.g., due to death), are they still obligated to bring the offering? The Gemara links this to a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding a king who sinned before ascending the throne and only later realized his error once he had become king. The rabbis hold that he must bring an individual sin offering, since obligation is determined at the time of the sin. Rabbi Shimon, however, argues that both the sin and its realization must occur while the individual is in the same status—thus exempting the king entirely. The Gemara then explores whether this principle can be applied to a case where the people sinned as a minority and later became a majority. It concludes that the comparison is invalid, since Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning hinges on the sin and realization occurring during the same period of obligation, which does not apply in this scenario. A series of unresolved questions is posed regarding whether two distinct teaching errors could combine to obligate the community in a communal sin offering. None of these questions receives definitive answers. Rabbi Yonatan holds that a communal offering is only warranted if the court’s ruling was unanimous. However, after three challenges are raised against his position, the final one leads to its rejection. Ultimately, all judges—and even students present during deliberation—share responsibility for the verdict. As a result, rabbis would often invite others to participate in the judgment process, thereby distributing the responsibility more broadly. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? Rabbi Shimon does not obligate in a sacrifice, but Rabbi Elazar requires an asham talui, a provisional guilt offering. However, their debate only applies in cases where the person was in the city. If they were out of town, all agree that there is an exemption, as they had no way to know about the corrected ruling. A communal sin offering is relevant for erroneous rulings regarding details of a Torah law, but not if they rule to uproot a Torah law completely. Rav explains Rabbi Shimon’s position and the Gemara raises a difficulty to Rav from a braita, but resolves it.      

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that the exemption discussed in the Mishna—for an individual who follows an erroneous ruling of the court—is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. However, the other rabbis disagree and require the individual to bring a sin offering. In contrast, Rav Nachman, also quoting Shmuel, asserts that the Mishna reflects Rabbi Meir’s view, with the rabbis again dissenting. This dispute between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis appears in a braita, though it is unclear whether the braita is actually addressing this specific issue. Rav Papa offers an alternative interpretation of the braita, followed by three additional suggestions. Rav Asi maintains that the majority required for a communal sin offering refers specifically to the majority of Jews living in Israel, as supported by a verse in Melachim I (8:65). A question arises: if the people sinned while constituting a majority, but by the time the offering is to be brought, they are no longer the majority (e.g., due to death), are they still obligated to bring the offering? The Gemara links this to a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding a king who sinned before ascending the throne and only later realized his error once he had become king. The rabbis hold that he must bring an individual sin offering, since obligation is determined at the time of the sin. Rabbi Shimon, however, argues that both the sin and its realization must occur while the individual is in the same status—thus exempting the king entirely. The Gemara then explores whether this principle can be applied to a case where the people sinned as a minority and later became a majority. It concludes that the comparison is invalid, since Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning hinges on the sin and realization occurring during the same period of obligation, which does not apply in this scenario. A series of unresolved questions is posed regarding whether two distinct teaching errors could combine to obligate the community in a communal sin offering. None of these questions receives definitive answers. Rabbi Yonatan holds that a communal offering is only warranted if the court’s ruling was unanimous. However, after three challenges are raised against his position, the final one leads to its rejection. Ultimately, all judges—and even students present during deliberation—share responsibility for the verdict. As a result, rabbis would often invite others to participate in the judgment process, thereby distributing the responsibility more broadly. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? Rabbi Shimon does not obligate in a sacrifice, but Rabbi Elazar requires an asham talui, a provisional guilt offering. However, their debate only applies in cases where the person was in the city. If they were out of town, all agree that there is an exemption, as they had no way to know about the corrected ruling. A communal sin offering is relevant for erroneous rulings regarding details of a Torah law, but not if they rule to uproot a Torah law completely. Rav explains Rabbi Shimon’s position and the Gemara raises a difficulty to Rav from a braita, but resolves it.      

Power Up!
The Secret Ingredient to a Life Well Lived

Power Up!

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 18, 2025 24:04


What is the single most important quality a person can hold onto in life? In this episode, we dive into the Mishnah in Pirkei Avot where Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai asks his students: What is the best path a person should cling to? Each student suggests something different—generosity, friendship, foresight, kindness—but Rabbi Elazar says: a good heart.Why did Rabbi Yochanan declare this the most valuable path of all? What does it mean to truly have a “good heart”—and how does that shape the way we see others, ourselves, and even God?Join us as we explore:The different answers the students gave and why each mattersWhy a good heart includes all the other qualitiesThis Mishnah invites us to reframe success—not by what we achieve or acquire, but by the quality of our inner world and how it radiates outward.

The Daily Sicha - השיחה היומית
יום ד' פ' ואתחנן, י"ב מנחם-אב, ה'תשפ"ה

The Daily Sicha - השיחה היומית

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 6, 2025 11:30


התוכן איתא בסיום מס' מכות: "כבר הי' ר"ג וראב"ע ור"י ור"ע מהלכין בדרך .. כיון שהגיעו להר הבית ראו שועל שיצא מבית קדשי הקדשים התחילו הן בוכין ור"ע מצחק .. אמרו לו מקום שכתוב בו והזר הקרב יומת ועכשו שועלים הלכו בו ולא נבכה, אמר להן לכך אני מצחק דכתיב ואעידה לי עדים נאמנים את אורי' הכהן ואת זכרי' בן יברכיהו, וכי מה ענין אורי' אצל זכרי' .. אלא תלה הכתוב נבואתו של זכרי' בנבואתו של אורי', באורי' כתיב לכן בגללכם ציון שדה תחרש בזכרי' כתיב עוד ישבו זקנים וזקנות ברחובות ירושלים, עד שלא נתקיימה נבואתו של אורי' הייתי מתיירא שלא תתקיים נבואתו של זכרי', עכשיו שנתקיימה נבואתו של אורי' בידוע שנבואתו של זכרי' מתקיימת בלשון הזה. אמרו לו עקיבא ניחמתנו עקיבא ניחמתנו". ראי' זו שהביא ר"ע אינה על עצם ענין הגאולה ותחיית המתים, שה"ז מפורש בתושב"כ, אלא על אופנה: שהרי תחיית המתים כשלעצמו הי' יכול להיות באופן (רק) כמו שהי' בג"ע לפני החטא – ביטול ענין המיתה, ו(במילא) יקומו מלכתחילה בריאים וחזקים. אבל מנבואת זכרי' "עוד ישבו זקנים וזקנות ברחובות ירושלים" מוכח שאז יהי' חידוש נעלה יותר שאינו מוכרח – הענין דאתהפכא, שיקומו באופן של "זקנים וזקנות" והם יהיו חזקים עד ש"ישבו .. ברחובות ירושלים" (לא כדרך זקנים)! [המשך יבוא]ב' חלקים משיחת יו"ד שבט ה'תשכ"ה ל"הנחה פרטית" או התרגום ללה"ק של השיחה: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=06-08-2025 Synopsis The conclusion of Masechta Makkos states: “It once was that Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Akiva were walking along the road…When they arrived at the Temple Mount, they saw a fox that emerged from the site of the Holy of Holies. They began weeping, and Rabbi Akiva was laughing…They said to him: This is the place of which it is written: “And the layman who approaches shall die,” and now foxes walk in it; and shall we not weep? He said to them: That is why I am laughing, as it is written: “And I will take to Me faithful witnesses to attest: Uriah the Kohen, and Zechariah ben Yevarchiyahu.” Now, what is the connection between Uriah and Zechariah…Rather, the verse hinged the fulfillment of the prophecy of Zechariah on the fulfillment of the prophecy of Uriah. In the prophecy of Uriah it is written: “Therefore, for your sake Tzion will be plowed as a field.” In Zechariah it is written: “There will yet be elderly men and elderly women sitting in the streets of Yerushalayim.” Until the prophecy of Uriah was fulfilled, I was afraid that the prophecy of Zechariah would not be fulfilled. Now that the prophecy of Uriah was fulfilled, it is evident that the prophecy of Zechariah remains valid. They said to him: Akiva, you have comforted us; Akiva, you have comforted us.” Rabbi Akiva here is not bringing proof for the Redemption and Techias Hameisim themselves, because they are stated explicitly in the Written Torah. Rather, he is bringing proof as to the manner in which they will occur: Conceptually, Techias Hameisim could occur in a manner similar to the state of Gan Eden before the sin, meaning, the abolition of death, as a result of which the dead would be resurrected in a state of optimum strength and health. But since Zechariah's prophecy states that “There will yet be elderly men and elderly women sitting in the streets of Yerushalayim,” that proves that there will be an even greater novelty – the fact that they will arise as “elderly men and elderly women,” and yet they will become strong enough to be “sitting in the streets of Yerushalayim” like young people. (To be continued).2 excerpts from sichah of Yud Shevat 5725 For a transcript in English of the Sicha: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=06-08-2025 לע"נ מרת צבי' אדל בת ר' צבי ע"ה ליום היארצייט שלה י"ב מנחם-אב. ת.נ.צ.ב.ה.

Talking Talmud
Avodah Zarah 43: Here There Be Dragons

Talking Talmud

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 1, 2025 24:34


What is the figure of a dragon that is prohibited? One descriptor is scales between the joints, and that is determined to be the halakhah. Also, the story how Rabbi Elazar ben HaKappar found a ring on the road with the depiction of a dragon and he insisted that an adult non-Jew nullify the idolatrous status of it -- with 3 laws being learned from his behavior. Plus, the fact that the change of status of any item when it is saved from wild animals or a destructive river, or so on -- so why did he need a non-Jew to change the status, when that ring was just found on the road? It depends on the despair of the original owner, but that assumes that the finder is Jewish and not going to sell it. Also, the prohibition against depicting the celestial bodies - but Rabban Gamliel had images of the moon to help assess witnesses who come to testify about the new moon - but how could he have those images?! What about a menorah? There are concerns about replication. Likewise, the faces that are part of God's heavenly throne - how could those images be replicated? The Gemara distinguishes between worshipping (obviously prohibited) vs. depicting, which seems to have been done, and therefore flies in the face of the prohibition.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Avodah Zarah 32 - July 20, 24 Tamuz

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 20, 2025 39:07


Vinegar produced by idol worshippers from beer is prohibited if there is a concern that wine yeast may have been added during its preparation. The Hadrianic earthenware shards are prohibited for any benefit, as they were soaked in wine with the intention that the absorbed wine would later be used to produce more wine. Rav Dimi provides a description of their preparation and use. A question is raised regarding whether one may benefit from the shards when the benefit comes not from the wine but from the shard itself—such as placing them under the legs of a bed for support. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan hold differing views on this issue. A difficulty is posed from a braita that supports the permissive opinion, but it is ultimately resolved. A second, seemingly contradictory braita is introduced to challenge the first, and it too is resolved with two possible explanations. What are the necessary criteria to prohibit a hide of an animal with an incision found near the heart—specifically, when can it be assumed that such an incision was made to remove the heart as part of an idolatrous offering? The Mishna discusses the status of an animal slaughtered and handled by an idol worshipper when carried into or out of a house of idol worship. Under what circumstances is there concern that the animal is being offered as a sacrifice to an idol, thereby rendering it prohibited for Jewish benefit? Which tannaitic authorities does the Mishna align with in this context? Is it permissible to engage in business dealings with idol worshippers as they enter or exit Tarput (either a festival or house of idol worship)? How does this ruling differ from conducting business with a Jew in similar circumstances? What are the reasons for this distinction?

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English
Avodah Zarah 32 - July 20, 24 Tamuz

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 20, 2025 39:07


Vinegar produced by idol worshippers from beer is prohibited if there is a concern that wine yeast may have been added during its preparation. The Hadrianic earthenware shards are prohibited for any benefit, as they were soaked in wine with the intention that the absorbed wine would later be used to produce more wine. Rav Dimi provides a description of their preparation and use. A question is raised regarding whether one may benefit from the shards when the benefit comes not from the wine but from the shard itself—such as placing them under the legs of a bed for support. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan hold differing views on this issue. A difficulty is posed from a braita that supports the permissive opinion, but it is ultimately resolved. A second, seemingly contradictory braita is introduced to challenge the first, and it too is resolved with two possible explanations. What are the necessary criteria to prohibit a hide of an animal with an incision found near the heart—specifically, when can it be assumed that such an incision was made to remove the heart as part of an idolatrous offering? The Mishna discusses the status of an animal slaughtered and handled by an idol worshipper when carried into or out of a house of idol worship. Under what circumstances is there concern that the animal is being offered as a sacrifice to an idol, thereby rendering it prohibited for Jewish benefit? Which tannaitic authorities does the Mishna align with in this context? Is it permissible to engage in business dealings with idol worshippers as they enter or exit Tarput (either a festival or house of idol worship)? How does this ruling differ from conducting business with a Jew in similar circumstances? What are the reasons for this distinction?

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Avodah Zarah 19 - July 7, 11 Tamuz

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 7, 2025 42:58


In Tehillim 1:1, the verse begins with "ashrei ha'ish," happy is the man. According to Rabbi Yonantan, the man is Avraham, who did not associate himself with the dor haflaga, the people of Sodom and the Philistines. A similar verse in Tehillim 112:1 employs the same phrase "ashrei ish" who fears God. Why is the masculine form used and not the feminine? Two explanations are offered: happy is the person who repents when still young or happy is the person who can control one's evil inclination like a man, i.e., a warrior overcoming his enemies. The continuation of the verse is, "He delights in God's mitzvot." This is explained as one who does mitzvot for the sake of doing a mitzva and not for receiving a reward. In Tehillim 1:1-2, the verse says that instead of being with evildoers, happy is the person who desires the Torah of God. Rebbi derives from this verse that a person can only learn Torah from the parts of the Torah that one desires to study. Rava extrapolates the verse in the same way and derives other concepts about stages of learning Torah and best practices of learning Torah from these verses and others. What are the rewards received for learning Torah? The Mishna forbids building the area in the bathhouse that was built for an idol. Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that if one got paid, the money is permitted for use. How is this explained? The Mishna does not permit making jewelry for idol worship, but Rabbi Eliezer rules that one could get paid for doing that. Since one cannot sell land to gentiles in Israel, one can also not sell items that are attached to the ground, unless they are already detached. Rabbi Yehuda permits them if they are being sold to be detached after the sale.      

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

In Tehillim 1:1, the verse begins with "ashrei ha'ish," happy is the man. According to Rabbi Yonantan, the man is Avraham, who did not associate himself with the dor haflaga, the people of Sodom and the Philistines. A similar verse in Tehillim 112:1 employs the same phrase "ashrei ish" who fears God. Why is the masculine form used and not the feminine? Two explanations are offered: happy is the person who repents when still young or happy is the person who can control one's evil inclination like a man, i.e., a warrior overcoming his enemies. The continuation of the verse is, "He delights in God's mitzvot." This is explained as one who does mitzvot for the sake of doing a mitzva and not for receiving a reward. In Tehillim 1:1-2, the verse says that instead of being with evildoers, happy is the person who desires the Torah of God. Rebbi derives from this verse that a person can only learn Torah from the parts of the Torah that one desires to study. Rava extrapolates the verse in the same way and derives other concepts about stages of learning Torah and best practices of learning Torah from these verses and others. What are the rewards received for learning Torah? The Mishna forbids building the area in the bathhouse that was built for an idol. Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that if one got paid, the money is permitted for use. How is this explained? The Mishna does not permit making jewelry for idol worship, but Rabbi Eliezer rules that one could get paid for doing that. Since one cannot sell land to gentiles in Israel, one can also not sell items that are attached to the ground, unless they are already detached. Rabbi Yehuda permits them if they are being sold to be detached after the sale.      

Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection
Ep 84 - Afflictions of Love: Divine Messages in Life's Challenges (Berachos 5a)

Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 4, 2025 50:00


In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe continues the discussion from Tractate Berachot 5B, building on the previous episode's exploration of the three divine gifts given to the Jewish people through suffering: the Torah, the Land of Israel, and the World to Come. Rabbi Wolbe emphasizes that these gifts require immense effort and perseverance, using the analogy of running a marathon to illustrate that acquiring Torah, for instance, demands complete immersion and overcoming challenges, not innate talent alone. He shares stories of great sages like Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who achieved greatness through persistent struggle, not effortless brilliance. Addressing the Land of Israel, Rabbi Wolbe firmly asserts its divine allocation to the Jewish people, as promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, citing Rashi's commentary on the Torah's opening to underscore its eternal significance despite historical disputes. The episode delves into the concept of "afflictions of love," exploring Talmudic stories of sages like Rabbi Chia bar Abba, Rabbi Yochanan, and Rabbi Elazar, who faced illness but were revived through mutual support, highlighting the necessity of external help to overcome personal afflictions. A key story involves Rav Huna, who lost 400 barrels of wine to vinegar due to withholding a sharecropper's due, illustrating the principle of midah k'neged midah (measure for measure). After accepting correction, Rav Huna's loss was miraculously reversed, showing divine communication through afflictions. Rabbi Wolbe concludes by stressing that afflictions are purposeful messages from God to redirect and refine us, urging listeners to view challenges as opportunities for growth and connection to Hashem. The episode ends with a Q&A, affirming that God communicates clearly through tailored actions, encouraging introspection to understand and act on these divine messages.This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on June 27, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on July 4, 2025_____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Torah, #Resilience, #Israel, #Struggle, #DivineGifts, #Suffering, #Support_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org ★ Support this podcast ★

Thinking Talmudist Podcast · Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe
Ep 84 - Afflictions of Love: Divine Messages in Life's Challenges (Berachos 5a)

Thinking Talmudist Podcast · Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 4, 2025 50:00


In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe continues the discussion from Tractate Berachot 5B, building on the previous episode's exploration of the three divine gifts given to the Jewish people through suffering: the Torah, the Land of Israel, and the World to Come. Rabbi Wolbe emphasizes that these gifts require immense effort and perseverance, using the analogy of running a marathon to illustrate that acquiring Torah, for instance, demands complete immersion and overcoming challenges, not innate talent alone. He shares stories of great sages like Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who achieved greatness through persistent struggle, not effortless brilliance. Addressing the Land of Israel, Rabbi Wolbe firmly asserts its divine allocation to the Jewish people, as promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, citing Rashi's commentary on the Torah's opening to underscore its eternal significance despite historical disputes. The episode delves into the concept of "afflictions of love," exploring Talmudic stories of sages like Rabbi Chia bar Abba, Rabbi Yochanan, and Rabbi Elazar, who faced illness but were revived through mutual support, highlighting the necessity of external help to overcome personal afflictions. A key story involves Rav Huna, who lost 400 barrels of wine to vinegar due to withholding a sharecropper's due, illustrating the principle of midah k'neged midah (measure for measure). After accepting correction, Rav Huna's loss was miraculously reversed, showing divine communication through afflictions. Rabbi Wolbe concludes by stressing that afflictions are purposeful messages from God to redirect and refine us, urging listeners to view challenges as opportunities for growth and connection to Hashem. The episode ends with a Q&A, affirming that God communicates clearly through tailored actions, encouraging introspection to understand and act on these divine messages.This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on June 27, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on July 4, 2025_____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Torah, #Resilience, #Israel, #Struggle, #DivineGifts, #Suffering, #Support_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org ★ Support this podcast ★

Daf Yomi: Babble on Talmud
The tale of Rabbi Elazar ben Dordaya: Daf Yomi Avodah Zarah:17—Episode 2009

Daf Yomi: Babble on Talmud

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 4, 2025 41:08


Daf 17 of masechta Avodah Zarah tells several important and somewhat well known stories. The first, is the story of when Rabbi Eliezer was arrested by heretics for the capitol offense of studying the holy Torah. Wel also learn of the story of Rabbie Elazar ben Dordaya who repented at the last moment and was admitted to the world to come. The daf ends off with the story of Rabbis Chanina ben Teradyon and Elazar ben Perata, who were arrested by the Romans for studying Torah (among other offenses). Very interesting daf here on Babble on Talmud. Enjoy.Sefaria: https://www.sefaria.org/Avodah_Zarah.17a?lang=heEmail: sruli@babbleontalmud.com

Daf in-sight
Avodah Zara 17

Daf in-sight

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 4, 2025 4:36


What is the meaning of the phrase, "yesh koneh olamo b'shaa achat" regarding Rabbi Elazar ben Durdaya and the Roman executioner of Rabbi Chanina ben Tradyon?

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Shevuot 48 - June 17, 22 Sivan

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 18, 2025 49:27


Today's daf is sponsored by Rena Kurs in loving memory of Dr. Leatrice Rabinsky, on her 7th yahrzeit. "She instilled the love of learning in all of her children, grandchildren and generations of students. May her memory be for a blessing." Rav and Shmuel held that orphans cannot collect a loan of their parents from other orphans if the parent of the debtor died first, as a parent can't pass an oath on to one's children. Rabbi Elazar disagreed and permitted them to collect with an oath of orphans (that their father did not tell them that the loan was already collected). The rabbis of later generations tried to override Rav and Shmuel's opinion without success but managed to limit it in various ways. Can one do a gilgul shvua in a case where the oath is a rabbinic oath?

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Today's daf is sponsored by Rena Kurs in loving memory of Dr. Leatrice Rabinsky, on her 7th yahrzeit. "She instilled the love of learning in all of her children, grandchildren and generations of students. May her memory be for a blessing." Rav and Shmuel held that orphans cannot collect a loan of their parents from other orphans if the parent of the debtor died first, as a parent can't pass an oath on to one's children. Rabbi Elazar disagreed and permitted them to collect with an oath of orphans (that their father did not tell them that the loan was already collected). The rabbis of later generations tried to override Rav and Shmuel's opinion without success but managed to limit it in various ways. Can one do a gilgul shvua in a case where the oath is a rabbinic oath?

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Shevuot 33 - June 3, 7 Sivan

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 3, 2025 48:58


The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Makkot 23 - May 1, Iyar 3

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later May 1, 2025 45:22


Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters.  How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition. 

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters.  How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition. 

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Makkot 18 - Shabbat April 26, 28 Nisan

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 25, 2025 35:32


The braita brought on Makkot 17 with Rabbi Shimon's position is amended, as the original version was rejected. Rava ruled that a non-kohen who ate from a burnt offering before the blood was sprinkled transgressed five different transgressions. The Gemara questions why there aren't more than five transgressions, and suggests four more that could have been mentioned. They explain why each one was not in rava's list. Rav Gidel quoted a halakha in the name of Rav that a kohen that ate from a guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled would receive lashes. After raising a difficulty on this statement, they emend his words to be referring to a non-kohen andhe does not receive lashes for eating guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled.  Rabbi Elazar, and then Rabbi Yochanan are quoted as having said that placing the bikkurim is critical to the fulfillment of the mitzva, but reading the text is not. A contradiction is raised on each of them from other statements they made. However, they are resolved.

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English
Makkot 18 - Shabbat April 26, 28 Nisan

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 25, 2025 35:32


The braita brought on Makkot 17 with Rabbi Shimon's position is amended, as the original version was rejected. Rava ruled that a non-kohen who ate from a burnt offering before the blood was sprinkled transgressed five different transgressions. The Gemara questions why there aren't more than five transgressions, and suggests four more that could have been mentioned. They explain why each one was not in rava's list. Rav Gidel quoted a halakha in the name of Rav that a kohen that ate from a guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled would receive lashes. After raising a difficulty on this statement, they emend his words to be referring to a non-kohen andhe does not receive lashes for eating guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled.  Rabbi Elazar, and then Rabbi Yochanan are quoted as having said that placing the bikkurim is critical to the fulfillment of the mitzva, but reading the text is not. A contradiction is raised on each of them from other statements they made. However, they are resolved.

Eli Goldsmith Inspired Flow!
Hilchos Sefirah, Yom Hashoa, Talmidim Rebbe Akiva

Eli Goldsmith Inspired Flow!

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 24, 2025 35:07


Good Shabbos Mevarachim Chodesh Iyar, Weekly Office Learning BH Thu, Apr 24 Summary from Otter.ai • 4:05 PM • 30 min plus • Weekly Learning Introduction and Purpose 0:05 • Focus on Kisurei Hachaim and Modern Relevance 1:18 • Yom HaShoah and Its Significance 3:30 • Counting the Omer and Halachot 6:01 • Customs and Practices During the Omer 8:55 • The Role of the Tannaim and Amoraim 9:10 • The Impact of Historical Events on Modern Practices 24:01 • Respecting Different Customs and Practices 29:21 • The Role of Reminders and Tools 29:35 • Conclusion and Final Thoughts 29:5 Cover Pic The Kaliver Rebbe Ztl who survived the Shoa and rebuilt Yiddishkeit in the holy land & beyond with all the United Souls - https://eligoldsmith.substack.com/ Itamar Asked - ChatGPT 4 Great questions! Let's go through each historical event and tie them to both their Jewish (Hebrew) and general (Gregorian) calendar context:

Gematria Refigured +
Rabban Gamliel vs Rabbi Yehoshua Part 2

Gematria Refigured +

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 18, 2025 50:23


At times, people incorrectly depict Chazal as being petty or small-minded—and they often cite stories from the Gemara that seem to support this perspective. One such Gemara is Brachos 27b which depicts Rabban Gamliel (the Nasi) putting Rabbi Yehoshua in place for arguing with him, the other Rabbanan demoting Rabban Gamliel for this mistreatment, and the ensuing events (like Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria miraculously growing a massive beard overnight). This pair of episodes analyzes this story in light of the fact these were great men.

Eternal Ethics - With Rabbi Yaakov Wolbe
Stairway to Heaven (3:15)

Eternal Ethics - With Rabbi Yaakov Wolbe

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 16, 2025 47:08


Rabbi Elazar from Modi'in shares a list of five very different things that disqualify its doer from Olam Haba. What is the connection between these five things and why would one who does them be locked out of eternity? This Ethics Podcast was originally released on the Ethics Podcast on Apr 3, 2019 – – […]

Gematria Refigured +
Rabban Gamliel vs Rabbi Yehoshua Part 1

Gematria Refigured +

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 7, 2025 50:23


At times, people incorrectly depict Chazal as being petty or small-minded—and they often cite stories from the Gemara that seem to support this perspective. One such Gemara is Brachos 27b which depicts Rabban Gamliel (the Nasi) putting Rabbi Yehoshua in place for arguing with him, the other Rabbanan demoting Rabban Gamliel for this mistreatment, and the ensuing events (like Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria miraculously growing a massive beard overnight). This pair of episodes analyzes this story in light of the fact these were great men.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Sanhedrin 92 - March 19, 19 Adar

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 19, 2025 45:46


Today's daf is sponsored by Yarden and Guy in honor of Leah Zelda Shechter's birthday! What happens to someone who doesn't teach Torah to others? What happens to someone who does? Rava, Ravina and Rav Ashi brought three more verses to prove the resurrection of the dead. Rabbi Elazar brought a statement relating to the resurrection of the dead. From there, the Gemara brings several statements from Rabbi Elazar about different topics, including the value of de'ah, leaving bread of the table in case a poor person shows up, and being humble. A braita from the school of Eliyahu teaches that when the dead are resurrected, they will not die again. The Gemara brings the verses in Ezekiel where Ezekiel brings the bones back to life. Can this be brought as a source for the resurrection of the dead or to prove that when they are brought back to life, they will not live forever? Various interpretations are brought to explain whether he really resurrected the dead (or was it just a parable) and if he did, whether they lived for a few moments or went on to lead full lives. Another question is who were the people who Ezekiel resurrected? Several suggestions are brought, and the last interpretation leads into the story of Chanania, Mishael, and Azarya.

Talking Talmud
Sanhedrin 92: Bringing Back the Dry Bones

Talking Talmud

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 19, 2025 18:18


A small corrective on Cleopatra and Rabbi Meir (we know they couldn't have actually spoken to each other; they didn't live at the same time!). From there, delving into the teachings of Rabbi Elazar, some of which are about personal conduct, some about personal intellect, and how we interact. Also, the possible people who were resurrected by Ezekiel, in restoring the dry bones of his visions to life. Plus, the fiery furnace of the Book of Daniel and Nebuchadnezzar -- borrowed by the midrash for the famous fiery furnace from which Abraham also emerges unscathed.

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Today's daf is sponsored by Yarden and Guy in honor of Leah Zelda Shechter's birthday! What happens to someone who doesn't teach Torah to others? What happens to someone who does? Rava, Ravina and Rav Ashi brought three more verses to prove the resurrection of the dead. Rabbi Elazar brought a statement relating to the resurrection of the dead. From there, the Gemara brings several statements from Rabbi Elazar about different topics, including the value of de'ah, leaving bread of the table in case a poor person shows up, and being humble. A braita from the school of Eliyahu teaches that when the dead are resurrected, they will not die again. The Gemara brings the verses in Ezekiel where Ezekiel brings the bones back to life. Can this be brought as a source for the resurrection of the dead or to prove that when they are brought back to life, they will not live forever? Various interpretations are brought to explain whether he really resurrected the dead (or was it just a parable) and if he did, whether they lived for a few moments or went on to lead full lives. Another question is who were the people who Ezekiel resurrected? Several suggestions are brought, and the last interpretation leads into the story of Chanania, Mishael, and Azarya.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Sanhedrin 73 - 1st Day Rosh Chodesh Adar - February 28, 30 Shvat

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 28, 2025 41:23


The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English
Sanhedrin 73 - 1st Day Rosh Chodesh Adar - February 28, 30 Shvat

Daf Yomi for Women – דף יומי לנשים – English

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 28, 2025 41:23


The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Sanhedrin 52 - February 7, 9 Shvat

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 7, 2025 48:51


This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment? 

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Sanhedrin 30 - January 16, 16 Tevet

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 16, 2025 48:11


Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Yedid ben Shai Tzvi and Esther Shifra.  When a legal document of admission is written in formal judicial language but bears only two signatures, should we be concerned? The issue is whether this indicates the document was approved by only two judges instead of the required three, potentially invalidating the document. A braita discusses three scenarios involving orphans and hidden money. In these cases, the orphans learn about money their father had concealed - either from a third party during their father's life, from their father before his death, or through a dream after his death. The money in question was either owed to others or was maaser sheni (second tithe). The text examines whether the orphans may retain this money, analyzing how the different circumstances affect the ruling. Regarding judicial disagreements, there is a three-way debate about how to record the verdict. Rabbi Yochanan, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Elazar each propose different approaches: recording only the final verdict, naming which judges held which positions, or using the formula "from the statement of the judges... was deemed innocent." Their reasoning has practical implications, particularly in cases where judges err and must compensate for losses their mistakes caused. The Mishna describes court proceedings and mentions bringing "them" back in after the judges reach their decision. There is a discussion about whether "them" refers to the witnesses or the litigants. Two key questions arise regarding witness testimony: Must witnesses observe the event together, and must they testify together in court? A related issue is whether testimony is valid when two witnesses describe identical circumstances (such as a loan of the same amount between the same parties) but are actually describing separate events. These matters are debated, with arguments based on both logic and Torah verses. The resolution may differ depending on whether the case involves land or moveable property. Finally, Rav Yehuda ruled that in monetary cases, we accept witness testimony even if there are discrepancies in the bedikot (detailed questioning). The rabbis debate which types of details this ruling encompasses.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Sanhedrin 28 - January 14, 14 Tevet

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 14, 2025 46:59


Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Sanhedrin 26 - January 12, 12 Tevet

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 12, 2025 46:11


Those who sell produce during the Sabbatical year are disqualified from testifying. Rabbi Shimon (in the Mishna) explains that initially, these people were called collectors of Sabbatical produce. However, when tax collectors (anasim) became more numerous, the term changed to "sellers of Sabbatical produce." The Gemara presents two interpretations of this unclear passage, with the first interpretation being rejected. Reish Lakish was following two rabbis who were traveling to Asya to intercalate the year, as he wanted to observe their process. During their journey, they encountered people plowing and harvesting during the Sabbatical year. When Reish Lakish questioned why the rabbis weren't stopping these apparent violations, they offered possible explanations for how each person's actions might be permissible. Upon reaching their destination, the rabbis went to the second floor to deliberate about the intercalation. They climbed up using a ladder and immediately removed it to prevent Reish Lakish, whom they considered bothersome, from following them. Reish Lakish later complained to Rabbi Yochanan, declaring the rabbis to be a kesher reshaim (conspiracy of wicked people) who should not participate in the year's intercalation. The Gemara then traces the origin of the term kesher reshaim through stories about Shevna, who served as Hizkiyahu's steward. Rabbi Abahu, citing Rabbi Elazar, states that the court must publicly announce when someone is found to be disqualified from serving as a witness. Until such an announcement is made, the witnesses retain their qualification to testify. There is a specific debate regarding whether this announcement requirement applies to shepherds. Regarding wrongdoers such as those who accept charity from gentiles, engage in forbidden sexual relationships, or eat from fields during harvest season - there is a discussion of their eligibility to testify. Rav Nachman presents his views on these three cases, and the Gemara either restricts the scope of these rulings or presents opposing viewpoints.

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Sanhedrin 16 - January 2, 2 Tevet

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 2, 2025 49:31


Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Atik for the refuah shleima of Tzvi Dov Ben Sara.  A tribe that sins is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. To what is this referring? What was their sin? After rejecting the possibility that it is a regular sin with capital punishment like Shabbat or idol worship, several possibilities are suggested. Rav Matna says it is the Nasi of a tribe who sins. Ulla says it is a dispute between two tribes over property. Ravina returns to the rejected answer of idol worship and resolves the earlier difficulty by explaining that they are judged in a court of seventy-one, even though they receive the same punishment as individuals who worshipped idols. A false prophet is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived through a gezeira shava from the rebellious elder who is punished only if he rebels against a decision of the Great Sanhedrin, even though he is judged in a court of twenty-three. The High Priest is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived from the words "davar gadol" - issues relating to a gadol, a prominent person. However, others explain this as referring to a difficult matter. Rabbi Elazar asks about an ox of the High Priest that gored - would that be judged in a court of twenty-three or the Great Sanhedrin? There is no answer to this question, but Abaye infers from the question that it was obvious that a financial dispute of the High Priest is ruled in a court of three. The Great Sanhedrin needs to be part of the decision to go out to an optional war. From where is this derived? Only the Great Sanhedrin can expand the borders of Jerusalem and the azarot, and establish courts of twenty-three. These are derived from Moshe's actions, as his actions are considered equivalent to those of the Great Sanhedrin. From where is it derived that an idolatrous city is judged before the Great Sanhedrin? The derivations of other laws regarding idolatrous cities are brought - why not near the border and why not more than two cities? There are different opinions regarding how many cities can be designated as idolatrous cities, depending on location, different courts, and other factors.  

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Sanhedrin 14 - 1st Day Rosh Chodesh Tevet - December 31, 30 Kislev

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 31, 2024 48:39


Due to the brave actions of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who defied the Roman decree forbidding semicha (ordination), the tradition of rabbinic ordination continued. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was killed for this act, but not before he ordained Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamoa. Rav Avia added that Rabbi Nechemia was also ordained at this time. While the story appears to suggest that one person alone could perform ordination, this contradicts a braita requiring three judges. The Gemara resolves this contradiction by explaining that two others must have been present with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled that rabbinic ordination cannot occur outside of Israel. The Gemara explores whether someone in Israel could ordain someone in Babylonia through written authorization or a messenger. The conclusion is that ordination requires the physical presence of both parties - the ordainer and the one being ordained must be together in person, as demonstrated by several stories of failed attempts at ordination on account of the distance. Rabbi Zeira initially hid to avoid ordination, believing it better to remain humble and avoid positions of power. However, upon hearing that one's sins are forgiven when rising to a position of authority, he agreed to be ordained. Regarding the egla arufa ceremony, Rabbi Shimon holds it requires three judges, while Rabbi Yehuda requires five. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov presents a third position not mentioned in the Mishna - that the king and High Priest must also participate. Rav Yosef concludes that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov requires the entire Great Sanhedrin to attend, supporting this with a tannatic source. While Abaye interprets this source differently, a braita is brought supporting Rav Yosef's reading. Maaser sheni whose value is unclear must be evaluated by three people. What Is meant by the term "whose value is unclear"? What kind of people can do the evaluation? The Mishna also states that evaluation of consecrated movable items requires three judges. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's position requiring ten, which he derives from the word 'kohen' appearing ten times in Vayikra 27 in the section about consecrated items. The Gemara leaves unanswered the question of how the rabbis derive their requirement of three judges.