Podcasts about rabbi elazar

Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel's limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri's opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda's opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it.

The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved. The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance. The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed. The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi  Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion.

If one has intent to leave blood over from an animal sacrifice, does everyone agree that doing so would invalidate the offering? The Tannaim hash it out - with a focus on Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua. With a lot of heartfelt drama in the details of this passage. Also, a new mishnah: If you didn't do a whole slew of the tasks associated with the grain-offering, the tasks on that list won't invalidate the offering. Plus, the Gemara that delves into the specifics of those tasks, and why those details matter to preserve the validity of the offerings. And more on the Temple service for the shelamim - peace-offerings too. Plus, the 15 tasks associated with these grain-offerings all together.

Daf Yomi Menachos 18Episode 2217Babble on Talmud with Sruli RappsJoin the chat: https://chat.whatsapp.com/LMbsU3a5f4Y3b61DxFRsqfMERCH: https://www.etsy.com/shop/BabbleOnTalmudSefaria: https://www.sefaria.org.il/Menachot.18a?lang=heEmail: sruli@babbleontalmud.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/babble_on_talmudFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/p/Babble-on-Talmud-100080258961218/#dafyomi #talmud00:00 Intro 04:00 R Eliezer on makhsheves pigul she'lo k'darkah14:00 Intention to leave some blood alone until tomorrow50:13 Discussing some of the steps of a mincha01:04:05 Conclusion

The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda's position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved. The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance. The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed. The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi  Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion.

The sharp scholars (charifei) of Pumbedita argue that one burning can create pigul for another. Specifically, if one burns the kometz (handful) with the intention to burn the levona (frankincense) outside its designated time, it becomes pigul. They explain that even the Rabbis - who generally hold that a pigul thought during only half of a permitting act (matir) is ineffective - would agree here, because the levona was included in the person's thoughts. Rava supports this from the general rule in the Mishna, however, his proof is rejected as it is inconclusive. Rav Hisda, however, cites Rav to argue that one burning cannot create pigul for another. He reasons that since the kometz is not the permitting agent (matir) for the levona, an intention concerning burning the levona during the burning of the kometz is irrelevant. A proof is brought for this from a case involving the two lambs of Shavuot, but it is countered by distinguishing between items in separate vessels versus items in the same vessel. Rav Hamnuna presents a unique case that he considers of immense value, where the pigul thought "spreads" through the entire process. If one burns the kometz with intent to burn the levona tomorrow, and with intent to eat the shirayim (remnants) tomorrow, the offering is pigul. This is because the thoughts combined eventually cover both the completion of the permitting acts and the consumption of the remnants. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a braita regarding a case that all agree on. At first it seems they all agree that there is pigul even if the pigul thought is only in one matir. However, since it is clear that is not the case, they edit the braita to read "pasul" instead of "pigul," as all agree that it is disqualified, even if it is not necessarily pigul. The third chapter begins with a Mishna discussing intentions regarding items not normally meant for that specific use. If one has intent during the kometz service to eat something not usually eaten (like the kometz itself) or to burn something not usually burned (like the remnants), the rabbis rule the offering valid, while Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it. Additionally, if the intention involves a quantity less than an olive-bulk, or if it combines half an olive-bulk of eating and half an olive-bulk of burning, it remains valid because eating and burning do not combine to reach the required measure for pigul. Rabbi Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the double expression in the verse: "ve'im he'achol ye'achel" (and if it should surely be eaten). He understands this to include two types of "eating": human consumption and the consumption of the altar (burning). Therefore, an intention to switch these roles - intending to eat what is meant for the fire - is a valid disqualifying thought. The rabbis who disagree extrapolate that verse in a different manner, either to include a case of one who uses the language of eating instead of burning when having a pigul intent, or to derive the requisite amount of burning from the requisite amount for eating - an olive-bulk - meaning one who has a thought to burn less than an olive-bulk beyond its given time will not render the offering pigul. Rabbi Zeira questions Rav Asi that if Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the Torah, it should carry the penalty of karet, and yet Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that is does not. Rav Asi answer that there is a Tannaitic dispute regarding the nature of Rabbi Eliezer's disqualification: one view holds it is a Torah-level disqualification punishable by karet, while another suggests it is a Rabbinic disqualification and he brings a braita to support this. The braita discusses one who slaughters a sacrifice with the intent to drink the blood tomorrow or to burn the meat tomorrow. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies these cases, while the rabbis validate them. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar disagree in a case where one's intent was to leave the blood for tomorrow. Rabbi Yehuda says it is disqualified while Rabbi Elazar says that the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree about this as well. In trying to assess the point of disagreement between Rabbis Yehuda and Elazar, they suggest that it is on their understanding of Rabbi Eliezer's position and whether he views these cases as disqualified (rabbinic) or as pigul (Torah law, with karet). However, this understanding of the braita is rejected.

The sharp scholars (charifei) of Pumbedita argue that one burning can create pigul for another. Specifically, if one burns the kometz (handful) with the intention to burn the levona (frankincense) outside its designated time, it becomes pigul. They explain that even the Rabbis - who generally hold that a pigul thought during only half of a permitting act (matir) is ineffective - would agree here, because the levona was included in the person's thoughts. Rava supports this from the general rule in the Mishna, however, his proof is rejected as it is inconclusive. Rav Hisda, however, cites Rav to argue that one burning cannot create pigul for another. He reasons that since the kometz is not the permitting agent (matir) for the levona, an intention concerning burning the levona during the burning of the kometz is irrelevant. A proof is brought for this from a case involving the two lambs of Shavuot, but it is countered by distinguishing between items in separate vessels versus items in the same vessel. Rav Hamnuna presents a unique case that he considers of immense value, where the pigul thought "spreads" through the entire process. If one burns the kometz with intent to burn the levona tomorrow, and with intent to eat the shirayim (remnants) tomorrow, the offering is pigul. This is because the thoughts combined eventually cover both the completion of the permitting acts and the consumption of the remnants. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a braita regarding a case that all agree on. At first it seems they all agree that there is pigul even if the pigul thought is only in one matir. However, since it is clear that is not the case, they edit the braita to read "pasul" instead of "pigul," as all agree that it is disqualified, even if it is not necessarily pigul. The third chapter begins with a Mishna discussing intentions regarding items not normally meant for that specific use. If one has intent during the kometz service to eat something not usually eaten (like the kometz itself) or to burn something not usually burned (like the remnants), the rabbis rule the offering valid, while Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it. Additionally, if the intention involves a quantity less than an olive-bulk, or if it combines half an olive-bulk of eating and half an olive-bulk of burning, it remains valid because eating and burning do not combine to reach the required measure for pigul. Rabbi Asi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the double expression in the verse: "ve'im he'achol ye'achel" (and if it should surely be eaten). He understands this to include two types of "eating": human consumption and the consumption of the altar (burning). Therefore, an intention to switch these roles - intending to eat what is meant for the fire - is a valid disqualifying thought. The rabbis who disagree extrapolate that verse in a different manner, either to include a case of one who uses the language of eating instead of burning when having a pigul intent, or to derive the requisite amount of burning from the requisite amount for eating - an olive-bulk - meaning one who has a thought to burn less than an olive-bulk beyond its given time will not render the offering pigul. Rabbi Zeira questions Rav Asi that if Rabbi Eliezer derives his position from the Torah, it should carry the penalty of karet, and yet Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that is does not. Rav Asi answer that there is a Tannaitic dispute regarding the nature of Rabbi Eliezer's disqualification: one view holds it is a Torah-level disqualification punishable by karet, while another suggests it is a Rabbinic disqualification and he brings a braita to support this. The braita discusses one who slaughters a sacrifice with the intent to drink the blood tomorrow or to burn the meat tomorrow. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies these cases, while the rabbis validate them. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar disagree in a case where one's intent was to leave the blood for tomorrow. Rabbi Yehuda says it is disqualified while Rabbi Elazar says that the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree about this as well. In trying to assess the point of disagreement between Rabbis Yehuda and Elazar, they suggest that it is on their understanding of Rabbi Eliezer's position and whether he views these cases as disqualified (rabbinic) or as pigul (Torah law, with karet). However, this understanding of the braita is rejected.

If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is effective to permit the other (pure) bread to be eaten. But if it does not atone for food items, the blood can be sprinkled, but since the bread was not complete at the time, it is forbidden to eat, as per Rabbi Yochanan's opinion in Menachot 9b. However, Rav Papa's explanation is rejected on three counts. First, Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis also disagree in a case where the item that was to be offered on the altar becomes impure. Second, Rabbi Yehuda's position by the Paschal sacrifice, as appears in the braita, demonstrates that the phrase "the communal offerings are not divided" has no connection at all to the tzitz atoning. Third, the Mishna states explicitly the reason for Rabbi Yehuda's position and it is because the communal offerings are not divided and not on account of the tzitz. In a thanksgiving (toda) offering, if there is a pigul thought about the meat, the breads are disqualified, but a pigul thought about the bread only disqualifies the bread, but not the meat. The same holds true for the two sheep regarding the accompanying breads. After attempting one explanation, which is rejected, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind the law – the bread comes on account of the animal offering, but the animal offering does not come on account of the bread. Both cases were necessary to bring, as one may have thought that the sheep and the accompanying breads are waved together and therefore might be considered completely one unit, but they are not. There are three different versions of a question Rabbi Elazar asked Rav. The first version: if one slaughters the animal for the toda offering with a thought to eat a half an olive-bulk of the meat and half an olive-bulk of the bread, do they combine to make the bread pigul? Rav answers that it is. The Gemara asks why a kal v'chomer reasoning isn't employed to lead us to say that the bread wouldn't be pigul, as it cannot even make the meat pigul. A difficulty is raised against that suggestion as in a similar situation regarding mixed breeds in a vineyard, that kind of kal v'chomer isn't used. But they distinguish between the two cases, resolving the difficulty. The second version has the same type question asked but regarding the two sheep offering and the accompanying breads. The third version of the question is about the meaning of someone's language if they slaughtered the sheep to "eat an olive-bulk of its friend tomorrow." Does "its friend" refer to the other sheep (it would not be pigul, as the sheep is a "permitter") or to the bread (it would be pigul as bread is not a "permitter")? Rav brings a tannaitic source which makes it clear that the meaning was the other sheep. The Gemara rejects this proof of Rav. What is the relationship between the sacrifice and its libations regarding pigul? Rabbi Meir holds that if the libations were already placed in a sanctified vessel and the sacrifice is brought with a pigul intent, the libations are disqualified as well. But a pigul thought regarding the libations only disqualifies the libation, not the sacrifice. In the Tosefta Zevachim 5:1, the rabbis bring counter arguments to Rabbi Meir. First, they view the libations as completely separate and do not agree with Rabbi Meir that they become disqualified if the sacrifice becomes pigul, as they can be brought up to ten days later. When Rabbi Meir qualifies his ruling to a case where the libations are brought together with the offering, the rabbis continue with another claim. Since the libations can be designated to a different sacrifice, that proves that they are not inherently connected. Rava explains that Rabbi Meir must have held that the libations cannot be designated for a different sacrifice. In the Tosefta, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree as well regarding the oil of the leper – if the guilt offering becomes pigul, does the oil become pigul as well, and the same discussion ensues.

2 mishanyot! 1 - How combinations can make items pigul or not. With the cases of the thanksgiving offering (animal offering plus loaves) and also the "Shtei HaLehem" - lambs and 2 loaves of Shavuot. Also, a long discussion about what question Rabbi Elazar asked of Rav (to determine the question itself), in terms of pigul with varied factors -- the order of events, with regard to offerings, intent, minimal measure, and so on. Plus, a mention of "cannabis" (hemp) in the context of mixtures. 2 - Pigul intent renders the libations pigul once they've been sanctified, but the libations, if brought with pigul intent, would not make the offerings themselves pigul.

If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is effective to permit the other (pure) bread to be eaten. But if it does not atone for food items, the blood can be sprinkled, but since the bread was not complete at the time, it is forbidden to eat, as per Rabbi Yochanan's opinion in Menachot 9b. However, Rav Papa's explanation is rejected on three counts. First, Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis also disagree in a case where the item that was to be offered on the altar becomes impure. Second, Rabbi Yehuda's position by the Paschal sacrifice, as appears in the braita, demonstrates that the phrase "the communal offerings are not divided" has no connection at all to the tzitz atoning. Third, the Mishna states explicitly the reason for Rabbi Yehuda's position and it is because the communal offerings are not divided and not on account of the tzitz. In a thanksgiving (toda) offering, if there is a pigul thought about the meat, the breads are disqualified, but a pigul thought about the bread only disqualifies the bread, but not the meat. The same holds true for the two sheep regarding the accompanying breads. After attempting one explanation, which is rejected, the Gemara explains the reasoning behind the law – the bread comes on account of the animal offering, but the animal offering does not come on account of the bread. Both cases were necessary to bring, as one may have thought that the sheep and the accompanying breads are waved together and therefore might be considered completely one unit, but they are not. There are three different versions of a question Rabbi Elazar asked Rav. The first version: if one slaughters the animal for the toda offering with a thought to eat a half an olive-bulk of the meat and half an olive-bulk of the bread, do they combine to make the bread pigul? Rav answers that it is. The Gemara asks why a kal v'chomer reasoning isn't employed to lead us to say that the bread wouldn't be pigul, as it cannot even make the meat pigul. A difficulty is raised against that suggestion as in a similar situation regarding mixed breeds in a vineyard, that kind of kal v'chomer isn't used. But they distinguish between the two cases, resolving the difficulty. The second version has the same type question asked but regarding the two sheep offering and the accompanying breads. The third version of the question is about the meaning of someone's language if they slaughtered the sheep to "eat an olive-bulk of its friend tomorrow." Does "its friend" refer to the other sheep (it would not be pigul, as the sheep is a "permitter") or to the bread (it would be pigul as bread is not a "permitter")? Rav brings a tannaitic source which makes it clear that the meaning was the other sheep. The Gemara rejects this proof of Rav. What is the relationship between the sacrifice and its libations regarding pigul? Rabbi Meir holds that if the libations were already placed in a sanctified vessel and the sacrifice is brought with a pigul intent, the libations are disqualified as well. But a pigul thought regarding the libations only disqualifies the libation, not the sacrifice. In the Tosefta Zevachim 5:1, the rabbis bring counter arguments to Rabbi Meir. First, they view the libations as completely separate and do not agree with Rabbi Meir that they become disqualified if the sacrifice becomes pigul, as they can be brought up to ten days later. When Rabbi Meir qualifies his ruling to a case where the libations are brought together with the offering, the rabbis continue with another claim. Since the libations can be designated to a different sacrifice, that proves that they are not inherently connected. Rava explains that Rabbi Meir must have held that the libations cannot be designated for a different sacrifice. In the Tosefta, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree as well regarding the oil of the leper – if the guilt offering becomes pigul, does the oil become pigul as well, and the same discussion ensues.

Rabbi Eliezer holds that when the Kohen accepts the blood from a sacrifice into a sanctified vessel, there must be enough collected in that single bowl to be used for placing the blood on the altar. If one collects some blood in one bowl and some in another, and later mixes them together before performing the placements, the blood is not sanctified. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Eliezer contradicts himself, as regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin), he holds that it is sanctified even if placed in two separate bowls. To resolve this, the Gemara first suggests that perhaps Rabbi Eliezer does not derive one law from another—specifically, a mincha offering from blood. However, this is rejected because Rabbi Eliezer does derive laws for a mincha from the bowls of frankincense of the Showbread. In conclusion, the Gemara distinguishes between learning a mincha offering from another mincha-style offering and learning a mincha offering from an animal sacrifice (blood). Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin and rules that it is not sanctified if placed in the vessel in parts. Rabbi Acha brings the source in the Torah for his prohibition, and the Gemara brings two braitot that support his opinion and contradict Rabbi Elazar's position. Rabbi Yochanan's position regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin) is questioned in light of a position he holds against Rav in a case of a regular mincha offering that is sanctified even before the person completely filled the vessel with the fine flour. Why does he differentiate between the cases? The Gemara then asks about Rav, who disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan and requires the vessel to be filled: would he hold like Rabbi Yochanan or Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin offering? They conclude that since he derives one item from another (on a different mincha-related issue), he would derive from the minchat chavitin to here, and therefore he must hold like Rabbi Yochanan by the minchat chavitin and requires it to be complete to sanctify. Since the Gemara mentions a different mincha-related issue where Rav derives one thing from another, they quote that source in its entirety and delve into his debate with Rabbi Chanina about mincha offerings where not all the parts were added yet to the bowl – are they sanctified without everything being there? At the beginning of the daf, Rabbi Elazar had made a comparison of taking the kometz from a mincha in the Sanctuary, which is permitted as it is derived from the bowls of frankincense from the Showbread. Rabbi Yirmia raises a difficulty against this from a braita, but the drasha in that braita is reinterpreted to fit with Rabbi Elazar's ruling.

Rabbi Eliezer holds that when the Kohen accepts the blood from a sacrifice into a sanctified vessel, there must be enough collected in that single bowl to be used for placing the blood on the altar. If one collects some blood in one bowl and some in another, and later mixes them together before performing the placements, the blood is not sanctified. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Eliezer contradicts himself, as regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin), he holds that it is sanctified even if placed in two separate bowls. To resolve this, the Gemara first suggests that perhaps Rabbi Eliezer does not derive one law from another—specifically, a mincha offering from blood. However, this is rejected because Rabbi Eliezer does derive laws for a mincha from the bowls of frankincense of the Showbread. In conclusion, the Gemara distinguishes between learning a mincha offering from another mincha-style offering and learning a mincha offering from an animal sacrifice (blood). Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin and rules that it is not sanctified if placed in the vessel in parts. Rabbi Acha brings the source in the Torah for his prohibition, and the Gemara brings two braitot that support his opinion and contradict Rabbi Elazar's position. Rabbi Yochanan's position regarding the Kohen Gadol's griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin) is questioned in light of a position he holds against Rav in a case of a regular mincha offering that is sanctified even before the person completely filled the vessel with the fine flour. Why does he differentiate between the cases? The Gemara then asks about Rav, who disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan and requires the vessel to be filled: would he hold like Rabbi Yochanan or Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin offering? They conclude that since he derives one item from another (on a different mincha-related issue), he would derive from the minchat chavitin to here, and therefore he must hold like Rabbi Yochanan by the minchat chavitin and requires it to be complete to sanctify. Since the Gemara mentions a different mincha-related issue where Rav derives one thing from another, they quote that source in its entirety and delve into his debate with Rabbi Chanina about mincha offerings where not all the parts were added yet to the bowl – are they sanctified without everything being there? At the beginning of the daf, Rabbi Elazar had made a comparison of taking the kometz from a mincha in the Sanctuary, which is permitted as it is derived from the bowls of frankincense from the Showbread. Rabbi Yirmia raises a difficulty against this from a braita, but the drasha in that braita is reinterpreted to fit with Rabbi Elazar's ruling.

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

Study Guide A third answer is introduced to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Elazar's ruling in the Mishna concerning the incense and Rav's statement about Rabbi Elazar's position in a braita. The second answer,Abaye's, had been rejected earlier, but Rav Ashi reinstates it by resolving the difficulty raised against it. The Gemara asks: If part of a sacrificial item is missing after it has already been taken out of the Temple courtyard, is one liable for offering the remainder outside? Three sources are brought to address this question, but each is ultimately rejected. If the fatty portions of a peace offering are burned outside together with the meat, one is liable, even though the meat should theoretically constitute a barrier (chatzitza). The Gemara offers three explanations for why it is not considered a chatzitza in this case. If the kometz was never taken from a meal offering, one is not liable for offering the entire mixture outside, since such an act would not fulfill the mitzvah of offering a mincha even inside the Temple. However, if the kometz was taken and then returned to the rest of the mincha, one would be liable for burning the entire mixture outside. The Gemara asks: why is the kometz not nullified in the remainder? A meal offering is brought through the burning of both the kometz and the frankincense. If only one of these is burned outside, the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar again disagree about liability, since the act is only partial. Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha asks whether burning the kometz permits half of the remainder to be eaten by the priest, or whether it merely weakens the prohibition on the remainder. The Gemara first analyzes according to whose view the question is posed, and then leaves the matter unresolved. One who sprinkles part of the blood outside is liable, even according to Rabbi Elazar, consistent with his position regarding the Yom Kippur goat in a case where the blood spills midway through the sprinklings of blood. Rabbi Elazar also rules that one who pours the water libation outside the Temple on Sukkot is liable. Rabbi Yochanan cites Rabbi Menachem Yodafa, who explains that Rabbi Elazar must follow the view of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the water libation on Sukkot is a Torah obligation derived from the laws of wine libations. However, Reish Lakish raises three objections to this explanation.

  The rabbis and Rabbi Elazar disagree about a case involving liability for performing water libations outside the Temple. Three amoraim debate the precise scenario in which they disagree and the underlying basis of their dispute. According to Rav Papa, their disagreement stems from a debate - found in other sources as well - regarding whether libations accompanied sacrifices during the Israelites' time in the desert. This question has practical implications for whether libations were ever offered on private bamot, and whether such libations required sanctified vessels. That, in turn, affects whether one would be liable for performing a libation outside the Temple when it was not placed in a sanctified vessel. Rabbi Nechemia maintains that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside. Rabbi Yochanan explains that this view is rooted in Rabbi Nechemia's position that the pouring of the leftover blood is an essential component of the sacrificial rite. A challenge is raised from a baraita in which Rabbi Nechemia debates Rabbi Akiva on this very issue, but the contradiction is ultimately resolved. The sugya then analyzes liability for offering a bird sacrifice outside the Temple: does liability depend on whether the bird was slaughtered (shechita) or melika was performed inside or outside? All four possible combinations are examined. Rabbi Shimon disputes one of the rabbis' rulings, but it is initially unclear what aspect of their position he rejects. After systematically eliminating all possibilities, the Gemara proposes three explanations - either expanding the Mishna to include another case or revising the formulation of Rabbi Shimon's statement as it appears there.  

Study Guide A third answer is introduced to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Elazar's ruling in the Mishna concerning the incense and Rav's statement about Rabbi Elazar's position in a braita. The second answer,Abaye's, had been rejected earlier, but Rav Ashi reinstates it by resolving the difficulty raised against it. The Gemara asks: If part of a sacrificial item is missing after it has already been taken out of the Temple courtyard, is one liable for offering the remainder outside? Three sources are brought to address this question, but each is ultimately rejected. If the fatty portions of a peace offering are burned outside together with the meat, one is liable, even though the meat should theoretically constitute a barrier (chatzitza). The Gemara offers three explanations for why it is not considered a chatzitza in this case. If the kometz was never taken from a meal offering, one is not liable for offering the entire mixture outside, since such an act would not fulfill the mitzvah of offering a mincha even inside the Temple. However, if the kometz was taken and then returned to the rest of the mincha, one would be liable for burning the entire mixture outside. The Gemara asks: why is the kometz not nullified in the remainder? A meal offering is brought through the burning of both the kometz and the frankincense. If only one of these is burned outside, the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar again disagree about liability, since the act is only partial. Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha asks whether burning the kometz permits half of the remainder to be eaten by the priest, or whether it merely weakens the prohibition on the remainder. The Gemara first analyzes according to whose view the question is posed, and then leaves the matter unresolved. One who sprinkles part of the blood outside is liable, even according to Rabbi Elazar, consistent with his position regarding the Yom Kippur goat in a case where the blood spills midway through the sprinklings of blood. Rabbi Elazar also rules that one who pours the water libation outside the Temple on Sukkot is liable. Rabbi Yochanan cites Rabbi Menachem Yodafa, who explains that Rabbi Elazar must follow the view of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the water libation on Sukkot is a Torah obligation derived from the laws of wine libations. However, Reish Lakish raises three objections to this explanation.

  The rabbis and Rabbi Elazar disagree about a case involving liability for performing water libations outside the Temple. Three amoraim debate the precise scenario in which they disagree and the underlying basis of their dispute. According to Rav Papa, their disagreement stems from a debate - found in other sources as well - regarding whether libations accompanied sacrifices during the Israelites' time in the desert. This question has practical implications for whether libations were ever offered on private bamot, and whether such libations required sanctified vessels. That, in turn, affects whether one would be liable for performing a libation outside the Temple when it was not placed in a sanctified vessel. Rabbi Nechemia maintains that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside. Rabbi Yochanan explains that this view is rooted in Rabbi Nechemia's position that the pouring of the leftover blood is an essential component of the sacrificial rite. A challenge is raised from a baraita in which Rabbi Nechemia debates Rabbi Akiva on this very issue, but the contradiction is ultimately resolved. The sugya then analyzes liability for offering a bird sacrifice outside the Temple: does liability depend on whether the bird was slaughtered (shechita) or melika was performed inside or outside? All four possible combinations are examined. Rabbi Shimon disputes one of the rabbis' rulings, but it is initially unclear what aspect of their position he rejects. After systematically eliminating all possibilities, the Gemara proposes three explanations - either expanding the Mishna to include another case or revising the formulation of Rabbi Shimon's statement as it appears there.  

It is forbidden to offer any sacrificial item outside the Azara. This prohibition applies both to valid offerings and to offerings that became invalid in the kodesh—meaning either after they were brought into the Azara or after they were slaughtered. A braita derives the various valid and invalid items for which one is liable if offered outside the Azara from derashot on the verses in Vayikra 19:8–9. The Mishna rules that if one offers outside the Temple an olive‑bulk composed of a combination of meat and imurim (the fatty portions burned on the altar) of a burnt offering, one is liable. This implies that in the case of a peace offering, the two would not combine, since the meat is designated for consumption while the imurim are designated for burning. Although this inference is supported by Tosefta Meila 1:15, that Tosefta appears to contradict a Mishna in Meila 15b. The Tosefta states that in a burnt offering, the meat and imurim combine for pigul, notar, and impurity, whereas the Mishna states that they combine for pigul and notar in all types of offerings, not only burnt offerings. The Gemara resolves these contradictions by explaining that the terms pigul and notar refer to different cases in each source. The distinction regarding pigul is between (1) eating pigul and (2) having a pigul thought concerning eating or burning the combined olive‑bulk. The distinction regarding notar is between (1) eating leftover meat and imurim after their designated time and (2) a case where parts of an animal (a combined olive‑bulk of meat and imurim) remained from an animal that had been lost before the blood was sprinkled. Since in a peace offering the meat and imurim are destined for different places - human consumption and the altar - they cannot combine in situations where the law depends on their being in the same place (such as pigul thought or leftover parts from before the sprinkling of the blood). However, they can combine in a case involving the eating of disqualified parts. This interpretation of the Tosefta aligns with the view of Rabbi Yehoshua, who discusses a case in which only an olive‑bulk of the animal remains before the sprinkling of the blood. Items that are entirely burned on the altar - such as the kometz, frankincense, the mincha of the priests, and similar offerings - also incur liability if offered outside. However, there is a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar regarding whether liability applies for offering merely an olive‑bulk or only when the entire item is burned outside. A braita is then cited concerning the requisite amounts for liability when offering a incense outside and for burning incense inside. Initially, a question is raised about the incense and the meaning of the braita. After Rabbi Zeira resolves the question, he raises a further difficulty based on a statement of Rav regarding Rabbi Elazar's opinion about the required amount for liability when offering incense outside the Temple. Rava and Abaye each propose solutions, but both are ultimately rejected.

It is forbidden to offer any sacrificial item outside the Azara. This prohibition applies both to valid offerings and to offerings that became invalid in the kodesh—meaning either after they were brought into the Azara or after they were slaughtered. A braita derives the various valid and invalid items for which one is liable if offered outside the Azara from derashot on the verses in Vayikra 19:8–9. The Mishna rules that if one offers outside the Temple an olive‑bulk composed of a combination of meat and imurim (the fatty portions burned on the altar) of a burnt offering, one is liable. This implies that in the case of a peace offering, the two would not combine, since the meat is designated for consumption while the imurim are designated for burning. Although this inference is supported by Tosefta Meila 1:15, that Tosefta appears to contradict a Mishna in Meila 15b. The Tosefta states that in a burnt offering, the meat and imurim combine for pigul, notar, and impurity, whereas the Mishna states that they combine for pigul and notar in all types of offerings, not only burnt offerings. The Gemara resolves these contradictions by explaining that the terms pigul and notar refer to different cases in each source. The distinction regarding pigul is between (1) eating pigul and (2) having a pigul thought concerning eating or burning the combined olive‑bulk. The distinction regarding notar is between (1) eating leftover meat and imurim after their designated time and (2) a case where parts of an animal (a combined olive‑bulk of meat and imurim) remained from an animal that had been lost before the blood was sprinkled. Since in a peace offering the meat and imurim are destined for different places - human consumption and the altar - they cannot combine in situations where the law depends on their being in the same place (such as pigul thought or leftover parts from before the sprinkling of the blood). However, they can combine in a case involving the eating of disqualified parts. This interpretation of the Tosefta aligns with the view of Rabbi Yehoshua, who discusses a case in which only an olive‑bulk of the animal remains before the sprinkling of the blood. Items that are entirely burned on the altar - such as the kometz, frankincense, the mincha of the priests, and similar offerings - also incur liability if offered outside. However, there is a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Elazar regarding whether liability applies for offering merely an olive‑bulk or only when the entire item is burned outside. A braita is then cited concerning the requisite amounts for liability when offering a incense outside and for burning incense inside. Initially, a question is raised about the incense and the meaning of the braita. After Rabbi Zeira resolves the question, he raises a further difficulty based on a statement of Rav regarding Rabbi Elazar's opinion about the required amount for liability when offering incense outside the Temple. Rava and Abaye each propose solutions, but both are ultimately rejected.

Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute. One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af,  anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this by saying that Moshe slapped Pharaoh in the face. This explanation is challenged by another statement of Reish Lakish, in which he says that Moshe showed respect toward Pharaoh. Two answers are offered to reconcile these conflicting statements. Two verses are then brought to support the principle that one must show respect to a king, even a wicked king, one verse concerning Pharaoh and another concerning Ahab. Earlier, a source had referred to Moshe as a king. However, Ulla stated that Moshe desired to be king but was not granted that status. Rava resolves this by qualifying Ulla's statement: Moshe wished for his sons to inherit kingship, and that request was denied, but Moshe himself was indeed considered a king. The Gemara then asks: from where do we derive that kohanim with any type of blemish are entitled to receive portions of the priestly gifts? Four braitot are cited, each offering a drasha that builds upon the previous one. The Mishna states that those who cannot serve in the Temple do not receive a portion, which seems to contradict the ruling regarding blemished kohanim. Furthermore, the implication that those who do serve may eat is difficult in the case of impure kohanim during communal offerings, where they may serve, yet do not receive a portion. The Gemara explains how this contradiction is resolved. Rav relates that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon was once in the bathroom and devised various arguments that a tevul yom might use to claim a share of sacrificial portions. Yet for every argument he proposed, a pure kohen could cite a verse proving that a tevul yom is excluded, since he cannot perform the Temple service. The Gemara then asks: how was Rabbi Elazar able to think Torah thoughts in the bathroom, something that is normally forbidden?  

Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute. One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af,  anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this by saying that Moshe slapped Pharaoh in the face. This explanation is challenged by another statement of Reish Lakish, in which he says that Moshe showed respect toward Pharaoh. Two answers are offered to reconcile these conflicting statements. Two verses are then brought to support the principle that one must show respect to a king, even a wicked king, one verse concerning Pharaoh and another concerning Ahab. Earlier, a source had referred to Moshe as a king. However, Ulla stated that Moshe desired to be king but was not granted that status. Rava resolves this by qualifying Ulla's statement: Moshe wished for his sons to inherit kingship, and that request was denied, but Moshe himself was indeed considered a king. The Gemara then asks: from where do we derive that kohanim with any type of blemish are entitled to receive portions of the priestly gifts? Four braitot are cited, each offering a drasha that builds upon the previous one. The Mishna states that those who cannot serve in the Temple do not receive a portion, which seems to contradict the ruling regarding blemished kohanim. Furthermore, the implication that those who do serve may eat is difficult in the case of impure kohanim during communal offerings, where they may serve, yet do not receive a portion. The Gemara explains how this contradiction is resolved. Rav relates that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon was once in the bathroom and devised various arguments that a tevul yom might use to claim a share of sacrificial portions. Yet for every argument he proposed, a pure kohen could cite a verse proving that a tevul yom is excluded, since he cannot perform the Temple service. The Gemara then asks: how was Rabbi Elazar able to think Torah thoughts in the bathroom, something that is normally forbidden?  

Study Guide The Gemara examines the debate between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether leather garments stained with blood from a sin offering require laundering. A braita cites verses in the Torah as the source for each position, with the disagreement hinging on how to interpret the term "beged." Rabbi Yehuda understands "beged" to include any material potentially capable of receiving impurity, while according to Rabbi Elazar it includes sackcloth and other types of clothing that are actually susceptible to impurity. Abaye and Rava identify three practical differences that emerge from their interpretations. Another braita establishes that only the specific area of a garment where blood lands requires laundering, not the entire garment. The Gemara then derives from the Mishna that hides are subject to laundering, but cites a conflicting source related to Shabbat observance, which rules that rinsing a hide with water is not considered laundering. Abaye resolves the contradiction by attributing one view to the Rabbis and the other to "others," who include hides in laundering. Rava challenges this, citing verses that explicitly mention leather, and concludes that the distinction lies between soft and hard hides. After raising two difficulties with his own explanation, Rava proposes a third approach: differentiating between scrubbing, which constitutes laundering, and merely pouring or soaking with water, which does not. The Gemara then cites a braita deriving from verses that laundering, breaking earthenware vessels, and rinsing copper vessels must all be performed in the Azara. The Mishna rules that laundering is the only stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other offerings, though the Gemara questions this in light of other possible stringencies. The Mishna further teaches that if a garment with blood, an earthenware vessel, or a copper vessel in which meat was cooked leaves the Azara and becomes impure, the impurity must first be removed - by tearing, making a hole, or otherwise invalidating the vessel - and then the item is returned to the Azara to be laundered, broken, or rinsed. Ravina challenges the ruling that an impure garment is torn outside and then laundered inside: if tearing removes its status as a garment, how can the obligation to launder be fulfilled? The Gemara clarifies that the case refers to tearing along the length without splitting it into two pieces, which is sufficient to remove impurity while still leaving it with the status of a garment for laundering.    

Study Guide The Gemara examines the debate between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether leather garments stained with blood from a sin offering require laundering. A braita cites verses in the Torah as the source for each position, with the disagreement hinging on how to interpret the term "beged." Rabbi Yehuda understands "beged" to include any material potentially capable of receiving impurity, while according to Rabbi Elazar it includes sackcloth and other types of clothing that are actually susceptible to impurity. Abaye and Rava identify three practical differences that emerge from their interpretations. Another braita establishes that only the specific area of a garment where blood lands requires laundering, not the entire garment. The Gemara then derives from the Mishna that hides are subject to laundering, but cites a conflicting source related to Shabbat observance, which rules that rinsing a hide with water is not considered laundering. Abaye resolves the contradiction by attributing one view to the Rabbis and the other to "others," who include hides in laundering. Rava challenges this, citing verses that explicitly mention leather, and concludes that the distinction lies between soft and hard hides. After raising two difficulties with his own explanation, Rava proposes a third approach: differentiating between scrubbing, which constitutes laundering, and merely pouring or soaking with water, which does not. The Gemara then cites a braita deriving from verses that laundering, breaking earthenware vessels, and rinsing copper vessels must all be performed in the Azara. The Mishna rules that laundering is the only stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other offerings, though the Gemara questions this in light of other possible stringencies. The Mishna further teaches that if a garment with blood, an earthenware vessel, or a copper vessel in which meat was cooked leaves the Azara and becomes impure, the impurity must first be removed - by tearing, making a hole, or otherwise invalidating the vessel - and then the item is returned to the Azara to be laundered, broken, or rinsed. Ravina challenges the ruling that an impure garment is torn outside and then laundered inside: if tearing removes its status as a garment, how can the obligation to launder be fulfilled? The Gemara clarifies that the case refers to tearing along the length without splitting it into two pieces, which is sufficient to remove impurity while still leaving it with the status of a garment for laundering.    

Study Guide Rami bar Hama asks Rav Chisda whether blood that splashes onto a garment already impure requires laundering. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua explains that the question hinges on whether laundering is unnecessary only when impurity and disqualification occur sequentially, or even when they occur simultaneously. Rav Chisda connects the issue to a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis regarding the status of mei chatat that became impure, as interpreted by Abaye. To clarify Abaye's understanding, the Gemara presents a broader disagreement among Raba, Abaye, and Rava about the nature of the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis. A braita teaches that only blood fit for sprinkling requires laundering, excluding blood already disqualified. Rabbi Akiva rules that blood which had a moment of fitness and was later disqualified does require laundering, while Rabbi Shimon maintains that disqualified blood never requires it. The Mishna rules that blood splashed from the neck of the animal, or from the altar's corner or base, does not require laundering, nor does blood spilled on the floor and later gathered, since only blood received in a vessel and fit for sprinkling requires laundering. Two braitot are cited to demonstrate how these laws are derived from verses in the Torah. The Gemara further clarifies that the requirement of being "capable of sprinkling" excludes cases where less than the requisite measure was received in each vessel. Rava explains that this principle is rooted in a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 4:6. After presenting several drashot on the different words of that verse, the Gemara analyzes them both in relation to one another - explaining why each was necessary - and in relation to other statements. The Mishna continues with blood splashed on the hide: before flaying it does not require laundering, but after flaying it does. Rabbi Elazar limits laundering to the place of the blood and only where the material is susceptible to impurity. A braita extends laundering obligations to garments, sackcloth, and hides, and specifies that laundering, breaking of earthenware vessels, and rinsing of copper vessels must all be performed in a sacred place. Laundering is a stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other kodshei kodashim.

Study Guide Rami bar Hama asks Rav Chisda whether blood that splashes onto a garment already impure requires laundering. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua explains that the question hinges on whether laundering is unnecessary only when impurity and disqualification occur sequentially, or even when they occur simultaneously. Rav Chisda connects the issue to a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis regarding the status of mei chatat that became impure, as interpreted by Abaye. To clarify Abaye's understanding, the Gemara presents a broader disagreement among Raba, Abaye, and Rava about the nature of the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis. A braita teaches that only blood fit for sprinkling requires laundering, excluding blood already disqualified. Rabbi Akiva rules that blood which had a moment of fitness and was later disqualified does require laundering, while Rabbi Shimon maintains that disqualified blood never requires it. The Mishna rules that blood splashed from the neck of the animal, or from the altar's corner or base, does not require laundering, nor does blood spilled on the floor and later gathered, since only blood received in a vessel and fit for sprinkling requires laundering. Two braitot are cited to demonstrate how these laws are derived from verses in the Torah. The Gemara further clarifies that the requirement of being "capable of sprinkling" excludes cases where less than the requisite measure was received in each vessel. Rava explains that this principle is rooted in a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 4:6. After presenting several drashot on the different words of that verse, the Gemara analyzes them both in relation to one another - explaining why each was necessary - and in relation to other statements. The Mishna continues with blood splashed on the hide: before flaying it does not require laundering, but after flaying it does. Rabbi Elazar limits laundering to the place of the blood and only where the material is susceptible to impurity. A braita extends laundering obligations to garments, sackcloth, and hides, and specifies that laundering, breaking of earthenware vessels, and rinsing of copper vessels must all be performed in a sacred place. Laundering is a stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other kodshei kodashim.

Although technically Pesukeh De'zimra ends after the verses of "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen," at which point we should, in principle, proceed to Yishtabah – the concluding blessing of Pesukeh De'zimra – it is customary to add Va'yebarech David as well as Shirat Ha'yam. This is an ancient practice, instituted around one thousand years ago. The section of Va'yebarech David consists of verses from the Book of Dibreh Ha'yamim I (29:10-13) and a series of verses from the Book of Nehemya (9:5-11). The section of Shirat Ha'yam, of course, is the song sung by Beneh Yisrael after crossing the sea (Shemot, chapter 15), preceded by two introductory verses ("Va'yosha Hashem…"). The Sha'ar Ha'kavanot writes that one should stand while reciting the first 40 words of Va'yebarech David, meaning, through the words "Ata Hu Hashem Ha'Elokim." He adds that the first letters of these final five words – Alef, Heh, Yod and Heh – spell the Name of Hashem ("E-heyeh") associated with "Keter," the highest of the Sefirot (emanations). As standing during the recitation of these forty words is only customary, and not a strict requirement, one who finds it difficult to stand may certainly sit. While reciting the words "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol" in Va'yebarech David, one should give some money to charity. Specifically, one gives three coins – he should first give two coins together, and then a third coin by itself. This practice was taught by the Arizal, but there are indications that its origins date back even earlier. One indication is a testimony that the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, 1520-1572) followed this custom of giving charity during Va'yebarech David in his synagogue in Cracow, and the Rama did not have access to the Arizal's teachings. By giving charity during Pesukeh De'zimra, before praying the Amida, one fulfills the custom of Rabbi Elazar, mentioned by the Gemara (Baba Batra 10a), to give charity before praying. The commentaries explain that this should be done so that the charity acts as an advocate on the individual's behalf, helping to ensure the acceptance of his prayers. It has been noted that if Rabbi Elazar, a righteous sage, felt that he needed an advocate, then certainly we, who are on a much lower level, should avail ourselves of such an advocate by giving charity before praying. Some had the custom to give charity each morning twice – when they first entered the synagogue, and then a second time while reciting the words "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol." This custom is brought by the Kaf Ha'haim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939), who tells the story of a person who consistently followed this practice, but one day failed to do so. That night, he dreamt that he was harshly chastised for deviating from this practice. Interestingly enough, Rav Ben Sion Mussafi brings a tradition among Iraqi Jews that whenever the Kaf Ha'haim tells a story about somebody without naming him, this story is actually about himself. We may thus conclude that the Kaf Ha'haim personally observed this custom to give charity when entering the synagogue and then a second time during the recitation of "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol." In any event, the consensus among the Poskim is that it suffices to give charity only once, during the recitation of "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol," because, as mentioned, the purpose is to give charity before one presents his requests in the Amida prayer. One should preferably give charity not only at Shaharit, but also before Minha and Arbit. The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) taught that the act of giving charity is associated with the divine Name of Havaya (which is spelled Yod, Heh, Vav and Heh). The small coin resembles Yod – the smallest letter in the alphabet – and the giver holds it in his hand, with his five fingers, alluding to the letter Heh, which in Gematria equals 5. When he extends his arm, he forms the letter Vav, which is long and straight, and the coin is then received in the poor individual's hand, which represents the second Heh in the Name. The Ben Ish Hai adds that if a poor person is not present, and one is setting aside the money for charity, then he should place the coin with his right hand into a pouch in his left hand. In his work Od Yosef Hai (Parashat Vayigash), the Ben Ish Hai writes that there were Sadikim who fulfilled this custom even on Shabbat. Before Shabbat, they would prepare two envelopes – one with two coins, and another with one coin, and place them in a designated location. Then, on Shabbat, while reciting "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol," they would think of those envelopes, allocating them for charity. They would then give these coins to the poor after Shabbat. Even one who did not designate these envelopes before Shabbat can fulfill this practice on Shabbat by pledging in his mind during the recitation of "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol" to donate three coins to Sedaka after Shabbat. The Kaf Ha'haim writes that if a person has a bill, and he cannot exchange it for coins, then he should hold it and have in mind to donate the value of two coins within this bill for charity, and then the value of one coin. After several days, when he has donated the full amount of the bill, he should give the bill to charity. If one wishes to give charity from the bill before Minha and Arbit, when speaking is permissible, he should make this pledge verbally.

Although technically Pesukeh De'zimra ends after the verses of "Baruch Hashem Le'olam Amen Ve'amen," at which point we should, in principle, proceed to Yishtabah – the concluding blessing of Pesukeh De'zimra – it is customary to add Va'yebarech David as well as Shirat Ha'yam. This is an ancient practice, instituted around one thousand years ago. The section of Va'yebarech David consists of verses from the Book of Dibreh Ha'yamim I (29:10-13) and a series of verses from the Book of Nehemya (9:5-11). The section of Shirat Ha'yam, of course, is the song sung by Beneh Yisrael after crossing the sea (Shemot, chapter 15), preceded by two introductory verses ("Va'yosha Hashem…"). The Sha'ar Ha'kavanot writes that one should stand while reciting the first 40 words of Va'yebarech David, meaning, through the words "Ata Hu Hashem Ha'Elokim." He adds that the first letters of these final five words – Alef, Heh, Yod and Heh – spell the Name of Hashem ("E-heyeh") associated with "Keter," the highest of the Sefirot (emanations). As standing during the recitation of these forty words is only customary, and not a strict requirement, one who finds it difficult to stand may certainly sit. While reciting the words "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol" in Va'yebarech David, one should give some money to charity. Specifically, one gives three coins – he should first give two coins together, and then a third coin by itself. This practice was taught by the Arizal, but there are indications that its origins date back even earlier. One indication is a testimony that the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, 1520-1572) followed this custom of giving charity during Va'yebarech David in his synagogue in Cracow, and the Rama did not have access to the Arizal's teachings. By giving charity during Pesukeh De'zimra, before praying the Amida, one fulfills the custom of Rabbi Elazar, mentioned by the Gemara (Baba Batra 10a), to give charity before praying. The commentaries explain that this should be done so that the charity acts as an advocate on the individual's behalf, helping to ensure the acceptance of his prayers. It has been noted that if Rabbi Elazar, a righteous sage, felt that he needed an advocate, then certainly we, who are on a much lower level, should avail ourselves of such an advocate by giving charity before praying. Some had the custom to give charity each morning twice – when they first entered the synagogue, and then a second time while reciting the words "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol." This custom is brought by the Kaf Ha'haim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Jerusalem, 1870-1939), who tells the story of a person who consistently followed this practice, but one day failed to do so. That night, he dreamt that he was harshly chastised for deviating from this practice. Interestingly enough, Rav Ben Sion Mussafi brings a tradition among Iraqi Jews that whenever the Kaf Ha'haim tells a story about somebody without naming him, this story is actually about himself. We may thus conclude that the Kaf Ha'haim personally observed this custom to give charity when entering the synagogue and then a second time during the recitation of "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol." In any event, the consensus among the Poskim is that it suffices to give charity only once, during the recitation of "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol," because, as mentioned, the purpose is to give charity before one presents his requests in the Amida prayer. One should preferably give charity not only at Shaharit, but also before Minha and Arbit. The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) taught that the act of giving charity is associated with the divine Name of Havaya (which is spelled Yod, Heh, Vav and Heh). The small coin resembles Yod – the smallest letter in the alphabet – and the giver holds it in his hand, with his five fingers, alluding to the letter Heh, which in Gematria equals 5. When he extends his arm, he forms the letter Vav, which is long and straight, and the coin is then received in the poor individual's hand, which represents the second Heh in the Name. The Ben Ish Hai adds that if a poor person is not present, and one is setting aside the money for charity, then he should place the coin with his right hand into a pouch in his left hand. In his work Od Yosef Hai (Parashat Vayigash), the Ben Ish Hai writes that there were Sadikim who fulfilled this custom even on Shabbat. Before Shabbat, they would prepare two envelopes – one with two coins, and another with one coin, and place them in a designated location. Then, on Shabbat, while reciting "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol," they would think of those envelopes, allocating them for charity. They would then give these coins to the poor after Shabbat. Even one who did not designate these envelopes before Shabbat can fulfill this practice on Shabbat by pledging in his mind during the recitation of "Ve'ata Moshel Ba'kol" to donate three coins to Sedaka after Shabbat. The Kaf Ha'haim writes that if a person has a bill, and he cannot exchange it for coins, then he should hold it and have in mind to donate the value of two coins within this bill for charity, and then the value of one coin. After several days, when he has donated the full amount of the bill, he should give the bill to charity. If one wishes to give charity from the bill before Minha and Arbit, when speaking is permissible, he should make this pledge verbally.

  According to the Mishna, in a burnt offering, items that are connected to the meat but not the meat itself—such as bones, hooves, horns, and sinews—are left on the altar if they remain attached to the meat. However, if they are detached, they must be removed from the altar. This ruling is derived from two different verses in the Torah: in Vayikra 1:9 it says that everything is burned on the altar, while in Devarim 12:27 it specifies that in burnt offerings, meat and blood are brought on the altar. This opinion in the Mishna is attributed to Rebbi, while another tannaitic view interprets "everything" more broadly to include these parts, with the limiting verse excluding bones, sinews, etc. only once they have already been consumed by the fire and separated from it. Rabbi Zeira qualifies Rebbi's opinion, explaining that if these parts became separated from the meat but moved closer to the pyre, they are to remain on the altar. The Gemara rejects this explanation, and Rabba offers a different interpretation of Rabbi Zeira's qualification. He explains that the qualification was not on Rebbi's words themselves but on an inference drawn from them—that if they separate, they must be removed from the altar, though they still retain sanctity and cannot be used for personal benefit. Rabba then distinguishes between items that separated before the blood was placed on the altar and those that separated afterward. If they were still attached at the time of the blood sprinkling and later separated, they are considered sanctified items that became disqualified, which are forbidden for benefit. But if they were already detached at the time of sprinkling, they were never destined for the altar and are therefore permitted for the kohanim's use, as derived from a gezeira shava from the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar takes the opposite approach. If they were still attached when the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling permits them, so there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, though they remain prohibited by rabbinic law. However, if they were already detached, the sprinkling has no effect on them, and they remain in their original consecrated state, making one liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Mishna further explains that if any of the disqualified offerings that are meant to remain on the altar (as mentioned in Zevachim 84a) fall off the altar, or if an ember of wood falls off, they do not need to be returned. The Mishna also rules that if parts of the sacrifice that are to be burned on the altar fall off, they must be put back on if this occurs before midnight. After midnight, however, they do not need to be returned. The Gemara limits this ruling to items that have hardened but not yet reduced to ash. Items not yet consumed to that state must be returned regardless of the time, while items already reduced to ash do not need to be returned. Rav brings a source for the significance of midnight in this law from a drasha on the verses in Vayikra 6:2–3. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on this braita from a Mishna in Yoma 20a, and Rabbi Yochanan brings a different drasha to explain the Mishna.

  According to the Mishna, in a burnt offering, items that are connected to the meat but not the meat itself—such as bones, hooves, horns, and sinews—are left on the altar if they remain attached to the meat. However, if they are detached, they must be removed from the altar. This ruling is derived from two different verses in the Torah: in Vayikra 1:9 it says that everything is burned on the altar, while in Devarim 12:27 it specifies that in burnt offerings, meat and blood are brought on the altar. This opinion in the Mishna is attributed to Rebbi, while another tannaitic view interprets "everything" more broadly to include these parts, with the limiting verse excluding bones, sinews, etc. only once they have already been consumed by the fire and separated from it. Rabbi Zeira qualifies Rebbi's opinion, explaining that if these parts became separated from the meat but moved closer to the pyre, they are to remain on the altar. The Gemara rejects this explanation, and Rabba offers a different interpretation of Rabbi Zeira's qualification. He explains that the qualification was not on Rebbi's words themselves but on an inference drawn from them—that if they separate, they must be removed from the altar, though they still retain sanctity and cannot be used for personal benefit. Rabba then distinguishes between items that separated before the blood was placed on the altar and those that separated afterward. If they were still attached at the time of the blood sprinkling and later separated, they are considered sanctified items that became disqualified, which are forbidden for benefit. But if they were already detached at the time of sprinkling, they were never destined for the altar and are therefore permitted for the kohanim's use, as derived from a gezeira shava from the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar takes the opposite approach. If they were still attached when the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling permits them, so there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, though they remain prohibited by rabbinic law. However, if they were already detached, the sprinkling has no effect on them, and they remain in their original consecrated state, making one liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Mishna further explains that if any of the disqualified offerings that are meant to remain on the altar (as mentioned in Zevachim 84a) fall off the altar, or if an ember of wood falls off, they do not need to be returned. The Mishna also rules that if parts of the sacrifice that are to be burned on the altar fall off, they must be put back on if this occurs before midnight. After midnight, however, they do not need to be returned. The Gemara limits this ruling to items that have hardened but not yet reduced to ash. Items not yet consumed to that state must be returned regardless of the time, while items already reduced to ash do not need to be returned. Rav brings a source for the significance of midnight in this law from a drasha on the verses in Vayikra 6:2–3. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on this braita from a Mishna in Yoma 20a, and Rabbi Yochanan brings a different drasha to explain the Mishna.

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

A contradiction between the Mishna in Mikvaot 10:6, which seems to be Rabbi Yehuda's position anrules according to majority, and Rabbi Yehuda in the braita, who follows appearance, is resolved in two ways. Abaye suggests that in the braita, where the position is stricter, Rabbi Yehuda is quoting Rabban Gamliel, who was known for his stringency in cases of nullification, as he did not allow nullification at all in mixtures of the same type (min b'mino). Rava, however, explains that the more lenient opinion in Mikvaot refers to a case where only the outside of the cup was impure. By Torah law, the mikveh waters need only pass over the rim, not fill the cup. Since the requirement to fill the cup is rabbinic, there is room for leniency. Rabbi Elazar disagrees with Reish Lakish regarding pigul and notar that became mixed together. He holds that just as mitzvot do not nullify one another, prohibitions likewise do not nullify each other. This principle is based on Hillel, who would eat matza and maror together on Pesach to fulfill the commandment that they be eaten simultaneously. If mitzvot could nullify one another, the strong taste of the maror would cancel the taste of the matza, preventing fulfillment of the mitzva of eating matza in that manner. Regarding min b'mino, a mixture of the same type, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis as to whether it can be nullified. A similar debate appears in the Tosefta Taharot 5:3 between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the rabbis in a case of a shard that absorbed urine: can it be purified by soaking or rinsing in urine? In the Mishna, there is also a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blood mixed with problematic blood. The question arises: does Rabbi Eliezer disagree in both cases - disqualified blood and dam hatamtzit (the blood that flows from inside the animal) - or only in the latter case? The Mishna explores various scenarios of blood mixtures and clarifies where Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis differ.

A contradiction between the Mishna in Mikvaot 10:6, which seems to be Rabbi Yehuda's position anrules according to majority, and Rabbi Yehuda in the braita, who follows appearance, is resolved in two ways. Abaye suggests that in the braita, where the position is stricter, Rabbi Yehuda is quoting Rabban Gamliel, who was known for his stringency in cases of nullification, as he did not allow nullification at all in mixtures of the same type (min b'mino). Rava, however, explains that the more lenient opinion in Mikvaot refers to a case where only the outside of the cup was impure. By Torah law, the mikveh waters need only pass over the rim, not fill the cup. Since the requirement to fill the cup is rabbinic, there is room for leniency. Rabbi Elazar disagrees with Reish Lakish regarding pigul and notar that became mixed together. He holds that just as mitzvot do not nullify one another, prohibitions likewise do not nullify each other. This principle is based on Hillel, who would eat matza and maror together on Pesach to fulfill the commandment that they be eaten simultaneously. If mitzvot could nullify one another, the strong taste of the maror would cancel the taste of the matza, preventing fulfillment of the mitzva of eating matza in that manner. Regarding min b'mino, a mixture of the same type, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis as to whether it can be nullified. A similar debate appears in the Tosefta Taharot 5:3 between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the rabbis in a case of a shard that absorbed urine: can it be purified by soaking or rinsing in urine? In the Mishna, there is also a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blood mixed with problematic blood. The question arises: does Rabbi Eliezer disagree in both cases - disqualified blood and dam hatamtzit (the blood that flows from inside the animal) - or only in the latter case? The Mishna explores various scenarios of blood mixtures and clarifies where Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis differ.

The Gemara concludes its explanation of how, according to Rabbi Shimon, a safek leper may bring the oil for his purification process as either a possible leper's offering or a possible voluntary oil offering, by resolving the multiple complications inherent in this situation. Rav Rachuma said to Ravina that Rav Huna bar Tachlifa asked why Rabbi Shimon suggested that the safek leper bring an animal as either a guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, when he could have instead proposed bringing it as either a guilt offering or a hanging guilt offering, thus avoiding the issue of disqualifying kodashim. Rav Rachuma explains that one can infer from this that Rabbi Shimon must disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, holding that one cannot voluntarily bring a hanging guilt offering. However, Ravina rejects this reasoning, noting that the guilt offering of a leper comes from a one-year-old sheep, whereas a hanging guilt offering requires a two-year-old sheep, also known as a ram. In the Mishna, there is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a mixture of limbs from sin offerings and burnt offerings: can they be brought on the altar? The Gemara explores the basis of their disagreement, rooted in different interpretations of Vayikra 2:11–12, and then cites a braita quoting Rabbi Yehuda, who preserved a different version of the dispute. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the disagreement applies only to mixtures of limbs from blemished and non-blemished animals. Both sides, however, agree that mixtures of sin and burnt offerings may certainly be brought on the altar, while those from animals that engaged in bestiality may not. Why did Rabbi Eliezer distinguish between blemished animals and those involved in bestiality? Rav Huna explains that the blemish in question is a mild one, following Rabbi Akiva's more lenient position. Yet since Rabbi Akiva permitted such blemishes only post facto, Rav Papa qualifies that the case must involve limbs already placed on the ramp. This explanation is rejected, however, because if that were the case, even without being part of a mixture, the offering would be permitted. A new explanation is therefore introduced, deriving Rabbi Eliezer's permission to sacrifice parts of blemished animals intermingled with regular ones from a drasha on Vayikra 22:25. The Mishna also records a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blemished animals that become intermingled with other animals. Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one is sacrificed inadvertently, the remaining animals are permitted, since we can assume the blemished one was already offered. Rabbi Elazar, however, restricts Rabbi Eliezer's leniency to cases where the other animal parts are sacrificed in pairs. The Mishna discusses the issue of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances, under what circumstances can it still be brought on the altar?

The Gemara concludes its explanation of how, according to Rabbi Shimon, a safek leper may bring the oil for his purification process as either a possible leper's offering or a possible voluntary oil offering, by resolving the multiple complications inherent in this situation. Rav Rachuma said to Ravina that Rav Huna bar Tachlifa asked why Rabbi Shimon suggested that the safek leper bring an animal as either a guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, when he could have instead proposed bringing it as either a guilt offering or a hanging guilt offering, thus avoiding the issue of disqualifying kodashim. Rav Rachuma explains that one can infer from this that Rabbi Shimon must disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, holding that one cannot voluntarily bring a hanging guilt offering. However, Ravina rejects this reasoning, noting that the guilt offering of a leper comes from a one-year-old sheep, whereas a hanging guilt offering requires a two-year-old sheep, also known as a ram. In the Mishna, there is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a mixture of limbs from sin offerings and burnt offerings: can they be brought on the altar? The Gemara explores the basis of their disagreement, rooted in different interpretations of Vayikra 2:11–12, and then cites a braita quoting Rabbi Yehuda, who preserved a different version of the dispute. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the disagreement applies only to mixtures of limbs from blemished and non-blemished animals. Both sides, however, agree that mixtures of sin and burnt offerings may certainly be brought on the altar, while those from animals that engaged in bestiality may not. Why did Rabbi Eliezer distinguish between blemished animals and those involved in bestiality? Rav Huna explains that the blemish in question is a mild one, following Rabbi Akiva's more lenient position. Yet since Rabbi Akiva permitted such blemishes only post facto, Rav Papa qualifies that the case must involve limbs already placed on the ramp. This explanation is rejected, however, because if that were the case, even without being part of a mixture, the offering would be permitted. A new explanation is therefore introduced, deriving Rabbi Eliezer's permission to sacrifice parts of blemished animals intermingled with regular ones from a drasha on Vayikra 22:25. The Mishna also records a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis concerning blemished animals that become intermingled with other animals. Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one is sacrificed inadvertently, the remaining animals are permitted, since we can assume the blemished one was already offered. Rabbi Elazar, however, restricts Rabbi Eliezer's leniency to cases where the other animal parts are sacrificed in pairs. The Mishna discusses the issue of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances, under what circumstances can it still be brought on the altar?

In a set of intermingled parts of sacrifices, including from a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one was sacrificed, we can "assume" that the one sacrificed was the blemished one and all the others are permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer follows a unique opinion, that of Chanan the Egyptian, who holds that animals, even after slaughter, are not considered "rejected," and if they are brought on the altar, they can be accepted. Similarly, Rav Nachman cites a ruling of Rav that if one ring of idol worship was mixed in with many other rings, and one fell into the sea, all the rest are permitted. After Rava raised a difficulty on this from the Mishna—that all the animals are left to die, so why wouldn't we permit them after the first one dies—the Gemara concludes that Rav holds like Rabbi Eliezer. It is then established that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rav would permit the others only if they are sacrificed or sold in pairs, since one of the pair will certainly be a permitted item. Rav also ruled in a case where there were one hundred rings with one being of idol worship. If they were separated into sixty and forty, and then one from each section was mixed into separate sets of rings, the one that came from the forty is permitted based on a safek sefeika—two doubts: likely it was in the sixty, and even if it was in the forty, likely it remained in the original forty. Shmuel disagreed and did not permit safek sefeika in idol worship. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position from a braita that permits it, but it is established that there is a tannaitic debate. Reish Lakish brings a similar ruling to Rav Nachman regarding a barrel of wine of truma. The Gemara explains why both his case and Rav Nachman's case needed to be ruled on separately, as one would not necessarily be able to infer one from the other. Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about the extent to which Reish Lakish's leniency applies. Rabbi Elazar rules leniently in a case of a barrel of truma, but his ruling is modified after Rav Nachman raised a difficulty against it. Rabbi Oshaya rules about a similar case, adding another potential issue. The Mishna discusses a situation in which a treifa is mixed in with other animals. As a treifa should be recognizable, the Gemara asks how such a situation could occur. Three possible answers are given. If sacrifices of the same type are intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are sacrificed for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in sacrifices where smicha is necessary, how can the sacrifice be brought—since one cannot perform smicha on someone else's sacrifice? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha.

In a set of intermingled parts of sacrifices, including from a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one was sacrificed, we can "assume" that the one sacrificed was the blemished one and all the others are permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer follows a unique opinion, that of Chanan the Egyptian, who holds that animals, even after slaughter, are not considered "rejected," and if they are brought on the altar, they can be accepted. Similarly, Rav Nachman cites a ruling of Rav that if one ring of idol worship was mixed in with many other rings, and one fell into the sea, all the rest are permitted. After Rava raised a difficulty on this from the Mishna—that all the animals are left to die, so why wouldn't we permit them after the first one dies—the Gemara concludes that Rav holds like Rabbi Eliezer. It is then established that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rav would permit the others only if they are sacrificed or sold in pairs, since one of the pair will certainly be a permitted item. Rav also ruled in a case where there were one hundred rings with one being of idol worship. If they were separated into sixty and forty, and then one from each section was mixed into separate sets of rings, the one that came from the forty is permitted based on a safek sefeika—two doubts: likely it was in the sixty, and even if it was in the forty, likely it remained in the original forty. Shmuel disagreed and did not permit safek sefeika in idol worship. A difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position from a braita that permits it, but it is established that there is a tannaitic debate. Reish Lakish brings a similar ruling to Rav Nachman regarding a barrel of wine of truma. The Gemara explains why both his case and Rav Nachman's case needed to be ruled on separately, as one would not necessarily be able to infer one from the other. Raba and Rav Yosef disagree about the extent to which Reish Lakish's leniency applies. Rabbi Elazar rules leniently in a case of a barrel of truma, but his ruling is modified after Rav Nachman raised a difficulty against it. Rabbi Oshaya rules about a similar case, adding another potential issue. The Mishna discusses a situation in which a treifa is mixed in with other animals. As a treifa should be recognizable, the Gemara asks how such a situation could occur. Three possible answers are given. If sacrifices of the same type are intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are sacrificed for "whichever owner they belong to." However, in sacrifices where smicha is necessary, how can the sacrifice be brought—since one cannot perform smicha on someone else's sacrifice? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha.

Study Guide How does Rabbi Yehuda counter the difficulties raised by Rav Shizbi? First, the Gemara shows that he derives the rulings of Rav Shizbi (that both the verses on a dead bird and the cheilev of an animal only apply to kosher birds/animals differently. Then, they bring three suggestions on how to explain the meaning of the word treifa in the verse regarding the cheilev. The first two suggestions are rejected.  How does Rabbi Meir explain the three different verses - two for the impurity of a dead bird and the one for cheilev? A braita is brought that derives some of the halakhot previously mentioned from the verses, that the cheilev ruling only applies to kosher animals and not to undomesticated animals.  Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree about whether Rabbi Meir would hold that melika removes a bird from having impurity of a carcass in birds with blemishes or even birds not generally offered on the altar. This leads to Rabbi Yirmia asking if the same would be true if, instead of breaking the neck of a calf in the egla arufa ceremony, they broke the back of a goat?   

Study Guide How does Rabbi Yehuda counter the difficulties raised by Rav Shizbi? First, the Gemara shows that he derives the rulings of Rav Shizbi (that both the verses on a dead bird and the cheilev of an animal only apply to kosher birds/animals differently. Then, they bring three suggestions on how to explain the meaning of the word treifa in the verse regarding the cheilev. The first two suggestions are rejected.  How does Rabbi Meir explain the three different verses - two for the impurity of a dead bird and the one for cheilev? A braita is brought that derives some of the halakhot previously mentioned from the verses, that the cheilev ruling only applies to kosher animals and not to undomesticated animals.  Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree about whether Rabbi Meir would hold that melika removes a bird from having impurity of a carcass in birds with blemishes or even birds not generally offered on the altar. This leads to Rabbi Yirmia asking if the same would be true if, instead of breaking the neck of a calf in the egla arufa ceremony, they broke the back of a goat?   

Study Guide The Mishna, as in Chapter 2 (Zevachim 29b), outlines various scenarios in which a thought can, or cannot, render a sacrifice pigul, thereby making consumption of the meat punishable/not punishable by karet. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with one of the rulings and maintains that if melika (the ritual slaughter of a bird) was performed with the intent to offer the blood beyond its designated time, and the blood was then squeezed with the intent to burn the flesh outside the Azara (Temple courtyard), the offering would be considered pigul. This is because, although the sacrifice was already disqualified for other reasons, the disqualification due to improper intent regarding time occurred first. A braita examines the verses concerning the bird burnt offering and derives several halakhot specific to this sacrifice: One who volunteers to bring this type of offering may bring only one bird. Melika must be performed by a kohen. Melika is not performed with a knife. Melika is performed at the top of the altar. Melika is done on the back of the bird's neck. The bird's head must be severed. All the blood must be squeezed out - none may remain. The blood is squeezed onto the upper part of the altar wall. There is a debate whether melika and the squeezing of the blood are performed on the sovev (the ledge surrounding the altar) or at its top. Another braita presents differing opinions regarding which parts of the bird are cast onto the beit hadeshen (the ash heap) and how those parts are removed. The bird is split in half - this is done by hand, as derived from a verse in Judges concerning Shimshon. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the tanna of our Mishna regarding a bird sin offering in which the kohen severs the head: is the offering thereby disqualified or not? Three interpretations are offered to explain the basis of their disagreement.  

All ramps in the Temple had a slope of three cubits in length for every one cubit of height, except for the ramp of the altar, which had a gentler incline of three and five-ninths cubits. This was to accommodate the kohanim, who had to carry the animal body parts up to the top of the altar. The kmitza—a handful taken from the meal offering—could be performed anywhere within the Azara (Temple courtyard). The remainder of the offering was eaten by male kohanim, could be prepared in any manner, and was permitted to be eaten only on that day and the following night until midnight. Rabbi Elazar taught that if the kmitza was taken in the Heichal (Sanctuary), it was still valid. He compared it to the bowls of frankincense, since both are referred to with the term azkarata, and the frankincense is brought from inside the Sanctuary and burned outside. Rabbi Yirmia raised a challenge from a braita that seemed to imply the kmitza must be performed where the owner presents the offering—i.e., not in the Sanctuary, which is restricted to kohanim. However, two interpretations of that braita are offered, the first of which is rejected. Both explanations ultimately show that the braita was not intended to restrict the location of the kmitza, but rather to broaden it. Rabbi Yochanan ruled that peace offerings may be slaughtered in the Sanctuary. His reasoning was that since slaughtering may be done outside the Ohel Moed, it stands to reason that it may also be done inside. If the secondary location is valid, then certainly the primary one should be. A difficulty is raised from a braita concerning eating in the Sanctuary, which is prohibited, if not for a verse permitting it in unique circumstances. To resolve this, a distinction is made: slaughtering is a sacrificial rite, whereas eating is not. The bird sin offering is ideally performed on the lower half of the altar at the southwest corner, though it may be offered anywhere on the altar. Six actions were performed at the southwest corner—three on the lower half and three on the upper half of the altar. On the lower half: the bird sin offering, bringing the meal offering to the altar for kmitza, and pouring the remainder of the blood into the yesod (base). On the upper half: pouring the wine and water libations, and offering the bird burnt offering. When ascending the altar, people would typically go up the ramp on the right side, turn right at the top, begin at the southeast corner, and circle counter-clockwise around the altar before descending via the left side of the ramp. However, for the three actions performed on the upper southwest corner, they would ascend via the left side of the ramp to reach that spot directly, then turn around and descend from there after completing the task. The bird sin offering is brought at the southwest corner, a location derived from the placement of the meal offering. The meal offering's placement is itself derived from the verse in Vayikra 6:7.  

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast on Bava Metzia 85a, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe delves into the profound theme of suffering, mercy, and redemption through the stories of Rebbe (Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi) and Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon. Rebbe, inspired by Rabbi Elazar's preserved body due to accepted suffering, voluntarily endured 13 years of excruciating illness—six of tzmirta (a beet-based treatment for urinary stones) and seven of tzfarna (thrush)—to attain spiritual merit. Despite his stableman's wealth and the deafening noise of feeding animals to mask Rebbe's cries, seafarers heard his agony. Yet Rabbi Elazar's suffering was deemed superior: it “came through love and left through love,” while Rebbe's stemmed from a specific incident. A calf, led to slaughter, sought refuge in Rebbe's garment and wept; Rebbe dismissed it, saying, “Go, for this you were created.” Heaven responded: no mercy shown, no mercy received. Thirteen years later, Rebbe's maid swept baby weasels; he intervened, citing Psalm 145:9—“His mercy is upon all His works”—and Heaven declared, “Since he shows mercy, We will show mercy.” His afflictions vanished.The Gemara contrasts their merits: during Rabbi Elazar's years in the attic, no one died prematurely; during Rebbe's 13 rainless years, the earth stayed saturated—radish holes brimmed with water—proving the tzaddikim's pain sustains the world. Rabbi Wolbe highlights the mystical power of 13 (love, unity, the 13 Attributes of Mercy, Torah hermeneutics), noting Rebbe's 13-year ordeal mirrored this divine framework. Posthumously, Rebbe sought Rabbi Elazar's son—a stunningly handsome youth prostituted by harlots—and entrusted him to his uncle for Torah study. Though the boy initially resisted, he grew into a sage; Rebbe applied Proverbs 11:30—“The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life”—to both teacher and student. Burial dramas underscored merit: Rabbi Elazar joined his father Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai in the cave (earned by shared suffering), but his son was barred by a serpent—Heaven clarified it was due to lacking cave-endured pain, not lesser righteousness._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on October 3, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on November 14, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content._____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Suffering, #Mercy, #Redemption, #Compassion, #Kindness, #Healing, #Sage, #Mystical, #Inclusivity, #Torah, #JewishSoul, #Roots, #Ignorance, #Enlightenment, #Responsibility, #Teaching, #Learning, #Shabbos ★ Support this podcast ★

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast on Bava Metzia 85a, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe delves into the profound theme of suffering, mercy, and redemption through the stories of Rebbe (Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi) and Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon. Rebbe, inspired by Rabbi Elazar's preserved body due to accepted suffering, voluntarily endured 13 years of excruciating illness—six of tzmirta (a beet-based treatment for urinary stones) and seven of tzfarna (thrush)—to attain spiritual merit. Despite his stableman's wealth and the deafening noise of feeding animals to mask Rebbe's cries, seafarers heard his agony. Yet Rabbi Elazar's suffering was deemed superior: it “came through love and left through love,” while Rebbe's stemmed from a specific incident. A calf, led to slaughter, sought refuge in Rebbe's garment and wept; Rebbe dismissed it, saying, “Go, for this you were created.” Heaven responded: no mercy shown, no mercy received. Thirteen years later, Rebbe's maid swept baby weasels; he intervened, citing Psalm 145:9—“His mercy is upon all His works”—and Heaven declared, “Since he shows mercy, We will show mercy.” His afflictions vanished.The Gemara contrasts their merits: during Rabbi Elazar's years in the attic, no one died prematurely; during Rebbe's 13 rainless years, the earth stayed saturated—radish holes brimmed with water—proving the tzaddikim's pain sustains the world. Rabbi Wolbe highlights the mystical power of 13 (love, unity, the 13 Attributes of Mercy, Torah hermeneutics), noting Rebbe's 13-year ordeal mirrored this divine framework. Posthumously, Rebbe sought Rabbi Elazar's son—a stunningly handsome youth prostituted by harlots—and entrusted him to his uncle for Torah study. Though the boy initially resisted, he grew into a sage; Rebbe applied Proverbs 11:30—“The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life”—to both teacher and student. Burial dramas underscored merit: Rabbi Elazar joined his father Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai in the cave (earned by shared suffering), but his son was barred by a serpent—Heaven clarified it was due to lacking cave-endured pain, not lesser righteousness._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on October 3, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on November 14, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content._____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Suffering, #Mercy, #Redemption, #Compassion, #Kindness, #Healing, #Sage, #Mystical, #Inclusivity, #Torah, #JewishSoul, #Roots, #Ignorance, #Enlightenment, #Responsibility, #Teaching, #Learning, #Shabbos ★ Support this podcast ★

In Zevachim 59, a difficulty was raised against Rav's position that a sacrifice slaughtered while the altar was damaged is disqualified. The contradiction came from a statement of Rav that incense could be burned even when the altar was removed. It was resolved by suggesting that just as Rava explained, Rabbi Yehuda distinguished between blood and burning (and required the altar for blood), so too Rav distinguished between blood and burning the incense (and required the altar to be complete for slaughtering and sprinkling the blood). Where did Rava make that statement? A lengthy argument between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi is brought to provide background. Then a proof is offered for Rava's understanding of Rabbi Yehuda, based on Rabbi Yehuda's suggestion regarding the blood from the Paschal sacrifices that spilled on the floor, but the proof is rejected. Rabbi Elazar brings a source to derive the requirement for the altar to be complete  to permit eating the remains of the meal offerings and other food of kodashim kodashim. Is a complete altar required for eating kodashim kalim? Abaye brings a braita of Rabbi Yishmael proving that the second tithe cannot be eaten in Jerusalem when there is no Temple. He first attempts to derive it from the firstborn by logical inference, but then derives it from a juxtaposition (heikesh). Abaye's explanation of Rabbi Yishmael leads to the understanding that kodashim kalim cannot be eaten when there is no altar. Rabbi Yirmia vehemently disagrees with Abaye, calling him a 'stupid Babylonian,' due to a contradiction between two braitot, which he resolves by differentiating between kodshai kodashim and kodashim kalim regarding this law.  

Study Guide The bloods of the firstborn, maaser, and Pesach are only sprinkled once on the altar. This is derived from the fact that the word "saviv"-"around" the altar - appears in the context of the burnt, sin, and guilt offerings. One cannot learn from those cases to others, as details that appear two or three times cannot be used to establish a paradigm for a different case. Rabbi Tarfon taught that the firstborn can be eaten for two days and one night, as it is similar to the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagelili, on his first day in the Beit Midrash in Yavne, raised several difficulties with this comparison and likened it to a guilt and sin offering, which are eaten only for a day and night. When Rabbi Tarfon could no longer respond to the questioning, he left, and Rabbi Akiva took his place and said that in Vayikra 18:18, where the firstborn is compared to the thigh and breast given to the kohen, this is a juxtaposition between the firstborn and the peace offering. Rabbi Yosi Hagellil responded that also the thigh and breast are given to the kohen in a thanksgiving offering which is eaten only for a day and night. Therefore, perhaps the comparison should be made to the thanksgiving offering instead. Rabbi Akiva was convinced by Rabbi Yosi that the comparison should be to the thanksgiving offering, but he found other words in the verse from which to derive an additional day. When Rabbi Yishmael heard about this, he engaged in a lengthy debate with Rabbi Akiva regarding his change of position—that the comparison is to the thanksgiving offering. Rabbi Yishmael argued that the law of the thigh and breast in the thanksgiving offering is derived by juxtaposition (heikesh), and the law about the firstborn is derived from the thigh and breast by juxtaposition, and one cannot derive a law from a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition. However, the Gemara explains that this juxtaposition is not typical: while the law of the thigh and breast is derived by juxtaposition, the time limitation is stated directly. The debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael centers on whether a law derived partially by juxtaposition and partially stated explicitly can serve as the basis for a juxtaposition to another law. The Gemara raises two difficulties with Rabbi Yishmael's position—one regarding the number of times the kohen gadol must sprinkle the blood of the bull and goat in the Sanctuary (Heichal) on Yom Kippur, and one regarding the amount of flour required for the loaves of matza that accompany the thanksgiving offering. Each of these laws is derived by means of a juxtaposition on a juxtaposition, along with something explicitly stated or derived by a gezeira shava. Each difficulty is resolved. The Mishna stated that the Pesach may be eaten only until midnight. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria, but Rabbi Akiva permits it until dawn. Each derives their opinion from a different verse.

Starting with the last mishnah (on the bottom of 56:) - the offerings of the first-born, the tithes, Passover sacrifice, and more... in terms of what is eaten by whom. Starting with the first-born and the tithing - where the Gemara finds a source for the details and time frame of these offerings. The sages in these discussions are earlier - Tannaim, not Amoraim - and Rabbi Tarfon himself is a kohen. Which makes him more familiar with the details, perhaps. And Rabbi Yossi HaGelili has some questions for him. With a comparison to the piece-offering. Also, why the Passover sacrifice was eaten only at night and only until midnight (or the midpoint of the dark of the night). And it's another dispute between Tannaim - in this case, Rabbi Elazar ben Azariyah and Rabbi Akiva.

Public and individual sin offerings are categorized as kodshei kodashim. Public offerings include the goat offerings on Rosh Chodesh and the holidays. They are slaughtered and blood is accepted in the North of the Azara. The blood is sprinkled on the top of the altar. The kohen goes onto the sovev, a ledge of the altar, one cubit wide and five cubits off the ground that extends across the length of the altar. From there, he walks around the altar, placing the blood, using his finger, at the top of the altar near the horns. The remainder of the blood is then spilled at the base of the altar, and the meat can be prepared in all manners, and is eaten by male kohanim for that day and night, until midnight. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood was placed on the horns, while Rebbi holds that the blood just needs to be placed above the red line at the mid-height of the altar (chut hasikra). Within Rebbi's opinion, there is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar whether it needs to be placed on the edge of the corner or can it be up to a cubit away from the corner. Even though a braita clearly states "the edge of the corner," it is possible that is only ideally, but a cubit away would be sufficient as well. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rebbi regarding the blood of a bird burnt offering, which can be done anywhere above the red line, but distinguishes between that and the sin offering of an animal as the Torah specified kranot, horns. The Gemara brings a source for Rebbi's opinion from Yechezkel 43:15 and a source for the red line from Shmot 27:5. There is a debate regarding the placement of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar – some say both were on the Western part of the base, some say both were on the Southern part and some say the inner ones were poured on the Western part, while the outer ones were placed on the Southern part. What is the basis for the different opinions? The burnt offering is slaughtered in the North and blood is collected in the North. The blood is placed on two corners, but covers all four sides. Rav and Shmuel, based on a tannaitic debate, disagree about whether the kohen throws the blood twice in each corner to get on both sides or in one throw reaching both sides. The blood was placed only from two corners, as one of the corners does not have a yesod, base, underneath and the blood of the burnt offering needs to be placed on the altar where there is a base underneath, as derived from verses earlier in the Gemara. Why was there no base on the East and South sides? Since that area was specifically part of Yehuda's territory, and the rest of the altar was in Binyamin's territory, they did not extend the base there, as Binyamin was promised that the altar would be in his territory.  

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