Podcasts about rabbi elazar

In Tehillim 1:1, the verse begins with "ashrei ha'ish," happy is the man. According to Rabbi Yonantan, the man is Avraham, who did not associate himself with the dor haflaga, the people of Sodom and the Philistines. A similar verse in Tehillim 112:1 employs the same phrase "ashrei ish" who fears God. Why is the masculine form used and not the feminine? Two explanations are offered: happy is the person who repents when still young or happy is the person who can control one's evil inclination like a man, i.e., a warrior overcoming his enemies. The continuation of the verse is, "He delights in God's mitzvot." This is explained as one who does mitzvot for the sake of doing a mitzva and not for receiving a reward. In Tehillim 1:1-2, the verse says that instead of being with evildoers, happy is the person who desires the Torah of God. Rebbi derives from this verse that a person can only learn Torah from the parts of the Torah that one desires to study. Rava extrapolates the verse in the same way and derives other concepts about stages of learning Torah and best practices of learning Torah from these verses and others. What are the rewards received for learning Torah? The Mishna forbids building the area in the bathhouse that was built for an idol. Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that if one got paid, the money is permitted for use. How is this explained? The Mishna does not permit making jewelry for idol worship, but Rabbi Eliezer rules that one could get paid for doing that. Since one cannot sell land to gentiles in Israel, one can also not sell items that are attached to the ground, unless they are already detached. Rabbi Yehuda permits them if they are being sold to be detached after the sale.      

In Tehillim 1:1, the verse begins with "ashrei ha'ish," happy is the man. According to Rabbi Yonantan, the man is Avraham, who did not associate himself with the dor haflaga, the people of Sodom and the Philistines. A similar verse in Tehillim 112:1 employs the same phrase "ashrei ish" who fears God. Why is the masculine form used and not the feminine? Two explanations are offered: happy is the person who repents when still young or happy is the person who can control one's evil inclination like a man, i.e., a warrior overcoming his enemies. The continuation of the verse is, "He delights in God's mitzvot." This is explained as one who does mitzvot for the sake of doing a mitzva and not for receiving a reward. In Tehillim 1:1-2, the verse says that instead of being with evildoers, happy is the person who desires the Torah of God. Rebbi derives from this verse that a person can only learn Torah from the parts of the Torah that one desires to study. Rava extrapolates the verse in the same way and derives other concepts about stages of learning Torah and best practices of learning Torah from these verses and others. What are the rewards received for learning Torah? The Mishna forbids building the area in the bathhouse that was built for an idol. Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that if one got paid, the money is permitted for use. How is this explained? The Mishna does not permit making jewelry for idol worship, but Rabbi Eliezer rules that one could get paid for doing that. Since one cannot sell land to gentiles in Israel, one can also not sell items that are attached to the ground, unless they are already detached. Rabbi Yehuda permits them if they are being sold to be detached after the sale.      

The foundation of Teshuvah.Source Sheet: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1051AmiojXJH3pI6z_QFPIkCnQB2syIp-/view?usp=share_link

Avodah Zara 17 : Marc Chipkin : 2025-07-05 Keeping away from sin. The story of Elazar ben Dodaya. Rabbi Elazar ben Parta gets saved.

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe continues the discussion from Tractate Berachot 5B, building on the previous episode's exploration of the three divine gifts given to the Jewish people through suffering: the Torah, the Land of Israel, and the World to Come. Rabbi Wolbe emphasizes that these gifts require immense effort and perseverance, using the analogy of running a marathon to illustrate that acquiring Torah, for instance, demands complete immersion and overcoming challenges, not innate talent alone. He shares stories of great sages like Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who achieved greatness through persistent struggle, not effortless brilliance. Addressing the Land of Israel, Rabbi Wolbe firmly asserts its divine allocation to the Jewish people, as promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, citing Rashi's commentary on the Torah's opening to underscore its eternal significance despite historical disputes. The episode delves into the concept of "afflictions of love," exploring Talmudic stories of sages like Rabbi Chia bar Abba, Rabbi Yochanan, and Rabbi Elazar, who faced illness but were revived through mutual support, highlighting the necessity of external help to overcome personal afflictions. A key story involves Rav Huna, who lost 400 barrels of wine to vinegar due to withholding a sharecropper's due, illustrating the principle of midah k'neged midah (measure for measure). After accepting correction, Rav Huna's loss was miraculously reversed, showing divine communication through afflictions. Rabbi Wolbe concludes by stressing that afflictions are purposeful messages from God to redirect and refine us, urging listeners to view challenges as opportunities for growth and connection to Hashem. The episode ends with a Q&A, affirming that God communicates clearly through tailored actions, encouraging introspection to understand and act on these divine messages.This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on June 27, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on July 4, 2025_____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Torah, #Resilience, #Israel, #Struggle, #DivineGifts, #Suffering, #Support_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org ★ Support this podcast ★

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe continues the discussion from Tractate Berachot 5B, building on the previous episode's exploration of the three divine gifts given to the Jewish people through suffering: the Torah, the Land of Israel, and the World to Come. Rabbi Wolbe emphasizes that these gifts require immense effort and perseverance, using the analogy of running a marathon to illustrate that acquiring Torah, for instance, demands complete immersion and overcoming challenges, not innate talent alone. He shares stories of great sages like Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who achieved greatness through persistent struggle, not effortless brilliance. Addressing the Land of Israel, Rabbi Wolbe firmly asserts its divine allocation to the Jewish people, as promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, citing Rashi's commentary on the Torah's opening to underscore its eternal significance despite historical disputes. The episode delves into the concept of "afflictions of love," exploring Talmudic stories of sages like Rabbi Chia bar Abba, Rabbi Yochanan, and Rabbi Elazar, who faced illness but were revived through mutual support, highlighting the necessity of external help to overcome personal afflictions. A key story involves Rav Huna, who lost 400 barrels of wine to vinegar due to withholding a sharecropper's due, illustrating the principle of midah k'neged midah (measure for measure). After accepting correction, Rav Huna's loss was miraculously reversed, showing divine communication through afflictions. Rabbi Wolbe concludes by stressing that afflictions are purposeful messages from God to redirect and refine us, urging listeners to view challenges as opportunities for growth and connection to Hashem. The episode ends with a Q&A, affirming that God communicates clearly through tailored actions, encouraging introspection to understand and act on these divine messages.This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on June 27, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on July 4, 2025_____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Torah, #Resilience, #Israel, #Struggle, #DivineGifts, #Suffering, #Support_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org ★ Support this podcast ★

Daf 17 of masechta Avodah Zarah tells several important and somewhat well known stories. The first, is the story of when Rabbi Eliezer was arrested by heretics for the capitol offense of studying the holy Torah. Wel also learn of the story of Rabbie Elazar ben Dordaya who repented at the last moment and was admitted to the world to come. The daf ends off with the story of Rabbis Chanina ben Teradyon and Elazar ben Perata, who were arrested by the Romans for studying Torah (among other offenses). Very interesting daf here on Babble on Talmud. Enjoy.Sefaria: https://www.sefaria.org/Avodah_Zarah.17a?lang=heEmail: sruli@babbleontalmud.com

What is the meaning of the phrase, "yesh koneh olamo b'shaa achat" regarding Rabbi Elazar ben Durdaya and the Roman executioner of Rabbi Chanina ben Tradyon?

Today's daf is sponsored by Rena Kurs in loving memory of Dr. Leatrice Rabinsky, on her 7th yahrzeit. "She instilled the love of learning in all of her children, grandchildren and generations of students. May her memory be for a blessing." Rav and Shmuel held that orphans cannot collect a loan of their parents from other orphans if the parent of the debtor died first, as a parent can't pass an oath on to one's children. Rabbi Elazar disagreed and permitted them to collect with an oath of orphans (that their father did not tell them that the loan was already collected). The rabbis of later generations tried to override Rav and Shmuel's opinion without success but managed to limit it in various ways. Can one do a gilgul shvua in a case where the oath is a rabbinic oath?

Today's daf is sponsored by Rena Kurs in loving memory of Dr. Leatrice Rabinsky, on her 7th yahrzeit. "She instilled the love of learning in all of her children, grandchildren and generations of students. May her memory be for a blessing." Rav and Shmuel held that orphans cannot collect a loan of their parents from other orphans if the parent of the debtor died first, as a parent can't pass an oath on to one's children. Rabbi Elazar disagreed and permitted them to collect with an oath of orphans (that their father did not tell them that the loan was already collected). The rabbis of later generations tried to override Rav and Shmuel's opinion without success but managed to limit it in various ways. Can one do a gilgul shvua in a case where the oath is a rabbinic oath?

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs.

Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters.  How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition. 

Our learning today is dedicated in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 77 years of independence. We continue to pray for the safe and speedy return of our hostages, for the safety of our soldiers, and for a refuah shleima for all the injured soldiers.  We also dedicate our learning to the speedy extinguishing of the terrible fires blazing in Israel and to the safety of the firefighters.  How were the lashes administered? Why? What situations would provide enough embarrassment for the one getting the lashes that even if some of the lashes were given or in some cases, even if none were yet administered, one would already have fulfilled receiving the punishment? Why was the whip made from a calf and a donkey? Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel holds that one who is obligated to receive karet and then receives lashes for that sin, the lashes atone for the sin and the person will no longer receive karet. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Chanina. Rav Ada proves this from a Mishna in Megilla. However, Rav Nachman and Rav Ashi reject the proof, each in a different way. The Mishna brings various statements regarding the value of observing mitzvot. When Rav Ada bar Ahava ruled like Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, Rav Yosef asked rhetorically if he had gone up to the heavens and seen that those who received lashes did not receive karet? Abaye responded that Rabbi Chanina derived it from a verse, just as in a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that there are three things the rabbis did that the heavens approved of - the obligation to read Megillat Esther, greeting a friend using the name of God, and bringing the tithes to the Temple to be distributed. Rabbi Elazar said that there are three instances where the Divine Spirit appeared in a court to intervene - with Yehuda, Shmuel, and Shlomo, as can be proven from verses in the Tanach. Rava rejects the proof from the verses, but says this was learned by a tradition. 

The braita brought on Makkot 17 with Rabbi Shimon's position is amended, as the original version was rejected. Rava ruled that a non-kohen who ate from a burnt offering before the blood was sprinkled transgressed five different transgressions. The Gemara questions why there aren't more than five transgressions, and suggests four more that could have been mentioned. They explain why each one was not in rava's list. Rav Gidel quoted a halakha in the name of Rav that a kohen that ate from a guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled would receive lashes. After raising a difficulty on this statement, they emend his words to be referring to a non-kohen andhe does not receive lashes for eating guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled.  Rabbi Elazar, and then Rabbi Yochanan are quoted as having said that placing the bikkurim is critical to the fulfillment of the mitzva, but reading the text is not. A contradiction is raised on each of them from other statements they made. However, they are resolved.

The braita brought on Makkot 17 with Rabbi Shimon's position is amended, as the original version was rejected. Rava ruled that a non-kohen who ate from a burnt offering before the blood was sprinkled transgressed five different transgressions. The Gemara questions why there aren't more than five transgressions, and suggests four more that could have been mentioned. They explain why each one was not in rava's list. Rav Gidel quoted a halakha in the name of Rav that a kohen that ate from a guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled would receive lashes. After raising a difficulty on this statement, they emend his words to be referring to a non-kohen andhe does not receive lashes for eating guilt or sin offering before the blood was sprinkled.  Rabbi Elazar, and then Rabbi Yochanan are quoted as having said that placing the bikkurim is critical to the fulfillment of the mitzva, but reading the text is not. A contradiction is raised on each of them from other statements they made. However, they are resolved.

Good Shabbos Mevarachim Chodesh Iyar, Weekly Office Learning BH Thu, Apr 24 Summary from Otter.ai • 4:05 PM • 30 min plus • Weekly Learning Introduction and Purpose 0:05 • Focus on Kisurei Hachaim and Modern Relevance 1:18 • Yom HaShoah and Its Significance 3:30 • Counting the Omer and Halachot 6:01 • Customs and Practices During the Omer 8:55 • The Role of the Tannaim and Amoraim 9:10 • The Impact of Historical Events on Modern Practices 24:01 • Respecting Different Customs and Practices 29:21 • The Role of Reminders and Tools 29:35 • Conclusion and Final Thoughts 29:5 Cover Pic The Kaliver Rebbe Ztl who survived the Shoa and rebuilt Yiddishkeit in the holy land & beyond with all the United Souls - https://eligoldsmith.substack.com/ Itamar Asked - ChatGPT 4 Great questions! Let's go through each historical event and tie them to both their Jewish (Hebrew) and general (Gregorian) calendar context:

At times, people incorrectly depict Chazal as being petty or small-minded—and they often cite stories from the Gemara that seem to support this perspective. One such Gemara is Brachos 27b which depicts Rabban Gamliel (the Nasi) putting Rabbi Yehoshua in place for arguing with him, the other Rabbanan demoting Rabban Gamliel for this mistreatment, and the ensuing events (like Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria miraculously growing a massive beard overnight). This pair of episodes analyzes this story in light of the fact these were great men.

Rabbi Elazar from Modi'in shares a list of five very different things that disqualify its doer from Olam Haba. What is the connection between these five things and why would one who does them be locked out of eternity? This Ethics Podcast was originally released on the Ethics Podcast on Apr 3, 2019 – – […]

At times, people incorrectly depict Chazal as being petty or small-minded—and they often cite stories from the Gemara that seem to support this perspective. One such Gemara is Brachos 27b which depicts Rabban Gamliel (the Nasi) putting Rabbi Yehoshua in place for arguing with him, the other Rabbanan demoting Rabban Gamliel for this mistreatment, and the ensuing events (like Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria miraculously growing a massive beard overnight). This pair of episodes analyzes this story in light of the fact these were great men.

Today's daf is sponsored by Yarden and Guy in honor of Leah Zelda Shechter's birthday! What happens to someone who doesn't teach Torah to others? What happens to someone who does? Rava, Ravina and Rav Ashi brought three more verses to prove the resurrection of the dead. Rabbi Elazar brought a statement relating to the resurrection of the dead. From there, the Gemara brings several statements from Rabbi Elazar about different topics, including the value of de'ah, leaving bread of the table in case a poor person shows up, and being humble. A braita from the school of Eliyahu teaches that when the dead are resurrected, they will not die again. The Gemara brings the verses in Ezekiel where Ezekiel brings the bones back to life. Can this be brought as a source for the resurrection of the dead or to prove that when they are brought back to life, they will not live forever? Various interpretations are brought to explain whether he really resurrected the dead (or was it just a parable) and if he did, whether they lived for a few moments or went on to lead full lives. Another question is who were the people who Ezekiel resurrected? Several suggestions are brought, and the last interpretation leads into the story of Chanania, Mishael, and Azarya.

A small corrective on Cleopatra and Rabbi Meir (we know they couldn't have actually spoken to each other; they didn't live at the same time!). From there, delving into the teachings of Rabbi Elazar, some of which are about personal conduct, some about personal intellect, and how we interact. Also, the possible people who were resurrected by Ezekiel, in restoring the dry bones of his visions to life. Plus, the fiery furnace of the Book of Daniel and Nebuchadnezzar -- borrowed by the midrash for the famous fiery furnace from which Abraham also emerges unscathed.

Today's daf is sponsored by Yarden and Guy in honor of Leah Zelda Shechter's birthday! What happens to someone who doesn't teach Torah to others? What happens to someone who does? Rava, Ravina and Rav Ashi brought three more verses to prove the resurrection of the dead. Rabbi Elazar brought a statement relating to the resurrection of the dead. From there, the Gemara brings several statements from Rabbi Elazar about different topics, including the value of de'ah, leaving bread of the table in case a poor person shows up, and being humble. A braita from the school of Eliyahu teaches that when the dead are resurrected, they will not die again. The Gemara brings the verses in Ezekiel where Ezekiel brings the bones back to life. Can this be brought as a source for the resurrection of the dead or to prove that when they are brought back to life, they will not live forever? Various interpretations are brought to explain whether he really resurrected the dead (or was it just a parable) and if he did, whether they lived for a few moments or went on to lead full lives. Another question is who were the people who Ezekiel resurrected? Several suggestions are brought, and the last interpretation leads into the story of Chanania, Mishael, and Azarya.

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

The Mishna discusses the laws of a rodef (pursuer), addressing when it is permissible to kill someone pursuing another person – either to kill or to rape. A fundamental question emerges: Is this permission based on preventing the pursuer from committing a grave offense, or is it specifically aimed at protecting the potential victim? The Mishna rules that one is not about to pursue one who is going to commit idolatry, violate Shabbat or engage in bestiality. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son Rabbi Elazar extended this rule to include some of these cases.  The Gemara examines several potential scriptural sources for the law permitting the killing of a rodef who intends to murder someone. After rejecting two initial suggestions, the law is ultimately derived through a hekeish (textual comparison) involving the rape of a betrothed young woman. The Gemara then explores which verses establish the obligation to save someone facing mortal danger, whether from drowning, wild animal attacks, or armed assailants. A braita expands upon the Mishna's teachings, and the Gemara provides derivations for the various categories where the law of rodef applies. Two additional cases from the braita are analyzed in detail: First, the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a woman who, facing imminent rape, fears that intervention could lead to her death and therefore tells potential rescuers not to intervene. Second, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction between this braita and a Mishna in Ketubot 29a, offering several resolutions to reconcile the texts.

This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment? 

This daf is sponsored anonymously. "May the passion of our daily learning be a zechut that we see more and more miracles in the coming days." The Gemara discusses a case involving a daughter of a kohen who commits adultery. Rabbi Yishmael interprets the phrase "she disgraces her father" to mean that her actions affect the respect normally given to her father as a kohen, since children's behavior reflects on their parents. People may even say to the father, "Cursed is the one who gave birth to and raised her." Regarding the death penalty by burning, the Mishna clarifies that it wasn't performed by surrounding the person with clusters of branches and lighting them on fire. Instead, the condemned person was executed by having molten lead poured down their throat. There was a debate about how to open the person's mouth: The Sages advocated strangling them until their mouth opened, while Rabbi Yehuda suggested using tongs, concerned that strangling might cause death by suffocation rather than the required death by burning. The source for this method of execution is debated. Rav Matna derives it from Korach's punishment, while Rabbi Elazar points to the death of Aharon's sons (Nadav and Avihu). Both bring textual evidence showing internal burning, though they disagree on each other's interpretations. When asked why the method isn't derived from the burning of bull offerings outside the Temple, the Gemara explains that execution by burning shares more similarities with the cases of Korach and Aharon's sons. Rav Nachman adds that the principle of "love your neighbor as yourself" requires choosing the quickest and least painful method of execution. The Gemara provides background on these biblical cases: Nadav and Avihu were punished for discussing their anticipated succession of Moshe and Aharon's leadership and wishing for Aharon and Moshe to die so they could lead. As for Korach, he gained followers by providing food, leading to flattery from the people. This caused respected Torah scholars to be diminished in Korach's eyes, ultimately leading to their downfall as they followed his rebellion. A relevant case is cited where Rav Chama bar Tovia executed a kohen's daughter by burning her with branches. Rav Yosef points out two errors: the correct method is pouring molten lead down the throat, and capital punishment cannot be carried out when the Temple is no longer in existence. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok attempted to justify external burning by citing a case he witnessed, but this was rejected for two reasons in different versions: either the court was composed of Sadducees who misunderstood the law, or Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok's testimony was invalid because he was too young at the time. How can the two versions be reconciled? The Mishna discusses decapitation by sword: How was it performed? Since this method was used by gentiles, doesn't it violate the prohibition against following their practices? What is its scriptural source? From where do we learn those who receive this punishment? Similar questions are posed about death by strangulation: How was it performed and how do we learn that adulterers receive this punishment? 

Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Yedid ben Shai Tzvi and Esther Shifra.  When a legal document of admission is written in formal judicial language but bears only two signatures, should we be concerned? The issue is whether this indicates the document was approved by only two judges instead of the required three, potentially invalidating the document. A braita discusses three scenarios involving orphans and hidden money. In these cases, the orphans learn about money their father had concealed - either from a third party during their father's life, from their father before his death, or through a dream after his death. The money in question was either owed to others or was maaser sheni (second tithe). The text examines whether the orphans may retain this money, analyzing how the different circumstances affect the ruling. Regarding judicial disagreements, there is a three-way debate about how to record the verdict. Rabbi Yochanan, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Elazar each propose different approaches: recording only the final verdict, naming which judges held which positions, or using the formula "from the statement of the judges... was deemed innocent." Their reasoning has practical implications, particularly in cases where judges err and must compensate for losses their mistakes caused. The Mishna describes court proceedings and mentions bringing "them" back in after the judges reach their decision. There is a discussion about whether "them" refers to the witnesses or the litigants. Two key questions arise regarding witness testimony: Must witnesses observe the event together, and must they testify together in court? A related issue is whether testimony is valid when two witnesses describe identical circumstances (such as a loan of the same amount between the same parties) but are actually describing separate events. These matters are debated, with arguments based on both logic and Torah verses. The resolution may differ depending on whether the case involves land or moveable property. Finally, Rav Yehuda ruled that in monetary cases, we accept witness testimony even if there are discrepancies in the bedikot (detailed questioning). The rabbis debate which types of details this ruling encompasses.

Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Yedid ben Shai Tzvi and Esther Shifra.  When a legal document of admission is written in formal judicial language but bears only two signatures, should we be concerned? The issue is whether this indicates the document was approved by only two judges instead of the required three, potentially invalidating the document. A braita discusses three scenarios involving orphans and hidden money. In these cases, the orphans learn about money their father had concealed - either from a third party during their father's life, from their father before his death, or through a dream after his death. The money in question was either owed to others or was maaser sheni (second tithe). The text examines whether the orphans may retain this money, analyzing how the different circumstances affect the ruling. Regarding judicial disagreements, there is a three-way debate about how to record the verdict. Rabbi Yochanan, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Elazar each propose different approaches: recording only the final verdict, naming which judges held which positions, or using the formula "from the statement of the judges... was deemed innocent." Their reasoning has practical implications, particularly in cases where judges err and must compensate for losses their mistakes caused. The Mishna describes court proceedings and mentions bringing "them" back in after the judges reach their decision. There is a discussion about whether "them" refers to the witnesses or the litigants. Two key questions arise regarding witness testimony: Must witnesses observe the event together, and must they testify together in court? A related issue is whether testimony is valid when two witnesses describe identical circumstances (such as a loan of the same amount between the same parties) but are actually describing separate events. These matters are debated, with arguments based on both logic and Torah verses. The resolution may differ depending on whether the case involves land or moveable property. Finally, Rav Yehuda ruled that in monetary cases, we accept witness testimony even if there are discrepancies in the bedikot (detailed questioning). The rabbis debate which types of details this ruling encompasses.

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Presentation of Relatives Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP." Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel. From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well? Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position. Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law. When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14. If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife? Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives. Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely. The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Those who sell produce during the Sabbatical year are disqualified from testifying. Rabbi Shimon (in the Mishna) explains that initially, these people were called collectors of Sabbatical produce. However, when tax collectors (anasim) became more numerous, the term changed to "sellers of Sabbatical produce." The Gemara presents two interpretations of this unclear passage, with the first interpretation being rejected. Reish Lakish was following two rabbis who were traveling to Asya to intercalate the year, as he wanted to observe their process. During their journey, they encountered people plowing and harvesting during the Sabbatical year. When Reish Lakish questioned why the rabbis weren't stopping these apparent violations, they offered possible explanations for how each person's actions might be permissible. Upon reaching their destination, the rabbis went to the second floor to deliberate about the intercalation. They climbed up using a ladder and immediately removed it to prevent Reish Lakish, whom they considered bothersome, from following them. Reish Lakish later complained to Rabbi Yochanan, declaring the rabbis to be a kesher reshaim (conspiracy of wicked people) who should not participate in the year's intercalation. The Gemara then traces the origin of the term kesher reshaim through stories about Shevna, who served as Hizkiyahu's steward. Rabbi Abahu, citing Rabbi Elazar, states that the court must publicly announce when someone is found to be disqualified from serving as a witness. Until such an announcement is made, the witnesses retain their qualification to testify. There is a specific debate regarding whether this announcement requirement applies to shepherds. Regarding wrongdoers such as those who accept charity from gentiles, engage in forbidden sexual relationships, or eat from fields during harvest season - there is a discussion of their eligibility to testify. Rav Nachman presents his views on these three cases, and the Gemara either restricts the scope of these rulings or presents opposing viewpoints.

Those who sell produce during the Sabbatical year are disqualified from testifying. Rabbi Shimon (in the Mishna) explains that initially, these people were called collectors of Sabbatical produce. However, when tax collectors (anasim) became more numerous, the term changed to "sellers of Sabbatical produce." The Gemara presents two interpretations of this unclear passage, with the first interpretation being rejected. Reish Lakish was following two rabbis who were traveling to Asya to intercalate the year, as he wanted to observe their process. During their journey, they encountered people plowing and harvesting during the Sabbatical year. When Reish Lakish questioned why the rabbis weren't stopping these apparent violations, they offered possible explanations for how each person's actions might be permissible. Upon reaching their destination, the rabbis went to the second floor to deliberate about the intercalation. They climbed up using a ladder and immediately removed it to prevent Reish Lakish, whom they considered bothersome, from following them. Reish Lakish later complained to Rabbi Yochanan, declaring the rabbis to be a kesher reshaim (conspiracy of wicked people) who should not participate in the year's intercalation. The Gemara then traces the origin of the term kesher reshaim through stories about Shevna, who served as Hizkiyahu's steward. Rabbi Abahu, citing Rabbi Elazar, states that the court must publicly announce when someone is found to be disqualified from serving as a witness. Until such an announcement is made, the witnesses retain their qualification to testify. There is a specific debate regarding whether this announcement requirement applies to shepherds. Regarding wrongdoers such as those who accept charity from gentiles, engage in forbidden sexual relationships, or eat from fields during harvest season - there is a discussion of their eligibility to testify. Rav Nachman presents his views on these three cases, and the Gemara either restricts the scope of these rulings or presents opposing viewpoints.

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Zohar for All. Lech Lecha. Rabbi Hiya Went to See Rabbi Elazar

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Zohar for All. Lech Lecha. Rabbi Hiya Went to See Rabbi Elazar

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Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Atik for the refuah shleima of Tzvi Dov Ben Sara.  A tribe that sins is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. To what is this referring? What was their sin? After rejecting the possibility that it is a regular sin with capital punishment like Shabbat or idol worship, several possibilities are suggested. Rav Matna says it is the Nasi of a tribe who sins. Ulla says it is a dispute between two tribes over property. Ravina returns to the rejected answer of idol worship and resolves the earlier difficulty by explaining that they are judged in a court of seventy-one, even though they receive the same punishment as individuals who worshipped idols. A false prophet is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived through a gezeira shava from the rebellious elder who is punished only if he rebels against a decision of the Great Sanhedrin, even though he is judged in a court of twenty-three. The High Priest is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived from the words "davar gadol" - issues relating to a gadol, a prominent person. However, others explain this as referring to a difficult matter. Rabbi Elazar asks about an ox of the High Priest that gored - would that be judged in a court of twenty-three or the Great Sanhedrin? There is no answer to this question, but Abaye infers from the question that it was obvious that a financial dispute of the High Priest is ruled in a court of three. The Great Sanhedrin needs to be part of the decision to go out to an optional war. From where is this derived? Only the Great Sanhedrin can expand the borders of Jerusalem and the azarot, and establish courts of twenty-three. These are derived from Moshe's actions, as his actions are considered equivalent to those of the Great Sanhedrin. From where is it derived that an idolatrous city is judged before the Great Sanhedrin? The derivations of other laws regarding idolatrous cities are brought - why not near the border and why not more than two cities? There are different opinions regarding how many cities can be designated as idolatrous cities, depending on location, different courts, and other factors.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Shifra Atik for the refuah shleima of Tzvi Dov Ben Sara.  A tribe that sins is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. To what is this referring? What was their sin? After rejecting the possibility that it is a regular sin with capital punishment like Shabbat or idol worship, several possibilities are suggested. Rav Matna says it is the Nasi of a tribe who sins. Ulla says it is a dispute between two tribes over property. Ravina returns to the rejected answer of idol worship and resolves the earlier difficulty by explaining that they are judged in a court of seventy-one, even though they receive the same punishment as individuals who worshipped idols. A false prophet is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived through a gezeira shava from the rebellious elder who is punished only if he rebels against a decision of the Great Sanhedrin, even though he is judged in a court of twenty-three. The High Priest is judged in the Great Sanhedrin. This is derived from the words "davar gadol" - issues relating to a gadol, a prominent person. However, others explain this as referring to a difficult matter. Rabbi Elazar asks about an ox of the High Priest that gored - would that be judged in a court of twenty-three or the Great Sanhedrin? There is no answer to this question, but Abaye infers from the question that it was obvious that a financial dispute of the High Priest is ruled in a court of three. The Great Sanhedrin needs to be part of the decision to go out to an optional war. From where is this derived? Only the Great Sanhedrin can expand the borders of Jerusalem and the azarot, and establish courts of twenty-three. These are derived from Moshe's actions, as his actions are considered equivalent to those of the Great Sanhedrin. From where is it derived that an idolatrous city is judged before the Great Sanhedrin? The derivations of other laws regarding idolatrous cities are brought - why not near the border and why not more than two cities? There are different opinions regarding how many cities can be designated as idolatrous cities, depending on location, different courts, and other factors.  

Due to the brave actions of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who defied the Roman decree forbidding semicha (ordination), the tradition of rabbinic ordination continued. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was killed for this act, but not before he ordained Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamoa. Rav Avia added that Rabbi Nechemia was also ordained at this time. While the story appears to suggest that one person alone could perform ordination, this contradicts a braita requiring three judges. The Gemara resolves this contradiction by explaining that two others must have been present with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled that rabbinic ordination cannot occur outside of Israel. The Gemara explores whether someone in Israel could ordain someone in Babylonia through written authorization or a messenger. The conclusion is that ordination requires the physical presence of both parties - the ordainer and the one being ordained must be together in person, as demonstrated by several stories of failed attempts at ordination on account of the distance. Rabbi Zeira initially hid to avoid ordination, believing it better to remain humble and avoid positions of power. However, upon hearing that one's sins are forgiven when rising to a position of authority, he agreed to be ordained. Regarding the egla arufa ceremony, Rabbi Shimon holds it requires three judges, while Rabbi Yehuda requires five. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov presents a third position not mentioned in the Mishna - that the king and High Priest must also participate. Rav Yosef concludes that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov requires the entire Great Sanhedrin to attend, supporting this with a tannatic source. While Abaye interprets this source differently, a braita is brought supporting Rav Yosef's reading. Maaser sheni whose value is unclear must be evaluated by three people. What Is meant by the term "whose value is unclear"? What kind of people can do the evaluation? The Mishna also states that evaluation of consecrated movable items requires three judges. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's position requiring ten, which he derives from the word 'kohen' appearing ten times in Vayikra 27 in the section about consecrated items. The Gemara leaves unanswered the question of how the rabbis derive their requirement of three judges.

Due to the brave actions of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who defied the Roman decree forbidding semicha (ordination), the tradition of rabbinic ordination continued. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was killed for this act, but not before he ordained Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamoa. Rav Avia added that Rabbi Nechemia was also ordained at this time. While the story appears to suggest that one person alone could perform ordination, this contradicts a braita requiring three judges. The Gemara resolves this contradiction by explaining that two others must have been present with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled that rabbinic ordination cannot occur outside of Israel. The Gemara explores whether someone in Israel could ordain someone in Babylonia through written authorization or a messenger. The conclusion is that ordination requires the physical presence of both parties - the ordainer and the one being ordained must be together in person, as demonstrated by several stories of failed attempts at ordination on account of the distance. Rabbi Zeira initially hid to avoid ordination, believing it better to remain humble and avoid positions of power. However, upon hearing that one's sins are forgiven when rising to a position of authority, he agreed to be ordained. Regarding the egla arufa ceremony, Rabbi Shimon holds it requires three judges, while Rabbi Yehuda requires five. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov presents a third position not mentioned in the Mishna - that the king and High Priest must also participate. Rav Yosef concludes that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov requires the entire Great Sanhedrin to attend, supporting this with a tannatic source. While Abaye interprets this source differently, a braita is brought supporting Rav Yosef's reading. Maaser sheni whose value is unclear must be evaluated by three people. What Is meant by the term "whose value is unclear"? What kind of people can do the evaluation? The Mishna also states that evaluation of consecrated movable items requires three judges. This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's position requiring ten, which he derives from the word 'kohen' appearing ten times in Vayikra 27 in the section about consecrated items. The Gemara leaves unanswered the question of how the rabbis derive their requirement of three judges.

This week's learning is sponsored by my parents, Paula and Robert Cohen, in loving memory of my grandmother, Sonja Waschitz, Sara bat Yitzchak z"l, on her third yahrzeit. My grandmother was always optimistic, despite the many challenges she endured, beginning with leaving her parents behind in Vienna to forge a new life in America at age 14 in 1939. She continues to serve as a role model for our entire family. Ameimar ruled that children not old enough to sell their inheritance could give it away as a gift. After being questioned by Rav Ashi, he explains the logic behind his ruling by differentiating between a sale and a gift. Rav Nachman brings in the name of Shmuel a list of cases where one must check if the person has signs of maturity to see if the action was valid. The Gemara analyzes why he brought each of the cases. The Mishna bring the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that one on one's deathbed cannot pass on possessions through words but must do an actual kinyan, act of acquisition. A debate between him and the rabbis regarding a few cases is brought - each one explains the cases in a way that supports their position. The Mishna explains a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua regarding the differences between whether an act of acquisition is not needed only on Shabbat or is not needed at all. The logic of their positions matches the logic of their argument regarding the concept of zakhin l'adam shelo b'fanav as applying only for a minor or everyone else as well.

This week's learning is sponsored by my parents, Paula and Robert Cohen, in loving memory of my grandmother, Sonja Waschitz, Sara bat Yitzchak z"l, on her third yahrzeit. My grandmother was always optimistic, despite the many challenges she endured, beginning with leaving her parents behind in Vienna to forge a new life in America at age 14 in 1939. She continues to serve as a role model for our entire family. Ameimar ruled that children not old enough to sell their inheritance could give it away as a gift. After being questioned by Rav Ashi, he explains the logic behind his ruling by differentiating between a sale and a gift. Rav Nachman brings in the name of Shmuel a list of cases where one must check if the person has signs of maturity to see if the action was valid. The Gemara analyzes why he brought each of the cases. The Mishna bring the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that one on one's deathbed cannot pass on possessions through words but must do an actual kinyan, act of acquisition. A debate between him and the rabbis regarding a few cases is brought - each one explains the cases in a way that supports their position. The Mishna explains a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua regarding the differences between whether an act of acquisition is not needed only on Shabbat or is not needed at all. The logic of their positions matches the logic of their argument regarding the concept of zakhin l'adam shelo b'fanav as applying only for a minor or everyone else as well.

Rav and Shmuel disagreed regarding a case where one promised a gift using the phrase "in life and in death." Rav held that this language indicated a deathbed gift, with "in life" being mentioned merely as an expression of hope. Shmuel, however, interpreted it as a gift from a healthy person. In Nehardea, they followed Rav's ruling. Later, Rava introduced a distinction: he argued that Rav would agree that using the phrase "from life" (rather than "in life") would be treated as a gift from a healthy person. Ameimar, however, rejected Rava's interpretation of Rav's position. When a case of this nature came before Rav Nachman in Nehardea, he sent it to be adjudicated in a different city, not wanting to rule against Shmuel in Shmuel's own city of Nehardea. In another instance, Rava ruled against a woman who tried to reclaim her gift, which was consistent with his position (as she had used the phrase "from life and in death"). When she persistently complained about his ruling, Rava arranged for another rabbi to write her the ruling she desired, but instructed him to add a citation at the bottom of the document from Bava Metzia regarding deception, signaling that he was deceiving her and the ruling should not be followed. Upon realizing this subterfuge, the woman cursed Rava that his boat should sink—and indeed, his boat sank. When a gift document lacks language indicating either a deathbed or healthy status of the giver, and there is a dispute between the giver claiming it was written while dying and the recipients claiming otherwise, who bears the burden of proof? Rabbi Meir holds that we presume the person was healthy until proven otherwise. The rabbis, however, rule that the money remains with the giver until proven otherwise. A case arose involving a deathbed gift that used appropriate deathbed gift language, but the document didn't record that the person had died. After the person's death, the recipients claimed the gift, while the heirs argued that their father had recovered from his illness (thus invalidating the gift) before becoming sick again and dying. Raba ruled in favor of the recipients, reasoning that since the person was now dead, it was likely they died from the original illness, making the gift valid. Abaye challenged Raba's ruling by citing the case of a sunken ship: even though we presume the passengers died, we must consider the possibility they survived if their bodies aren't found. Similarly, he argued, we should consider the possibility of recovery, as most sick people do recover. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, resolved the difficulty by explaining that Raba was following Rabbi Natan's position. Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov disagreed about a case where the document did not include whether given while healthy or on one's deathbed. Rabbi Yaakov held that we follow the last known presumption of ownership, regardless of current possession. Rabbi Natan ruled that we follow the current presumption - if the person is currently on their deathbed, we assume the gift was given on their deathbed; if healthy, we assume they were healthy at the time the document was written. Rabbi Elazar noted that this same dispute between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov applies to a case in Mishna Taharot 6:7 regarding ritual impurity. The case involves a valley enclosed by a fence that is defined as a public space in summer (due to heavy foot traffic) but as a private space in winter (due to minimal traffic). When there's a known dead body present but uncertainty about whether someone passed over it, the rule is: doubt in a public space yields ritual purity, while doubt in a private space yields impurity (based on Sotah laws). If it's unknown whether the person was there in summer or winter, Rabbi Yaakov would rule based on the last known presumption of the person, which means they are deemed pure, while Rabbi Natan would rule based on the current season - they would be declared impure if the issue arises in the winter, and pure if it is summer.

Rav and Shmuel disagreed regarding a case where one promised a gift using the phrase "in life and in death." Rav held that this language indicated a deathbed gift, with "in life" being mentioned merely as an expression of hope. Shmuel, however, interpreted it as a gift from a healthy person. In Nehardea, they followed Rav's ruling. Later, Rava introduced a distinction: he argued that Rav would agree that using the phrase "from life" (rather than "in life") would be treated as a gift from a healthy person. Ameimar, however, rejected Rava's interpretation of Rav's position. When a case of this nature came before Rav Nachman in Nehardea, he sent it to be adjudicated in a different city, not wanting to rule against Shmuel in Shmuel's own city of Nehardea. In another instance, Rava ruled against a woman who tried to reclaim her gift, which was consistent with his position (as she had used the phrase "from life and in death"). When she persistently complained about his ruling, Rava arranged for another rabbi to write her the ruling she desired, but instructed him to add a citation at the bottom of the document from Bava Metzia regarding deception, signaling that he was deceiving her and the ruling should not be followed. Upon realizing this subterfuge, the woman cursed Rava that his boat should sink—and indeed, his boat sank. When a gift document lacks language indicating either a deathbed or healthy status of the giver, and there is a dispute between the giver claiming it was written while dying and the recipients claiming otherwise, who bears the burden of proof? Rabbi Meir holds that we presume the person was healthy until proven otherwise. The rabbis, however, rule that the money remains with the giver until proven otherwise. A case arose involving a deathbed gift that used appropriate deathbed gift language, but the document didn't record that the person had died. After the person's death, the recipients claimed the gift, while the heirs argued that their father had recovered from his illness (thus invalidating the gift) before becoming sick again and dying. Raba ruled in favor of the recipients, reasoning that since the person was now dead, it was likely they died from the original illness, making the gift valid. Abaye challenged Raba's ruling by citing the case of a sunken ship: even though we presume the passengers died, we must consider the possibility they survived if their bodies aren't found. Similarly, he argued, we should consider the possibility of recovery, as most sick people do recover. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, resolved the difficulty by explaining that Raba was following Rabbi Natan's position. Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov disagreed about a case where the document did not include whether given while healthy or on one's deathbed. Rabbi Yaakov held that we follow the last known presumption of ownership, regardless of current possession. Rabbi Natan ruled that we follow the current presumption - if the person is currently on their deathbed, we assume the gift was given on their deathbed; if healthy, we assume they were healthy at the time the document was written. Rabbi Elazar noted that this same dispute between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov applies to a case in Mishna Taharot 6:7 regarding ritual impurity. The case involves a valley enclosed by a fence that is defined as a public space in summer (due to heavy foot traffic) but as a private space in winter (due to minimal traffic). When there's a known dead body present but uncertainty about whether someone passed over it, the rule is: doubt in a public space yields ritual purity, while doubt in a private space yields impurity (based on Sotah laws). If it's unknown whether the person was there in summer or winter, Rabbi Yaakov would rule based on the last known presumption of the person, which means they are deemed pure, while Rabbi Natan would rule based on the current season - they would be declared impure if the issue arises in the winter, and pure if it is summer.

One cannot profit from selling basic food items in Israel. If so, how did Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria profit from wine and oil in Israel? A braita ruled that one cannot profit from eggs twice. The Gemara brings two explanations for what this ruling means. Under what circumstances of financial challenges is one permitted to leave Israel? Is it forbidden to leave Israel, even if prices are expensive for basic food items if one can afford the high prices? This is proven from the book of Ruth as Elimelech and his sons were punished for this. The Gemara tangents to various drashot on verses from the beginning of the book of Ruth as well as drashot on the connection between Boaz and Ivtzan - one of the judges mentioned in the book of Shoftim/Judges. After quoting a statement of Rav Chanan son of Rava regarding Elimelech, four other statements of his are quoted. An alternative explanation of the sins of Elimelech and his family is that they should have stayed to help pray for everyone. Four statements of Rabbi Yochanan that all start with the word ‘nehirna,’ ‘I remember when’ are quoted. The sons of Elimelech, Machlon and Khilion were also mentioned in the Tanach by different names – Yoash and Saraph. Which was the real name and which was meant for extrapolation?