Podcasts about rabbi elazar

Today's daf is sponsored by Rena Kurs in loving memory of Dr. Leatrice Rabinsky, on her 7th yahrzeit. "She instilled the love of learning in all of her children, grandchildren and generations of students. May her memory be for a blessing." Rav and Shmuel held that orphans cannot collect a loan of their parents from other orphans if the parent of the debtor died first, as a parent can't pass an oath on to one's children. Rabbi Elazar disagreed and permitted them to collect with an oath of orphans (that their father did not tell them that the loan was already collected). The rabbis of later generations tried to override Rav and Shmuel's opinion without success but managed to limit it in various ways. Can one do a gilgul shvua in a case where the oath is a rabbinic oath?

Today's daf is sponsored by Rena Kurs in loving memory of Dr. Leatrice Rabinsky, on her 7th yahrzeit. "She instilled the love of learning in all of her children, grandchildren and generations of students. May her memory be for a blessing." Rav and Shmuel held that orphans cannot collect a loan of their parents from other orphans if the parent of the debtor died first, as a parent can't pass an oath on to one's children. Rabbi Elazar disagreed and permitted them to collect with an oath of orphans (that their father did not tell them that the loan was already collected). The rabbis of later generations tried to override Rav and Shmuel's opinion without success but managed to limit it in various ways. Can one do a gilgul shvua in a case where the oath is a rabbinic oath?

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters.  How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition. 

Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters.  How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition. 

The braita brought on Makkot 17 with Rabbi Shimon's position is amended, as the original version was rejected. Rava ruled that a non-kohen who ate from a burnt offering before the blood was sprinkled transgressed five different transgressions. The Gemara questions why there aren't more than five transgressions, and suggests four more that could have been mentioned. They explain why each one was not in rava's list. Rav Gidel quoted a halakha in the name of Rav that a kohen that ate from a guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled would receive lashes. After raising a difficulty on this statement, they emend his words to be referring to a non-kohen andhe does not receive lashes for eating guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled.  Rabbi Elazar, and then Rabbi Yochanan are quoted as having said that placing the bikkurim is critical to the fulfillment of the mitzva, but reading the text is not. A contradiction is raised on each of them from other statements they made. However, they are resolved.

The braita brought on Makkot 17 with Rabbi Shimon's position is amended, as the original version was rejected. Rava ruled that a non-kohen who ate from a burnt offering before the blood was sprinkled transgressed five different transgressions. The Gemara questions why there aren't more than five transgressions, and suggests four more that could have been mentioned. They explain why each one was not in rava's list. Rav Gidel quoted a halakha in the name of Rav that a kohen that ate from a guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled would receive lashes. After raising a difficulty on this statement, they emend his words to be referring to a non-kohen andhe does not receive lashes for eating guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled.  Rabbi Elazar, and then Rabbi Yochanan are quoted as having said that placing the bikkurim is critical to the fulfillment of the mitzva, but reading the text is not. A contradiction is raised on each of them from other statements they made. However, they are resolved.

Good Shabbos Mevarachim Chodesh Iyar, Weekly Office Learning BH Thu, Apr 24 Summary from Otter.ai • 4:05 PM • 30 min plus • Weekly Learning Introduction and Purpose 0:05 • Focus on Kisurei Hachaim and Modern Relevance 1:18 • Yom HaShoah and Its Significance 3:30 • Counting the Omer and Halachot 6:01 • Customs and Practices During the Omer 8:55 • The Role of the Tannaim and Amoraim 9:10 • The Impact of Historical Events on Modern Practices 24:01 • Respecting Different Customs and Practices 29:21 • The Role of Reminders and Tools 29:35 • Conclusion and Final Thoughts 29:5 Cover Pic The Kaliver Rebbe Ztl who survived the Shoa and rebuilt Yiddishkeit in the holy land & beyond with all the United Souls - https://eligoldsmith.substack.com/ Itamar Asked - ChatGPT 4 Great questions! Let's go through each historical event and tie them to both their Jewish (Hebrew) and general (Gregorian) calendar context:

At times, people incorrectly depict Chazal as being petty or small-minded—and they often cite stories from the Gemara that seem to support this perspective. One such Gemara is Brachos 27b which depicts Rabban Gamliel (the Nasi) putting Rabbi Yehoshua in place for arguing with him, the other Rabbanan demoting Rabban Gamliel for this mistreatment, and the ensuing events (like Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria miraculously growing a massive beard overnight). This pair of episodes analyzes this story in light of the fact these were great men.

Rabbi Elazar from Modi'in shares a list of five very different things that disqualify its doer from Olam Haba. What is the connection between these five things and why would one who does them be locked out of eternity? This Ethics Podcast was originally released on the Ethics Podcast on Apr 3, 2019 – – […]

At times, people incorrectly depict Chazal as being petty or small-minded—and they often cite stories from the Gemara that seem to support this perspective. One such Gemara is Brachos 27b which depicts Rabban Gamliel (the Nasi) putting Rabbi Yehoshua in place for arguing with him, the other Rabbanan demoting Rabban Gamliel for this mistreatment, and the ensuing events (like Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria miraculously growing a massive beard overnight). This pair of episodes analyzes this story in light of the fact these were great men.

Today's daf is sponsored by Yarden and Guy in honor of Leah Zelda Shechter's birthday! What happens to someone who doesn't teach Torah to others? What happens to someone who does? Rava, Ravina and Rav Ashi brought three more verses to prove the resurrection of the dead. Rabbi Elazar brought a statement relating to the resurrection of the dead. From there, the Gemara brings several statements from Rabbi Elazar about different topics, including the value of de'ah, leaving bread of the table in case a poor person shows up, and being humble. A braita from the school of Eliyahu teaches that when the dead are resurrected, they will not die again. The Gemara brings the verses in Ezekiel where Ezekiel brings the bones back to life. Can this be brought as a source for the resurrection of the dead or to prove that when they are brought back to life, they will not live forever? Various interpretations are brought to explain whether he really resurrected the dead (or was it just a parable) and if he did, whether they lived for a few moments or went on to lead full lives. Another question is who were the people who Ezekiel resurrected? Several suggestions are brought, and the last interpretation leads into the story of Chanania, Mishael, and Azarya.

A small corrective on Cleopatra and Rabbi Meir (we know they couldn't have actually spoken to each other; they didn't live at the same time!). From there, delving into the teachings of Rabbi Elazar, some of which are about personal conduct, some about personal intellect, and how we interact. Also, the possible people who were resurrected by Ezekiel, in restoring the dry bones of his visions to life. Plus, the fiery furnace of the Book of Daniel and Nebuchadnezzar -- borrowed by the midrash for the famous fiery furnace from which Abraham also emerges unscathed.

Today's daf is sponsored by Yarden and Guy in honor of Leah Zelda Shechter's birthday! What happens to someone who doesn't teach Torah to others? What happens to someone who does? Rava, Ravina and Rav Ashi brought three more verses to prove the resurrection of the dead. Rabbi Elazar brought a statement relating to the resurrection of the dead. From there, the Gemara brings several statements from Rabbi Elazar about different topics, including the value of de'ah, leaving bread of the table in case a poor person shows up, and being humble. A braita from the school of Eliyahu teaches that when the dead are resurrected, they will not die again. The Gemara brings the verses in Ezekiel where Ezekiel brings the bones back to life. Can this be brought as a source for the resurrection of the dead or to prove that when they are brought back to life, they will not live forever? Various interpretations are brought to explain whether he really resurrected the dead (or was it just a parable) and if he did, whether they lived for a few moments or went on to lead full lives. Another question is who were the people who Ezekiel resurrected? Several suggestions are brought, and the last interpretation leads into the story of Chanania, Mishael, and Azarya.

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment? 

This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment? 

Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Yedid ben Shai Tzvi and Esther Shifra.  When a legal document of admission is written in formal judicial language but bears only two signatures, should we be concerned? The issue is whether this indicates the document was approved by only two judges instead of the required three, potentially invalidating the document. A braita discusses three scenarios involving orphans and hidden money. In these cases, the orphans learn about money their father had concealed - either from a third party during their father's life, from their father before his death, or through a dream after his death. The money in question was either owed to others or was maaser sheni (second tithe). The text examines whether the orphans may retain this money, analyzing how the different circumstances affect the ruling. Regarding judicial disagreements, there is a three-way debate about how to record the verdict. Rabbi Yochanan, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Elazar each propose different approaches: recording only the final verdict, naming which judges held which positions, or using the formula "from the statement of the judges... was deemed innocent." Their reasoning has practical implications, particularly in cases where judges err and must compensate for losses their mistakes caused. The Mishna describes court proceedings and mentions bringing "them" back in after the judges reach their decision. There is a discussion about whether "them" refers to the witnesses or the litigants. Two key questions arise regarding witness testimony: Must witnesses observe the event together, and must they testify together in court? A related issue is whether testimony is valid when two witnesses describe identical circumstances (such as a loan of the same amount between the same parties) but are actually describing separate events. These matters are debated, with arguments based on both logic and Torah verses. The resolution may differ depending on whether the case involves land or moveable property. Finally, Rav Yehuda ruled that in monetary cases, we accept witness testimony even if there are discrepancies in the bedikot (detailed questioning). The rabbis debate which types of details this ruling encompasses.

Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Yedid ben Shai Tzvi and Esther Shifra.  When a legal document of admission is written in formal judicial language but bears only two signatures, should we be concerned? The issue is whether this indicates the document was approved by only two judges instead of the required three, potentially invalidating the document. A braita discusses three scenarios involving orphans and hidden money. In these cases, the orphans learn about money their father had concealed - either from a third party during their father's life, from their father before his death, or through a dream after his death. The money in question was either owed to others or was maaser sheni (second tithe). The text examines whether the orphans may retain this money, analyzing how the different circumstances affect the ruling. Regarding judicial disagreements, there is a three-way debate about how to record the verdict. Rabbi Yochanan, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Elazar each propose different approaches: recording only the final verdict, naming which judges held which positions, or using the formula "from the statement of the judges... was deemed innocent." Their reasoning has practical implications, particularly in cases where judges err and must compensate for losses their mistakes caused. The Mishna describes court proceedings and mentions bringing "them" back in after the judges reach their decision. There is a discussion about whether "them" refers to the witnesses or the litigants. Two key questions arise regarding witness testimony: Must witnesses observe the event together, and must they testify together in court? A related issue is whether testimony is valid when two witnesses describe identical circumstances (such as a loan of the same amount between the same parties) but are actually describing separate events. These matters are debated, with arguments based on both logic and Torah verses. The resolution may differ depending on whether the case involves land or moveable property. Finally, Rav Yehuda ruled that in monetary cases, we accept witness testimony even if there are discrepancies in the bedikot (detailed questioning). The rabbis debate which types of details this ruling encompasses.

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Those who sell produce during the Sabbatical year are disqualified from testifying. Rabbi Shimon (in the Mishna) explains that initially, these people were called collectors of Sabbatical produce. However, when tax collectors (anasim) became more numerous, the term changed to "sellers of Sabbatical produce." The Gemara presents two interpretations of this unclear passage, with the first interpretation being rejected. Reish Lakish was following two rabbis who were traveling to Asya to intercalate the year, as he wanted to observe their process. During their journey, they encountered people plowing and harvesting during the Sabbatical year. When Reish Lakish questioned why the rabbis weren't stopping these apparent violations, they offered possible explanations for how each person's actions might be permissible. Upon reaching their destination, the rabbis went to the second floor to deliberate about the intercalation. They climbed up using a ladder and immediately removed it to prevent Reish Lakish, whom they considered bothersome, from following them. Reish Lakish later complained to Rabbi Yochanan, declaring the rabbis to be a kesher reshaim (conspiracy of wicked people) who should not participate in the year's intercalation. The Gemara then traces the origin of the term kesher reshaim through stories about Shevna, who served as Hizkiyahu's steward. Rabbi Abahu, citing Rabbi Elazar, states that the court must publicly announce when someone is found to be disqualified from serving as a witness. Until such an announcement is made, the witnesses retain their qualification to testify. There is a specific debate regarding whether this announcement requirement applies to shepherds. Regarding wrongdoers such as those who accept charity from gentiles, engage in forbidden sexual relationships, or eat from fields during harvest season - there is a discussion of their eligibility to testify. Rav Nachman presents his views on these three cases, and the Gemara either restricts the scope of these rulings or presents opposing viewpoints.

Those who sell produce during the Sabbatical year are disqualified from testifying. Rabbi Shimon (in the Mishna) explains that initially, these people were called collectors of Sabbatical produce. However, when tax collectors (anasim) became more numerous, the term changed to "sellers of Sabbatical produce." The Gemara presents two interpretations of this unclear passage, with the first interpretation being rejected. Reish Lakish was following two rabbis who were traveling to Asya to intercalate the year, as he wanted to observe their process. During their journey, they encountered people plowing and harvesting during the Sabbatical year. When Reish Lakish questioned why the rabbis weren't stopping these apparent violations, they offered possible explanations for how each person's actions might be permissible. Upon reaching their destination, the rabbis went to the second floor to deliberate about the intercalation. They climbed up using a ladder and immediately removed it to prevent Reish Lakish, whom they considered bothersome, from following them. Reish Lakish later complained to Rabbi Yochanan, declaring the rabbis to be a kesher reshaim (conspiracy of wicked people) who should not participate in the year's intercalation. The Gemara then traces the origin of the term kesher reshaim through stories about Shevna, who served as Hizkiyahu's steward. Rabbi Abahu, citing Rabbi Elazar, states that the court must publicly announce when someone is found to be disqualified from serving as a witness. Until such an announcement is made, the witnesses retain their qualification to testify. There is a specific debate regarding whether this announcement requirement applies to shepherds. Regarding wrongdoers such as those who accept charity from gentiles, engage in forbidden sexual relationships, or eat from fields during harvest season - there is a discussion of their eligibility to testify. Rav Nachman presents his views on these three cases, and the Gemara either restricts the scope of these rulings or presents opposing viewpoints.

Audio, eng_t_norav_2025-01-06_lesson_zohar-la-am-lech-lecha-rabi-chiya-halach-lirot-at-rabi-elazar_n4_p1. Lesson_part :: Daily_lesson 4 :: Lessons_series. Zohar for All

Video, eng_t_norav_2025-01-06_lesson_zohar-la-am-lech-lecha-rabi-chiya-halach-lirot-at-rabi-elazar_n4_p1. Lesson_part :: Daily_lesson 4 :: Lessons_series. Zohar for All

Zohar for All. Lech Lecha. Rabbi Hiya Went to See Rabbi Elazar

Audio, eng_t_norav_2025-01-06_lesson_zohar-la-am-lech-lecha-rabi-chiya-halach-lirot-at-rabi-elazar_n4_p1. Lesson_part :: Daily_lesson 4 :: Lessons_series. Zohar for All

Audio, spa_t_norav_2025-01-06_lesson_zohar-la-am-lech-lecha-rabi-chiya-halach-lirot-at-rabi-elazar_n4_p1. Lesson_part :: Lessons_series. Zóhar para todos :: Daily_lesson 4

Video, eng_t_norav_2025-01-06_lesson_zohar-la-am-lech-lecha-rabi-chiya-halach-lirot-at-rabi-elazar_n4_p1. Lesson_part :: Daily_lesson 4 :: Lessons_series. Zohar for All

Audio, eng_t_norav_2025-01-05_lesson_zohar-la-am-lech-lecha-rabi-chiya-halach-lirot-at-rabi-elazar_n4_p1. Lesson_part :: Lessons_series. Zohar for All :: Daily_lesson 4

Zohar for All. Lech Lecha. Rabbi Hiya Went to See Rabbi Elazar

Video, eng_t_norav_2025-01-05_lesson_zohar-la-am-lech-lecha-rabi-chiya-halach-lirot-at-rabi-elazar_n4_p1. Lesson_part :: Lessons_series. Zohar for All :: Daily_lesson 4

Audio, eng_t_norav_2025-01-05_lesson_zohar-la-am-lech-lecha-rabi-chiya-halach-lirot-at-rabi-elazar_n4_p1. Lesson_part :: Lessons_series. Zohar for All :: Daily_lesson 4

Video, eng_t_norav_2025-01-05_lesson_zohar-la-am-lech-lecha-rabi-chiya-halach-lirot-at-rabi-elazar_n4_p1. Lesson_part :: Lessons_series. Zohar for All :: Daily_lesson 4

Audio, spa_t_norav_2025-01-05_lesson_zohar-la-am-lech-lecha-rabi-chiya-halach-lirot-at-rabi-elazar_n4_p1. Lesson_part :: Daily_lesson 4 :: Lessons_series. Zóhar para todos

Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Atik for the refuah shleima of Tzvi Dov Ben Sara.  A tribe that sins is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. To what is this referring? What was their sin? After rejecting the possibility that it is a regular sin with capital punishment like Shabbat or idol worship, several possibilities are suggested. Rav Matna says it is the Nasi of a tribe who sins. Ulla says it is a dispute between two tribes over property. Ravina returns to the rejected answer of idol worship and resolves the earlier difficulty by explaining that they are judged in a court of seventy-one, even though they receive the same punishment as individuals who worshipped idols. A false prophet is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived through a gezeira shava from the rebellious elder who is punished only if he rebels against a decision of the Great Sanhedrin, even though he is judged in a court of twenty-three. The High Priest is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived from the words "davar gadol" - issues relating to a gadol, a prominent person. However, others explain this as referring to a difficult matter. Rabbi Elazar asks about an ox of the High Priest that gored - would that be judged in a court of twenty-three or the Great Sanhedrin? There is no answer to this question, but Abaye infers from the question that it was obvious that a financial dispute of the High Priest is ruled in a court of three. The Great Sanhedrin needs to be part of the decision to go out to an optional war. From where is this derived? Only the Great Sanhedrin can expand the borders of Jerusalem and the azarot, and establish courts of twenty-three. These are derived from Moshe's actions, as his actions are considered equivalent to those of the Great Sanhedrin. From where is it derived that an idolatrous city is judged before the Great Sanhedrin? The derivations of other laws regarding idolatrous cities are brought - why not near the border and why not more than two cities? There are different opinions regarding how many cities can be designated as idolatrous cities, depending on location, different courts, and other factors.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Atik for the refuah shleima of Tzvi Dov Ben Sara.  A tribe that sins is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. To what is this referring? What was their sin? After rejecting the possibility that it is a regular sin with capital punishment like Shabbat or idol worship, several possibilities are suggested. Rav Matna says it is the Nasi of a tribe who sins. Ulla says it is a dispute between two tribes over property. Ravina returns to the rejected answer of idol worship and resolves the earlier difficulty by explaining that they are judged in a court of seventy-one, even though they receive the same punishment as individuals who worshipped idols. A false prophet is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived through a gezeira shava from the rebellious elder who is punished only if he rebels against a decision of the Great Sanhedrin, even though he is judged in a court of twenty-three. The High Priest is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived from the words "davar gadol" - issues relating to a gadol, a prominent person. However, others explain this as referring to a difficult matter. Rabbi Elazar asks about an ox of the High Priest that gored - would that be judged in a court of twenty-three or the Great Sanhedrin? There is no answer to this question, but Abaye infers from the question that it was obvious that a financial dispute of the High Priest is ruled in a court of three. The Great Sanhedrin needs to be part of the decision to go out to an optional war. From where is this derived? Only the Great Sanhedrin can expand the borders of Jerusalem and the azarot, and establish courts of twenty-three. These are derived from Moshe's actions, as his actions are considered equivalent to those of the Great Sanhedrin. From where is it derived that an idolatrous city is judged before the Great Sanhedrin? The derivations of other laws regarding idolatrous cities are brought - why not near the border and why not more than two cities? There are different opinions regarding how many cities can be designated as idolatrous cities, depending on location, different courts, and other factors.  

Due to the brave actions of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who defied the Roman decree forbidding semicha (ordination), the tradition of rabbinic ordination continued. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was killed for this act, but not before he ordained Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamoa. Rav Avia added that Rabbi Nechemia was also ordained at this time. While the story appears to suggest that one person alone could perform ordination, this contradicts a braita requiring three judges. The Gemara resolves this contradiction by explaining that two others must have been present with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled that rabbinic ordination cannot occur outside of Israel. The Gemara explores whether someone in Israel could ordain someone in Babylonia through written authorization or a messenger. The conclusion is that ordination requires the physical presence of both parties - the ordainer and the one being ordained must be together in person, as demonstrated by several stories of failed attempts at ordination on account of the distance. Rabbi Zeira initially hid to avoid ordination, believing it better to remain humble and avoid positions of power. However, upon hearing that one's sins are forgiven when rising to a position of authority, he agreed to be ordained. Regarding the egla arufa ceremony, Rabbi Shimon holds it requires three judges, while Rabbi Yehuda requires five. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov presents a third position not mentioned in the Mishna - that the king and High Priest must also participate. Rav Yosef concludes that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov requires the entire Great Sanhedrin to attend, supporting this with a tannatic source. While Abaye interprets this source differently, a braita is brought supporting Rav Yosef's reading. Maaser sheni whose value is unclear must be evaluated by three people. What Is meant by the term "whose value is unclear"? What kind of people can do the evaluation? The Mishna also states that evaluation of consecrated movable items requires three judges. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's position requiring ten, which he derives from the word 'kohen' appearing ten times in Vayikra 27 in the section about consecrated items. The Gemara leaves unanswered the question of how the rabbis derive their requirement of three judges.

Due to the brave actions of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who defied the Roman decree forbidding semicha (ordination), the tradition of rabbinic ordination continued. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was killed for this act, but not before he ordained Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamoa. Rav Avia added that Rabbi Nechemia was also ordained at this time. While the story appears to suggest that one person alone could perform ordination, this contradicts a braita requiring three judges. The Gemara resolves this contradiction by explaining that two others must have been present with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled that rabbinic ordination cannot occur outside of Israel. The Gemara explores whether someone in Israel could ordain someone in Babylonia through written authorization or a messenger. The conclusion is that ordination requires the physical presence of both parties - the ordainer and the one being ordained must be together in person, as demonstrated by several stories of failed attempts at ordination on account of the distance. Rabbi Zeira initially hid to avoid ordination, believing it better to remain humble and avoid positions of power. However, upon hearing that one's sins are forgiven when rising to a position of authority, he agreed to be ordained. Regarding the egla arufa ceremony, Rabbi Shimon holds it requires three judges, while Rabbi Yehuda requires five. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov presents a third position not mentioned in the Mishna - that the king and High Priest must also participate. Rav Yosef concludes that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov requires the entire Great Sanhedrin to attend, supporting this with a tannatic source. While Abaye interprets this source differently, a braita is brought supporting Rav Yosef's reading. Maaser sheni whose value is unclear must be evaluated by three people. What Is meant by the term "whose value is unclear"? What kind of people can do the evaluation? The Mishna also states that evaluation of consecrated movable items requires three judges. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's position requiring ten, which he derives from the word 'kohen' appearing ten times in Vayikra 27 in the section about consecrated items. The Gemara leaves unanswered the question of how the rabbis derive their requirement of three judges.

This week's learning is sponsored by my parents, Paula and Robert Cohen, in loving memory of my grandmother, Sonja Waschitz, Sara bat Yitzchak z"l, on her third yahrzeit. My grandmother was always optimistic, despite the many challenges she endured, beginning with leaving her parents behind in Vienna to forge a new life in America at age 14 in 1939. She continues to serve as a role model for our entire family. Ameimar ruled that children not old enough to sell their inheritance could give it away as a gift. After being questioned by Rav Ashi, he explains the logic behind his ruling by differentiating between a sale and a gift. Rav Nachman brings in the name of Shmuel a list of cases where one must check if the person has signs of maturity to see if the action was valid. The Gemara analyzes why he brought each of the cases. The Mishna bring the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that one on one's deathbed cannot pass on possessions through words but must do an actual kinyan, act of acquisition. A debate between him and the rabbis regarding a few cases is brought - each one explains the cases in a way that supports their position. The Mishna explains a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua regarding the differences between whether an act of acquisition is not needed only on Shabbat or is not needed at all. The logic of their positions matches the logic of their argument regarding the concept of zakhin l'adam shelo b'fanav as applying only for a minor or everyone else as well.

This week's learning is sponsored by my parents, Paula and Robert Cohen, in loving memory of my grandmother, Sonja Waschitz, Sara bat Yitzchak z"l, on her third yahrzeit. My grandmother was always optimistic, despite the many challenges she endured, beginning with leaving her parents behind in Vienna to forge a new life in America at age 14 in 1939. She continues to serve as a role model for our entire family. Ameimar ruled that children not old enough to sell their inheritance could give it away as a gift. After being questioned by Rav Ashi, he explains the logic behind his ruling by differentiating between a sale and a gift. Rav Nachman brings in the name of Shmuel a list of cases where one must check if the person has signs of maturity to see if the action was valid. The Gemara analyzes why he brought each of the cases. The Mishna bring the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that one on one's deathbed cannot pass on possessions through words but must do an actual kinyan, act of acquisition. A debate between him and the rabbis regarding a few cases is brought - each one explains the cases in a way that supports their position. The Mishna explains a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua regarding the differences between whether an act of acquisition is not needed only on Shabbat or is not needed at all. The logic of their positions matches the logic of their argument regarding the concept of zakhin l'adam shelo b'fanav as applying only for a minor or everyone else as well.

Rav and Shmuel disagreed regarding a case where one promised a gift using the phrase "in life and in death." Rav held that this language indicated a deathbed gift, with "in life" being mentioned merely as an expression of hope. Shmuel, however, interpreted it as a gift from a healthy person. In Nehardea, they followed Rav's ruling. Later, Rava introduced a distinction: he argued that Rav would agree that using the phrase "from life" (rather than "in life") would be treated as a gift from a healthy person. Ameimar, however, rejected Rava's interpretation of Rav's position. When a case of this nature came before Rav Nachman in Nehardea, he sent it to be adjudicated in a different city, not wanting to rule against Shmuel in Shmuel's own city of Nehardea. In another instance, Rava ruled against a woman who tried to reclaim her gift, which was consistent with his position (as she had used the phrase "from life and in death"). When she persistently complained about his ruling, Rava arranged for another rabbi to write her the ruling she desired, but instructed him to add a citation at the bottom of the document from Bava Metzia regarding deception, signaling that he was deceiving her and the ruling should not be followed. Upon realizing this subterfuge, the woman cursed Rava that his boat should sink—and indeed, his boat sank. When a gift document lacks language indicating either a deathbed or healthy status of the giver, and there is a dispute between the giver claiming it was written while dying and the recipients claiming otherwise, who bears the burden of proof? Rabbi Meir holds that we presume the person was healthy until proven otherwise. The rabbis, however, rule that the money remains with the giver until proven otherwise. A case arose involving a deathbed gift that used appropriate deathbed gift language, but the document didn't record that the person had died. After the person's death, the recipients claimed the gift, while the heirs argued that their father had recovered from his illness (thus invalidating the gift) before becoming sick again and dying. Raba ruled in favor of the recipients, reasoning that since the person was now dead, it was likely they died from the original illness, making the gift valid. Abaye challenged Raba's ruling by citing the case of a sunken ship: even though we presume the passengers died, we must consider the possibility they survived if their bodies aren't found. Similarly, he argued, we should consider the possibility of recovery, as most sick people do recover. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, resolved the difficulty by explaining that Raba was following Rabbi Natan's position. Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov disagreed about a case where the document did not include whether given while healthy or on one's deathbed. Rabbi Yaakov held that we follow the last known presumption of ownership, regardless of current possession. Rabbi Natan ruled that we follow the current presumption - if the person is currently on their deathbed, we assume the gift was given on their deathbed; if healthy, we assume they were healthy at the time the document was written. Rabbi Elazar noted that this same dispute between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov applies to a case in Mishna Taharot 6:7 regarding ritual impurity. The case involves a valley enclosed by a fence that is defined as a public space in summer (due to heavy foot traffic) but as a private space in winter (due to minimal traffic). When there's a known dead body present but uncertainty about whether someone passed over it, the rule is: doubt in a public space yields ritual purity, while doubt in a private space yields impurity (based on Sotah laws). If it's unknown whether the person was there in summer or winter, Rabbi Yaakov would rule based on the last known presumption of the person, which means they are deemed pure, while Rabbi Natan would rule based on the current season - they would be declared impure if the issue arises in the winter, and pure if it is summer.

Rav and Shmuel disagreed regarding a case where one promised a gift using the phrase "in life and in death." Rav held that this language indicated a deathbed gift, with "in life" being mentioned merely as an expression of hope. Shmuel, however, interpreted it as a gift from a healthy person. In Nehardea, they followed Rav's ruling. Later, Rava introduced a distinction: he argued that Rav would agree that using the phrase "from life" (rather than "in life") would be treated as a gift from a healthy person. Ameimar, however, rejected Rava's interpretation of Rav's position. When a case of this nature came before Rav Nachman in Nehardea, he sent it to be adjudicated in a different city, not wanting to rule against Shmuel in Shmuel's own city of Nehardea. In another instance, Rava ruled against a woman who tried to reclaim her gift, which was consistent with his position (as she had used the phrase "from life and in death"). When she persistently complained about his ruling, Rava arranged for another rabbi to write her the ruling she desired, but instructed him to add a citation at the bottom of the document from Bava Metzia regarding deception, signaling that he was deceiving her and the ruling should not be followed. Upon realizing this subterfuge, the woman cursed Rava that his boat should sink—and indeed, his boat sank. When a gift document lacks language indicating either a deathbed or healthy status of the giver, and there is a dispute between the giver claiming it was written while dying and the recipients claiming otherwise, who bears the burden of proof? Rabbi Meir holds that we presume the person was healthy until proven otherwise. The rabbis, however, rule that the money remains with the giver until proven otherwise. A case arose involving a deathbed gift that used appropriate deathbed gift language, but the document didn't record that the person had died. After the person's death, the recipients claimed the gift, while the heirs argued that their father had recovered from his illness (thus invalidating the gift) before becoming sick again and dying. Raba ruled in favor of the recipients, reasoning that since the person was now dead, it was likely they died from the original illness, making the gift valid. Abaye challenged Raba's ruling by citing the case of a sunken ship: even though we presume the passengers died, we must consider the possibility they survived if their bodies aren't found. Similarly, he argued, we should consider the possibility of recovery, as most sick people do recover. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, resolved the difficulty by explaining that Raba was following Rabbi Natan's position. Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov disagreed about a case where the document did not include whether given while healthy or on one's deathbed. Rabbi Yaakov held that we follow the last known presumption of ownership, regardless of current possession. Rabbi Natan ruled that we follow the current presumption - if the person is currently on their deathbed, we assume the gift was given on their deathbed; if healthy, we assume they were healthy at the time the document was written. Rabbi Elazar noted that this same dispute between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov applies to a case in Mishna Taharot 6:7 regarding ritual impurity. The case involves a valley enclosed by a fence that is defined as a public space in summer (due to heavy foot traffic) but as a private space in winter (due to minimal traffic). When there's a known dead body present but uncertainty about whether someone passed over it, the rule is: doubt in a public space yields ritual purity, while doubt in a private space yields impurity (based on Sotah laws). If it's unknown whether the person was there in summer or winter, Rabbi Yaakov would rule based on the last known presumption of the person, which means they are deemed pure, while Rabbi Natan would rule based on the current season - they would be declared impure if the issue arises in the winter, and pure if it is summer.

One cannot profit from selling basic food items in Israel. If so, how did Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria profit from wine and oil in Israel? A braita ruled that one cannot profit from eggs twice. The Gemara brings two explanations for what this ruling means. Under what circumstances of financial challenges is one permitted to leave Israel? Is it forbidden to leave Israel, even if prices are expensive for basic food items if one can afford the high prices? This is proven from the book of Ruth as Elimelech and his sons were punished for this. The Gemara tangents to various drashot on verses from the beginning of the book of Ruth as well as drashot on the connection between Boaz and Ivtzan - one of the judges mentioned in the book of Shoftim/Judges. After quoting a statement of Rav Chanan son of Rava regarding Elimelech, four other statements of his are quoted. An alternative explanation of the sins of Elimelech and his family is that they should have stayed to help pray for everyone. Four statements of Rabbi Yochanan that all start with the word ‘nehirna,’ ‘I remember when’ are quoted. The sons of Elimelech, Machlon and Khilion were also mentioned in the Tanach by different names – Yoash and Saraph. Which was the real name and which was meant for extrapolation? 

We Learnfrom the Fruit of the Earth to Reinvent Ourselves in the Month of Elul so thatWe Will Be New Creatures at Rosh HaShanah Based onShvilei Pinchas – Rav Pinchas Friedman I canstart with the story Can aperson be reborn? Lastnight Chantelle took me along to an Emunah Dinner. I say Chantelle took mebecause if she didn't make me come out, I wouldn't. She lights the fire. Herfriends Liz Gindea and Fran Hirmes have been very involved with and generouslysupportive of the organization for years. Emunah funds a number of children'shomes in Israel, along with schools, an arts college, daycare services andthese days many mental health programs. My son in law, Daniel's brother Michaelthrough his organization Kol HaNearim also works with these children'shomes. Chantelleand all of my kids have volunteered and worked in some of these homes over theyears especially with Yehuda Kohen of Bet Elazraki. At thedinner, a young lady spoke and shared her very moving story. She grewup in the north of Israel in no mans land. Her mother did nothing and herfather raised goats. She was one of ten siblings. They had no rules, nodiscipline, no money, sometimes no food and ran amok. The kids sometimes foughtand often got in trouble. When shewas ten, social services showed up. After investigating, they took some of heryounger siblings to be raised outside the house. She convinced them that sheshould stay. But her situation went from bad to worse and a few months laterthey came back and took her as well. She wasplaced into one of Emunah's homes and was angry with her situation and everyonearound her. She was angry that she had been taken from home. She was angry thather parents had not provided a real home. She was angry to be told when to wakeup and when to go to sleep. She was angry to be sent to school. She was angryto be pressed to do homework. She was angry that she was subject to structureand in her mind lost her freedom. She was depressed and alone in the world. Ateleven years old, she had reached rock bottom. Butwithin a few weeks, things started to change. The people at the Emunah homemade her feel loved and wanted. She made friends in the home and at school. Thesocial workers and teachers encouraged her and in a short time she began tosoar as a phoenix rising from the ashes. She wasencouraged to pursue drama studies and loved it. In 2013 she joined the armyand became a combat paramedic assisting injured soldiers and people in thefield, sometimes under fire. When she completed her army duty, she continuedher studies focusing on drama. She eventually went to work for channel 12 newsin Israel. She currently heads their social media team and pursues feel goodstories to help lift people. Emunahbecame her family. Her goal is to raise her own family and break the cycle. Her storywas very moving. Chantelle noted that she wished she could have her share herstory with our own community children in school. She would surely touch someand encourage others. Some might be lifted and others might consider assistingin the homes one summer. Perhaps we can get a video from Emunah and share that. There isa beautiful story told of Rav Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev, a renowned Hasidicmaster, who was known for his compassion and ability to find sparks of holinessin every soul. One day, a poor, troubled Jew came to him, feeling hopeless andconsumed by darkness. The rabbilistened attentively, then began to tell a story: 'In the summer, when thesun shines brightly, the grasshopper sings a beautiful song. But in the winter,when snow covers the earth, the grasshopper's song is silenced. Does this meanthe grasshopper has lost its ability to sing?' The manshook his head. 'Ofcourse not!' the rabbi exclaimed. 'The grasshopper's song is stillwithin, waiting to emerge when the seasons change.' The rabbilooked deeply into the man's eyes: 'Similarly, within you, there is aspark of divine light, a song waiting to be sung. Though darkness may surroundyou now, it's temporary, like winter's snow. Your task is to find that innerlight, nurture it, and let it shine forth.' The man'sface lit up with newfound hope. In thisseason of Elul, we hope to be born again. We canimagine ourselves as caterpillars, hoping to shed our cocoons and emerge asbutterflies. Sometimesthough we think that success is based on achieving perfection. But isthat really what Hashem demands or even wants from us. There isa story, I heard from Rabbi Joey Haber, of a man seeking perfection in his ownlife. His rabbiasks his profession He is anartist, Hisfavorite painting is of sunset. Histeacher suggests taking a picture of a sunset and that will be a perfectreproduction. theartist explains the painting has imperfections and thats what makes it special. Theteacher explains, same with us Angelsmay be perfect, but our imperfection makes us special. imperfectionsadd uniqueness and value, both in art and in life. Thisweek's parsha is Ki Tavo. Based onthe teaching of the Shvilei Pinchas, Rabbi Pinchas Friedman, I would like toshare with you a connection of our efforts in Elul and the mitzvah of“bikkurim,” bringing the first fruits, which we open the perasha with The SefatEmet quotes the Chiddushei HaRim, zy”a. Heexplains why the month designated for teshuvah is named Elul based on thepassuk (ibid. 100, 3 דְּע֗וּ כִּֽי־ ה֮ ה֤וּא אֱלֹ֫קים הֽוּא־עָ֭שָׂנוּ (ולא) [וְל֣וֹ]אֲנַ֑חְנוּ עַ֝מּ֗וֹ וְצֹ֣אן מַרְעִיתֽוֹ׃ If onelooks in the book of Tehilim the word Loh is spelled Lamed alef or No But inthe siddur when we read this psalm each morning as Paslm 100 Miszor LeDavid wechange the aleph to a vav —know thatHashem, He is G-d; it is He Who made us and we are His—His nation and the sheepof His pasture. Traditionteaches us that the word “v'lo” in this passuk is written as ' ולא ',with an “aleph”; yet, it is read as ולו' ', with a “vav.” With an“aleph,” the passuk suggests that we are unworthy and inadequate to be Hispeople; with a “vav,” it means that we merit being close to Him. Heexplains that in reality both the way “v'lo” is written and the way it is readcomplement each other and achieve the same goal. By recognizing our lowlystature and the fact that we have sinned and failed to serve Hashemadequately--' ולא אנחנו עמו ' (the way the passuk is written)—we aremotivated to draw closer to Hashem by means of sincere teshuvah and attain thestatus of-- ולו אנחנו עמו' ' (the way the passuk is read) again. Bothprocesses enable us to achieve the goal of being ' עמו ', HKB”H'speople. This is alluded to by the name אלו'ל ; it combines thetwo spellings of the word “lo”-- ל'א and ל'ו . This teaches us thatour goal during the month of Elul is to combine these two processes, to correctall of our wrongdoings by means of complete teshuvah and to regain the statusof ' .'עמו Lets turnto the Gemara (Makkot 24a): 'וכברהיה רבן גמליאל ורבי אלעזר בן עזריה ורבי יהושע ורבי עקיבא מהלכין בדרך...The first story tells about the Goyim. Then the gemara continues Now Iimagine these stories take place following the rebellion of Bar Kochba and theedicts of Hadrian Yimach Shemo שׁוּב פַּעַםאַחַת הָיוּ עוֹלִין לִירוּשָׁלַיִם, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיעוּ לְהַר הַצּוֹפִים קָרְעוּבִּגְדֵיהֶם, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיעוּ לְהַר הַבַּיִת רָאוּ שׁוּעָל שֶׁיָּצָא מִבֵּיתקׇדְשֵׁי הַקֳּדָשִׁים, הִתְחִילוּ הֵן בּוֹכִין וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מְצַחֵק. אָמְרוּלוֹ: מִפְּנֵי מָה אַתָּה מְצַחֵק? אָמַר לָהֶם: מִפְּנֵי מָה אַתֶּם בּוֹכִים? אָמְרוּלוֹ: מָקוֹם שֶׁכָּתוּב בּוֹ ״וְהַזָּר הַקָּרֵב יוּמָת״, וְעַכְשָׁיו שׁוּעָלִים הִלְּכוּבּוֹ, וְלֹא נִבְכֶּה?! אָמַר לָהֶן:לְכָךְ אֲנִי מְצַחֵק, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאָעִידָה לִּי עֵדִים נֶאֱמָנִים אֵת אוּרִיָּההַכֹּהֵן וְאֶת זְכַרְיָה בֶּן יְבֶרֶכְיָהוּ״ – וְכִי מָה עִנְיַן אוּרִיָּה אֵצֶלזְכַרְיָה? אוּרִיָּה בְּמִקְדָּשׁ רִאשׁוֹן, וּזְכַרְיָה בְּמִקְדָּשׁ שֵׁנִי! אֶלָּא:תָּלָה הַכָּתוּב נְבוּאָתוֹ שֶׁל זְכַרְיָה בִּנְבוּאָתוֹ שֶׁל אוּרִיָּה. בְּאוּרִיָּהכְּתִיב ״לָכֵן בִּגְלַלְכֶם צִיּוֹן שָׂדֶה תֵחָרֵשׁ״, בִּזְכַרְיָה כְּתִיב ״עוֹדיֵשְׁבוּ זְקֵנִים וּזְקֵנוֹת בִּרְחֹבוֹת יְרוּשָׁלִָם״. עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִתְקַיְּימָהנְבוּאָתוֹ שֶׁל אוּרִיָּה הָיִיתִי מִתְיָירֵא שֶׁלֹּא תִּתְקַיֵּים נְבוּאָתוֹ שֶׁלזְכַרְיָה, עַכְשָׁיו שֶׁנִּתְקַיְּימָה נְבוּאָתוֹ שֶׁל אוּרִיָּה – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁנְּבוּאָתוֹשֶׁל זְכַרְיָה מִתְקַיֶּימֶת. בַּלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה אָמְרוּ לוֹ: עֲקִיבָא נִיחַמְתָּנוּ,עֲקִיבָא נִיחַמְתָּנוּ. Once,Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah, Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva weretraveling on the road . . . When they reached Har HaTzofim, they tore theirgarments. When they came to Har HaBayis, they saw a fox emerging from KodeshHaKodashim, and they began to cry; however, Rabbi Akiva smiled. They said tohim, “Why are you smiling?” He responded to them, “Why are you crying?” Theyanswered him, “A place about which it is written (Bamidbar 1, 51): ‘Thenon-kohen who comes close shall be put to death,' and now (Eichah 5, 18) ‘foxesare walking about there,' should we not cry?” He saidto them, “This is why I am smiling . . . In the prophecy of Uriah, it iswritten (Michah 3, 12): ‘Therefore, because of you, Tziyon will be plowed likea field etc.' In the prophecy of Zechariah, it is written (Zechariah 8, 4):‘Old men and old women will yet sit in the streets of Yerushalayim.' As longas the nevuah of Uriah had not been fulfilled, I feared that the nevuah ofZechariah would not be fulfilled. Now, that the nevuah of Uriah has beenfulfilled, it is apparent that the nevuah of Zechariah will be fulfilled.” Theyresponded to him in these words, “Akiva, you have consoled us; Akiva, you haveconsoled us!” Itbehooves us to analyze Rabbi Akiva's reactions described above. Why did helaugh and smile upon seeing proof of Zechariah's nevuah related to the futuregeulah? Without a doubt, the other sages also believed wholeheartedly in theveracity of the prophecies concerning the future geulah. Nevertheless, whenconfronted with the extent of the churban—witnessing a fox exiting from theKodesh HaKodashim—they were overcome with grief and cried. So, what possessedRabbi Akiva to react so differently to the same disturbing sight? Additionally,why did he require seeing the fulfillment of Uriah's nevuah concerning theextent of the churban in order to substantiate that Zechariah's nevuahconcerning the geulah would be fulfilled? Toexplain the matter, the Maharal teaches us a basic principle. HKB”H created theworld such that there is always void and nullification prior to renewal.Furthermore, the degree of renewal relates to the degree of absence and divineconcealment. In other words, the greater the absence and void, the greater therenewal will be. TheMaharal asserts that HKB”H revealed this phenomenon to us at the beginning ofthe Torah (Bereishis 1, 1): 'בראשית ברא אלקים את השמיםואת הארץ, והארץ היתה תוהו ובוהו וחושך על פני תהום ורוח אלקיםמרחפת על פני המים, ויאמר אלקים יהי אור ויהי אור'. theMaharal interprets Rabbi Akiva's profound message. Uponseeing the fox emerge from the chamber of the Kodesh HaKodashim, he smiled. Hehad no doubt that the nevuah of Zechariah would come to pass—that old men andwomen would sit in the streets of Yerushalayim. However, he had no idea howgreat or grand the revival and renewal of Yerushalayim would be. The foxemerging from the Kodesh HaKodashim represented an extreme degree of “hesterpanim”—divine concealment. Therefore, he had cause to rejoice. For, heunderstood that the degree of churban and absence of the divine presencereflected on the commensurate greatness and glory of the renewal ofYerushalayim at the time of the geulah. InNetzach Yisrael (Chapter 30), the Maharal applies this incredible principle toexplain the galut in Mitzrayim that preceded Yisrael's entry into Eretz Yisraeland, for that matter, all the exiles that have preceded the future geulah. Theyall represent the void that precedes the new state of existence, like thedarkness of night that precedes the light of day. Therefore, HKB”H subjectedYisrael to the galut in Mitzrayim—which constituted a process ofnullification—prior to taking them into Eretz Yisrael. Thisexplains very nicely the following passuk related to the galuts in Mitzrayim(Shemos 1, 12): 'וכאשר יענו אותו כן ירבה וכן יפרוץ'—but as much as they afflict it, so it will increase and so it will burst forth. Here theTorah teaches us that the suffering and affliction in Mitzrayim constituted thevoid that gave rise to Yisrael's renewal and rebirth. After the exodus, theyreceived the Torah at Har Sinai and entered Eretz Yisrael. That demonstratesfor us magnificently how all of the galuyot constitute the absence and voidthat is destined to produce the incredible renewal of the future geulah. Its difficult to read this and not think of the Holocaust andthe miracles of 1948 and 1967 RabbiPinchas of Koretz—defines the state of nullification and void as ' אַיִן', which always precedes the state of renewal, referred to as '.'יֵשׁ.' Hecompares this concept to seeds of wheat or other fruit and vegetation that isplanted in the ground. Their growth only starts after the seed decays intoalmost nothingness -אַיִן'- '. Only then, from this state of nearnothingness, the seed begins to grow and sprout and renew itself. As he writes in Imrei Pinchas (Tishah B'Av 384): When grainis planted in the ground, it cannot grow unless it first decays and actuallybecomes nothing. In that void, remains a tremendous potential that can producean entire stalk. This is a type of metamorphosis. At the precise moment that itis virtually nothing, it immediately takes shape. There is a Hasidic story of a couple who come to their Rebbefor a blessing for a child. He asks for an exorbitant pidyon. They return,unable to raise it. He tells them that he can't help. They leave dejected andoutside his home they realize they can only turn to hashem. When the rebbehears that he calls them in and tells them they will be blessed with a child. We havelearned an important principle in the Mishnah (Avos 6, כלמה שברא הקב'ה בעולמו לא בראו אלא לכבודו' :( 11 '—everything that HKB”H created in His world, He created solely for His honor.That being the case, why did HKB”H create the world in such a way that nothingcan be renewed or revitalized without first undergoing a process of void andnullification? How does this enhance His honor? RabbiYisrael of Ruzhin, zy”a, explains regarding the following statement from DavidHaMelech (Tehillim 13, 2): 'עד אנה תסתיר את פניך ממני,עד אנה אשית עצות בנפשי' —how long will You hide Your countenance from me?How long will I continue to seek counsel within my own spirit? Heexplains that David HaMelech wished to teach us a vital lesson regarding ouremunah and trust in Hashem. When a Jew wants to receive salvation from Hashem,he must first understand that he is totally helpless on his own; his salvationdepends solely on Hashem. As long as he believes that he has a solution of hisown, his emunah and trust in Hashem are lacking. So, DavidHaMelech asks: How long will You continue to conceal Your presence from Me? Heanswers his own question: So long as I delude myself into thinking that I amcapable of resolving dilemmas with my own counsel and devices, the “hesterpanim”—divine concealment—will continue; however, as soon as I recognize withcertainty that I in fact lack any such wisdom or ability, the “hester panim”will cease, and Hashem's salvation will arrive instantaneously. Only whenI accept that I don't have all the answers Thus, it appears that this explains why HKB”H created theworld such that every renewal—situation of ' יש '–must be preceded bya state of void and nullification—situation of אין' '. It is becausesuch a difficult transformation causes man to understand that he does not havethe wisdom or resources to emerge from the darkness and void alone withoutHashem's assistance. As soon as he says to himself: “How long will I continueto seek counsel within my own spirit?”—he will succeed in emerging from thevoid to a state of renewal. In perekShirah Everythingin nature has a song And thesong sung by the wheat in Perek Shirah (Chapter 3): 'שיבולת חיטים אומרת שירהמעלות ממעמקים קראתיך ה'' —the stalk of wheat says (Tehillim 130, 1):“From the depths, I call to You, Hashem.” It isimportant to recognize that the term “lechem”—bread—encompasses all of man'sfood and nourishment. This is evident from the prayer of Yaakov Avinu(Bereishis 28, 20): 'ונתן לי לחם לאכול'—and He will give me bread to eat. Similarly, another passuk says (ibid. 47,12): 'ויכלכל יוסף את אביו ואת אחיו ואת כל בית אביו לחם לפי הטף'—Yosef provided his father and his brother and all of his father's householdwith food (“lechem”) according to the children. It is precisely for this reasonthat the berachah “hamotzi,” which is recited over bread, covers all the foodthat one consumes during a meal; it is because all other food is consideredsecondary to the bread. Weexplained above, that we learn from the growth of the wheat, from which breadis made, the vital principle that nothing can grow or be renewed without firstundergoing a stage of nullification—i.e. nullification of its current state.Therefore, only after the seeds of wheat decay and achieve a virtual state ofnothingness--' אין '—do they begin to grow and develop into a newentity. At that very moment, when they are in the ground and achieve the stateof » אין «, they pray to Hashem from the depths of the earth not to decaycompletely, to survive and grow into a new stalk of grain in the field above. We cannow appreciate and comprehend the song of the stalk of wheat. It recalls thechesed Hashem performed on its behalf whilst it was still deep in the ground ina state of decay. To express its gratitude to Hashem, it sings: 'שיר המעלותממעמקים קראתיך ה'' —thanking Hashem for hearing and responding to its pleafrom the depths of the earth. This iswhy David HaMelech instituted this psalm; so that we would join the stalk ofwheat in expressing gratitude to Hashem. For, we recognize all the kindness Heperforms on our behalf when we are in states of nothingness and helplessness.For instance, after every night of sleep, He returns our neshamos to usrevitalized. Itappears that we can suggest another reason that every situation of renewalrequires a prior state of nothingness. TheYosher Divrei Emet cites his Rav, the Maggid of Mezritsch, zy”a. He explainsthat this principle applies to spiritual matters as well. A person who wants torenew and revitalize his service of Hashem must first nullify his presentcircumstances—his ' יש '. This is accomplished by recognizing how farhe still has to go to serve Hashem properly. Through humility, submission andrecognition of his unworthiness, he will succeed in serving Hashem on a muchhigher level. Until he acknowledges his shortcomings in the service of Hashem,he will be unable to renew his spiritual self. We nowhave cause to rejoice! This illuminates for us the insight provided by theChiddushei HaRim, zy”a, concerning the name אלו'ל . As explained, itcombines the two spellings of the word “lo”-- ל'א and ל'ו . Thus, thename Elul reminds us that we must recognize that we have acted improperly andare not truly worthy of being Hashem's people--' .'ולא אנחנו עמו As aresult of this recognition and by mending our ways and attitudescorrespondingly, we will once again be deserving of the status of ' ולו אנחנועמו '. Let us explain this process in terms of our current discussion. Atthe end of the year, during the month of Elul, it is incumbent upon us to pushour personal reset buttons, so to speak. In order to create ourselves anewprior to Rosh HaShanah, we must nullify our old selves during the month ofElul. By recognizing that we are unworthy to be called His people--' ולא אנחנועמו '—we will succeed in transforming ourselves and taking on a newpersona in the new year consistent with the depiction--' .'ולו אנחנו עמו Followingthis glorious path, let us now address the opening pesukim of this week'sparsha discussing the mitzvah of bikkurim: “It will be when you enter the landthat Hashem, your G-d, gives you as an inheritance, and you take possession ofit, and dwell in it, that you shall take of the first of every fruit of theearth that you bring in from your land that Hashem, your G-d, gives you, andyou shall put it in a basket and go to the place that Hashem, your G-d, willchoose, to make His name rest there.” The KliYakar provides a rationale for this mitzvah. After conquering the new land,Yisrael were liable to become arrogant and attribute the conquest to their ownpowers and strategies. In particular, after working the land and growingvarious produce and fruit, they might think to themselves (Devarim 8, 17):' כוחי ועוצם ידי עשה לי את החיל הזה '—my strength and the might of myhand have generated this wealth for me. To eliminate this false belief, HKB”Hcommanded Yisrael to take the first of every fruit of the land, to take it upto the kohen in Yerushalayim and to recite an explicit expression of gratitudeto Hashem for giving us this land. This procedure was designed to fortify ouremunah in Hashem. Let usinterject a spicy tidbit. It is written (Tehillim 37, 11): וענוים יירשו ארץ''—the humble will inherit the earth. This passuk clearly implies that thequality of humility is propitious for inheriting Eretz Yisrael. For, we knowthat the kedushah of Eretz Yisrael is due to the presence of the Shechinah.This was especially true when the Beis HaMikdash was extant and operational. Asit is written (Shemos 25, 8): 'ועשו לי מקדש ושכנתי בתוכם' —they shallmake Me a sanctuary (Mikdash), so that I may dwell among them. Now, weknow that a prerequisite for the presence of the Shechinah is the midah ofhumility. In the words of the Gemara (Sotah 5a): 'לעולם ילמד אדם מדעת קונו,שהרי הקב'ה הניח כל הרים וגבעות והשרה שכינתו על הר סיני' —a personshould always learn from the good sense of his Creator—for behold, when HKB”Hgave the Torah, He abandoned all the great mountains and hills and insteadrested His Shechinah on Har Sinai (a lowly, unimpressive mountain). Additionally,they taught (ibid.): 'כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח, אמר הקב'ה אין אני והוא יכולים לדורבעולם' —concerning any person who possesses a haughtiness of spirit, HKB”Hsays: I and he cannot dwell together in the world. Therefore, HKB”H commandedthat upon entering the land, Yisrael would bring the bikkurim “to the placethat Hashem, your G-d, will choose, to make His name rest there.” This wouldinculcate in them the knowledge that HKB”H only rests His name in Eretz Yisraelin the merit of the midah of humility. Asexplained, the mitzvah of bikkurim is designed to shatter the klipah of “mystrength and the might of my hand have generated this wealth for me.” We willnow endeavor to explain why HKB”H used this mitzvah to hint to us theimportance of the midah of humility; for, this is the vital lesson we aresupposed to learn from the first fruit if we want to enter the land, keep itand endure in it. וְהָיָה֙ כִּֽי־תָב֣וֹאאֶל־הָאָ֔רֶץ אֲשֶׁר֙ ה אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לְךָ֖ נַחֲלָ֑ה וִֽירִשְׁתָּ֖הּ וְיָשַׁ֥בְתָּבָּֽהּ׃ וְלָקַחְתָּ֞מֵרֵאשִׁ֣ית ׀ כׇּל־פְּרִ֣י הָאֲדָמָ֗ה אֲשֶׁ֨ר תָּבִ֧יא מֵֽאַרְצְךָ֛ אֲשֶׁ֨ר יְהֹוָ֧האֱלֹהֶ֛יךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לָ֖ךְ וְשַׂמְתָּ֣ בַטֶּ֑נֶא וְהָֽלַכְתָּ֙ אֶל־הַמָּק֔וֹם אֲשֶׁ֤ריִבְחַר֙ יְהֹוָ֣ה אֱלֹהֶ֔יךָ לְשַׁכֵּ֥ן שְׁמ֖וֹ שָֽׁם׃ “It willbe when you enter the land that Hashem, your G-d, gives you as an inheritance,and you take possession of it, and dwell in it, that you shall take of thefirst of every fruit of the earth that you bring in from your land that Hashem,your G-d, gives you, and you shall put it in a basket and go to the place thatHashem, your G-d, will choose, to make His name rest there.” HKB”Hinstructs Yisrael: 'ולקחת מראשית כל פרי האדמה אשר תביא מארצך' . Letus expound: ' ולקחת '—you must learn a vital lesson— “lekach”—fromthe “first” yield of “every fruit of the earth.” When those fruits were yetseeds deep in the earth; they could not grow or sprout until they decayed intoa state of virtual nothingness— ״אין״ . In similar fashion, if you wish toremain in EretzYisrael, you must constantly humble yourselves, which is a type ofnullification and expression of nothingness. You must acknowledge how far youare still from serving Hashem properly. Only then will you be able to startanew, serving Hashem properly in His royal palace in Eretz Yisrael. Let usadd a valuable detail. When Moshe Rabeinu sent the meraglim to survey the land,he said to them (Bamidbar 13, 20): והתחזקתם ולקחתם מפרי הארץ' '—youshall strengthen yourselves and take from the fruit of the land. According tothe Zohar hakadosh (Shelach 158a), the meraglim did not want to enter the land,because they perceived that they would not maintain their elite status asprinces and leaders in Eretz Yisrael. This motivated them to speak ill of EretzYisrael, so that they would maintain thestatus of princes that they held in the midbar. In other words, the meraglim'sfailure is attributable to the klipah of arrogance— “ga'avah”; they feared thatthey would lose their prominence. Thus, itseems that this is what Moshe was hinting to the meraglim: ' והתחזקתם'—fortify yourselves against the yetzer of “ga'avah” that instills in youthe fear of losing authority and control; ' ולקחתם '—learn a vitallesson (“lekach”); ' —'מפרי הארץ from the fruit whose seeds cannotgrow and produce within the depths of the earth until they decay and achieve astate of nothingness. You, too,must fortify yourselves by achieving a state of virtual nothingness by totallyrelinquishing your prominent status as princes. By doing so, you will achieveyour complete tikun in Olam HaZeh and rise higher and higher in the service ofHashem. We cannow suggest the following. After the original generation of the midbar alldied—who were influenced by the meraglim, failing to learn the lessonconcerning the midah of humility from the fruit of the land—Moshe announced totheir children who were about to enter the land: “It will be when you enter theland that Hashem, your G-d, gives you as an inheritance, and you takepossession of it, and dwell in it.” He waswarning them that if they intend to enter the land and to prosper and survivein it, and not to suffer the fate of their fathers, who were not allowed toenter the land: 'ולקחת מראשית כל פרי האדמה' —be sure to learn thislesson (“lekach”) from the first yields of the fruits of the land—in contrastto their fathers who neglected to heed Moshe's warning: 'והתחזקתם ולקחתם מפריהארץ' —fortify yourselves and take (learn a lesson) from the fruit of theland. Thelesson relates to the avodah of the month of אלו'ל , whose name is formedby the two spellings of the word “lo”-- ל'א and ל'ו . As wehave explained, it is incumbent upon us to achieve a state of nothingnessthrough the midah of humility; we must acknowledge that due to our behavior, weare the embodiment of ' ולא אנחנו עמו '—we do not truly deserve to beHis people. Yet, withthis acknowledgment, we are able to renew ourselves through total teshuvah andreclaim the status of ' ולו אנחנו עמו '. In this merit, we willfinally deserve to be redeemed from the trials and tribulations of galus; aswe've learned, galus is the void and nothingness that must precede theflourishing growth of the future geulah—swiftly, in our times! Amen.

This week's learning is sponsored by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 24th yahrzeit. "She had a "נותן בעין יפה" approach to her interactions with everyone she encountered. She was generous of heart, of mind and of spirit, and we miss her. Yehi zichra baruch." Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother, Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, Adina bat Aryeh Leib, on her 20th yahrzeit. "She was devoted to her husband, family, and the Beth El Synagogue community in New Rochelle, NY. Her two sons made Aliyah and her daughter has lived a professional life of service to the American Jewish community." Today's daf is sponsored by Ayala Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shulamit.  How does one determine if the branches grew out of the trunk or the ground to determine whether the growths belong to the owner of the tree or the owner of the land? Rav Nachman rules that a palm tree does not have laws of geza, the trunk. Rav Zevid and Rav Papa each understand this statement differently. If one purchases three trees, one acquires land with the trees. How much land does one acquire? Rabbi Yochanan rules that they acquire the land beneath each tree, between each tree, and, in addition, the amount of space needed for a fig gatherer to walk around with a basket. Rabbi Elazar raises a question about the space for the fig gatherer - if one does not get an access route, as per the rabbis' position that a seller sells sparingly (ayin ra'ah), how does the buyer get space for collecting? The land underneath and in between the trees can be used by the tree's owner for planting, but who has the right to plant in the area around the trees for the fig gatherer and basket? How much space can/should there be between the trees to consider them a field so that the purchaser will acquire the land? Rav Yosef and Rava disagree. Abaye raises a difficulty from a Mishna against Rav Yosef's position.

 Study Guide Bava Batra 79 Today’s daf is sponsored by the Hadran zoom family in loving memory of the beloved mother of their dear Hadran learner and friend, Rhona Fink - Millie Laxer, Malka bat Sarah v'Avraham z"l, who passed away yesterday. “May her family be comforted among aveilei Zion v’Yerushalayim. What is the punishment for those who separate themselves from the words of Torah? A Mishna in Meila is brought which discusses one who consecrates an item that generally holds something else like a pit with water, or a field with crops. If one consecrates the pit, is the water consecrated as well? Does it depend on whether it was full of water when it was consecrated or if it was empty? In which items do Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi disagree? After reconciling the disagreement between them with the words of Rebbi in a braita, the Gemara proceeds to bring a different braita also regarding this issue. In that braita, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon. First Raba explains the debate to be parallel to that of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi, but this is rejected in light of the latter case in the braita where Rabbi Elazar. In conclusion, they explain the debate differently. The debate in the first part of the braita is based on a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis about whether one can acquire items that are not yet in existence. A difficulty is raised, but it is resolved. The debate in the second part depends on whether we learn laws of consecrated items from laws of sales. A difficulty is raised with the explanations of each of these. A difficulty is raised on this explanation, as well, from our Mishna but it is resolved, as is proven from a braita, that the position in our Mishna is a minority opinion.