POPULARITY
121 episodes with rabbi elazar
122 episodes with rabbi elazar
44 episodes with rabbi elazar
4 episodes with rabbi elazar
4 episodes with rabbi elazar
2 episodes with rabbi elazar
2 episodes with rabbi elazar
2 episodes with rabbi elazar
2 episodes with rabbi elazar
All ramps in the Temple had a slope of three cubits in length for every one cubit of height, except for the ramp of the altar, which had a gentler incline of three and five-ninths cubits. This was to accommodate the kohanim, who had to carry the animal body parts up to the top of the altar. The kmitza—a handful taken from the meal offering—could be performed anywhere within the Azara (Temple courtyard). The remainder of the offering was eaten by male kohanim, could be prepared in any manner, and was permitted to be eaten only on that day and the following night until midnight. Rabbi Elazar taught that if the kmitza was taken in the Heichal (Sanctuary), it was still valid. He compared it to the bowls of frankincense, since both are referred to with the term azkarata, and the frankincense is brought from inside the Sanctuary and burned outside. Rabbi Yirmia raised a challenge from a braita that seemed to imply the kmitza must be performed where the owner presents the offering—i.e., not in the Sanctuary, which is restricted to kohanim. However, two interpretations of that braita are offered, the first of which is rejected. Both explanations ultimately show that the braita was not intended to restrict the location of the kmitza, but rather to broaden it. Rabbi Yochanan ruled that peace offerings may be slaughtered in the Sanctuary. His reasoning was that since slaughtering may be done outside the Ohel Moed, it stands to reason that it may also be done inside. If the secondary location is valid, then certainly the primary one should be. A difficulty is raised from a braita concerning eating in the Sanctuary, which is prohibited, if not for a verse permitting it in unique circumstances. To resolve this, a distinction is made: slaughtering is a sacrificial rite, whereas eating is not. The bird sin offering is ideally performed on the lower half of the altar at the southwest corner, though it may be offered anywhere on the altar. Six actions were performed at the southwest corner—three on the lower half and three on the upper half of the altar. On the lower half: the bird sin offering, bringing the meal offering to the altar for kmitza, and pouring the remainder of the blood into the yesod (base). On the upper half: pouring the wine and water libations, and offering the bird burnt offering. When ascending the altar, people would typically go up the ramp on the right side, turn right at the top, begin at the southeast corner, and circle counter-clockwise around the altar before descending via the left side of the ramp. However, for the three actions performed on the upper southwest corner, they would ascend via the left side of the ramp to reach that spot directly, then turn around and descend from there after completing the task. The bird sin offering is brought at the southwest corner, a location derived from the placement of the meal offering. The meal offering's placement is itself derived from the verse in Vayikra 6:7.
All ramps in the Temple had a slope of three cubits in length for every one cubit of height, except for the ramp of the altar, which had a gentler incline of three and five-ninths cubits. This was to accommodate the kohanim, who had to carry the animal body parts up to the top of the altar. The kmitza—a handful taken from the meal offering—could be performed anywhere within the Azara (Temple courtyard). The remainder of the offering was eaten by male kohanim, could be prepared in any manner, and was permitted to be eaten only on that day and the following night until midnight. Rabbi Elazar taught that if the kmitza was taken in the Heichal (Sanctuary), it was still valid. He compared it to the bowls of frankincense, since both are referred to with the term azkarata, and the frankincense is brought from inside the Sanctuary and burned outside. Rabbi Yirmia raised a challenge from a braita that seemed to imply the kmitza must be performed where the owner presents the offering—i.e., not in the Sanctuary, which is restricted to kohanim. However, two interpretations of that braita are offered, the first of which is rejected. Both explanations ultimately show that the braita was not intended to restrict the location of the kmitza, but rather to broaden it. Rabbi Yochanan ruled that peace offerings may be slaughtered in the Sanctuary. His reasoning was that since slaughtering may be done outside the Ohel Moed, it stands to reason that it may also be done inside. If the secondary location is valid, then certainly the primary one should be. A difficulty is raised from a braita concerning eating in the Sanctuary, which is prohibited, if not for a verse permitting it in unique circumstances. To resolve this, a distinction is made: slaughtering is a sacrificial rite, whereas eating is not. The bird sin offering is ideally performed on the lower half of the altar at the southwest corner, though it may be offered anywhere on the altar. Six actions were performed at the southwest corner—three on the lower half and three on the upper half of the altar. On the lower half: the bird sin offering, bringing the meal offering to the altar for kmitza, and pouring the remainder of the blood into the yesod (base). On the upper half: pouring the wine and water libations, and offering the bird burnt offering. When ascending the altar, people would typically go up the ramp on the right side, turn right at the top, begin at the southeast corner, and circle counter-clockwise around the altar before descending via the left side of the ramp. However, for the three actions performed on the upper southwest corner, they would ascend via the left side of the ramp to reach that spot directly, then turn around and descend from there after completing the task. The bird sin offering is brought at the southwest corner, a location derived from the placement of the meal offering. The meal offering's placement is itself derived from the verse in Vayikra 6:7.
In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast on Bava Metzia 85a, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe delves into the profound theme of suffering, mercy, and redemption through the stories of Rebbe (Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi) and Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon. Rebbe, inspired by Rabbi Elazar's preserved body due to accepted suffering, voluntarily endured 13 years of excruciating illness—six of tzmirta (a beet-based treatment for urinary stones) and seven of tzfarna (thrush)—to attain spiritual merit. Despite his stableman's wealth and the deafening noise of feeding animals to mask Rebbe's cries, seafarers heard his agony. Yet Rabbi Elazar's suffering was deemed superior: it “came through love and left through love,” while Rebbe's stemmed from a specific incident. A calf, led to slaughter, sought refuge in Rebbe's garment and wept; Rebbe dismissed it, saying, “Go, for this you were created.” Heaven responded: no mercy shown, no mercy received. Thirteen years later, Rebbe's maid swept baby weasels; he intervened, citing Psalm 145:9—“His mercy is upon all His works”—and Heaven declared, “Since he shows mercy, We will show mercy.” His afflictions vanished.The Gemara contrasts their merits: during Rabbi Elazar's years in the attic, no one died prematurely; during Rebbe's 13 rainless years, the earth stayed saturated—radish holes brimmed with water—proving the tzaddikim's pain sustains the world. Rabbi Wolbe highlights the mystical power of 13 (love, unity, the 13 Attributes of Mercy, Torah hermeneutics), noting Rebbe's 13-year ordeal mirrored this divine framework. Posthumously, Rebbe sought Rabbi Elazar's son—a stunningly handsome youth prostituted by harlots—and entrusted him to his uncle for Torah study. Though the boy initially resisted, he grew into a sage; Rebbe applied Proverbs 11:30—“The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life”—to both teacher and student. Burial dramas underscored merit: Rabbi Elazar joined his father Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai in the cave (earned by shared suffering), but his son was barred by a serpent—Heaven clarified it was due to lacking cave-endured pain, not lesser righteousness._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on October 3, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on November 14, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content._____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life. To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Suffering, #Mercy, #Redemption, #Compassion, #Kindness, #Healing, #Sage, #Mystical, #Inclusivity, #Torah, #JewishSoul, #Roots, #Ignorance, #Enlightenment, #Responsibility, #Teaching, #Learning, #Shabbos ★ Support this podcast ★
In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast on Bava Metzia 85a, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe delves into the profound theme of suffering, mercy, and redemption through the stories of Rebbe (Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi) and Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon. Rebbe, inspired by Rabbi Elazar's preserved body due to accepted suffering, voluntarily endured 13 years of excruciating illness—six of tzmirta (a beet-based treatment for urinary stones) and seven of tzfarna (thrush)—to attain spiritual merit. Despite his stableman's wealth and the deafening noise of feeding animals to mask Rebbe's cries, seafarers heard his agony. Yet Rabbi Elazar's suffering was deemed superior: it “came through love and left through love,” while Rebbe's stemmed from a specific incident. A calf, led to slaughter, sought refuge in Rebbe's garment and wept; Rebbe dismissed it, saying, “Go, for this you were created.” Heaven responded: no mercy shown, no mercy received. Thirteen years later, Rebbe's maid swept baby weasels; he intervened, citing Psalm 145:9—“His mercy is upon all His works”—and Heaven declared, “Since he shows mercy, We will show mercy.” His afflictions vanished.The Gemara contrasts their merits: during Rabbi Elazar's years in the attic, no one died prematurely; during Rebbe's 13 rainless years, the earth stayed saturated—radish holes brimmed with water—proving the tzaddikim's pain sustains the world. Rabbi Wolbe highlights the mystical power of 13 (love, unity, the 13 Attributes of Mercy, Torah hermeneutics), noting Rebbe's 13-year ordeal mirrored this divine framework. Posthumously, Rebbe sought Rabbi Elazar's son—a stunningly handsome youth prostituted by harlots—and entrusted him to his uncle for Torah study. Though the boy initially resisted, he grew into a sage; Rebbe applied Proverbs 11:30—“The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life”—to both teacher and student. Burial dramas underscored merit: Rabbi Elazar joined his father Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai in the cave (earned by shared suffering), but his son was barred by a serpent—Heaven clarified it was due to lacking cave-endured pain, not lesser righteousness._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on October 3, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on November 14, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content._____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life. To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Suffering, #Mercy, #Redemption, #Compassion, #Kindness, #Healing, #Sage, #Mystical, #Inclusivity, #Torah, #JewishSoul, #Roots, #Ignorance, #Enlightenment, #Responsibility, #Teaching, #Learning, #Shabbos ★ Support this podcast ★
In Zevachim 59, a difficulty was raised against Rav's position that a sacrifice slaughtered while the altar was damaged is disqualified. The contradiction came from a statement of Rav that incense could be burned even when the altar was removed. It was resolved by suggesting that just as Rava explained, Rabbi Yehuda distinguished between blood and burning (and required the altar for blood), so too Rav distinguished between blood and burning the incense (and required the altar to be complete for slaughtering and sprinkling the blood). Where did Rava make that statement? A lengthy argument between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi is brought to provide background. Then a proof is offered for Rava's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda, based on Rabbi Yehuda's suggestion regarding the blood from the Paschal sacrifices that spilled on the floor, but the proof is rejected. Rabbi Elazar brings a source to derive the requirement for the altar to be complete to permit eating the remains of the meal offerings and other food of kodashim kodashim. Is a complete altar required for eating kodashim kalim? Abaye brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael proving that the second tithe cannot be eaten in Jerusalem when there is no Temple. He first attempts to derive it from the firstborn by logical inference, but then derives it from a juxtaposition (heikesh). Abaye's explanation of Rabbi Yishmael leads to the understanding that kodashim kalim cannot be eaten when there is no altar. Rabbi Yirmia vehemently disagrees with Abaye, calling him a 'stupid Babylonian,' due to a contradiction between two braitot, which he resolves by differentiating between kodshai kodashim and kodashim kalim regarding this law.
In Zevachim 59, a difficulty was raised against Rav's position that a sacrifice slaughtered while the altar was damaged is disqualified. The contradiction came from a statement of Rav that incense could be burned even when the altar was removed. It was resolved by suggesting that just as Rava explained, Rabbi Yehuda distinguished between blood and burning (and required the altar for blood), so too Rav distinguished between blood and burning the incense (and required the altar to be complete for slaughtering and sprinkling the blood). Where did Rava make that statement? A lengthy argument between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi is brought to provide background. Then a proof is offered for Rava's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda, based on Rabbi Yehuda's suggestion regarding the blood from the Paschal sacrifices that spilled on the floor, but the proof is rejected. Rabbi Elazar brings a source to derive the requirement for the altar to be complete to permit eating the remains of the meal offerings and other food of kodashim kodashim. Is a complete altar required for eating kodashim kalim? Abaye brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael proving that the second tithe cannot be eaten in Jerusalem when there is no Temple. He first attempts to derive it from the firstborn by logical inference, but then derives it from a juxtaposition (heikesh). Abaye's explanation of Rabbi Yishmael leads to the understanding that kodashim kalim cannot be eaten when there is no altar. Rabbi Yirmia vehemently disagrees with Abaye, calling him a 'stupid Babylonian,' due to a contradiction between two braitot, which he resolves by differentiating between kodshai kodashim and kodashim kalim regarding this law.
Study Guide The bloods of the firstborn, maaser, and Pesach are only sprinkled once on the altar. This is derived from the fact that the word "saviv"-"around" the altar - appears in the context of the burnt, sin, and guilt offerings. One cannot learn from those cases to others, as details that appear two or three times cannot be used to establish a paradigm for a different case. Rabbi Tarfon taught that the firstborn can be eaten for two days and one night, as it is similar to the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagelili, on his first day in the Beit Midrash in Yavne, raised several difficulties with this comparison and likened it to a guilt and sin offering, which are eaten only for a day and night. When Rabbi Tarfon could no longer respond to the questioning, he left, and Rabbi Akiva took his place and said that in Vayikra 18:18, where the firstborn is compared to the thigh and breast given to the kohen, this is a juxtaposition between the firstborn and the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagellil responded that also the thigh and breast are given to the kohen in a thanksgiving offering which is eaten only for a day and night. Therefore, perhaps the comparison should be made to the thanksgiving offering instead. Rabbi Akiva was convinced by Rabbi Yosi that the comparison should be to the thanksgiving offering, but he found other words in the verse from which to derive an additional day. When Rabbi Yishmael heard about this, he engaged in a lengthy debate with Rabbi Akiva regarding his change of position—that the comparison is to the thanksgiving offering. Rabbi Yishmael argued that the law of the thigh and breast in the thanksgiving offering is derived by juxtaposition (heikesh), and the law about the firstborn is derived from the thigh and breast by juxtaposition, and one cannot derive a law from a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition. However, the Gemara explains that this juxtaposition is not typical: while the law of the thigh and breast is derived by juxtaposition, the time limitation is stated directly. The debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael centers on whether a law derived partially by juxtaposition and partially stated explicitly can serve as the basis for a juxtaposition to another law. The Gemara raises two difficulties with Rabbi Yishmael's position—one regarding the number of times the kohen gadol must sprinkle the blood of the bull and goat in the Sanctuary (Heichal) on Yom Kippur, and one regarding the amount of flour required for the loaves of matza that accompany the thanksgiving offering. Each of these laws is derived by means of a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition, along with something explicitly stated or derived by a gezeira shava. Each difficulty is resolved. The Mishna stated that the Pesach may be eaten only until midnight. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria, but Rabbi Akiva permits it until dawn. Each derives their opinion from a different verse.
Starting with the last mishnah (on the bottom of 56:) - the offerings of the first-born, the tithes, Passover sacrifice, and more... in terms of what is eaten by whom. Starting with the first-born and the tithing - where the Gemara finds a source for the details and time frame of these offerings. The sages in these discussions are earlier - Tannaim, not Amoraim - and Rabbi Tarfon himself is a kohen. Which makes him more familiar with the details, perhaps. And Rabbi Yossi HaGelili has some questions for him. With a comparison to the piece-offering. Also, why the Passover sacrifice was eaten only at night and only until midnight (or the midpoint of the dark of the night). And it's another dispute between Tannaim - in this case, Rabbi Elazar ben Azariyah and Rabbi Akiva.
Study Guide The bloods of the firstborn, maaser, and Pesach are only sprinkled once on the altar. This is derived from the fact that the word "saviv"-"around" the altar - appears in the context of the burnt, sin, and guilt offerings. One cannot learn from those cases to others, as details that appear two or three times cannot be used to establish a paradigm for a different case. Rabbi Tarfon taught that the firstborn can be eaten for two days and one night, as it is similar to the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagelili, on his first day in the Beit Midrash in Yavne, raised several difficulties with this comparison and likened it to a guilt and sin offering, which are eaten only for a day and night. When Rabbi Tarfon could no longer respond to the questioning, he left, and Rabbi Akiva took his place and said that in Vayikra 18:18, where the firstborn is compared to the thigh and breast given to the kohen, this is a juxtaposition between the firstborn and the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagellil responded that also the thigh and breast are given to the kohen in a thanksgiving offering which is eaten only for a day and night. Therefore, perhaps the comparison should be made to the thanksgiving offering instead. Rabbi Akiva was convinced by Rabbi Yosi that the comparison should be to the thanksgiving offering, but he found other words in the verse from which to derive an additional day. When Rabbi Yishmael heard about this, he engaged in a lengthy debate with Rabbi Akiva regarding his change of position—that the comparison is to the thanksgiving offering. Rabbi Yishmael argued that the law of the thigh and breast in the thanksgiving offering is derived by juxtaposition (heikesh), and the law about the firstborn is derived from the thigh and breast by juxtaposition, and one cannot derive a law from a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition. However, the Gemara explains that this juxtaposition is not typical: while the law of the thigh and breast is derived by juxtaposition, the time limitation is stated directly. The debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael centers on whether a law derived partially by juxtaposition and partially stated explicitly can serve as the basis for a juxtaposition to another law. The Gemara raises two difficulties with Rabbi Yishmael's position—one regarding the number of times the kohen gadol must sprinkle the blood of the bull and goat in the Sanctuary (Heichal) on Yom Kippur, and one regarding the amount of flour required for the loaves of matza that accompany the thanksgiving offering. Each of these laws is derived by means of a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition, along with something explicitly stated or derived by a gezeira shava. Each difficulty is resolved. The Mishna stated that the Pesach may be eaten only until midnight. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria, but Rabbi Akiva permits it until dawn. Each derives their opinion from a different verse.
Public and individual sin offerings are categorized as kodshei kodashim. Public offerings include the goat offerings on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays. They are slaughtered and blood is accepted in the North of the Azara. The blood is sprinkled on the top of the altar. The kohen goes onto the sovev, a ledge of the altar, one cubit wide and five cubits off the ground that extends across the length of the altar. From there, he walks around the altar, placing the blood, using his finger, at the top of the altar near the horns. The remainder of the blood is then spilled at the base of the altar, and the meat can be prepared in all manners, and is eaten by male kohanim for that day and night, until midnight. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood was placed on the horns, while Rebbi holds that the blood just needs to be placed above the red line at the mid-height of the altar (chut hasikra). Within Rebbi's opinion, there is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar whether it needs to be placed on the edge of the corner or can it be up to a cubit away from the corner. Even though a braita clearly states "the edge of the corner," it is possible that is only ideally, but a cubit away would be sufficient as well. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rebbi regarding the blood of a bird burnt offering, which can be done anywhere above the red line, but distinguishes between that and the sin offering of an animal as the Torah specified kranot, horns. The Gemara brings a source for Rebbi's opinion from Yechezkel 43:15 and a source for the red line from Shmot 27:5. There is a debate regarding the placement of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar – some say both were on the Western part of the base, some say both were on the Southern part and some say the inner ones were poured on the Western part, while the outer ones were placed on the Southern part. What is the basis for the different opinions? The burnt offering is slaughtered in the North and blood is collected in the North. The blood is placed on two corners, but covers all four sides. Rav and Shmuel, based on a tannaitic debate, disagree about whether the kohen throws the blood twice in each corner to get on both sides or in one throw reaching both sides. The blood was placed only from two corners, as one of the corners does not have a yesod, base, underneath and the blood of the burnt offering needs to be placed on the altar where there is a base underneath, as derived from verses earlier in the Gemara. Why was there no base on the East and South sides? Since that area was specifically part of Yehuda's territory, and the rest of the altar was in Binyamin's territory, they did not extend the base there, as Binyamin was promised that the altar would be in his territory.
Public and individual sin offerings are categorized as kodshei kodashim. Public offerings include the goat offerings on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays. They are slaughtered and blood is accepted in the North of the Azara. The blood is sprinkled on the top of the altar. The kohen goes onto the sovev, a ledge of the altar, one cubit wide and five cubits off the ground that extends across the length of the altar. From there, he walks around the altar, placing the blood, using his finger, at the top of the altar near the horns. The remainder of the blood is then spilled at the base of the altar, and the meat can be prepared in all manners, and is eaten by male kohanim for that day and night, until midnight. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood was placed on the horns, while Rebbi holds that the blood just needs to be placed above the red line at the mid-height of the altar (chut hasikra). Within Rebbi's opinion, there is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar whether it needs to be placed on the edge of the corner or can it be up to a cubit away from the corner. Even though a braita clearly states "the edge of the corner," it is possible that is only ideally, but a cubit away would be sufficient as well. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rebbi regarding the blood of a bird burnt offering, which can be done anywhere above the red line, but distinguishes between that and the sin offering of an animal as the Torah specified kranot, horns. The Gemara brings a source for Rebbi's opinion from Yechezkel 43:15 and a source for the red line from Shmot 27:5. There is a debate regarding the placement of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar – some say both were on the Western part of the base, some say both were on the Southern part and some say the inner ones were poured on the Western part, while the outer ones were placed on the Southern part. What is the basis for the different opinions? The burnt offering is slaughtered in the North and blood is collected in the North. The blood is placed on two corners, but covers all four sides. Rav and Shmuel, based on a tannaitic debate, disagree about whether the kohen throws the blood twice in each corner to get on both sides or in one throw reaching both sides. The blood was placed only from two corners, as one of the corners does not have a yesod, base, underneath and the blood of the burnt offering needs to be placed on the altar where there is a base underneath, as derived from verses earlier in the Gemara. Why was there no base on the East and South sides? Since that area was specifically part of Yehuda's territory, and the rest of the altar was in Binyamin's territory, they did not extend the base there, as Binyamin was promised that the altar would be in his territory.
Rabbi Daniel Walker, leader of the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation in Manchester, became a symbol of courage during the Yom Kippur 2025 terrorist attack on his shul. When the attacker tried to storm the building with a knife, Rabbi Walker bravely held the doors shut, protecting his congregants while two community members tragically lost their lives. He has since vowed that he will not let the darkness win and continues to lead his community and the Jewish people of the UK.✬ SPONSORS OF THE EPISODE ✬► Shilo: Help Heal the Hearts of Israeli ChildrenThousands of Israeli children are affected by terrorism daily. Your support can help create more stories of strength and resilience, like that of Hadar and her siblings.Help Here→ https://bit.ly/4nvOfPu► Touro: Your Next StepTouro's Lander College for Men / Beis Medrash L'Talmud offers a powerful balance of rigorous Torah learning and top-tier academics, guided by rebbeim and faculty who truly care about your growth. With 20+ majors, direct Medical and Dental Honors Pathways, and unmatched career outcomes, it's where driven students achieve greatness without compromising their values. See it for yourself at their Open House on November 9th.→ https://rmi.touro.edu/lcm2/► Feldheim: Best New Books for Your HomeTully Gets Hooked on Books:A fun and heartwarming story that shows kids just how exciting reading can be. Join Tully as he discovers the magic, adventure, and joy hidden inside every book.BUY HERE → https://bit.ly/3LiRf4sAmoraim Series:The beloved Amoraim Series brings the great sages of the Gemara to life with vivid stories and beautiful illustrations that inspire children to learn and love Torah. Explore the lives, wisdom, and courage of three new heroes of our heritage.→ Rabbi Elazar ben Pedas: https://bit.ly/4oNI5vj→ Rav Huna: https://bit.ly/4olr1wW→ Rav Yehuda: https://bit.ly/4hC1RaJLet My Nation Begin:Experience the miracles and challenges of Yetzias Mitzrayim through this powerful and inspiring retelling of Klal Yisrael's journey from slavery to freedom. Perfect for readers of all ages who want to feel the story of the Exodus come alive.BUY HERE → https://bit.ly/3L9n0gq► Wheels To Lease: #1 Car CompanyFor over 35 years, Wheels To Lease has offered stress-free car buying with upfront pricing, no hidden fees, and door-to-door delivery.Call today!→ CALL/TEXT: 718-871-8715→ EMAIL: inspire@wheelstolease.com→ WEB: https://bit.ly/41lnzYU→ WHATSAPP: https://wa.link/0w46ce✬ IN MEMORY OF ✬This episode is in memory of:• Miram Sarah bas Yaakov Moshe• Shimon Dovid ben Yaakov ShloimaThis episode is for the speedy recovery of:• Yosef Chaim ben Devorah Chaya Golda#iftnLchaim.
A sin offering that is slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the sacrifice is valid. However, if the owner slaughtered it thinking that the animal was not sacred, it is disqualified. The second category is called mitasek, one who did not at all intend to do the act. The source for this disqualification is brought from two verses, as two are necessary to prove that the intention for the act of slaughtering a sacrifice is an essential component. The Gemara explains that both tanna kama in the Mishna and Rabbi Yosi hold that the intention that is necessary, and can disqualify, is that of the kohen performing the sacrificial rites (or non-kohen who slaughtered). However, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Yosi holds that the owner's intention can disqualify a sacrifice. Abaye brings two others who seem to have a similar opinion to Rabbi Elazar regarding other areas of halakha. Each case involves an instance where one person is performing an action on someone else's item, and the owner's intent can determine the status of the item. One case deals with slaughtering for idol worship, and the other is whether or not an item is considered significant enough to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. The fifth perek specifies details relating to all the sacrifices, including the location of the slaughtering and acceptance of the blood, where the blood is placed, etc. It begins with kodshei kodashim, a higher level of sanctity. The slaughtering of these sacrifices must take place on the northern side of the Azara. Before the Mishna details each of the offerings, it begins with a general statement about all kodshei kodashim and says their slaughtering is performed in the North. Why didn't it also mention another issue that is true for all of them - that their blood is collected in a sacred vessel? The Gemara explains that at first, they thought the blood of the leper could be collected in the kohen's hand, but they then realized that his hand can be used only for the blood going on the leper's ear, finger, and toe. The blood that is placed on the altar must first be placed in a sacred vessel. Since they originally thought otherwise, and two kohanim accept blood, each in a different manner, this is omitted from the opening line of the Mishna.
In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe continues the discussion of Tractate Bava Metzia 84b, focusing on Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon's emotional and spiritual struggle after executing a guilty laundryman (referenced from a prior episode, likely tied to the “vinegar, son of wine” incident). The episode explores themes of guilt, divine justice, Torah study, and the efficacy of prayer, connecting them to personal anecdotes and broader Jewish responsibilities. Key points include:Rabbi Elazar's Guilt and Suffering: Rabbi Elazar, a marshal who executed a disrespectful laundryman (justified by the man's capital offense), feels lingering guilt despite following the law. Like a police officer experiencing PTSD after a justified shooting, Rabbi Elazar cannot rely on his reasoning to absolve himself and accepts physical suffering as atonement. He suffers a severe illness, losing blood and pus nightly, but recovers after his wife prepares 60 types of fig-based food (lifta). He converses with his afflictions, inviting them at night but dismissing them in the morning to avoid disrupting Torah study, showing his dedication despite pain (0:26–3:32).Wife's Reaction and Wealth: His wife, frustrated by his self-imposed suffering and believing he squandered her father's wealth, leaves for her father's house. Sixty sailors then bring Rabbi Elazar 60 slaves with 60 money bags, preparing 60 types of lifta, restoring his wealth. He tells his daughter to inform her mother that “ours is greater than theirs,” citing Proverbs 31:14 (from Eishet Chayil) to affirm that Torah brings sustenance from afar. His wife's absence allows him to return to the study hall (3:32–6:45).Rabbinic Rulings and Validation: In the study hall, Rabbi Elazar examines 60 blood samples from women checking for ritual purity (tahar) during their seven clean days post-menstruation. He declares all samples pure, enabling marital resumption after mikvah. Other rabbis question the statistical likelihood of all 60 being pure, suggesting an error. Rabbi Elazar prays that if his rulings are correct, the women will conceive boys (who cannot become niddah); if incorrect, at least one girl (who can become niddah) will be born. All 60 babies are boys, named after him, validating his rulings and demonstrating divine confirmation (7:07–14:21).Transmission of Halacha: Rabbi Wolbe explains the expertise required to identify impure blood, a skill transmitted from Moshe at Sinai through generations of rabbis, including himself, underscoring the mesorah (oral tradition). This parallels other halachic details (e.g., temple offerings) requiring precise training, like distinguishing colors of blood (8:39–11:27).Prayer's Efficacy: Addressing his daughter's question, Rabbi Wolbe shares a personal story of praying at the Western Wall for a son to fulfill Pidyon HaBen (redeeming the firstborn), which was granted, and accepting Hashem's choice of a daughter for his second child. He clarifies that Hashem answers all prayers, but not always as requested, citing “Ein Tfilason Chozeres Reikam” (no prayer returns empty). Answers may be “no” or “wait,” tailored to what's best, as seen in Rabbi Elazar's answered prayer (15:04–17:08).Broader Lessons: The episode emphasizes human sensitivity in upholding justice (Rabbi Elazar's guilt), the transformative power of Torah study despite physical suffering, and the communal responsibility to trust expert rabbinic rulings. Rabbi Wolbe connects this to the upcoming holidays (Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, Sukkot, post-October 8, 2025), urging listeners to carry forward spiritual growth and good deeds._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on September 12, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 31, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content. _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life. To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Justice, #Law, #Morality, #Guilt, #Redemption, #TorahStudy, #Faith, #Patience, #Prayer ★ Support this podcast ★
In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe continues the discussion of Tractate Bava Metzia 84b, focusing on Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon's emotional and spiritual struggle after executing a guilty laundryman (referenced from a prior episode, likely tied to the “vinegar, son of wine” incident). The episode explores themes of guilt, divine justice, Torah study, and the efficacy of prayer, connecting them to personal anecdotes and broader Jewish responsibilities. Key points include:Rabbi Elazar's Guilt and Suffering: Rabbi Elazar, a marshal who executed a disrespectful laundryman (justified by the man's capital offense), feels lingering guilt despite following the law. Like a police officer experiencing PTSD after a justified shooting, Rabbi Elazar cannot rely on his reasoning to absolve himself and accepts physical suffering as atonement. He suffers a severe illness, losing blood and pus nightly, but recovers after his wife prepares 60 types of fig-based food (lifta). He converses with his afflictions, inviting them at night but dismissing them in the morning to avoid disrupting Torah study, showing his dedication despite pain (0:26–3:32).Wife's Reaction and Wealth: His wife, frustrated by his self-imposed suffering and believing he squandered her father's wealth, leaves for her father's house. Sixty sailors then bring Rabbi Elazar 60 slaves with 60 money bags, preparing 60 types of lifta, restoring his wealth. He tells his daughter to inform her mother that “ours is greater than theirs,” citing Proverbs 31:14 (from Eishet Chayil) to affirm that Torah brings sustenance from afar. His wife's absence allows him to return to the study hall (3:32–6:45).Rabbinic Rulings and Validation: In the study hall, Rabbi Elazar examines 60 blood samples from women checking for ritual purity (tahar) during their seven clean days post-menstruation. He declares all samples pure, enabling marital resumption after mikvah. Other rabbis question the statistical likelihood of all 60 being pure, suggesting an error. Rabbi Elazar prays that if his rulings are correct, the women will conceive boys (who cannot become niddah); if incorrect, at least one girl (who can become niddah) will be born. All 60 babies are boys, named after him, validating his rulings and demonstrating divine confirmation (7:07–14:21).Transmission of Halacha: Rabbi Wolbe explains the expertise required to identify impure blood, a skill transmitted from Moshe at Sinai through generations of rabbis, including himself, underscoring the mesorah (oral tradition). This parallels other halachic details (e.g., temple offerings) requiring precise training, like distinguishing colors of blood (8:39–11:27).Prayer's Efficacy: Addressing his daughter's question, Rabbi Wolbe shares a personal story of praying at the Western Wall for a son to fulfill Pidyon HaBen (redeeming the firstborn), which was granted, and accepting Hashem's choice of a daughter for his second child. He clarifies that Hashem answers all prayers, but not always as requested, citing “Ein Tfilason Chozeres Reikam” (no prayer returns empty). Answers may be “no” or “wait,” tailored to what's best, as seen in Rabbi Elazar's answered prayer (15:04–17:08).Broader Lessons: The episode emphasizes human sensitivity in upholding justice (Rabbi Elazar's guilt), the transformative power of Torah study despite physical suffering, and the communal responsibility to trust expert rabbinic rulings. Rabbi Wolbe connects this to the upcoming holidays (Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, Sukkot, post-October 8, 2025), urging listeners to carry forward spiritual growth and good deeds._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on September 12, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 31, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content. _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life. To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Justice, #Law, #Morality, #Guilt, #Redemption, #TorahStudy, #Faith, #Patience, #Prayer ★ Support this podcast ★
A sin offering that is slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the sacrifice is valid. However, if the owner slaughtered it thinking that the animal was not sacred, it is disqualified. The second category is called mitasek, one who did not at all intend to do the act. The source for this disqualification is brought from two verses, as two are necessary to prove that the intention for the act of slaughtering a sacrifice is an essential component. The Gemara explains that both tanna kama in the Mishna and Rabbi Yosi hold that the intention that is necessary, and can disqualify, is that of the kohen performing the sacrificial rites (or non-kohen who slaughtered). However, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Yosi holds that the owner's intention can disqualify a sacrifice. Abaye brings two others who seem to have a similar opinion to Rabbi Elazar regarding other areas of halakha. Each case involves an instance where one person is performing an action on someone else's item, and the owner's intent can determine the status of the item. One case deals with slaughtering for idol worship, and the other is whether or not an item is considered significant enough to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. The fifth perek specifies details relating to all the sacrifices, including the location of the slaughtering and acceptance of the blood, where the blood is placed, etc. It begins with kodshei kodashim, a higher level of sanctity. The slaughtering of these sacrifices must take place on the northern side of the Azara. Before the Mishna details each of the offerings, it begins with a general statement about all kodshei kodashim and says their slaughtering is performed in the North. Why didn't it also mention another issue that is true for all of them - that their blood is collected in a sacred vessel? The Gemara explains that at first, they thought the blood of the leper could be collected in the kohen's hand, but they then realized that his hand can be used only for the blood going on the leper's ear, finger, and toe. The blood that is placed on the altar must first be placed in a sacred vessel. Since they originally thought otherwise, and two kohanim accept blood, each in a different manner, this is omitted from the opening line of the Mishna.
התוכן עמ"ש בזהר פ' תזריע שר' אלעזר ור' אבא הלכו בדרך ופתח ר' אלעזר ודרש עה"פ [בראשון דפ' לך לך] "אמרי נא אחותי את" וכו', מסביר אאמו"ר הטעם שדרש על פסוק זה דוקא, כי ר' אלעזר ור' אבא הם בדוגמת אברהם ושרה (חכמה ובינה), ולכן בהליכתם בדרך דרש על פסוק זה המדבר בהליכת אברהם ושרה בדרך. ויש לבאר גם שייכות הענינים בתוכן, ובהקדמה: אע"פ שהליכת אברהם ושרה בדרך היתה כפשוטו (כידוע הסיפור בימי הרשב"א בקשר לזה), יש לדעת שכ"ז הוא "גופי תורה", ויש גם "נשמתא דאורייתא", פנימיות הדברים: מטרת ופנימיות הכוונה בהליכת אברהם ושרה (חכמה ובינה) בדרך היתה כדי לברר הניצוצי קדושה שבכסף וזהב וכו' של מצרים ולהעלותם לארץ ישראל, לקדושה, "למען ייטב לי בעבורך". ועד"ז היתה הכוונה בהליכת ר"א ור"א בדרך (אע"פ שר' אלעזר הי' "תורתו אומנתו" וכן ר' אבא שהתחבר אליו, ואיך הפסיקו ויצאו לדרך? אלא) שהיו מוכרחים לצאת מביהמ"ד כדי לברר הניצוצי קדושה שבדרך.ב' חלקים מהתוועדות מוצש"פ תזו"מ ה'תשל"ט ל"הנחה פרטית" או התרגום ללה"ק של השיחה: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=31-10-2025 Synopsis The Zohar states on parashas Tazria that Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Abba were once traveling, when Rabbi Elazar expounded on the verse (at the beginning of parashas Lech Lecha), “Please say that you are my sister…”. My father explains that the reason Rabbi Elazar expounded specifically on this verse is because Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Abba correspond to Avraham and Sarah (Chochmah and Binah). Therefore, when they were traveling, he expounded upon this verse, which talks about Avraham and Sarah traveling. We can explain that there is also a thematic connection between the journey of Avraham and Saraha and the journey of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Abba, by way of introduction: We know that while Avraham and Sarah's journey took place physically (the body of Torah), there is also a deeper meaning (the soul of Torah): the inner purpose of Avraham and Sarah's journey was to refine the sparks of holiness contained in the silver and gold of Egypt and to elevate them to holiness (“Eretz Yisroel), as alluded to in the verse, “…so that it may go well with me because of you.” Similarly, this was the intent Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Abba's journey: Although “Torah was their sole occupation” (and therefore they would not ordinarily interrupt their learning for travel), they were compelled to leave the beis midrash in order to refine the sparks of holiness along the way.2 excerpts from farbrengen of Motzaei Shabbos parashas Tazria-Metzora 5739 For a transcript in English of the Sicha: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=31-10-2025 לזכות ר' לוי הלוי בן לאה שי' לרפואה שלימהנדבת משפחתו שי'
The halakha was decided according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Shimon regarding pigul in the inner sin offerings. Rava (and some say Rav Yosef) wondered: Why is halacha being decided on a matter that is no longer relevant in our times? To this, Abaye responded: "Expound and receive reward." Is there a difference between offerings brought by non-Jews and those brought by Jews? Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi disagree on this matter. From which verses does Rabbi Shimon derive that certain laws do not apply to offerings brought by non-Jews? A baraita is brought which states that the tzitz (forehead plate of the High Priest) does not atone for offerings brought by non-Jews. Does this baraita align with the opinion of Rabbi Yosi as well? The prohibition against eating notar (leftover sacrificial meat) and tamei (impure items) applies even to offerings that do not have elements permitting consumption. What is the source for these halakhot?
The halakha was decided according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Shimon regarding pigul in the inner sin offerings. Rava (and some say Rav Yosef) wondered: Why is halacha being decided on a matter that is no longer relevant in our times? To this, Abaye responded: "Expound and receive reward." Is there a difference between offerings brought by non-Jews and those brought by Jews? Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi disagree on this matter. From which verses does Rabbi Shimon derive that certain laws do not apply to offerings brought by non-Jews? A baraita is brought which states that the tzitz (forehead plate of the High Priest) does not atone for offerings brought by non-Jews. Does this baraita align with the opinion of Rabbi Yosi as well? The prohibition against eating notar (leftover sacrificial meat) and tamei (impure items) applies even to offerings that do not have elements permitting consumption. What is the source for these halakhot?
Study Guide Zeiri explains a very complicated braita referring to leniencies and stringencies regarding an impure person eating consecrated items and why each needed to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. A braita is brought to explain the source of the law that one receives karet for eating part of a sacrifice that became pigul only if there is an action that permits it to be eaten or burned on the altar. The braita brings drashot on the verse in Vayikra 7:18 explaining how it applies to sacrifices other than peace offerings. It also specifies what items can and cannot become pigul. The braita says the oil of the leper can become pigul, but libations that are brought with a sacrifice cannot. This seems to contradict, as the oil follows Rabbi Meir's position and the libations follow that rabbi's position. Three possible solutions are suggested, but the first is rejected. From where do we derive that the meat of the bird sin offering is permitted for the kohen to eat? Rabbi Elazar cites a position of Rabbi Yosi that while there is pigul in the sin offerings whose blood is brought on the inner altar, it is only if both the action when the pigul thought occurs and the action that the thought is about occurs outside the sanctuary, in the Azara.
Study Guide Zeiri explains a very complicated braita referring to leniencies and stringencies regarding an impure person eating consecrated items and why each needed to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. A braita is brought to explain the source of the law that one receives karet for eating part of a sacrifice that became pigul only if there is an action that permits it to be eaten or burned on the altar. The braita brings drashot on the verse in Vayikra 7:18 explaining how it applies to sacrifices other than peace offerings. It also specifies what items can and cannot become pigul. The braita says the oil of the leper can become pigul, but libations that are brought with a sacrifice cannot. This seems to contradict, as the oil follows Rabbi Meir's position and the libations follow that rabbi's position. Three possible solutions are suggested, but the first is rejected. From where do we derive that the meat of the bird sin offering is permitted for the kohen to eat? Rabbi Elazar cites a position of Rabbi Yosi that while there is pigul in the sin offerings whose blood is brought on the inner altar, it is only if both the action when the pigul thought occurs and the action that the thought is about occurs outside the sanctuary, in the Azara.
In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Bava Metzia 84a, focusing on the profound relationship between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, their transformative encounter, and the tragic fallout of their dispute. The episode delves into themes of Torah's transformative power, respect for teachers, self-sufficiency, and the Jewish people's global mission. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's Encounter: Rabbi Yochanan, swimming in the Jordan River, is pursued by Reish Lakish, a highway robber. Rabbi Wolbe digresses to note the Jordan's flow from the sweet Sea of Galilee (a “giver”) to the bitter Dead Sea (a “taker”), symbolizing the sweetness of giving. Rabbi Yochanan praises Reish Lakish's strength, suggesting he redirect it to Torah study, while Reish Lakish retorts that Rabbi Yochanan's beauty suits women. Rabbi Yochanan offers his sister in marriage if Reish Lakish repents, leading to his transformation. Reish Lakish weakens physically upon accepting Torah, as Torah shifts focus from physical to spiritual pursuits, consuming one's energy (6:11–9:54).Torah's Transformative Power: Rabbi Wolbe explains that Torah is not just a subject but a “sam hachaim” (elixir of life), weakening physical desires to strengthen spiritual ones. Reish Lakish's sudden weakness reflects Torah's overwhelming influence, countering the Yetzer Hara (evil inclination), which distracts from study (e.g., causing sleepiness or daydreaming, per Psalms 20). This underscores the incompatibility of material and spiritual pursuits, critiquing modern attempts to “have it all” (e.g., 2008 mortgage crisis).Their Dispute and Tragedy: Years later, as scholars, they debate when a vessel becomes susceptible to tumah (ritual impurity): Rabbi Yochanan says when metals are fused; Reish Lakish says when polished. Rabbi Yochanan's comment, “A thief knows the tools of thievery,” is meant constructively but offends Reish Lakish, who retorts, “How have you benefited me?” Rabbi Yochanan responds that he brought him under the Divine Presence. Reish Lakish's disrespect causes divine retribution, leading to his illness and death. Rabbi Yochanan's sister pleads for mercy, but he cites verses (Jeremiah 49:11) to prioritize divine justice, as Reish Lakish's contempt endangered their bond and the nation's spiritual integrity (29:34–32:14).Rabbi Yochanan's Grief: Rabbi Yochanan is heartbroken, grieving Reish Lakish's loss. A new student, Rabbi Elazar ben Pedas, merely affirms Rabbi Yochanan's teachings, unlike Reish Lakish's challenging 24 questions and answers, which clarified Torah through debate. Rabbi Yochanan's anguish drives him to madness, and the rabbis pray for his death, as his bond with Reish Lakish was central to his existence (50:30–54:38)._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on September 5, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 24, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content. _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life. To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Yochanan, #ReishLakish, #BavaMitzia, #mentorship, #parenting, #marriage, #authority, #respect, #leadership, #reverence ★ Support this podcast ★
In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Bava Metzia 84a, focusing on the profound relationship between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, their transformative encounter, and the tragic fallout of their dispute. The episode delves into themes of Torah's transformative power, respect for teachers, self-sufficiency, and the Jewish people's global mission. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's Encounter: Rabbi Yochanan, swimming in the Jordan River, is pursued by Reish Lakish, a highway robber. Rabbi Wolbe digresses to note the Jordan's flow from the sweet Sea of Galilee (a “giver”) to the bitter Dead Sea (a “taker”), symbolizing the sweetness of giving. Rabbi Yochanan praises Reish Lakish's strength, suggesting he redirect it to Torah study, while Reish Lakish retorts that Rabbi Yochanan's beauty suits women. Rabbi Yochanan offers his sister in marriage if Reish Lakish repents, leading to his transformation. Reish Lakish weakens physically upon accepting Torah, as Torah shifts focus from physical to spiritual pursuits, consuming one's energy (6:11–9:54).Torah's Transformative Power: Rabbi Wolbe explains that Torah is not just a subject but a “sam hachaim” (elixir of life), weakening physical desires to strengthen spiritual ones. Reish Lakish's sudden weakness reflects Torah's overwhelming influence, countering the Yetzer Hara (evil inclination), which distracts from study (e.g., causing sleepiness or daydreaming, per Psalms 20). This underscores the incompatibility of material and spiritual pursuits, critiquing modern attempts to “have it all” (e.g., 2008 mortgage crisis).Their Dispute and Tragedy: Years later, as scholars, they debate when a vessel becomes susceptible to tumah (ritual impurity): Rabbi Yochanan says when metals are fused; Reish Lakish says when polished. Rabbi Yochanan's comment, “A thief knows the tools of thievery,” is meant constructively but offends Reish Lakish, who retorts, “How have you benefited me?” Rabbi Yochanan responds that he brought him under the Divine Presence. Reish Lakish's disrespect causes divine retribution, leading to his illness and death. Rabbi Yochanan's sister pleads for mercy, but he cites verses (Jeremiah 49:11) to prioritize divine justice, as Reish Lakish's contempt endangered their bond and the nation's spiritual integrity (29:34–32:14).Rabbi Yochanan's Grief: Rabbi Yochanan is heartbroken, grieving Reish Lakish's loss. A new student, Rabbi Elazar ben Pedas, merely affirms Rabbi Yochanan's teachings, unlike Reish Lakish's challenging 24 questions and answers, which clarified Torah through debate. Rabbi Yochanan's anguish drives him to madness, and the rabbis pray for his death, as his bond with Reish Lakish was central to his existence (50:30–54:38)._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on September 5, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 24, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content. _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life. To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Yochanan, #ReishLakish, #BavaMitzia, #mentorship, #parenting, #marriage, #authority, #respect, #leadership, #reverence ★ Support this podcast ★
During the Paschal sacrifice, the drain in the floor of the Azara was plugged to ensure that any spilled blood would be collected. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis offer different explanations for this practice. Rabbi Yehuda says the blood was collected and placed on the altar in case some of the blood from the sacrifices had spilled and had not yet been brought to the altar. The rabbis explain that it was to demonstrate the dedication of the kohanim, who stood knee-deep in blood as they performed their service. Each opinion faces challenges. Regarding Rabbi Yehuda, the Gemara asks how the blood could be valid for the altar if it had not been collected in a sanctified vessel. After resolving this, another issue is raised: the dam hatamtzit, the residual internal blood, might nullify the dam hanefesh, the lifeblood that exits during slaughter and is valid for the altar. Regarding the rabbis, the Gemara questions whether the accumulated blood would create a chatzitza, an interposition between the kohanim’s feet and the floor, potentially invalidating their service. It also asks whether the blood-soaked garments would be rendered unfit for priestly service. All these objections are ultimately resolved. The laws of pigul apply only to parts of the animal designated for consumption or burning on the altar. If a priest has a pigul thought, such as intending to eat or burn a part of the sacrifice beyond its permitted time, it only renders the sacrifice pigul if the thought concerns a part meant to be eaten or burned. Non-edible or non-sacrificial parts, such as the hide, tendons, horns, and similar items, are not subject to pigul. In a female animal, a thought regarding the fetus, placenta, or eggs does not render the sacrifice pigul. If a sacrifice becomes pigul, consuming the milk or eggs does not incur karet. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether a pigul thought regarding a non-sacrificial item, such as intending to eat something not meant to be eaten or burn something not meant to be burned, can render the offering pigul. Rabbi Eliezer is more stringent, while the rabbis are lenient. Rabbi Elazar adds that while a thought about a fetus or similar part does not independently render the sacrifice pigul, if the animal itself becomes pigul due to improper intent, then those parts, like the fetus, are also considered pigul. Three sources, including the Mishna under discussion, are brought to support Rabbi Elazar’s position. Attempts to refute his view are made, but ultimately only an inference from our Mishna stands as a conclusive proof in his favor. A Mishna in Zevachim 84a records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis regarding a blemished animal that was mistakenly brought to the altar. Rabbi Akiva holds that if the animal has already been placed on the altar, it is not removed. The rabbis disagree, requiring its removal. The Gemara qualifies Rabbi Akiva’s leniency with three limitations: the ruling applies only to certain types of blemishes; if the blemish was present before the animal was sanctified, it must be removed; and a female animal designated for a burnt offering is also removed. Rabbi Zeira raises a challenge to the third limitation based on a braita previously cited in a discussion concerning Rabbi Eliezer. This challenge is ultimately resolved.
During the Paschal sacrifice, the drain in the floor of the Azara was plugged to ensure that any spilled blood would be collected. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis offer different explanations for this practice. Rabbi Yehuda says the blood was collected and placed on the altar in case some of the blood from the sacrifices had spilled and had not yet been brought to the altar. The rabbis explain that it was to demonstrate the dedication of the kohanim, who stood knee-deep in blood as they performed their service. Each opinion faces challenges. Regarding Rabbi Yehuda, the Gemara asks how the blood could be valid for the altar if it had not been collected in a sanctified vessel. After resolving this, another issue is raised: the dam hatamtzit, the residual internal blood, might nullify the dam hanefesh, the lifeblood that exits during slaughter and is valid for the altar. Regarding the rabbis, the Gemara questions whether the accumulated blood would create a chatzitza, an interposition between the kohanim’s feet and the floor, potentially invalidating their service. It also asks whether the blood-soaked garments would be rendered unfit for priestly service. All these objections are ultimately resolved. The laws of pigul apply only to parts of the animal designated for consumption or burning on the altar. If a priest has a pigul thought, such as intending to eat or burn a part of the sacrifice beyond its permitted time, it only renders the sacrifice pigul if the thought concerns a part meant to be eaten or burned. Non-edible or non-sacrificial parts, such as the hide, tendons, horns, and similar items, are not subject to pigul. In a female animal, a thought regarding the fetus, placenta, or eggs does not render the sacrifice pigul. If a sacrifice becomes pigul, consuming the milk or eggs does not incur karet. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether a pigul thought regarding a non-sacrificial item, such as intending to eat something not meant to be eaten or burn something not meant to be burned, can render the offering pigul. Rabbi Eliezer is more stringent, while the rabbis are lenient. Rabbi Elazar adds that while a thought about a fetus or similar part does not independently render the sacrifice pigul, if the animal itself becomes pigul due to improper intent, then those parts, like the fetus, are also considered pigul. Three sources, including the Mishna under discussion, are brought to support Rabbi Elazar’s position. Attempts to refute his view are made, but ultimately only an inference from our Mishna stands as a conclusive proof in his favor. A Mishna in Zevachim 84a records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis regarding a blemished animal that was mistakenly brought to the altar. Rabbi Akiva holds that if the animal has already been placed on the altar, it is not removed. The rabbis disagree, requiring its removal. The Gemara qualifies Rabbi Akiva’s leniency with three limitations: the ruling applies only to certain types of blemishes; if the blemish was present before the animal was sanctified, it must be removed; and a female animal designated for a burnt offering is also removed. Rabbi Zeira raises a challenge to the third limitation based on a braita previously cited in a discussion concerning Rabbi Eliezer. This challenge is ultimately resolved.
In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe discusses a passage from Tractate Baba Metzia 83b, focusing on an aggadic narrative about Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and a Talmudic exposition of Psalms 104:20. The episode explores themes of divine justice, human sensitivity, and the role of punishment in Jewish law, using a story about Rabbi Elazar's tenure as a marshal arresting thieves. Key points include:Talmudic Exposition (Psalms 104:20): Rabbi Yosef (or a braisa) interprets “You make darkness, and it is night, in it every forest beast stirs” as this world being like night, where the wicked roam like beasts without immediate retribution. The righteous receive punishment in this world to preserve their reward in the “day” of the world to come, where clarity prevails. This world is for action (mitzvahs), as one cannot perform deeds like charity after death.Rabbi Elazar's Story: Rabbi Elazar, appointed by the king to arrest thieves, is questioned by Rabbi Yeshua ben Korcha for handing over Jews to execution, earning the rebuke “vinegar, son of wine” (implying he's a lesser version of his father, Rabbi Shimon). Elazar defends himself, claiming he removes “thorns from the vineyard” (evil from Israel), but is told the vineyard's owner (God) should handle it. He advises the marshal to identify thieves by observing who drinks and dozes at the fourth hour (10 AM), ruling out scholars, laborers, or quiet craftsmen. Appointed to enforce this method, Elazar arrests a disrespectful laundryman who calls him “vinegar, son of wine.” The laundryman is executed, causing Elazar distress, but it's revealed he deserved it for a capital offense (cohabitating with a betrothed woman on Yom Kippur). Elazar's relief is confirmed when his surgically removed fat doesn't rot, symbolizing his righteousness (Psalms 16:9).Sensitivity in Punishment: Rabbi Wolbe emphasizes the sages' sensitivity, even when enforcing justice. Elazar's remorse, despite the laundryman's guilt, reflects this, as does a surgical test to confirm his integrity. Rabbi Wolbe contrasts this with modern prosecutors' lack of introspection, urging sensitivity even when enforcing laws (e.g., deporting illegal immigrants). He shares his grandfather's teaching against hasty punishment, especially with children, advocating apologies and reflection to avoid harm, as punishment should be a last resort.Additional Narrative: The Talmud digresses to discuss Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yishmael's obesity, addressing a noblewoman's claim that their size prevented them from having children. Their responses defend their ability, showing concern for their children's legitimacy, not personal pride. The Talmud compares sages' physical attributes humorously, emphasizing their humanity.Broader Message: The episode underscores that divine justice operates providentially (e.g., the laundryman's execution), but human enforcers must act with sensitivity, reflecting on potential errors. Rabbi Wolbe connects this to parenting and societal laws, advocating a balance between the letter and spirit of the law, and highlights that this world's “night” is for action, not just punishment.The episode concludes with a preview of next week's discussion on Baba Metzia 84a about the beauty of Jerusalem's people and a call to share Torah content._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on July 25, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 10, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content. _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life. To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Metaphor, #Darkness, #Light, #Righteous, #Wicked, #Leadership, #Sensitivity, #Criticism, #MoralJudgment, #Accountability, #Respect, #Authority ★ Support this podcast ★
In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe discusses a passage from Tractate Baba Metzia 83b, focusing on an aggadic narrative about Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and a Talmudic exposition of Psalms 104:20. The episode explores themes of divine justice, human sensitivity, and the role of punishment in Jewish law, using a story about Rabbi Elazar's tenure as a marshal arresting thieves. Key points include:Talmudic Exposition (Psalms 104:20): Rabbi Yosef (or a braisa) interprets “You make darkness, and it is night, in it every forest beast stirs” as this world being like night, where the wicked roam like beasts without immediate retribution. The righteous receive punishment in this world to preserve their reward in the “day” of the world to come, where clarity prevails. This world is for action (mitzvahs), as one cannot perform deeds like charity after death.Rabbi Elazar's Story: Rabbi Elazar, appointed by the king to arrest thieves, is questioned by Rabbi Yeshua ben Korcha for handing over Jews to execution, earning the rebuke “vinegar, son of wine” (implying he's a lesser version of his father, Rabbi Shimon). Elazar defends himself, claiming he removes “thorns from the vineyard” (evil from Israel), but is told the vineyard's owner (God) should handle it. He advises the marshal to identify thieves by observing who drinks and dozes at the fourth hour (10 AM), ruling out scholars, laborers, or quiet craftsmen. Appointed to enforce this method, Elazar arrests a disrespectful laundryman who calls him “vinegar, son of wine.” The laundryman is executed, causing Elazar distress, but it's revealed he deserved it for a capital offense (cohabitating with a betrothed woman on Yom Kippur). Elazar's relief is confirmed when his surgically removed fat doesn't rot, symbolizing his righteousness (Psalms 16:9).Sensitivity in Punishment: Rabbi Wolbe emphasizes the sages' sensitivity, even when enforcing justice. Elazar's remorse, despite the laundryman's guilt, reflects this, as does a surgical test to confirm his integrity. Rabbi Wolbe contrasts this with modern prosecutors' lack of introspection, urging sensitivity even when enforcing laws (e.g., deporting illegal immigrants). He shares his grandfather's teaching against hasty punishment, especially with children, advocating apologies and reflection to avoid harm, as punishment should be a last resort.Additional Narrative: The Talmud digresses to discuss Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yishmael's obesity, addressing a noblewoman's claim that their size prevented them from having children. Their responses defend their ability, showing concern for their children's legitimacy, not personal pride. The Talmud compares sages' physical attributes humorously, emphasizing their humanity.Broader Message: The episode underscores that divine justice operates providentially (e.g., the laundryman's execution), but human enforcers must act with sensitivity, reflecting on potential errors. Rabbi Wolbe connects this to parenting and societal laws, advocating a balance between the letter and spirit of the law, and highlights that this world's “night” is for action, not just punishment.The episode concludes with a preview of next week's discussion on Baba Metzia 84a about the beauty of Jerusalem's people and a call to share Torah content._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on July 25, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 10, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content. _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life. To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Metaphor, #Darkness, #Light, #Righteous, #Wicked, #Leadership, #Sensitivity, #Criticism, #MoralJudgment, #Accountability, #Respect, #Authority ★ Support this podcast ★
Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza—an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both “kohen” and “finger,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either “finger” appears alone or “kohen” together with “finger”. According to Rabbi Yochanan’s rule that the mention of “kohen” implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava—a textual analogy—from the three mentions of “right” in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word “kohen”? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.
Today's daf is sponsored by Elana Kermaier in loving memory of her father, Moishe Fox, Moshe Yehuda ben Harav Binyamin and Chaya Tzipora, on his seventh yahrzeit. "I miss his smile, his chuckle, his humor, and his warmth more and more as the years go by." If the kohen does not stand directly on the floor but rather on an object placed upon the floor while performing one of the central sacrificial rites, this is considered a chatzitza—an interposition—and disqualifies the sacrifice. From where is this derived? The Mishna presents three examples of such interpositions between the kohen and the floor. Each example is necessary to illustrate different types of chatzitzot. A braita is cited with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling: if a kohen has one foot on the ground and the other on an object, and the object is removed such that he can stand solely on the grounded foot, the sacrifice remains valid. Rabbi Ami raises a question regarding a kohen standing on a loose stone. One version of his inquiry concerns whether the looseness of the stone constitutes a chatzitza. An alternative version explores whether, if the stone were removed and the kohen stood directly on the ground beneath, the rite would be valid. The Mishna also discusses a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding whether accepting the blood with the left hand renders the sacrifice invalid. Their disagreement centers on the interpretation of the verse in Vayikra 4:25. Three explanations are offered by Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Abaye to clarify the root of the dispute. Abaye further notes a third interpretation by Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that while the blood must be accepted with the right hand, the sprinkling may be performed with the left. Rabba bar bar Channa quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who teaches that if the Torah mentions both “kohen” and “finger,” the action must be performed with the right hand. Rava clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan meant that even if either term appears independently, the right hand is required. Abaye limits this principle to essential sacrificial rites. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon requires the right hand if either “finger” appears alone or “kohen” together with “finger”. According to Rabbi Yochanan’s rule that the mention of “kohen” implies the use of the right hand, why did Rava derive a gezera shava—a textual analogy—from the three mentions of “right” in the leper purification ritual (right hand, right foot, right ear), applying one of them to kemitza (the flour offering), when the verse already includes the word “kohen”? This is there to teach an additional halakha that requires the right hand.
Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.
Rebbi and Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the sanctification of a kohen’s hands and feet, performed before Temple service, is nullified each night, requiring repetition the next morning. According to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon, the sanctification remains valid overnight, and there is no need to repeat it. Ilfa raises a question based on this view: If the sanctification remains valid overnight, is the water in the Temple’s basin also unaffected and not disqualified by nightfall? Rabbi Ami quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who reports that Ilfa later answered that the water is indeed not disqualified overnight. However, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna challenges this conclusion. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple—the muchni—which lowered the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified by remaining overnight. The Gemara attempts to use this source to support the possibility that Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon holds the water is disqualified overnight. This is based on an earlier Mishna in the same chapter that discusses the location of the bull’s slaughter on Yom Kippur, which aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: the area between the altar and the ulam (entrance hall), designated for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). If the earlier Mishna accords with his opinion, it stands to reason that the later Mishna accords with his opinion as well. However, since the passage can also be interpreted in accordance with Rebbi’s view, no definitive conclusion is reached. A Mishna in Yoma describes a device used in the Temple, the muchni, to lower the water into a well each night to prevent it from becoming disqualified overnight. The Gemara attempts to prove that this source aligns with Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view, proving that he holds the water is disqualified overnight, as an earlier Mishna in the chapter that describes the location of the slaughtering of the bull on Yom Kippur accords with his opinion. This location, between the altar and the ulam, matches Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s opinion regarding the designated area for slaughtering kodashei kodashim (most holy offerings). However, the passage can also be interpreted according to Rebbi’s view, so no definitive conclusion is reached. Rabbi Yochanan rules that a kohen who removes ashes from the altar during the final part of the night sanctifies his hands and feet for the day, despite it still being nighttime. Abaye explains this ruling according to Rebbi, while Rava explains it according to Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon. A challenge is raised against Rava’s interpretation, but it is ultimately resolved. Two additional questions are discussed: Does leaving the Temple cancel the sanctification of one’s hands and feet? Four sources are brought to address this, but each is rejected, and the question remains unresolved. Does becoming impure cancel the sanctification? Two of the sources cited in the previous discussion are brought in an attempt to answer this question as well.
In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.
In the discussion regarding whether an improper intention, such as intending to eat or burn the meat outside its designated time, or to place the blood at the wrong time, during the act of dipping the finger into the blood of a sin offering brought on the inner altar renders the offering pigul, the Gemara presents two contradictory braitot. This suggests a tannaitic dispute over whether dipping the finger is akin to conveying the blood to the altar in a standard sacrifice. Initially, the Gemara attempts to resolve the contradiction by aligning the braitot with the views of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to this approach, both agree that dipping is equivalent to conveying the blood, but Rabbi Shimon holds that conveying is not an essential avoda (sacrificial service). However, this resolution is rejected, since Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul does not apply to sacrifices whose blood is placed on the inner altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the two braitot refer to different types of sin offerings - one brought on the inner altar and one on the outer altar. Dipping is essential for the inner altar offering, as the verse states, “and he dips his finger,” and therefore an improper intention during this act would render the offering pigul. In contrast, the outer altar offering does not require dipping, as the verse merely states, “the kohen takes the blood,” without mentioning dipping. Reish Lakish explains that according to Rabbi Shimon, an improper intention regarding the type of sacrifice during the act of conveying the blood to the inner altar would disqualify the offering, since the animal cannot be slaughtered adjacent to the inner altar, making the act of conveying necessary. This seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon’s position that an “outside its time” intention does not render such a sacrifice pigul, which would imply that a mistaken intention regarding the type of sacrifice should also not disqualify it. Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina resolves this by clarifying that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an “outside its time” intention disqualifies the sacrifice, even though it does not render it pigul. The Gemara further derives that an “outside its place” intention would also disqualify this type of offering. Rava explores Rabbi Shimon’s position, as interpreted by Reish Lakish, regarding conveying the blood to the inner altar as being essential. He considers various scenarios depending on whether Rabbi Shimon accepts other positions. For instance, if Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son’s view that kodshei kodashim may be slaughtered between the ulam and the altar, then improper intention would only disqualify the sacrifice from the entrance to the ulam, since slaughtering adjacent to the ulam is permissible. Rava also discusses the case of carrying frankincense from the shulchan (table) in the sanctuary to burn it on the outer altar. The point at which intention disqualifies the offering depends on differing views regarding the sanctity of the ulam and the azara. Abaye asks Rav Chisda whether the blood is disqualified if conveyed by a non-kohen. Rav Chisda responds that it is not, citing a verse as proof. However, Rav Sheshet presents a braita suggesting the opposite. Raba and Rav Yosef argue that the answer depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Abaye challenges their position, and Ulla quotes Rabbi Elazar’s ruling that even Rabbi Shimon would disqualify conveying by a non-kohen. Another question arises: Is conveying without moving one’s feet considered valid conveying? After three unsuccessful attempts to prove this from various sources, Ulla rules in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that valid conveying requires movement of the feet.
Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.
Ben Beteira maintains that a Pesach sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of a different offering on the morning of the fourteenth is also disqualified. Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, explains that Ben Beteira considers the morning a valid time for offering the Pesach sacrifice. Although the verse uses the phrase “bein ha’arbayim,” typically understood as “afternoon,” Rabbi Oshaya interprets it as “between two evenings,” encompassing the entire day. Several challenges are raised against this interpretation, referencing the timing of the daily afternoon Tamid offering, the incense, and the lighting of the menorah. In each case, it is argued that a separate verse specifies that these rituals must occur specifically in the afternoon. After further scrutiny, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation is ultimately rejected. Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative understanding of Ben Beteira’s position: while the Pesach sacrifice cannot be slaughtered in the morning, that time is still considered “its time” for the purpose of disqualifying a sacrifice offered with the intent of a different offering, since part of the day is designated for the Pesach, the entire day carries implications for intent. Rabbi Abahu challenges this view, arguing that if an animal is designated in the morning or earlier, it becomes disqualified that morning, as it cannot be offered either as a Pesach or a peace offering. This prior disqualification would prevent the animal from being offered later in the afternoon, as it had already been rejected for a period of time. Rabbi Abahu, Abaye, and Rav Papa each propose possible resolutions to this difficulty. Rabbi Zeira ask Rabbi Abahu that base don his previous question it seems that Rabbi Yochanan holds that live animals can be rejected from sacrifice, not only after slaughter. Rabbi Abahu affirms this and supports it with a ruling from Rabbi Yochanan, from which three principles regarding the rejection of offerings are derived, including that live animals can indeed be rejected from the altar. The Gemara continues with additional statements from Rabbi Yochanan about sacrifices that become permanently disqualified, such as when a person renounces the religion or becomes a shoteh (mentally incapacitated). Ben Azai holds that even a burnt offering brought with improper intent is disqualified. Rav Huna attempts to source this opinion from the Torah verse “olah hu” (“it is a burnt offering”). When this is rejected, the reasoning shifts to a kal va’chomer argument: since a burnt offering is more stringent than a sin offering, being entirely consumed, it should be subject to stricter rules. However, this reasoning is also challenged, as both the Pesach and sin offerings have unique stringencies not applicable to burnt offerings.
Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.
Study Guide Zevachim 11 The Gemara seeks to find a source for the opinion of the rabbis that the blood of the guilt offering whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary is not disqualified. Why is the guilt offering not treated like the sin offering? After the first attempt by a logical kal v’chomer argument is rejected, they learn it from a drasha from the verse relating to that law. According to the rabbis’ opinion in our Mishna that a sin offering slaughtered with intent for another offering is disqualified, but a guilt offering is not, one can understand the comparison in a braita of two different types of meal offering – one to a sin offering (will be disqualified is offered for the wrong sacrifice) and one to a guilt offering (will not be disqualified. In the braita, this is derived from a verse, Vayikra 6:10. How does Rabbi Eliezer understand this verse, which differentiates between sin and guilt offerings? To answer the question, they quote a Mishna with a different differentiation. This leads to a further question as both sources quote Rabbi Shimon – how can he derive two different things from the same verse? This question is resolved as well. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in our Mishna was derived from a verse that compared the guilt offering to a sin offering. The rabbis use that verse to derive that a guilt offering also requires smicha, leaning on the animal. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabba explain that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi’s position in the Mishna that an offering brought for a Pesach (on the 14th of Nissan) is disqualified as well. Rabba points out that he disagrees, though, about an offering brought with the intent of a sin offering and does not hold that it is disqualified. To prove this, a lengthy braita is quoted, featuring a debate between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, as well as the logical arguments of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer's attempts to disprove them. In the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that an offering slaughtered with intent for a sin offering is disqualified. Shimon ben Azaria holds that an offering brought with the intention of a higher level of sanctity is not disqualified, but one brought with the intention of a lower level is. The source for this is from Vayikra 22:15. Does he disagree on two counts and he holds that it also atones for the owner, or not? This question is left unanswered. Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira disagree in the Mishna about a Pesach sacrifice that was slaughtered for the intent of a different sacrifice on the morning of the fourteenth will be disqualified as well. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, explains that their disagreement is broader as they also disagree about whether a Pesach sacrificed slaughtered for its own sake will be accepted if it was slaughtered in the morning, meaning, is the morning also a valid time for bringing the Pesach sacrifice.
Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering (lo lishma). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner's obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all? Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs. Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish’s view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer’s position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well. Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma. Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: “And he slaughtered it as a sin offering” (Vayikra 4:33). From the word “it,” we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma. The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner's obligation. Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v’chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone (“And he slaughtered it as a sin offering”). Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn’t Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn’t Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother’s burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?
Continuing the discussion surrounding Reish Lakish’s response to Rabbi Elazar, the Gemara examines whether heirs acquire the sacrificial offering of someone who dies. Various sources are presented supporting both sides of the debate. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the heirs do not acquire the offering, though they may receive a limited degree of atonement through it. Another question arises regarding a sacrifice brought lo lishma, with intent for a different type of offering. If the original sacrifice is still offered, does it fulfill its intended purpose? If not, why is it brought at all? And if it does, why is a second offering required? Rav Ashi clarifies that the first offering is brought due to the power of its original designation, while the second is needed to achieve full atonement. The Gemara also explores whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments that were neglected between the time the animal was designated and the time it was slaughtered, or only for those neglected before its designation. Sources are cited in an attempt to resolve this question.
Reish Lakish grappled with the legal concept of a sacrifice slaughtered with the intent of fulfilling a different offering (lo lishma). If such a sacrifice is valid and not disqualified, why does it fail to fulfill the owner's obligation? And conversely, if it does not fulfill the obligation, why is it offered at all? Rabbi Elazar responded by citing a precedent: a sacrifice that does not provide atonement but is nevertheless brought. For example, when a woman gives birth, she becomes obligated to bring a pair of birds—one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering. If she dies before fulfilling this obligation, her children still bring the burnt offering. In this case, the sacrifice is offered despite not providing atonement for the heirs. Reish Lakish accepted that there is precedent for bringing a burnt offering, and similarly for offerings like the peace offering, which may be brought without atonement. However, he continued to question the case of the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar replied that Reish Lakish’s view aligns with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, who holds that a guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not for its intended purpose. Yet Reish Lakish resisted being confined to Rabbi Eliezer’s position, expressing a desire to understand the mainstream view as well. Reish Lakish then proposed that the principle might be derived from Devarim 23:24, which discusses a neder (vow) that becomes a nedava (voluntary offering). This verse had previously been interpreted as referring to a sacrifice brought lo lishma. Some questioned this verse being used by Reish Lakish, as the verse only applies to voluntary offerings, such as those brought through a vow, and not to obligatory ones like the guilt offering. In response, Abaye suggested that Reish Lakish intended to derive the principle from both that verse and another: “And he slaughtered it as a sin offering” (Vayikra 4:33). From the word “it,” we learn that only a sin offering is disqualified when not brought lishma. The verse in Devarim then explains that although other sacrifices may be brought, they do not fulfill the owner's obligation. Although the verse in Devarim refers specifically to burnt and peace offerings, Abaye argued that the principle could be extended to guilt offerings through a kal v’chomer argument. However, this reasoning was rejected, as one can distinguish between voluntary and obligatory offerings. Rava then suggested a different derivation from Vayikra 7:37, which juxtaposes various types of sacrifices in a single verse. This allows the laws of lishma to be extended from the peace offering to other offerings as well. This interpretation compares the other offerings to the peace offering, which is valid even when not brought lishma, rather than to the sin offering, which is disqualified, as per the earlier drasha that limited the disqualification to the sin offering alone (“And he slaughtered it as a sin offering”). Later, other rabbis revisited the discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar, raising two questions. First, why didn’t Rabbi Elazar respond that a guilt offering can also be brought after death? Rav Sheshet addressed this question. Second, why didn’t Reish Lakish counter that the heirs who bring their mother’s burnt offering do, in fact, receive atonement—thus undermining the precedent cited by Rabbi Elazar?
Continuing the discussion surrounding Reish Lakish’s response to Rabbi Elazar, the Gemara examines whether heirs acquire the sacrificial offering of someone who dies. Various sources are presented supporting both sides of the debate. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the heirs do not acquire the offering, though they may receive a limited degree of atonement through it. Another question arises regarding a sacrifice brought lo lishma, with intent for a different type of offering. If the original sacrifice is still offered, does it fulfill its intended purpose? If not, why is it brought at all? And if it does, why is a second offering required? Rav Ashi clarifies that the first offering is brought due to the power of its original designation, while the second is needed to achieve full atonement. The Gemara also explores whether a burnt offering can atone for positive commandments that were neglected between the time the animal was designated and the time it was slaughtered, or only for those neglected before its designation. Sources are cited in an attempt to resolve this question.
Daily Halacha Podcast - Daily Halacha By Rabbi Eli J. Mansour
Before one learns Torah in the morning, he must first recite Birkot Ha'Torah. The Gemara cites different opinions as to which particular subjects within the broad corpus of Torah may not be studied before the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. Rav Huna maintained that only the study of Tanach requires Birkot Ha'Torah; in his view, one may study anything else before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. Rabbi Elazar ruled that both Tanach and Midrash require Birkot Ha'Torah, because the Midrash explains the verses of the Tanach. The next opinion brought is that of Rabbi Yohanan, who held that even the study of Mishna must be preceded by Birkot Ha'Torah. However, Halacha follows the final view brought by the Gemara – that of Raba, who asserted that even Gemara requires Birkot Ha'Torah. Accordingly, the Rambam and Shulhan Aruch write that one must recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying either Tanach or any part of Torah She'be'al Peh (the oral law). Although the Shulhan Aruch does not specify the study of Midrash, the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles of Cracow, 1520-1572) adds that Midrash also requires the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. The Peri Hadash (Rav Hizkiya Da Silva, 1659-1698) writes that the Shulhan Aruch does not disagree with the Rama on this point, even though he did not specifically mention Midrash. The Aruch Ha'shulhan (Rav Yehiel Michel Epstein of Nevardok, 1829-1908) notes the possibility of restricting this requirement to areas related to Halacha. It is possible, he writes, that Birkot Ha'Torah is required only before the study of texts that form the basis of Halacha. The Sages infer Halachot from the verses, and these inferences and their applications are discussed, elucidated and debated in the Midrash, Mishna and Gemara – and it might be for this reason that these texts are specified as the material requiring Birkot Ha'Torah. If so, then one would be permitted to study non-halachic portions of the Torah – such as the stories in Midrashic texts, Aggadic portions of the Gemara, and Zohar – before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. The Aruch Ha'shulhan remains uncertain about this matter. By contrast, the Kaf Ha'haim Sofer (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939) writes that the study of the Zohar requires Birkot Ha'Torah. He does not explain the reason for this ruling, but we may presume that he equated the study of Zohar with the study of Gemara, and, moreover, we occasionally determine practical Halacha based on teachings in the Zohar. The final Halacha is that even the study of non-halachic texts such as the Midrash and Zohar requires Birkot Ha'Torah. The study of works of Mussar also requires Birkot Ha'Torah, because these works are based upon Torah sources. Texts such as Mesilat Yesharim and Michtab Me'Eliyahu, which guide and instruct how to live a religious life, are rooted entirely in Torah, and so they certainly qualify as parts of Torah requiring the recitation of Birkot Ha'Torah. This applies to works of Hassidic teachings, as well. In principle, biographies of Sadikim, or story books that tell about the lives of great Sages, may be read before Birkot Ha'Torah, because reading these stories – despite being very valuable – does not qualify as the study of Torah. In practice, however, books about great Rabbis almost invariably contain Torah insights which they taught, and so they require Birkot Ha'Torah. One is not required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying general subjects, even those subjects which have great value and are important to learn. For example, one must study math in order to properly understand certain sections of the Gemara, such as those which deal with geometry (e.g. Sukka, Erubin and Kil'ayim). There are texts which address the dimensions and layout of the Bet Ha'mikdash which similarly cannot be understood without a background in mathematics. Scientific knowledge, too, is critically important for the understanding of certain sections of the Talmud – such as the Gemara's discussion about the volume of wine which a Nazir must drink to be liable for violating his vow, which touches upon the subject of volume displacement. This issue requires an understanding of how displacement works, and how the density of wine becomes a factor. One cannot understand the portions of the Talmud that deal with the Jewish calendar without basic knowledge of astronomy. An understanding of modern technology, too, is necessary for learning how Halacha applies in our time, and indeed, Hacham Ovadia Yosef studied the mechanics of boilers in order to determine the relevant Halachot. Nevertheless, the study of these subjects does not require Birkot Ha'Torah, since they are not actual Torah, but rather background information to help in the study of Torah. The Rambam writes that subjects such as mathematics and science are the "chefs" and "maidservants" of Torah, meaning, they are necessary for the understanding of Torah, but are not part of Torah. Therefore, one is not required to recite Birkot Ha'Torah before studying general subjects. Summary: One may not learn any Torah subject before reciting Birkot Ha'Torah in the morning. This includes Tanach, Midrash, Mishna, Gemara, Halachic texts, Zohar, Mussar and Hassidut. Biographies of Sadikim, too, require Birkot Ha'Torah since they usually incorporate Torah insights by the Sages whose lives and legacy they present. Birkot Ha'Torah is not required before the study of non-Torah subjects, even those which are necessary to learn to properly understand Torah.
This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans. The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering. There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.
This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans. The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering. There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that the exemption discussed in the Mishna—for an individual who follows an erroneous ruling of the court—is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. However, the other rabbis disagree and require the individual to bring a sin offering. In contrast, Rav Nachman, also quoting Shmuel, asserts that the Mishna reflects Rabbi Meir’s view, with the rabbis again dissenting. This dispute between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis appears in a braita, though it is unclear whether the braita is actually addressing this specific issue. Rav Papa offers an alternative interpretation of the braita, followed by three additional suggestions. Rav Asi maintains that the majority required for a communal sin offering refers specifically to the majority of Jews living in Israel, as supported by a verse in Melachim I (8:65). A question arises: if the people sinned while constituting a majority, but by the time the offering is to be brought, they are no longer the majority (e.g., due to death), are they still obligated to bring the offering? The Gemara links this to a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding a king who sinned before ascending the throne and only later realized his error once he had become king. The rabbis hold that he must bring an individual sin offering, since obligation is determined at the time of the sin. Rabbi Shimon, however, argues that both the sin and its realization must occur while the individual is in the same status—thus exempting the king entirely. The Gemara then explores whether this principle can be applied to a case where the people sinned as a minority and later became a majority. It concludes that the comparison is invalid, since Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning hinges on the sin and realization occurring during the same period of obligation, which does not apply in this scenario. A series of unresolved questions is posed regarding whether two distinct teaching errors could combine to obligate the community in a communal sin offering. None of these questions receives definitive answers. Rabbi Yonatan holds that a communal offering is only warranted if the court’s ruling was unanimous. However, after three challenges are raised against his position, the final one leads to its rejection. Ultimately, all judges—and even students present during deliberation—share responsibility for the verdict. As a result, rabbis would often invite others to participate in the judgment process, thereby distributing the responsibility more broadly. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? Rabbi Shimon does not obligate in a sacrifice, but Rabbi Elazar requires an asham talui, a provisional guilt offering. However, their debate only applies in cases where the person was in the city. If they were out of town, all agree that there is an exemption, as they had no way to know about the corrected ruling. A communal sin offering is relevant for erroneous rulings regarding details of a Torah law, but not if they rule to uproot a Torah law completely. Rav explains Rabbi Shimon’s position and the Gemara raises a difficulty to Rav from a braita, but resolves it.
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that the exemption discussed in the Mishna—for an individual who follows an erroneous ruling of the court—is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. However, the other rabbis disagree and require the individual to bring a sin offering. In contrast, Rav Nachman, also quoting Shmuel, asserts that the Mishna reflects Rabbi Meir’s view, with the rabbis again dissenting. This dispute between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis appears in a braita, though it is unclear whether the braita is actually addressing this specific issue. Rav Papa offers an alternative interpretation of the braita, followed by three additional suggestions. Rav Asi maintains that the majority required for a communal sin offering refers specifically to the majority of Jews living in Israel, as supported by a verse in Melachim I (8:65). A question arises: if the people sinned while constituting a majority, but by the time the offering is to be brought, they are no longer the majority (e.g., due to death), are they still obligated to bring the offering? The Gemara links this to a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding a king who sinned before ascending the throne and only later realized his error once he had become king. The rabbis hold that he must bring an individual sin offering, since obligation is determined at the time of the sin. Rabbi Shimon, however, argues that both the sin and its realization must occur while the individual is in the same status—thus exempting the king entirely. The Gemara then explores whether this principle can be applied to a case where the people sinned as a minority and later became a majority. It concludes that the comparison is invalid, since Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning hinges on the sin and realization occurring during the same period of obligation, which does not apply in this scenario. A series of unresolved questions is posed regarding whether two distinct teaching errors could combine to obligate the community in a communal sin offering. None of these questions receives definitive answers. Rabbi Yonatan holds that a communal offering is only warranted if the court’s ruling was unanimous. However, after three challenges are raised against his position, the final one leads to its rejection. Ultimately, all judges—and even students present during deliberation—share responsibility for the verdict. As a result, rabbis would often invite others to participate in the judgment process, thereby distributing the responsibility more broadly. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? Rabbi Shimon does not obligate in a sacrifice, but Rabbi Elazar requires an asham talui, a provisional guilt offering. However, their debate only applies in cases where the person was in the city. If they were out of town, all agree that there is an exemption, as they had no way to know about the corrected ruling. A communal sin offering is relevant for erroneous rulings regarding details of a Torah law, but not if they rule to uproot a Torah law completely. Rav explains Rabbi Shimon’s position and the Gemara raises a difficulty to Rav from a braita, but resolves it.
What is the single most important quality a person can hold onto in life? In this episode, we dive into the Mishnah in Pirkei Avot where Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai asks his students: What is the best path a person should cling to? Each student suggests something different—generosity, friendship, foresight, kindness—but Rabbi Elazar says: a good heart.Why did Rabbi Yochanan declare this the most valuable path of all? What does it mean to truly have a “good heart”—and how does that shape the way we see others, ourselves, and even God?Join us as we explore:The different answers the students gave and why each mattersWhy a good heart includes all the other qualitiesThis Mishnah invites us to reframe success—not by what we achieve or acquire, but by the quality of our inner world and how it radiates outward.
What is the figure of a dragon that is prohibited? One descriptor is scales between the joints, and that is determined to be the halakhah. Also, the story how Rabbi Elazar ben HaKappar found a ring on the road with the depiction of a dragon and he insisted that an adult non-Jew nullify the idolatrous status of it -- with 3 laws being learned from his behavior. Plus, the fact that the change of status of any item when it is saved from wild animals or a destructive river, or so on -- so why did he need a non-Jew to change the status, when that ring was just found on the road? It depends on the despair of the original owner, but that assumes that the finder is Jewish and not going to sell it. Also, the prohibition against depicting the celestial bodies - but Rabban Gamliel had images of the moon to help assess witnesses who come to testify about the new moon - but how could he have those images?! What about a menorah? There are concerns about replication. Likewise, the faces that are part of God's heavenly throne - how could those images be replicated? The Gemara distinguishes between worshipping (obviously prohibited) vs. depicting, which seems to have been done, and therefore flies in the face of the prohibition.
Vinegar produced by idol worshippers from beer is prohibited if there is a concern that wine yeast may have been added during its preparation. The Hadrianic earthenware shards are prohibited for any benefit, as they were soaked in wine with the intention that the absorbed wine would later be used to produce more wine. Rav Dimi provides a description of their preparation and use. A question is raised regarding whether one may benefit from the shards when the benefit comes not from the wine but from the shard itself—such as placing them under the legs of a bed for support. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan hold differing views on this issue. A difficulty is posed from a braita that supports the permissive opinion, but it is ultimately resolved. A second, seemingly contradictory braita is introduced to challenge the first, and it too is resolved with two possible explanations. What are the necessary criteria to prohibit a hide of an animal with an incision found near the heart—specifically, when can it be assumed that such an incision was made to remove the heart as part of an idolatrous offering? The Mishna discusses the status of an animal slaughtered and handled by an idol worshipper when carried into or out of a house of idol worship. Under what circumstances is there concern that the animal is being offered as a sacrifice to an idol, thereby rendering it prohibited for Jewish benefit? Which tannaitic authorities does the Mishna align with in this context? Is it permissible to engage in business dealings with idol worshippers as they enter or exit Tarput (either a festival or house of idol worship)? How does this ruling differ from conducting business with a Jew in similar circumstances? What are the reasons for this distinction?
In Tehillim 1:1, the verse begins with "ashrei ha'ish," happy is the man. According to Rabbi Yonantan, the man is Avraham, who did not associate himself with the dor haflaga, the people of Sodom and the Philistines. A similar verse in Tehillim 112:1 employs the same phrase "ashrei ish" who fears God. Why is the masculine form used and not the feminine? Two explanations are offered: happy is the person who repents when still young or happy is the person who can control one's evil inclination like a man, i.e., a warrior overcoming his enemies. The continuation of the verse is, "He delights in God's mitzvot." This is explained as one who does mitzvot for the sake of doing a mitzva and not for receiving a reward. In Tehillim 1:1-2, the verse says that instead of being with evildoers, happy is the person who desires the Torah of God. Rebbi derives from this verse that a person can only learn Torah from the parts of the Torah that one desires to study. Rava extrapolates the verse in the same way and derives other concepts about stages of learning Torah and best practices of learning Torah from these verses and others. What are the rewards received for learning Torah? The Mishna forbids building the area in the bathhouse that was built for an idol. Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that if one got paid, the money is permitted for use. How is this explained? The Mishna does not permit making jewelry for idol worship, but Rabbi Eliezer rules that one could get paid for doing that. Since one cannot sell land to gentiles in Israel, one can also not sell items that are attached to the ground, unless they are already detached. Rabbi Yehuda permits them if they are being sold to be detached after the sale.
© 2020-2025 Ivy Podcast Discovery LLC
